Lithuanian Identity and Values

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Introduction

Lithuania is a special testing ground for human progress. This comes from its long history of enlightened leadership that joined with Poland to create a kingdom which has always led in the free and creative political development of Eastern Europe. Its University was the first in the entire region.

In the 1980s the claim of Lithuania for its independence was a catalyst and rallying point for the entire region and in Georgia, the young Chavchavadze was assassinated for supporting that claim. M. Gorbachaev would later apologize to Bronius Kusmitchas, Vice President of Lithuania, for having refused to receive him when he came to Moscow on the part of his people. Yet the Lithuania would be heard. So when as part of what was to be a new “people’s May Day Parade” the Lithuanian delegation unfurled its long forbidden national flag in Red Square it unleashed from all the peoples their common call for freedom. Twenty minutes later the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union climbed down from atop Lenin’s Tomb. It could well be said that it was the tip of the Lithuanian flag that dealt communism its final coup de grace.

But of course the end of one system imposes the need to develop a new one. Lithuania was able to draw on the rich resources of its past, but it faced a daunting challenge.

After 150 years of foreign domination during the time of the Polish partitions and, with little intermission, another forty years of Soviet occupation it was necessary to face the daunting task of rediscovering and redeveloping the roots of its national identity. This meant reconstructing its recognition of the identity and dignity of the person and claiming its position between East and West and among the peoples of Europe. This is the concern of Part I. In this time of total transition and reconstruction, it was necessary to find new bases for such moral values as the interpersonal trust upon which the quality of social life depends. Part II is devoted to empirical investigation of these concerns.

Part I undertakes “The Quest for Personal Identity in Changing Times.”

Chapter I by Almantas Samalavičius “National Identity, Culture and Globalization,” introduces the work by noting that the cultural identity of the people becomes especially conscious and important when under threat but diminishes when the threats pass. Moreover, though identity is related to long cultural traditions, it is not fixed or retrospective but mobile and progressive through changing times. Thus it is in need of being redeveloped and newly conceived in order to avoid becoming stagnant and impeding progress.

Chapter II by Aida Savicka, “Personal Identity in the Face of Change: Between Destiny and Choice,” begins by identifying two main emphases: values and subjective perception of selfhood, on the one hand, and social structure and role performance, on the other. The former is seen as enabling
stability and identity through changes in roles. Whereas in traditional society identities were fixed, this is no longer the case and all is constantly subject to reconsideration. This is related to consumption by Bourdieu and Featherstone by means of understanding consumption as a basic mode of communication independent of social status. Based on this, Savicka proceeds to describe the major changes in self-identity in the post communist move away from the common and hence shared, to free enterprise and consumer trends. In the post modern context this central change in identity or even multiple selves tends now to be accepted as normal rather than abnormal. Values rather than roles now emerge as the guide and coordinator of the consumerist choices by which the new identities are established and combined.

In Chapter III by Virginijus Savukynas, “Lithuania and Europe: Possibilities for Reconstructing Identity,” begins by asking about the human significance of space and hence of geography, as well as of the historical acts by which these are established, divided and appropriated. In the case of Lithuania this took on special meaning through remembrance of the dead. After the intense national consciousness in the thrust to regain independence this at first weakened but now appears to take on renewed and perhaps deeper and more symbolic meaning, changing the negative into the positive. With changes in Europe, globalization becomes not only a flattening homogenization but an opportunity for difference as well where Lithuania can find its proper identity.

In Chapter IV by Antanas Andrijauskas, “Searching for Lithuanian Identity Between East and West,” presents a full review of the remarkable development of Asian studies in Lithuania. These are traced in detail from the 19th century to the subsequent period of Lithuanian history. Each presents the major authors with a section on the work of each. This extends across dance and the arts to the classical writings of the various Asian religions and even includes the development of communities of artists and scholars where Eastern cultures are lived.

Part II treats “Culture in Transition” in an empirical perspectives.

Chapter V by Arvydas Virgilijus Matulionis, “Self-Identification: Sociological Research Data,” provides a close and detailed survey of the way the various groups identify themselves and the changing pattern of this self-identification in various sized settlements in Lithuania, with comparison as well to other people.

Chapter VI by Stanislovas Juknevičius, “Religiosity and the Moral Values of Lithuanians in the European Context,” records a significant decline in religiosity and attention to moral values in Europe. The Western countries lead the way, but the East follows along by and large except where the earlier forced atheism shows some redress. This was reflected in the notably tendency to find undesirable church influence in public affairs.

Chapter VII by Rūta Žiliukaitė, “The Anatomy of Generalized Trust: The Case of Lithuania,” studies generalized trust as a key to healthy personal life and social interrelations. She studies as well the history of this phenome-
non and does so comparatively in relation to the European countries. She finds deficiencies in the social conditions which provide the context for generalized trust, noting that a strong individualism which was not encouraged in Soviet time generally correlates with generalized trust.

Chapter VIII by Ingrida Gečienė, “A Subjective Evaluation of the Quality of Life in Lithuania: A Comparative Perspective,” shows that, above age or stable relations, the strongest indicator of life satisfaction is the economic factor. This presents a special challenge to Lithuania and other post communist societies which are relatively impoverished. This situation is changeable, however, as can be seen in Poland. Greater political stability and room for self-development would seem to promise improvement in the subjective evaluation of the quality of life for the future.

George F. McLean
Part I

The Quest for Personal Identity in Changing Times
Chapter I

National Identity, Culture and Globalization

Almantas Samalavičius

The impact of globalizing cultural trends on the various national cultures has become one of the burning issues of the day. Today globalization often is seen as a hegemonic discourse enveloping and affecting all possible cultural elements and their forms all over the world, enveloping as well post-modern and traditional societies. Post-Soviet Lithuania, like many other countries shifting from a closed to an open society, is now being subjected to global forces operating a contemporary world. These are no longer divided and dismembered by competing political and economic systems and their militant ideologies, the two opposite poles which divided the former “East” and “West” of the post-World War II era until the spectacular and truly epochal events of the 1990s. Researchers of the present global pressures and interactions mostly agree that it is no longer possible to neglect or ignore the most essential processes of globalization operating in the world linked to the vast extensions of market and economic relations; political and cultural interactions; the cycles of production and reproduction shaped under the completely new conditions of capitalism and the new world order; and the expansion and multiplication of gigantic worldwide business structures of multi-national corporations, transnational communication and media channels, entertainment industries and the like.

There has been more and more speculation about the end of history, the end of ideology, and the end of the geography; these were the concepts that came into being even before the notion of globalization took over the vocabularies of academic research, politics, economy, culture and even popular journalism. Globalization has become both a catchy and a powerful term. In many local settings the meaning of such terms as ‘globality,’ ‘globalization,’ ‘globalizing,’ etc., is treated from different perspectives, depending on how local societies and cultures feel and identify themselves in the shifting world-systems, how the changes in center-periphery relations have influenced their own images of themselves and what their past experiences were in regard to external powers and relationship to larger nation-states.

Obviously Lithuanian society is not “tax-exempt” from the pressures of globalization. It is a tiny country from the point of view of its physical geography that shrunk to these dimensions from a Medieval kingdom ten-times larger, as burdened by the great historical turbulence that befell it during the last several centuries, when it was enforced to give up its statehood to foreign powers, and subjected to the traumatic experiences during the Soviet occupation/colonization that lasted almost half of the 20th century. Naturally it is aware of the pitfalls of globalizing trends, threatening the fragile and ambivalent content of the national culture. It is no wonder that questions of national
National Identity, Culture and Globalization

Identity during recent years have been articulated openly and heatedly, and occasionally even desperately, in academic and public discourses.

It might be added that the rapid expansion of globalization and the penetration of global forces into local societies and their markets inflict feelings of insecurity, fear and disillusionment in the many regions of the world. The anti-globalist movements and their actions taken in many places of the world (the events in Genoa and Goteborg were perhaps the most radical) were not the only responses to worldwide globalization, but they can rightly be considered the products and side-effects of its processes. Anti-globalist movements encompassing the entire globe might resemble the desperate activities of luddites during the ascent of industrial revolution. Distrust toward neo-liberal doctrines that seem to be the most powerful ideological tools and prime-movers of a free market, as well as the conduct of trans-national companies and corporations, today becomes stronger as these operating forces threaten to destroy national economies and sovereignties.

It is true that expansion of globalizing factors gives rise to well-grounded discontent. It should also be added that most European countries were shaped as national states during the 19th century. Thus on the one hand, the appeals to some forms of supra-national or denationalized states made by the heartiest advocates of globalization sound more like old utopias of the industrial age than realities that might soon come into being. On the other hand, pessimistic critics of globalization are inclined to interpret globalizing processes as social dystopias of the very near future. No wonder that gloomy pictures of the future mature in such a climate of contradictions and reasonable worries.

There is more or less articulated distrust toward globalization in Lithuanian social and cultural discourses, and in many cases for good reason. The skeptical views of globalization are not difficult to understand or explain. Having in mind that after a half-century of enforced relationship with the “Big Brother”, i.e. the Soviet Union, and all the ill effects this period of foreign oppression had upon Lithuanian society and its culture, it is not easy for the society to accommodate itself to a new geo-political setting. The unification of Europe, in which Lithuania now takes part, is, in fact, much awaited, however, the project is not easily adjusted to, as it demands many changes in the local social structure. The networks of international and supra-national market forces, financial institutions and business corporations that take over local bodies are sometimes seen as almost invisible, yet extremely powerful institutions offering new forms of dependence. They impose integrated recipes for development, even those that have been compromised in other continents for different reasons.

