The Philosophy of Person: Solidarity and Cultural Creativity

Polish Philosophical Studies, I

Edited by

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Acknowledgements
Preface

George F. McLean

The life of philosophy in Poland mirrors in microcosm the work of philosophy in these times. As philosophy, one of its branches by its solid grounding in tradition reflects the perennial search for the most profound and important truths. As philosophy in our time, another of its branches situates itself in, develops and draws its dynamism from, the contemporary vision of the person. The major catastrophes of the century have driven thinkers to investigate anew the nature, dignity and passage through time of the human person. Philosophers in Poland, inspired by the work of Roman Ingarden and led by Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, richly explored this inspiration.

As long ago as 1977 members of the World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies from all continents met jointly in Krakow with their Polish confreres on the theme: “The Human Person in the Contemporary World.”

Something of the tone of the meeting was set on its first day when the rich phenomenological work of the Pontifical Faculty at Krakow was presented by Marian Jaworski in his paper, “The Human Person in Transcendent Perspective.” The ringing critical traditionalist response by Stefan Swiezawski brought to vibrant tension the philosophic cord between past and future on which the philosopher must elaborate the meaning of life in his time. It was a debate which had been argued often and with great wisdom and depth by Polish philosophers. This time, however, it was followed immediately by a panel which included also Profs. Charles Lefèvre from France, Albert Nambiaparambil from India, Thomas Langan from Canada, O. Bimwemyi Kweshi from Africa, and A. Caturelli from South America. Through them and the still more varied audience, the rich diversity of philosophers throughout the world was able to profit from, while contributing to, the struggle by Polish philosophers for a vision of the human person adequate to our times.

This search to develop the tradition in order to elaborate an enriched sense of the human person would have delighted the conference’s chief organizer, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla. In a classic statement of its theme he suggested four principles for new life in philosophy are basic:

1. “a realistic image of the person”;
2. the establishment of the “basis” and “the correct limits” of “phenomenological analysis, developed from the principles of the philosophy of consciousness”;
3. “deeper rethinking” to “enrich” the realist understanding of the person by this phenomenological analysis; and
4. a philosophical anthropology and ethics for our times.

A text\(^1\) by Cardinal Wojtyla states succinctly the theme of this volume.

The problem of man’s subjectivity is today of paramount importance for philosophy. Multiple epistemological tendencies, principles and orientations wrestle in this field and often give it a diametrically different shape and sense. The philosophy of consciousness seems to suggest that it was the first to discover the human subject. The philosophy of being is ready to demonstrate that,

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\(^1\) This introduction to the article by K. Wojtyla, “The Person: Subject and Community,” *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1979-1980), was omitted by the *Review* from its printed version.
on the contrary, the analysis conducted on the basis of pure consciousness must lead in consequence to its annihilation. It is necessary to find the correct limits, according to which the phenomenological analyses, developed from the principles of the philosophy of consciousness, will begin to work to enrich the realistic image of the person. It is also necessary to establish the basis of such a philosophy of person.

Apart from this, the problem of the subjectivity of the person, and especially this problem in relation to the human community, imposes itself today as one of the central questions concerning the world outlook (Weltanschauung). This is at the basis of human “praxis” and morality (and consequently ethics) and at the basis of culture, civilization, and politics. Here, exercising its essential function, philosophy takes the floor as the expression of basic understanding and ultimate justification. Though the need for such understanding and justification always accompanies man in his earthly existence, this need becomes especially acute at moments, such as the present, of great crises and confrontations regarding man and the very sense of man’s existence, and in consequence regarding the nature and meaning of his being . . . .

It is well known that such situations in the course of history contribute to a deeper rethinking of the whole Christian doctrine and of its particular elements. This is true in the present case in which the truth about man gains a distinctly privileged place. Twenty years of discussions on the world outlook have made it clear that it is not cosmology or philosophy of nature alone, but precisely philosophical anthropology and ethics which are at the center, contributing to the great and fundamental controversy on man.

From the point of view of Christian philosophy, and also of theology, such a turn of events, which has found its expression also in the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, and especially in the Constitution Gaudium et Spes, favors undertaking the discussion on the subject of the human person in many aspects.

The results of the meeting, which constitute the main burden of this volume, were published in samizdat form by the legally non-existent Academy of Theology in Krakow. The impact of the ideas in the volume were dramatic indeed. Solidarity was soon founded upon the principles of the primacy of the person which had been elaborated through the long quiet work of the Polish philosophers and tested in this international meeting with philosophers from many countries. Throughout the following decade, time and again desirable concession made by the political powers were rejected under the principle that if the people were not part of the decision making process no concession, no matter how good in itself, was worthy of their dignity as persons. Finally, in 1989 this was recognized by the first free election and before the end of that year all the Marxist regimes in Central Europe had crumbled.

It has often been noted that a major strength of Solidarity was not only that the people stood behind the movement but that it had the developed and deeply grounded theoretical insight required to lead. There were, of course, many other factors, but this was indispensable in order for it to be able to lead not only Poland but all of Central and Eastern Europe beyond government by decree to government by the people. Increasingly since that time it has been clear that the deeper challenge in Central and Eastern Europe has been in living practically its newly won freedom.

As this volume reflects this root inspiration of the liberation of Eastern Europe it is fittingly the first volume in this series of philosophy works by the Academies of Science and Universities
of Eastern Europe for it provides unique insight into the deep inspiration from which the changes have come.

Further, the distinctive character of the philosophical debate in Poland, between those who wished to draw faithfully upon the classical philosophy of the past and those who would enliven this by the more recent phenomenological philosophy of the person, has provided a uniquely rich response to the problem of relating the cultural heritage to contemporary change.

This reappears in each of the three sections of the volume. In Part I the first three papers by M. Jaworski, J. Tischner and A.M. Tymieniecka all provide expert insight into the key emergent insights into the person. M. Krapiec and Z. Zdybicka follow to articulate the implications of classical philosophy for the developing sense of culture, value and religion.

In Part II focuses upon ethical issues. There J. Lotz writes on the new insight into freedom drawing upon the resources of the German neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy in order to enrich the tradition, and vice versa. The implications of this for person and ethics are developed by T. Styczynski and A. Szostek who had worked closely with Cardinal Wojtyla. Its implications are extended to labor and even to facing death by A. Swiecicki and A. Siemianowski.

The meaning of this for the elaboration of more an integral and profound philosophy is the topic of Part III. Here the extraordinary work of the Polish philosophers, J. Zycinski and M. Heller, on the philosophy of science is joined by J. Ladrière to review the contemporary impact of science and search out ways of appreciating the uniqueness of the person and of personal creativity by man and God. In this they point the way beyond past ideologies constructed upon the model of the necessary laws of the physical sciences to those dimensions of reality in which freedom lives, founds and transforms the world. L. Dupré then joins E. Morawiec to add new personalist dimensions to the classical meaning of Christian philosophy.

Finally, Kenneth Schmitz, with the help of the Postmodern critique and partially in response thereto, points the way to a rich reconciliation of the new sense of person. In response to the critique of principles as elements of domination and restriction, Schmitz directs attention to the long elaboration of the sense of being and its principles within the cultural ambience of the Christian sense of the Trinity. In this context reality is seen as most fundamentally a life of diversity and mutual sharing. Thus, the present sense of person makes possible new awareness and new commitment to enriching the Greek philosophical tradition and our contemporary life in ways that substitute domination by generosity, enable unity to generate diversity and make room for mystery founded in the abundance of light. This masterful example of drawing on the heritage for the resources needed in facing changing situations augurs well for the volumes to follow in this series from East and Central Europe.
Part I
Person and Cultural Creativity
1.

The Human Person from a Transcendental Perspective

Marian Jaworski

The Issue and Method

The Problem

Transcendence constitutes one of the characteristic properties of our existence as this is revealed to our consciousness. Our consciousness is not closed in ourselves but constantly opens to reality beyond ourselves. We may say that we never are what we are because we are always beyond what we actualize in any one moment; we are more than what we are because the horizon of our existence extends beyond what we are at any one point.¹

In formulating the title “The Human Person from a Transcendental Perspective” and using the Capital “T” we raise the problem of relating the human person to a reality which completely transcends the world and which, in turn, constitutes the horizon for man as a being within the universe. If we identify this transcendent reality as God and if, in addition, we perceive the transcendent reality as the Person par excellence, then the problem can also be formulated as follows: does the human existent—the human person—of itself, relate to, or find itself open to, the reality of God the Person; or, to put it another way, is God the Person “inscribed in” the reality of the human person?

In order to better understand the problem formulated this way we must appreciate its specific origins in contemporary thought. This problem is marked by the contraposition: man-world. Man is no longer perceived as “microcosmos” or as the most perfect reality in the world, but as person man is contrasted radically to the world which is the totality.² Hence, it is not a matter of contrasting the world together with man on the one hand, to God on the other, for this would reduce the being of man to a finite thing. Rather, the effort is to grasp the entire distinctive peculiarity of human existence, and on that basis to decide whether or not on that basis man relates and is open to transcendent reality. Or, is the transcendent nothing but a transposition of some worldly reality or value, for which reason that transposition must be rejected in the name of authenticity. To put it another way: what constitutes the extent or boundary of the transcendence by which our mode of life is specified?

There is no need to point out that the contemporary problematic, whether understood as theistic or atheistic, focuses on this problem. Marxism, the atheistic existentialism of J.P. Sartre and scientism all exclude the possibility of relations beyond being-in-the-world. L. Kolakowski’s Religious Symbols and Humanistic Culture sums up the standpoints of these philosophers in the following way:

Twentieth century philosophy in its many forms is tied to demonstrating the purely human, temporal and historical character of all values. In a way, Marxism, as well as psychoanalysis,

² Cf. Romano Guardini, Welt und Person. Versuche zur christliche Lehre von Menschen (Würzburg, 1939).
positivist philosophies and, in the end, existential philosophy have contributed in various ways to the spread of this humanistic interpretation of values. Simultaneously, they have removed all power from religious symbols as valued means for interpreting the hidden essence of the world. They spread the conviction that man has no reference but himself, that any integration with the Absolute is mystification.³ (Author’s emphasis.)

Despite this, philosophical thought is constantly faced with the metaphysical dimension of man, which manifests itself through diverse signs. Not only does man raise the question of ultimate meaning, he himself is that question. This ultimate dimension reveals itself to us in the perception of mystery, of that which does not lend itself to being objectified: what the Greeks called theion. The experience of the other, according to Levinas, leads to the experience of one’s own existence as the relation to the other, or “to an Other” (capital O) in the sense of the absolute Other, which is at once both immanent and transcendent.⁴ In this situation the problem which should be central to a Christian philosophical anthropology is the transcendence of the human person, one’s openness and relation to the divine “Thou.”

One should add that though this formulation of the problem: “the human person and transcendence” is contemporary, the problem itself is an old one in the history of European Christian thought. Based upon the revelation of man as created in the image and likeness of God, the greatest representatives of Christian thought sought what, in man, constitutes this likeness, which not only points to its origin but also puts one in relation thereto. E. Gilson wrote: “irrespective of the aspect which Christian philosophy considers, in the final conclusion it always relates and subordinates this to God... This likeness to God, three times stated within a few lines in Gen I: 26-27, is inscribed in the very nature of man by the act of creation and determines the inner structure of one’s being.” Among others he cites St. Thomas: “God’s likeness is in one’s soul inasmuch as one is oriented to God or as one’s nature enables this orientation” (S. Th., I, 93, 8, sed contra and resp.). Gilson points out that St. Bonaventure, approaching this problem more directly, identified God’s likeness in man to the privilege one enjoys of being in direct relation to God through one’s intelligence and will.⁵

The Way towards a Solution of the Problem

There are many forms of experience which unveil the structure of the personal being of man as manifested in human experience.⁶ Here we will not present or organize these, but will limit ourselves to a description of the structure of personal being which points to the corresponding forms of experience and of its understanding. In order to avoid certain misunderstandings as to the method chosen, we will refer to many earlier and more detailed studies⁷ regarding the concept of

⁶ For example, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla begins from the experience acting. See also L. Leahy.
experience we are employing and the link between phenomenology or anthropology and metaphysics.

From what has been said about the route we will follow it is clear that the fundamental point of our analysis will be human experience. Here, we fully agree with R. Ingarden, who, together with the whole school of phenomenology, maintains that “such experiences not only make possible a knowledge of objects, but, beyond that, have a constitutive power which motivates our convictions, on the one hand, and, on the other, verifies the ideas and judgments regarding these objects.”

Experience is understood neither in a subjective manner nor within the framework of a transcendental philosophy of the subject, but in a realistic manner. The basis of this realism is not arbitrary principles, but the given experiences themselves in their immediateness. They point, on the one hand, to objects transcending our consciousness and, on the other hand, to the real concrete subject. R. Ingarden states with regard to the experience of responsibility:

all theories which reduce the person to a multiplicity of lived experiences are inadequate to explain the ontic foundations of responsibility. Rather, it is a matter of understanding man and especially his soul and his person, as a real substance enduring in time, with a special characteristic form. Only then can one take account of the postulates of responsibility.

These principles make possible the construction, not only of a realistic anthropology, but also of metaphysics. On what grounds? With Albert Dondeyne we see the phenomenological explanation coming finally to a trans-phenomenological (metaphysical) question concerning the concrete being in all its concreteness, because in the end the phenomenological procedure of itself cannot provide the absolute foundation of that which is given in experience. Rather, the concrete reality given in experience directs one towards another reality as its ultimate foundation.

Our procedure here, in its own way, follows the path suggested by Frederick Sontag according to whom the opening question should be that of Sartre: “What must man be in his internal psychological existence in order for metaphysical questions to continue to arise from him?” Sontag adds:

if the metaphysical questions arise directly from human nature then we should be able to find through the investigation of human nature an empirical foundation for the more abstract considerations. . . . We can find there a new foundation for metaphysics, different from that given by the exact sciences.

After this justification of the method we have chosen, let us proceed to the resolution of the problem thus specified.

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8 This stand point is represented among others by N. Hartmann, c.f. Dupuy, La philosophie de la religion chez Max Scheler (Paris, Warsaw, 1959), 249.
9 Roman Ingarden, A badań nad filozofia współczesna (Research on Contemporary Philosophy), (Warsaw, 1963), 290.
10 Roman Ingarden, Książeczka o człowieku (Short Work on Man), (Krakow, 1972), 132.
12 This stand point is taken by F. Sontag, The Existentialist Prolegomena to a Future Metaphysics (Chicago, 1969).
The Structure of Personal Being

With Guardini, we recognize several layers which constitute the concrete personal existence of man, namely, form, individuality, personality and person in the proper sense.\(^{13}\) Let us look one by one at these layers so that we may observe the gradual development of that which is truly decisive, namely, the person in the proper sense.

The lowest layer is form. Man is a form to the degree that he is something specific: a man, a unity or one thing among others. The next layer of the phenomenon of the person is individuality, the “the living being as a closed unity from the point of view of both structure and function.” Thus, “the living thing is distinguishable from the set of mere things in general”;\(^{14}\) “the individual being is determined by his centrum, which is not spatial but living and can be described as interiority.” This interior sphere founds the individual living being in himself. Through it one distinguishes the individual from the world; indeed, it enables him to build his own world. By this interior sphere the individual distinguishes himself from the characteristic value of the species. “The interaction between the interiority of the living human being and the outside world which is related to him is realized through the perception of meaning and by spontaneous activity.”\(^{15}\)

The third dimension is that of personality. This concept is a product of contemporary thought; it is a living individual marked by spirit. Here, interiority becomes “self consciousness” with “depth of will” in acting and creating so that the human being differs basically from animals. Proper consciousness, as well as will, occur only in man. It “occurs only where our perception is spiritually recreated and leads to the perception of meaning, or where from the beginning it is directed toward that appreciation of meaning,” writes Guardini. “It is the same for the deeper sense of willing, for which the subject must be affected by the value of the object. This must be understood as an objective value founded in itself. One is taken position in relation to that value and on its basis one moves into action.”\(^{16}\)

The third element which creates the interiority of a human being is the sphere of action and creation. Between this and any production by animals there exists a qualitative difference. Guardini sees the real character of creative action not in the effort to achieve a goal, but “in the project of bringing into reality a new reality in terms of its very existence and of manifesting a meaning. This is the case with a pure work of art and a symbol, where the creativity is determined by the meaning.”

What then is signified by person in the proper sense of the term? A first response is negative: one cannot identify it either with form, individuality or personality. Nor can one escape the finitude of the person and conceive it as a personal absolute. It should be noted that ancient thought did not have the concept of person.

A person includes all the above mentioned layers, but does not identify with any of them. What is characteristic of the person is “that one lives oneself and decides about oneself.”\(^{17}\) This was said also by Cardinal Jean Daniélou: “The concept of a person means nothing other than the

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\(^{13}\) See R. Guardini, op.cit., 122-149.

\(^{14}\) We have presented somewhat more broadly the construction of the personal being according to R. Guardini in his article “Człowick a Bog” in Logos I Ethos (Krakow, 1971), pp. 115-128, with the addition of the distinction between the two types of “thou” as the final reference to “I.”

\(^{15}\) R. Guardini, 125-126.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 128.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 136.
perfection of being which in itself is possessed on all the levels of perfection this
implies.”\(^{18}\) Cardinal Karol Wojtyla emphasizes this second element of the description of the
person: “belonging to oneself”: one is a person because one decides about oneself: “a person is
one who possesses oneself and cannot be possessed except by oneself.” Only on the basis of self-
possession “is self-determination possible. Each statement, ‘I want’, is such a self-disposition. . . .
As actual self-determination, ‘I want’ assumes structural self-possession, for one can dispose only
of that which one really possesses.” By self-determination one “actualizes one’s power over oneself, . . . for no one else can exercise or put this power to work. The medieval thinkers expressed
this in the sentence: *persona est alteri incommunicabilis.*”\(^{19}\) R. Guardini describes this as follows:
“to be a person means that I cannot be used by any other, but that I am an end in myself. . . . I
cannot be possessed by another, but as regards my own self I am alone with myself; I cannot be
represented by any other, but must fill my own place.”\(^{20}\)

Assuming that this is what constitutes the human person in its proper meaning we can ask, in
turn, what constitutes the horizon of the relationships inscribed in its “nature.”

The Various Relations of the Human Person

The person is really and essentially related to the material world for its existence, but these
are external dependencies;\(^{21}\) in itself and as such the person remains unaffected by these bonds.

When it comes to the world of the soul, of morality, the problem becomes more complex. If
we assume the Augustinian definition of the soul deduced from the content of its operations, which
embraces Truth, the Good and God, then we can deduce that the living center of the soul, the
human person, is its essential relationship to Truth, the Good and to God.\(^ {22}\) This is the direction
being taken by, among others, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Rahner, Ladislaus Boros, Joseph Möller, etc.
Through analyzing different spiritual acts of a man, they attempt to discover, as their fundamental
principle, their relationship to the absolutely transcendent reality.\(^ {23}\) However, to understand the
relationship to the absolutely transcendental reality, understood in keeping with our initial position
as God-Person, one has to begin by considering that in which interpersonal relationships consist.
An inadequate interpretation of these relations and their transposition to God, as with Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty, results in God being negated in the name of man. Dostoyevski in Devils and
Nietzsche reason: If I am to exist as a person having power over myself, then God cannot exist.
But I must exist; therefore He cannot exist (Nietzsche).

When one turns to interpersonal relationships two questions arise:

1. What is the basis of the relationship of one person to another?
2. Is the possibility of the existence of a person dependent upon the existence apart from him
of other persons? More precisely, “can a person exist without being an “I” ordered to another who

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\(^{19}\) *Osoba i czyn*, 110-111.

\(^{20}\) R. Guardini, 137.

\(^{21}\) *Ibid.*, 150.

\(^{22}\) *Ibid.*, 139-140.

\(^{23}\) For example, according to K. Rahner the act of absolute respecting the conscience and its demands
shows the transcendental reference of the subject to God. G. Marcel finds this reference in hope. Joseph
Müller starts from human relationships with truth, freedom and hope. Similarly, L. Boros discovers the
reference to God as the condition of the various acts of the spiritual life of man.
constitutes a “thou”? Using the language of existential phenomenology, “is co-existence a constitutive aspect of the being of man” or is it only a consequence of the fact that, without knowing why, another man does exist?24

The answers to the first question have been varied and even exclude one another, as with Sartre and Marcel. The description of inter-personal relationships given by Sartre is surely one-sided for he bases them on hatred. There are, however, other descriptions. The relationship to the other person does not mean the destruction of its subjectivity and its reduction to the category of an object. On the contrary, as a self I leave the other his existential space in which “he can attain his aim as that to which each person is destined.”25 In this way it becomes possible for the other to take the position of “thou” for me while I take the position of an interested and active subject and become truly an I or self.

By this relationship an internal change occurs in the “I” which opens itself and shows itself. The relation becomes complete when, from the other side, this type of opening is responded to in kind. According to Guardini, only then is the person fully realized and does one’s destiny as a person begin.26 On this basis Guardini maintains that a human being becomes a reality in the relation “I” and “Thou,” and there attains its complete meaning, though it does not spring from this relationship.27 This does not mean that such a meeting was necessary, but rather the “ontological fact that in principle the person does not exist by essence as a unique being.”28 This state of affairs can be expressed also in the following way: “man’s constitutive attitude is one of dialogue. . . Spiritual life is realized essentially in speech,” and “speech provides a preexisting outline, thanks to which person to person meetings are possible.”29

These views of Guardini coincide to a large extent with those of Heidegger, for whom the experience of solitude is possible only on the basis of a more primary being-together or relatedness. The possibility of solitude, of not meeting the other person depends upon my existence being one of relatedness; not meeting the other implies a more fundamental community.30 It is difficult to question this, notes W.A. Luijen, but the real problem is the mode or specific character of this co-existence—an issue to which we have not yet come.

We can arrive at the same conclusion by: 1) a semantic analysis of the meaning of the Greek term “person,” and 2) research into the genesis of the term “I.” Cardinal J. Daniélou reminds us that the word “person” in Greek, prosopon, means that the person has its own form and is, at the same time, oriented towards the other.31 We can also ask whether it is possible to arrive at the proper meaning of the “I” without assuming a “thou.” In regard to things we construct the notions of aliquid (something which assumes a counter-position in relation to the other: “dicitur enim aliquid quasi aluid quid,” De Veritate, q. I, art. I), and of unity (unum, which is contraposed to plurality and means irreducibility by division). Similarly we arrive at proper meanings in the field of subject. I am an “I” (in a personal sense) not because I stand in opposition to the world, but because the other is a “thou.”

24 William A. Luipen, Existential phenomenology (fenomenologia egzystencjalna) (Warsaw, 1972), 222.
25 R. Guardini, 153.
26 Ibid., 154.
27 Ibid., 155.
28 Ibid., 156.
29 Ibid., 156-157.
30 W.A. Luipen, 222-223.
31 J. Daniélou, 80
We conclude then that it is an “ontological fact that the person cannot exist as a separate unit, but is dependent on the existence of other persons”\textsuperscript{32}

The Relationship of Human Person to the Absolute Thou

Can we discover also in the human person the relationship to the transcendental Absolute “Thou,” and if so what is peculiar to this relationship?

There are at least two ways in which one can establish the relationship of the human person to the transcendent and Absolute “Thou.” The former is connected with the question of source of the being of a person, while the latter relies on an analysis of the experience of inter-human personal relationships.

(1) Describing the relationship of one person to another, the “I” to the other as “thou,” we discover something characteristic, namely, all inter-personal relationships assume the existence of persons, but do not create them. We are conscious that the complete sense of being a person is fulfilled in the inter-personal relationship described above, but does not result therefrom. Just as the person is existent in itself and belongs to itself, as beyond itself it exists (existiere), all in the sense of turning towards the other as a “thou”; it is constituted as something given, an original donation. This implies a basic question proper to human beings, the metaphysical question par excellence, namely, the source of the being of a person.

This source can be only God-person, the absolute “Thou.” Thus, to constitute the person as a person, as being-in-itself open to the otherness of a “thou,” is possible only through a reality which by itself exists in itself, and whose life is based on a relationship to the “thou.” I could not be the “I” and relate to the other “thou,” if the Absolute did not call me to be his “thou,” thereby establishing me as an “I” and presenting himself as the “thou” of man. Thus, my personal existence as an “I” depends on the fact that God is my “thou.” This is the basis of the creation of the person.\textsuperscript{33}

(2) The analysis of the experience of inter-personal relationships confirms this relation of the human person to the Absolute Thou. This happens first of all through the experience of the limitation of inter-personal relationships. The relationship to the other “you” has its limit which should not be transgressed; total penetration of the other is impossible. There is a primordial sphere of intimacy which cannot be attained by any inter-human relationship. Is man’s experience of this sphere an experience of complete solitude and autonomy? Careful examination indicates that it is otherwise. The human person feels totally open and bound in a positive sense to the Absolute “Thou.” “Lord, You pervade me and you know me” (Ps. 138) “before even I was conceived in the womb of my mother” (J 1.5).

Such a pervasion is not a negation of my personal “I,” as Sartre would claim; rather it is its deepest confirmation. I experience myself as unique and irreplaceable, because at the basis of my being I experience the Absolute “Thou.” Creation bears the mark of vocation; otherwise it would not be.

If person means to-be-onself and to-be-in-relation, I would not be wholly myself if that relationship were not at the basis of my being. The reality of a personal being could not be explained otherwise. This becomes still more clear when we examine carefully, in accordance with Heidegger, the basis of the knowledge of the other. To know, states Heidegger, is to maintain an

\textsuperscript{32} R. Guardini, 156.
\textsuperscript{33} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, 164-166.
exist in being; Dondeyne adds that it is what “make one free in relation to me and vice versa.” If this is so, then in authentic interpersonal relationships, it assumes a new dimension with reference to God who founds the human person. The fact that God permeates me to my roots means that he must be the most profound foundation of my very being; this is the gift of my freedom as belonging to myself. It is not necessary to underline that such an approach goes beyond the atheism of Sartre or Merleau-Ponty which derives from Nietzsche and Dostoevski. The truth is quite different: if I am to exist as a personal “I,” then God cannot but exist: God is the source of man’s identity, not of his alienation.

Secondly, the relationship of the human person to the personal God appears to us par excellence in ethical experience, which takes place in meeting another “thou.” As noted above, this was suggested by Levinas and its importance was underlined by Dondéyne. This is the “epiphany” of the countenance described by Levinas, that is, the appearance of the other as freedom which appeals to my goodness in the ethical sense of this term. In this appeal or vocation my freedom in its spontaneity is called to question. I become aware that the autonomy of my freedom does not constitute the basis of the mystery of man and of his being in the world. My autonomy and freedom are brought out through the appearance of the other. In the meeting with the other there is a certain “metaphysical asymmetry”: I can give my life for the other, but have no right to ask him to sacrifice his life for me. Everything seems to happen as if I were called “from above through the countenance of the other.” The other, although my equal, appeals to my responsibility and obligates me as if he was invested with the authority and power of the Highest. Through the countenance the other I find myself before the countenance of the completely Other, the Holy, the face of the invisible God who judges me in this appeal.

As we see, adds Dondeyne, this is the God of the Bible. It is not a magic power, but a Mystery of Word and Goodness which touches my depths (intimior intimo meo). God is the highest and definitive in being, and consequently is Transcendent par excellence; he is completely beyond all representation.

Summary and Conclusions

Analyzing the structure of personal being as manifest in experience we find an essential relationship to the other, to the “thou.” The human person is based on his “being in himself” and on his relation to the “thou.” A more developed examination of this relationship would differentiate in the structure of the person being two different kinds of relationships of the human person to a “thou.” On the one hand, it shows different “spheres” in the human person and, on the other hand, it points to essentially different “thous.” There is a relationship to the “thou” in which the fullness of the sense of personal being is realized by its nature: the person is turned toward the other, a human “thou.” Further, the origin of the being of man is experienced in the limitations of personal relationships and the finitude of the person manifested thereby. Finally, there is the experience of the other, which is the ethical experience par excellence. All these factors show the relationship of the personal “I” to the Transcendental “thou” to be the fundamental and constitutive relationship of my personal self. In its own way this confirms the traditional definition of man as a homo religiosus.

The categories which we use here are personalist ones: personal self, freedom and relationship to the “thou.” With their help we discover neither “the God of the philosophers” to whom man can

34 Albert Dondeyne, L’expérience, 163-165.
35 Albert Dondeyne, Un discours, 446-447.
neither pray nor dance, nor the God of the religions expressed in objective categories. Rather, we
find the metaphysical God of the Bible, the God of absolute Transcendence, of Mystery, the
“Thou” to whom the human person is turned.

Thus, the personal categories constitute adequate tools for our theme of man and
Transcendence, and therefore we have taken them as our starting point. As such, the human person
and the personal categories enable us to move beyond the aporias put forward on those problems
by Marxism, atheistic existentialism and scientism. Paraphrasing K. Rahner’s point of view for
whom Christology exemplifies the human being in its perfection and “pure” anthropology is an
imperfect Christology, we can say that complete personalism is impossible without theism. The
human person can be totally explained only by the divine “thou”; but the divine “thou” bespeaks
the plenitude, fulfillment, and thus the perfection of the personal “I” of man.

Consequently, the way is open towards a personalist metaphysics, by which I mean a
metaphysics centered on the human being as a personal being seeking its ultimate foundation, and
thereby its comprehension. This metaphysics begins from the experience of personal being and
culminates in absolute Transcendence which constitutes the “thou” toward which man is turned.
This metaphysics overcomes both anthropocentrism and theocentrism, and indeed any philosophy
in which divine and human autonomy are mutually exclusive. It is a metaphysics which lances no
Promethean denial of the gods and where man not only finds himself, but also discovers the final
confirmation of his being and thus of his freedom as self-possession.

The constitution of this kind of metaphysics is a most urgent and important matter. In contrast,
to ascribe the character of objectivity exclusively to the metaphysics of the object or of things; to
treat metaphysics as a science in the sense of the Greek theoria, rather than as the ultimate
explanation of human experience (which is nothing other than the experience of my “immersion”
in being, my participation in being in a human manner—Dondeyne); and finally consider such an
approach as a subjectivism which abandons realism—all this does not correspond to the changes
which have occurred in the concepts of science and philosophy and can only bring harm to
Christian thought.

In a new form then let us return to the “noverim me, noverim te.”

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2. Thinking and Creativity

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Since thinking creates no beings but at the most only knows them, and since to know means first of all to let them be, it is often claimed that thinking is not creative and cannot be viewed as such. Thus to attribute creative properties to thinking would be a step towards idealism. It is true that thinking does contribute to the formation and growth of technology, but technology creates nothing that is essentially new; it is but an ingenuous application of what has already been created.

There are, however, contrary opinions. It is claimed that we are capable of truly knowing only what we ourselves have created. Even if thinking creates no being, it creates the sense of being and it is only the sense of being that we envisage. Being would be nothing without the knowledge of it. Thus, while one approach denies any creative abilities of the mind, the other acknowledges them.

Between these two extremes there are various intermediate positions. Using different arguments they point to what may be viewed as two aspects of thinking: the active and the passive. Thinking does not create, but it constructs out of the existing material. The active aspect of thinking is revealed by the acts of abstraction, questioning and synthesizing. Its passive aspect is revealed by the starting point for abstraction, questioning, and synthesizing, namely, the sense data, the incoherent structure of an object and the elementary parts disclosed by analysis. In this connection it is argued that, though thinking does not create the real world, it determines man’s attitude to the world and thus educates him. Since education is in some respects a creative art, thinking is, therefore, a kind of creativity.

What are the relations between thinking and creativity? Looking for an answer to this question we must attempt to gain some insight into the essence of the phenomenon of thinking and thereby reach a conclusion. Putting aside a semantic discussion of the concepts of thinking and creating, we shall attempt then a phenomenological analysis of the data from the direct experience of thinking. The necessary brevity of this article forces us to restrict our considerations to a most general outline.

Thinking and Experience

There is one distinction in the question of thinking which, for all the efforts made to refute it, stands firm and seems undeniable, namely, that between thinking and experience. Regardless of everything that has been said about what comes within the span of thinking and what within the span of experience, it is impossible to reduce the one to the other. Thinking is always “enveloped” in experience, which rouses thinking out of dormancy and supplies the material for thought. It is through of the inner experience that the process of thinking itself becomes manifest to us. To think we must have something to think of; we must have the experiential awareness that we are thinking. It is experience that makes us think, that supplies the matter for thinking. But is this the case with every experience; do not that experiences make us think more than do others?

Hegel maintained that the life of the spirit is not the kind of life that would be afraid of death, that would shrink from destruction in the desire to remain unblemished. It is rather the kind of life that is able to withstand death and to persist in it. The spirit could discover its truth only if, having
been torn apart, it discovers itself. Thinking is the proposition brought about by the situation of being torn apart; it is a situation which threatens us with blemish, destruction or death. According to Hegel to think is to look straight into the eyes of negativity and to stop there. The most penetrating threat becomes the strongest incentive to thinking.

The pivot of the system of Paul Ricoeur is the principle: “it is a symbol that makes us think.” But the ones which make us think are, first of all, those that describe the nature of good and evil, their conflict in human life, and the means of liberating man from the oppression of evil. These are the outstanding symbols in the great mythologies of mankind. To Martin Heidegger it is the “truth of beingness” revealed in the context of the experience of what is both terrifying and liberating that is really worthy of being thought. It seems highly significant that in all the instances mentioned here what makes us think is not the experience of things as things, of an object as an object, of energies, events or facts, but the experience of what may be seen as the tragic dimension of human existence.

Where are we to seek the experiences which make us think in this special way; are they to be found in intimate relations with past history, myths, or great works of art? Without rejecting other possibilities the answer seems to be that more than anywhere else we find them in the intercourse with a person we love. The source of the experience of the tragic dimension of human existence is the intercourse with other persons; nothing makes us think more than a human being whom we meet.

Here we may well refer to Plato. It is not accidental that his thoughts are in the form of the dialogue. In the dialogue there is always the other partner who is given in direct experience so that his or her existence is beyond all question. Moreover, the dialogue becomes possible only when the existential situation of the partner is, at least to some extent, manifest. Without this there would be no common platform for the dialogue. We may even say that the more extensive and deep the manifestness of a situation, the more important is the dialogue. Philosophical dialogue necessitates the overt manifestness of existence, what, according to Plato, is the characteristic trait of the existential situation of the partner in the dialogue? Regardless of the name given to this or that participating person, he is always an inhabitant of the famous cave of the Republic. The partner in the dialogue is someone deprived of his original freedom, who has turned away from actual reality and carries in his heart a feeling of incomprehensible guilt. Man’s existential situation is tragic, and it is in the awareness of the tragedy of one’s situation that the most profound interhuman dialogue, that of the philosophers, has its source. There is no other being whose fate is as tragic as that of man. It makes us think; it opens the radical dialogue on truth and illusion, on good and evil, on love and hatred. Though Plato never said it explicitly, his whole philosophy shows that at its source lies the experience of another person, the meeting with human tragedy.

How does the primitive act of thinking, initiated by the meeting with another’s man’s existential tragedy, manifest itself externally? It is an act of questioning, in which we ask, “How is it possible”? We see someone with his back turned on the truth of reality, fettered and unable to change his position, suffering for an unknown sin. We see Prometheus chained to his rock, condemned for his charitable deed to eternally dying. We see King Oedipus running from his fate only to become its prey. Always the same question recurs in the same act of thinking: “How is it possible?”

Is there anything creative in this question? Thinking has two aspects: the objective and the subjective. Does the first question of radical thinking create anything in the thinking subject or does it create something in what is submitted to thought?
The Thinking Subject

Nothing can give us as much to think of as a meeting with another’s existential tragedy. But to have something to think of is by no means equivalent to being forced to think. Thinking is not a forced response, but a choice from among many possibilities. Thoughtlessness may take the form of fear and manifest itself in turning away from the tragic and escape into forgetfulness, dissipation and self deception. It may also manifest itself in acquiescence to defeat, a resignation in the face of brute force, as a sacrifice of oneself without any hope of victory. But thinking is neither one nor the other, for to think is again to look straight into the eyes of negativity and to stop there. To think is to ask, and to ask is to see the problem of that which itself is problematic in human existence. To ask questions in a situation that leaves open various possible courses is equivalent to assuming one’s own freedom. Thus, thinking is instituting freedom in the face of the tragic. Thinking attains freedom, and does so simply by assuming it.

Is this assumption of freedom in the fulfillment of the act of thinking creative? If so, then what is being created? Is it freedom that creates thinking or does thinking create its own freedom? Can the instituting of freedom through thinking be called creation?

Satisfactory answers to these questions would necessitate detailed and comprehensive investigation. Unfortunately, impossible here. We must pass over the wholeness of reasoning and stop only at the conclusions. It seems that in the assumption of freedom in the act of radical thinking we have an instance of authentic inner creativity. Through this act the thinking subject creates his or her own freedom in the face of the tragedy of life, and by creating freedom also creates oneself as a thinking person. This is authentic creation: man is not free because of some general freedom or abstract freedom in abstract situations; his freedom is that which he has managed to create for himself by thinking in the face of the tragic. Thinking is a form of transcending the tragic, but to surmount the tragic is tantamount to constituting, that is, raising or creating within oneself the self that is free of the tragic dimension and somehow Promethean. This self may bear different names: it may be the rebellious self of A. Camus, the transcendental Ego of E. Husserl, the determined self of M. Heidegger, or the axiological self of which I spoke elsewhere. At any rate, it is always the same self that sees as a problem anything that makes it a problem, and creates its own freedom in a concrete situation. Of such freedom we may indeed say that it is a work of art, the art of asking questions.

Is not the concept of creation an exaggeration in this context? I do not think so provided we do not interpret it in the radical sense of creation without any raw material or out of nothing. Freedom is never created out of nothing; there are always some raw materials to create it with: the external situation, undefined inner conditions, the act of thinking. Up to a certain point creation appears to be nothing more than transformation, but at a certain level transformation ends and something new is born. The concrete shape of freedom is, as H. Bergson so aptly remarked, unpredictable. Freedom surpasses its raw materials as well as its motives. The same oppression imposed by the domination of one and the same master becomes the starting point for the different kinds of concrete freedom; it can breed the freedom of slaves, the freedom of stoics or skeptics, the liberty of the knight errant, civil liberties and many others. Every form of freedom whatsoever is like the work of all art; from it springs all thinking and artistic creativity. Thus, if we can speak of the different forms of artistic activities as creative, with all the more reason may we call creative that concrete freedom which institutes the independence of man in the face of the tragic.

The course of creation is, however, beyond predictability. This is why Hegel thought the course of history could be understood *ex post facto* but was unpredictable in advance. Indeed it is
impossible to predict the different ways some concrete freedom is created in the midst of the tragic, for predictability is incompatible with true creativity. K. Marx believed that this was not the case, that the course of history could be predicted. For Marx, however, the history of humanity is the history, not of freedom, but of the drive to dominate man and the forces of nature. In the place of freedom he substituted domination whose forms can be predicted and controlled according to plan. But planned freedom has nothing in common with creation or creativity.

The Sense of Questioning

Though the immanently creative nature of thinking is usually accepted without dispute, the same is not true of its transcendent nature. Does thinking create its own object and if so is it legitimate to assert that thinking is cognitive? If not, we must conclude that its proper place is only immanent. The radical thinking we are dealing with here depends on the question, “How is it possible”? Does this question change anything in the object to which it refers? Will the man in chains, turned away from the truth and suffering for unknown sins, be released from his shackles only because when meeting him we ask, “How is it possible to be in such a situation”?

At first there seems to be nothing creative in this question. Indeed, the question can change nothing in the situation, nor should it do so. Its aim is to prepare an attitude of seeking and interpreting. This implies that both the search and the interpretation be faithful, but what does a faithful search and interpretation mean?

In the question “How is it possible?” we have two important words: “it” and “possible.” Let us take a close look at both.

The “it” seems essential inasmuch as it points to a phenomenon or experience, a question or datum. In a way, it may be regarded as being, the answer to an earlier “what?” that could have been, but never was asked. The question “what”? refers to the essence of things, according to Husserl for whom the first meaning of “essence” is that which in the proper being of an individual can be identified as the individual’s own “what.” However, if the “it” points to an essence, what then is the meaning of “essence.” At present we are concerned with the essence, not of things, but of the situation in which the person we have met, our partner in the dialogue, stands. Thus, it is simultaneously a question about truth. When is facing another human being we ask about essence, we actually ask, “What is the truth about man’s existential situation”? The essence is then the truth of the situation, while its truth is also its essence.

We speak of “truth,” but in what sense do we use that word? The idea of truth has, as we know, two opposites, namely false judgment and illusory experience, neither of which is reducible to the other. Error of judgment appears at the predicative level and is in fact an inconsistency of the judgment with that to which it refers. The illusion appears at an earlier stage and is an inconsistency with a phenomena. Which of these concepts of truth are we concerned with in our question; is it the one opposed to false judgment or the one that is opposed to illusion?

The answer seems quite simple; we are concerned with the truth of the phenomenon, its manifestation, which truth as the opposite of illusion. When asking “How is it possible”? we seek to distinguish between an illusion about the situation and the truth of the situation. Not all the inhabitants of the cave know their true position. This is the reason why thinking is of crucial importance; its task is to free people of illusions about themselves and their existential situation. We seek the authentic: to distinguish the authentically tragic from the illusory, the hero from the actor, the face from the grimace of a mask.
The criteria of this discrimination may differ. For some the mark of authenticity is in the constancy of being, for others in its force or in its indubtability. The inability to reach an agreement on the criteria of authenticity is itself a part of the human tragedy and as such is something that, in its own way, “makes us think.”

The thinking that thus seeks the truth of the essence has no awareness that something new is being created. On the contrary, it is deeply convinced that this form of activity is subservient. Even the formulation of questions is seen not as something creative, but solely as a search. To search is the negative of finding; to question is the negative of the answer. Indeed, the idea of the truth of the essence is no more than something negative; it is something that of necessity we substitute for the absent “true reality.” The thinking that remains true to the question steers clear of any creation. Its only ambition is humility in watching, listening, and perceiving.

Our question has, however, still another component, the word “possible.” We ask, “How is it possible?” but what is possibility?

Let us look once again into Plato’s cave. There comes a moment when light disperses the prevailing darkness. The role of light is crucial. It does not create the world in which man lives, but without some light there is no world for him. Light is not equivalent to a knowledge of the world; without experience it is like pure space without points, figures, straight or curved lines. Nevertheless, it is only because of light that cognition is possible, that the world of the person wait its astonished wonder, and his questioning are possible. What is the significance or role of light? Its role consists in constituting before the person an alterative or another possibility. The shackles are a fact that cannot be denied; but they are only one of the many possibilities.¹

When asking “How is it possible”? we put what we are asking about within the perspective of other possible beings, facts or situations. In this way the thinking that asks questions establishes a horizon. Strictly speaking, however, the horizon is not something given, but is connected with acting; the concept of constituting extends beyond the sphere of acting or non-acting. To constitute is to “synthesize,” but the synthesis is “passive.” Essentially, constituting sense differs from the creation of sense, for it belongs to a different world than that of being as such. I accept Husserl’s point of view and consider his argument to be conclusive. I do so all the more readily because his theory of the sense that is constituted allows us to lay down the basis for judging any action at the level of being, for judging every act of creation as a sensible or nonsensical course of action.

Indeed, to create is not the only thing that is important for the person. Those in shackles are also capable of creating and there have been creators whose thoughtlessness made them dangerous. Some things are more fundamental than creating. By forming the space of thought, the space of hope, we open the course for the progress of concrete human freedom.

¹ *Swiat ludzkiej nadziei* (Krakow: Znak, 1976).
3.

The Creative Self and the Other in Search of the Sacred

Anna Teresa Tymieniecka

Introduction

Present intellectual criticism, which appears to have reached its peak with the denunciation of onto-theologies as the artifacts of speculative reason makes us more aware of the value of experience. Being concerned with the absolute validity of discourse about the divine, we are challenged to put aside for a while rational speculation and to show that there is a way to establish such discourse in compliance with the demands of universal validity, certainty, and objectivity. These are demands that the classic theoretical approach allegedly fails to satisfy.

The debate on this subject is of crucial importance for present metaphysical and theological thinking, in which one dispute focuses upon Martin Heidegger’s critique of traditional metaphysics and anthologies. This rejects explicitly the validity of traditional theologies as well as the possibility of theology as a ‘science of the Divine’ in general.1 The focus of attention here is the situation of the problem of God in relation to the immanence/transcendence antithesis. The major question which emerges in this context is whether the problem should be treated discursively or requires a radical elucidation of its experiential foundation.

The present study is understood as a contribution to this debate. As the radical criticism comes from phenomenologically inspired radicalism, so also does the answer proposed in the present study. I submit that the elucidation of the primordial, originary experience of the sacred, as prepared by phenomenology, is an appropriate focus from which discourse about the Divine can derive a new beginning.

Though individual testimonies of the experience of the sacred abound, the quest for an assessment of the sacred can take them merely as singular variants of the universal prototype of man’s genetic progress on the way to unfold a state of his inward being in which the full-fledged experience of the sacred may occur. That is, in order to distill from the sedimentation of the singular variants of experiences of the sacred the originary innermost virtual condition of man as a human being we must elucidate it philosophically. From its personal subjective singularization, the experience of the sacred must be investigated within the general philosophical schema in order to appear in its proper place as pertaining to the universally human condition.

The following phenomenological fragment of the elucidation of the originary experience of the sacred is to be situated at the intersection of two different lines of my work. First, it is the continuation of my phenomenology of creative experience;2 second, it is a part of my

1 Cf. especially, M. Jaworski, Analecta Cracoviensia, III(1971), 51-69. This debate followed the 1975 Congress of the Polish Catholic Theological Society, devoted to questions concerning the possibility of theology “as the science about God” in view of radical challenges to the validity of rational speculation.

2 See my last study, “The Creative Self and the Other in Man’s Self-interpretation in Existence,” in vol. VI, Analecta Husserliana, The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977), of which the present essay is a continuation. See also the present author’s Eros et Logos, Interiorité creatrice (Brusels: Nauwelaerts, 1967); “Imaginatio Creatrix” in vol. III, Analecta Husserliana; and “Beyond Ingarden’s Idealism/Realism Controversy with Husserl the Contextual Phase of Phenomenology,” Analecta Husserliana, IV (1976).
phenomenology of the sacred. Consequently, it is necessary to establish it within its bearings. To indicate the proper context of the following analysis three pivotal points should be noted:

1. The originary experience of the sacred is not a one time occurrence, but a genetic progress.
2. This consists of a quest for the ultimate significance of the human life.
3. This quest is not confined to a solitary pursuit, but occurs within a dialogue with the other.
4. The quest for the ultimate significance of life is not a progressive discovery of a pre-established state of affairs or of a pre-installed route of development, but a personal creative activity.

The genetic progress of the originary experience of the sacred leads to the establishment of the transnatural destiny of the soul.

The Philosophical Coordinate of the Inquiry

It is the human person’s specific privilege to pause for a moment to contemplate the enigmatic position which he has outlined in the process of weaving the texture of his existence within the otherwise alien forces of the natural universe and the social world. In doing this he searches for the end toward which tends the ever more meaningful pattern of his progress. This pattern in itself appears to be advancing within its segments of intricate and always fragmentary plots, without revealing the secret of “what it is all about.” One will wonder, “What point do the flowing concatenated meanings intend to make? What is the final aim that glimmers and is enigmatically foreshadowed, and toward which man spontaneously tends? Shall the person pursue it by him or herself alone or recur to the Other”?

Indeed, when we pause for a moment to consider it, in a way detached from our flux, we see that our dynamism will be spent. The works of our invention will last at the utmost only as long as does humanity. Yet, caught within one’s genetic progress, one must seek its final significance. In fact, when the existential life-oriented processes in which the real individual unfolds come to the end of their course of acquiring meaning, one engages in a quest for the significance of this course itself.

This raises the question of whether this quest is accessible to phenomenological inquiry? The answer established in our previous work is that it may be approached with reference to man’s creative function. The process in question shares with the creative function first of all the initial situation that both emerge from a reaction against the constituted world. Both surge up in the form of a quest through and with the given elements of the life-world, and they carry beyond the life-world as experienced in its present phase.

However, in contrast to the creative process, the search for the key to the enigma of human existence does not mean a rebellion solely against the present phase of this world. It emerges only when the validity of the human world as such is disclaimed; when we begin to question the purposefulness of its changing, precarious, never completed course; when, finally, it is recognized that it lacks sufficient reason. In short, it presupposes the loss of the natural belief in the validity of the life-world as such, as well as any objectivity. The frenetic quest into which the human being

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3 Cf. “Hope and the Present Instant,” in God in Contemporary Thought (Brussels: Nauwelearts, 1978), which is only a fragment of a large work so far unpublished.
4 Cf. by the present writer: “The Creative Self and the Other in Man’s Self-interpretation in Existence,” Analecta Husserliana, VI (1977), 151-186.
enters, once the contingency of natural life within the world is discovered, contains no positive scope. In opposition to the Creative impulse, it does not seek a new form in order to incarnate the Real.

Since Man has already abolished the outer world, the inquiring subject turns toward his inward self. Though this line of questioning, which also scrutinizes all objectively constituted aspects of one’s experience, relies negatively and to a degree on intentional constitution and the life-world as its product it nevertheless runs in a different and original course. Likewise, while it uses the creative function and all the operative elements of its orchestration, this quest avoids the crystallization of its aim in the pursuit of a creative work. Lacking the reference to a definitive object, it proceeds tentatively in the “darkness of the senses.” Nevertheless, we are able to trace its progress from the landmarks it establishes on its way.

This quest, which we identify as the road to the experience of the sacred, does not progress without aim, but reveals an inner direction and proper telos. Husserlian phenomenology calls ‘soul’ everything in the human monad which represents the mute element of passion, affective pulsations, internal urge, nostalgia, etc. That is the material ontological element which flows from the natural depths and represents the empirical resources of human existence. In parallel as much as in contrast, we call this telos of the experience of the sacred “The soul’s transemipirical destiny.” It now becomes necessary to ask: What is the purpose of this quest, of what does human destiny consist, how could it be in all its arteries the fulfillment of the specifically human genesis?

Creative Self-Interpretation between the Self and the Other

The initial question here is: Do we pursue the quest of our destiny within the soul alone and in isolation from other beings? Or, on the contrary, can we find a meaning of our lives, beyond its struggle for survival on the short waves transmitted between the self and the other, by entering with him or her into a relation of “inward creative reciprocity”? Study of the various forms of communication in which human self-interpretation proceeds shows that, apart from the organic and vital interactions and strictly utilitarian types of involvements with other human beings, the specifically personal quest for the meaning of life proceeds in the dialogue between two persons classically termed Eros, Agapé, Philia, Storge.

However, there is more to this dialogue than Jaspers, Marcel, Buber, Nedoncelle and Levinas have so well described. It still remains to be shown what it is in the human functioning and condition which allows it to take place; that is, on what is the metaphysical horizon of human existence founded and opened. We propose, in line with our argument, to show that the transemipirical dialogue is founded in the human person’s ontological state of “inward creative reciprocity.” This state itself is but a further stage of man’s ontological individualization or self-interpretation in existence, though, unlike other phases of self-interpretation, it does not take the other merely as means.

Furthermore and most notably, it is a creative process, from whose various forms we will consider only the innermost profile of the common search for the transemipirical destiny. In this common pursuit self-interpretation has two reciprocal poles. The “reciprocity of love,” for example, consists in a search for the meaningfulness of events for our own existence. This results in “ciphering” their significance into the weaving of the thread of our existence. Simultaneously, it is also an attempt to find the meanings which the beloved gives them in reference to his or her

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own thread, that is, in “deciphering” its meaning with reference to our own. This interrogatory process is shared by both members of this relationship.

Indeed, the profile of the self-explication of destiny may be clearly recognized as the thread running through the above-mentioned dialogical relations. This identification occurs only in the perspective of the creative function of man, because it proceeds using all the ways and means of creativity. Nevertheless, they differ on several essential points.

First, in opposition to the interiorization and total self-absorption of the artist in the creative process leading to a work of art, in the pursuit of destiny we seek clues to the meanings to be given to our interior existence as radically turned toward the Other as caught within his own identical quest. Secondly, although evidence of our inventive and constructive ingenuity is present in this search, we do not seek to construct, discover or project any object. Neither do we aim at promoting an event or occurrence of any sort in the life-world. In fact, the self-interpretation in destiny is not oriented toward ciphering a rational intersubjective message.

That inner urge to forge a significant thread of our existence in response to the ultimate question, at the point of our discovering the contingency of the life-world-existence cannot be postponed any longer, for it is the question of how to salvage from the fleetingness of life something of lasting value. In that inner urge we direct our scrutiny of the Other and seek to discover whether and how he proceeds, and what significance he attaches to his own existence? We provoke him to reveal this secret thread by revealing without any reserve, our own interior existence. The Other receives the revelations of our quest in his own inwardsness in a spontaneous reaction, in which he makes clear to himself that for which he is striving.

Inasmuch as he receives our manifestation as the revelation of our virtual self, which we tentatively project but have not yet crystallized, he is co-present with us; yet he remains absent because he remains within the network of his own quest of the final meaningfulness of things. From our self-revelation he grasps our virtual self in a fluid and fleeting manner inasmuch as he may compare, confront, identify or assimilate some of its aspects with his own tentative and undefined tender substance.

In fact, what else are we after in this mutual examination of each other? We attempt to penetrate into the most secretive tendencies and intentions of the other self and into the way in which he appreciates their significance by confronting them with our own, only in order to dig deeper into our virtualities. We seek to scrutinize and reason, to feel, to comprehend, and to dig deeply enough in the never ceasing current of experience for some clues by means of which the perdurably valid thread of this course of experience may be sustained. Though this thread sustains the perduing validity of our very self, it must be wrung from the fleeting segments of existence and spun by their means. Its progress requires that we discover the virtualities of the very undercurrent of our being. In order to “transcend” our natural, empirical, everyday self at the present stage in which we are constituted and seemingly stabilized, and to do so within the scheme of a new meaning of the current of existence, we must reorganize even our vital functioning at its elementary stage.

Our quest is continuous and carries us relentlessly onward while undergoing innumerable metamorphoses. Its spontaneity crystallizes by trial and error in this new interweaving in the course of mutual self-revelation. My own new self becomes “other” without ever stopping in its course and without identifying itself with a form or mold; indeed, no definite form may grasp it. It flees from and evades its own eye as much as that of the other self who would try vainly to maintain it, even for an instant, in any fixed shape. It is tempting to consider it almost a “nonbeing” because it may not be subordinated or paired with a definite mold of experience into which our constitutive
apparatus would like to force it. Yet, it “exists” because it manifests itself as a thread running through our innermost concern, in relation to which it is incessantly “molded” and “forged” in its own way.

The processes of creative reciprocity emerge from a situation comparable to that from which the creative process sensu stricto arises. It is not only that their orientations diverge on many essential points. The quest for destiny decisively assumes the stance of the final concern which is “no more to be postponed” merely in order to pursue daily occupations or tasks. Unlike the creative process which stops each time at a newly proposed answer to the enigma of the Real, the quest of the ultimate significance of human existence never stops. Yet, it is essentially creative in the ways it progresses.

We address this interrogatory simultaneously in two directions: toward our innermost self and toward the Other, while we attempt to scrutinize the most intimately personal experiences, convictions and attitudes in their foundations and reasons. Hence, we draw clues for the meanings which we should give to the state of things present as well as past. But in neither of these essentially conjoined steps can we expect to find a complete solution to our perplexities and uncertainties.

Furthermore, it is of the very nature of the quest, in which it is our own actual being that is in question, that we do not expect to find within the Other an already established sense of life which we could accept. This must come from within our resources and upon our own evidences, but none of these has material to offer which is ready and waiting to be discovered. Indeed, we would reject any such ready-made finding as not being our “very own.” We would not stop at the assimilation of anything we did not ourselves deliberately choose; for that would be merely haphazard and circumstantial whose reasons would remain hidden to us. No readily available form or answer will ever fit the purpose. It is precisely in an awareness of all its reasons as giving the key to its complete script that we have to acquire our final interpretation of existence. To know “all the reasons” for our choice we have to invent ourselves.

This interrogatory is, thus, not a passive flow. One’s own and the Other’s attitudes toward one’s own existence remain hazy, undefined, in the twilight of the consciousness of both. We probe them by inventing ever new ones according to the particular bias which we also invent as fitting our own circumstances and the Other’s, and according to the ones we have already half-established, half-projected. In our tentative approach to his quest, we provisionally assimilate his answers in our interpreting, checking the validity of his presumed stand over against our own.

We address ourselves to the Other as to a witness and a judge, seeking his approval or consent for our deepest concern and conflicts. We try to introduce him into the very heart of our perplexing attempts to interpret the givenness, by scanning one by one the possible meanings with which it may be endowed. We show him the reasons we envisage, weigh, or outright reject for evaluating the meanings which our imagination proposes, probing thereby ever more deeply into the intrinsic virtualities they suggest.

We then introduce the Other into the very heart of our creative investigation as a second self. We face him or her simultaneously as an “other self” insofar as we expect to receive into the common current of interrogation the opening of his own case of being-in-a-quest. We face him or her as a being-in-a-quest, other than ourselves and over against whom we may measure our own self. He is an “other self” sharing our own self insofar as he not only receives, observes and retains for himself the essentials of our own quest, but also develops his quest by checking its progress reciprocally in the same way with ours.

Each of us, seeks to reveal to the Other the meanings which he might propose for facts, events, feelings, decisions, acts, nostalgias, and deepest urges. With him we seek to understand them and
check their relevance in this understanding. To do so we scrutinize one by one all the available and possible systems of interpretation, trying and rejecting each in turn. None of them appears capable of transmitting or holding this unique significance we seek to establish.

The Quest for the Final Telos of a Person’s Self-Explication

This reciprocal inward quest develops and maintains itself through innumerable instances: fluctuating, instantaneous, and yet sustained by the thread they forge. This thread seems to sustain itself on its very own. It has neither any definitive foothold in empirical reality nor a pre-posed set of regulative guidelines to follow; it proceeds by trial and error relying essentially upon human invention. It would be accessible merely in extreme instances of spiritual experience, if it could not be understood and accounted for as the ultimate phase of man’s creative interpretation. This quest for the trans-empirical destiny carried on by the self and the Other appears as the quest for the final telos of man’s self-explication in existence only when we discover that it proceeds by means of a creative self-interpretation.⁶

To realize this let us summarize the points of our description. In the first place, as the dynamic thread of our communication with the other self and like the creative process it is constructive. Although it does not construct an intersubjective message, it carries on a unique and unprecedented transformation of the state of our own being. Secondly, like the creative process, it advances by breaking, one by one, all the joints of the functional intentional network oriented toward the constitution of objectivity. Furthermore, comparable to the creative process, the self-interpretation in destiny employs for its own purpose the means of human functioning and all the points of reference which the constituted life-world and ourselves may useful provide. Yet, it is by no means subject to its organizing regulations and projects; on the contrary, it is worked out through a functional system devised for its own unique purpose by the interrogating process itself. No principle of its interpretative articulation or of its meaning is pre-posed. All are essentially dependent upon our discovery regarding to our deepest self in communication with the Other.

Like the creative process, the search for our destiny in the personal interiority with the Other pervades all the functional dimensions, making use of the whole operational mechanism of the human being considered as an individual as well as a person. Like creative interrogation, the questions which the self addresses to the Other and the answers which he or she gives in turn appear ambiguous because, although they bring to light the most profound and secret longings of our inner-most being, they are proposed merely tentatively. Their meaning becomes more precise and nuanced, coalescing with the response of the other self and of our own probing appreciation of it. In this movement, bringing forth, reaching out, and turning-inward, the reciprocal quest suspended between its two poles establishes, like the creative process, a specific orchestration of all human functions. It draws directly upon the subliminal resources of the human being which are liberated from their intentional constitutive ties within the creative context.

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⁶ The present author believes to have offered in this study a new analysis of the human communication called by Cardinal Wojtyla “communion personarum”; cf. “znaczeniu miłości oblubienczej” Roczniki Filozoficzne, XXII (1974), 166-172. By introducing into the investigation the creative analysis according to the “creative context,” which she had established in the previously quoted work, the author has intended to introduce the nature of the communion in the sacred as being at the roots of the “communion personarum.” This differentiates it radially from other types of “human communion,” a distinction which Cardinal Wojtyla seems to have overlooked (p. 172) extending human communion too far.
In the search for its own significant script, the soul lends progressively to this creative dialogue all its means, down to those which are most rarified and of which it cannot otherwise partake. The soul addresses the other self with a transparent sincerity that is not capable of mastery, even toward herself alone. She addresses him beyond the reach of any objectivity, leaving the life-pursuits, concerns, and values aside, that is, beyond the vicissitudes of time. Since it does not aim at any particular object, its objective being is to conjure the ultimate significance of everything for it dwells in the supratemporal and continues forever, eternal.

Yet, the communication in which its being is crystallized seems to be in danger of breaking down at any moment. The ambiguities of this reciprocal interpretative creation are so extensive that we may even ask: Do such encounters ever come to pass? If so, they are games of the moment and we would have no objective evidence for intuition since no objective content is to be sighted. Nevertheless, each encounter meant a new clue we discovered or invented to weave a further mesh for our transnatural destiny. Our quest seems progressively to issue and to abandon all of life, while yet salvaging its unique lasting significance.

What of the other self, however, upon whom we seem to have suspended our whole being and existence: Do we really ever meet him in his truth? Each self progresses, in fact, in separation; in the quest after the new, final interpretative system each has scrutinized all available cues and rejected them all. Nevertheless, it has accomplished the essential task. In the quest for a destiny uniquely one’s own, by discarding the interpretative schemes one by one like the leaves of an artichoke each of the selves has in the first place despoiled itself from explicative schemes. Then, it advanced in inventing the new ones to be discarded in their turn. In the process we maintain the belief that we could “encounter” the other self, or communicate to him our ultimate concern, if only we could find together a meaningful system in which both his search and ours would be explicated. The unreserved radical commitment of both offers the unique possibility to the self and the Other to transgress their own closed framework toward that which they are not in this impervious plan. This becomes more and more intense as the creative interrogation becomes more demanding and refined. The progress of the “ciphering” of our own existence being exfoliated is, however, constantly disrupted. We lose both the loops of the thread or the meaningful forms it proposed and the meshes which were expected to bring our experience and that of the other self into the same net. While we think we have thrown a hook for him to grasp, we see that it has no meaning for him.

Though a genetic “ciphering” of a lasting, meaningful system and text in which the other would recognize himself is a task to which our ever repeated efforts seem to be applied, this will never be attained. The entire edifice collapses at the point of its seemingly constructive advance, that is, when man is convinced that the self and the other self are firmly established within the same meaningful text, that he has constructed a common “universe” which we both share, and that this is meaningful with reference equally to us and to him. It is when we believe we have grasped the other self in his identity that this entire edifice collapses.

Let us turn now to some questions which force themselves upon us concerning the significance of this attempt or the nature of the ultimate self-interpretation in existence. Although no definitive meaningful system could be applied to interpret the progress and other moments of the quest, that does not mean that scanning, discriminating, and temporarily adjusting them was fruitless. On the contrary, it has served several purposes.

First, although we fail to meet the Other in any rationally definitive, objectively “lasting” way, nevertheless, the instants in which we communicate with each other in our ultimate concern with existence are extremely rich in “substance.” They expand their significant rays into all the hidden
dimensions of our being and by revealing our virtualities may provide the cornerstones of its progress. Secondly, although our quest does not lead to the definitive establishment of a meaningful system for our route, it fulfills the crucial role of breaking out of the objectifying strata of the life-world structures which keep us closed upon ourselves and in contingency.

In fact, it is in this progress of liberation from the ties with the empirical, life-oriented structures and processes which run through our being that we actually uncover its virtualities. In the common search with the Other, the clues are found for their working into a thread of destiny.

Every discourse, every interpretative process, every communication fails. The virtual sense of their genesis, for whose discovery we have employed all our resources, escapes a finalization or completion of its meaning. Does this mean that we face a void upon reaching the breaking point in this pursuit? That would undoubtedly be the case in an isolated, self-centered search for the meaning of life or of human existence, as is presented by Kafka, Camus, and other contemporary writers. In an isolated search, when the creative reciprocity of the Other as engine and support is missed the initial impulse does not crystallize into a constructive process; it does not unfold the inventive imagination which would nourish and stimulate its advance. Without that, the search becomes sterile and dies.

The plan of the reciprocal inward quest at deciphering the ultimate significance of the human life-course, on the contrary, is prompted and intensified as it proceeds. When it breaks down in its weaving, the soul, on the one hand, is left free from the empirical ties. On the other hand, the Other having detached himself and vanished from her horizon, the soul finds herself to be indeed lost, “nowhere,” and with “no one” to turn. However, cut off from the world, all her spontaneities flow into the urgent impetus of her quest, and on the other side of the opening abyss the soul discovers the Absolute Other abiding with her face to face.

In retrospect, we come to see that in this quest, working through and leaving aside the empirical dimensions, we were uncovering and elaborating the inward ground of the sacred in man.

What of the communication between the self and other; does its breaking mean that the communication must discontinue? That would be the case in communication founded upon common vital interests of everyday existence, social and ideological commitments, etc., that is, communication grounded in life-concerns. There, as the conflict of interests or loss of mutual understanding emerges, the thread spun together divides and each follows passively its own life-course. That would have been the case also had the communication been grounded exclusively in our ethical commitment to the other. In that case the breaking of communication would have meant the exhaustion of our resources in being compassionate, opened in our innermost being to the other.

It is quite different with communication in transnatural destiny which is carried on by the creative interrogation. There, for communication to break means merely that the given spectrum of possible variations in the meaningful system being projected and scrutinized in our common interrogation is exhausted. Carried by our creative spontaneity we must move to invent more. Furthermore, when the entire edifice of our common search crumbles at the radical breaking point and we are faced with the enigmatic traces of transnatural destiny, its disclosure poses the further challenge of inventing at this new level the specific significance of these traces. That is, the interrogation re-opens and we turn ourselves again toward the Other to resume the common creative quest. This is the new phase of the creative search: the itinerary of the sacred in a transnatural destiny pursued in common.
4.

Culture and Value

M. A. Krapiec

The relationship between culture and value is understood in a realistic way in the classical philosophy of being. Although the problems of value appeared mainly in the philosophy of subject, particularly in Kant and in the Baden neo-Kantian school, they are connected with everyday facts and are expressed in natural and especially prescientific language. Natural language serves as a perfect tool of analysis in classical philosophy of being. As is shown by Aristotle’s Organon and by the constructive commentaries from the golden age of medieval scholasticism, prescientific language, when subjected to methodological precision, becomes a philosophical language. In common with other real sciences, philosophy is based on prescientific language, and is made philosophical by means of various definatory operations.

The Terms ‘Culture’ and ‘Value’

The terms ‘culture’ and ‘value’, before becoming virtually technical expressions of contemporary post-Kantian trends in philosophy, had been used in the classical philosophy of ancient and medieval times. An understanding of these terms was based on daily human experiences which determined a primary and derivative conception of culture and value. Thus the term ‘culture’ derives from the Latin and originally meant cultivation of soil: ‘agri-cultura’. Other derivatives arose, such as ‘anima cultura’, ‘tempora cultiora’ and ‘cultus litterarum’. Furthermore, these expressions took on religious and cult meanings: ‘cultura Christi’ or ‘cultura christianae religionis’.1 Simultaneously, other terms were used in a sense close to the contemporary understanding of the world “culture.” These were the ancient Greek terms: paideia and kolokagatia,2 and the Christian terms: agape, perfectio, sanctitas, virtus, and others,3 all pointing to the state of human behaviour perfected through acts. In modern times4 since Puffendorf, ‘culture’ has denoted a social condition of man opposed to that of ‘nature’, seen as, wild and uncouth. Herder understood cultured man as living in a society which contributes to his development and who is the object of intellectual analyses, especially those connected with Kant’s philosophy. The world of culture and its historical diversity, is a manifestation of the spirit and of various national and social attitudes. It reveals simultaneously the tension between the Kantian solle-sein, which supposedly occurs in the consciousness of nations. This tension concerns not only things, but primarily styles of life and forms of collective behaviour—in short, a people’s whole way life.5 Its other manifestations are styles in art. Thus understood, art in the post-Kantian sense would have its ultimate ontological source in a yet unpolluted nature.

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1 See W. Perpert, “Kulturphilosophie,” in Historisches (Bael-Stuttgart), vol. IV, col. 1309-1324. This contains extensive bibliography.
2 See W. Jaeger, Paideia, introduction.
3 See Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, especially Secunda where the Aristotelian “optimum potentiæ humanæ” is the crowning of a perfect human life.
4 See Perpert, Ibid.
5 Ibid.
Without an understanding of nature itself at first hand, culture as a world of values built upon nature would have been absolutely incomprehensible. Only nature allows man to introduce some new principle of organization of the originally given nature. Thus, in an understanding of culture nature would be the absolute postulate, the primary reality on which the construction of culture could be erected. The field between nature and culture would be similar to that between two poles related as challenge and response, culture being the human response to the imprecisely defined challenge which is reality.6 The only difficulty encountered is how this reality should be understood.

The understanding of a ‘value’ has also had its own history in which its primary intuitive definitions were connected with the use of everyday language and first philosophical formulations. The term ‘value’ was used interchangeably with the term ‘goodness’. Goodness is the highest value in Plato’s vision of reality; above being and all ideas it is the Self-comprehensible reality through which all is comprehensible. Goodness is the source of any reality, since it is the one and the absolute identity. Plotinus observed that goodness is *diffusivum sui*, for it goes beyond itself and permeates everything that is.

The greatest dynamic value of goodness was acknowledged by Aristotle in his theory of intentional cause. This states that as the cause of all other causes goodness is the chief principle of cosmic dynamism and motion. Even the Aristotelian god binds cosmic movement by love to himself. Being self-thinking thought, in relation to the world and especially to first heavenly bodies, he is the good and value, the liberating “love which puts the sun and stars in motion.”7 St. Thomas has a similar conception of value, although his understanding of being is somewhat different. On the basis of the composition of being from act as existence and potentiality as essence, he associated any dynamism with the act or self-actualization of existence in the various orders of reality available to man.

Pursuing the line of thought of the classical philosophers with special attention to St. Thomas Aquinas, we will define in the light of a description of being and cognition, the concepts of culture, value, and their relationship one to the other.

**Being and Nature**

Being is primary in relation to the acts of human cognition and to all psychic acts. It is understood as something which actually exists, and which becomes the real object of specific human cognition, wants, decisions and psychic activity. It exists actually as concrete, self-determined contents, and consists intrinsically of potential factors which are its constitutive concrete contents, and of actual factors which are commensurable existence. Being is subject to a continual process of change, self-perfection and decay. Man, being himself a complex composition, is also immersed in a pluralistic world of concrete beings. There he is subjected to processes of change, namely of self-perfection and of decay. Thus actually existing reality, as a world of concrete analogous real beings in the process of continual change, is a manifestation of the dynamism of being. The set of various, unlimited and inconceivable possibilities of being is at the heart of being really existing in itself. It is this actually existing being, and not a set of possibilities, which designates the state of its various possibilities, and determines the direction of the change, dynamism and self-realization of being. In the words of Francis Sylvestris of Ferrara,

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6 See Dante’s *Divine Comedy*, the last verse of *The Paradise*.
possibility is beneath actual existence; really existing being is the justification of the various possibilities and dynamisms of being.

The actualization of possibility in the real world is manifested through the simultaneous interaction of both non-living and living beings. The development and dynamism of the world of living beings is especially important for man. In ancient times this was called nature or *physis*, for man is particularly struck by the rise, birth and development of beings. Therefore, the world of nature as it emerged in natural birth and was subject to change by the interaction of the other beings was the subject of works by many ancient philosophers. The topics *Per Physeos* were treated as synonymous with the philosophical problems of the ancient world. Nature or *physis* became the subject of a concept of nature, which greatly affected science as the starting point for philosophical analysis and justification. Nature itself was understood as a constant set of unvarying factors inevitably constituting a concrete essence, and generating concepts characterized by generality, necessity and constancy. The world of nature is an already existing environment given to and for man; its partner, bound to it by a relationship of necessity, is also man. Man belongs to the real world of nature as to a set bound by various relationships of analogous, concrete, really existing beings.

Knowledge

*Dialectic of Knowledge and Love*

The really existing world of analogous beings, which includes man as a creation of nature, is the object of man’s intellectual cognition, wants and acts of creation and decision-making. Various kinds of acts of cognition, love, creativity, and decision connect us with the really existing world. These acts do not produce a subject, but presuppose its existence, for being is really, if only selectively and in certain aspects, available for acts of cognition and desire. This means that our acts of cognition can begin on aspects interesting to ourselves and assimilate them in existential propositions in the form of cognitively affirmed conjunctions. These assimilate the existence or factuality of the world and intentional contents in proposition and evaluation. The one intellectually perceived being is at the same time the existing good which attracts our desire and serves as a real motivation and goal for human endeavor. Therefore, through acts of cognition and love, that is, through intellectual desire man is linked with analogously existing beings to such a degree that his internal intellectual, moral, and artistic development is nothing more than a creative interiorization through selective cognition and love of the world of real beings.

There is a sort of circular movement from really existing beings through acts of cognition to the psycho-cognitive soul. In gathering and systematizing these intentional contents, man enriches himself spiritually. Then through his acts of love man somehow “comes out from himself” to the world of real beings as the concretely existing good and goal of human endeavor. The internal growth of man and his enrichment is brought about only through a given being, through reality-nature. This is internalized in acts of personal intellect and will which selectively and in certain aspects, through various acts and human endeavors bring about the molding of the existing reality.

*Three Types of Knowledge*

Our basic contact with the world of analogously existing being is through human cognition structured by the processes of sensual and intellectual cognition in such specific acts as: seeing,
hearing, visualizing, memorizing, conceptualizing, evaluating and reasoning. The contents of every act of cognition comes exclusively from the world of analogously existing beings. It is important, however, to pay attention to the triple character of intellectual cognition as the basis for further personal acts of human endeavor, for according to Aristotle one must distinguish informative, practical and poietic cognition.

1. Informative or theoretical cognition makes contact with reality and assimilates selected aspects of the content of being. Depending on the character and state of this cognition, both its prescientific and scientific phases in a more or less methodical manner internalize the contents of being. The basic criterion of informative theoretical cognition is truth understood in the classical sense as the co-ordination with reality of man’s cognitive and evaluatory acts insofar as he can state that something is as it exists. In informative cognition, it is important to pay attention to concepts which are an intentional, sign-bearing presentation of the contents of the really existing thing. One may objectivize the concept through acts of reflection which sometimes allow one to know exactly the aspects grasped of the structure of the being, to perceive its component parts, and then to deal with them separately and abstractly. In this way, informative theoretical cognition may be used in other types of cognition, namely, the poietic and the practical.

2. Practical cognition is particularly connected with human endeavor, for man both for himself and the surrounding world is the source of autonomous endeavor. By causal or practical reason he can set himself in motion and change both himself and his surrounding world through more or less sensible endeavors. As autonomous these human endeavors calls for guidance and self-determination by the proper act of cognition called a practical proposition: “do it now and in such-and-such a way.” This type of cognition is not at all an abstract cognitive process. Rather, its content is concrete; here cognition is connected with endeavor. Since man is an open being, free to act in a human way, he requires self-determination to act through the choice of a practical proposition. Through these he wills to act and to make himself the source and causative reason of this endeavor. This choice of a practical proposition is connected with a vision of concrete beings as real and realized completely. These constitute the goal and the good which enable man to rejoice and to love, because they provoke a practical decision which determines the endeavor which produces joy and love. Thus, the criterion of this concrete type of cognition which in classical philosophy is called phronetic is the good. It can never be abstract or general, but is a concrete and really existing being. In relation to such good, there are proportional acts of phronetic cognition. These manifest themselves in the continual process of pronouncing practical propositions. From these, in turn, and through the will we chose some propositions, not always the best and most noble. Through them we can determine our notions and constitute ourselves as a free causative reason which would change existing being, called nature. Certainly, any self-determination is at the same time a human act of decision-making on which depends a moral act which is either positive or negative in moral content. Because practical cognition is so intrinsically connected with morality it is called moral cognition.

3. Finally, the third type of intellectual cognition is poietic. This is creative in relation to previously assimilated intentional content absorbed by informative cognition. In this creative cognition the previous selectively grasped real content is transformed. In the act of creative cognition, one breaks down the complex of intentional content which was given in the act of informative cognition. From the broken elements of the content previously grasped one constructs new sets of contents according to the criterion which we have accepted for this creation. The
creative transformation of broken content in poietic cognition was traditionally called a process of art (ars) controlled by a previously constructed intellectual model-idea.

The most interesting moment of a poietic cognitive process is undoubtedly the choice of the criterion of construction and the creation of the new intentional contents to be realized by acts. In ancient and medieval times this criterion was called beauty, though people were aware of the radical analogy of this term. In modern times the concept of beauty was divided into various categories now related to various kinds of art.

It must be emphasized that intentional creativity itself is totally based on the contents of real being, which are previously grasped in a cognitive manner. The transformation of these contents may sometimes be so great and far-reaching that the primary derivation of the intentional contents from the grasped reality is sometimes lost. Moreover, constructed intentional contents in the process of creative cognition never constitute reality, but can be embodied in real concrete matter or spirit, namely, the human psyche. The intentional produce attains permanent existence through its base and through the matter in which it is embodied. Its being is the existence of the matter in which intentional being has been expressed.

Culture

Considering both real and concrete existing being, as well as psychic acts, we see the relationship with being of both cognitive and volitional or decision-making acts. Really existing being as found in the world by man is called nature. The basic human contacts with nature are our cognitive acts as the starting point for further acts based on the knowledge of contacts with nature. Man has no personal human contacts with the world of nature apart from acts of cognition. This contact is not limited to structured cognitive acts, but all personal contacts are performed against some cognitive background because all kinds of practice are impregnated with cognition-consciousness.

Thus, a specific intellectualization of nature occurs through cognitive contact. This is an assimilation of content into a process of cognition; it is also the guidance of oneself in one’s own behaviour through consciously realized models and ideas constructed by oneself. This intellectualization of nature is the entire object of any human endeavor as a given reality. This reality is both man himself as the object of his efforts to perfect his personal spirituality, and the world of beings surrounding man: both the living and the non-living environments.

In short, the reality in which man is submerged both constitutes the object of human endeavor guided by intellectual cognition and is subjected to changes due to this conscious endeavor. Thus understood, the world of nature as the object of human activities based on cognition becomes a world of culture in its metaphysical sense. The intellectualization of nature on a scale possible for man is culture in its fundamental meaning. Culture is characterized by the informative, practical and poietic cognition of man; it is, however, most visible in the acts of poietic cognition described above.

Culture is not limited to intellectual cultivation. The intellectual cognitive processes are inevitable and fundamentally constitute elements of culture, but they are also assigned to such other psychic acts as desire and creativity. Nonetheless, desire, love, decision, or creativity are not always present in all products of culture, whereas the intellectual elements must always occur in the products of culture. This is true whether this product is a conscious modification of man himself

8 See my article, “Filozofia bytu a zagadnienie wartosci,” Znak (1965), 434-433.
as intellectual, moral, artistic, or physical culture; or in nature as the non-human beings which surround man in a network of bridges, towns, roads, transportation and tools. All these bear the marks of human intellectual cultivation and may be treated as the intellectualization to a greater or lesser degree of existing nature.

Naturally, the metaphysical conception of culture does not exclude such other supplementary conceptions as the sociological, psychological, or religious. These conceptions and theories of culture presuppose, however, some basic, fundamental understanding without which the very phenomenon of culture would eventually be incomprehensible. Otherwise it would treat important and significant manifestations of culture without taking into account the decisive factor “due to” (*Dia Ti*) which is in fact culture and assumes different forms. This much was said by post-Kantian thinkers.

Ernest Cassirer, however, exaggerates when he says that man lives only in the world of symbols, and thus of culture, and that man’s access to the world of nature is impossible because, instead of dealing with things or beings, he is constantly dealing with himself as a producer of symbols. According to Cassirer, culture as a *universum* of symbols is like a fine net covering man. Even primitive societies are covered over by a net of culture woven with myths, symbols, etc. Symbols, however, are signs and belong to the category of signs constructed by man. By its nature a sign is a mediator because every sign and symbol is a specific cluster of subject-object relationships because it represents object content to a cognizing subject. Moreover, every sign is derived from and made by man, and presupposes basic cognition that is direct and without signs. Thus, culture is a continual transformation of nature by man. Because this human transformation is based on a cognitively affirmed junction, culture is basically the intellectualization of nature on the scale available to man as a person acting freely in the world of nature.

**Value**

Nature as a cosmos of analogous beings is a mosaic of qualities inseparably connected with being as manifestations of its constitutive elements. Aristotle defined quality as the perfection of substantial and dispositional forms. Quantity organizes matter, sorting out its components and arranging them interchangeably outside itself. As a result being is extensive and legible to the intellect according to measure. On the other hand, being is perfected as regards its form, especially substantial form, through quality. This perfecting of being as regards its organizing or, in Aristotle’s sense, formal factors concerns, above all, structural moments insofar as they to some extent actualize being by assigning it to endeavor which is perfect according to nature’s measure. That is why real qualities which perfect being by assigning to it more efficient and perfect endeavors can be only concrete actualizations. As concrete actualizations assigning being to natural endeavor they make being in itself worthy of desire. Qualities perfecting being strengthen its goodness, which is the object of the love and admiration of the organizing person.