It should further be added that Lithuanian society is in social transition; accordingly many layers of its social strata feel insecure, and some of its social groups have neither economic nor intellectual means to attune to the new rhythm of the social life of this “brave new world”. Unemployment, lack of social security programs, limited re-educational and career opportunities are lived through very painfully in this stage of post-communist transition.
Many Lithuanian social critics admit that disillusionment in the ruling elite (no matter whether left or right wing parties have been in power), and lack of trust in state institutions (such as the parliament, government, courts and law enforcement – well-documented by many opinion polls during the last decade) contribute to the formation of public opinion that readily gives itself up to mass phobias and social hysterias. It is also obvious and noted on many occasions by researchers and critics that these developments have been accompanied by the waning of the communal bonds and communal spirit that were so strong during the upheaval of 1990 when the country won back its national independence. Contemporary social discourse more often than not speaks of differences than common denominators: citizens are opposed to state power, the employed to the unemployed, rural to city populations, nationalists to cosmopolitans, etc.

Even the somewhat shaky results of Euroreferendum in which Lithuania finally favored the European Union might be interpreted in many ways. Perhaps there are good reasons to suggest that many Lithuanian citizens voted for Europe not because of a newborn feeling of pan-European community and solidarity, but because of fear of remaining on the periphery of this new supra-national economic and political body. It would remain too close (physically and mentally) to its closest neighbor Russia, with its imperial rhetoric and return to the old political discourse of the Soviet period, which often exhibits signs of instability and militant political claims over former territory. On the other hand, many citizens, who exhibit a sense of being deprived of social security during the post-Soviet period, fear remaining trapped in the swamp of a transitory economy, seeing their present poverty as largely a result of the unjust privatization that swept the country immediately after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Thus, it is no wonder that, under the influence of harsh collective memories and the stigmatic experiences, public consciousness today espouses almost apocalyptic visions of the future. Such mentality is characteristic not only of mass consciousness, but also of the habits of thinking of intellectuals and academics, who often articulate almost the same apocalyptic viewpoints as do marginalized social groups. Catastrophist Spenglerian kinds of concepts of a waning national culture often persist not only in public criticism, but also in theoretical discourses. Some recent Lithuanian academic conferences and seminars on the issues of globalization and national culture in their rhetoric and formation of questions remind one of seances of exorcism, during which “incantations” are made to surpass the disastrous and demoralizing influences of the Western world. A rather characteristic example of such apocalyptic discourse on national culture and identity is the collection of papers from the academic conference aimed at discussion of globalization’s impact upon contemporary Lithuanian society. An excerpt from one of the key-note speeches in this forum is a vivid demonstration of such an attitude:

A Lithuanian, who under Soviet occupation attempted by all means to preserve his identity, consciously or sub-
consciously stuck to those symbols and historical-cultural memory that could be classified as the spirit of the agrarian epoch. For him ethno-culture was a way of self-defense. But it was mercilessly crushed, not only by bolshevism and Russification, but also by the historically inevitable, rather rapid and shameful, urbanization and industrialization enforced by methods alien to Lithuania. The post-war guerilla resistance and hundreds of thousands of deportations and imprisonment that destroyed the genetic elite of Lithuanian nation, and the rapid growth of the cities and industry that drew together thousands of energetic country dwellers, dug the grave of the Lithuanian culture and its ethno-culture cherished in the agrarian epoch. […] We all, however, witness in various forms an echo of the post-industrial, post-modern society entering from the Western world, especially from the USA. Every torrential trend – and post-modernism is of such a kind – brings waste and sediment on its surface. In the conditions of a weak culture and destroyed national moral resistance these sediments and waste get caught and remain to perform their evil mission. Poisonous sediments enter all cells of society (nation): politics, the economy, the professional arts, family and especially the hearts of children and teenagers who are not protected from historical, cultural and other draughts. (Grigas, 2000: 33-34)

The text cited above at first sight might be considered as belonging to a hasty utterance of marginalized, hysterical social group, voicing its phobias and discontent. One should not be mistaken, though, because this statement was made by a person who ranks as a member of Lithuanian academic power elite: a university professor, member of the Academy of Sciences, former chairman of Lithuania’s sociological society, recipient of the annual national scientific award, etc. Besides it was made not at a fuzzy Hyde-park type of gathering, but at a conference which was national in scale. Moreover, this opinion might be taken as reflecting a much wider set of opinions, expressed by a larger number of academic and public critics.

Let us consider what seems oversimplified and unconvincing as social diagnosis in these remarks? Firstly, the author presents a rather inadequate image of dilemmas that Lithuanian people encountered during the Soviet period, insisting that all society in corpore resisted Russification and Sovietization. In fact, there is an abundance of literary testimonies and memories indicating that the loss of national consciousness, dignity, moral indifference, national and social solidarity were already showing their signs during the period of oppression. In fact, it was an outcome of Soviet-style “internationalization” imposed upon subjugated societies. On the other hand, social psychologists and anthropologists who researched the colonized/oppressed societies have provided substantial evidence indicating that there always co-existed several
versions of identity building or re-building. For example, Aland Roland in his seminal book on Indian and Japanese identities, presents at least three identity types applicable to colonized India: first, complete identification with the oppressor; another of denial of anything English or European and withdrawal to nativism, and a third, a mixed type in which both elements merged (Roland, 1989: 22). He goes on further to say that these are theoretical models of identity, while in reality there were many more versions of self-identification.

We should bear in mind also the fact that elements of traditional culture that long ago lost their relevance to society or community are usually revived under conditions of foreign domination, as a conscious opposition to the enforced power and prescribed alien way of life. This means that what is termed ethnic culture is ideologically re-constructed according to the program of resistance, which more often than not is offered by intellectuals of a subjugated nation. Frantz Fanon, a renowned Algerian psychiatrist and one of the leaders of resistance against French colonization in the post-World War II period, has anthropologically demonstrated how the veil – the traditional women’s headwear which by that time had already lost all relevance and had become archaic cultural element – regained its importance during French colonization (see Fanon, 1995).

Ethnic culture as a form of resistance (as insisted by professor Grigas) demands a closer scrutiny. It is true that extensive urbanization and industrialization were imposed upon Lithuanian society by the Soviet power and these processes were crucial in destroying traditional forms of rural life. Moreover, despite the expansion of modernizing trends during the first half of the 20th century, the society was still largely rural. It should be added, though, that archaic and traditional forms of culture during the Soviet era were preserved not by local rural communities exclusively. Much in this sphere was done due to the activities of intellectual communities (the “Ramuva” community deserves special mention) that originated in the capital city of Lithuania. The revival of the movement of folk dances and songs was a truly conscious and purposive form of cultural resistance initiated by academics and the intelligentsia. However, immediately after the great social upheaval of 1990, this faded rapidly away. The experience of post-Soviet Lithuania’s independence confirms the insight that traditional cultural elements, folk customs, traditions and the like are, as a rule, much more important during the periods of dependence when they become a source of national pride, mythology and continuation of tradition, sustaining a core national identity (threatened by erasure by foreign power structures). But they lose their previous importance in the new independent political and social setting. One would also find it difficult to agree with the exaggerated statement that it is the flow of mass culture that destroys collective identity and ethnic culture, because some forms of mass culture, though with slightly different content, flourished in the Soviet society as elsewhere in the Western world. Contemporary critics of mass culture hardly imagine society as a monolithic entity. Such perceptive sociologists as Herbert J. Gans (see Gans, 1974) long ago proved that society is made up of what he termed “groups of taste”. Hardly any researcher today would insist on
dividing all culture into two rigid cultural poles: one elite and the other mass. However, appeals to a mystic “genetic elite” of the nation sound most strange and can only re-invoke comparisons with categories found in fascist or racist discourse. Obviously, what is being offered, instead of sound critical inquiry into culture, is nothing more than a moralizing discourse that does not carry forward understanding of the identity changes of a transitory post-communist society facing globalization.

Another question should be raised here: is identity fixed, rigid, and stable, or a continuously changing phenomenon in need of constant revision? While I would claim that it is impossible to prove that identity can be preserved in some “original” form of being, it is obvious that like everything in culture and social life it is apt to reshape itself over time. Thus any attempt to treat identity as a “pure” or fixed phenomenon might in the end turn out to be a kind of paranoid activity or mania, as is suggested by Thomas Mayer who claims that “the search for identity becomes a mania for identity only in cases where identity projects itself as one and the same in every realm of action, without maintaining a distance from the roles of the individual, without empathy for the diverse roles and identities of the other, without the will and the ability to withstand ambivalence. Identity mania seeks nothing but identity, the very same in all-life contexts and for all the others at that” (Meyer, 2001: 17). Perhaps there is a certain difference between considering identity a fixed phenomenon and turning a search for identity into a mania. However, there are firm reasons to suggest that the attempts to re-consider Lithuanian identity through the lenses of the old cultural ideology, shaped in the nationalistic intellectual climate of the first half of the 20th century, without considering the complexity of the present world, are nothing but reactionary. Instead of becoming a useful tool in reconsidering new shapes of national and cultural identity, such a stand-point becomes an iron cage that locks us in an eternal past, which, by the way, was once socially constructed as well. A project of purifying Lithuanian national identity so as to counter-balance the influence of globalization has no further prospects, because the only path mapped out by such an activity is a return to the past, and this kind of project is successful on one condition: if a totalitarian society, with all the mechanisms of control, was to be restored.

A different kind of perspective is offered by those Lithuanian philosophers and cultural critics, who see Euro-integration and openness to the world as a timely possibility and inducement to reconstruct national identity. They claim that traditional Lithuanian identity already has been lost and leaves no hope of being restored as a rigid legacy. These insights are as a rule based on recent sociological data and opinion polls, the results of which allow these critics to conclude that the present understanding of a fixed Lithuanian identity is stale, and does not stimulate any questions about oneself or belonging to a community. Thus a strong challenge is needed in order to create ideational space for creating or re-creating one’s new national self-identification. Some critics suggest that the European Union might provide such a prospect-
tive space for helping to understand what makes us be and feel Lithuanian and in what ways we differ from other contemporary nations.

However, I would take a slightly different stand. It would be an oversimplification or even a gross mistake to conclude that present Lithuanians have lost the feeling of their national identity. First, one cannot rely on opinion polls exclusively, especially when these polls are designed to target especially the younger generation. Perhaps it is more important to note that in a transitory society such polls or questionnaires often reflect short-lived emotions: stress and disillusionment in social and political reality, lack of self-assurance and dignity, etc., that are typical of societies labeled post-communist or post-colonial. Even claims that there are no strong external challenges is no proof of extinction of national identity; they could be just treated as pointing out the possible threats that collective identity might encounter in the near future. These social conditions of a post-communist realm might be taken as making manifestations of national identity more obscure, and the feelings of communal bond perhaps less strong than they were during dependence or national resurgence movement.

Taking into consideration the insightful though occasionally debated concept of national identity offered by Anthony D. Smith (Smith, 1991: 14), one could conclude that there are much more profound ways for national embodiment, such as historical territory or homeland, common myths and historical memories, common mass culture, common legal rights and obligations, common economy with territorial mobility of its members. If we view the supposed present problems of identity in these categories, further elaboration on the subject hardly brings us to a conclusion that Lithuanian identity suffers an epochal crisis. Perhaps, on the contrary, the fact that the feelings of national identity and pride about one’s national belonging ceased to be most important on the day’s agenda indicate other things. Most probably Lithuanian society has entered into another stage of its post-communist development, abandoning the ideology of national culture and identity so important before 1990 and shortly afterwards when many of its constituent groups fell back into the old cultural mythology and espoused the rhetoric of a tribe.

Of course, when the borderline between dependence and independence turns more and more into a past experience, society undergoes significant changes and leaves many of its former myths and dreams behind. These days many things that existed in the past occasionally seem almost nostalgic: the feelings of unity, of common sufferings, of experiences endured, as well as of communal bond; all seem to become looser and less important. Collective memories about the past also become less persistent, and, most probably, are becoming less stigmatic and painful. All these are both good and bad things in themselves; it is rather difficult to draw the straight line between what has been lost and has been or is being gained.

It is obvious, however, that what we are witnessing today is a new social and cultural reality to which we still have to become adapted and adjusted, and at the same time to meet the real challenges brought by globalization. One of the most urgent challenges that post-communist Lithuanian society faces
today is the need of revising and restructuring its national identity under the influences of Europeanization and globalization. This task can be completed successfully, depending on what path toward the understanding of identity will be chosen: either narrow and outdated view of identity as fixed and rigid entity never entitled to change or, as Zygmunt Bauman has suggested, treating it not as inherited or acquired but as “never-ending, always incomplete, unfinished and open activity in which we all, by necessity or by choice, are engaged” (Bauman, 2001: 152). As was argued above, the first path could take us only back to the kind of cultural “preserve” in which there is space only for old and rigid notions and which hardly fits into the present complex transnational realities. I see it as nothing more than a utopian project which has no place in the reality of the contemporary world. Meanwhile a flexible approach toward individual and collective (first and foremost) national identity has the power to open new vistas for placing oneself in rapidly changing social and cultural surroundings and escaping the prison of homogenized world-vision enforced by mindless globalization and likewise stiff nationalism.

REFERENCES

Chapter II

Personal Identity in the Face of Change: Between Destiny and Choice

Aida Savicka

During the last few decades an increase in the preoccupation with identity issues is observed which can be explained by the difficulties caused by the “postmodern” complexity of social life and social relations. The scientific study of identity was initiated by the works of psychologists and by now has a long history. Its beginning is commonly associated with the work of original thinker, William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (1890). However, the topic soon became interdisciplinary as students of identity had inevitably to refer to such individual, social, and cultural phenomena as thoughts, emotions, interpersonal relations, role performance, etc.

Identity has been defined in a great variety of ways, which sometimes are very controversial and conflict with one another. For example, according to the definition presented in *The Concise Encyclopaedia of Psychology*, “Personal identity refers to a sense of sameness or continuity of the self, despite environmental changes and individual growth”. Similarly, *The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* states that “a subjective sense of identity is a sense of sameness and continuity as an individual”. In the same line, American anthropologist, Dorothy Holland, defines identity as “a self-understanding or self-objectification to which one is emotionally attached” (Holland 1997: 162). All these definitions of identity emphasize perception of selfhood by an individual as the essence of identity. That is, their attention is concentrated on individual self-consciousness, which means that they treat identity as subjective in its nature.

However, there is another tradition of defining identity as well. Because of the influence of such sociologists as George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley who argued for the importance of social interactions in shaping individuals’ self-conceptions, role performance became strongly emphasized in relation to identity issues. Authors basing themselves on this conception relate the notion of identity very closely to role performance. Their shared idea is that roles that an individual has to accomplish are the crucial determinants of personal identity.

Despite great variety of identity concepts, several of its aspects are commonly treated as essential. First of all, there is subjective perception of one’s separateness from environment. This issue, however, is a matter of psychological rather than sociological investigation. Another important element is perception of continuity of self notwithstanding changes in the environment, social roles performed by an individual, ageing, etc. Closely related is another aspect of identity, which is perception of one’s inner unity or in other words, harmony of basic personality traits. All these premises imply the con-
cept of identity as certain “content”. As Polish sociologist, Hanna Malewska-Peyre, puts it, the essence of identity, its content is made of “relatively stable organization of feelings, values, imaginations, experiences and future projects related to oneself” (Malewska-Peyre, 1981: 27).

Thus there are two main emphases in defining identity: subjective perception of selfhood, and restraints of social structure and role performance. Too strong emphasis on the latter sometimes leads to the neglect of the former, which makes the very concept of identity too simplistic. Interpretations of the importance of the subjective perception of selfhood, however, also encounter internal contradictions quite often, as they fail to find important factors of the integrity of personal identity in a rapidly changing social environment.

In traditional writings on identity, one finds no clear answer to the question of how the identity system (or system of identities) is integrated. Nowadays precisely this issue becomes of prime importance and evokes heated dispute. The confusion is inevitable once the premises of our predecessors about the nature of identity are accepted uncritically, without reconsidering them from the perspective of present social reality. Perception of identity in close association with social roles, status, interests, consumption patterns and similar social facts is not adequate, at least not for post-traditional society of intense and permanent change. Much more appropriate for the present situation is defining personal identity through the prism of the basic values of an individual which are the crucial factor integrating various aspects of identity. Once identity is defined as grounded in values rather than in roles and social positions, it becomes possible to elucidate the stability of identity despite continuous change in the set of roles an individual accomplishes.

IDENTITY: DESTINED OR CHOSEN?

Personal identity is shaped through identification of oneself with certain social groups or categories and also through internalization of their values, since individual self-definition is necessarily based on certain social, historical and cultural premises. Some authors even conceptualize identity not as a phenomenon but as a continuous process, a dialectical synthesis of internal and external definitions of self. The latter assumption is basic for interpreting the complex relationship between personal identity and social structure. According to Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967), the process of identity formation takes place in the context of a specific social structure, since identity is a phenomenon that springs from dialectical interaction between an individual and society. What this means is that identities vary in different societies and cultures and also that they change responding to the changes in socio-cultural environment.

In societies of relatively simple social structure the process of identity formation was rather uncomplicated simply because it was socially predefined to a great degree. Identity and relevant individual attributes – such as social origin and status, place of living, nationality, religion or language – were relatively stable under normal circumstances in such societies. Work used to be
the central activity of human life, determining to a large degree the social status of an individual, but also shaping one’s self-perception. All this served as a guarantee for the stability and integrity of personal identity. As Berger and Luckmann argue, “The individual in such a society not only is what he is supposed to be, but he is that in a unified, “unstratified” way” (Berger, Luckmann, 1967: 165). According to them, “Identity then is highly profiled in the sense of representing fully the objective reality within which is located. Put simply, everyone pretty much is what he is supposed to be. Everybody knows who everybody else is and who he is himself. ... There is, therefore, no problem of identity” (Berger, Luckmann, 1967: 164). Individuals virtually never found themselves in the circumstances where they needed to essentially reconsider their identities; therefore they escaped harsh identity crises.

Thus in traditional society, individual identity was socially predefined. However, in modern society the importance of social status for individual self-perception is constantly decreasing. In the contemporary conditions of the plurality of worldviews, self-definition turns into an individual rather than a social problem, as individual identity becomes more and more abstracted from structural belonging, cultural heritage and socialization. Here, the choice of both work and leisure activities becomes less and less determined by social origins of an individual and, increasingly, becomes a matter of an individual decision that is made in the context of a more or less conscious construction of life style in general. The growing importance of personal choice in human life, if compared to the ascribed social status is by no means a contemporary phenomenon: it was discussed already by the “founding fathers” of sociology. The qualitatively new aspect of this process in post-industrial society is that even achieved social status, determined primarily by profession, does not strictly constrain the individual choices of life style. Leisure activities become essentially independent not only of his/her social origin but also of the professional status.

Discussing the consequences of the new social setting for individual identity, Berger and Luckmann emphasize that here “a market basis entails specific constellations of subjective reality and identity. There will be an increasingly general consciousness of the relativity of all worlds, including one’s own, which is now subjectively apprehended as “a world”, rather than “the world”. It follows that one’s own institutionalized conduct may be apprehended as “a role” from which one may detach oneself in one’s own consciousness, and which one may “act out” with manipulative control. The situation, then, has a much more far-reaching consequence than the possibility of individuals playing at being what they are not supposed to be. They also play at being what they are supposed to be – a quite different matter” (Berger, Luckmann, 1967: 172-173).

In this new social situation, an individual is not only empowered to accept virtually any identity, to put it on as a mask, but also starts to perceives one’s genuine identity only as one of many possible roles in the performance of life. Thus, in post-traditional society identity faces the threat of turning into a masterly self-presentation detached from any deeper self-reflection.
British sociologist Anthony Giddens also considers the quest for personal identity to be a modern problem, as the integrity of personal identity is threatened by ever increasing complexity of social life and subsequent fragmentation of individual experience. As he describes the situation, “Each of us not only ‘has’, but lives a biography reflexively organized in terms of flows of social and psychological information about possible ways of life. Modernity is a post-traditional order, in which the question, ‘How shall I live?’ has to be answered in day-to-day decisions about how to behave, what to wear and what to eat - and many other things - as well as interpreted within the temporal unfolding of self-identity” (Giddens, 1991: 14). The decisions are not easy ones, however, for people living in modern societies because of a devaluation of their previously omnipotent cultural tradition.