The qualitative character of being has a universal, transcendental scope of which the manifestations are such transcendentals as truth, goodness, beauty. At the same time, it has also a limited scope in respect to the categories. For instance the qualities of a good horse are contained within the limits of the set of horse; the qualities of good steel are limited by the nature of steel, and so on. Both transcendentally and categorically qualitivized being is the cognitive object of our psychic acts as well as of those of desire. Psychological intentions meet with really existing beings which are more or less perfect. It is this being with its qualities and really existing in various forms
of nature and culture as the object of our intentional cognitive and volitive acts that assumes the name of a value.

The content and goal of these acts become a proposition. Our intentional cognitive and volitive acts are impregnated with the content of real being which appears in the form of the being of nature or the being of culture. Thus, a world of values is not only obligatory in such domains of culture as logic, esthetics, mysticism, erotica, and philosophy of religion, as Rikert noted. To these correspond the following values: truth, beauty, non-personal sainthood, morality, happiness, and personal sainthood. Value is undoubtedly a correlate of culture occurring in specific human endeavor, but it is, moreover, a correlate of specific human personal endeavor in relation to analogously understood being. For ontological reasons a realm of values is broader than that of human culture for being as the object of our intentional cognitive and volitive acts is value. This can be either a real being of nature or a real being of culture.

It is probably true also that in the understanding of culture and values the specifically human endeavor is an interchangeable and determining correlate, provided that this endeavor by basing itself on cognition is objectivized by analogously existing being.
We are witnessing a dramatic struggle in the mutual relations between religion and culture. The development of a lay culture and, in certain circumstances, even the purposeful elimination of religion from culture in order that man be fully recognized converge with some of the anti-human implications of the contemporary cultural model. This calls for a reconsideration of the nature and essential contributions of both religion and culture in order to establish a proper relation between them.

**Culture and Religion: The Differentiation of Terminology**

Culture, as opposed to nature, includes all that is formed intentionally and purposely by mankind. In fact, mankind has changed its surrounding reality or world, as well as itself, according to its own concepts and plans. Culture is the process of the transformation that leaves on nature an essentially human mark.

We cannot discuss the cultural activity of a human being without taking account of his or her spiritual-material potential and its social dimension. Cultural activity is the realization of human potentiality through action adequate to achieve specific goals or values. These specific aims distinguish the fundamental cultural domains by their specific values: science by truth, morality by goodness, art by beauty, and religion by holiness. The particular cultural domains depend upon and penetrate each other. In order to guarantee harmonious human development it is necessary to establish a proper hierarchy of aims and values. Each culture is based on this principle, which requires a fully clarified concept of all reality, especially that of mankind itself.

Religion is the most distinctive domain of human cultural activity. It combines the cognitive and active spheres, focusing on the Absolute or transcendent. In its cognitive and informative function, religion broadens mankind’s sources of knowledge as the dimension of understanding in personal life. The religious person experiences new elements which influence his or her outlook if accepted with confidence and faith. This act of acceptance is unique for interpersonal relations. Religion clarifies the relation of human existence to the transcendent “Thou,” pointing out the way in which the fragile existence of the human person is reinforced by its relation to the everlasting personal and loving being. Only through this specific relationship does the full development of the human personality become possible.

Religion reveals the infinite dimensions of man’s life. It stresses those essential goals and values which are the objects of human endeavors. Their realization is the justification of human live and its cultural activity.

In addition to the above functions, religion provides the models which are essential for the development of personal human life. They are also essential in the process of personal growth in a manner that leads to the humanization, and even the divinization, of the human being: to becoming like God.

Finally, in each religion we can find supernatural intervention through grace, prayer, sacraments and ritual. These means reinforce the human spirit in its battle to free itself from the
constantly threatening evil which weakens man’s creative possibilities. Hence, they are also necessary in achieving his goals and values.

**Cultural Models: The Religious Aspect of Personal Culture**

One can observe a significant crises of culture and religion in our cultural milieu. This raises a very basic question: how can one explain the phenomenon of the existence of a lay culture and consumer life style within the almost two thousand year old Christian society?

In general religions, including Christianity, emphasize some general perspectives, models, and means for personal life, but they do not solve all the problems of human life. Religion demands the contribution of human thought to clarify man’s goals and values. Specifically, the contribution of philosophical thinking and scientific models are of great value.

In order to explain the phenomenon of the model of culture, which has been accepted in the developed societies and desired within underdeveloped societies, we must relate it to Descartes’ dualistic philosophy of matter and spirit and to the acceptance of mathematics as the model science.

The “New science” of XVII century, that is, mathematics and the mathematical science of nature, attracted the leaders of the developing and industrializing countries, and inspired the dream of a technical utopia which would completely change the world. This model science would assign the domain and mode of cognition. Mathematics would become the bundle of impersonal relations which result from the knowledge of that aspect of the material reality which can be measured and presented in numerical relations. This very useful cognitive tool promised to transform the material universe. Knowledge founded on mathematics would create omniscient people; in turn, their technology would make humankind all-powerful. Hence, science and technological progress became leading principles in the hierarchy of values. Unlimited production, unlimited freedom, satisfaction in possessing and consuming became the most important values of human endeavors. Because, however, this attitude limited man’s cognitive horizons and therefore limited human goals it differed from Christianity’s hierarchy of values.

In modern society one can observe the decline of the scientific, technological and impersonal model of culture which considered man as an instrument in relation to such impersonal values as science, progress and technology. This model of culture, as well as the consumer life-style, created new and dangerous forms of alienation which limited human freedom by bureaucracy and imposed its own opinions through mass media, as well as the danger of nuclear war, air pollution, and moral and psychological deformations.

Whereas culture is essentially a humanizing of nature, and especially of mankind and interpersonal relations, the acceptance of the impersonal model of culture has changed humanism into antihumanism. That is why there is so much to be said about destruction of the human being in a consumer culture, and about his “death” being essentially connected with the “death” of God.

Contemporary philosophers of culture, sociologists and psychologists now remark the danger resulting from narrowed perspectives and limited goals, with an inadequate hierarchy of values. They call for a new model of culture which would be more humanitarian and would deal with human needs. They discuss the need for a “new science” characterized by humanistic principles, which will provide evidence and develop a “new direction” for man both in his activity and in his interpersonal relations. This would produce a model for a new man, a new society, and a renewed life-style. On the basis of existing achievements, we must create a model of culture in which the human person and the knowledge of his structure, place in society, and development would be the basic goal of human cultural activity. We need a personal model of culture in which a human being
will not be used as an instrument, but will be the main purpose of all activity. Science and technology must be looked upon as an instrument in human development, and as aids in improving interpersonal relations.

The higher forms of religion, specifically of Christianity, suggest a personal vision of human life and humanistic culture. The God of Christianity is a community of Persons relating to each other by love and possessing individual personality. The Holy Trinity in Its personal, intrinsic life establishes the ideal model of interpersonal human relations, and is, at the same time, the unique internal force and final destination of human life. God in the Holy Trinity assists humankind in its life and continues to help it in the realization of its human and superhuman possibilities. Christ, as a perfect unity of the divine and the human, is the concrete example who points out the direction, goal, and style of human development: “I am the way, the Truth, and the Life.” It is necessary to emphasize this essential purpose and personal model in the Christian religion.

This implies an important role for philosophy. While religion receives from above the supernatural inspiration which reveals its eternal perspectives, it is connected to the temporal and changing existence of earthly reality. Therefore man’s efforts to gain knowledge of the whole reality, especially of the human person, is very necessary. Existentialism, by stressing personal human life, the dialogic character of human existence, and the uniqueness and importance of personal feelings, opposes the instrumentalization of the human person. However, because it possesses only a subjective perspective which excludes the eternal aspects of the human life, it is not able to provide a realistic place for the human being in the whole universe.

The anthropology based on a philosophy of being fills this gap. The person as such is the highest form of being. As persons we are able to discover our unique self (“I”) which is essentially different from our acts. At the same time, we realize not merely the self but our unique self (“I”). There are other personal beings with whom we establish interpersonal relations. We experience the limitations and weaknesses of our existence, and at the same time feel the need for overcoming these. While we are “beings in ourselves” and “for ourselves,” we tend constantly to achieve fullness through other persons, and finally through the transcendent “Thou.”

Accepting this primary human experience, we must realize that a human person is not an absolutely autonomous and metaphysically independent. A human being is a person among other persons who form the natural proximate context of human life. The person is concerned also to be united with God, who is the perfect Person. The human person exists through participation in God’s existence, with whom he is able to communicate freely and consciously.

Though this human person is the real goal and destination of all cultural functions, he is not their final goal. The final goal, the principle of human existence and dignity, is the Transcendent person. The affirmation of a human person in relation to a transcendent “Thou” is itself a realization of a personal model of culture. The most humane experience which completes human nature thoroughly is love. It embraces both the Absolute person and other human persons. Therefore, a full affirmation of a person guarantees an attitude of love and leads to a “civilization of love” (Paul VI): that love which is the realization of Christianity.

It is difficult to comprehend an affirmation of a human person which is not also an affirmation of a personal Absolute. No other ideals can satisfy human nature; they are subhuman and their acceptance as primary goals degrades a person to an instrumental role. In contrast, the recognition of God as the fullness of good and the highest ideal, goal and model of human activity, guarantees the full development of the human person. The affirmation of God guarantees a proper hierarchy
of goals and the “ordo caritatis” mentioned by St. Thomas.¹ A culture whose final goal is impersonal is an inhuman culture. It threatens man because it does not make him a better being.

The Motivational and Causal Function of Religion as a Model for a Personalist Culture

The correct understanding of human development is that of a human being in dialogue with God and with other human persons. This is possible only through a dialogue with God and others in time or history and in earthly reality. Only then can the most significant cultural goal, the “cultivation” of man, be realized and completed. This locates the real place and direction for science, technology, economics and politics, which by nature have an instrumental character and should be subordinated to the real needs of man. This implies an affirmation and great respect for life in all its aspects, and an equality of human rights. It also defines a life style which is a realization of love as an attitude of mutual giving or of service, rather than of domination.

The most important aspect of religion, especially of Christianity, is a personal union with a personal God through love. This gives us the necessary motivation in forming a human attitude in dialogue with others. It also provides the motivation, model and spiritual energy to move a human being, to change a heart, to be open to others, to be flexible as concerns social changes which are necessary and in accord with a religion of love.

Taking into consideration the dignity of a human being, religion fulfills the following functions:

a) motivation: it identifies the final goal and sense of human life;

b) model: as example, it models a life-style; and

c) support: it provides supernatural help by means of grace, sacraments, prayer and rituals.

These ideas and norms, as well as the help needed for their realization, are so significant that without them man would not be able to fulfill his goals. This gives man his real value and dignity as a “child of God”: throughout we are given the greatest and most valuable promise of being participants of the divine nature.

The relation between religion and culture is not one sided or static. A human person has the capacity to grow and develop through action. This development and growth takes place in time and history, both present and future. It is only the most general perspective, the highest and non-instrumental value of the human person, and its ultimate foundations and principles which are stable. In order to comprehend this and find concrete forms for the realization of those values, we must make great efforts in every dimension of knowledge and of life. Therefore, the acceptance of a religious idea and model does not diminish the effort to gain knowledge about man. On the contrary, because philosophy has the most proper view of a person and of human values it provides the basic stimulus and authentic orientation for their fruitful development.

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¹ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 26.
Part II
Person and Ethical Values
The Freedom of the Person in Society

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I wish to show how freedom with its essential characteristics is implicit in the notion of person. In a similar manner, the notion of society is also rooted in the essence of the person. Finally, I shall argue that the same root which yields the person, also produces freedom and society. With this step, we arrive at the ground upon which freedom and society—which only in appearance are opposed to each other—attain reconciliation.

The Person

From an ontological perspective, the entity which we call person and which is unique in its independence possesses a spiritual nature (Boethius). “Spiritual nature” simply defines that entity in which the all-encompassing or infinite being shines forth and which, in turn, grounds each finite being and grants participation in its own fullness. Whereas in non-human entities Being is closed and remains hidden, in and by means of this spiritual being it is opened and disclosed. Due to spiritual natures, Being is able to come forward as itself. For this reason non-human things are called only humans, however, are ontological insofar as they stand in explicit relation to the ground (logos) of being (on). The ontic is thus the field in which the ontological coincides with human things, persons, or more exactly, with finite or embodied person. Due to his corporeality, the person finds himself embedded in pre-personal layers, which predominate in childhood, yet from which he manages to emerge through progressive stages of maturity. Herein lies the danger that one might regress to pre-personal patterns and begin to resemble things. Such behavior contradicts the truth that a person is only completely himself when he lives in ways befitting a person. This complete identity is, of course, in principle already perceptible in the very first stages of a person’s life, yet it is fully achieved only when all the essential attributes of the person’s constitution are expressed.

Freedom

These essential attributes of a person are manifest in self-consciousness and the acts of freedom and self-determination. Such acts bring about a process of interiorization, which Thomas Aquinas called “a perfect return” (reditio completa). Through this the person raises himself above the level of the animal, which manages only the mere beginning of a return (redire incipit). As he moves into the external world, the human being returns constantly to his innermost self, i.e., to that depth dimension in which he is totally himself. Further, in this double activity of the self, the person attains a lucid consciousness by which he discovers who he is, and, thus sets himself apart as a subject to whom he can say “I”—something beyond the dull perception of the animal.

As this ego which knows itself and belongs to itself it is able to determine its own actions and decisions. It is not merely at the mercy of inner and outer drives and instincts, so that the instinctual bonds of the animal are not merely quantitatively, but essentially surpassed. Thus a person exists for his own sake, and not just for the sake of the species or of nature as a whole—which is precisely the case of the animal (individuum est propter speciem). A person is an end in himself and can never, therefore, be regarded as a means to an end; this, again, does not hold true for the animal.
The human possesses priority as a person over against the animal which as a thing can never equal the human's unique value and inviolable dignity.

The reason for this essential difference is, as we have already stated, that the animal is merely ontic while the person is onto-logically determined. As the animal cannot transcend the inherent limitations of its being, it must remain restricted to having its being only in certain respects, that is, in a purely relative manner. On the other hand, the human being constantly transcend restricted modes of being insofar as he has already, in a sense, advanced towards Being itself—that is, toward that which is Being in every respect or the fullness of Absolute Being.

It remains to be clarified how this absoluteness of Being is coherent with the two fundamental acts of the human person. With consciousness of his ego, the person achieves possession of himself, i.e., of his Selfhood, and thus comes to know both what and who he is—his very own Being. This does not occur, however, as long as the person is content with the mere appearance of being a self, which is distinct from genuine selfhood. The person is able to grasp his being only in the light of Being Itself, for only the all-encompassing Being Itself can reveal the absolute standpoint from which each individual being reveals in turn what he is. A limited being, on the other hand, can reveal only what it is from a limited point of view; consequently, it can appear only from a particular perspective. Even the human ego, as a relative being, is restricted to such perspectival appearances.

One can assert the same of the free self-determination of the ego. The human will is attracted to many finite goods as its material object. Yet a certain kind of striving will not be drawn irresistibly to such finite goods. This is the desire which, because of its inner constitution or formal object, can never be satisfied by any finite good. Because its striving is essentially beyond all these partial goods, this desire can bring forth, beyond mere reasons why such goods are desirable, its own opposing reasons. Therefore, the free act of self-determination presupposes a striving which is so constituted as to aim at the infinite Good by means of finite goods. This infinite good is identical with the all-encompassing Being Itself. Because only finite goods are to be found in limited beings, only unlimited Being can fulfill such a desire. In this way, the free will of the person, rooted in the Absolute, differs from the limited and unfree striving of the animal which is directed simply to relative goods.

With these two essential acts of the person, both grounded in the openness of Being Itself, we may now specify two views of the person, one existential (existenzielle), and the other based on his openness to Being (existentiale). The former views the person insofar as fully realized in one’s own existential acts in which one is fully oneself. The latter views the person’s self-realization as resulting from the openness of Being. At this point, we once again focus on the theme of freedom which we can now consider under two aspects. First, there is the freedom with which the person deals with himself, his life and his own activities. Second, there is the freedom of an unrestricted and uncurtailed realm in which the person realizes his own freedom of action and his genuine personal life. This realm of freedom has to be granted to the person from other persons, as well as from society itself.

Society

Society arises as a unification of many persons who strive conjointly for a common purpose. Its root is found in the same openness of Being from which freedom also arose. This Being is such that it embraces and supports all beings which exist only to the extent that they participate in Being. This is especially true of persons who depend totally on the event of the openness of Being within
them. Further, this appearance of Being within the person implies also that community with other such beings is at least possible. In principle, this community of persons in Being is unlimited, although its actual achievement encounters continual barriers. An excellent instance of what I mean is provided by the practice of mutual communication between persons who, in contrast to the closed mute bearing of animals, bring to each other that same openness of Being itself. As the human person is a being in himself, so too he is a being with others. This means that he can never lose himself in others, but actually comes to possess himself for the first time as a result of such relationships. In fact, the more he is with others in the depth of his being, the more he is with himself. The opposite is equally true: the more he is truly with himself in the depth of his being, the more he is with others.

In this giving of self to another, two decisive tendencies appear: one corresponds to the relative or limited aspect of the person; the other, to the absolute or unlimited aspect. As a limited being, the person constantly needs completion with another person in order to be a whole person. On the other hand, as participating in the fullness of Being itself, the person communicates this fullness to the other in new and unlimited ways. Consequently, this mutual giving and receiving binds them together in the very act of communication. What binds them together further is the urge to share their own fullness with others, just as they also feel the need to receive.

More exactly, this communication between persons develops in two ways. The first is the I-Thou relation: here the person encounters the other as an irreplaceable partner, not because of any particular performance or use value, but simply for himself. These relationships, often occurring in friendships, may continue for a determinate time, or, as in the case of marriage, may embrace a whole lifetime. They may arise in the workplace, in social encounters or, as in marriage, they may take the form of a physical bond. Often, the I-Thou relation will continue to develop into friendships in which many persons are involved and through such relations a group identity is formed.

This second form of communication in which several persons as in the family, or many persons as in a nation or a state, live and work together differs from the I-Thou or partner relation. For the group identity stresses working and striving together in order to realize a common purpose or good. This difference is not to be taken as a fixed rule, for as friendship is often held together by common goals, so too in social groupings one encounters other persons as partners. On the other hand, only in group relations does one find as dominant the striving after a common end to which all contribute, as is seen in the case of a state. I shall now speak of society in the context of the national state.

**Society and Freedom**

The freedom of the individual person is limited within any given society or state insofar as the individual is directed to a common goal which demands his integration and co-ordination with others. This restriction of the individual’s right of freedom can be allowed only to the extent that it furthers social life in general. This can degenerate, however, into totalitarianism if the state limits the freedom of the individual more than the attainment of the common good demands. On the other hand, social relations of freedom may degenerate towards the other extreme of libertinism if the state does not adequately steer the freedom of the individual toward the common good. This interplay of persons within society must therefore be regulated by means of the legal system which imposes upon individual freedoms essential obligations as well as protecting these same freedoms from either societal abuse or individual violation. It is, above all, the task of governmental authority...
to establish such a legal order by enacting appropriate laws and enforcing them effectively—which under certain circumstances could require even an application of force.

In order to define in a more precise manner the relationship between freedom and society, we must first clarify the question concerning which of the terms ought to be given priority. Certainly, neither can be regarded merely as a means to some other end; rather, each has the character of an end or goal. Thus, in each particular instance, it will always be a matter of determining which one ought to be subordinated to the other. It appears at first glance, however, that society is in fact superior to the individual’s freedom simply because it alone is the all-encompassing whole. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the common good for which society strives cannot simply be identified with whatever happens to be good for society. Rather, the common good is intended to benefit both small associations in society as well as individuals.

A second point is equally crucial: only insofar as individuals are parts of a whole may they be subordinated to that larger organism. But as persons who participate not only in the social whole, but also in the absoluteness of Being--whose absoluteness they thus share--they are superior to society. Therefore, we must conclude that the social totality does not exist for its own sake, but solely for the sake of individual persons. Certainly, in a sense persons do serve the ends of society, but ultimately they exist for their own sake.

One might object that society is not capable then of imposing any obligations on the individual if it is only such a relative, subordinate entity. But that is not completely true if society also participates in the Absoluteness of Being. In fact, we must admit such a participation insofar as persons constitute society thereby making the social “We” a personal construction which is illuminated by the Absoluteness of the constitutive persons. Thus, since the Absoluteness of society derives from the Absoluteness of persons, the latter is ultimately superior to the former.

Certainly, due to the superiority of its power society will always pose a threat to individual freedom. In its most distorted form society can operate, seemingly without friction or strife, to depersonalize the individual, turning him into a robot-like atom whose freedom disappears and who carries out without question the mandates from on high. This is contrary to its genuine essence, however, according to which society constitutes the realm in which freedom finds its fullest realization. In this case, as we have seen, society is allowed to limit certain rights only for the sake of the final fulfillment of freedom. Society must therefore create and protect this realm which allows freedom continually to expand. For this purpose, human beings work together in society to elevate their personal freedom to the highest level possible. Consequently, through their own initiative persons are able to complement the work of society and, often, are able to improve upon it as well. Society is thus stamped by the human and personal character which accords with its essence. This means simply that it is only through persons that society becomes what it is. If this does not happen, then it will degenerate into inhumanity.

The Moral and Religious Background

The obvious misuse of freedom which is always a possibility under concrete human conditions, cannot simply be checked through the enactment of laws or by means of force. The harm inflicted by such abuse, moreover, often is irreparable. Rather, the protection of freedom more often depends upon the inner ethical stipulations which constitute the person’s “moral voice,” i.e., his conscience. These inner restraints help the person develop a correct use of freedom which corresponds to his most fundamental value, to become unceasingly the person he is called to be. In this light, he will in fact accept the duty to live up to the demands of conscience, not only in his
private but also in his social life. If, however, there should arise a conflict between the claims of conscience and those of society, and this persists even upon closer scrutiny, then the maxim of his own conscience must be granted priority even when such moral fidelity carries with it severe personal sacrifice.

This moral dimension of freedom brings the religious background into focus. Up to this point we have spoken exclusively about Being as it reveals itself in the personal life of human beings. However, our initial indication of this all-encompassing Being left it undetermined in itself. Now we must state that its ultimate meaning points beyond the individual person towards a further determination which fully transcends the human altogether. This transcendent aspect discloses Being as self-subsistent, existing in and through itself, and free of all limiting relations to particular entities.

Our attention is now directed towards the infinite Fullness of Being from which finite beings receive only a share, and yet which shines through the individual person in a multitude of ways. Although each finite entity can manifest only a limited aspect of Being, the self-subsistent Fullness is able to manifest itself in persons as truly infinite and unlimited. It follows, therefore, that this Being is adequately conceived only in terms of the infinite fullness of a personal Being. It should not, therefore, be represented as an “it,” but solely as a divine Thou. Accordingly, the human person, in his involvement with Being, finds himself in communication with a divine, self-subsistent Thou of whom the human person himself is the image. In this manner, the human being as person is essentially God’s partner. It is true that in this mortal life the human person necessarily remains at a distance from God, but it is a life which will ripen into immortal life in the presence of God. In this regard, the ultimate superiority of the human being, who lives in society but surpasses it, reveals itself simply because, in spite of his ties to society, the person is constantly able to transcend these relations through his freedom.

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Chapter 7.
Karol Wojtyla’s View of the Human Person

Andrzej Szostek

Before all else, as a philosopher Karol Wojtyla is interested in man as a dynamic subject, who is able to fulfill himself by fulfilling acts which correspond to him as a person with regard to their contents and the manner in which they are realized. Thus, we can say that Karol Wojtyla’s field of study is philosophical anthropology and ethics. All other problems which he touches upon in his works, especially gnoseological-methodological ones, arise out of, and are subordinated to, anthropological questions. The question of the starting point occupies a special place among these problems, as do methods of inquiry concerning man and the paths of self-fulfillment proper to him. Karol Wojtyla realized the importance of these questions and clearly expressed his own methodological standpoint. According to him, both man and morality can be known through experience. As we shall see, the author justifies this thesis by a critique of the tendencies which generally predominate in modern and contemporary philosophy, particularly in ethics.

All of this still fails to account for his particular openness to the experience of morality which generated such penetrating observations and analyses. A search for the source of Wojtyla’s experiential perspective in his discussions about man should note his rich pastoral experience, especially in his work with youth, as well as his encounter with the mysticism of St. John of the Cross to which he was led while still going by John Tyranouski, a tailor who was a zealous apostle of the interior life. These personal experiences would seem to have led Wojtyla to give form and foundation to his sensitivity to the experience of man and morality and also to have convinced him of the fundamental role which this experience plays in philosophical anthropology and ethics.

These experiences, although different, share a similar character and are connected with each other to such an extent that one could say that “the implication of these experiences (i.e., of man and of morality) is mutual and two-fold, because of the strict connection (though not identity) found between their objects. One could thus reflect upon what the general experience of man says about morality and vice versa, what vision of man is revealed by the experience of morality. This second question will be of particular interest to us for it seems that Wojtyla’s analysis of the experience of morality brings to light the features characteristic of the human being as a person, and that these features can be known only with difficulty, if at all, through other experiences connected with man. What this analysis shows is the particular bond between the respect which is owed to each person as the one addressed in the subject’s activity, on the one hand, and, on the other, the self-fulfillment of the very subject as a person. Wojtyla’s inquiries about this object take

2 Cf. K. Wojtyla, “Apostoz, Pamieci Jana” (Apostle, In Memory of John), Aby Chrystus sie nami poslugiwaz (Krakow, 1979), 16-27. The influence of K. Wojtyla’s pastoral experiences upon his creative work is seen most clearly in his poetry and dramas, but it can be seen also in his strictly philosophical works. The author himself emphasizes its importance in the Introduction to Mizosc I odpowiedzialncsc (Love and Responsibility) (Lublin, 1982-1983), 13, 17-18; (London, 1981), 15.
3 “Problem doswiadezenia w etyce,” loc. cit., 19.
place fundamentally in the tradition of Thomistic philosophy, although at the same time they seem
greatly to enrich this tradition precisely because they are based upon experience, in contrast to the
works of many Thomists.

The first portion of this presentation will consist in a discussion of Wojtyla’s conception of
experience. In the second part we will take a closer look at what is characteristic of the experience
of morality. In the third part we sill show what important truths about man are revealed by this
experience.

**Karol Wojtyla’s Concept of Experience**

Wojtyla sets forth the postulate that ethics should be based upon its own specific experience
by appealing to the situation which exists in contemporary ethics. This situation reflects “two
radical tendencies in the theory of science toward which modern and contemporary philosophical
thought gravitates.” One of these is radical empiricism; this requires that ethics be based upon
experience but understands this same experience in such a narrowly “sensualists” manner, that
“according to its agenda it refrains from posing the question which is proper to ethics: what is
good, what is evil, and why?” and asks only “what in a given individual, in a given society, is
considered as being morally good or evil.”

We could call the second tendency by the name of apriorism, or radical rationalism: “in striving for scientific certainty (this) searches for a starting
point in the direct determinative nature of first propositions” which “have their exclusive source
in reason and not in experience.” Cardinal Wojtyla seeks to unite these divergent systems of ethics
by appealing to an integrally conceived experience of morality which lies at the basis of ethics and
to its careful explication.

In the mind of the author of *The Acting Person* the appeal to experience is intended, not only
to overcome the extremism of Hume’s empiricism and Kantian apriorism, but also to harmonize
the divergent tendencies which can be observed in the framework of classical philosophy. On the
one hand, the Thomistic philosophy of being treats the problematics of morality in too objective
a manner at the cost of diminishing the subjective dimension which is so important for a philosophy
of morality. On the other hand, the philosophy of consciousness which is represented by Scheler
and the other phenomenologists excessively subjectivizes morality by isolating it from its real
foundation in the human being.

How does Karol Wojtyla understand this experience which he wants to make into a basis for
his ethics and philosophical anthropology and the most important criterium for the accuracy of
their theses? From the point of view of our interests the following theses of the author are of special
importance:

a. *Experience is an immediate knowledge of a designated area or facts.* This statement
introduces nothing new into the universally accepted sense of the terms “experience,” but rather
calls to mind the minimum content in all conceptions of experience. Nevertheless,
acknowledgment that an immediate knowledge of such a reality as morality and man is possible,
implies a foundation in accordance with which,

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4 Ibid., 6.
5 Ibid., 7.
6 Ibid., 6.
8 Ibid., 12 (7).
b. the human mind plays an active role in experience. Moreover, “every human experience is also some primary understanding and, in this manner, it can be the starting point for further understandings.” This is not taken here in the sense of “ratiocination,” that is, of a rational discourse upon data obtained in an earlier stage of the cognitive process, but in the sense of “intus-legare,” i.e., reading out the interior of an experienced reality. By ascribing such a role to the mind in experience, Wojtyla not only radically opposes himself to all extremely empirical conceptions of experience but, as it were, does away with the sharp dividing line between experience and the interpretation of experience. “The interpretation of morality has its roots in experience. When we enter into this interpretation, we penetrate this experience by an understanding which is given to us together with the experience of morality.” Also, experience itself, through its distinctive structure points out the direction of its interpretation.

c. The interpretation of the experience of man and morality should proceed according to an Aristotelian induction, the extension of which is, in a certain sense, a reduction. The sense of these methods which basically are one and the same lies in a unification of various elements of experience by making clear the reasons common to what appears manifold. These reasons are already present in what is experienced or accessible to the mind which plays an active role in this experience.

It does not follow from what has been said that Cardinal Wojtyla wanted to ascribe to reason the function of constituting the very object of experience in order to avoid a deformation of experience in the direction of Kantian idealism. Wojtyla emphasizes that

d. experience has an objective character. “Knowledge must go beyond itself, since it is fulfilled not by the truth of its own act /'percipi'/, but by the truth of the transcendental object--that which is or exists by real and objective existence /'esse'/, independently of the act of knowledge.” Only by properly respecting the ability of the subject to attain knowledge of an object which is not merely a construct of the subject is it possible to guarantee the realism of the theory we intend to build. The active character of mind in experience is thus the imitative activity proper to knowledge; it is not, however, a creative action.

The next thesis is joined more strictly than the foregoing ones with the specific character of the experience of man and morality, namely:

e. man and morality can be known both by way of external and internal experience. This twofold path presents us with a unique opportunity in comparison to the way of cognizing objects which belongs exclusively to the external world. Nevertheless, this approach gives rise to a difficult methodological problem. In any case, Wojtyla is convinced that both types of experience, even though they are different, “meet” each other on the ground of the identity of the experienced object, they mutually fulfill each other, and even interpenetrate. The internal

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12 “Problem doswiadezenia w etyce,” loc. cit., 11-14.
13 This needs to be emphasized in view of the tendencies which are very strong today, also in theology and attempt to blur the sharp distinction between the subject and object of knowledge. One effect of this is radical subjectivization of the norm of morality. Cf., for example, C. Curran, Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology (Notre Dame, 1977), 203-220.
14 Cf. especially S. Kaminski, “Jak filozofowao o ozlowieku?” (How to Build the Philosophy of Man?), Analecta Gracoviensia 5-6 (1973-1974), 73-79.
15 See also “Problem doswiadezenia w etyce,” loc. cit., 16. Osoba I czyn, 10 (7-8).
experience, however, retains its specific priority. This priority, Wojtyla writes, “occurs however, somehow, through internal experience; it is impossible to catch the specifics of morality anywhere else than in the interior of the person.”\textsuperscript{16} This unique opportunity, which is the possibility of knowing oneself from within, not merely by the external aspects of one’s own life and activity, will play, as we shall see, a particularly important role in Wojtyla’s conception of the experience of morality.

**Moral Value-Dignity-Conscience**

What, then, is morality experienced in such a specific manner? Wojtyla undertook his most systematic attempt to answer this question in two articles: “The Problem of Experience in Ethics” and “The Problem of the Theory of Morality.” These works were intended as the first chapters of a wider study devoted to the conception and methodology of ethics.\textsuperscript{17} Although the further chapters of this work, which the author had intended to be of a similar rank as *The Acting Person* are unavailable, the above mentioned articles allow us to grasp clearly enough his thought. Without going too much into the particulars of Wojtyla’s argumentations,\textsuperscript{18} we should keep in mind that he understands morality to be first of all the value of moral good or evil which belongs to particular acts. Hence he distinguishes the *experience of morality* conceived in this manner from so-called *moral experience*, i.e., from particular acts of choice which are understood and lived out in the categories of moral good and evil. Moreover, the question “What is morality?” and the problematics connected with it, point to the *theory of morality* rather than to *ethics*.\textsuperscript{19} The aim of the latter is to show that, by which acts are morally good or evil, that is, to point out the reasons for, moral value of acts as well as to give an ultimate justification for these reasons, i.e., for moral norms. Since, however, the construction of a theory of morality is the condition for the correlative cultivation of ethics, Wojtyla begins his sketch of the basis of ethics from analyses which are, strictly speaking, meta-ethical.

After introducing the matter by way of these qualifying remarks, he goes on to unveil gradually the specifics of moral value. These specifics can be expressed in the following four theses:

1. **Moral value draws its binding power from the norm of morality**\textsuperscript{20} which is man as *person* together with the *dignity* which belongs to him. Moral value is differentiated from other kinds of values precisely because it appeals to man’s distinctive character as a person. Moral value derives its normative binding power from its essential link with the good of man as a person. “At the basis of morality, and at the same time at its very center, there is found only man as a person. This is the moral good by which he as man becomes good and the moral evil by which he as man becomes evil.”\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{16}] “Problem doswiadzenia w etyce,” loc. cit., 17. See also
\item[\textsuperscript{17}] Cf. T. Styozen, Introduction to “Problem teorii moralności,” *w nurcie ragsdnien posoborowych*, loc. cit., 217.
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] See in this matter R. Modras, “Moral Philosophy of John Paul II,” *Theological Studies* 41 (1980), 683-697.
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] “Problem doswiadzenia w etyce,” loc. cit., 16-19.
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] “Problem doswiadzenia w etyce,” loc. cit., 219-223.
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Ibid., 244.
\end{itemize}
2. **Morality value refers directly to act and through act reaches its author.** Such a positing of value in act and the necessity of transferring it to a subject spotlights the mark of self-transcendence, a feature which is especially characteristic of the human person. Man appears as one who is able to determine himself by his own acts; he can fulfill or ruin himself. Moral good and evil gives emphasis to the dramatic alternative which is laid in man’s hand. “In morality there is contained the proper measure of each man’s greatness. By it each man writes his own most internal history, which is most truly his very own.”

3. **The choice of moral value is essentially a choice of oneself; one’s moral profile.** Here the peculiar twofold character of the act of the will is manifest; immediately it is directed to some object; in a mediate manner, however, by the moral qualification of the act of willing this object, it expresses and actualizes the fundamental decision of the subject: “I want to be good” or I want to be bad.” In this sense, every act of choosing a moral value has an autoteleological character: “Man not only wants good, but he also wants to be good. He either wants or he does not want: the elementary core of morality is contained in this.”

4. **This choice of moral good and through it the choice “I want to be good” is not optional, but is marked by the obligation to bring it about.** This obligation is of a particular rank: it is characterized by an apodicticity proportional to the absolute value of the person: the subject in acting, by his own choice has the opportunity, and thus the duty, to confirm this value by an act. “Obligation indubitably refers to this autoteleology, to the moment of fulfillment or non-fulfillment, which we discover at the root of the reality which is morality.”

It is impossible not to notice how the logically sequential stages which characterize moral value more and more clearly uncover the dignity of the bearer of moral value, a dignity strictly linked with the personal structure of his being. The critical remarks addressed to Scheler in the above mentioned article “The Problem of the Theory of Morality” can be reduced to one fundamental criticism: Scheler failed to see the essential link between moral value, on the one hand, and man and his activity, on the other. This link shows the foundation of moral values in man himself and explains their specificity. Again, this link through these moral values permits us to encounter man in that which differentiates and distinguishes him from other terrestrial creatures. The normative foundation of values, their reference to act and through act to the person, their special double character as object-oriented and subject-oriented and finally the mark of apodietic obligation—all these show that the proper position of moral value is the theory of “medium quo”: by experiencing these, we experience the dignity of the person to which these values point by their entire structure.

Is it possible to experience the person and his dignity? Are not both “person” and “dignity” terms which are so wrapped up in various philosophical systems that we would find it impossible to treat them as objects of immediate knowledge? These questions and other difficulties which they imply can be and, in fact, are posed not only by Scheler’s followers but also by representatives

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22 Ibid., 245.

23 See also “Problem doswiadezenia w etyce,” loc. cit., 238-239 as well as the article “W poszukiwaniu podstaw perfedjoryzmu w etyce” (In Search for the Foundation of Perfectionism in Ethics), *Rocznik Filosoficzne KUL*, 5 (1955-1957), s.4, 303-317

24 “Problem doswiadezenia w etyce,” loc. cit., 237.

25 Ibid., 244.
of the Thomistic tradition.  Wojtyla, however, when he speaks about experiencing the person, does not have in mind a full, theoretically developed sense of the term “person,” but rather that vision of man which constitutes an experiential basis for all anthropology and cannot be said to belong exclusively to any one system. “The person is a reality far more visible than it would seem from the perspective of pure speculation. That, which from another source might be the result of arduous analyses in the area of metaphysics, possesses its own reality when man is the object of his own experience.” Of course, it is necessary to find a perspective in which man is more fully revealed as a person and according to Wojtyla, “the act is a special moment of insight or experience of the person.”

Similarly, just as the act allows us to get a deep look into the world of the person, so morality, which is first of all the morality of the act, reveals above all the dignity of this person in whose name we are obliged to treat the bearer of this dignity as an end, to act according to his fullest possible development. Obviously, this dignity is rooted in the entire specificity of the person, built as it were upon the set of his characteristics. This does not mean however that we must infer this dignity in a quasi-deductive manner from these characteristics hitherto recognized and understood. Rather, this dignity is seen in a manner proportionate to the difference which we see between the person and other beings. Of course such factors as religion, Weltanschauung, the level of cultural development, etc., indubitably have an influence upon the ability to see the person in his specificity and greatness. These influences are not so great that differences in Weltanschauung and culture would make it impossible to recognize the particular rank of man.

“Man has a superior position in relation to all of nature. He stands above all that we encounter in the visible world. This conviction reaches both to the individual and to the human community conceived of in the widest possible sense.” The experience of morality seems to reveal this truth most sharply. The entire foregoing introductory analysis of moral value shows that this value and its complex specifics can be understood ultimately only when in it there is seen the manner in which the person “demands” the right to be treated as an end and not in a utilitarian manner. He who does not conceive of these values in such a manner, who respects these values not by reason of the dignity of the person but because they are promulgated by the power of some authority, or only because their observance seems to him to be profitable—such as man demonstrates his own moral immaturity, for he has failed to see that which essentially constitutes moral good or evil.

The aforesaid characteristics of the experience of morality, although they have revealed such an important truth about the dignity of the person as the bearer of moral values need to be treated further, specifically as regards the manner in which the subject comes to know these values and is joined with them in action.

What does it mean to say that man knows a moral value which is marked by a particular duty? What does it mean to say that the subject is called by this obligation to realize a moral good, through which he will confirm and actualize the good which he himself is as a person? This significant link between cognition and this “calling” can be explained by the fact that man, in a

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26 See, for example, the remarks made by J. Kalinowski and M. Gogacz, Analecta Gracoviensia 5-6 (1974), 63-71. 125-138.
27 “Słowo koncowe” (Concluding Remarks), w dyskusji nad ksinaka Osoba I czyn, Analecta Gracoviensia, loc.cit., 247-248.
28 Osoba I czyn, 153 (146).
29 Cf. in this matter, M.S. Krapiec, “Człowiek I prawo naturalne” (The Man and the Natural Law) (Lublin, 1975), 146-155.
30 “Człowiek jest osoba” (Man Is a Person), Aby Chrystus si nami posługiwal, loc.cit., 215.
specific way, comes to a realization of the *truth about the good*: in particular, he has a living experience of the truth about himself as a good—an end which needs to be confirmed by his own appropriate act. This moment of truth about the good” is grasped by an act of judgment, by virtue of which “the person attains the cognitive transcendence in relation to objects which is proper to him.”31

However, and this is one of the most important notions in *The Acting Person*, it is not only for theoretical knowledge that this moment of truth has so essential a meaning. Acts of the will, too, can be understood only when we see their “reference to truth and their inner dependence on truth.”32 A rational choice must be based on the recognition in the chosen object of the truth about its good, otherwise it would not deserve to be called a rational choice; it would not deserve to be called an act of a person. “The essential condition of choice and the ability to make a choice as such, seems to lie in the specific reference of will to truth, the reference that permeates the intentionality of willing and constitutes what is somehow the inner principle of volition.”33

Thus this judgment about which we have been talking “is not only preconstituted in and by itself through the truth about objects . . . but also makes possible and lays a foundation for that proper relation of the will to objects.”34 The affirmation, the acknowledgment of truth, of the person and his dignity at the level of cognition, is also a summons to affirm this truth by an act of choice, i.e., by an act which in a given situation corresponds to man as a person. In this manner it is shown to what extent “truth is not only essential for the possibility of human knowledge, but is simultaneously the basis for the person’s transcendence in the action. For the moment of truth in this respect, or the truth about the moral good, makes of the action what it actually is; it is this moment that gives to the action the authentic form of the “actus personae.”35

The judgment by which a subject recognizes the truth about himself and which also summons the subject to acknowledge this truth by a morally good act is the *judgment of conscience*. In this judgment there occurs an unusual “self-binding together” of the subject by means of the truth about himself which brings into the full light of day the self-transcendence of the person. This is the truth obtained by an insight into oneself by only I can cognitively grasp myself. In this sense, this truth is untransferable, accessible to no one besides me in all its obviousness, fullness and strength. This is the truth about my inwardness perceived only in an interior cognitive experience; it is the subjective dimension of truth. It is, however, the objective truth about my subjectivity; it is not created by the subject but recognized by him.