Transition from the traditional world of social certainty to the post-traditional world of constant questioning of almost everything, Daniel Bell describes as follows: “To the classic question of identity “Who are you?” a traditional man would say, “I am the son of my father”. A person today says, “I am I, I come out of myself, and in choice and action I make myself”. This change of identity is the hallmark of our own modernity. For us experience, rather than tradition, authority, revealed utterance, or even reason, has become the source of understanding and identity. Experience is the great source of self-consciousness, the confrontation of self with diverse others” (Bell, 1996: 89). Undoubtedly a modern person has more freedom to choose than ever before. However, along with the increased individual freedom, a modern person faces the problem of sustaining a coherent sense of self-identity.

Douglas Kellner (1992), who also addresses the issue of identity in post-traditional society, claims that identity becomes increasingly uncertain in contemporary society because of the declining importance of ascribed social roles for the definition of individual identity, which was characteristic of traditional societies. In traditional societies individual identity was dependent on clearly defined social roles, which made it stable and integral; individuals were spared identity crises and situations that would make them modify radically their identity. In contemporary society, however, individual identity becomes increasingly dependent upon the free choices of individuals themselves, rather than upon ascribed status or unchangeable social roles. Identity begins to be consciously constructed through the performance of chosen social roles and the active creation and re-creation of one’s image. Because of that, it becomes unstable and multi-faceted; it yields to the individual’s manipulations but also is more problematic. As Kellner perceives it, the declining stability of social roles during the individual’s life-span results in the tendency to construct an individual identity through leisure time and consumption images, which makes identity even more unstable and playful. Since this view is rather widely spread in recent sociological literature, it is worth discussing in more detail.
IDENTITY AS A PROJECT OF CONSUMPTION

It was not sociologists who disclosed the relationship between consumer behavior and personal identity. As Richard Jenkins notices aptly, “The advertising industry has long understood that selling things to people often means selling them an identity too: a “new look” may be synonymous with a “new me”, and the path to that new identity is likely to pass through the local shopping centre. Identity and consumption have probably always been bound up with each other, but what may be new is that consumers are more sophisticated in their awareness of this and more self-consciously collusive in the face of the expanding range of alternatives produced by a global market” (Jenkins, 1996: 7-8).

In the huge volume of literature devoted to the analysis of the relationship between the formation of personal identity and consumption of certain commodities one can identify several more or less distinctive interpretations. According to one, consumption is a specific communication system where commodities are symbols of an individual’s social and, more precisely, class position. Among the pioneers of this conception was Jean Baudrillard (1988). According to him, human life is centered on consumption in contemporary society, and the objects consumed become signs rather than simply functional commodities. He acknowledges that consumption objects have always provided the basis for social recognition; however, they were important only when combined with other factors, such as ascribed or inborn status, language, ritual, etc. Baudrillard claims that it is not until recently that these later factors of social recognition lost importance. Because of that, the situation arises that clear and universal criterion for social recognition is an urgent need, and these are exactly consumption objects that become such a criterion. In the contemporary world, where individuals encounter enormous numbers of strangers on a regular basis, marking one’s social position by certain commodities fulfils a fundamental social function, that is, it satisfies the basic human need to be informed about the person one encounters. Therefore, conscious consumption of certain commodities is meant to signify one’s happiness, welfare, success, prestige, etc. According to Baudrillard, consumption becomes a way of life, the basis for the formation of social identity and prestige, as well as the basis for social order and differentiation (since objects of consumption constitute a hierarchical system of signs).

A similar idea is central to the theorizing of Pierre Bourdieu (1984), another celebrated advocate of the concept of consumption as a communication system. According to him, the major mechanism regulating consumer behavior is an aspiration to distinguish oneself from others. Bourdieu associates different forms of consumer behavior with an individual’s class position and aspiration to reproduce it. In his mind, individuals are conscious about choosing particular lifestyles and deliberately acquire commodities symbolizing those lifestyles in order to enable others to identify them as belonging to that particular social stratum. Thus the main idea of Bourdieu is that individuals consume commodities because of their symbolic value that makes it possible
to identify them as representatives of certain social strata.

This idea of Bourdieu is propagated and further developed by other well-known contemporary sociologists, Lash and Urry, who also undertake to analyze the relationship between different types of consumer behavior and class position (1987). They claim that commodities are consumed because of their symbolic power to draw the dividing line between one social class (or class fraction) and another. Because of that, one of the main features of contemporary consumer society for them is consumption of signs created by mass media and advertising, and no longer of commodities. In their view, commodities themselves become valuable only as signs.

Another contemporary sociologist who adheres to a quite similar conception is Mike Featherstone who maintains that “the term “consumer culture” points not only to the increasing production and salience of cultural goods as commodities, but also to the ways in which the majority of cultural activities and signifying practices become mediated through consumption, and consumption progressively involves the consumption of signs and images. Hence the term ‘consumer culture’ points to the ways in which consumption ceases to be a simple appropriation of utilities, or use values, to become a consumption of signs and images in which the emphasis upon the capacity to endlessly reshape the cultural or symbolic aspect of the commodity makes it more appropriate to speak of commodity signs” (Featherstone, 1995: 75). Even though Featherstone relies heavily on the conception of Bourdieu as a starting point of his own interpretation of the relationship between consumption and identity construction, his position is somewhat different.

Featherstone slightly modifies the conception of consumer behavior presented by the scholars mentioned above, emphasizing some aspects that previously were not given adequate treatment. First of all, he puts more weight on the fact that individuals are not passive representatives of their social class who consume in order to reproduce this class position. Rather, they actively select certain commodities so as to create the image or identity they choose for themselves. Even though Featherstone partly associates the choice of commodities with the class position and habits of consumers (in manner similar to Bourdieu), the concept of lifestyle acquires more import than that of social class in his conception. He employs it in order to emphasize the way in which individual consumer choices crystallize into distinctive models of consumer behavior. As Featherstone notes, a creative attitude towards one’s identity and identity construction through consumer behavior is characteristic of “new intellectuals,” first and foremost, who are delighted with the possibility of experimenting with their image, appearance and lifestyle. According to him, “Their veneration of the artistic and intellectual lifestyle is such that they consciously invent an art of living in which their body, home, and car are regarded as an extension of their “persona” which must be stylized to express the individuality of the bearer” (Featherstone, 1991: 60).

Still, despite the minor differences in interpretation all, the scholars mentioned – Baudrillard, Bourdieu, Lash, Urry, as well as Featherstone – basically treat consumption as a certain kind of communication system, conscious
manipulation of commodity-signs which is aimed at reproducing one’s social position or, to use Featherstone’s terminology, at creating one’s lifestyle. However, there are interpreters of consumer behavior who go even further in their emphasis on the free choice of a consumer and who associate individual identity and consumer behavior at a much deeper level. They treat consumption not so much as a deliberate performance for others or as a presentation of self as belonging to a certain social class, but rather as a substantial element of the creation of one’s genuine personal identity that can no longer be clearly associated with one’s social position. Thus these theories emphasize much less the individual’s dependence upon social relations than as an individual being capable of freely creating his/her identity through the relatively unconstrained choice of certain consumer practices. To put it differently, the advocates of this conception of consumption as identity-construction speak not so much of the systematic and consistent consumption of commodity-signs adequate for one’s social position or lifestyle, but rather of a situational, fragmentary construction of self-image based on momentary moods and created both for oneself and for the conscious presentation of self for others.

The latter view is represented by the most celebrated contemporary sociologists, such as Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens. As they insist, consumption and the lifestyle created thereby intrinsically influence the formation of personal identity, since commodities become important means for self-expression. According to Giddens, an individual is free to form his/her identity in the routine of everyday choices: “Each of the small decisions a person makes everyday – what to wear, what to eat, how to conduct oneself at work, whom to meet with later in the evening – contributes to such routines. All such choices (as well as larger and more consequential ones) are decisions not only about how to act, but who to be. The more post-traditional the settings in which an individual moves, the more lifestyle concerns the very core of self-identity, its making and remaking” (Giddens, 1991: 81).

Advocates of this approach disregard the importance of social settings in this process, as they believe that individuals are unrestrained to create their identities through various consumption practices. As Bauman claims, in contemporary society the uppermost value acquires freedom which is “translated above all as the plenitude of consumer choice and as ability to treat any life-decision as a consumer choice” (Bauman, 1998a: 212). Thus for him, consumption is probably the best example of free choice, since there are no efficient means to make an individual choose certain commodities.

Some scholars, accepting the idea that consumption patterns become increasingly independent of individuals’ social statuses, question, however, the extent to which self-creation through consumption is a matter of a truly free choice. The point made by Cohen is worth citing at length:

The pernicious combination of economic and political market management has left us in the invidious condition of being persuaded to experience and express ourselves by wearing designers’ labels, drinking their instant coffee (and
investing its advertisements with the status of soap opera),
driving their cars. In consuming their products, we may lose
our outward individuality, but we should distrust the sugges-
tion that we thereby also lose our selves. Advertising spe-
cialists were quick to associate mass production and mass
marketing with the ‘massification’ of the individual. In order
to entice me to consume their products as an expression of
my identity, they try to create an entire persona for me: I am
Sony-person, Guinness-man, perhaps both together. If I re-
sist and opt not to conform, I am liable to be treated merely
as having swapped one stereotype for another, labelled ‘al-
ternative’, which will almost certainly soon be colonised by
the mainstream market. In this manipulative strategy, style is
supposed to displace individuality. (Cohen, 1994: 177)

Despite the diversity of opinions as to the freedom of individual
choice, all the authors mentioned above come to one essential conclusion
about the basic shift in the nature of personal identity in post-traditional soci-
ety: identity became detached from the context of social roles performed by
an individual but, by the same token, it became more ambiguous as it lost any
clear criteria of identity definition.