The above-mentioned objectivity refers no less to the judgment of conscience than to any other kind of knowledge. We should especially emphasize the subject’s dependence upon the truth about himself which he recognizes in his conscience, because no one other than myself can be a witness to my fidelity or infidelity to this truth. The higher the price of fidelity to the truth which one sees in the judgment of conscience, the greater the temptation to infidelity. Sometimes an illusory prospect of freeing oneself from the consequences of the truth recognized about oneself (one’s dignity) to be very attractive. If however, as mentioned above, freedom “is not realized . . . by subordinating the truth to itself, but by being subordinated to truth,”36 then the “liberation” from the truth not only does not confirm, but all the more fails to liberate the greatness of man--more

31 Osoba I czny, 153 (146).
32 Ibid., 146 (139).
33 Ibid., 143 (137).
34 Ibid., 153 (146).
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 162 (154).
than as one contemporary herald of freedom would have it. Instead, it deforms man’s greatness at its very roots. Disloyalty to the truth about good must lead to enslavement by a false good. Man always tends towards some good in his activity for such is the nature of the will, and when it is carried out an act always shapes its author. Not every act, however, fulfills its author in conformity with the dynamic structure that constitutes the contingent human being and hence “fulfillment is not identical to efficacy.” It is this necessary link between the respect for the truth about oneself, one’s personal structure and dignity, on the one hand, and the self-fulfillment of the subject, on the other, which generates the judgment of conscience and gives it a stable normative character proportionate to this dignity.

The judgment concerns a concrete act; it summons the subject to an act of choosing the known and accepted truth about oneself. This judgment reveals the moral qualification which so profoundly expresses what is essential to the person, that “the person’s true fulfillment occurs not so much through the act itself as through the moral goodness of this act.” Thus the essential “function of conscience . . . is to describe the true good in the act and to create obligation along with it.” In conscience there occurs “this special link of truth with obligation, which makes its appearance in the form of the normative strength of the truth.” In this same act of conscience, normative truth is recognized and assigned. Dignity belongs so essentially to the full truth about man that it is impossible to talk about knowing man as man if we fail to take into account the obvious imperative to treat him as the end of every activity, to treat him as a being who, by reason of his own autoteleology, cannot be subordinated to other ends. This imperative is indeed included in our knowledge of man.

**Love - The Fulfillment of the Person**

Does the subject know himself only in such way that the truth about oneself is conceived of as a normative truth, which marks all one’s acts by an apodictic obligation of self-fulfillment? Indubitable, as has been mentioned, I am in a position to know myself in an interior and profound manner, which I cannot do as regards any other person. Since, however, the act of conscience is an act of reason, just as in every other act wherein the mind knows extra-sensible reality, it grasps that which is general in the known concrete thing. Here, in the rationality of moral cognition, lies the source of the “universalizability” of all moral norms. On this account these norms can be applied to every situation covered by a given moral norm, as well as to every subject who is found in this situation. This concerns also those specifics of the knowledge of the person in respect to his dignity which are of particular interest to us here: if my dignity obliges me to carry out acts which further my self-fulfillment, then it is the same when my activity concerns other persons who are characterized by this same dignity.

Here, the ability of man to find the fundamental identity of the internal and external experience of man takes on a special significance. Wojtyla does not go into the epistemological problems connected with the possibility of knowing the other “I,” but is content with the experientially given, evident proposition that one is in position to recognize the personal structure of a subject similar

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37 Ibid., 158 (151).
38 Ibid., 160 (153).
39 Ibid., 163 (156).
40 Ibid., 169 (162).
41 My dignity “binds” of course in the same ground as the other subject for whom I am in a position of the “person-object.”
to one’s own in other persons, and thus can recognize a dignity similar to one’s own in a similarly normative way. In characterizing the interpersonal dimension of community, he notes that “this dimension can be reduced to the treatment, i.e., also to the actual experience of “the other as oneself,” . . . In order to specify more fully this dimension of community proper to the interpersonal relations of “I-Thou,” we must say that it is in these relations that there occurs the mutual revelation of man in his personal subjectivity . . . In this subjective structure, the “Thou” as a “second I’ represents his own transcendence and his own tendency to self-fulfillment.” 42 On this account “this dimension is both a fact and a postulate; it possesses metaphysical and normative (ethical) meaning.” 43 Wojtyla’s previous inquiries concerning the experience of morality did not reveal so clearly the normative dimension of reference to other persons, because the reductive method of analyzing this experience which the author had adopted looked for the roots of moral values which are based in the subject of activity. Moreover, (and this is indicated by his emphasis upon the priority of internal experience), he thinks that the prerequisite for discovering personal subjectivity and dignity in others is, at least to a certain degree, its discovery in oneself. The strength and effectiveness of this particular “shifting of gears” between love of oneself and love of neighbor, which is contained in the biblical precept “love your neighbor as yourself,” depends essentially upon whether a man has discovered himself as being worthy of love, and if so, how deeply he appreciates this. The “Golden Rule” which Christ set forth in his “Sermon on the Mount” is simply the extension of such an interpretation of the precept of love of one’s neighbor. The rule “do unto others as you would have them do unto you” 44 will only be properly applicable when the one who uses it truly understands himself, his own essential needs and justifiable claims.

Thus, it is not strange that in this introductory interpretation of the experience of morality other persons remained, as it were, in the shadow of the person-subject. When, however, the author of Love and Responsibility takes up directly the problem of love between two persons, he begins by stressing the moral rank of the one to whom the love is addressed. The first heading of this book is entitled “The Person as the Subject and Object of Action,” 45 and the analysis of the word “use” which we find in the first chapter is intended to clarify the personalistic norm. Its negative formulation is: “The person is the kind of good which does not admit of use and cannot be treated as an object of use and as such as ‘means to an end’. Its positive formulation is: “The person is a good toward which the only proper and adequate attitude is love.” 46 This categorically binding norm of conduct is justified by the dignity of the person-object and by his internal teleology which the subject should perceive just as he ought to perceive his own dignity and his own autotelcology which explains the normative character of moral values.

At this stage of explication of the experience of morality we see a similarity to what has been said before; he who bases his norms of reference to other persons upon some other foundation than the dignity of the person bears witness to his serious moral immaturity. Utilitarianism is an example of such immaturity, in opposition to which Wojtyla formulates the personalitic norm. Generally speaking this is eudamonism, which sees the reason for the moral goodness of an act exclusively in its usefulness in the attainment of the subject’s happiness. Of course, man should strive for his own happiness, understood as the fullness of being. But this is not above all because

42 “Osaba: podmici I wspolnota” (Person, Subject and Community), Roczniki Filozoficzne KUL, 24 (1976), n.2, 28.
43 Ibid., 27-28.
44 Lec 6-31. See also Matth. 7-12.
45 Milose I odpowiedzialnosc, loc.cit., 23 (Love and Responsibility, loc.cit., 21).
46 Ibid., 52 (41).
the structure of his acts of will determines him to this, by reason of the dignity of his own person which needs to be confirmed by an appropriate act. This same reason lies at the basis of the obligation to affirm other persons. That someone should not go beyond concern for his own self would seem to bear witness, not only to the fact that he does not set the personal dignity of others, but that he does not see his own specificity and his own greatness. The man who has not perceived the essential and morally important identity between himself and other persons not only fails to understand others, but does not and is even unable to understand himself.

The discovery that “to each person belongs a respect proportional to his dignity” constitutes the next stage in the explication of the experience of morality. This discovery is not, however, the final stage. Love, which is opposed to the attitude of use which degrades the person, is owed to the person not merely because of his dignity but because it fulfills the subject of love in the most profound manner, since it corresponds most deeply to him as a person.

In a certain way, a person is more himself, the more he is for others. Only in love—which is more ample to the degree that it is a “giving of oneself”—that the structure of self-determination characteristic of the person finds its proper place. If one could say so, man “possesses himself” in order that he may “give himself”: the more completely he is as a person, the more he will desire and be able to give of himself as a gift. This gift, in turn, if accepted and reciprocated according to the rank of the person, constitutes the fullest form of the life of the sons: communio personarum.47

This is why the obligation of behaving towards each person in a spirit of love does not lead to a “collision of interests” on the part of those to whom the love is addressed. Such a collision would take place if the person were to be conceived of as a being for himself, who necessarily subordinates everything and everybody to his own benefit. Humans are conceived in such a manner by J.S. Sartre for whom it followed that “Hell is other people.” Man seems to be conceived in this manner by the entire liberal tradition, including the particular form presented by Marxism, which treats the other man as a rival, either individual or class. Wojtyla, on the other hand, reveals the dimension of human participation. By this he understands “a property of the person himself, an internal and homogenic property which is decisive in that by being and acting ‘together with the other’ the person is being and acting as a person . . . one realizes an act and fulfills oneself in it.”48 The analysis of participation arising from the entire perspective of the vision of man sketched out in The Acting Person shows how the reference to others as neighbors and not as rivals has an essentially personalistic meaning. “The reference system of ‘neighbor,’ as the author of The Acting Person describes it

is contained in Sacred Scriptures and so, on this account, is deeply rooted in the whole of Christian culture. At the same time, in practice--most sharply perhaps in political-social practice--the reference system of ‘rival’ is dominant. We must constantly and diligently purify the way we see man in such a way as to be able to perceive to what an extent man is a person and fulfills himself


48 Osoba I czny, 295 (269).
as a person, along with the entire structure of self-determination which is proper to him. This can be done only through the “reference system of ‘neighbor’.

Wojtyła’s analyses concerning participation and its opposite, alienation, serve this aim.

Alienation as the antithesis of participation denotes . . . the limitation or annihilation of all by which man is for man another ‘I’. This threatens the experience of the truth of humanity, the essential value of the person in the human ‘Thou’. The ‘I’ will remain out of and without contact and thus will remain undiscovered in full for oneself. Further, in interhuman relations the ‘neighbor’ disappears and there remains instead the ‘other,’ the ‘stranger,’ or even the ‘enemy.’

This truth about man is revealed in the clearest way by the experience of morality as seen in its progressive stages. The first stage of this application is to show the personal dignity of the subject. This dignity explains the normative character of moral values. The next stage is to reveal the dignity of the person-object. This revelation is possible thanks to the specificity of the judgment of conscience. The third and final stage is to uncover the most profound dimension of the person’s fulfillment, which is the dimension of love.

These truths about man appear in the context of other truths about him. The human being is distinct from other terrestrial beings because he is entirely different. Moreover, the affirmation which is due to the person can be realized only through an act which respects the whole truth about man. It is not enough to formulate a personalistic norm and defend it against the above-mentioned eudaimonistic deformation, although this purpose is still important. We must moreover realize the danger of not taking account the objective, given truth about the nature of the human person and the ways of attaining his fullness which are proper to him. If the truth is ignored, the result will be a blow against man and his good which will be hidden behind euphemistically sounding personalistic or humanistic slogans. That is why this truth about man is so important, a truth witnessed especially by the experience of morality. It would be difficult to put it more concisely than does this citation from the Pastoral Constitution “Gaudium et spes,” no. 24, to which Wojtyła often refers “Man, being the only creature on earth which God wills for his own sake, cannot find himself fully except by a disinterested gift of his very self.”

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8. The Autonomy of Ethics and of the Moral Subject

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It was a truly revolutionary thesis when St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century claimed that philosophical knowledge is different from theological knowledge. For the theory of morality this amounted to a proclamation of the autonomy of ethics with respect, not only to revelation (faith), but also to moral theology understood in the sense of a systematization of the moral substance of revelation. But the exact meaning of this historically significant thesis remains unclear as long as we do not know what Thomas understands by ethics, which he claimed to be independent of revelation.

One will respond that Thomas understands by ethics the philosophy of moral reality, or more exactly the philosophical theory of the moral ought (obligation) and of the morally good, and that as a result the independence of ethics means for him the methodological autonomy of such a philosophy of moral reality with respect to a theology of moral reality. We have nothing to object to this. There is, nevertheless, at least one question which needs further clarification: what does “moral reality” or “moral” mean in the formulation, “philosophy of moral reality,” or “philosophical theory of the moral ought and of the morally good”? Answering this question is indispensable for understanding the position of Thomas, even if Thomas himself should have seen no reason to pose it.

Eudaemonism

The Aristotelian point of view prevails in Thomas when he tries to determine what moral reality is. The moral ought (but also the moral goodness and badness of human acting) is characterized by its relation to the final end of man, which is found in the self-realization which makes up the essence of happiness. In this respect all the differences between Aristotle, the philosopher, and Thomas, the theologian, have to do with content and not with form. The teleological structure of the moral character of the human act, as well as the theory of this character (ethics), are in no way called into question. We have here a teleological theory of moral reality.

If one recognizes the necessity of assuming a final end of man, then one has also to determine the content of this end; otherwise one cannot identify the means which lead to the end. But to determine what the final end of human action is, we must have knowledge of the nature (essence) of man as agent, that is, we need a philosophical anthropology. This is the point at which the concept of eudaimonia is encountered: the concept of happiness (eudaimonia) as the most perfect act of that most perfect power of man (identified as the power of contemplative knowledge) with regard to the most perfect object (the knowledge of the pure act). Only in this way does Aristotle obtain a sufficient criterion for dividing human actions into those which lead to the final end (the contemplation of the Godhead) or are in harmony with it from those which do not lead to that end or are not in harmony with it. This characteristic of actions is for him equivalent to (and not just equal in importance to) their moral character. An act which leads to the final end is morally required, and one which is in harmony with the final end is morally good; an action not in harmony with this end is morally bad. The moral oughtness or the moral goodness of an action comes from the fact that the action is an apt means for attaining happiness, which man cannot fail to will. As
we see, Aristotle’s determination of happiness is the result of a difficult analysis of human action, it is the end-point of a philosophical train of thought.

Thomas, by contrast, is a theologian who derives the notion of happiness directly from revelation, and on this basis develops his theory of moral reality. Here lies the difference between Thomas and Aristotle. We also see this difference in what each says about the final end of man, which of course has a certain influence in determining which actions are morally obligatory or at least morally good. But Thomas does not doubt that the form of the moral act can only be teleological. To call an action moral means for him, as for Aristotle, nothing more than that it is a suitable or an unsuitable means for attaining the final end, which is happiness. Eudaimonia is the crucial point of reference, the norm of morality according to which actions take on and possess a morally obligatory or non-obligatory character, and are morally good or bad. In this respect Thomas is fully and completely an Aristotelian. But does this also mean that he is also an eudaimonist? Does he think that the final end is that which man wills and cannot fail to will, or is it rather that which man ought to will and must not fail to will? The difference is quite crucial: are we dealing here with a eudaemonistic theory of action, in which every ought is reduced to an “I want,” or with a theory of moral obligation as categorical (“I ought”)?

It seems that there is no sed contra which could weaken the conviction of Aquinas that it is the teleological structure of the act which expresses its essentially moral character. But if we look more closely at the moral meaning of the parable of the good samaritan, we find that the ought which is there in question needs absolutely no teleological structure in order to show its distinctive character, indeed such a structure would obscure the factor essential for moral obligation. And we would have doubts of the same kind if we tried to interpret a “pagan” obligation, the moral value of which we can see in Sophocles’ Antigone, as lying in the teleological structure of the act. Are we for instance to say that the moral call to respect the dignity of her dead brother, a call which categorically obliged Antigone to sacrifice her own purposes, her ultimate desires, her happiness, was an amoral (antimoral) obligation, or was this not rather precisely a properly moral obligation?

If the questions which we are asking have some basis to them, then we have to draw the consequence and doubt whether the theory of human action which goes by the name of “ethics” in the moral philosophy of Aristotle and then later in the context of Thomas’ moral theology, is really a theory of morality at all, whether it is an ethics at all. Is it not rather--in spite of its name--(merely) a theory of happiness? But if the theory of morality in the strict sense cannot be reduced to a theory of happiness without losing what is proper to it, then we have to ask in principle whether the problem of the independence of ethics and the solution of this problem is not in reality quite different from the way it appears in Thomas. For though Thomas deals with a theory of obligation in what which he calls “ethics,” it is an obligation different from a specifically moral obligation.

The main objection to be raised against any eudaemonistic ethics, as is well known, that it eliminates from obligation an inseparable moment, namely its unconditional character. But the moral imperative, as the obligation to a certain action, shows itself to be independent of the goals at which the agent aims. In a sense it takes no account of these, indeed it requires their renunciation, even if the agent longs for them with all his heart and knows that he can realize them only by fulfilling the moral imperative. The imperative call to perform a certain act does not attain its moral character from the fact that the act is a means to man’s final end. Even when the goals of the agent can be reached exclusively through morally good action and he really wants to attain them, his action by its very nature is morally good only if he is not primarily motivated by these
goals and only if the decisive reason for his decision is unconditioned and free from personal interest.

Are we not compelled to approve of someone in a particular way precisely for his commitment, his readiness to sacrifice and to give of himself, and would we not withdraw this approval if it should turn out that some interest of his own was the main factor motivating his actions? What then forms the basis for this peculiar approval and for the corresponding disapproval? Is it not because we protest against manipulating another person in the name of one’s own interest, of one’s own self-actualization? (For even if the effect of our action is to help another, it seems that we somehow use that person for ourselves if we act to help him primarily with a view to our self-actualization and ultimate happiness.)

Of course, in intending our own self-actualization our motivation can often, if not always, be truly moral, and we can bring forth morally good actions. This interest in ourselves, however, is not so much per se an authentic moral motivation or the adequate ground of our moral obligation, but rather per accidens, in virtue of a certain convergence. There is a moral imperative to actualize myself because it is only in this way that I can affirm the personal dignity of man in the case where the man in question is my own person. It can happen that his “self-love” requires the same selflessness as in the case of love of neighbor; it can require the sacrifice of my life. The moral imperative to realize myself nevertheless remains a particular instance of the obligation to affirm the dignity of the person in every man, and thus also in “my own” case. For the person as subject lives and acts in a field of moral obligation (enclosed above all by the dignity of his own person as object) and is always responsible for himself, even when his action is directed to others. He can inflict moral harm only on himself, and so he is in a special way, and in a certain sense primarily, responsible for the “personal” as it is given in himself.

Perhaps we can now better understand how it is that one comes to hold eudaemonistic perfectionism. For this position emerges when one replaces responsibility for the person in general with responsibility for myself (that is, for the personal in my own self alone) as the constitutive mark of moral obligation. Perfectionism loses then the ground and basis which is essential for moral obligation. This transition a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter gives rise to its characteristic difficulties. By narrowing this basis to self-actualization (self-affirmation) perfectionism can explain our moral duty toward others only by deriving it from our own self-realization, whereby it is forced to exclude from the definition of morality the unconditioned as well as the selfless.

Deontonomism

Heteronomous Deontonomism

The attempt has been made to secure these moments of the unconditioned and the selfless by seeing the source of moral obligation in the command of a competent authority outside of the moral subject (later one looked for this command within the subject himself). On this view an action is morally obligatory to the extent that it is commanded by this authority, and morally good to the extent that it is in harmony with this command and performed in accord with it. There are many ways of interpreting moral obligation as coming from without, according to who it is (God, society, officials, or even dominant customs) who is said to have such a weighty authority that his commands oblige the subject to the performance of certain actions. In spite of these differences, the theories agree in principle: moral obligation is said to be constituted by a command to the
moral agent which comes from without. We propose to call this view of moral obligation “heteronomous deontonomism.”

When the moral imperative is understood in this way, we encounter new difficulties which had not come up with regard to the teleological theory. For on this view an action which is in accord with the command of an authoritative instance would be by its very nature morally obligatory and morally good, even if it were not in harmony with the inner conviction of the moral agent. But our intuition of the moral character of obligation rebels against this view, and in this case our intuition shows itself to be an advocate of respect for the autonomy of the moral agent. For moral obligation binds the subject “from within” and on the basis of his innermost conviction, and never violates his autonomy. By autonomy we mean here a sui generis ius et debitum subjecti, that is, an inalienable and inviolable right, which at the same time obliges from within. This right is superior to the commands of any authority and has the final word when such commands collide with the “inner command.” The command from without can at the most explain the phenomenon of compulsion and the experience of pressure, since it resembles moral obligation by a categorical character which it too has. But it cannot explain—-even less can it constitute--the phenomenon of moral obligation as binding the moral agent from within.

Autonomous Deontonomism

In light of this difficulty a further attempt was made to comprehend the essence of moral obligation; one assumed that the moral agent is himself able to give himself morally binding commands. Kant, the author of this ethical theory was of the opinion that one can in this way secure what the heteronomous theory endangers, namely the autonomy of the moral agent. If the source of moral obligation is the command which one gives to oneself (that is, a command which proceeds from the moral agent and is directed to the moral agent), then one eliminates the possibility that the autonomy of the person would be endangered by a conflict between one’s moral obligation and an external command. Everything unfolds in the inner sphere of the moral subject, and this excludes in principle any heteronomy. In addition, the notion of a moral lawgiver external to the moral agent is applied to this agent himself; the agent himself is set up as the creator of his moral obligations. Thus this view is equivalent to proclaiming the autonomy of the subject (quo maior cogitari non potest). Have we not finally found the right understanding of the moral imperative and brought out its essential idea, and discovered the subject-matter of ethics for which we were looking for?

Critique of Autonomous Deontonomism

In critically discussing autonomous deontonomism, as one could call this position, we will pass over the purely logical objections which have been raised, for the main basis for rejecting this theory of moral obligation is ultimately the consulting of the “things themselves”; it is the intuitive, immediate grasp of moral obligation. On this basis we have to reject the autonomous no less than the heteronomous understanding of moral obligation. It is the unconditioned character of moral obligation which shows us that its binding force cannot be the result of a command given by the agent himself, that it cannot come from any contract which the agent has made with himself or from any duty of faithfulness towards such a contract. For if the subject were really able to give himself commands of this kind, then he would equally be able, in virtue of the same power, to revoke them. But since it is evident that the agent does not have this power with respect to that
which unconditionally obliges him, it follows that he is not and cannot be the author of these obligations.

It is an elementary experience which teaches us that the agent is subject to moral demands which he encounters as simply pregiven. The agent sees himself, that is, his conscious and free self, as an “I” “encompassed” by obligation. This obligation calls the agent to take certain decisions with respect to himself and others: the self discovers an obligation to take a decision. To say that it discovers an obligation means that the “I” grasps it in virtue of his own acts of knowing. Here the object is an obligation to make a certain decision. The obligation is attained through knowledge in just the way in which any other state of affairs is known. The judgment of the agent only informs him as to what he ought to do. Note well--this is the only source which comes into question here at all.

It is, then, understandable that the decision of the agent can be in harmony with the moral imperative only if the agent acts on the basis of his own knowledge of the imperative. There is no other way. This is why a moral duty, which itself has an unconditioned character, has to take on the form of an unconditioned obligation to respect one’s own knowledge with regard to what one ought to do, that is, to respect the so-called command or voice of conscience. This is why there is no “valid” imperative for the agent if it is not approved by his conscience. In the case of a conflict between the judgment of conscience and the command of an external authority, the agent, provided he submits his conscience to as thorough a “revision” as possible, has “no alternative”; he cannot act against himself. This “cannot” means that he absolutely may not. It is precisely this rule which provides the basis for the so-called autonomy of the moral agent (which is his obligation, and as a result of this obligation also his right, to act in accordance with his own conviction, with the “command of conscience”). It was not Kant, but classical ethics, which was the first to proclaim this autonomy by teaching that conscience is the ultimate norm of morality.

But though this ethics, on the one hand, stressed the duty of acting according to conscience (it held that even an erring conscience oblige), it did not overlook a further, equally important fact. If it is an irrefutable truth that only our own judgment can bind us morally since it is after all only this which informs us of our obligation, it is also true that our own judgment binds us in virtue of the fact that it is a judgment based on knowledge. Thus, it does not so much bind us because it is our own judgment, as rather because it is, at least according to our conviction, true and objectively grounded, which means that it discloses to the agent what binds him objectively and in the nature of things. The judgment does not create any obligation by itself, it is neither genetically nor methodologically any kind of a priori moral imperative; rather it lets the agent know of the obligation (for this is the function of a judgment—to inform about a state of affairs). Further, it is unique and irreplaceable in this role and function. This is why classical ethics underlined the fact that conscience is the ultimate norm of morality, but then immediately added that it is a subjective norm, that is, subjectively ultimate. Conscience was seen to be subject to error, just as is any human judgment in any area outside of ethics. Now we can see why there is the obligation constantly to test critically our own ethical convictions; this obligation is indispensable in balancing the obligation to respect the commands of our conscience. It is precisely of this that the ethical autonomists have lost sight.

Another objection is to be made to the autonomists. Is the moral agent really in a better position as a result of owing “blind obedience” not to another but to himself? For is not obedience to the decree of one’s own will—in calling this decree “practical reason,” one fails to inquire into the basis for its acts—still obedience to something arbitrary and thereby qualitatively expressed the same lack of freedom? Does lack of freedom “in oneself” (that is, with respect to one’s own
arbitrariness) cease to be lack of freedom? This renunciation of rationality on the part of the agent seems to amount to extinguishing autonomy or resigning from it. Autonomous deontonomism demands this resignation no less than does the heteronomous, the only difference being that heteronomism demands this so to speak de iure and speaks openly of it, whereas autonomism tries to make us think that it is proclaiming and defending autonomy, while actually eliminating it. The tragedy of the author of the Critique of Practical Reason is grounded in the fact that Kant in order to safeguard the autonomy of the subject had to forbid asking for the why, that is, for the intelligible foundation of morality. In asking the subject to give up the right to ask such questions, however, Kant took away his right to be a rational being, to be himself. He thus presents us with a caricature of the subject in affirming the latter’s autonomy at the high price of denying him the right to inquire into the rational ground of the moral ought.

The moral ought is thus given to the subject and not created by him in one way or another. The moral obligation is an object of his act of knowledge and judgment. The fact that a moral obligation is given always and only through the person’s own knowledge and judgment explains the stated interiority or subjectivity of the moral ought (and of the entire sphere of morality). While all those philosophers who recognized the so-called principle of authenticity as the main principle of morality came close to this truth, they deviated in another respect from the truth, when they saw in this condition of morally good acts their constitutive ground. For whereas the moral duty is given to the subject exclusively in his own judgment—a fact which makes a morally good act against one’s own conviction impossible—the moral obligation is given to the subject in a judgment and act of knowledge. This reveals the transsubjective origin of the moral obligation. For the judgment gives birth to the moral obligation only inasmuch as the person is convinced of its truth or at least assumes this truth. Hence, the moral ought does not really originate in the act of judgment but in the “thing” (being) which is revealed through it.

To summarize our critical discussion up to this point: in their account of the phenomenon of moral obligation, each of the deontonomistic positions eliminates the objective cognitive, rational element and replaces it with something purely imperative. The teleological position, by contrast, tries in its own way to take account of this rational element, but characterizes it wrongly. For the realization of the final end of the agent explains only a conditional obligation to act, and yet moral obligation shows itself, as Kant rightly observes, to be independent from any condition of the form, “If you want . . . .” The “being” which gives rise to moral obligation is not of the form, “I want,” or “I strive for (something desirable),” it is rather something which in a unique way is to be affirmed. The teleological position wants to take account of both the objectivity and the rationality of moral oughtness (and in its own way to protect the autonomy of the moral subject), and is quite aware of the necessity of rationally grounding the moral imperative. This gives it a certain superiority over the deontonomistic views. Yet, it fails to grasp adequately this imperative, and excludes from its other elements which are no less essential to it. We find, then, that neither the deontonomistic nor the teleological analysis of moral obligation can satisfy us, and proceed now to present our own position on moral obligation.

Moral Obligation

Taking the unconditionedness, the selflessness, the inward-ness, and the rational groundedness of moral obligation as crucial marks of its moral character, the first attempt was to distinguish the moral ought from any extra-moral one, in order to elucidate the essence of moral obligation. Still relying on this criterion, it was found that the moral obligation binds a person to
affirm another person in virtue of the special dignity or value which is proper to the other as person. The mere presence of another person in my field of action suffices to give rise to, and to ground, a moral imperative to affirm that person. In this way we take account of the unconditionedness which characterizes moral obligation and also of the selflessness which is found in the value of a morally good action. The only condition which has to be considered at all with regard to the constitution of moral obligation is the presence of persons, or even of a single person.

On this view we also take account of the groundedness of moral obligation. For the imperative which binds me to affirm another person not only has an evident and sufficient rational basis in the dignity of the other person; in this dignity we find everything necessary for recognizing the imperative, that is, for being bound to commit ourselves to the other person as the other person deserves. One can in fact call a moral obligation a command which flows from the dignity of the person. Of course in this case the word “command” means something completely different from a decree in the sense of the heteronomists and autonomists.

The perceiving of the dignity of another person secures in the deepest way possible the autonomy of ourselves as persons. For when we feel ourselves obliged by the duty to affirm the other person, we feel this exclusively on the basis of our own conviction of this duty.

In the realm of morally relevant things, i.e., of things which originate moral obligations, we find, besides persons, nonpersonal beings, i.e., all other beings inasmuch as they too possess value. But the manner in which nonpersonal beings ground moral obligations is fundamentally different. Hence, it seems to us justified to take moral obligation as primarily an interpersonal relation and to extend this obligation in an analogous sense to the relations between persons and things. Thus we lay down as the foundational principle of ethics, persona est affirmanda, and we prefer this to the imprecise, though not exactly false formula, bonum est faciendum.

The person, then, under the aspect of his dignity--the person as a “someone” and not as an “it”--fulfills all the requirements for grounding moral obligation: persona ut affirmabilis propter se ipsam. This fact shows, and at the same time explains, the primary, autonomous (taking this term now in a different sense) character of moral obligation. It is “original” and “irreducible” because the value on which it is based, the dignity of the person, is equally “original” and “irreducible.”

It is very significant that moral philosophers who are otherwise very far apart philosophically agree in proclaiming the dignity of the person as the object, source and essence of moral obligation. Kant forgets his formalism and announces his categorical imperative about treating the person exclusively as an end. Marx says that man is the summum bonum for man. Thus, we must join them the same list as ourselves, together with such others as M. Buber and N. Hartmann, E. Mounier and R. Garaudy, or K. Wojtyla and T. Kotarbinski.

Let us draw out the important consequences of this for our knowledge of morality. We discussed above the difficulties of eudaemonism in attempting to explain the moral ought in terms of our desire for happiness, and the difficulties of deontonomism in attempting to explain it in terms of command. This shows that the moral ought is “different” from the position of these theories and that it resists all attempts to define it in terms of an ought which only apparently resembles a moral ought. But if the essential content of the moral ought cannot be expressed by means of the logical efforts at definition and deduction, if in other words it cannot be grasped in a mediate manner; and if nevertheless it is perfectly well known to us, lest the whole phenomenon of debating about it be impossible; then it follows that we must grasp it in an immediate manner, that it presents itself directly to our knowing. If it were not known in this way, that is, directly, then it would have to remain completely unknown.
In recognizing this we are admitting the fact and also the necessity of a direct knowledge of moral oughtness. An object as distinctive and as unique as moral oughtness is knowable only in a distinctive way. To the distinctive character of the object there corresponds here the peculiarity of the knowing of it. The direct grasp of the moral ought forms, therefore, the proper source which informs us about the moral ought and which allows us to recognize its objective validity. Knowledge of ethics has no other source from which it can be derived. One can simply not lead anyone into the unique world of moral ought and obligation if he lacks all intuitive “feel” for it.

Some call the grasp of moral oughtness an intuitive knowledge, intuition. This designation understandably is burdened with various prejudices whose reason lies mainly in the fact that the various intuitionists have claimed as intuitively known objects a whole host of very diverse and altogether eccentric constructions, and then have ascribed some kind of reality to these constructions, or some “ideal mode of being.” Their writings swarm with expressions such as “value as such,” “ideal value,” etc. For my part decidedly fail to recognize this kind of “being.”

Nevertheless, do not renounce in principle the reality and claim to validity of immediate, intellectual knowledge. The apprehension of moral oughtness is surely the apprehension of something with its own unique character, but this does not mean that we have to take the position of metaphysical idealism. The ought has its own character simply because it expresses what is due to another concrete person in virtue of his being a person, that is, what is due to the person without any reference to anything outside of him (such as a reward or a command). In a similar fashion it never occurred to St. Thomas that he had to demonstrate to somebody the truth of the proposition, *persona est aliquid perfectissimum in entibus*. No one of us would ask for such a proof. This impossibility of comparing man with any other being in the world, his incomparability, is precisely what is often called the dignity of the person or the value of the person.

At this point, ethics becomes the philosophical anthropology of morality. This is not because ethics is being linked with a philosophical anthropology which exists totally outside of, and independently from, ethics. Thus, the autonomy of the discipline of ethics which was mentioned before, is not threatened by the metaphysical and anthropological foundations of ethics. Rather, from the very beginning, man and the person is a theme which belongs properly to ethics. For it is man, it is the *person* (whether divine or created) who alone gives rise to an “ought” simply by *being*; we have in mind here the moral obligation to affirm the person for his or her own sake, and also the fact that only by *being* a person can one be obliged to make an affirmation of the person. Hence, ethics must not leave itself in order to become philosophical anthropology. On the contrary: this process is inevitable if ethics intends to explain its very own subject-matter “to the very end.” Hence, ethics does not become a metaphysics of morality through a reduction of its subject-matter to that of metaphysics (*being qua being*). This transition from ethics to metaphysics happens rather because the subject-matter of ethics, under the pressure of the existential questions of man as a moral being, calls for an ultimate explanation. If this is so, however, the ultimate metaphysical ground of moral oughtness cannot be foreign to ethics, so that, in looking for it, one “heteronomizes” ethics. What can be more proper to anything or to any discipline than its ground and foundation, due to which it is and is what it is? Which effort can be more proper to the ethician than to shed light on the most profound dimension and origin of that being which brings about the field of reference for moral obligations, and which simultaneously dwells in the midst of obligations: namely, man?

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(Translated and abbreviated by John Crosby)
This essay attempts to show a developmental outline of humanity. The respective elements of this outline are taken from the social and economic sciences. Medicine and psychology, so far as their conclusions are applicable both to men and to animals, are excluded. Therefore, this theory of humanity considers man to be a being exclusively guided by his own mind and will.

To specify more closely the concepts used in the title: *homo socialis* is understood as the manifestation of man in his person-to-person relations. On the other hand, *homo faber* is understood as man’s manifestation in person-to-thing relations. Here “thing” is understood as all of nature which man makes subservient to himself. One should not forget that man himself is a part of nature and, as a result, may himself be treated as a “thing” by other men.

When using the term “development,” one has to describe which direction of change is regarded as being progressive for that development. For person-to-person relations this direction can be described as moving from social integration among people of similar biological and psychological traits, for example within a family, to the integration of human communities which differ in somatic traits, conditions of life, occupations, and aims of economic goals. In broad terms, development is the direction which leads to the integration of mankind.

In person-to-thing relations, the direction of development is not integration, but separation, which means man’s ever-increasing independence from the existing order of things in nature. The process of separation is simultaneously the development of superiority and hence man’s domination over the outside world. Among other things, this authority depends on achieving continually increasing effects on the outside world through ever-decreasing efforts.

**Homo Socialis**

The question of *homo socialis* will be discussed first, and *homo faber* will follow. This results from the outlook which can be expressed as “A person gives birth to a person.” The outlook that a person comes not only from a person but also from things is not excluded. The priority under discussion has more a moral and logical, than historical, character.

**Durability of Cultural Patterns**

a. Among primitive people, socialization occurs most easily between persons of similar physical and psychic constitutions. It is no wonder that the oldest social groups known from the past, or the most primitive groups discovered today by travelers and described by ethnographers are societies based on blood ties and simultaneously inhabiting a homogenous environment. Common behavioral patterns are a typical human phenomenon which is always found in such groups. These patterns are slowly subject to change, but show great durability. They differ according to sex and age. They provide group cohesiveness and ensure each member his proper place.
This durability is not based on inheriting the proper, irreplaceable instincts, as it is in the case of bees. It stems from the recognition of the value of these patterns, which integrate the human community and adapt it to a changing environment.

b. The memory of unique events and actions which are transmitted by successive generations has a great role in determining the durability of the aforementioned groups and in enriching their experience. Each person possesses his own history, independent of the repeated behavioral patterns of the group, and he obtains a certain amount of individual experiences. The relation of these unique experiences to the group creates the group’s history. On the basis of history, clans and nations develop consciousness of their identity, of their “we.”

c. Material good gathered by the aforementioned groups are passed to the next generation. As a result of differing forms of social inheritance, values gathered in this way accumulate and form an environment developed by man. Property which is consciously gathered and developed also strengthens interpersonal relations in the group. Inheritance of this property often becomes the preferred way of bolstering the group’s fellowship, durability and prestige, and this to a much greater degree than the behavioral pattern and individual authority of outstanding personalities.

The above mentioned elements of durability of the primary group manifest themselves in an average contemporary family, however, they play a considerably smaller role in the general system of a family’s social relations than they did previously, and sometimes they are regarded as an undesirable form of conservatism.

Three forms of conscious influence on interpersonal relations have been discussed above, namely: imitation of patterns, maintenance of the prestige of outstanding individuals (heroes) and the creation and inheritance of property. Their common trait is the overcoming of the weakening influence of time. This influence of time can be observed in the animal world, which has no counterpart to human culture and in which, for example, ties between a female and her young or in a temporarily well-knit flock quickly disappear.

Social Relations Among Groups

Space separates one group from another. It poses man with the problem of “we” and “you.” “We” have our own behavior patterns, rhythm of life, inherited history, and environment which we have shaped. “You” have different customs, different traditions, even different tools or settlements built in a different way.

Social relations between groups shape interactions among persons belonging to separate social groups. These interactions occur in what can be termed “social space.”

a. Language is the basic instrument of personal relations among people raised in the tradition of different cultural patterns. The long-term process of the need for contact causes a language’s range of usage to be much wider than the tradition of its primary clans, stocks, or nationalities. Despite the feeling of separateness, people find means of communicating. History provides numerous examples of how a language tie was able to break the enmity of mutually hostile clans, tribes, and even states.

Today the importance of a “common language” is being raised in the field of science and elsewhere. Representatives of the respective branches of knowledge, who use the traditional terminologies of their field, feel the need for the continual perfection of a common language.

b. Language is not the only instrument of inter-group relations. The desire to know what is individual, unique, and unknown in “our” group causes the observation of certain forms of
behavior with respect to “strangers.” Some friendly gestures have to be made to approach them. We expect a certain behavior from people we meet, and, in return, we feel obliged to behave similarly.

Positive law, as the main factor which regulates relations among people from different groups and stocks, defines the unbreakable bounds of expected behavior. In a primary group which could be described as “us,” a law code was superfluous. The oldest formulated laws, which incorporated principles such as “an eye for eye and a tooth for a tooth” or traditions of family vengeance, later took the shape of ius gentium, and today the Declaration of Human Rights. These are codifications of documents common to all people, to “us” and to “you.”

c. It is appropriate to discuss another popular instrument of relations among people of different groups, which is a scale of values commonly accepted by “us” and by “you.” Such a scale emerges when value judgments of some people can be empirically confirmed by others. In this sense, one can speak of confirming the reliability of information, as well as of the value of material goods. However, one needs common criteria of truth to judge the reliability and accuracy of information exchanged. Empirical methods, logic, and the scientific method are increasingly gaining acceptance in the world. In economic exchange on estimates the utility of a good through the use of money. Money in its developed forms has taken the shape of intrinsically useless paper notes or bank balances. Money thus becomes a symbol similar to those symbols used with other information systems. Contemporary monetary systems are slowly achieving a global span similarly to scientific achievements.