CONSUMERIST EXPLOSION IN POST-COMMUNIST MILIEU:
THE PURSUIT OF A NEW IDENTITY?

It would be erroneous to assume that personal identity becomes prob-
lematic only in post-traditional societies of unbridled consumerism and not in
post-communist societies of economic deficiency. It is still an open question
if the latter societies could be labeled as “consumer societies,” in Bauman’s
(1998b) sense, at the present stage of their economic development. Many
would be ready to give a positive answer, since it seems undoubted at first sight
that these societies have already passed from a deficit economy with the char-
acteristic empty shops and short supply of consumer goods to an abundance
of commodities. Nowadays, as only more than a decade has passed after the
radical political and subsequent economic changes that swept Central Europe,
the fundamental problem is no longer how to bridle population’s desire to
consume, but how to stimulate it to consume the highest possible amount of
commodities. Answering the latter question is becoming the basic task for the
professionals in such new occupations as advertising, marketing, public rela-
tions specialists, etc. As some theoreticians claim, consumption is becoming
one of the major new mechanisms of the formation of social structure in post-
communist societies since the phenomenon of unrestrained consumption by
the representatives of certain social strata is observed.

Despite this evidence, one can doubt if this sudden, extensive and
almost unhindered flow of consumer and luxury goods into the markets of
post-communist societies observed in the last decade is a sufficient proof to
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the statement that Central European societies have already become consumer societies in the Baumanian sense. It is important to remember here that the prerequisite of a consumer society is not only the abundance of commodities but at least two additional conditions: first, the financial possibilities of a population to consume; and second, certain changes in the consciousness of consumers, as well as in their lifestyles.

Undoubtedly, some manifestations of consumerism could be observed in post-communist countries. As a Lithuanian sociologist addressing the issues of consumerism, Anelė Vosyliūtė, observes, “After long years of ascetic socialist consumption the beginning of the new era can hardly be imagined without the explosion of consumer ‘hedonism’ or without the development of mechanisms enabling people to satisfy long-restrained needs and desires” (Vosyliūtė, 2001: 45). One can question if the roots of consumerist explosion in post-communist milieu should be looked for in improving socio-economic condition or rather in the domain of widespread predisposition for Western cultural trends and fashions on the part of Central European societies. As Vosyliūtė herself observes, “Foreign goods were important for society not only with regard to their function, but as the symbols of availability, marking the end of the constant shortages of different consumer goods in the Soviet period” (Vosyliūtė, 2001: 46).

It is interesting that such a novel way of identity construction as consumption in the post-communist milieu so suddenly gains tremendous importance, to the extent that consumer durables (even expensive ones) are purchased to mark one’s social position. Some would argue that consumption was an important element of identity construction in these societies under the communist rule as well, and the only thing that has changed is increased accessibility of a great variety of commodities. Such a statement, however, should be reconsidered. First of all, because of the shortage of consumer goods and their uniformity, one could speak neither of consumer choice nor, consequently, of self-creation through consumption in communist societies. What is also important, the acquisition of certain consumer goods could not be easily associated with the social position of a possessor, since the possibilities of their acquisition were not in fact socially differentiated (for instance, an owner of certain car model could be a laborer in a non-prestigious profession equally well as a well-positioned bureaucrat: meanwhile the representatives of highly prestigious academic professions usually did not own cars at all). When speaking about the consumption of luxury commodities (such as prestigious residences), the situation is even more interesting: because of the abolishment of private property, their allotment was temporary in principle and related to the social position of an individual (or most often, his position in the political hierarchy), rather than to individual identity.

In reference to the theoretical discussion of the relationship between consumption and identity construction, consumption is a performance for others, both in Soviet and in post-Soviet society, and in this context there is little ground for speaking of self-creation through consumption. Even when observed, consumerist practices are not means for identity construction but
rather the way of defining one’s social position through the purchase of the socially imposed repertoire of consumer goods. To quote Vosylūtė, “Today people are using the consumption behavior to signify who they are to other people from whom they hope to gain approval” (Vosylūtė, 2001: 46). Therefore, consumption continues to be structured along the lines of such social categories as social status, age, sex, and the like. The consumerist tendencies already observable among the populations of these societies are difficult to explain by analogy with the Western developments for two main reasons: first, the prolonged economic difficulties which Central European societies continuously experience, along with the relatively low average household incomes; and second, the persistent dominance of producer rather than consumer consciousness.

**CHALLENGES FOR PERSONAL IDENTITY IN SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATIONS**

When analyzing premises for the formation and development of personal identity in post-communist societies, even more important is another feature of social development, that is, the radical transformation of the entire social structure. As clarified above, personal identity is shaped and influenced by the processes circumscribed by the social structure. In the face of rapid social and cultural change, there is need to define oneself in the new situation, to answer the question “Who am I?” It is not always an easy task. The need for conscious selection of one’s identity becomes especially pressing when the range of potential choice is too wide or when clear criteria necessary to make the choice are missing. The choice is confused even more when the ambiguity of the criteria requires an individual to identify him/herself with several social categories which are hardly compatible among themselves. Therefore, the downfall of social structures is among the key sources of the identity crises, even on the collective scale.

Post-soviet societies are living through a period of painful transition from the social system based on egalitarian economic policy (aimed at elimination of traditional attributes of social differentiation – individual property, education, social origin, status, etc.) to the free market system characterized by apparent economic and cultural differentiation. This process is followed by drastic redistribution of social resources and privileges. Some social groups experience significant decline in their economic status, even to the degree of finding themselves below the poverty line. It should be emphasized that economic transformation means not so much disclosure of previous polarizations, but rather creation of new lines of social stratification. What these people have to go through is not only adaptation to a new socio-economic situation, but also reconsideration of their place in the world, finding new sense of their existence. The task is not an easy one in a social world that has lost the lucidity previously granted by ideological monopoly, and opens to an almost unrestricted plurality of potential identity models.
Interesting insights into this issue are presented by Vosyliūtė (2002) who conducted empirical research on the changing relations, social statuses and lifestyles of Lithuanian villagers. Re-establishment of private land introduced polarization between land owners and hired laborers instead of the equality characteristic for the era of kolkhoz, which inevitably makes villagers reconsider their place in a rural community. As Vosyliūtė reports, life stories of new land owners do not reveal apparent identity crises: such alteration of social status is considered a restoration of social justice and human dignity. Much more problematic are pursuits of a new identity on the part of impoverished villagers. Some of them accept passively the new marginalized status, adapting accordingly their expectations, views and behavior; they could be characterized by apathy, inertia, lack of initiative, short-sightedness. Some others reject their deflated status even though they do not really know how to live under the new condition. The main trouble of the latter, according to the researcher, is their inflexibility, reluctance to accept new social relations and roles and blind adherence to the old self-image which becomes inadequate for the new circumstances. Usually, marginalized villagers consider themselves “helpless victims of the privatization process in the village”, therefore, they do not feel responsible for their situation and hope that someone (state authorities, employer, etc.) will solve their problems.

It would be erroneous to think that the described situation of social disarray and confusion is present only in the Lithuanian countryside due to the demolition of the whole agricultural sector based on collective property and stumbling agricultural reforms. Even the villagers themselves acknowledge that the situation of the impoverished in the cities is much worse because of even more harsh economic shortages (due to higher indispensable expenditures) and, what is not the least important, more apparent economic and cultural clashes. Despite somewhat conflicting interests, the rural community is dependent upon firm co-operation between land owners and landless people, which induces tolerance and mutual support. City space is much more anonymous where everyone cares for himself. Therefore social differentiation here means also restriction of contacts across the lines of one’s social position, as well as increasing degrees of physical separateness (for example, due to the territorial clustering of urban population) that lead to inter-group prejudice and intolerance. Social antagonism and anxiety in urban space, more exposed to the influences of consumer culture, are also augmented by strong senses of relative deprivation on the part of those who lack the resources to keep abreast of fashions.

Similar examples of drastic change or deflation of social status could be found not only in Lithuanian or other post-communist society, but in any society. However the scope that the phenomenon acquires in our societies makes this experience collective. This gives rise to a widely spread opinion that an individual suffering these changes is not fully responsible for his/her situation and destiny. For many people, solutions of identity crises are complicated also because they feel forced into the inescapable clutches of social
realities, with no possibility to choose among the huge variety of commodities or potential lifestyles presented so extensively by mass media.

It is an interesting observation that identity crises are undergone not only by those whose social status has significantly declined, but also those whose status is considerably improved in the rapidly changing social context. In her articles on the evolution of value orientations and self-identity of the post-communist elite, Irmina Matonytė (2000; 2001) describes such unexpected reaction to identity crises brought about by increased social status, which is the rejection or denial of one’s identity as a member of the elite. Such cases are not marginal. As the data of empirical research show, only one third of respondents who were defined as elite members, using such structural characteristics as occupational status, participation in decision making, income, etc., accepted such identification in 1996. The author explains this phenomenon as a remnant of Soviet culture that used to praise the principles of equality and brotherhood and that was hostile to elitist thinking. In Matonytė’s mind, consolidated elite identity is of crucial importance for the normal functioning of democratic society. As she puts it, “Self-identification with the elite stimulates responsibility to society for the domains where leaders feel authorized to take decisions with big social consequences. Those who belong to the elite have more rights to act in the public arena, they also have more duties. The elite share some sense of social mission. Thus, we expect that the leaders who identify themselves with the elite will more intensively express their attention and interest in socio-economic problems than those who lack (or decline) the elite identity” (Matonytė, 2001: 36). Therefore, the author associates the rejection of elite identity with the avoidance of social responsibility, lack of the sense of social mission, unwillingness to think and to act according to elite standards.

Radical alterations of social status due to the transformation of the whole social structure can evoke not only denial but also a contrary – conformist – reaction when an individual completely adapts to the standards implied by the new status. Such a case is aptly exemplified by Caroline Humphrey in her empirical study of consumer behavior of the newly rich Russians, a case of “massively wealthy elite whose consumption nevertheless has difficulty in achieving cultural coherence” (Humphrey, 1997: 101). Even though the author concentrates on a small fragment of consumer behavior (namely, the acquisition of villas), her findings are revealing and worth putting into the wider theoretical context.

Humphrey uses the example of consumer behavior of the New Russians to illustrate the point that consumption can have little to do with the construction of individual identity, as it becomes a matter of social obligation rather than of individual choice. The purchase of villas by the New Russians is very illustrative of this point. A villa is perceived both by the New Russians themselves and outsiders as an almost necessary attribute, an extension of their social position, to the extent that the New Russians see themselves as having virtually no other choice than to purchase one. In doing so, they could have aspirations of acquiring or creating a particular kind of villa for them-
selves so as to express their worldview, lifestyle, and self-image (the latter most commonly being that of the haute bourgeoisie or of a successful representative of European business elite). However, what they get in fact is not a consistent object capable of manifesting the inner self of an owner, but a repertoire of parts that appears to be rather incoherent and non-functional as a whole. According to the author’s observation, “there is a slippage between the mental image and the physical fact of the building, often indeed a ludicrous gap. This reveals the unintended aspects of identity creation, the heaps and bits and pieces that have somehow ended up on the site, which of course are at the same time visible and ‘readable’ by everyone else” (Humprey, 1997: 86). Because of their inadequacy for the practical functions of a house, many villas are not lived in at all; they have “an existence which the owners may hardly incorporate into their everyday life” (Humprey, 1997: 101). Identity created this way does not endorse some inner self of an owner of the commodities, but rather is artificially imposed, given from outside; thus a villa is a demonstration of wealth, one’s social position, which unexpectedly has its own hold on the owner. According to the author, “the goods themselves confer their identity on their owners” (Humprey, 1997: 91).

Insights of Humprey could be generalized beyond the processes taking place in contemporary Russia, as one could find a number of similar examples in any rapidly changing society. When speaking about this phenomenon, it is worth asking what meaning consumption has for those people and how, if at all, it is related to their identity. More specifically, one can wonder if for those “new consumers” the acquisition of certain commodities is meant just to signify their belonging to certain social strata or if it becomes a means of self-expression, individuation and identity construction, as described in the most recent theories of consumption society originating in the West. The former opinion seems to be the more grounded. In the social context where acquisition and consumption of certain commodities becomes compulsory instead of being a matter of personal choice, it takes extreme forms, becomes fragmentary and inconsequent, not meant to mirror the personality or self-image of a consumer and, moreover, not really dependent upon his/her will. To put it differently, a consumer is not an actual author of the identity project under these circumstances.

All these and many more examples from everyday life in post-communist society show how wide is the scope of threats to the harmony of personal identity triggered by the transformations of social structure. On the one hand, people realize themselves in the new situations when they have to question their previous self-image, which is a painful experience in many cases. On the other hand, they face not only new menaces but also new possibilities. As Polish sociologist Małgorzata Melchior aptly notes “In the new social, political and cultural situation people start to accept identities that previously they considered to be inappropriate or forbidden” (Melchior, 1993: 236). The author perceives this situation as loaded with potential identity crises because they face the problem of identity choice in a social world where public demonstration of one’s own distinctiveness became possible. Thus, radical politi-
cal, economic and social change, along with attempts to adapt to them that are not always successful, create the situation of deep identity crises for members of post-communist societies. These are expressed through such extreme collective phenomena as radicalism, nationalism, apathy, and the like.

IDENTITY: UNITY VERSUS MULTIPLICITY

The constantly growing complexity of social life – both in post-traditional Western and post-communist societies – and consequently the perplexing social relations made the scholarly search for the factors and mechanisms of identity integration an extremely difficult enterprise and evoked two kinds of reaction: some social researchers persistently continue the search for the ways in which a person living in a constantly and rapidly changing environment preserves the sense of inner coherence and continuity of self; some others claim that we have entered an era where such search becomes senseless and advocate multiple identities instead. Which direction of reasoning is more adequate for the analysis of the phenomena of the contemporary social world?

The idea of the unity of identity has a long history. One of the crucial criteria of identity emphasized in the majority of definitions is the sense of continuity of self notwithstanding the flow of time, bringing the changes in the environment and in personality itself. This sense of continuity of self means perception of oneself as the same person in different situations and at different moments in time. Lack of the sense of continuity of one’s identity until recently was interpreted as personal disorder caused by extreme situations, not a normal state of mind. The same is to be said not only about the sense of continuity of self, but also about another important property of identity which is the sense of inner harmony. Therefore, sense of personality disintegration, i.e., sense of incoherence and internal contradictions between basic personality traits, is defined as a disease rather than a normal psychical state.

From the point of view of Dan P. McAdams, who is an advocate of the latter approach, identity involves the process “through which subjective experience is synthesized and appropriated as one’s own” (McAdams, 1997: 56). His conception is based on the distinction between I and me as two aspects of identity. He claims that the I is the process of being self, of selfing, to use his term. Thus, the I is a process of setting various pieces of experience into a single entity. It is the aspect of identity where unity is unquestionable. With respect to another aspect of identity, the me, McAdams states that “if the I is the process of selfing, then the me is the product of that selfing process” (McAdams, 1997: 60). The me has to do with the variety of roles, interests, and similar social facts that are not necessarily consistent with one another; thus, the me must not be a unified or unifying thing. However, selfing allows anticipating and interpreting these elements in a way to provide an individual with a sense of fundamental unity essential for human beings. Therefore, “to suggest ... that the self lacks unity in contemporary social life is to suggest that the self-conceptions that contemporary men and women fashion for
themselves are too diffuse, incoherent, or multifaceted to qualify as selves that “have identity” (McAdams, 1997: 60-61). In a way, “multiple identity” would mean “no identity”. Therefore, what we can speak about is the multiplicity of manifestations of self, rather than a multiplicity of selves.

McAdams acknowledges that the unity of selfhood of a modern person becomes more problematic than it used to be because of the increasing complexity of contemporary life. He identifies five characteristics of modern self that render identity such a problem: (1) selves are no longer given but have to be created by individuals themselves; (2) selves are constructed in the everyday social life (and not under some special conditions or exclusively by extraordinary personalities); (3) the modern self is multi-layered; (4) the self develops over time (because of the increasing probability of experiencing the full normative life course, modern adults think of themselves as changing, moving through life passages); (5) the developing self seeks coherence and continuity in order for change to make sense. Thus, the modern person faces a greater variety of life possibilities. Therefore, a person’s selfing process encounters more difficulties in integrating different experiences into a single pattern. Still, it is one selfing process, not several, and that is why we cannot speak about the multiplicity of selves. The rejection of the conception of the multiplicity of selves does not necessarily mean adherence to the concept of stable and unchangeable selfhood. Since the me is constantly changing, selfing has to operate in such a way as to make sense of this permanent change. Thus, the author is strongly convinced that even the omnipotent complexity of today’s life allows an individual to preserve inner coherence so as to avoid serious personality disorders.

However, recently the circle of scholars which believes that the state of personality disintegration should not be treated as pathological is growing; moreover, it becomes even a norm in some regions of the world. Post-modern sociological literature proposes an alternative for the modern concept of identity, which is contextual identity. Contrary to the modern concept of identity, contextual identity is closely associated with a specific time, place and circumstances, as well as with social roles and consumption. The concept of multiple selves becomes rather fashionable in these discussions.

Seymour Rosenberg is among those who advocate the idea of the multiple selves instead of the unified self. He readily rejects the conception of unity of self as “the continuity of consciousness” or as “superior self,” as well as that of “the sense of self”. Rosenberg’s theory is based on the dialectic concept of self consisting of two interrelated aspects: ego and alter. According to the scholar, “Ego elements refer to the multiple aspects of self, readily identifiable by an individual as his or her family and work roles, interests, religious and ethnic affiliations, particular interpersonal relationships, and any of these elements as the person remembers them or anticipates them” (Rosenberg, 1997: 24). In the same manner, the “alter element refers to the “multiplicity” of persons about whom an individual has some beliefs (a view). Such persons include casual acquaintances, public figures, ‘types’ of persons, and intimates” (Rosenberg, 1997: 24). Rosenberg’s statement is very controversial
as he claims that not only crucial social relations and roles, but also accidental interpersonal bonds constitute elements of self and are incorporated in the identity structure. In his words, “phenomenologically, for example, it may seem paradoxical that a person’s view of others that he/she does not identify with is an important aspect of self; from a structural point of view, however, such views of others are part of dichotomy that is essential to the unity of self. Even more paradoxical perhaps is the notice that the more intense the rejection of certain others as “not me”, the more evident it is that the “not me” is part of “me”” (Rosenberg, 1997: 41). Does it mean that every new person of whom we form an opinion would slightly change our identity or supplement it with some novelty? If one perceives identity as something very basic, it is difficult to imagine this basic structure of identity could be dependent on or include such superficial and accidental bonds. It seems rather that the formation of opinion about new acquaintances is based on the need to maintain the unity of identity.

When analyzing the issue of adaptation to the changing cultural environment in the light of the conception of the multiplicity of selves, the process can be described as a change of various elements of self (both ego and alter): a person makes new acquaintances, forms opinions of new people, learns new roles, etc. According to Rosenberg, the change should be overwhelming since “changes in the structural location of one element likely affect the location of other elements” (Rosenberg, 1997: 41). The theory is not able to explain, however, how the system survives the changes of its elements. After all, these changes happen, the system is the same. When a person claims that s/he has changed, s/he means that s/he became different, not another. This means that the change of the roles, interests, attitudes is more superficial and does not necessarily reach the depth of identity.

Some proponents of the postmodernist school of thought go even further in their rejection of the concept of identity as a unified system, as they argue that in contemporary world both things and identities become short-lived, freely chosen or discarded. They undervalue the continuity aspect of identity; rather, they perceive identity as a collage of multiple selves. As Christopher Lasch describes the contemporary situation, “The conditions of everyday social intercourse, in societies based on mass production and mass consumption, encourage an unprecedented attention to superficial impressions and images, to the point where the self becomes almost indistinguishable from its surface” (Lasch, 1984: 30).