The juxtaposition of the reliability of scientific information and the currency exchange rate may seem artificial. Yet one should note that the source of their global dissemination is similar. The value of a scientific theorem and the value of currency can be tested empirically. The difference is that a law of physics is tested in a laboratory, whereas the buying power of the dollar is tested in the marketplace.

The surmounting of the “social space” which separates people raised under the influence of different cultural patterns is thus a permanent human aspiration. This aspiration leads to the creation of social bonds. The most important bond is regarded as the means of communication: the language, positive law, and common system of valuation which relate both to the truthfulness of scientific statements and to the justification of prices of material goods.

*Forces Acting within the Sphere of Interpersonal Relations*

A man acting in space and time activates forces within person-to-person relations. These forces bring people together or draw them apart, they cause the creation and disintegration of social groups. Alongside the primary group termed “we” and a parallel group which emerged from a different tradition, “you,” increasingly there appear new groups, “they,” which are created to effect some freely chosen values. A young married couple can be used to illustrate the propriety of this usage. The couple is something other than “we,” one partner’s own family, or than “you,” the other partner’s family. The new family, which lives in a separate household and which was created from members of two primary groups, can be described as “they.”

a. A conscious control over forces acting within interpersonal relations begins with an individual who has passed through the elementary process of upbringing by his family and who is starting to search for ideals and values, to direct his own life and to decide about relationships with
others. A vocation, profession, career; these are differing outlooks on the process of arranging one’s life. An individual confronts his personal opportunities and desires with his appreciation of the social value of chosen undertakings in terms of anticipated results, earnings, etc.

b. Every person usually performs many roles in various groups. Without breaking one’s bonds to the parent group, a person undertakes many other social roles. Each respective group expects certain behavior patterns from its members, which creates a relatively stable and coherent intra-group system. The key problem is the organization of new groups and the full use of the energy brought by their members in the form of initiative, cooperation, and the will to achieve common values. People who associate not as a result of common tradition or feelings of alienation, but as a result of common aims, usually form the most dynamic social groups.

c. The general social structure simultaneously contains many old and new groups. The interaction of existing forces may result in the strengthening of the fellowship of existing groups or in their disintegration and the creation of new groups, the reorganization and remolding of intergroup correlations, or, in other words, changes in the social structure. The conscious direction of these changes takes the shape of general development plans. In the nineteenth century many theories of development appeared---among them was historical materialism. Today, development plans are produced in almost all countries. In science a new discipline has arisen---futurology. The common trait of these theories and plans is the necessity to coordinate all human and material resources. Thus, economic development plans discuss the full employment and optimization of production factors. The people who make the final decisions about the parameters of these plans are subject to the society’s prevailing concept of the common good. They must also take into account the stocks of human energy and material resources. As a result, society gives individuals the freedom to choose a career, but at the same time individuals are expected to participate voluntarily in the implementation of great development schemes, to serve the common good.

To summarize the discussion about *homo socialis* one has to stress the analogy between the respective stages of individual development, and the stages in the social development of humanity. Upbringing is the first stage of human life. It is based on behavior conditioning and teaching the recognition of authority, of adults’ experience, of respect for property, etc. Coexistence in one’s age and school group is the second stage. A child learns to communicate during play, to behave properly in school, to observe regulations and norms of wider communities, and to assess critically the reliability of information or the quality of goods and services.

Society expects every one of its members to work for the common good in the third stage. One could cite the choice of a profession, participation in various active social roles, the formation of new groups, and finally participation in the responsibility for the fate of global society, often in terms of “us,” “you,” and “them” on a global scale.

**Homo Faber**

*Homo socialis* is subjected to society, is a part of it. Other people taught him how to live and expect from him a well-defined contribution to realize the values recognized by society. *Homo faber* is superior to nature, the master of it. The direction of development of person-to-thing relation could thus be discussed as the growth of the range of freedom of human beings in relation to nature.

Man’s technological and economic activity supplies the greatest data necessary to follow the process of “making the earth one’s servant.” This process will not be discussed in as great detail
as were person-to-person relations, since technological and economic history is usually being presented much more clearly nowadays than the history of the development of social relations. Like in the case of the person-to-person relations, the story of the person-to-things relations may be divided into three stages, which take into account: course of action over time, overcoming space which separates subjects of action, and mastering the energy involved in the process.

Course of Action over Time

It is assumed that the first stage of human independence from nature was when man ceased to identify himself with the environment. Man noticed his independent existence and distinguished actions taking place around him from his own actions. External events at the same time ceased to determine his own routine. The ability to guide his imagination independently from the input of outside sensations enabled man to master his own movements. For example, the manus skill of the human hand can be regarded as an evolutionary product of this phase. The fact that man learned how to master himself and simultaneously observed the external result of events taking place in his environment and independent of his internal processes, can be described as the acquisition of a real, external time, in contrast to “psychic time.”

Overcoming Space which Separates Subjects of Action

The second stage of homo faber was the mastering of activities of other beings similar to us. It was the period of animal domestication and plant cultivation, as well as--or perhaps mainly--a period of acquiring the ability to direct other people. All the more important forms of managing great state and economic organizations were already created in ancient times. The peak of craftsmanship and of the expression of thought was already attained. Man was immortalized in art and moral doctrines, but at the same time masses of people were enslaved. The earth’s surface was divided by property laws and assigned to particular individuals. Man was able to master in his external environment, that, which beforehand he was able to understand and master within himself; he became the measure of things and of other people. Gods were also given human forms.

Mastering Energy

Homo faber of the third stage noticed the variability in the relations between laborer and object, between cause and result, or between two things affecting each other. He become not an artist of forms and shapes for other people or for things, but an engineer directing the energy of action. First, he mastered the psychic energy of medieval people, then water, steam, electric, or nuclear energy. Cybernetics, computers, and automation epitomize contemporary achievements. Thanks to them a human signal becomes a command for a machine. People-to-thing relations have become similar to the situation where the “Person” says, “Let it be,” and the object obediently executes the order.

The history of humanity is a fabric on which reflections about the development of homo faber have been weaved. It could have been done in much the same way on the fabric of the psychological development of an individual. A child starts on his road of life by separating himself from his environment, differentiating himself from his mother, mastering his uncoordinated movements, and directing the flow of his imagination. Later comes the period of greater objectivity, recognition of authority, rebellion, idealism, and doctrinairism, when his relation to
the surrounding world is formed and perfected. Not every person is able to truly taking the third step and impartially viewing his own strengths and energy in comparison to his mission in life. Breaking away from the world of existing relations is a necessary condition of perceiving the possibilities of creating a new world, which would have a consciously chosen framework of personal and material relations, a new organization, and new technical systems.

The development of interpersonal relations, from the maintenance of groups and authority, through universality and the material truthfulness of information, leads to the ability to coordinate and implement energies directed to the common good.

The stages of development of *homo faber* consist of the possibilities of human action and his liberation from material necessities.
Man and Death: A Philosophical Study

Antoni Siemianowski

Human attitudes toward death, as well as our behavior in the face of death, have changed in the last quarter of the century: death and dying stopped being an unmentionable question and became the topic of numerous discussions. Now death is being interpreted in various aspects (medical, psychological, legal or sociological) by thanatologists who treat this fact in a scientific manner and propose rational attitudes on death.

Whereas nuclear arms imply the possibility of total destruction of life, while contemporary medicine creates an opportunity to prolong life. On the other hand, terrorism courts death, while some people demand the right to so-called death with dignity and promote mercy-killing or suicide. There is then a rising interest in death.

One can ask, however, if it is possible to explain death in a scientific way. May one demand his or her right to die in the same way as human beings demand their right to live?

What is death: is it a phenomenon of life, its natural end? What is the ultimate sense of death in the total existence of man? If Thanatologists do not answer these questions clearly, can philosophy give proper answers? Certainly, it should search for them. From the philosophical point of view we should recognize first that we can experience death, because we ought to know the cognitive value of our conceptions and judgments about death and its relation to with the whole of human existence.

Only human beings experience death as an ultimate and shocking event. In the world of nature we deal only with the phenomenon of passing, which is something natural for animate creatures other than human beings. Why does man experience death as something unnatural; what does he see in it? One cannot totally experience its essence for when he dies he experiences it personally but cannot transmit the content of his experience to the others after his death. He falls absolutely silent; the dead ones tell us nothing about death and about the life that follows.

We can experience death only in others’ dying and only until they actually die. So it is given to us as an ultimate personal event in the life of another human being, never as an event of mine. This is the principal limitation of the possibility of our experience of death. We know that it must happen, but it is always far away from us. Thus, it is given to us in a one-sided manner; exclusively on that side of life. Death itself designates the limits of the possibility of its experience.

This should be considered in philosophy. All the conceptions of death and of its connection with the whole of our existence are based on one-sided incomplete experience, which is had in the life time before death, never after it. Our understanding of death is given to us exclusively on the basis of the self-understanding of a living-man, who is inevitably approaching death as the ultimate event of his life. Thus, we come to an understanding of death by analyzing our actual existence in the light of the one-side experience of death and dying by the others.

What can we say of death itself. We are absolutely sure that it will come into our lives: each of us certainly will die. What can it be then: the law of life and destination of our existence; the entrance into a new life, or a total destruction of our being?

Death comes into our lives without any rules, inconsiderately and irrationally, as a thief, a dark power that we cannot control or understand. Let us try to analyze these various ways. 1. The death of an old man or woman as a quiet end and passing away of life. 2. A sudden death of a man
dying in his prime as a tragic breaking of life. 3. Death as a result of an incurable disease taken as a liberation by the neighborhood of the dying man and sometimes also by himself. 4. A death that breaks the bond of love as an inexpiable enemy of life. 5. Death experienced consciously in the unity with God as passing to a new life.

The analysis of the above-mentioned manners in which death comes into someone’s life allows us to make the following statements.

1. In each case death annihilates the visual presence of man among the living; it takes him away from the community of life. This negative element of death is aggressively evident to us because we have to remove the corpse as soon as possible. Therefore we experience death as a dark, damaging force, inimical to life.

2. This negative element makes us treat death as an unnatural and odious phenomenon, even in the case where someone dies quietly in the old age. It is difficult to understand death as a natural end of life or liberation, because the visual existence of man is absolutely annihilated, so that we do not know what happens to him.

3. Death as negative and inimical to life is hardly considered as a natural and normal law of human personal life, even when it is assumed to be something natural for the human system. A human being as a person is intrinsically directed toward life; he transcends the world of the values created by himself and therefore experiences death especially as something unnatural and shocking for his desires and creative actions.

4. Death comes into human life in an irrational way and is itself an irrational event as the end of life, because it explains nothing and does not solve anything in a positive way. So it is difficult to consider the phenomenon in question as a wise law of nature for human beings.

5. Death cannot be given any exact definition or conceptions: it is something basically negative and absurd. Its “eidos,” its own “What” is best expressed with the image of a skeleton with scythe. Anything that could positively be said of death, e.g., that it introduces seriousness in human life or makes us spiritually mature, can be derived from the fact that human beings discover some sense for the experience of death in themselves as a religious act of sacrifice for some other higher values or as an act of resignation.

In view of such experiences of death it is remarkable that human beings have been opposing the idea of personal immortality to the phenomenon of death throughout the history of mankind. What is the reason of this fact: is it only the fear of death, or, is it perhaps some experience of the immortality of our own selves?

It should be remembered that the conception of soul itself and of its immortality is posterior to the idea of personal immortality. The conception of an immortal soul is connected with the attempts to find some rational arguments that have been being made since the birth of philosophy. The primary source of the idea of immortality and the hope of lasting after death is the consciousness of the sense and value of being a personal “I.” Such an interpretation is made evident by the historically common facts of burying human corpses and worshipping the dead ones. Since the very beginning of history humans have experienced the fact of being a personal “I” as something high and precious, regarding themselves as transcendent entities in the world of nature. Thus, they have been worshipping the bodies of the dead and burying them with the hope of a future meeting and continuation of life, understanding that the destination of a human being as a person is to be, rather than falling into oblivion as a nonentity.
All later ontological arguments for the immortality of man were derived from the above-mentioned preunderstanding of the sense and value of being a person. It is remarkable, however, that in all cultures known to us human beings connected their primary consciousness of the sense and value of being a person with some religious experience, referring their own existence to the absolute "Thou" of God. The religious understanding of human existence in the world always made them experience death in their lives in terms of awaiting hopefully the new life that would be given to them by God (or the gods).

Human beings always tend to interpret the fact of their inevitable death and to give some sense to it. Their freedom is expressed in taking various attitudes. However, we do it always in a manner depending on our understanding of ourselves and of our existence in the world, because it is only our consciousness of the sense and value of life (whether it be spontaneous or philosophical) that allows us to perceive immortality as our eternal significance and destination. Man knows that as a person he deserves the eternal life.

A philosopher is not able to give a "stronger" argument for immortality. However, if he believes in Jesus Christ and His promise that a person will live even when he dies (cf. J 11:26), this argument will satisfy him.
Part III
Person and Knowledge: Metaphysics and Science
On Creation without Anthropomorphisms

Michael Heller

Introduction

As man comes to think of creation, he is confronted with such various questions as:

- should creation be conceived as a single act calling the world into existence or rather as a complete dependence of a contingent being upon the Absolute?
- did God create the world into time and space or simultaneously with time and space?
- what is the relation between Creation and evolution: has the world been created “ready-made,” or is it still “in the making,” in a state of continual evolution and creation?

Practically, all questions of this kind have met with all possible answers, indeed in this domain questions have more value than answers. In philosophy, answers contain elements of novelty only if they contribute to a better understanding of questions.

Questions relative to creation are of a particularly delicate character since they refer to the Artisan-Maker of the world. Thus anthropomorphisms are inevitable and may go as far as to completely distort the sense of questions.

Therefore I shall attempt a different approach to the problem of creation. As a human, I have good reason to believe that my questions will make sense, as long as they concern this world, even if they go somewhat beyond direct empiricity. I am going to speak about creational attitudes as a man committed to this world and this life. If I succeed in avoiding openly mentioning such words as: “God,” “Creator” and “Absolute” so much the better, because the hazard of anthropomorphic distortions will thus be reduced (although it should be remembered that some anthropomorphisation cannot be helped).¹

My tentative approach to creation does not pretend to be a new philosophical solution of this issue; it casts in its lot with the other philosophies. Even if it seems to ascertain something, in fact it poses questions. However, if the questions are formulated more correctly (or more profoundly), this is already a step forward.

The Question

To say that science exists implies that it is capable of existence. By saying that science explores the world we presume that the world is explorable. Such statements sound like truisms, not while considering; yet, for quite a long time philosophers of science have been paying attention to the rich, and by no means common-place, contents of such statements.

The conjecture that the world is explorable seems to be devoid of meaning because we have become used to our living in an explorable world. Science is reducing largely to the art of forecasting future events. Everyday life also relies on forecasts. When I take a step forward, I must have some idea of what will happen to my body. The possibility of making forecasts means that

¹ Overt anthropomorphism may sometimes prove to be a handy trick in presenting very abstract ideas.
in nature many things are “not allowed” and that the “game must be played according to the rules,” which must also be obeyed by nature. Some natural limitations may have a fundamental character, as for instance the statement that a material body cannot be present in many different places at one time. There is a kind of continuity in the existence of material bodies. A body cannot suspend its own existence, i.e., disappear and reappear and so on. Thanks to such limitations, forecasting is possible in everyday life. Other limitations are of a more subtle (less obvious) character. For instance, movements of certain sets of material bodies are possible only within the laws of Newtonian mechanics while other sets (e.g., consisting of elementary particles) can move only according to the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics. Such limitations are called laws of nature and it is to them that we owe our scientific ability to forecast future events.

The concept of the laws of nature as limitations which single out a subclass of events allowed to happen, from a class of “absolutely all possible events” (chaos), is due to cybernetics (or more strictly to information theory). Transition from a class of greater multiplicities to a class of smaller multiplicities (i.e., limitation of possibilities) amounts in cybernetics to stepping up the degree of information, whereas, complete chaos means total lack of information.

Thus, from the limitations imposed upon nature, a certain amount of information is derived. It may be that its number is infinite. At any rate, more limitations mean more information. Decoding the information “recorded” by nature is the function of science.

The assumption of the world’s explorability cannot be proved empirically. All empiricism, as well as all exploration, must take its validity as granted.

No mathematical equation could be fitted to comply with nature if nature were void of information (i.e., if it lacked coded information); nature would then evade mathematical description or be non-mathematical. Therefore the statement that “in general, there are limitations in nature” is tantamount to saying that “nature is mathematical” (can be described mathematically). Moreover, it can be described not only “in general” (nature is not non-mathematical) but the limitations are so substantial that nature can be described—with good approximation—by reasonable regular mathematical functions. To express our surprise at this fact, we may simply ask: “Why is nature mathematical”? Here two points in question are touched upon: first, why is nature not non-mathematical and second, how is it that nature can be described by fairly regular mathematical functions?

As a result, we have three worlds: the material world, the world of mathematical ideals, and the man who knows that some mathematical worlds (some functions) fit into the material world satisfactorily. All three “worlds”: matter, mathematics and man, are involved in the question “why is nature mathematical?”

The philosophy of science has discovered the fact, on which the very existence of science rests, that nature is explorable. It also put the question: “Why is nature explorable? and demonstrated its originality. Now, the possible answers to that question should be examined. As will be shown, they extend beyond the domain of the philosophy of science (methodology) and are closely linked to some philosophical systems.

Three Answers

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3 An interesting proof of this theorem is found in J.G. Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks at Science (New York, 1959).
It seems that a priori three answers are possible to the question about the mathematical character of nature. As we have seen, three things are involved here: nature (matter), man and mathematics. Depending on which is credited with priority, three possible answers are obtained, as follows:

1. The reason for the mathematicity of nature rests with matter: matter is prior to mathematics, mathematics owes it existence to matter. After all, man has developed mathematics by abstracting some numerical properties of matter. For instance, the concept of numbers stems from frequent repetition of the process of counting material objects (e.g., fingers). Such an attitude seems fairly convincing and compatible with common sense.

2. The reason for the mathematicity of nature rests with man. Through the very process of cognition, men, in a way, projects the mathematicity (rationality) of his intellect onto nature. The question: “why is nature mathematical?” should be answered: “because such are the qualities of our intellect.” Today this is a widely accepted view, in agreement with contemporary tendencies to anthropologize, i.e., to approach all philosophy from the point of view of man.

3. Neither man nor nature, but mathematics is the primary factor. Mathematics is not inherent in matter, but exists independently. It is possible freely to conceive mathematical theories which-at least initially--bear no direct relation to the material world. However, mathematics is not man-made. Man has only the free choice of axioms and there his creativeness ends. Drawing conclusions from once accepted axioms (according to established rules) is a necessary, explicitly determined procedure. In a sense, man does not invent laws of mathematics, he discovers them. Nature is only the “realization” of some mathematical theories.

It is possible to prove the following theorem: a set of all possible mathematical functions is essentially larger than a set of all sensible (not necessarily true) statements about nature. Considering that not all sensible statements about nature are laws of nature, it is evident that there are more laws of mathematics (mathematical functions) than laws of nature. In fact, nature is the realization of only part of mathematics.

Opinion (3) (mathematics) is typical of many theoretical physicists who have very often predicted hitherto unknown properties of the material world. To them and in their scientific usage a mathematical function is often more tangible than the property of an object they seek to define. At least some of them dream of finding one set of equations--called, precociously, the unitary field theory--comprising all physics. It should be noted that equations are already known that do comprise large areas of physics (the equations of Einstein, Schrodinger, Dirac).

Answer (2) (man) is just an ostensible answer. For one thing, man is part of nature and therefore nothing is gained by referring to the mathematicity of human intellect in order to explain the mathematicity of nature. Second, how can the mathematicity of the human intellect be explained? Finally, history contradicts interpretation (2). If the characteristics of our cognitive apparatus were projected onto the outside world then we would know beforehand which of the possible theories are right or, more precisely, only the one theory projected by our cognition would be possible, whereas in science controversies exist and, as a rule, are cleared experimentally (and not arbitrarily).

The answer of type (1) (nature/matter) stresses the fact that mathematical ideas are developed from material objects by abstract speculations. Man thus shapes, for himself, mathematical ideas of the simplest kind. We may well say that man has developed the ideas of Euclidean geometry by refining the practice of surveying (in connection with the yearly overflow of big rivers), but non-
Euclidean geometries have grown out of purely theoretical speculations concerning the so-called fifth Euclidean postulate and bear no direct relation to ideas abstracted from any features of material objects. After all, it is not important how man has come by all sorts of mathematical ideas and the point is whether mathematical theories can exist independently of matter. Theoretically speaking, today we know an infinite number of geometries. Does it mean that the space (or the space-time) of the real world obeys them all simultaneously or, speaking more precisely: will all geometries find application in physics, some time in future?

Today we are reluctant to use such philosophical language. Ideas like these are preferably expressed as follows: if certain quantities occurring in a mathematical theory can be correlated to some measurable physical phenomena then we say that this mathematical theory has become a physical model of this particular reality. We may ask if all possible mathematical theories are physical models of a physical reality? In the light of what has been said it seems that the answer should be negative.4

The answer of type (3) (mathematics) shows visible traits of platonism: mathematics is the really existing world of ideas while material objects are only their shadows. This kind of neoplatonism may assume--and in contemporary philosophy of mathematics it really does so--various forms: from extreme conceptual realism to forms so moderated that any reference to Plato reduces to simple comparison. This type (3) of answer can also be regarded as a synthesis of answers (1) and (2), for the mathematical world has two quasi-complementary faces: one is the “world of matter,” the other the perceiving intellect of man. We shall not go into this subject any deeper. Obviously, it is related to the problem of mathematical existence.

I am inclined to regard answer (3) as an element of creationism,5 or more precisely, as an element of this version of creationism which I am going to expound here. Nature is mathematical in that it contains a certain amount of information, or still better, it is in itself a sort of information. The task of science is the study of nature, or decoding this information.

Let us now reflect upon one essential fact. In the so-called theory of information--in agreement with what was said before--increase of information is equivalent to transition from a set of “more potentialities” to a set of “fewer potentialities.” In other words, information implies limitation of multiplicity, which produces a better ordered set. In the theory of information, sets of material objects are generally examined under the assumption that the laws of nature are already in force: all possible structures are conceived within the same framework of the laws of nature as containing the same elements. On the other hand, creationism, as I understand it, is information-contained-in-nature and takes us a step further.

Here we have two sets: one contains all possible mathematical worlds (mathematical theories). We may call it the “world of worlds.” The other is the one mathematical world which reflects our material reality (the physical model of material world), or “our world.” The information-contained-in-nature consists in the transition from the “world of worlds” to “our world.” It is tremendous information reducing the innumerable multiplicities of all possible worlds to the one real world.

In the ordinary theory of information we act within the existing laws of nature while in the version of creationism proposed here I am trying to understand the origin of the laws of nature as the information-contained-in-nature.

4 A strong case for this point is in the theorem proved by Kemeny, see footnote 3.
5 Although, referring to God’s omnipotence, it might be possible to imagine the creation of the world in a way consistent with answer (1). In this case, a certain accent of interpretation (1) should be modified according to the spirit of creationism. Vice versa, interpretation (3) can be explained in the spirit of atheism or pure pantheism by shifting the accents correspondingly.
Important Ethical Questions

The information-contained-in-nature (the mathematicity of nature) may be called the logical (or mathematical) sense of nature. Man and his life belong to nature. Here also questions arise as to the sense of life and death, of good and evil, of penalty and justice--the so-called existential problems of mankind. Such questions have important ethical meaning.

A priori two attitudes are possible (if the positivist attitude is rejected as denying meaning to questions about sense, which attitude, I believe, is an evasion, not an answer):

A. Man and his existence are devoid of sense,
B. They make sense.

I find ethical nonsense incompatible with the logical sense of nature. Inevitably the question suggests itself whether it is through man that absurdity invades nature?

The ethical (existential) sense of man’s life has nothing in common with such problems as, for instance, the law of gravitation, but it does have something in common--I suspect--with the very existence of laws of nature as well as with the fact that the world is logical and reasonable. What I call the “ethical sense” does not follow directly from nature’s “logical sense.” However, I would see an incongruity in accepting the logical sense (which is implied by the existence of science) and, at the same time, rejecting the ethical sense. This incongruity is, in my opinion, incompatible with creationism. A creationist stands for answer (B).

The Outlook on Life

The former step played an important part in forming views on creationism. However, I believe creationism to be something more than simply a set of purely theoretical ideas. It is also an outlook on the world and on man’s existence.

If there is logical sense and if I can perceive it, it gives rise to my optimistic attitude towards the world. I would speak of “cosmic” optimism if the word “cosmic” enjoyed the same good reputation as in the past. If I believe in an “ethical sense” in life, then the natural outlook on life is optimistic and we can speak safely of “ethical optimism.”

I admit that neither kind of optimism mentioned here is clearly defined. However, both are outlooks on life and not merely terms in a philosophical vocabulary. The outlook on life crystallizes only in a given reality and assumes as many forms and shades as there are human realities. I would simply say that the optimism I am speaking of has nothing to do with the gullible admiration of the marvelous (I) and of the wonderful (II), although sometimes heroically difficult (III), human life. Optimism is not a stimulant pill but a realistic attitude.

I believe that my optimistic outlook on nature should extend also to science concerned with its exploration: the process of exploring the world (the pursuit of science) makes man (mankind) better and improves the world to better suit man’s goals unless man himself interferes. An optimistic view of one’s own (and other’s) existence must lead to some kind of ethics and to living up to its standards in the belief that it makes sense.

Such thoughts are quite sketchy, and with intent. Here creationism is not an end but just a starting point for shaping outlooks.
Can one be a creationist and say nothing about God? If one insists on making everything perfectly clear one had better drop the adjectives “logical” and “ethical” in the expressions “logical sense” and “ethical sense,” treat both senses as identical, and spell them with a capital S. However, one can often say more and express oneself more correctly without words.

What is the relation between the above-mentioned creational attitude and the image of the world shaped by modern sciences?

This question is easily answered, for creationism is not founded on scientific achievements. Especially the problem of the initial cosmological singularity (“beginning of the Universe”), and its interpretation, offer no justification for creationism. However, the very existence of science is, as was demonstrated, of primary importance to creationism. The existence of science proves that some information is contained, or some idea is coded, in nature and that it can be decoded in terms of mathematical functions. To put it into more traditionally creational language, we may say that nature is designed according to a rational plan. The task of science is to decode this plan.

Creationism—as was said—presumes, among other things, a certain outlook on nature and on science engaged in its exploration. The image of the world presented by science cannot be insignificant to this outlook. In fact, the “image of the world” is but a part (or perhaps better, an approximation) of the information coded in nature which the man has already been able to decipher. In terms of creationism: it is part (or approximation) of the pattern after which the world has been programmed.

In decoding this plan, all branches of empirical science have an equal share: physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology and others. The author is perhaps apt to credit cosmology, more than other disciplines, with shaping the image of the world, not so much because the image outlined by cosmology is very general but because he is more familiar with this branch of science than with others.

In the context of these attitudes, mathematics plays a singular part, because it takes no interest in the actual empirical world but simply discovers all possible worlds; it investigates what we call the “world of worlds.” The task of empiricism will be matching one of these possible mathematical worlds to “our world”; that is how the “basic pattern” is discovered after which the world in which we live has been made.

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Epistemological Aspects of the Relationship between Science and Theology

Józef M. Zycinski

Attempts to create a conflict between results of natural sciences and conclusions of theology reached the peak of popularity at the end of 19th century. At the beginning of this century such attempts underwent an incisive and many-sided critical assessment by P. Duhem who, in the Appendix to his *La theorie physique; son objet et sa structure* deemed absurd the efforts of the “cafe physicists and village scholars” aimed at demonstrating that certain theological propositions are confirmed or rendered false by scientific theories.

Duhem’s arguments have not met with universal acceptance; thirty years later A. Eddington stated that religion has been possible for a reasonable scientific man since the formulation of the principle of uncertainty in 1927. In sporadic cases one may yet encounter traces of the old slogans about the conflict between science and religion. As a general rule, however, in the current attempts to contrast the cognitive methods of the theology and of natural science, stress is being laid, not on the conflict of conclusions but, rather, on the differences in methods and epistemological procedures. The old myth of the anti-scientific nature of the religious theses has been superseded by a new and more subtle myth of the ideal method existing solely in the realm of natural science. The myth has its roots in the concept of the development of science presented by logical positivists; such interpretation has led to a dichotomic division of statements into those pronounced by natural sciences which are meaningful and verifiable and those spelled out by other disciplines which are meaningless and purely intuitive. Though the verifiability criterion of meaning was given up shortly after it was formulated and many postulates of the Vienna Circle were recognized as unrealistic, one may find, the consequences of the obsolete, idealized interpretations in contemporary attempts to contrast the epistemological status of theology and that of natural sciences. The fundamental propositions of these interpretations may be summed up as follows:

I. In natural sciences the empirical data play a fundamental role whereas the theological theses are outside the scope of any experiment.

II. Science creates an harmonious and internally coherent system of statements whereas the theological speculations lead to internal contradictions.

III. Scientific statements can be verified, confirmed or falsified; such procedures are not possible in theology.

IV. Development, which proceeds rationally and in accordance with the principles determining the selection of the appropriate solution is a characteristic feature of science. Theology, on the other hand, is characterized by a dogmatic and authoritarian approach.

Statements, such as enumerated above, have been repeated very often by the contemporary “cafe methodologists” and consequently they should be confronted with conclusions of the contemporary philosophy of science.

Ad I. The concept of the fundamental character of the empirical data in science does not take into account the fact that bare, uninterpreted data do not exist and that, in reality, all data are theory-laden. The border line between the elements of observation and of the theory may be very difficult.
to draw in the concrete cases.\(^1\) In order to obtain a series of empirical data \(E\) which would confirm
a theory \(T\), it is necessary, to adopt previously another set of theories \(T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_k\), without which
the interpretation of the data would not be possible. This ‘closed loop’ nature of the argument is
particularly evident in cosmology where e.g., on the one hand, the confirmation of the so-called
cosmological principle is sought by reference to observation of the far-away parts of the universe
and, on the other hand, in order to obtain the data about brightness or dispersion of distant objects,
the cosmological principle has to be postulated.

Similarly, in the domain of the microcosm and of the related experiments, the mutual
dependence between observation and prior theoretical postulates makes it necessary to reject, as
uncritical, the notion of the so-called bare facts.

The simplistic and ultra-optimistic faith in empiricism is also inconsistent with the opinion of
scientists according to which “everybody can look through a microscope but only a few are capable
of evaluating correctly what they have seen.”\(^2\)

If, in fact, the empirical data had played such a fundamental role in the formulation of physical
theories then, the theory of Copernicus could not have been conceived in the scientific setting of
16th century, since it was in manifest disagreement with the results of observations which were
feasible at the time.\(^3\) Until the rise of the Newtonian physics and until the discovery of the laws of
planetary motion by Kepler, the Copernican theory, in its theoretical foundations, was not better
than the Ptolemaic astronomy.

In opposing the concept of the fundamental character of empirical results in the development
of scientific theories, I. Lakatos states, in his analysis of the methodology of the research programs,
that, given adequate financial resources, a team of enterprising scientists can defend, for an
indefinitely long time, the most sophisticated pseudotheories and contrive to gather suitable
experimental data in their support.

Also J. Agassi, invoicing a warning against the pitfalls of the Popperian theory of falsification,
stresses that the situations in which the experimental results play a fundamental role in science are
rather rare since intuition, aesthetic outlooks and inventive imagination are often more important
for the progress of science than results of the experiments.\(^4\)

In this context, a lofty yet unrealistic appearance is assumed by the postulates which were in
vogue in the thirties promulgating that in natural science the highest value should be set on the
reliability of the data described by observational sentences free of any theoretical assumptions.

Ad II. The differentiation between theological “speculation” and “sound” science could be
justified only when the physics of the macrocosms is taken into consideration. However, at the
present stage of development, notably in the branches of physics dealing with black holes or
elementary particles, such differentiation becomes groundless, since the highly abstract and subtle
problems being investigated by these disciplines are--according to scientists themselves--more
speculative than the medieval scholastic questions about the number of angels which could be
accommodated on the tip of a pin.\(^5\)

The assertion about the ideal, internal consistency of physics does not take into account the
historical realities of the development of scientific theories. Historiography reveals many examples
of hypothetetical solutions which, despite their internal contradictions, had long periods of

\(^2\) E.M. Vermel, Historiya ucheniya o kletkye (Moscow, 1970), 25.
\(^3\) Cf. S. Amsterdamski, Between Experience and Metaphysics (Boston, 1976), ch. 1.
\(^4\) See The Interaction between Science and Philosophy, ed. Y. Elkana IJerusalem, 1974), 286.
popularity. As a particularly significant example one may quote the Rutherford-Bohr atom model. When its original version was presented in 1913, it was evident that the model was inconsistent with the well-corroborated Maxwell-Lorentz theory of electromagnetism. Nevertheless, the solution met a general recognition and underwent many modifications which, after a long time, led to the elimination of inconsistencies. Similarly in pre-relativistic physics, when it was generally known that the Newtonian theory could not be reconciled with the data concerning the orbit of Mercury, nevertheless the inconsistent interpretations were maintained in the belief that future discoveries would remove the inconsistencies. Many similar situations arise in modern physics: one encounters here inconsistencies between various theories as well as between theory and experimental evidence. In such instances it is hoped and anticipated that future modifications will bring desired consistency. However, it is hardly admissible to assert that all physical theories can be presented as consistent axiomatic systems. Of course, one may speak, about an elegance or formal beauty of these theories but it does not compensate for their simplifications and inherent imperfections.

Ad. III. The fact that the verifiability criterion cannot be treated as a fundamental scientific criterion of meaning was recognized as early as the thirties. On the one hand, certain verifiable statements cannot be classed as scientific (e.g., “Mr. Kowalski is bald”) while, on the other hand, the fundamental laws of nature are not capable of being verified. Any attempts at confirmation of such fundamental laws cannot be decisive because it is impossible to derive a universal generalization from a finite set of particular observations. Far reaching hopes to find a fundamental solution are very often connected with the idea of falsification understood quite frequently, in a naive manner. In the attempts to treat falsification as a necessary condition of the scientific validity of theories, two important facts are being ignored:

1. Real falsification in science is a very rare phenomenon since the theories may be defended against such falsification for an indefinitely long time and may be justified by introducing ad hoc additional hypotheses.

2. There exist statements which are meaningful and important from the scientific point of view yet are not falsifiable.

The maximizing tendencies, in attempts to falsify a theory on the basis of a single experiment, are exemplified by efforts to discard the theory of relativity by invoking the experiments of W. Kauffman and D. C. Miller. In both these cases the results of observations were inconsistent with the implications of the Einstein theory and for a long time (in the former instance ten years, and in the latter thirty years) no one could explain the discrepancies. Notwithstanding isolated views that a knock-out blow had been dealt to the theory of relativity, the majority of the scientists did not agree that the experiments in question contradicted the Einstein theory. Again, the passage of time has confirmed the validity of their attitude. The cases which have been quoted do not represent the exceptions, they illustrate a rule that a credible falsification usually requires a long time and meets with recognition only when there exists a competing theory which is superior to one which is being falsified. When such a theory is lacking, the hope that it will be introduced, proves stronger than the penchant for falsification. When such a theory is available, the theory being falsified may be

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defended by introducing ad hoc arbitrary hypotheses. In this context the so called crucial experiment (experimentum crucis), highly regarded in the tradition of scientific methodology, is being considered by the contemporary philosophers of science merely as an “honorific title.”

The belief in the fundamental role of falsification in science has led some authors to question the value of theological statements which are not amenable to falsification whereas other authors have attempted to introduce falsification into theology. Despite arguments for the latter attempts, it must be noted that there exist many types of statements which have a cognitive importance and are not falsifiable. In particular these should be mentioned:

1. Purely existential statements in the form \(3x: F(x)\) which confirm the existence of certain objects (atom, primeval man, electron) without defining the place and the time of their existence. The impossibility of falsification in such instances is the consequence of the indeterminacy in the space-time domain.
2. Statistical statements which do not exclude the possibility of a particular state that define only a probability of certain events. Many laws of science belong to this category.
3. So called “mixed” statements which involve introduction of both the particular and the general quantifiers. Some laws of science also belong to this category.

Ad IV. The analyses of the philosophy of science and historiography presented by P. Feyerabend, M. Polanyi and T. Kuhn destroy the myth according to which science was conceived as the opposite to an irrational approach marked by a dogmatic and authoritative attitude. According to these authors, in the process of selection of scientific theories the important role is played by irrational elements produced either by chance or by personal inclination, whereas the process of discovery implies “neither logic nor observation nor common sense.” The idealized vision of science in tireless pursuit of the truth is opposed by a less optimistic interpretation in which “most scientists accept basic value judgments on trust; they do not examine them, they simply bow to the authority of their specialist colleagues . . . Common scientific wisdom is not very common and it certainly is not very wise.”

Some generalized conclusions above have met with fundamental criticism. One may also question the metaphors in which the authors treat the scientific community as a religious one and science as the scientists religion. Nevertheless, it is not possible to question a whole series of concrete historical examples which illustrate the influence of extra-scientific factors on progress of science.

The recognition of their role and acceptance of Feyerabend’s “anything goes” methodology resulted in new metascientific scheme in which the process of the growth of science is regarded as being ruled by the laws of mob psychology. The transition from the positivist vision of ideal science to the metascientific anarchism of Feyerabend’s adherents brought a radical revision in

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epistemological patterns. The very progress of science disclosed the unsubstantiated character of these positivist dogmas in which both theology and metaphysics were discredited whereas unified all-embracing science was to replace all former types of knowledge. Fifty years after famous declarations of the Vienna Circle, one discovers mainly a sophisticated metascientific poetry in lofty assurances that proclaim “that science is a unity, that empirical statements can be expressed in a single language, all states of affairs are of one kind and are known by the same method.\[14\]

Scientific discoveries initiated by the Einstein-Planck revolution in physics led to profound revisions both in science and in our theory of knowledge. Multifarious illusions underlying earlier metascientific postulates were detected after the discovery of important limitations both in physical and logical analyses. The limitative theorems proven in metalogic, and the cosmological principle of ignorance, Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty and the randomicity principle in the physics of black holes point out only some of the limitations imposed on us by nature. The questioning of these limitations and maintaining the optimistic epistemology of the 19th century would be just as uncritical as longing for the perfect world of Aristotelian physics.

The significance of epistemological changes is acknowledged particularly by contemporary physicists who admit that present science cannot be subordinated to the dogmatic normative principles of bygone epistemology. In new research on the foundations of quantum mechanics, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, the Bell inequalities, etc., new proposals dealing with future epistemological revisions are developed. The situation is different in the disciplines which are not so theoretically developed as physics. In biology as well as in social sciences the outdated programme of logical positivism can still provides an attractive cognitive framework.

In the context of contemporary critiques of former epistemological simplifications, one should note a new form of anti-intellectualism which seems to be the result of exaggerated social reactions to the breakdown of metascientific rationalism. The supporters of the new approach treat science merely as an “ideology”--one of many cultural phenomena dependent on social factors which are completely to determine the context of scientific theories. In this framework both scientific objectivity and the objective value of science are called into question, the growth of knowledge is to be based on social agreement and the very notion of science is considered a result of ideological camouflage in which the rationalist illusions seem more important than the courage of radical demystification.

The anti-intellectual component of similar programmes seems to threaten the conception of objective truth even more than did the positivistic idealizations. In intangible theses of the allegedly demystifying interpretations, the existence of hidden universal determinants is a priori decreed. The explanatory power of these psycho-social determinants resembles in many respects the power of the philosophers’ stone. The latter, when appropriately used by medieval alchemists, was able to convert all substances into genuine gold. The demystifying sociobiological and psychoanalytical theories are also to convert the alleged illusions of earlier science into the purest gold of the”only true” explanations. In such a context, the defense of the rational heritage of the past appears as a primordial task both for scientists and theologians.

In the new critical vision of the relationship between science and theology, many former misjudgments are eliminated. The elusive unimaginable world of quantum phenomena, described in modern science, appears conceptually and psychologically closer to the theological vision of reality than the image of nature proposed by 19th century mechanism. In the history of mutual relationships between theology and science there occurred substantial conflicts, epistemological prejudices and psychological distrust. When many former simplifications are avoided in the new

\[14\] R. Carnap, The Unity of Sciences (London, 1934), 32.
metascientific framework, the concern for objective truth appears as the basic value discovered in the two disciplines.\textsuperscript{15} When absolute relativism is treated as the only absolute value by new supporters of breakthrough demystifications, the continuation of the objective intellectual inheritance of the past remains the particularly important goal both in scientific and in theological investigations. The recent works by I.G. Barbour, A.R. Peacocke, J.C. Polkinghorne and E. McMullin indicate that this goal attracts appropriate attention in scholarly research practice.