Once accepting this consumerist view, one should acknowledge that an individual stands before a real threat of becoming lost among the huge diversity of identity choices. As Alan Warde notes, “Consumption would be a much less pleasurable practice if it were both subject to ever-expanding free choice and the decisions made were fundamental components of a reflexive process of identity-formation. Indeed, the consequence might well be high and visible levels of distress among those individuals most deeply involved” (Warde, 1994: 877). Therefore, the idea that the principal goal of consumption is the pursuit of self-identity seems to be doubtful. Thus, the accounts of
the impact of reflexive consumption on the creation of self-identity (as explained by Giddens and other authors mentioned above) are misjudged. Also, they leave the question of the factors guiding everyday consumer choices and granting the fusion of different elements of identity into an harmonious entity unanswered. This makes one question altogether the concept of consumption as a dominant way of identity construction. It seems that the main fallacy of the majority of recent consumer society theories is a too individualistic view of the consumer.

The previous analysis suggests that it would be erroneous to treat identity as constituted by various ego and alter elements, even accidental ones (as Rosenberg claims), as not all of these elements are important for the self-perception of an individual. Some of them are, but some others are not. This means that there is a selection among a variety of ego and alter elements, and this selection has to be guided. Identity is the mechanism that guides it. Very similar observations could be applied for the consumerist view of identity: it is identity that guides consumerist choices, not vice versa.

VALUES AS A BASIS FOR INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

It is a quite usual case that theories of identity reach a deadlock failing to find an adequate elucidation of the mechanisms of identity formation and sustentation, especially when speaking of radical social change. It seems that authors investigating the issue relate too closely notions of identity, on the one side, and social relationship, role performance or consumption, on the other. It is obvious, however, that not all roles are equally internalized by an individual; some of the roles can be perceived by him/her as accidental or imposed and, therefore, they would have little importance for self-perception. Various roles form a hierarchy, and the priorities given depend on the central values of an individual. Personal identity should by no means be equaled to a sum of multiple social roles of an individual, however integrated. Anthony P. Cohen explains this point aptly by describing engagement into a relationship that requires the transformation of “I” into “we”: “when I enter into such a relationship, I say, in effect, “There are some aspects of ‘I’ which are not relevant to ‘we,’ and which I will put into the background for the time being”. I take a particular version of myself into a ‘we’ relationship. Far from this entailing the loss of any aspect of my self, I regard my self as being augmented by my experience of, and participation in, this new relationship” (Cohen, 1994: 24). The author concludes that “engaging in social relationships does not necessarily deprive the individual of self- (or authorial) direction” (Cohen, 1994: 24).

Thus, it can hardly be suggested that personal identity is the sum total of the social roles being accomplished by an individual, however integrated. A strict differentiation between identity and accomplishment of specific social roles is necessary. Equally ungrounded is close association of the identity concept with social status, interests, consumption habits and similar social facts, at least not in the post-traditional society of rapid change. Much more
Personal Identity in the Face of Change

sensible is perception of identity through the prism of the basic values of an individual.

Values have implications for human existence, serve as guidelines for the everyday activities of an individual (also, for consumption) and protect from the feeling of temporality so pernicious for personality. Another distinction between values and social roles is also important. Alteration of social roles undertaken by an individual could not always be regarded as development since it happens quite often that it is accidental and incongruent, as exemplified by the stories of changing social statuses in post-communist societies. Meanwhile the basic values of an individual (that should by no means be equaled to whims, preferences, interests and other short-lived things) are much more stable; after all, even when changing, values preserve a certain degree of consistency.

One can argue that values are as much subject to change as any other social fact. Indeed, there is much talk nowadays about the incredible pace of value change in Western societies, as well as and in post-communist societies that have opened themselves culturally for the rest of the world and, by that same token, have experienced bewilderment in the established beliefs and views. However, this is not exactly what we have in mind when speaking of values as a basis of individual identity. Here values are defined according to their classical concept as formulated by such authorities of sociological theory as Talcott Parsons, Milton Rokeach and Clyde Kluckhohn. According to the definition of famous American sociologist Parsons, a value is “an element of a shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation” (Parsons, 1951: 12). A similar concept of values lies at the basis of the sociological theory formulated by the well-known expert of empirical value “measurement,” Rokeach, who defined values as “a type of belief, centrally located within one’s total belief system, about how one ought to or ought not to behave, or about some end-state of existence worth or not worth attaining” (Rokeach, 1969: 124). In the same manner, Kluckhohn perceives value as “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action” (Kluckhohn, 1962: 395). It is important to emphasize that, in this definition, values transcend specific situations – they are general conceptions of the desirable. Even though he emphasizes the relative stability of values over time, he does not reject altogether the possibility of value change, understanding the latter as a process of consistent consequent development. In his words, “New values come into being as a result of individual variability and new situations, though it should be added that new values are invariably created against a background of pre-existing values” (Kluckhohn, 1962: 416).

It has to be noted that one can find quite a number of identity definitions very similar to the above definition of values in the relevant literature. According to them, personal identity is an internalized theory or schema of who one is and who s/he should be in the view of other people. This identity
concept includes important facts, constructs, beliefs, values, and standards of behavior that compose the picture of an individual as a social being. For instance, the American psychologist Allen Wheelis (1958) maintains that at the basis of individual identity lie the highest values (beliefs, attitudes, ideals) that integrate and determine the values of lower rank.

Another aspect of the relation between identity and values is also important here: even though values are constitutive identity elements, identity itself might be perceived as a certain self-contained value. The very saying “without identity” clearly has the connotation of a negative value judgment. Moreover, the content of some specific identity might be appraised as more or less valuable; that is, an individual is able to assess the identity of his/her own or somebody else as complying more or less to the important criteria of evaluation.

It should be emphasized that concepts of both values and identity are abstracted from any specific decisions, events or social roles. Neither values nor identity can be reduced to the actions of an individual, even though they find expression in these actions. Let us consider the following example common in our everyday life: a qualified employee becomes unemployed for a prolonged period. Suddenly s/he falls down the stairs of the social hierarchy, which inevitably is reflected in his/her life chances, to use Weberian term. But could it be that this change in social status was not reflected also in his/her identity? And if it becomes reflected, in what ways? Now s/he refers to him/herself as “unemployed”, whereas s/he used to be a representative of some profession. Does John cease to be John only because he has lost the job? There is almost no doubt that the reaction of strangers to John-engineer and John-unemployed will be somewhat different. However, it is hardly possible that John himself or his family members will start to perceive him as being somebody else. It might be the case that they will perceive him as different, but this would have to do not that much with the very change of social status, but rather with the psychological consequences of the change for John’s judgments, self-reflection and, consequently, for his behavior. Such a scenario would be more likely in the situation where professional activity was the key element of the person’s identity and difficult to substitute with equivalent “proofs” of personal worth. This example illustrates vividly our statement that identity is associated with social roles or status, not directly, but through the mediation of their subjective evaluation. Speaking picturesquely, social roles might be perceived as forms that individual identity acquires; meanwhile the mediator that associates these roles to identity is values. In other words, it is not social roles themselves that are important for individual identity, but the meanings that an individual attaches to them, as well as subsequent their appraisals.

It is of importance here that the accomplishment of social roles is not strictly regulated socially and culturally and is more or less open to individual variations. When accomplishing various roles, an individual seeks to preserve the sense of sameness, that is, of being the same person (not of being the unchanged). It is the unity of self which determines the behavior of an individual
undertaking various roles, not vice versa. Thus, even in the post-traditional world of complex social relations it is sensible to speak of role performance as an expression of the unified self, rather than as a manifestation of fragmentary multiple selves.

Thus, an individual performs (or at least aspires to perform) his/her roles in accordance with his/her intrinsic values and, consequently, “in the spirit of his/her identity,” rather than that an individual forms personal identity with respect to the totality of roles he/she accomplishes. It is exactly the unity of self that serves as a guideline for an individual behavior while accomplishing various social roles, not vice versa. Once defining identity as grounded in values rather than roles and social positions, it becomes possible to elucidate the stability of identity despite continuous change of environment and, consequently, in the set of roles an individual accomplishes. Since the basic values of an individual are much more stable than roles, the scholarly search for the guarantees of the unity and stability of identity becomes easier.

**REFERENCES**


INTRODUCTION

The year is 1807. At the end of January Napoleon was moving from Warsaw to East Prussia. His army fought with the Russian military forces at Eylau. At 10 p.m. on January 7th when the French occupied the Eylau plateau, it became clear that the time for the main battle had come. The next morning both armies lined up in front of each other. The battle was unstable, and neither side was sure of victory. The heads of both armies ordered their military forces to retreat but, after the Russians did so first, Napoleon ordered his forces to remain in their positions. The Russians, however, thought that the French had retreated and even sang "We praise you, Lord!" ("Tebia, Gospoda, slavim") in celebration of their victory and later distributed a bulletin which announced the defeat of the French at Eylau, which perhaps was one of the reasons for ordering a painting of this battle. A competition was announced and in the description of this competition, it was written, "At his every step Bonaparte would stop by the wounded, talk to them in their language, ask to console and help them. He observed how those victims were bandaged, how riflemen of the guards lifted them onto their horses and how bodyguards looked after the execution of his benevolent orders".

Scholars have noted that the above gesture reflected the old ritual diligently described by Marc Bloch. It was widely believed that during the coronation a new king acquired miraculous healing powers. He could heal the sick, and his subjects acknowledged the legitimacy of his rule. This ritual can be traced to Indo-European mythology, although we are interested not in the roots of this ritual but in its place in the value system of the 19th century. Taking this tradition into consideration and the fact that Napoleon attempted to revive it, we can ask: what does this painting mean? First, it demonstrates that the ritual was performed and even sang "We praise you, Lord!" ("Tebia, Gospoda, slavim") in celebration of their victory and later distributed a bulletin which announced the defeat of the French at Eylau, which perhaps was one of the reasons for ordering a painting of this battle. A competition was announced and in the description of this competition, it was written, "At his every step Bonaparte would stop by the wounded, talk to them in their language, ask to console and help them. He observed how those victims were bandaged, how riflemen of the guards lifted them onto their horses and how bodyguards looked after the execution of his benevolent orders".