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\textsuperscript{15} Theoretically it is possible to develop science without accepting cognitive realism and the very notion of truth. Such a standpoint is, however, a rare phenomenon in the research practice of natural sciences.
In order to treat the question of the relations between Christian philosophy and science it is necessary to inquire first into the nature, object and work of Christian philosophy. Here these questions will be treated from a special point of view.

It should be said at the outset that the meeting between science, especially the science of nature, and Christian philosophy is situated within a philosophy of creation. But here it is a matter not of developing such a philosophy, but of a methodological clarification of its approach to reality. In the period between the two world wars, the theme of Christian philosophy was the object of passionate discussion, both within the Catholic world and in broader milieus. This was true at least in France, as can be seen from the celebrated debate on this subject in the French Society of Philosophy in 1931, which even today remains enlightening. Here, we shall not review it in its entirety, but only recall the framework of the discussion.

Even if, with some Christian thinkers, one should judge that there is no specifically Christian philosophy, from the properly Christian point of view one is confronted by this issue because of the importance traditionally attached by the Church to philosophy. This is perhaps relatively less true today in the sense that pastoral cares are in general, and undoubtedly justly, considered more important than speculative ones. But pastoral concern itself demands a speculative effort and must be taken into account in the thought of Christians. It must ask itself why this concern regarding the nature of philosophy itself is important for Christians.

If one considers this fact from a point of view exterior to Christianity, for example from the point of view of a philosophy which does not pretend to be inspired by the Christian tradition, the question becomes solely a general problem of the philosophy of religion. But for thought which intends to situate itself in the Christian tradition and to serve the values proper to Christianity, the question should be considered from within. This is possible only from a point of view already engaged in a certain type of reflexion, for it involves a conception of reason and of the relations between rational thought and the real. This point of view is not that of philosophy, but ought to be able to judge and situate the potentialities of philosophy in the perspective of Christian inspiration itself. Such a point of view is that of theology. To schematize a bit, one could say that two great conceptions have been elaborated and face each other in the history of Christian thought as regards this problem.

According to one of these conceptions, there is a natural order which is consistent in itself. This possesses in itself its proper finalities and the powers necessary to attain them. Nonetheless it is susceptible of being assumed in the order of salvation and thereby taking on a new and higher meaning over and above that which derived from its proper finality. If one adopts this interpretation, the task of philosophy situates itself in the line of a philosophy of structures. The question which ought to be examined is the following: how to conceive the internal articulation, the consistence, the finalities, the power of natural being, and how to do this in such wise that one can understand how they can be assumed in the supernatural order. If there is here a point of view which deserves to be qualified as “Christian philosophy,” it is located essentially in the concern to work out the opening to the supernatural.
According to the other conception, there is but one real order. This is the historical order of salvation, which has its effect on the whole of reality. Thus understood, it is theology which has the mission of thinking speculatively about the structure and the proper laws of that order. There is here nonetheless, a philosophical task, namely, to show the structure of historical experience. Here the primacy belongs to the existential point of view, for it is the concept of existence which provides access to the properly historical order. History presents itself as that in relation to which decision is engaged and existence is precisely the order of decision or choice.

From the viewpoint of theology all is related to the Incarnation. This is understood in the function of Redemption and thus of Salvation which is interpreted as a prolongation of the natural order. Nature, in turn, does not in itself have its full realization and awaits in some manner to be assumed in the operation of salvation. Or, it is interpreted as the foundation of the created order itself, which would have reality only inasmuch as it is an historical order.

Within the first perspective a choice remains possible. One can conceive the natural order not only as existing by itself, but also as autonomous. This could lead eventually to monism, eventually combined with a theistic position in the form of a pantheism. Or one could conceive it as able to support the supernatural order and as constituted in such a way that it entails precisely the possibility of that superelevation.

If we follow that second direction inevitably we encounter a problem of ontology: how to conceive being so that it should be able to be the place of an intervention which founds history? As such an intervention is of the order of an event, it is necessary to elaborate an ontology of the event which is capable of founding the possibility of theology. This requires showing both that reality is able to be assumed effectively into the supernatural order and that an historico-existential discourse is possible. This is a matter of showing that there is in reality all that is necessary for the order of decision, in which existence and its meaning are engaged.

Here we shall adopt the latter conception which consists in considering Christian philosophy to be the search for an ontology capable of carrying and founding an order of events.

Science in Terms of the Problematic of Christian Philosophy

What is meant by a science from the point of view of the problematic of Christian philosophy? Let us clarify first that in order to proceed it is necessary to distinguish formal, natural and human sciences. We shall leave aside the problem of formal sciences, which include, on the one hand, the structure of the spirit and, on the other hand, the sciences of nature in as much as they provide information on the intelligible structure of the real. The human sciences consider the human phenomenon inasmuch as it can be objectivized, and thus apprehended after the manner of a natural object. Hence, we can limit ourselves to considering solely the natural sciences, in the broader sense of that term.

This clarified, two perspectives are possible. First, one could ask about the contribution of the sciences to the constitution of this ontology. What is their content in terms either of the vision of the world they present or of their procedures, that is to say, inasmuch as they constitute a certain activity of the spirit? On the other hand, one could inquire regarding the judgment one can render on science from the point of view of such an ontology. This would be a matter of examining the meaning of science as an expression of humanity in its encounter with nature, and situating scientific discourse on the basis of the view unveiled by the ontological horizon in question.

The second perspective is the more classic; in sum, it is the doctrine of the degrees of knowledge. Essentially, this doctrine disengages the specificity and originality of the metaphysical
level with regard to that of science. The underlying idea is that science does not attain the most significant level of reality. Nonetheless, as it has a value it is necessary to explain how, why, and at what precise level this is situated. Eventually, the idea of the “foundation” of science is introduced and one shows that the sciences cannot find their authentic basis except in metaphysics. In any case, one distinguishes what constituted the deep nature of the reality on which scientific investigation bears (for example the profound nature of living reality) and the mode of operation of that reality. To metaphysics belongs the elucidation of the profound nature of the different sectors of the real, while the study of their modes of operation pertains to science.

But from the viewpoint of our problem, it is rather the questions regarding the first perspective, or the contribution of science to an ontology of the event, that can be clarified. Let us present here a rapid review of this contribution. Certainly, this will take us beyond the strict scientific given, for it is a certain interpretation. It is elaborated on the basis of a point of view which is no longer, properly speaking, that of science, but in a certain manner is already a philosophical point of view; although it may not yet be explicitly thematized as such.

Let us examine science first as regards its process. We leave aside here the properly methodological questions in order to attend essentially to the dynamic developmental aspect of science. One can interpret this dynamic of science as pertaining to the spirit, but there are internal requirements in scientific development of which one must take account. There is a perpetual passage back and forth between theory and experience which imposes on the spirit particular restraints. Theory too has its proper exigence. Further, to explain the progress of science it is necessary to take account of the role of invention. In the elaboration of new ideas there are undoubtedly structures proper to human reason which are fixed or which unfold in the process of the development of knowledge. One can suppose that the structures of the spirit are transformed and elaborated in contact with the objective exigencies from both experimental givens and theoretical demands. The dynamic of the spirit is not purely intrinsic; it emerges from continuous interaction with an exteriority which has its proper objectivity, namely, the experiences and theories in which the dynamic of the spirit is projected.

The spirit structures itself with a view to its interactions with the objective conditions it has already produced. These conditions are objective, not only because they represent objective products of the activity of the spirit, but also because they manifest the internal constraints which pertain to the nature of the spirit itself. Certainly, the human being is capable of innovation, but this is not pure creativity. The human spirit operates according to constitutive rules, it has a nature. But this nature unveils itself in constructing itself in and by the very activity in which it unfolds itself.

Let us now examine science as regards its content. Here we must evidently take account of the essentially historical nature of science and thus of a certain relativity of the representation it proposes to us. In the course of its historical development the theories it constructs transform themselves as certain conceptions become more limited and new perspectives and new problems appear. In short, the image of the world of science is not stable, but is evolving without cease. In particular at present scientific thought is in the process of passing from what is called the classic model of science tied to the metaphysics of representation, to a new type of science. This is still in the course of elaboration, but in it representation begins to weaken as it is tied ever more strongly to the operative possibilities of the formalisms. At the same time, we observe a rather radical questioning of the presuppositions which are at the base of classical science: the decisive separation of nature and spirit, of object and subject, which is the general postulate of determinism. This noted, we can recognize that, despite the relative instability of the content of science, certain
general traits emerge from the contemporary scientific vision. These traits are not necessarily tied
to one or another particular theory but reflect a certain maturation of scientific reason.

a. The notion of structure plays an extremely important role in the most diverse domains. This
role is marked by the efficiency of mathematics which implies that there is at least a partial
correspondence between the internal order of nature and the domain of formal constructions. These
are not purely and simply the objectivation of the internal structures of the human spirit, but
possess their own objectivity in which is expressed at least something of the nature of the spirit
considered in its operative possibilities.

b. There is a certain truth to mechanistic reductionism, at least if this be understood in a rather
broad manner. This is not its reduction of science to mechanics, but its systematic search for types
of explanation based on the decomposition of the object studied into its parts and the study of the
interconnections between them. When one works with such an explanatory schema one does not
at all pretend that the interactions in question are only those envisaged by the physical sciences.
This mechanistic (in the broad sense) point of view has shown itself particularly fruitful in the
study of the constitution of matter, and also in the different fields of biology. This approach is
employed in general systems theory and, in a broader fashion, in the procedures of modelling
which, in turn, point back to the role of structures.

c. But the mechanistic point of view should be immediately balanced by recalling the
complementary point of view, also related to the proceeding, which underlines the importance of
organization and considers reality as articulated in increasing levels of complexity. In contrast to
reductionism, this point of view brings out the phenomena of emergence. It tends also to explain
these phenomena on the basis of the interactions which appear at determined levels of organization
and which eventually generate complex systems with retroactively superimposed connections.
Reductionism is but the counterpart of this emergentist point of view.

d. Scientific knowledge is directed toward the establishment of universal laws. These suggest
that there is a unity of the cosmos with solidarity of all its parts, which manifest the organic
character of the universe. But there is also a counterpart to nomologic regularities, namely, all that
is based on singularity and is of the order of event. The point of view of singularity is in some
manner complementary to the point of view of universality. There are in nature numerous
phenomena of transition: phases, forms and the emergence of new forms. The “theory of
catastrophes” accents the ruptures and discontinuities which mark the passage from one type of
morphology to another.

e. The notion of process plays an ever more fundamental role. At the base of stable
configuration there is an incessant play of interactions. One could note here the representations of
elementary forces in terms of the emission and absorption of particles. It is these forces which in
the final analysis assure the stability of natural constructs. They seem able to be interpreted also in
terms of exchange and, hence, of process.

f. If in the nature of the real categories there are phenomena which obey general laws, there
are also important aspects of nature which do not seem to be subsumed under laws but are of the
order of pure facts. One can cite here the cosmology and the fact of the expansion of the universe.
One could cite also the uni-directional character of time. At the level of the highest complexity it
is probably necessary to add to the order of acts the evolutionary phenomena which support the
whole regimen of life. Here we find a certain element of historicity.

g. The preceding factors point to the evolutionary aspect of nature, which is probably uni-
directional in character. Whether evolution unfolds according to the best order is for the moment
an open question, but in any case there is certainly an “arrow of time” which traverses all the events. That evolutionary character should be considered as the form of the natural processes inasmuch as these integrate themselves into partial wholes traversed in a universal totality, whether physical or biological.

The evolutive schema implies two facets. From a certain viewpoint it would be considered as corresponding to a phenomenon of relaxation, to a loss of complexity and to a process of uniformization or homogenization. According to that perspective there is an increasing degeneracy, that is to say, a loss of originality: the systems evolve towards states of less and less singularity, towards states which can be realized in a great number of different matters. But from another and complementary point of view, evolution is a constructive process, signaling an increase in organization, complexification, and correlative autonomization. Seen from this perspective evolution goes towards individualization and singularization, towards what is original and unique.

The Contribution of an Ontology of the Event

As noted, there already is a dimension of event in the scientific description of the world in terms of transition, processes of organization and phenomena of the order of facts. Evidently it is not a matter of events in the sense of properly historical happenings. In the strong sense of the term an event is a meeting in which there is a double initiative: on the one hand, a proposition, and, on the other, a welcome (or a rejection). In the proper sense of the term, an event cannot happen unless there be a type of reality capable of proposing and receiving. But one should not harden this distinction. There is in effect a relation between nature and spirit. The reality of spirit for the human being is supported by nature, as one sees in the role of the body. It is necessary to think out, therefore, the relation between those two orders. This is already suggested by the organization of nature according to a hierarchy of levels. The dynamic of the spirit is but the point of culmination of the development of nature; it represents the moment at which reflexivity (tied to language) intervenes. This relation between nature and spirit bases an analogy. Hence, in the manner in which science describes nature there is a certain contribution to the comprehension of that which has the character of event. In this regard note the following.

a. The efficacy of mathematical structures shows that there is a “logos” of nature. But, on the other hand, the irreducibility of the fact which appears in experience shows that there is in nature another principle which corresponds to the requirements of the incarnation of the form. We are then in the presence of an internal duality: in the world seen through science there is one principle of the order of “logos” and another which corresponds to a supportive function.

b. Science shows us also that there is an aspect of becoming in being, that reality is fundamentally of the order of “becoming,” and that the universe is not completed but is realizing itself without cease. In this context one can bring forward all that is related to the concepts of organization and complexification. This evokes correlativey, the ideas of emergence: the interaction between the elements at a given level engenders the possibility of a qualitative leap which makes a new form or a more complex form appear.

c. If some aspects of the world derive from its nature as subject to laws, there are also aspects which reflect pure individuality. Nature shows the individual under the law. In fact, there is a complementarity between these two points of view. It seems that it is necessary to recognize in the
complementarity, nonetheless, a primacy to the pole of individuality. The singular is at the base; the universal which is expressed by the law is only the envelope which provides the conditions of order and of unity. In any case, there is an irreducible duality between the law or universal and the fact of the singular. This duality manifests at the level of nature, the quite basic duality between structure and event.

These indications, naturally, are not at the ontological level. They constitute simply a reflection of certain elements of the scientific image of the world; but they show that that image is already oriented by the idea of event, which here plays the role of a sort of *a priori*. These different traits evoke an interpretation, that is to say, the construction of a model capable of taking account in a unified manner of the aspects of reality they manifest. Certainly, the interpretation should respond to the requirements of rationality, that is to say, they should present things under the form of a conceptual structure capable of assuring the coherence of the whole. The coherence is not only a complementarity, but an organic character of the real.

It is just here that the impetus and orientation from Christian inspiration appear. This proposes an interpretation of the whole of reality from a point of view of an “economy” (that of salvation). That interpretation is developed in its own terms, which is that of theology; it is not properly an ontology. Two essential traits must be retained from the Christian vision: creation and salvation. The Christian idea of creation should not be understood only in the sense of an ultimate efficient causality. In a manner much more inclusive and complete it expresses at once the total dependence (of the related beings), the total otherness (of God in relation to creature), the intrinsic goodness of the created order, the idea of being as gift, and also by that very fact the idea of celebration in confidence and thanksgiving. Further, the Christian idea of salvation concerns not only the human being, but also and through him the entire cosmos with which he is one. Christ in incarnating himself assumes the universe and saves it. All these factors coalesce in the idea of eschatology: the entire creation awaits the full manifestation of salvation and is called to be totally integrated into the order of grace at the end of time.

**The Structure of the Event**

If we ought to look for an interpretation in the sense of an ontology of the event we should ask ourselves first in what exactly does an event consist. We cannot think of it simply in terms of becoming, at least if becoming is understood as change or as motion oriented towards a goal in conformity with the intrinsic exigencies of nature. Becoming understood in this sense is nothing other than the development of what is already given. Rather, the event in the proper sense of this term is the appearance of novelty in a perspective of historicity: the event opens a new space of realization, it offers a new dimension to existence, a new sense to destiny. If we attempt to analyze more closely the structure of event we can recognize in it the following couples: the before and after, the motion toward it and the remaining of that which is met, the proposal which offers itself and the decision which responds, the gift and the act of acceptance which ratifies it, revelation and the openness with regard to that which expresses itself therein. What makes the idea of an event difficult is that it is not simply the deployment of a given being, nor is it a simple addition joined to being from the exterior; rather it affects reality in its very being.

But in order for that to be possible it is necessary that being be already constituted in such a manner that it can receive effectively that which comes to it in the meeting, that extra or surplus which proposes itself to it. In one sense being already precontains the possibility of that which
comes upon it in the event, but in another sense it remains beyond it. That is, the event is always unexpected. Being which encounters the event should certainly already include what makes the meeting possible. One can even use here the term “requirement,” but on condition that one addresses a reality which can give itself gratuitously and freely.

What suggestions can come here from the scientific vision of nature? We can call upon the idea of architecture. Science shows us in effect that the world is made of organized systems which are like more or less complex and extraordinarily varied architectural systems. One can interpret a natural architecture by means of the ideal of an organism. What makes of a system an organism is the presence therein of a unifying principle which assures the coaptation of all the parts. One can also direct attention to the fact that natural architectures are in some sense enclosed one in the other like superimposed levels of organization. The systems are ordered according to a hierarchy in which each depends on the resources of the preceding, which, in turn, integrates that into its own functioning. But, does not the idea of natural architecture suggest more; does it not invite us to see being itself as appeal? Each level of organization precontains in itself the necessary possibility of its integration into a higher level. Being is at the same time solid and unstable, containing an internal tension which generates a continuing immanent metamorphosis. This is not simply the realization of an essence, but its transvaluation.

**Toward an Ontology of the Event**

These considerations open a number of avenues, but it is necessary to justify one’s conclusions and employ an appropriate method. One can dream of a retrospective justification: we are capable of discovering in nature the analogies which help us to think of the properly human order as an historical one inasmuch as we already know that historical order. But to justify the interpretation of nature by the knowledge one already has of that same reality is decidedly to invert what one proposes, namely, it is to read nature on the basis of history rather than depending upon the image of nature provided by science in order better to understand history.

If one wishes truly to speak of a contribution of science to the understanding of the order of events, it is necessary to begin from the scientific vision of the world as it presents itself. It is necessary first of all to think nature specifically according to the dimension of history, of existence. Discussions regarding the links between physics and psychology already go in this direction. One can also think of speculation based on the theory of evolution, which shows how different systems each provide support for the systems in which they are integrated—the human being itself corresponding to the highest known level of integration. One can think also of the study of phenomena at the junction of the biophysical and the mental, in particular the phenomenon of language. On the basis of these and others of the same type it is possible, fittingly, to articulate the nature of existence. But what method should be followed; which method can enable us to utilize validly the suggestions of science?

Science describes visible reality and enables understanding through the double mediation of formalism and of mechanistically inspired representation, i.e., through what one calls modeling. On the other hand, this poses provisionally unresolved questions of a metascientific character, for example, that regarding the sense of the distinction between law and fact or the exact nature of emergence. This problem of emergence is encountered through different theories: the irreversible processes in thermodynamics, the theory of catastrophes, and information theory. In providing us with these more rigorous and refined instruments of analysis, these theories enable us to define the issues with infinitely greater precision. Science does not ignore these questions; it attempts even
to work on them with its own means. It is one of the characteristics of present day science that it attempts to take up problems which one can characterize, in a sense, as “metascientific.”

The questions which arise from ontology properly speaking are not simply prolongations of the scientific word, but constitute their own dimension of questioning. This dimension is represented, for example, by the idea of totality or of principle (“arche”) on the basis of which reality develops itself and can be understood, or by the idea of foundation as that on which manifest reality is based and which is presupposed or implied by the given. Such a dimension of questioning enables one to think the constitutive structures of an order of essence not in a purely static fashion but as pervaded by becoming. However, the becoming proper to such an order is not merely a true apparition of novelty through the becoming of essence; it is not produced in conformity with a goal which expresses merely the internal requirements inscribed in the essence itself. To think the event, it is necessary to think of the transition in a much more radical sense, which in turn, requires situating oneself in a dimension which allows thought to escape the order of essences. Such a dimension could be only the point of arrival of the event itself: it is the end which clarifies the route that leads thereto. What makes it possible to think the event cannot be already there and hence is not properly speaking a principle, a foundation or a given totality. It is rather a reality which is to come (“eschaton”). This, of course, has relation to the present, in a certain manner it is already active in the present, but not however as already inscribed in the structure of being for it must be its “telos,” though with the presentment of the promise of itself.

But what could be the reading of reality which realizes itself in this dimension of promise? The promise is tied to the word and is realized in and through the word. It announces something other than what has been given, or what is able to be seized and depended upon. The announcement is truly constitutive of the being to which it is addressed: it qualitatively transforms it and makes it emerge from the relative inconsistency in which it is situated in order to give it the weight of something promised.

To be able to produce this transformation in being the word cannot itself be exterior to it; in a certain manner it must be interior to the being it makes come into its own--holds it in its power and thus gives it consistence. The dimension of promise is that of announcing inasmuch as it gives consistence in its very announcement.

What is its structure? A response to this question must depend upon the analogy of language and on what the analysis of language can teach us. The word puts into action what is “already there”; it cannot arise without drawing upon the resources provided by language. The whole is evidently indispensable, but must be able to say what has never been written. In saying itself it gives body to meaning or makes a trace which solidifies itself and enters into duration. The word is the instant of the event, but remains in duration under the form of its trace; it contains at the same time the “already there” and the unwritten. The “already there” is in sum the word itself under an already solidified form, it represents that which is already instituted in the antecedents of the word. Thus, one can say that the word precedes itself as its own possibility (in its “already there”). At the moment at which it speaks itself it grasps in itself this possibility; but at the same time and by the same token it presents what was already to be said. In a certain manner it carries the guarantee of a meaning which cannot be deflected or stopped. In stating itself it attests that the sense which it expresses is entirely realizable and carries the mark of indefectability. This is what constitutes the essence of promise.

The dimension of promise is essentially that of excess, of the unwritten, of the surplus. At the same time, it is the non-presence of this excess, which is attested but not yet thematized. In the
promise of that which is announced there is given is in a guarantee which founds reality in as much as it is to come, though in a certain manner it is already present.

In sum, promise is the dimension of generativity. This recalls the well-known formula: “the good is diffusive of itself” as constitutively good being consists in an intrinsic tendency to share itself. Here being is seen rather as source, as the initial reality which multiplies itself through giving itself. In some contrast, to think the event it is necessary to see the gift not so much as source, although that dimension of origin ought evidently be thought also, but as that which is to come, as that which is always ahead, as that which announces itself indefectably and in an inexhaustibility which is always to be discovered.

Here one can draw upon the idea of horizon in as much as an horizon is that inaccessible line which always lies beyond the given and which evokes the inexhaustible. But despite all, an horizon is delimited and in one sense appears even to be closed despite its indeterminacy. Hence, it is necessary to employ a spatial metaphor and to think of an ascent without cease departing from what is inconsistent or without foundation. Without doubt, there is an horizon as an inexhaustible future, but it must be thought as non-given and non-fact, and as always in the process of being made. Seen in this perspective, being is not what is already set, but rather what does not cease to constitute itself in the open space of promise; it is the incessant coming of itself. That coming, however, is precisely the taking place of the event. Hence, in the dimension of promise reality in its most intimate texture appears as taking place step by step.

It remains to think out the conditions of possibility of such a dimension and specification of being, which brings us back to the classic problematic of contingency: if there is finitude, namely, if being cannot give itself but must discover itself always as already given, how can being be its own promise, the unceasing excess which calls outside of its own limit? That question evokes reflexion on the internal structure of being, on the presence in itself of a constituting Word which is the very consistence of being; this reflexion leads to the idea of creation. Its nature enables the possibility of an “economy” to appear, that is to say, a properly eventual order in which finite being is put in question in its very meaning and is called to reach beyond its proper limits. In this the ontology of event founds the possibility of a theology of salvation.

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The Subject and Goals of Christian Philosophy

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Problems connected with the subject and goals of any specific body of systematic knowledge are related to the nature of that knowledge. They are fundamental problems regarding its theory for they refer to what the object of that knowledge and the goals to which the research is directed or serves. Issues of this kind which occur within the framework of Christian philosophy are fundamental in the sense that, similar to other branches of cognition, their concrete solutions indicate further developments of that philosophy and at undergird its various versions.

Here the subject and goals will be discussed in a slightly different way, however; the subject of our considerations will be, not so much the subject as such of classical Thomist philosophy, as the subject in relation to problems characteristic of Christian philosophy. The problem of the goals of philosophy seems similar, but here we shall attempt not so much the enumeration and characteristics of these goals, as their presents in connection with the subject of Christian philosophy and its nature. As the term “Christian philosophy” is open to question here, we shall focus upon its meaning.

The Problem of Christian Philosophy

“The problem of Christian philosophy” has been discussed quite broadly in the past. The questions in which this problem was finally formulated can be reduced to the following two: First, “Does any historical reality correspond to the term ‘Christian philosophy’; in other words: “Is Christian philosophy an historical reality?” Second, “Is Christian philosophy possible at all?” In the first question, the problem of Christian philosophy is formulated on an objective historical plane; in the second, the same problem appears on the theoretical, abstract plane. In the discussions that developed over this problem in the 30s and 50s, these two planes can be clearly delineated.

The problem of Christian philosophy, formulated on the historical plane was solved either in the negative in the sense that some attempted to prove that in historical reality there was nothing that might be called “Christian philosophy,” or in the positive according to the thesis that within Christian thought are to be found doctrines which can be called Christian philosophy. In both cases concrete examples from history are presented as the justifying grounds.

The advocates of the negative attitude towards the existence of Christian philosophy can be divided into two groups. One thinks that Christian writers, beginning from the first ages of Christianity, did not in fact develop anything like a Christian philosophy, some feeling that the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas does not deserve the name: Christian philosophy. Others, though they may consider St. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine itself to being “Christian philosophy,” regard what appears before St. Thomas Aquinas as no philosophy at all, but rather scraps of Greek doctrines more or less deftly attached to specific theological views. In this spirit, such medieval Catholic writers as St. Augustine, Anselm or Bonaventure are assessed as having developed theological, rather than philosophical, systems.

Others take positive attitudes towards the problems of Christian philosophy on the historical plane, stating that the term Christian philosophy has its sense because there really did exist
philosophies that may be defined by this term. E. Gilson is a decided advocate of such an attitude. In the first page of his book entitled “History of Christian Philosophy” he writes:

It is a historical fact that there have existed philosophical systems that owe their nature to the Christian faith. All these taken together constitute an explicitly compact group, markedly different from other groups of philosophic systems, e.g., Greek, Latin, Chinese or Muslin philosophies. It is true that within our group there often occur considerable differences, and even discrepancies, its fundamental unity, however, remains preserved. This group is a class covering philosophical systems from the apostolic times till our days, called . . . in terms of the meaning of the term ‘Christian philosophy.’

Similarly, different views are encountered when the problem is considered on the theoretical plane, i.e., independently of historical data, regardless of the circumstances in which this philosophy arises and develops. Then, the question occurs: “Is Christian philosophy possible?”; in other words “Does philosophy by its internally abstract structure give reasons for ascribing it a Christian character?” Thus formulated the problem is answered first in the negative, for if any philosophical system is to take on a Christian character some theses, it is held, ought to be added to its system whose cognitive value is connected exclusively with the Christian faith or religion. Such theses would be known only from Christian Revelation and not be verified by reason, that is, they would be termed mysteries of faith. But if the structure of philosophy is to correspond to the requirements of the concept of a rational science, points of belief cannot be included among the system of theses of philosophy, as this would result in mixing knowledge with faith, and the natural order with the supernatural one. When the problem is thus formulated, the conviction is reached that philosophy can have no reason for being Christian because its structure and formal object must correspond to the requirements of the rational concept of science. There is no difficulty in finding many texts of St. Thomas Aquinas which support such a view.

There are opinions however, according to which the problem of Christian philosophy can be solved positively on the theoretical plane. In other words, it is held that the term Christian philosophy can have a sense such that, without losing its rational nature, it is at the same time Christian. According to this opinion, every true philosophy will be a Christian philosophy.

The above opinion, as a criterion of the Christian character of any philosophy, assumes the convergence of its conclusions with the conclusions proper to a given philosophy. Here, the matter is not so much one utilizing theological theses in order to draw philosophical conclusions as in the former case, but rather of achieving the usual coherence of basic solutions in philosophy and theology. This coherence can be obtained either owing to the explicitly rational development of fundamental primary philosophical principles without taking into consideration the data of Revelation, or as a result of a special effort aimed at making decisions in the direction pointed by the data of the Revelation. These are two different situations, but the authors do not strive to explain them more exactly. Having assumed the first case, a paradoxical situation could ensue where a non-Christian would cultivate Christian philosophy though the connection of such a philosophy with Christianity would be clearly external, and sometimes even accidental.

In the second case, on the other hand, the problem is how to interpret the role of Revelation, in other words the role of faith, in directing philosophical decisions. Generally, it should be said that understanding the relation of philosophy to Christianity as that which finally determines the Christian nature of a philosophy warrants its rational character. Nevertheless, the terminology in which this relation is expressed is markedly diverse in meaning. Thus, e.g., the relation of
dependence between philosophy and Christianity, or, if you prefer, religious belief, is expressed by the term “openness to the supernatural.” This means that any philosophy would be considered Christian when it is open to the supernatural, but the meaning of this term is not explained. What is more, nothing indicates that this term contains in it any methodological dependence of philosophy upon faith or theology. Pure philosophy can be considered Christian when, in developing its own contents with full freedom, it states that it does need to reject any ability or “supernatural power.” There the term “openness to the supernatural” can be interpreted in the sense of an attitude of the cognitive subject in the course of constructing philosophy.

Another term expressing the relation of Revelation to philosophy (the basic feature of a Christian philosophy) is the term “aid” for reason from Revelation, or, in other words, “faith coexisting with the cognitive subject and the wisdom of the Holy Spirit.” Such a criterion for Christian philosophy is set, e.g., by J. Maritain. In his opinion, the term “Christian philosophy” ought to define wisdom in the sense of perfect work of mind which, due to the natural weakness of the human mind, could not otherwise be achieved. That is why the cognitive subject in striving to reach perfect knowledge of the highest truths, and thus “wisdom,” needs aid from above, consisting in the coexistence in the cognitive subject of faith as well as of the wisdom of the Holy Spirit. In consequence, faith and the wisdom of the Holy Spirit coexisting with the subject do not constitute for philosophy any positive criterion of the cognitive value of its theses, nor do they enter the structure of philosophical cognition; then fulfill only the function of an external regulating factor, “Vetuli stella rectrix.”

It is hard to estimate how far this regulation would reach. From what was said above it cannot influence the rationality of philosophy itself, for that would be to methodologically mix philosophy with theology. Faith, as well as the wisdom of the Holy Spirit, would be structural elements of the work of the thinker.

To a certain degree, a similar attitude is taken in this matter by E. Gilson. In his opinion, Christian philosophy is the philosophy created by believers, by Christians, who distinguished the order of faith and natural knowledge. Justifying his theses with natural arguments, he sees in Christian Revelation an aid of great value, and to a certain degree even morally necessary, the human mind or the only way, however, in which it would be possible to indicate this action or help from Revelation to the mind in developing a Christian philosophy is by comparing philosophy developed without Revelation with that elaborated under its influence. Using precisely this historical method, E. Gilson determined the role of understating in Christian philosophy.

In the system of St. Thomas Aquinas the theory of theology is based upon a marked differentiation of the order of faith from that of natural knowledge, and upon the conviction that knowledge on the basis of faith does not annihilate, but perfects the cognitive work of the mind. An analogous situation exists as far as theology is concerned. In its own order, philosophy is completely different from theology and the area of faith. This does not mean, however, that in his opinion religious faith has no impact whatsoever upon philosophy, but that it would be rather an indirect influence through the action of the faith upon the cognitive power of the subject in cultivating philosophy. Grace does not annihilate nature, but heals it, stimulates its growth and makes it more perfect. In the same way faith, through its influence from above on the exercise of the mind makes possible more fruitful and reliable mental activity. It is no wonder that even E. Gilson saw only the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as a truly Christian philosophy, for only in it are realized, on one hand, a methodological independence or Revelation, and on the other, that which affects its Christian character, namely, its psychological dependence. It is also in this sense
that the term “Christian philosophy” will be used in the consequent sections of this study.

Problems of Christian Philosophy and Its Subject

When we speak about the subject of any scientific knowledge, we ought always to distinguish its starting point from the completed system, for the two differ one from the other. In the first case, the subject of a study is the area observation or consideration in general. The subject is specified more precisely by indicating one aspect of reality within the general area of study. Traditional epistemology speaks here of the material and the formal subjects. The first is understood as the general field of knowledge, the second is the point of view according to which the reality studied in a given science. In a scientific system, the subject would be constituted by everything denoted by the constant term and would be represented by the variable in the theses of the system. Scientific cognition does not take the world as spontaneously given as its subject, but concerns rather certain elements or aspects of reality to which the world is as it is, or as it appears in our experience. This is the source of the need to distinguish the object of science in its starting point and in its developed state with its material and formal subject. On this basis there arise in science both questions about what is empirically given and a search for what explains the data.

There is considerable difficulties in attempting to determine the subject of Christian philosophy. These difficulties flow first of all from the various conceptions of its nature and development, from determining what leads to the total or at least partial uniformities of the philosophical disciplines constituting Christian philosophy, and from the ambiguous understanding of the relations that occur among these disciplines.

Regarding the first, it can be observed that in recent decades Christian philosophy has undergone certain modifications. The following phenomena have served as modifying factors: an attempt to connect Christian philosophy with the natural sciences, an attempt to enrich or even re-interpret it by means of the achievements of other philosophic systems, and the tendency to search out authentic philosophical thoughts in the texts of St. Thomas Aquinas.

In the first case, the effort is to connect classical philosophy with the data of the detailed sciences. Most probably, at the base of this tendency is an at least partial identification of rational with scientific cognition and, by implication, a rejection of the possibility of developing fundamentally different methods of knowledge and of ensuring their rationality.

The second case concerns the enrichment of Christian philosophy by such new philosophical attitudes as, e.g., Kant, phenomenology or existentialism. The phenomenological attitude to Christian philosophy has been particularly fashionable and varied. Greater attention is deserved also to understanding Christian philosophy as a return to the authentic or so-called existential version of Thomism.

In the attempt to utilize detailed sciences in cultivating Christian philosophy in almost all its versions the differences in understanding the subject must be taken into account. Thus, e.g., those who make Christian philosophy more scientific want to use methods not fundamentally different from scientific methods for attaining results and/or to use the results of these sciences as the starting point of philosophy. Conclusions reached either by way of far-reaching extrapolation or irrational intuition will contain terms whose meaning is only seemingly the same as similar terms in classical Christian philosophy. The language of individual branches of theoretical knowledge is determined specifically, most often in dependence upon its epistemology and ontology. For this reason the subject of the point of initiation of a Christian philosophy which has been made more scientific will differ from the subject of the point of initiation of a traditionally “unscientific”
Christian philosophy. An analogous situation exists in making Christian philosophy scientific by the way of utilizing simultaneously the traditional method and scientific theories or facts as given. Both cases have to do with a difference in subject in the starting point of philosophy, and consequently, also in its attainment. In turn, taking into consideration the genesis of scientific theories or scientific acts, it may be said also that philosophy cultivated in such a way will differ from traditional philosophy which has not been made scientific by its material and formal subject. Scientific theories and facts are built upon observations different from Christian philosophy and take into consideration aspects other than philosophy. As Christian philosophy deals with everything that exists it is interested in every being, whereas the detailed sciences from which the above-mentioned scientific facts and theories are derived are interested only in certain kinds of beings: they concern not the universal as does philosophy, but partial aspects. Philosophy cultivated in such a way may only simply extend scientific knowledge.

The matter is somewhat different, though similar, when Christian philosophy is considered to be enriched or even re-interpreted on the basis of the achievements of modern philosophical systems. Changes in the range of the subject may be observed depending as on what is understood in this case by the terms “achievements,” as well as upon how extensive this enrichment proves to be.

The second moment which makes determination of the subject of Christian philosophy in the above sense more difficult is constituted by the ambiguity in understanding relations between individual philosophical disciplines constituting a Christian philosophy that can be called a Christian theory of existence, or more briefly here, the theory of existence.

Thus, in Christian philosophy understood in this way, various areas of cognition can be distinguished and classified in various ways, but there is no uniform opinion among Christian philosophers on these branches of cognition, in particular on metaphysics as “first philosophy.” Thus, at times because of the character of its branches, the theory of existence is understood as an organic whole, in which view it is only for pedagogical or social reasons that the parts are treated autonomously, and by an analogy of attribution are called a theory of existence. At other times, it is understood as an indivisible unity in its formal subject and method of explanation; or the term “theory of existence” might be understood to denominate a series of disciplines, distinguished at least by their formal subjects.

Similarly, there are different understandings of the relations between these disciplines. Generally speaking, two basic opinions can be distinguished here: one, according to which the dependence among the disciplines passes from special to general metaphysics, and the second, according to which the relation passes from general to special metaphysics in at least two modes. In all these case there is a fundamental difference of view as regards the subject of the theory of existence. Thus, e.g., both in the case of the theory of existence as an organic whole consisting of various philosophical disciplines, or as one science indivisible at least as regards its formal subject, and in the case of the theory of existence as a science consisting of independent philosophical disciplines, fundamental differences may be found in the understanding especially of the formal subject. In the first two concepts of the theory of existence a unity of the formal subject in all component disciplines is assumed, while the possibility of various material subjects is admitted. In the third concept, disciplines constituting the theory of existence owe their proper autonomy and independence also to different formal subjects.

In order to determine the subject of Christian philosophy it will be necessary to consider the version related historically to the efforts to determine the authentic thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, generally termed today “the existential interpretation of Thomism.” Within this interpretation, the
problem of the subject of Christian philosophy will be limited to its theory of existence understood in the above sense, which is one indivisible insight from the point of view of both the formal or proper subject and the method of explanation. At the starting point certain disciplines situated within it are only partly autonomous because of their particular subject. The object of philosophy thus understood is the existential character of the goal rather than a purely formal moment of reality. In other words, this aspect is called transcendental. In the above sense philosophy allows us to explain the whole of reality in a manner that is both solid and informative. It covers all that exists and is necessary, for it covers intra-existential relations that cannot take place in the proportional unfoldings grasped through the notion of being. By this formal subject Christian philosophy is distinguished from all branches of cognition that treat the universal concept of existence, for it treats only the necessary aspects of the content of existence, rather than existence in itself. Moreover, it concerns only one class of existence, from which and for which it was abstracted.

The above-mentioned relations may be also the basis for necessary inter-existential relations so far as a sufficient analogy occurs, e.g., the relations of metaphysical causality. All relations of this kind belong to the existential order as they are based on the relation of the creature to the existence expressed in things. The laws of philosophy so understood are absolutely universal as they are based finally upon relations of constitutive elements of existence as such, and thus include everything that exists. The reason for their universal character is existence, i.e., the aspect under which what exists is examined, and not one or another qualification characteristic of objects in the universe.

The choice of this approach to Christian philosophy is not accidental: it is guided by a number of convictions; (a) that its problems concerning the world, God and man in many cases appear also within Christian Revelation and its rationalization, i.e., theology; (b) that in this version of Christian philosophy this occurrence is more explicitly related genetically to the concept of its subject; and (c) that the direction of solutions of these problems in philosophy regardless of their close connection with the subject, does not differ fundamentally from those based upon the data of Christian Revelation. In Christian philosophy thus interpreted, the Absolute appears, not as a mystery to be described, the creation of mysticism or the subject of Revelation, but rather as the reason explaining the existential aspect given in the experience of existence. This aspect determines the direction of philosophical analyses and leads to the formulation of a series of fundamental questions. In order to answer some of these the analysis leads in the end to stating the existence of the Absolute. As the problem of God in this concept of Christian philosophy appears within the process of philosophically explaining reality, it is internal to the problem of this explanation.

In this version of Christian philosophy also the problem of the existence of the human soul appears clearly. It appears in the discipline belonging to the theory of existence called philosophical psychology. True, in extra-philosophical fields, something analogous to the concept of soul is spoken about; in the proper sense, however, the human soul may be stated only in the classical philosophy of man. The field of knowledge is not neutral as regards the treatment of this problem any more than it is for the problem of the Absolute. Many sciences deal with man—natural sciences and the humanities, the philosophical and even the theological sciences—but the problem of the soul appears only when certain conditions are fulfilled.

When the analysis of man is undertaken in the area, e.g., of psychology or of humanistic natural science, the problem of the human soul does not occur because this is not allowed by their formal subject. The sciences, through analyses conducted upon man, reach only the constant
structures of the biological components of man that preserve his dynamic balance. Others instead of the soul, speaks about personality or the subject of psychic phenomena. In both cases the decisions are dictated principally by their appropriate subjects, and as such they solve problems which arise precisely at their research areas. In theology the problem of the soul appears in the analysis of man so far as it makes use of classical philosophy to explain revealed texts or in building theological anthropology.

In philosophical psychology as a partly autonomous discipline belonging to the theory of existence or reality, however, the problem of the existence of the human soul results from the analysis of human psychic life. This kind of psychology has as its goal the final explanation of the structure of man in the order of existence. The soul appears there as the reason for what is given in the experience, namely, for the acts constituting the whole of the psychic life. While explaining the unity and plurality of acts, in the human subject the soul is assumed to be the substantial form of the body, and to be self-existing only as an incomplete substance. In a general sense, it can be said that the human soul appears here as one of the explanatory principles of the existential structure of man.

For philosophy of man thus understood the subject in its starting point contains the data of experience concerning the psychic life of man. Its starting point is not the existence of the human soul, nor does this constitute the object of study at the beginning of the analyses, and in this specification of the subject the philosophy of man differs from metaphysics. They do not differ, however, in their formal subject which for both is the existential aspect of being: in psychology it is the existential aspect of human being, while in metaphysics it is everything inasmuch as it exists. It is precisely this existential aspect of human existence which allows it, on one hand, to raise the problem of the existence of the human soul in a natural rather than an artificial way, and, on the other hand, to solve it in such manner that the meaning of the term “human soul” may be treated as the philosophical equivalent of the religious concept of the human soul.

The above seems to prove that the problems of Christian philosophy constituted by the fundamental issues of human’s religious life—namely, the problems of the existence of the Absolute God, with the problem of man and, in particular, of his soul—constitute problems internal to this philosophy. They owe this status precisely to its subject, and in particular to its formal subject as the existential aspect of reality. This is due also to the fact that in general the solution to these problems does not differ from the data of Christian Revelation, though they belong to completely different orders.

**Goals of Christian Philosophy**

The expression “goals of science,” does not always have the same meaning. Hence before we discuss goals of Christian philosophy it is important to comment on the term “goals of science” itself.

This scientific cognition in its functional or subject aspect is a cultural creation of man, and like any cultural creation it takes its character from its purpose. Thus, it owes this property to man its creator, for it is man who sets the specific goals for scientific knowledge. To a certain degree, the goal is the cause of the initiation of science, of its development and its cultivation. For this reason we can say that the goals scientific knowledge can achieve are transcendental, for as the work of man these goals depend upon man. In many cases the goals influence the nature of a science, above all its subject and method. Thus, science as an ordered system of statements, and thus taken in its subject aspect, can not always fulfill the goals man designs it. Generally, the
possibilities of implementing the appropriate goals of a science as a constituted system are dictated by its nature, which, along with its goals, includes both its subject and method.

In speaking of the meanings of “the goal of scientific knowledge,” the following should be distinguished: 1. the motives or stimuli for cultivating science, 2. the science itself as the objective result to which the science-creating behavior leads; and 3. the functions to be fulfilled in human life broadly understood. In all three, the term “scientific cognition” is taken to designate science in its functional aspect, and thus as a certain set of operations creating science, rather than as the constituted system of sentences referring to any given branch of subjects. The motives for the cultivation of science can be highly varied, but in general terms can be grouped into two types: theoretical and practical. In the first type of motives we should include purely cognitive on theoretical interests and in the other practical interests and tendencies. The subject of intellectual or theoretical interests in knowledge or in understanding reality can be achieved by cultivating science through practical steps resulting from understanding human life. The subject of practical interests becomes the conscious striving to master reality and direct it so as to implement previously intended goals, generally those dictated by the concrete situations in life. In this case the cultivation of science is corrected. In both cases it is a matter of satisfying needs the only difference being that in the first case they are of an intellectual, and in the second of a practical nature. This two-dimensional satisfaction of human needs constitutes one type of goal of scientific knowledge.

In the second meaning of the term “the goal of the scientific cognition,” the goal of science is to constitute a system of statements: thus the subject results from operations directed by man in creating knowledge. When someone wants to build a scientific theory, it may be said that the scientific work is for knowledge itself, and thus disinterested. This does not mean that such a scientific theory does not contain in itself data from one branch or another. It means only that the moment of utilization of this theory is pushed to a later place in the sense that it may occur at a further stage, e.g., after it has been constructed. In the initial stages of constructing it no practical goals are sets; in general, it is disinterested and free, i.e., not aimed directly at any other goal than enriching and ordering knowledge.

Last of all, in the third sense, the term “the goal of the scientific cognition” is taken to denominate what scientific knowledge is to serve, or to determine the functions it is to perform. In this sense, the term “goal” is to be taken very broadly. Scientific cognition can serve by satisfying all human intellectual interests; this is a purely theoretical function. It may serve also as a tool for restructuring any area of reality, or to help to build a rational world outlook. These goals may be treated also as motives, especially when the term “science” is considered functionally. It should be stressed, however, that the theoretical and practical functions of scientific knowledge do not exclude each other, and may occur simultaneously. If we do not reduce them to one common denominator, it is because they are not to be compared in the same categories. The choice of the first kind of goals at one stage of cultivating science does not prevent undertaking the other kind of goals at later stages.

Like all scientific knowledge, Christian philosophy understood in the above sense fulfills tasks of a cognitive, theoretical and practical character. The first concerns satisfying the deepest intellectual and moral needs of man, the second can be reduced practically to the functions Christian philosophy performs in human life broadly understood as an organizing factor for the individual and social life of man. Christian philosophy implements both goals by supplying basic solutions and stimulating thought on fundamental issues. There is a series of questions which man has set and is still asking regarding both himself and reality surrounding him. These questions can
be expressed in the following formulas: “What does it mean that objects exist?”; “In what way do they exist?”; “Does there exist or can there exist other categories of objects than those that surround us?”; “Is the totality of existing objects something rational; does it have any sense or aim?”; “Can we (and if yes, in what sense) speak about the essence, i.e., about what is essential in objects?”; “Is any existing thing necessary?”; etc. In the case of man, we can ask also a series of analogous questions, e.g., “What is the position of man among other beings?”; “Does he really constitute a new category of existence?”; “Do his life and activities, such as art, science and religion, have any sense or goal, and if so of what kind?”; “What is the final goal of man’s fundamental tendencies, man’s search for happiness, his striving or possessing certain goods; what is the final reason of his existence?”

Raising such questions and working on them generally is considered characteristic of man. Many of these questions regarding both man and the surrounding world can be found in various forms in the history of the development of human thought. One who stated sought answers and depending on the historical period, referred either to common experience or to scientific knowledge. Today, we know that neither one nor the other is able to supply the answer to such problems. Not common experience because as a rule, it serves practical purposes and as such is a conglomerate of concepts from various points of view. This simply combines aspects which are accentuated according to extra cognitive needs, circumstances and attitudes of the moment. Not science because, being conscious, systematized and methodical, and eliminating extra-cognitive, emotional moments, it undertakes research within whose range the above-mentioned problems cannot be solved. Detailed sciences examine various categories of objects from the quantitative or qualitative aspect, taking into consideration their features, qualifies, structure or relations in a broad sense. Within these sciences, therefore, the above problems are not found in the sense that they cannot be formulated by means of the terminological apparatus and methods of these sciences. The problems we are speaking about, if they are to be undertaken and solved, require a branch of knowledge separate from the detailed sciences. It ought to be able to reach what is fundamental and final in the subject examined. Questions man asks himself, which cannot be solved by the detailed sciences, are of this sort. This range of questions is rightly treated in philosophy, whose concept, at least in general outline, was formulated already in Antiquity by Aristotle and fully realized in the tradition of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and its later continuation, called here Christian philosophy. The possibilities of answers to questions asked in such a way are closely connected with its subject as constituted by the existential aspect of what exists, and not, as was the case in Antiquity, the essential aspect.

If we assume that answers to the above and similar questions compose what is termed a “world outlook,” and if this can be realized so as to express convictions, attitudes, statements, assessments and norms determining the picture of oneself and one’s surroundings, it can be said that Christian philosophy constitutes the basis for the rationality of such an outlook in the full sense of this word. As a consequence, it influences the organization of human life both in its individual and in its social dimension. Nevertheless, Christian philosophy fulfills the latter task in a totally different way from other philosophical systems. In spite of the utilitarianism of European thought, the role of Christian philosophy cannot be reduced to performing the function of simply supporting the social and individual order already in place. If it is sometimes given the term of “magistra vitae,” it is not because it gives individuals and societies practical prescriptions of behavior, but because its primary task is to achieve the truth, and in that it creates science. Thus, rationalization of the world outlook is one of practical functions of Christian philosophy. This is a secondary goal, however, in the sense that Christian philosophy does not exist to justify the human world outlook
and then to shape individual and social life, but rather to achieve the truth about the world and man.

The possibilities for utilizing philosophical solutions to rationalize the world outlook exists on the basis of the convergence between of the subject matter of the questions of Christian philosophy and those man asks himself in looking for a global understanding both of himself and of the world. What brings the world outlook and the above mentioned philosophy closer to each other is the similarity in the subject of the questions. Nevertheless, they are two different branches. A world outlook is something quite different from the scientific cultivation of philosophy. Man is interested in his existence and that of the world surrounding it. Philosophy analyses being under the aspect of existence—it treats an analogous subject matter—but it does so for totally different motives than in the working out of a world outlook. Man himself and his interests, sometimes justified by motives of a psychological nature, are the basic source of the problems of world outlook. In contrast, the problems of Christian philosophy are genetically embedded in the subject itself as subject. These two moments decide finally the way problems such as those above will be understood and resolved in principle.

In an analogous sense we can speak about another practical goal of Christian philosophy, namely, its utilization of religious belief in the process of reasoning. This function has been assigned to philosophy since the most remote times. In the first ages of Christianity the term “theology” designated a broadly understood rational interpretation of the Revelation. Because of such a goal philosophy was given the name “ancilla” and carried with elements of platonic or neoplatonic philosophy. Adapting this type of philosophy was motivated by the fact that its language was the closest to the language and the contents of Revelation. In this way, the first apologists and St. Augustine often mixed the philosophical and theological orders.

Later philosophers continued along this line and in St. Thomas Aquinas’ cultivation of theology, philosophy was fully utilized, preserving its distinct character from theology. St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought was situated in an extrascientific order. Although he defined theology by the term “supreme” in comparison to other sciences, still he always understood this “supremacy” to be situated in an order different from that of the sciences. That is why, in Thomas’ opinion, the relation of theology to other sciences, including philosophy, is not between equal knowledge, e.g., the relation of one science to another. This tradition of utilizing theology in philosophy has survived in our day.

Similarly, in our times as in the earlier ages, connecting the natural and the supernatural sciences in theology is most frequently reduced to a rational elaboration of supernatural events. In the Middle Ages it was the philosophical rationalization of Revelation, in later times, particularly in the XIXth century, the rationalization was of a natural scientistic type; at present it is called humanistic or philosophical rationalization—all of which have many variations. In humanistic rationalization the following variations can be distinguished: historism, sociologism and psychologism; while philosophical rationalization, on the other hand, can be in terms of existentialism, structuralism, semiologism and praxism.

In such a situation, the question is not whether philosophy ought to be made use of in theology, but rather what philosophy ought to be made use of. The issue here is first of all that of the adequacy of philosophy for theology. In other words, the question concerns the service that ought to be performed by philosophy for theology. Often, a criterion suggested is the facility of the philosophical language for use by contemporary man as the recipient. Such a criterion does not seem, however, to be sufficient, because as a result of utilizing philosophy theology is very deeply permeated by philosophy. It is made use of by theology in creating the conceptual apparatus,
reaching theological conclusions, and even the systematizing theological enunciations. Thus, the criterion of adequacy ought to be, not so much the ease of language or in other words the regard for the recipient, but the “content” of the philosophy, because utilization is, to a certain degree, adaptation of one discipline by another. That is why the criterion of choice should be the agreement of a philosophy in its solutions with the Bible as regards its vision of the reality; also it should not collide with it as regards the nature of cognition. The first postulate requires that the philosophy of which theology would make use not be atheistic or relativistic. The other requires the philosophy not be irrationalist. Christian philosophy is exactly such a philosophy.

Similar to the relation of Christian philosophy to a world view, the principle of serving as a relationalizing factor relates Christian philosophy to religious faith or theology. The possibility of making use of philosophy in theology is rooted also in the analogous convergence of the subject matter of Christian philosophy with the problem of religious belief and theology. The sources of these problems are totally autonomous and genetically independent of one another. In the case of Christian philosophy, its problems appear as a result of the philosophical analysis of reality as such and in a proportionate manner. Genetically, it is connected with the nature of this philosophy itself. On the other hand, in the case of the religious belief, its problems are genetically connected with Christian Revelation and, in the case of theology, with the nature of that knowledge. Thus the role of Christian philosophy in serving theology finally is justified by the nature of this philosophy itself, i.e., its subject and method of analysis. The nature and focus of the subject determine that this philosophy not be of an atheist or relativist character, as well as the manner of its analysis. That is why it may be justified both in theology and in the process of rationalizing religious belief. All this, in turn, indicates unambiguously that the service role of Christian philosophy in relation to theology is not its initial goal, nor is it an apologetics of faith, nor was it constituted as a result of needs of religious belief or theology. These do not constitute a philosophical system. Rather, it was chosen by Christians for these or other reasons from among many philosophical directions they had at their disposal, because it constitutes a specific note of understanding reality. Only because of the proximity of its solutions can it be utilized, to some degree, in Christian philosophy.

It seems then that the basic problems in the version of Christian philosophy discussed here are most closely connected with its subject. In philosophy no problems are externally related, or imposed for some alien reasons. Its tasks, in agreement with its theoretical or practical nature, are finally dictated by its subject and the type of knowledge which depends upon that.

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15.
Philosophy and Religious Faith

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For many years metaphysicians have dealt with the object of the religious act as if they had invented it. Natural theology or theodicy as a branch of philosophy was considered to be totally independent of man’s religious activity. This view first appeared in Aristotle, survived in the Stoa, and disappeared in early Christian philosophy. It emerged again in late Scholasticism and reached new heights in the various systems which are loosely combined under the vague name of rationalism. Kant was at once one of its chief proponents and the main author of its decline in recent philosophy. The trend has not entirely died out, as the following quotation from Whitehead’s *Science and the Modern World* eloquently proves:

Aristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics by the introduction of the Prime Mover—God. This, for two reasons, is an important fact in the history of metaphysics. In the first place if we are to accord to anyone the position of the greatest metaphysician, having regard to genius of insight, to general equipment in knowledge, and to the stimulus of his metaphysical ancestry, we must choose Aristotle. Secondly, in his consideration of this metaphysical question he was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last European metaphysician of first-rate importance for whom this claim can be made. After Aristotle, ethical and religious interests began to influence metaphysical conclusions.¹

Whitehead himself believes that the time has come to secularize once more the idea of God in philosophy.² Against this thesis I posit that philosophy by itself has never reached the idea of God, that it has received it from religious faith and that the time has come to acknowledge fully this debt. In the forceful terms of Dumery:

The philosopher encounters this idea; he is not the author of it. He must therefore seek to know what it signifies and what role in life can be assigned to it. But he is not to mold it as he pleases nor turn it to uses which do not answer to the fundamental aspiration of the subject. In these conditions, the God of philosophies is from the start a theft and a blunder. One pretends to believe that the idea of God is the property of philosophy, whereas it is borrowed from the religious life.³

The philosopher may conclude to a transcendent world ground, or if he feels unable to reach such a conclusion he may postulate this ground as a necessary condition to make the universe intelligible. But a necessary ground is not God.

Reasoning to God

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Even if philosophy attains an ultimate, absolute principle of meaning and of value, it has not yet attained the Divine. For many philosophers the intelligibility of the real requires some absolutely intelligible *Logos*. Kant’s theory of constitution itself, far from having dispensed with such a requirement, implicitly presupposes it. A few philosophers, such as Plato, and more recently, certain Thomists, like Marechal and Lonergan, would also call this ultimately intelligible the ultimately real. Others admit that the real and the intelligible are related and must at least be partially identical, but they hesitate to make the absolutely real coincide with the absolutely intelligible. With the Kantians they keep wondering: Why should the real be ultimately intelligible? That the real is not self-explanatory does not necessarily imply that ultimately it must be explanatory, although we would all hope it to be so. But even then many will feel the need to “postulate” a principle of intelligibility which is at the same time the ultimate ground of all reality. Whether it is postulate or conclusion, however, this principle remains purely metaphysical and, as such, clearly distinct from the idea of God.

A similar way of reasoning applies to the ultimate principle of value in metaphysics. Does it coincide with absolute being? A partial identity is evident, a total one is not. But even if we accept or assume a total identity, the principle in which it is realized still differs from the religious idea of God. A German philosopher who discusses this point at length concludes: “That the principle of value just as the principle of meaning stands close to the religious idea of God, is undeniable.” Indeed, it stands even closer, as the term “principle of value” suggests. Nevertheless we must beware of identifying them. “Principle of value” is a metaphysical, “reality of value” a religious concept. The former lacks the specifically religious moment, the moment of the sacred. Our axiological argument did not assume the values of the sacred and could not assume them, for it was based on world-realization. But that does not appear among religious values, since the sacred has neither the ability nor the need to be realized, since it is a (preexisting) reality of value.”

From the preceding it should be obvious that we do not accept “purely rational” arguments for the existence of God. However, the real difficulty of a critique consists in evaluating the original purport of what we now regard as “proofs.” In many instances the idea of God was openly taken from religious sources and the author had no intention of construing an argument independently of the religious experience. This is notably the case for the instigator of the most controversial “argument,” Anselm of Canterbury. It holds true, I suspect, for most Medieval scholastics. Their purpose with the argument differs substantially from that of modern philosophers. They merely wanted to show how the existence of the finite and the contingent requires the existence of an infinite, necessary Being. This is difficult enough in itself and most attempts fail by serious flaws of reasoning. But at least Medieval authors until Scotus did not claim to produce out of philosophy an idea of God fully equipped like Athena stepping out of Zeus’s head. They merely attempted to find some rational justification for their religious beliefs. Once the finite’s need of the infinite is established, they did not hesitate to identify this infinite with their religious idea of God, since from theological reflection they knew already that, among other things, the God in whom they believed must be infinite and necessary. This procedure often leads to sloppy thinking. Since the authors knew the outcome beforehand they were anxious to reach the goal and to have it all over with. But in principle the method is unobjectionable.

What we reject are arguments which by a process of sheer reasoning pretend to arrive at full-fledged religious conclusions. All such arguments in some way fail to distinguish adequately the transcendent from the phenomenal. They treat the phenomenal as if it could give positive information about what transcends it, and the transcendental as if it were part of the phenomenal.

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Both errors are inherent in the structure of the purely philosophical proof. The former was first denounced by Kant. An analysis of the traditional arguments would show that a less agnostic philosophy must remain equally critical of the positive transition from the phenomenal to the transcendent. The second error is less obvious. It consists in the fact that all attempts to “prove” God, reduce Him to an object and treat the finite and infinite as if they were equal partners. To “prove” is to posit a content as objective, as another reality. But an object can never be God, for the nature of transcendent Being is such that it cannot be separated from the immanent subject.\(^5\)

More basically, all arguments misrepresent the relation between the finite and the infinite. The proof posits the finite first, as if it were the condition for the infinite’s existence: the finite is, therefore the infinite must also be. Now, to some extent any affirmation of the transcendent ascends from the finite to the infinite. But an “argument” has no way of correcting this initial position.

What is equally noticeable here is that a finite form of being is accepted as the starting-point, and this finite being thus appears as that by means of which the infinite Being gets its foundation. A finite being thus appears as the foundation or basis. Mediation is given a position which implies that the consciousness of the infinite has its origin in the finite. To speak more accurately, what we have here is that the finite is expressed in terms which imply that it has only a positive relation between the two. The proposition thus means that the being of the finite is the being of the infinite.\(^6\)

If the infinite is opposed to the finite, it is limited and thereby ceases to be infinite. Instead we must show that the finite is in the infinite. Which means that our initial affirmation of the finite must be followed by a negation of the finite’s independent being. Such a negation cannot be provided by the argument which asserts the infinite as also existing and thereby juxtaposes it to the finite. A purely phenomenal starting-point does not allow a negation of the finite since the infinite is entirely based on it.

The metaphysical proofs of the existence of God are deficient interpretations and descriptions of the mind’s elevation from the world to God, because they fail to express or, rather, to bring out the moment of negation which is implied in this elevation. For if the world is contingent (zufällig), it must be only falling (fallendes), only appearing, nothing in and for itself. The meaning of the elevation of the spirit is that the world possesses Being but Being which is only appearance; that true Being, absolute truth, is beyond all appearances in God alone, that God alone is true Being.\(^7\)

In the correct perspective the infinite negates the finite, because the finite itself considered from the infinite point of view, has only negative meaning. Not because the finite is the infinite,


\(^6\) Hegel, *Vorlesungen uber die Philosophien der Religion*, vol. II, 54; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans E.G. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson (London: Rougledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), vol. I, 329. (Capitalization changed). This translation is to be used with caution not only because of its own inaccuracies, but also because it is based upon the second, very uncritical edition of the *Vorlesungen*.

but because it is not. This is precisely the way religious man sees the relation between the infinite and the finite. For him the finite is what it is only through its limitation. In positing it, he preposits its negation. Of course, as we shall see later, the infinite negates the finite only insofar as the finite itself is negative. True infinity, therefore, preserves the finite within itself: it is its definitive affirmation. This in turn will require new negations to prevent the affirmation of the infinite from resulting in a Spinozistic monism.

Even if “purely rational” arguments for the existence of God could be made more successful than they are and were able to prove the existence of an infinite, perfect Being, they still would not reach the “object” of the religious act. Unless philosophy studies God from within the religious experience where his name was first heard, it will always fall into the error denounced by Scheler of identifying two differently intended objects without proving that they are identical. The absolute of philosophy solves an intellectual problem. The God of religion brings salvation. The latter is revealed in the religious experience, the former is a product of speculative thinking which borrows the name God from religious language for its own purposes. The metaphysical idea of God is never a subject, while the God of faith is. It is not merely that we speak differently about a person (object) than to a person. In the case of God we cannot talk about him except in a context of talking to him.

God is the only one to whom we can speak only in the second person. When we speak about him, we do so only insofar as we stand in his presence. We therefore can speak of God while praying. When we speak in the third person, as is inevitable in human language, we speak inauthentically about him.

For some, mostly contemporary religious philosophers, the arguments are rational articulations of the religious movement of the mind. To them the proposition that contingent being requires the existence of the necessary one means: religious man cannot envision the beings of phenomenal experience without seeing them supported by divine necessity. Reflecting upon this vision he may retrace his steps and fix them in the successive phases of an argument. The procedure is rational insofar as each stage ideally contains its own justification, but the movement itself is driven by religious power rather than by logical necessity. This interpretation of the arguments has the advantage that it brings out their religious motivation, but it must abandon all claims of pure rationality. The arguments, then, cease to be proofs.

Although this approach is defensible, I feel that something more is needed to support the faith of modern man. For unless it can be proven that a transcendent horizon falls within man’s vision of reality and that a positive urge drives him to explore this horizon, the foundation of the religious act remains dubious and the contemporary believer will not cease to question its meaningfulness. I shall therefore give some suggestions for such an “argument.” But it must be clear from the beginning that this will be no proof for the existence of God, but for the transcendence of Being and, at most, also for the rational acceptability of a religious interpretation of this transcendence. One may accept its conclusion without admitting the idea of God as religious faiths have traditionally conceived it. To conclude to a transcendent ground or to postulate such a ground in order to make the real intelligible, is not yet to attain the Divine. Is the absolutely intelligible, which many philosophers require to found the intelligibility of the real, the perfect Being intended by the religious act? Karl Jaspers’ philosophy of transcendence is there to prove that one does not necessarily imply the other.

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8 Hegel, Vorlesungen.
9 Karl Heim, Glauben und Denken (Berlin: Furche Verl, 1941), 316, quoted in Hessen, op.cit., 181.
The idea of transcendence is from a metaphysical point of view not further determinable, although it invites further investigation. Only from the kind of direct confrontation with the divine to which religious man gives such names as “revelation” and “grace” can transcendence acquire a positive content. An autonomous study of Being or consciousness can state the problem: it cannot provide the answer. The limits set by Kant are the limits of the metaphysical knowledge of God. Yet they are not the limits of the religious knowledge, nor are they the limits of philosophical language about God. To continue its investigation of the transcendent, philosophy must turn from metaphysics to critical reflection upon religious attitudes as they actually exist. In the remaining pages of this paper, we shall consider how a pure metaphysics encounters the transcendent.

Metaphysics and the Transcendent

Varied as they are, those encounters may be reduced to two basic models depending on whether the metaphysics is one of being or of consciousness. Here a great deal of the work achieved since the end of the last century in the area of the so called theodicy or natural theology, remains valuable, even though it never accomplished what its authors had hoped it would, namely, to prove the existence of God. The real objective of metaphysics ought to be to discover the locus in which a possible revelation could occur.10 The term revelation in this context is meant to include also the existence of God.

Scholastic philosophers directly or indirectly influenced by Marechal’s theory of dynamism of the intellect regard the encounter with the transcendent as an apprehension of infinite Being which conditions every finite perception and which can be made reflectively conscious. Thus Karl Rahner discovers the existence of transcendent reality in the pre-apprehension (Vorgriff) of Being which accompanies every assertion. “The pre-apprehension of such Being is...no a priori knowledge of an object, but the a priori horizon of perception of a sensuous object presented a posteriori. It is the a priori condition of the knowledge of an a posteriori appearance.11

Being-as-such is grasped implicitly as the goal and horizon of all intellectual affirmation. To be sure, the notion of Being is not altogether transcendent. For the Being of all finite beings can be no more absolute than the totality of all possible determinations. Together they would yield no more than an intrinsically finite reality. Yet at the same time Being is affirmed as transcending all finite beings. As a horizon of affirmation, Being suggests a beyond. Moreover, since this horizon surpasses even the greatest conceivable totality of finite beings, Rahner feels justified in assuming that infinite Being is co-affirmed in every particular assertion. One might object that a purely negative infinity, that is, a horizon which is unlimited without containing anything, would do just as well. Rahner answers: “The ‘whither’ does not itself have private infinity with respect to what is to be apprehended. For otherwise the pre-apprehension would attain to ‘nothing,’ to the mere possibility of that which is to be apprehended as actuality.”12 The entire argument depends on the priority of the actual over the possible. This priority is supposed to exclude the possibility of a purely negative horizon. If the horizon is pre-apprehended it must be actual rather than possible.

If the preceding argument is supposed to be a proof for the existence of God, I remain unconvinced. Several thing seem to be equated here which are by no means identical. I shall not challenge the pre-apprehensive of Being, for the content of Being exceeds every possible actual

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12 Spirit in the World, 184.
affirmation, but I do not see why that which exceeds every conceivable finite being must be infinite in itself. A “surplus” of Being appears like a halo around the affirmation of each finite being, but there is no evidence that this halo must be conceived by itself as an infinite actuality. That the mind affirms Being infinitely does not imply that it affirms an infinite Being. Undoubtedly each affirmation of the finite as such implicitly asserts the possibility of a more. But must it therefore assert infinite actuality? Such an actuality is not proven by saying that “the esse of the pre-apprehension does not come of itself to limit intrinsically.” It merely proves that the notion of Being is de se unlimited, not that its actual realization is unlimited.

This brings us to the notion of the infinite horizon. It is true that Being is the horizon of each affirmation and that this horizon is unlimited, but to bring both parts of this statement together and to conclude that an infinite Being is affirmed in the pre-apprehension of a limitless horizon seems unwarranted. Nor does the priority of the actual over the possible prove the point. For this priority does not require that an infinite actuality be asserted before a finite being can be affirmed as actual. To assume to the contrary, as Heidegger does, that Being itself is affirmed against a horizon of nothingness by no means implies that nothingness is prior. It simply means that Being is co-affirmed or co-preapprehended with nothingness. The notion of Being by itself is neither finite nor infinite—it is indefinite. How far it stretches depends on how far one’s ontological affirmation reaches. The terms finite and infinite in this respect fulfill no other function than to reveal the scope of this affirmation. To say that the totality of what is, is finite means that one assumes the existence of an actuality which surpasses it, but the universe conceived as the totality of what is and what could be, offers no intrinsic grounds for being called finite. The term finite, as applied to the totality of the real and the possible, merely indicates that one gives a positive meaning to the notion of transcendence. Such a consideration may be justified on many grounds, but from a purely metaphysical point of view it is a choice.

Yet, my main purpose is not to criticize Rahner, but to express my agreement with his fundamental insight: that the metaphysical horizon of affirmation necessarily raises the problem of transcendence. What lies beyond the horizon? This question is so far from being meaningless, as positivists try to tell us, that I consider it inevitable. In going to the end I cannot avoid asking how much farther I could go. Insofar as the mind focuses on this beyond aspect of the horizon of Being it raises the question of transcendent Being. This, in my position, is as far as the mind can go in the metaphysical search, but it is far enough to make religious concerns meaningful and even sufficiently interesting for the metaphysician to allow himself to be drawn into the complex web of religious affirmations. His first question will, of course, be how religious man could speak about a reality which he himself describes as transcendent. The answer is: by means of negation. “Through the negation of the limit of any particular and immediately accessible ‘having being’ and through the removal of the upper limit in the direction of the absolute being of God, supramundane existents can be defined, at least negatively.” Religious affirmations of the transcendent, then, do not provide new philosophical knowledge of the transcendent. They describe new experiences in man’s relation to the transcendent. As such, they fulfill a meaningful purpose and have an impact which, although stated in negative terms, is eminently positive.

Another major tradition encounters the problem of transcendence in the reflection upon consciousness. One of the great discoveries of Western philosophy, initiated by Socrates and completed by Augustine, Descartes, and Kant, is that the mind has a reality of its own which is irreducible to any other being. Yet the mind cannot know itself unless it previously knows

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13 Ibid.
14 Horer des Wortes, 151, 186.
something else. As Husserl established, its nature is thoroughly intentional. It is then only by a process of bracketing what does not belong to the mind itself that we are able to discover its proper being. Eventually this gradual reduction will reveal some form of pure self, an act which itself is one but is at the origin of all conscious multiplicity. Can we go further? Ever since Plotinus philosophers have been found who said that we can and that we must go further. For in its basic dichotomy between subject and object, activity and passivity, the mind reveals itself as an already established order which refers to an ulterior, simple source.

One contemporary writer who continues the Neo-Platonic tradition in the language of Husserl, concludes: “Either one seeks to arrest the reductive effort at a given order (for example that of the I, or rather, the transcendental We) and is completely arbitrary, since the reducible remains. Or one pushes the purifying exigency the whole way, and establishes that it stops of itself only after going beyond all the orders and even the notion of order.” Dumery calls the One, God, as he well may in a philosophy of religion. Yet an analysis of consciousness alone would not justify this name. The reduction concludes only to a dynamic simplicity beyond order and intelligibility in which the dichotomy of the mind is overcome. In line with the Neo-Platonic tradition Dumery rejects even the name “Being” for the One and, consequently, rules out any possibility or participation.

It is sheer overflowing, without imperfection or ebb. If its aseity is at the beginning of the procession, we cannot tie it to the terms which proceed from it . . . . The One-source is the triumphant irradiation, the fiery furnace in full blast. Once the rays are interpreted and reflected in various directions, finitude is introduced.

Many philosophers may balk at such images and, for that matter, at the thought which produces them. If the phenomenological method is controversial, an “ultimate” reduction is even more so, but the same could be said of the horizon of Being as developed by Rahner or Lonergan. A philosophical argument never moves in a vacuum; it is connected with a particular philosophical structure and ultimately originates in a personal vision of the universe. Without the vision and structure it becomes incomprehensible.

Others have encountered the transcendent in the self-surpassing drive of consciousness. This was the road followed by Bergson, Blondel, and the entire school of Marechal. Through scientific, moral, and aesthetic ideals the mind expresses its restless drive to go beyond itself. Their function is to draw the mind forever beyond its actual achievements. Thus, although ideals cannot be attained, they never cease to attract. Projecting the unattainable, ideals open up the mystery of transcendence. Why does man thus desire to transcend himself? This question intrigues the religious mind. It is not the existence of ideals that is mysterious, for they are man’s own creation, but rather the force which drives man to create them, his urge toward transcendence. The religious mind merely concentrates upon an aspect of experience which presents itself to all. Reflective interpretations of this dimension vary from one philosophy to another. Nor are they all philosophical. A reflective awareness of the transcendent does not require methodic thought. It may occur in an existential situation, a moral decision, an aesthetic experience. The entire literature of our civilization bears witness to man’s confrontation with transcendence. Philosophy can do no

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16 *Philosophie de la religion*, vol. I, 48; *Faith and Reflection*, 158.
more than articulate the primal awareness of transcendence. Only the religious act can transform it into an awareness of God.

The notion of transcendence may be established independently of the religious act, but whether or not it is to receive a positive content is a religious matter. In dealing with this content philosophy can only reflect on a given nonphilosophical experience of religious faith; it cannot constitute it by reflecting on the nature of the real as such. On the other hand, the content of faith must remain accessible to philosophical critique, for unless rational reflection be allowed on the sacred, the latter must remain meaningless. Moreover, since the believer holds certain views on the nature of the real which the philosopher explores in the light of reason alone, the believer must let that light in on his views. The mind cannot simultaneously embrace two positions on the same subject without being forced to harmonize them. Attempts to do so have resulted first in religious philosophies and, in the last two centuries, in philosophies of religion.

Here we face the fact that not all philosophies are fit to deal with the religious phenomenon. Any approach which rejects a priori all transcendent claims is obviously unable to evaluate the religious experience in terms acceptable to religious man, but equally unfit is a philosophy which feels too much at ease with religious statements and pretends to give them a full, rational support. Faith claims to create a transcendent world within the immanent and asks the philosopher to acknowledge this transcendence while abstaining from it.

Turning now to the particular modes in which philosophers have opened their metaphysics to the transcendent dimension, we notice an almost infinite variety. The approaches range from an idea of God which is the keystone of a system (a secularization after the fashion which we denounced in the previous section) to an open and benevolent agnosticism. Few today would still claim with Descartes that all certainties collapse unless there exists a transcendent, infinitely perfect Being, but all advocates of metaphysical arguments for the existence of God share, to some extent, Descartes’ position insofar as their universe must become incoherent without God. For if this universe implies the necessary existence of God, the very thought of a world without God would conflict with the only possible conception of the present one.

Some might say that the same argument applies to any philosopher who accepts the existence of God, insofar as the acceptance of a necessary being excludes a problematic attitude with respect to that idea: a necessary being once admitted, cannot be “bracketed” any more. Yet this conclusion does not follow, since there is a distinction between the thought of a necessary being and the necessary thought of a necessary being. The former is based upon a fluid concept of reality which can alternatively include and exclude the notion of a transcendent necessary being, while the latter, which is accepted by the adherents of the ontological argument, allows only one possible logical universe of which God is a necessary component. Nevertheless even those for whom God is such a philosophical necessity do not usually claim that philosophical discourse alone exhausts its riches. Whitehead, for instance, in the text referred to at the beginning of this chapter, praises Aristotle for having stayed within the confines of metaphysics: to him the poverty of the Aristotelian vision of God is the sign of its authenticity. Religious faith for Whitehead is by no means a mere extension of metaphysics, but rather an attempt to infuse “that nontemporal generality which primarily belongs to conceptual thought alone” into the particularity of emotion. Whether religious faith needs philosophical reflection, as this statement implies, will be discussed shortly.

First we must consider another position in which philosophy pretends neither to invent nor to prove the existence of God, but to remain “open” toward the transcendent. Such an open-ended

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17 *Process and Reality*, 23.
philosophy confronts the various positions concerning the ultimate ground of the mind and the universe as so many hypotheses. One of these deserves particular attention because it corresponds to an actually existing religious experience. Maurice Blondel, the main proponent of this theory, refers to it as “necessary hypothesis,” thus distinguishing it from a number of other hypotheses which the philosopher may prefer not to consider even though he does not regard them as logically contradictory. The task of philosophy is to analyze the intrinsic coherence of the God-hypothesis as it is presented by religious man. In doing so metaphysics naturally develops into a philosophy of religion. The transition is smooth enough, but it is all the more important that the philosopher be fully aware of it. Otherwise he will conclude, as he has done so often in the past, to some “natural” theory of God which faith or theology merely “follows up and fills out more fully.”

The main objective of philosophy of religion is to determine the specific nature of the religious act in and through its various expressions. To achieve this purpose it must be above all a study of symbols, situating the symbolic activity within the totality of consciousness. This, I take it, is what Schelling in his philosophy of myth and of revelation and Hegel in his theory of representation attempted to accomplish. Obviously a philosophical reflection upon religious symbolism never recaptures the riches of the original symbols. Nor is it itself symbolic, as Jaspers implied. Philosophy of religion is purely rational. It analyzes the various noetic structures of religious representations without being symbolically creative. Nevertheless its critical work fills a basic religious need, for in having his expressions subjected to a critical analysis, religious man becomes aware of their relativity. This helps him to prevent faith from being taken over by the luxuriant undergrowth of its own creativity. Philosophical reflection also assists him in answering such critical questions as how a faith can maintain its identity throughout the various expressions which it adopts in the course of its development.

Most importantly from an intrinsically religious point of view, philosophy responds to faith’s own need of reflection. The drive toward gnosis is part of the religious act itself. Faith seeks ever greater clarification. The adage fides quaerens intellectum is not an invention of philosophers but of theologians, and one which in the Christian tradition has been practiced ever since the Pauline and the Johannine writings. In an advanced culture faith naturally recurs to philosophical concepts to develop its ideas. The believer cannot avoid thinking about what a divine Creator, an immortal soul, and other tenets of this faith might possibly mean. Nevertheless, aside from particular beliefs, faith, as an overall integrating structure which assigns to all aspects of existence their ultimate meaning, must meet that rational interpretation of reality to which we refer as metaphysics. Windelband at one time went so far as to call religion “an intercourse with the inmost nature and foundation of all reality, a life in and with God, a metaphysical life.” Far from threatening the religious act, philosophical reflection brings it to a heightened awareness of itself. It follows the self-transcending movement of faith in its restless desire to go beyond its present state and to approach closer to vision.

Yet, this affinity to reflection is fraught with danger both to metaphysics and faith. The believing metaphysician may be tempted to take the religious integration for an ultimate metaphysical answer. As Heidegger indicated, God is not the final answer to the question: Why is

19 Karl Rahner, Horer des Wortes, 13, 27.
20 “Das Heilige,” Praludien (1903), 357.
there something rather than nothing?\textsuperscript{21} If anything he is part of the problem, for metaphysics must question his Being as much as that of all finite beings. Too eager a desire for philosophical insight may lead the religious man to substitute independent speculation for living experience. As a result, the believer may pretend to understand what in another respect he declares to be beyond understanding.

These dangers must be braved since religious man has no choice but to take the risk which is inherent in the nature of his experience. Whitehead forcefully expressed the need of reflection when he declared that faith, to maintain its religious status, must remain aware of its metaphysical implications. In this respect it differs from science.

Science can leave its metaphysics implicit and retire behind our belief in the pragmatic value of its general description. If religion does that, it admits that its dogmas are merely pleasing ideas for the purpose of stimulating its emotions. Science (at least as a temporary methodological device) can rest upon a naive faith; religion is the longing for justification. When religion ceases to seek for penetration, for clarity, it is sinking back into its lower forms.\textsuperscript{22}

The degeneration to which Whitehead refers consists in a flight into the purely emotional and the wildly fantastic, denounced by all students of the religious experience. Tylor was not entirely wrong in presenting the development of religion as a rationalization process which gradually subdues the unruly forces of religious inspiration. Rudolf Otto, from a much better viewpoint, considered the interpenetration of the rational elements with the nonrational ones as axiomatic and as an intrinsically necessary process.\textsuperscript{23} The category of the sacred is not fully realized until the nonrational numinous fact is “schematized” by rational elements.\textsuperscript{24} Otto Karrer mentions the constant threat of a \textit{Verwilderung} of the elements of imagination in religion.\textsuperscript{25} We find the need for rationalization mentioned in Plato, in Locke, and in Hegel. Of course, the need for reflection in the religious act is not exclusively being fulfilled by philosophy. Yet one inevitably leads to the other.

As I indicated previously, the philosophical reflection upon the religious act which is usually called philosophy of religion is to be distinguished from general metaphysics. While the latter must refrain from God talk in the strict, religious sense, the former must embrace the full content of the religious experience, the desire for an intrinsically unified philosophical system may lead the philosopher to incorporate this reflection upon religious experience into general metaphysics. Something of that nature seems to have occurred in Hegel’s philosophy. For Hegel the “system” of philosophy that begins with \textit{Logic} and ends with the \textit{Philosophy of Spirit} has no other content than religion. “Philosophy has its own content, its need and interest common with religion; its object is the eternal truth, that is, nothing but God and his explication. Philosophy explicates itself only when it explicates religion and while it explicates itself, it explicates religion.”\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} Op.cit., 45.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Das Religiöse in der Menschheit und das Christentum} (Freiburg: Herder, 1934), 134. See also Johannes Hessen, op.cit., 36.
Although its general object is the same as that of philosophy as such, philosophy of religion does not stay with pure thought: it descends to the religious representation in order to study thought in its external manifestation. At the same time, philosophy of religion does not consider the finite forms which the Spirit gives itself in nature and in the finite spirit and which general philosophy must also study. Instead it concentrates directly on the Idea as it appears in its infinite form, as absolute Spirit.\(^{27}\) Obviously the unity between philosophy of religion and metaphysics here becomes uncomfortably close.

Related to this “religionization” of metaphysics is the position held by some Catholic theologians in recent years. They simply subordinate philosophy to the theological reflection which occurs in the religious experience itself. Thus philosophical reflection is made dependent upon extra-philosophical norms and the autonomy of philosophical thought is jeopardized altogether. The nonbeliever is said to live an inauthentic existence and thereby to be at a definite disadvantage in philosophizing. The rejection of faith is thought to compromise the quality of his philosophical reflection. This position is a clear instance of an illegitimate intrusion of religion into the domain of metaphysics. We might even say: into the domain of philosophy, for when a thinker so widely extends the boundaries of theology, there is no proper domain for philosophy left.

A somewhat similar view, although more restrained, is defended by Etienne Gilson, who, on the basis of Thomas’ Summa Theologiae, considers Christian philosophy an integral part of Christian theology. This position obviously tolls the death bell for an autonomous philosophy of the Christian experience. If this is Christian philosophy, there is no Christian philosophy. If philosophy is an autonomous reflection upon living experience, it must be entitled to reflect upon the religious experience, in this case the Christian experience, without having to sacrifice its independence. Of course, all here depends on the meaning of “autonomy.” If it means that philosophy must create or at least independently reconstitute basic religious concepts, then religious man will no longer recognize them as his own. But if “autonomy” is restricted to an independently critical interpretation of a received experience, then there can be a philosophy of religion acceptable to religious man.

It is not always clear which one of the two positions an author adopts. In the case of Hegel this is a matter of dispute to the present day. Hegel accepts the unique authority of the Christian revelation. Yet he also argues that faith does not fully come into its own until it has philosophically thought the representational content of this revelation. Such a view may appear similar to the one proposed in the beginning of this section, but for Hegel philosophy is not merely a reflection upon faith: it is faith itself reaching its own truth. This does not mean, as has been argued so often in the past, that philosophy is a substitute for religion (how could it be a substitute for what it presupposes?), but it does mean that religion cannot be fully true in its own right until it has become philosophy.

Many will object to such a conclusion, because it places an exclusive emphasis upon the cognitive, the gnostic elements of the religious act. Certainly, a desire for clarification is essential to the act of faith, but it is not the whole act, nor can it ever change the act into a different one, an act of knowledge. Religious faith spontaneously tends toward philosophical reflection, but it never gives up its own identity in order to become philosophical reflection. To identify the two is to...

change the nature of the religious experience. It then becomes *primarily* an intellectual insight—which it was not before—claiming to understand its object exhaustively—which faith never does. To remain religious the gnostic drive of faith must be kept within the boundaries of faith. A religious act can never be transformed into one of reflection and still preserve its original identity. Hegel seems to set no limits to the gnostic drive. For him the act is its intellectual content. This appears even in the order of development of the *Philosophy of Religion*. How else could he claim that the Greek (indeed, the Roman) religion marked a higher stage of development than the Hebrew? Or that the Greek mysteries constituted a more “primitive” religious expression than the Greek mythology.\(^{28}\) If “primitive” means “more crudely religious” and not merely “more archaic” this statement is patently false.

The exhaustive character of the (philosophical) religious insight is the other trait which makes Hegel’s position suspect to the believer. The God of faith remains hidden at the end of the clarification process as much as in the beginning. It is essential to faith *not* to understand. Hegel’s philosophical religion has no such restrictions. The cognitive dynamism toward the absolute is pursued in the religious act until there remains nothing of the original darkness of faith, but is this still true *religious* insight? The question has given pause even to Hegel’s most sympathetic commentators:

Does speculative thought grasp the mystery as well as it thinks? Does the perfect knowledge, the spiritual gnosis, of the Trinitarian mystery not impose another negation, an abnegation, a passion of which the patient Idea does not seem to be overly aware? Perhaps it is not a mere figure of speech that a surplus of knowledge remains promised from the Spirit to the Spirit. But does the relentless idealist thought ever know a surplus?\(^{29}\)

Hegel’s case shows how difficult it is to state the relations between philosophy and religion such that both preserve their full integrity. We are inclined to think that the impact of religion, via the philosophy of religion, upon general metaphysics is more modest. It consists mainly in the awareness of a new dimension in the Being which the metaphysician studies. This means not that all reality is to be interpreted with reference to theology, but that philosophy must adopt a consciously expectant attitude. Only a religious philosophy provides the necessary infrastructure for a philosophy of religion. Yet to be religious, philosophy must keep a precarious balance between admitting the experience of transcendence and making the most of it on the one hand, and abstaining from an independent, positive exploration of the transcendent on the other. To maintain this attitude the philosopher must be willing to listen, while retaining his full critical jurisdiction. Past philosophies of religion have failed mainly by their unwillingness to expose the religious nature of their sources. By taking credit for doing independently what in fact they borrowed from religious sources, they jeopardized philosophy’s autonomy and misinterpreted the nature of the religious experience.

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\(^{28}\) *Vorlesungen*, III, 138.

To domination, a Christian philosophy offers: giving to hard unity: a unity charged with abundance; and to hiddenness: the mystery of presence.

One of the most influential movements among philosophers today is that of Deconstruction. It is the moving energy of thought at the center of much that has been called “post modern.” Its birthplace is Paris, but it has reached North America’s universities through philosophy, linguistics, literary studies, sociology, political theory and religious studies, and its influence among young teachers and scholars is already wide and diffuse. Its background was prepared by the hermeneutic work of German philosophers such as Heidegger, and by the work in linguistics and language of such thinkers as de Saussure and Wittgenstein. Deconstruction is part of a wider critical reexamination of nothing less than the nature and limits of rationality. Its importance may lie less in what it says than in what it attempts to “unsay.” In its skepticism and, in more extreme instances, its nihilism, deconstruction strikes at the very core of long-held understandings of the philosophical enterprise, and has implications for law, politics and social thought, as well as for theology. It subjects to criticism the basic modes of thought by which philosophy and theology have traditionally been developed, criticized and defended. The very possibility of continuing the long conversation we call Western culture and Western civilization is, therefore, itself called into question. It is fair to ask, what resources are available in the more constructive traditions of Western thought, and specifically in Christian thought and experience, which we may bring to the wider contemporary discussion within which deconstruction forms a part? At the heart of the issues raised by its challenge lies the nature, status and durability of the principles by which reason has sought for a better understanding of what is true and good.

It is difficult for us nowadays to grasp what the ancients and medieval meant by principles, and in that degree we may be said to live in an age of anarchy. By that term, however, I do not mean to refer primarily to the violence and disrespect for the law of which we hear so much today, since there have been periods of great and continued violence during ancient and medieval times as well. I take the term, rather, in its original sense: to live, think and act without principles. What is distinctive of our age, it seems to me, is that it has brought to a head a long-standing development in which the very conception of a principle--or, to speak Latin: principium, and to speak Greek: arche--has come under increasing challenge. What has become subject to criticism is, if I may so put it, the very “principle” of principle.

Now, if that is correct, then it is a matter of no little importance. For the very beginnings of our intellectual culture in ancient Greece may well be under challenge, and with it what we have known as reason, and rational discourse, and especially philosophy. It is difficult to judge the import of one’s own age, of course, because we cannot easily see through the smoke or hear through the din of the daily bustle of events which mixes important and deeper issues with issues that hold interest only for the day. It may be that, when reading Richard Rorty’s latest sigh of despair, we are merely seeing yet another of the recurrent descents into skepticism that have come
and gone at various periods in our intellectual history. And yet there are signs that there may be
deeper movement afoot.

Let me illustrate the confusion in which we find ourselves today when we try to read the signs
of the times, empowered only with the knowledge of the history of our culture. Some twenty years
ago there burst upon the intellectual scene a spate of books which argued that God is dead—not on
the Cross, but in the mind of an abstract construction called “Modern Man.” Now, that should have
signaled a long and serious debate, since the reality of God has played such an important role in
the development of European and American culture, whatever one might say of the present
situation. Yet, within a matter of a very few years, the whole cycle of debate had been run through,
with pros and cons and summations in plenty. Within five years of the first book on the topic, it
had become a stale witticism that in the publishing business nothing was deader than the “death of
God.” Admittedly, one did get tired of the frantic pace of the discussion and of its typicality, i.e.,
its superficiality. In the end nothing was settled, and everything returned more or less to the same
state as before the outbreak.

But it would be too easy to dismiss the controversy on these grounds, for there are deeper
signs of a dismissal of God from the important problems of human existence. Thus, there is no
diminution of the influence of two of the most powerful scriptures of contemporary intellectual
atheism: the writings of Marx and of Nietzsche. If we attend to them, we may well dismiss the
flurry of books that poured out twenty years ago, and yet not dismiss the serious nature of the
challenge to theism represented, perhaps superficially, by the “death of God” controversy. Indeed,
Nietzsche took a long view and looked toward the day when the very word “atheism”
would be unused because the new age would have forgotten the very meaning of the word
“God” (theos) which forms its root. Then there would be neither atheists nor theists, but the new
Overman (Ubermensch), innocent even of the merest memory-trace of God. Now, I have appealed
to the example of the “death-of-God” both because I do not think atheism is separate from the
question of principles and anarchy, and because it illustrates how difficult it is to assess the
seriousness of the challenge to what I have already called the very “principle” of principles. The
“death of God” controversy may not be as important as some thought it was at the time, but it
points to a longer and deeper challenge to metaphysics and to religion itself.

We hear a good deal these days about Deconstruction, especially among certain French
intellectuals, and increasingly among certain hermeneutists in America. What some of the
philosophers among them are “reconstructing” is the heritage of philosophical understanding
which has been built up according to principles and handed down over the centuries. The
Metaphysical Society of America took the challenge seriously enough to dedicate its 1988 annual
meeting to the question of: “Metaphysics, Deconstruction and the End of Philosophy?” In the
greater part of this article I propose to examine a current challenge to a philosophy of principles
by providing a sketch of part of a recent important book on Heidegger which bears the sub-
title: From Principles to Anarchy. In the final section, however, I should like to suggest three

1 A good introduction and anthology of important texts may be found in Deconstruction in Context:
Literature and Philosophy, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). One of the
key texts is, Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
2 Cf. After Philosophy: End or Transformation? ed. K. Barnes, Jas. Bowman, T. McCarthy (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1987). My own sense of the question is given in the opening paper of the conference,
3 Cf. Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1987); translated by Christian-Marie Gros in collaboration with the author from
topics that may lead us back from that criticism to a better understanding of traditional metaphysics, i.e., *from anarchy to principles*.

According to, Reiner Schurmann, the author of the book mentioned above, Heidegger has come to think of Western culture as exhibiting a series of *epochs*. Thus, in modern intellectual history we can speak of the different epochs: the Renaissance with its emphasis upon cultural individuality, Rationalism with its emphasis upon reflective subjectivity, Critical Idealism with its emphasis upon transcendental subjectivity, and Ideology with its emphasis upon the practical subjectivity of the moral agent (*HOBO*, p. 46). Looking over the entire scope of Western thought, Heidegger paints a large canvas in three epochs: first, that of the pre-metaphysical age, the age of the Greek poets, dramatists and early philosophers; secondly, the classical metaphysical age, whose influence has lasted well into modern times; and thirdly, the most recent epoch, in which (since Nietzsche) the reign of metaphysics has come to an end (*HOBO*, p. 122). In sum: metaphysics enjoyed an almost twenty-five hundred year hegemony in Western culture between an ancient pre-metaphysical and the present post-metaphysical epochs.

That reign began with Socrates’ turn towards man in his philosophical inquiry, and it was initially presided over by the brilliance of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, in large measure they gave to metaphysics its fixed shape and power. Heidegger holds that Aristotle’s *Physics* has been the Basic Book (*Grundbuch*) of Western philosophy. Moreover, true to its older anthropocentric origins, metaphysics (in the philosophies of Descartes, Hume, Kant and others) came to rest in and upon subjectivity as upon the *subjectum inconcussum* of thought and reality, its bedrock (*hypokeimenon*). The turn to man was made complete, however, only in modern metaphysics (*hypokeimenon*) become *subjectum humanum*. Nor was this merely a matter of theoretical thought, for it bore practical fruit as well, and above all in the form of modern scientific technology, in whose grip the popular as well as much of the intellectual culture still lives (*HOBO*, pp. 34-35).

Now modern technology--still according to Schurmann-Heidegger--modern technology is the last product of metaphysics, and it is through technology that the long reign of metaphysics is brought to an end. The task of recognizing and realizing that end, however, demands a new kind of thinking, a new effort of *logos* which will pass beneath the very foundations of metaphysics and its last product, modern technology, in order to release us from its grip. Metaphysics is the long-standing thought-*construction* which has been produced by means of principles; and it can be brought to truth only through the task of *deconstruction*, the task of comprehending and

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overcoming (*Verw"undung*) the way in which principles have sealed our thought in upon itself and away from the true disclosure of being.

Schurmann suggests that we may also call these large epochs “economies”--not in the restricted sense of commercial markets, nor even in its broader, more general meaning--but in the more original sense of any order of entities interrelated to one another by reference to a principle. These also constitute economies, i.e., social orders gathered about a single over-riding idea or ideal, so that the various members and regions within the social order are principiates taking their direction, meaning and value from the over-riding principle. According to Schurmann-Heidegger, the vast economy of metaphysics just described exhibits a variety of smaller economies or epochs within it, such as the Greek order of things which is to be referred to substance or essence (*ousia*), or the medieval order of things referred to and centered upon God (*theos, Deus*), or the modern order of things referred to man (*Humanism*), and within the latter, the present order of things referred to technology (*Technik*).

Now, the words “economy” and “epoch” are closely associated in Heidegger’s usage. For what marks each of these “epochs” or “economies” is that their order rests upon a single primary principle; and for those who live, think and act in terms of its order this foundation provides first, a selective delimitation of open possibilities, in a word: closure; secondly, stability or regularity, in a word: necessity; and thirdly, credibility through repetitive confirmation, in a word certitude (*HOBLO*, pp. 1-25). The foundation prescribes an order that fixes the fundamental relations of the entities within the order to itself and to one another. Moreover, the primary principle provides a purpose for action and an explanation of events. It proscribes conduct and rules out inappropriate action by preempting more radical choice. Now, it is just this that brings together the economic and the epochal nature of such an order. For an epoch is taken by Heidegger in its original sense; that is, it suspends possibilities. The famous phenomenological epoch is just such a suspension. Among the ancient skeptics the epoche could mean a waiting until better evidence came to the fore;¹ but according to Schurmann-Heidegger the metaphysical epoch was meant to put an end to inquiry. It is in this sense that an epoch is an economy which, in selecting some possibilities for a culture or age, simultaneously closes off others. Moreover, it does this by means of principles, i.e., by referring the plurality of phenomena (things, actions, events) to a single over-riding source (*arch*). All members of the world of thought and reality are principiates which flow from, are directed to, and justified by reference to the over-riding first principle. Thus, all things in Aristotle’s cosmos are referred to substance; all things in medieval thought and life, to God; all things in Cartesian philosophy, to human subjectivity; and all things (pragmata) in the modern world, to scientific technology.

When we turn to Aristotle’s most formal discussion of the term² we find the following senses of *arch*: first, it may be taken as a starting point of anything from which a movement is first made; though the point of departure may be either from what is primary in the thing itself or from what provides easiest access for us. Second, *arch* may mean that which is first present in the coming-to-be of anything, as the initial part (e.g., a foundation) must be present as a primary constituent in the thing itself or as a generative cause must be present first at the coming-to-be of the thing, even though it is not present as an intrinsic and constituent part. Third, *arch* may mean that which is

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² *Metaphysics* V, 1012b34-1013a17.
first as deliberately initiating the movement, or as providing it with a guiding principle, or finally as that from which something first comes to be knowable.

Heidegger reduces these related meanings to two important ones: the inceptive and the dominative meanings. Taking his lead from Heidegger, Schurmann suggests that the Greek word *arch* first meant in Homer: “to lead, to open up,” e.g., a conversation, battle or action of some sort, and hence: “to come first”; and this is the inceptive meaning. A second meaning came to the fore with Herodotus and Pindar: viz., “to dominate,” and this is the dominative meaning. Indeed, Heidegger himself⁶ tells us that the Greeks heard two things in the word:

On the one hand, *arch* means that from which something takes its egress and inception; on the other it means that which, as such egress and inception, at the same time reaches beyond whatever emerges from it, thereby dominating it. *Arch* means both inception and domination inseparably.

In Aristotle, then, according to Heidegger, “to begin” means “to dominate.” Scholars generally agree that the term received its technical meaning from Aristotle, and that the latter’s meaning overlays the famous interpretation of his earlier predecessors. Thus, Aristotle describes their attempts at natural philosophy as a search for principles in the form of causes (*aitiai* in his sense of the term), and mostly for the material cause of things.⁷

Schurmann remarks further that Aristotle’s list of the several senses of the term is hardly more than a lexicographical enumeration. It mixes the two meanings. Aristotle defines *arch* as that out of which something is or becomes or is known. The term therefore designates a source of being, becoming and knowledge beyond which it is use less to try to investigate: the source is ultimate in that it both begins and commands.⁸

He concludes that such an *arch* is opaque, resistant to further analysis (*unhintergehbar*).⁹

Moreover, Schurmann recognizes (*HOBO*, p. 99) that Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysics must establish that the twofold technical meaning of the term does not occur before

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⁷ Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy, 54, supposes that the use of the word *arche* to describe Anaximander’s *apeiron* is almost surely Aristotle’s and that we cannot assume that the term itself occurred in Anaximander’s writings. For another view (more reliant upon Aristotle), see F.E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 23. Peter cites H. Diels, *Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker*, ed. W. Kranz, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1934-1954) and writes: “The pre-Socratic search for an *arche* in the sense of a material cause (Aristotle had located the investigation within his own categories of causality…) is described by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 983-985b, and the word archa may have first been used in this technical sense by Anaximander (Diels, 12A9).
⁸ *HOBA*, 333-334, fn. 5. Notice that the nuances fall away in favor of a reduction to two paramount senses. A similar simplification occurs in the reduction of *ousia* to sensible substance, and of a first principle into a sheer unity.
⁹ Indeed, cf. for example, the remarks of Etienne Gilson: “One does not explain *esse*, it is what explains everything else.” (From “Compagnons de route,” in Etienne Gilson, *Philosophe de la Chretiente* (Paris: Cerf, 1949), 291-292. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between *esse* and “everything else” (*praeter esse*) in *Constra Gentiles* II, c. 52. There is implied here, of course, a criticism of the notion of self-evident principles. See Shurmann’s discussion of Cicero on *energeia* and *evidentia*, of the Vulgate on *te arche* and *principium*, and of Leibniz on *principium rationis sufficientis*, 106-107, 336, fn. 1-7.
Plato and Aristotle; so that the conclusion may be drawn that “the metaphysical way of thinking . . . begins only with Plato and [Aristotle].” Now that way of thinking--of which the original thinkers in Western philosophy supposedly were innocent--rests upon the amalgam of primacy and power, and proceeds by virtue of melding firstness (the inceptive meaning) with command (the dominative meaning). According to Schurmann, this “alliance between the notions of inception and domination is possible only once the metaphysics of the causes is constituted,” for to cause means to initiate through command and domination.

Schurmann comes close to reducing principles (archai) to causes (aitiai) at the beginning of Attic metaphysics. The paradigm is allegedly natural motion (physis), and the telos is: to render motion intelligible. The archai, then, become causes of motion (aitiai), which render intelligible the regions of being, becoming and knowing (HOBO, p. 99). Schurmann implies, without discussion and therefore somewhat gratuitously, that for the Attic philosophers the fundamental experience of cause-seeking rests upon “one very precise experience,”--our own initiative as movers. He does, however, cite both Heidegger and Nietzsche, who denounce cause-seeking as derived from “the subjective conviction that we are causes” (HOBO, p. 334f., fn. 25). Of course, this is meant to fit nicely with the anthropocentric turn from which metaphysics is alleged to have begun, i.e., the Socratic interest in human virtue. Finally, Schurmann maintains that “Aristotle’s discovery of teleocracy [i.e., domination by that arch which is telos] is native to the field of fabrication [techn].” And, he adds, “that is where it should stay” (HOBO, p. 103). It should stay there because prior to Aristotle’s amalgam of the two senses of arch as inception and domination “the Greeks do not seem to have understood the origin as located in the phenomenal region of the maneuverable” (HOBO, p. 104). Now, this restriction has as its result the enclosure of thought within the realm of the operable, and even the theoretical sphere is infected by the practical conceived as the manipulable. Being is restricted to technique, and power now takes on the meaning of “the capacity to dispose of,” and hence to dominate.  

Before we look more closely at this characterization of principle as coercive power, I will follow Schurmann-Heidegger a bit further as the account turns from the Greek arch to the Latin principium, from which our own word “principle” is so immediately derived. Schurmann-Heidegger discover a shift from attention to the arch as the commanding origin of becoming (physis) to principium as the commanding origin of order (ordo) (HOBO, pp. 108-110). The new concern, writes Schurmann, “clearly stresses the element of domination over the element of inception, or [stresses] constant presence over time.”

The influence of Heidegger’s very formalistic understanding of John Duns Scotus is prominent in Schurmann’s argument here. We have shifted from the sphere of becoming to the order of essences, to the “essential order” (HOBO, p. 111). The translation of Aristotle’s energeia by actualitas represents a new epoch in which principles are more reified, more rigid and static than ever, and in which time and becoming give way to a hierarchical world governed by a supreme Prince (princeps): God as Gubernator mundi. In modern times, according to Schurmann-Heidegger, the process of reification continues but shifts its center to human subjectivity, whose capacity for the representation of objects becomes the standard by which the truth of things is decided and their worth determined.

10 Remember that S. Thomas distinguishes the theoretical from the practical on the basis of
11 Schurmann adds (110) that the origin comes to be understood as thetic, i.e., as will, command, Pantocrator (which is more than Creator), and as princeps.
The locus where the origin, understood in this way, obtains is the region of logical [mental] entities; the locality of that locus, the being of those entities, is [human] subjectivity; and the foundation through which logical entities, henceforth held as paradigmatic, are anchored in their being, the method of founding them, is representation.\textsuperscript{12}

The modern epoch with its economy of technical systems produces a hardening (“enframing”: Gestell) of the order, a technical rigidity which reaches its apogee in contemporary technology and the social order framed by its demands. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that, according to Heidegger, this humanization—which in a more important sense is a dehumanization—did not begin with modern technology; it began with Aristotle’s turn to techn as paradigmatic. If we are to reconstruct metaphysics in order to release its grip, then, according to Schurmann-Heidegger, we must learn another way of thinking:

To say Anfang [beginning] or Ursprung [origin] instead of arch or principium is to abolish the patterns of command and rule that accompany the Classical Greek and Latin representations of origin (HOBO, p. 120).

It is not entirely facetious to sum up at this point by saying that philosophy must leant to speak German, or at least some reconstruction of it.

The coupling of inception with domination, and the alleged closure that fails to liberate us, is also a theme in Neo-Marxist thought, especially among followers of the Frankfurt School. Perhaps the essay that most closely parallels the scope—though not the detail—of Heidegger’s analysis of Western thought is the essay by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno entitled: Dialectic of Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{13} The thesis is a sweeping one, and the term “Enlightenment” is by no means confined to the eighteenth century or even to the modern period. An Excursus to the principal essay takes us back to Homer, for—according to the authors—“enlightenment” is present even in the early struggle by which reason and rational discourse sought to extricate itself from myth. In the end, however, we are told that reason never quite freed itself from the old powers resident in the ancient myths, and before which our cultural ancestors quailed. These powers still live on throughout the entire development of Western philosophy, science and society.\textsuperscript{14} For the old

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\textsuperscript{12} Heidegger’s development of the notion of philosophy as a kind of topology is discussed at length as a way of overcoming the tight rational systematic order of modern principles. The task of philosophy, then, is not to discover first principles, but rather to “locate” the region in which Being is to be heard.


\textsuperscript{14} The reference is to the essentials and powers—Cause (Ursache), Substance and Quality, Action and Passion, Being and Determinate Being (Dasein), which are alleged to be “rationalized precipitates of the mythical view.” Moreover, “these categories, in which Western philosophy determined its eternal order of nature, marked the places in which Oknos and Persephone, Ariadne and Nereus had once dwelled” (T.W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1981), 21-22. References will hereafter be made to this edition. Translations are my own except where otherwise indicated. The authors insist that the ghosts of the myths dwell there still; thus, for example, in the attempt to speak of the origin of thing, enlightenment introduces the distinction between a manifest effect and its hidden cause. There is present in
fearful ghosts do not dwell only in thought, images and ideas; they have exercised their malignant power over the very formation of social life. Indeed, the authors find the beginnings of bourgeois society itself in the Homeric epics. And they trace the root of this entanglement of rationality and social reality to the technological determination to master nature. Eventually everything is submitted to calculation and utility, and number becomes canonical. Moreover, myth passes over into enlightenment and nature into mere objectivity. Men count the increase of their power by their estrangement [Entfremdung] from that over which they exercise their power. Enlightenment relates itself to things as a dictator does to men. He is acquainted [kennt] with them insofar as he can manipulate them. The man of science knows [Kent] things insofar as he can produce [machen] them. In the transformation [from myth to rationality] the essence of things always hides itself as ever the same, as substrate for dominion [Herrschaft]. This identity constitutes the unity of nature.

Adorno and Horkheimer insist that the development of discursive rationality is inseparable from the transition from a nomadic society to a stable social order in which possession of property becomes the mark of the social distance between the master and the laborer. The very distanitation which marks abstraction in thought confirms the social control of the owners and the stability of the power structure. The fragile success in controlling nature through technology produces a social the concept of cause the primitive cry of terror before the unknown. Demythologization is the vain attempt to eradicate that fear (vol. 3, 31-32).

15 From the Preface (1944), vol. 3, 16. The first excursus pursues the dialectic of myth and enlightenment in the Odyssey "as one of the earliest representative witnesses of Western bourgeois civilization." Further, "not merely the ideal, but also the practical tendency to self-annihilation belongs to rationality from its very beginning, and is in no way a mere phase. The irrationality (here, precisely, of anti-Semitism, although the remark is meant to hold quite generally) is derived from the essence of domineering (herrschenden) reason itself and from the image (Bild) of its corresponding world" (vol. 3, 17). We are told that such thought "seals its own fate," if it does not reflect upon the presence of the seeds of its own destruction that lie within it. Without such reflection thought becomes pragmatic and blind, and loses its sublating character, and therewith its relation to truth (vol. 3, 13-14). Cf. Heidegger’s remarks on closure; also his remarks on domination; and finally, his remarks on the way the epochal suspension hides being and truth. Nevertheless, Adorno and Horkheimer insist that there is a resistance to the liberating reflection, a resistance built within Western rationality itself and from its very inception. It is nothing less than the fear of truth and the substitution of a false clarity for that truth. The fate of such rationality, then, is to lapse back into various mythologies, such as nationalism, Fascism, etc. (vol. 3, 14-15).

16 "The enlightenment holds in contempt whatever does not fit the measure of accountability (Berechenbarkeit) and utility (Nutzlichkeit)...Right from the beginning, enlightenment rationality had understood anthropomorphism to be the ground of myth, the projection of the subjective upon nature..Whatever is not absorbed into numbers and finally into unity is tuned into appearance...Unity remains the solution from Parmenides to Russell" (vol. 3, 22-24). Indeed, the concept of law (both scientific and juridical) is traced back to the will to reduce differences to the same by means of “the power of repetition over reality” (Dasein, vol. 3, 27-29). Cf. Heidegger’s remarks on the loss of the sense of becoming and of time.

17 Vol. 3, 25. There follow further developments. “The substitution of a victim [for the king or the community in a religious sacrifice] indicates a step towards discursive logic...Representability [Vertretbarkeit] turns about into functionality [Fungibilitat: the sense is that of being a functionary, an agent in our sense of that word]” (vol. 3, 26). Cf. Heidegger’s remarks on the closure that occurs in the process of “en framing.” See also, “…representability is the measure of mastery…” (vol. 3, 52).
elitism by which the powerful are able to command the services of the weak. Ultimately, however, mankind itself becomes the slave of the accumulated technological power, a power which knows [Wissen, Erkenntnis] no limitations [Schranken]. Such “knowledge” seeks neither the truth, nor happiness, but domination, eventually even over the dominators.\(^{18}\)

What Adorno and Horkheimer present to us is what is known in other contexts as “instrumental reason,” rationality used as an indifferent means to attaining an arbitrary end but unable itself to determine the true end of human life. “Representation,” the authors tell us,\(^{19}\) “is only an instrument. . . . The concept is the ideal [ideelle] instrument.” Indeed, we are told that the whole range of intellectual and spiritual thought is an exercise in domination of nature which, in the form of positive science and a supposedly “neutral” objectivity, really surrenders to nature and is mastered by it. But this, they further tell us, is still the ancient primitive fear of nature now transformed from the ghostly presence of mythical forces into a methodological submission to the given (data). Western man masters nature only by being mastered by it out of a fear that he has never mastered; but in our own century that illusory mastery (driven by self-preservation) has laid bare before us the very essence of power: it is force as compulsion (Zwang). In sum, then, the root of the entanglement of rationality and social life is the inseparable connection between technology and exploitation—it begins with the exploitation of nature, but it passes on to the domination over other human beings, and finally it subjects the true individuality of man himself to impersonal techniques and the contending forces of nature which they have unleashed.

We have been looking at two influential views of origins--of the origins of Western culture and philosophy, but also of the beginnings of man and things. Traditional metaphysics has produced a variety of differing views of origin; but to Schurmann-Heidegger and Adorno-Horkheimer they come to much the same result. Despite the apparent differences between realism, idealism, materialism, and the like, these epochs and economies are found to agree in that they couple the beginning with conquest, close off radical choice, hide the true nature of being, and reduce multiplicity and variety to a single uniform unity.

We have traced the deconstruction of metaphysics from principles to anarchy. Is there a way back from anarchy to principles? The most perennial of the traditional views is one that draws its support both from Biblical religion and from what may be called Christian philosophy (which has its analogies in Jewish and Moslem forms). I cannot here enter into the discussion of whether there is or can be a Christian philosophy strictly so called. What I mean by the name, however, is that there has arisen among Christians who philosophize a tradition of thought--shared at least in part by many who are not Christian--that seeks to appropriate by rational and properly philosophical means certain insights first disclosed by Christian revelation. Nor need any apology be made for such a proceeding, since philosophy has never been conceived exclusively from within pure reason itself. Thus, Russell developed certain of his philosophical views from insights disclosed by mathematics; Quine took experimental science as his paradigm; others have taken law or art or music or social interaction. Philosophers must draw from the totality of their experience, though the appropriation will be satisfactory only when it meets the canons of philosophical evidence and argument. A Christian philosophy, then, is neither of two extremes: on the one hand, it is not a philosophy that is done by someone who happens to be a Christian, but which could as easily have been done by someone who is not; on the other hand, it is not a philosophy that receives the vindication of its premises directly from religious faith, without its own work in accordance with the canons of rationality. We may speak of a Christian philosophy--and not merely of a


\(^{19}\) Vol. 3, 56-60. From the English edition, on mastery, 57; on instrumentality of reason, 87.
Christian philosopher--when, in important ways and in addition to other sources, the philosophy itself responds with positive interest and follows out lines of inquiry first suggested by Christian experience. All philosophy begins in prior understanding, and Christian philosophy begins in a pre-understanding that is shaped in important ways by Christian faith, life and action.

Now, such Christian philosophy has articulated an understanding of origin as creation, and precisely as creatio ex nihilo. Obviously such a philosophy is the target of the criticism of both Schurmann-Heidegger and Adorno-Horkheimer. Creation is understood by them to be a system of philosophy shaped by principles--and primarily and ultimately by one Principle--which fixes the beginning through domination. Now, my interest in the present article is not so much to defend Christian philosophy as to take the criticisms of Schurmann-Heidegger and of Adorno-Horkheimer as indications of pressure-points upon which these two contemporary philosophies have brought their weapons to bear. I would ask whether their attacks cannot be turned towards our own examination of Christian philosophy and thereby serve to clarify and even to advance the resources of traditional metaphysics.

I placed Schurmann-Heidegger alongside Adorno-Horkheimer, not only because they represent two of the most influential lines of contemporary thought regarding origins, but because they show lines of convergence that might also be found in some versions of other philosophies, (such as process philosophy and philosophy of language). I must not be misunderstood at this point. I do not mean to suggest that Heidegger is a crypto-Marxist, or that Adorno and Horkheimer have cribbed Heidegger. One has only to read the scorn with which the Frankfurters treat Heidegger’s writing to recognize the very considerable disagreement between them. Nevertheless, both place their critical fingers upon the same pressure-points in their criticism of what Schurmann-Heidegger calls a philosophy built by principles and what Adorno-Horkheimer calls a domineering bourgeois philosophy. These may be summed up as follows: Western philosophy in all of its forms, since Aristotle according to Schurmann-Heidegger, and even earlier according to Adorno-Horkheimer, has been basically metaphysical. It has understood the origin of things (whether as arch or principium or subjectum humanum) as both inception and domination, to be realized by means of representation and technology. As a result, the whole of reality has been understood as a closed order, whose principiates (things and men, actions and events, institutions and values) have been arranged into one or another economy, understood as having originated out of and being directed back to the one single over-riding principle (be it substance, God, humanity, property or technology itself). The result in modern times has been a humanism that is deeply de-humanizing, in which fixed practices and values suppress freedom and individuality. According to both critics, then, the only remedy is to find a new way of thinking about origins: either through deconstruction or through (at least in Adorno) negative dialectics.

Now, at each of these pressure-points there is a Christian disclosure that invites appropriation and interpretation by a Christian philosophy. Let me take up each of the three most important charges. They are: first, the inseparability of domination from inception; second, the reduction of all things within the cosmos, ordo or system to a uniform principle; and third, the subjection of thought and action to the closure brought about by the origin. Each of these pressure-points invites us to reexamine our own understanding of origin in the light of a Christian philosophy.

There is, first of all, the characterization of principle as the opening up (either in time or in being, chronologically or ontologically, diachronically or synchronically) that dominates all that follows. There is here a pre-understanding of power: as force, command, conquest, subjection, domination. There is much evidence to support such an understanding of power, both from its proper base in nature and from its dubious presence in human affairs; but we need to ask (with
Gabriel Marcel, for example) whether such an understanding of power is adequate to establish fully human relationships, inasmuch as it derives from and reflects the character of physical energy. We must ask whether it can sustain a social order appropriate for human persons. To the extent that we are not fully human, there will be the use of dominance—and, in our imperfect condition, there must needs be—but if we are trying to understand the way things are meant to be, and even more how they might be better, then we must ask whether the fault lies with the very notion of firstness as principle, or whether it is a faulty understanding of firstness that equates principle with dominance.

Again, we may well concede that aspects of domination are embedded in the various past metaphysical understandings of power, and that these must be sifted out and clarified by us; but this is a far cry from claiming that the very notion of principle is itself at fault and that every metaphysics of principles must be reconstructed. It is possible to retain the conception of principles as that which establishes a certain arrangement of consequent, but deny that the arrangement must be one of domination. Indeed, if we turn to St. Thomas’ formal discussion of creation\textsuperscript{20} we find that he arrives at it by a gradual deepening and broadening of the notion of cause as the communication of being. Now assuredly, the quality of the communication, and the character of the result, will flow from the quality of the being that is being communicated. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas tells us that the first philosophers, being confined to images, imagined reality in corporeal terms and sought the causes of coming-to-be in material causes, such as attraction and repulsion, condensation and rarefaction, seeds or elements, and the like. They were followed by others thinkers who were able to abstract from their imaginations in order to grasp by means of concepts the similarity among various sorts of things. This move was an important one, because the human intelligence came home to itself and was able to read in things more than the merely surface physical properties manifest in them. We find here in the origin of rational discourse a striking epiphany of the human spirit. But Thomas himself—in all modesty—takes us further. There were, he tells us, philosophers who asked after the very being of things, implying the question: Why anything at all, why not rather nothing? This question arose out of a freshly charged wonder, prompted no doubt by the Christian disclosure of the generosity of a Creator who sent his only Son to redeem a fallen humanity. So that a Christian philosophy is prompted to look for the primary form of power (and the ultimate meaning and worth of the term) not in domination, but in caring presence. Such a presence has the spiritual creative power to release us from those mythical fears of which Adorno-Horkheimer speaks. And, indeed, the term that St. Thomas uses to describe both the source of, and the first effect of creation, is not \textit{vis}; it is \textit{esse}, and finds its completion in a presence that is the source of everything else (\textit{praeter esse}).\textsuperscript{21}

Domination gathers power into a unified center, and the understanding of the beginning as dominative power reduces the primary principle of any economy or order to a unity as bare and sheer as the order will permit. But here again, there stands a Christian disclosure that should give a Christian philosopher pause; for in the struggle to move within a belief in the one God, the early

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae}, part 1, question 44, especially articles 1 and 2. I have treated the topic at some length in \textit{The Gift: Creation} (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, the 42\textsuperscript{nd}, Aquinas Lecture, 1982).

\textsuperscript{21} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Contra Gentiles}, Bk. I, 52. It is here, too, that the Christian disclosure of the beginning, tempers the creative process of \textit{Genesis} with the small and quiet beginnings of the Annunciation/Magnificat and the Nativity. This is an example of the way in which the Christian disclosure can invite a philosopher to rethink the first meaning of power. It is this, along with the recent studies in anthropology and the history of religions, that led me to explore creation under the category of the gift.
Christians arrived at the notion--not of Tritheism, three Gods--but of the Trinity, and the Tri-unity of the Godhead. Anyone who has followed the Fathers and the Councils on this matter realizes with what difficulty a new and richer sense of unity had to be forged: to retain the unity and simplicity of God, while enriching that unity and simplicity with a “purification” that arose from the very abundance of the divine life. That disclosure into the inherent “sociality” of the divine life has not yet been cultivated in philosophy to the degree that it needed. The charge that a metaphysics of principles is a means of domination is strengthened by the reductionism of the many to a sheer, univocal unity. But, if the first principle is one, yet not hostile to inner distinction (as, theologically and in respect of the Trinity, we speak of the distinct persons and their differentprocessions and missions), then the charge of closure must be reopened for discussion. The unstinting generosity and infinite abundance of the first principle will give room for all possibilities within creation--even, it must be remarked, for the possibilities of evil.

Finally, to the charge that the hiddenness of being is brought about by the closure of each epochal economy, a Christian philosophy replies with the mystery of being. And here too, there stands the Christian disclosure of the God who is so transcendent that he is not a part of the metaphysical order at all, indeed, so transcendent that he is more intimately present to his creatures than they are to themselves, precisely because he takes up no room in the world which he has created and continues to sustain by his transcendent immanent presence. Yet this mystery is a mystery of presence rather than of absence, not a hiddenness brought about by domination and reductionism, but a light too bright for clear sight.

To domineering power such a philosophy offers caring presence; to sheer unity it expands into the primordial harmony of plurality within unity; and to the darkness of reductive closure it opens out onto the inexhaustible light of mystery. All of this, then, is implied in a metaphysics of principles which does not find the beginning in domination, nor the end in reduction to unity and suppression of difference, nor in a hiddenness that withdraws from presence. Yet these are precisely the pressure-points at which new movements of thought and action press upon--not only Christian philosophy, nor even only upon the sphere of thought--but upon the very cultural and social traditions of the West.

We must receive these criticisms with thanks, as tokens of the thought and work yet to be done--not in order to defend those traditions against all criticism--but in order to bring to light tendencies and confusions within those traditions, and even within Christian philosophy itself. For Christian philosophy has resources yet untapped. To domination, a Christian philosophy offers: giving; to hard unity: a unity charged with abundance; and to hiddenness: the mystery of presence. There is work yet to be done and thoughts yet to be thought, if we are to render a better account of the original creative power which is not domineering but generous, of the richness of the primal unity which is no enemy of diversity, and of the mysterious nature of that which lies hidden in a great light.*

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