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Note that not the conquered, but conquerors think of and interpret this symbolic conquest. The addressee of this painting was the conqueror. The words that conquerors want to hear were put into the mouths of those conquered. This has nothing in common with the cultural codes of the latter, to whom the painting is incomprehensible. Thus, this artwork is one more
conquest and an act of violence. Native cultural codes are imposed on a new space. It can be argued that this is one more “lie”. Power is legitimizied by using one’s own cultural codes, incomprehensible to the conquered.

On the other hand, Napoleon’s action was natural because he attempted to legitimize his rule in the new territory. He did not need to understand the codes of the local culture and subject himself to them. It was important to legitimize his own power in the face of his own kind. Others did not matter to him, they were considered deaf; and even if they spoke like a Lithuanian hussar, they spoke according to the logic of the French and in their language. Here we have to pay attention to one very indicative historical imprecision. Napoleon communicated with the wounded in their native languages. Obviously it was not true. However, on the symbolic level where the conquered soon had to recognize Napoleon’s power, the French military commander was depicted as their ruler, speaking their language. Now they had to ask Napoleon to heal them and after healing they would have served him faithfully. Hence the ruler could speak the language of the others, but others could speak using the cultural codes of the conquerors. Although the ruler spoke all the languages, he knew only the codes of his own culture. At the same time even while speaking their own languages, others spoke the language of the conqueror.

What conclusions can be drawn from this short and fragmentary analysis? Space has to be given meaning. It must mean something. First, we have to ascribe our own metaphors and symbols to it. Second, this symbolic conquest of space is related to the issue of identity. Territories are very rarely homogenous. They are often the crossroads of many ethnicities, classes and social groupings that offer different spatial interpretations. Inevitably we encounter the question: How do different spatial interpretations interact? What are their relations?

Here we have a wide field of research: What interpretational images of Lithuania has Europe been offering and how have we been reacting to them? It is these issues that I consider the European challenge. European integration does not include only economic and political matters. The level of consciousness is also important because it demonstrates how deeply we are able to understand the current processes. Can we realize them and find cultural forms to describe them? Meaningless and unnamed processes are the most dangerous.

Napoleon’s case is an extreme example when one’s own interpretation is imposed using military force. However, it is possible to imagine different situations when the interpretations of space are negotiated and when the Other is not voicelessly repeating words in a foreign language.

Is it possible to imagine the current situation, when Lithuania is becoming a part of the European Union, in Napoleon’s way? Will the Lithuanian space be “conquered” by strange foreign codes? A number of Lithuanian intellectuals and some marginal politicians conceive the situation in this manner.

This article will suggest that identity is always defined in relation to the other, and that Europe has always been the other to Lithuania. In the
face of this other, different forms of identities have been formed. The case described of cultural expansion is not the only one possible: intercultural dialogue in which both sides have the right to propose their own interpretations is also possible.

I will attempt to describe Lithuanian identity by using the division between the center and periphery as during some historical periods the dialogue between the center and periphery was utilized productively in creating new identities. Such intercultural communication took place in the 19th century, as it does currently. It is possible to regard this intercultural communication as a possibility for re-articulating the Lithuanian identity.

**THE NOTION OF IDENTITY**

In Latin, the term “identity” means “the same”. This term implies a program according to which an unknown element is recognized and named with regard to what is known. Thus it means the commonality of something with something else. In other words, two elements are necessary: one that identifies with something and the other with whom one identifies, the known and unknown. By saying “the same” we are already competent to attribute a new phenomenon to the one known. Identity, understood broadly, is one of the main features of human thinking. The development of human thought (I mean here all practices of human thought: philosophy, literature, science, etc.) has been based on the recognition and description of the unknown by using the known. In this context, it is possible to examine one trend in identity research. Historians of culture and theoreticians of comparative civilizations (see Kavolis, 1995: 173-193) encounter the problem of defining some phenomena (their smaller or greater scope is a secondary problem). In this case, some or one descriptive feature of a phenomenon is distinguished. Dumont’s works demonstrating differences between the Western and Indian civilizations are one of the best examples: Western civilization is characterized by the principle of individuality, while the Indian by the hierarchical principle (Dumont, 1991: 301). Hence, any new empirical data must be re-evaluated with regard to these characteristics. Everything that displays the traces of the principle of individuality will belong to the Western civilization. We could attribute all research works that describe identity (for instance, Swedish, Lithuanian, working class, gay, etc.), that is, whose conception is descriptive, to this type of conceptual framework. In this kind of work, the issue of what characterizes one or another group is the most important: the type of cultural, social, or economic identity will depend on the distinctions between groups. One defines the field of research and looks for the features that characterize it. Simplifying this problem, it is possible to argue that the elements of the Lithuanian identity include national clothes, the national dish “zeppelins”, basketball, etc. However, the question arises at once: What allows us to recognize Lithuanians as such? How has Lithuanianness been understood and how is it now perceived? We don’t know what a Lithuanian is and therefore we attempt to define the contents of Lithuanianness. Each group creates the notion
of its own peculiarity as some phenomena are rejected and considered foreign, while others are accepted and considered as its own. In the conception of identity described above, this issue has not been raised, i.e., the characteristics of peculiarity are imposed from outside; they do not derive from the culture itself. For instance, individualism is an indisputable value for us, but often we cannot comprehend that this feature distinguishes us from others.

**“SĄJŪDIS”: REVIVAL OF NATIONHOOD**

People went to the square rejoicing, alone, in families, groups, carrying the national flags of different sizes that were attached to sticks, poles and clubs. Upon meeting friends they greeted and hugged each other, they cheered and cried. Here and there you could see older people, even disabled, accompanied by their friends and relatives to let them participate in this event. As during other exciting occurrences, many expressed regrets that their friends and relatives did not live until this happy day. (Senn, 1992: 57)

This quotation is from Alfred Erich Senn’s book, *Lithuania Awakening*. In this episode, the author who witnessed the events described the hoisting of the Lithuanian national flag in the Castle of Gediminas, at the heart of Lithuanian statehood. The regaining of national symbols and the possibility of exhibiting them in public places created the sense of commonality among Lithuanians: they hugged each other and rejoiced. Today a similar sense of commonality arises only after successful basketball games (in 1999 when Kaunas’ “Žalgiris” became the champion of the Euroleague and in 2003 when Lithuania became the champion of Europe). Since the summer of 1988 we can observe how quickly, even with lightning speed, national symbols have been acquiring an immense power in Lithuanian society.

It is possible to find many similar descriptions from the time of Lithuanian national revival movement, *Sąjūdis*. This was one of the most emotional as well as the most mysterious and interesting periods in the history of Lithuania. In fact, cultural critics face an interesting question: Why did some symbols become so important during such a short time? How did they acquire the power that prompted people to sacrifice their lives, health and property? When did the strong sense of unity arise? For many foreigners, our emotionality, decisiveness and sometimes completely illogical behavior seemed strange. From a temporal perspective some things could seem naive and trivial; though no one doubts the authenticity of the feelings at the time. Of course, it is possible to use various psychological and psychoanalytical theories in order to explain mass behavior. This period is favorable for such analyses and theories, thus we can expect a lot of studies about it. It is strange, however, that it has not yet been analyzed sufficiently. Here I have in mind cultural, psychological, and semiotic aspects of this period, since some historical research already has been done.
The question raised – why were national symbols recovered so quickly? – is not new. In answering this question, the fact that the inter-war tradition had never been forgotten and that Lithuanian people had not believed in the Soviet symbols are usually mentioned. There existed a generation that remembered the inter-war Lithuania. That generation associated the inter-war period with the “golden age”. Belief in the Soviet symbols was floundering as can be proved by widespread anecdotes in which the Soviet activists including Petka, Chapaev, Brezhnev and Lenin were the main heroes. However, this does not explain why the national symbols acquired such power. Nor can the fact that this national rhetoric was reproduced and multiplied in the mass media. I would argue that in this case one of the most important things was that the idea of nation was related to regaining history, which is connected with two fundamental things: truth (for since the positivist time, there was an imperative to write history in “the way it happened”) and death.

REGAINING HISTORY: DEATH AND TRUTH

I would begin with the concert in Vilnius of the March of Rock across Lithuania. *Sąjūdžio žinios* [Sąjūdis News] wrote:

“A year ago”, said Algirdas Kaušpėdas2, “we were a grey mass, angry and infuriated; we had no hope and we did not know the way. … But today our flags, our Vytis [coat of arms] and our history belong to us again”. But, as we experienced during our journey across Lithuania, there is no longer any “lost generation”. The youth are awakening, they are recovering their sense of national individuality, consciousness, self-respect, love, sacrifice and devotion to the Fatherland. Algirdas Kaušpėdas described it perfectly: “Yesterday you demanded “heavy metal”; today you intone “Lithuania!” – this is a genuine revival!”

The end of the concert was depicted in this way:

Arvydas Juozaitis3 addressed the audience asking to pay respect with a minute of silence to all citizens deported and lost in Siberia; to all who died in the Lithuanian forests after World War II. Our sacred national flags froze up, and thousands of people breathed as one person: this proved that we were strong not only in our joy, but also in our grief. After this, the National Hymn spread across our old capital: “Lithuania, our Fatherland, /The land of heroes...”. (Sąjūdžio žinios, August 18, 1988, no. 24, p. 3)

Thus, the rock concert became a place in which national symbolism was displayed. We must not forget that many lyrics at that time were political.
For instance, the group “For the Fatherland” sang:

Today we have “glasnost” – much is allowed now.
We speak about the future but our hearts are directed toward Stalin.
This is Lithuania, here fat pigs snore,
Here bureaucrats close their eyes at their desks.
This is Lithuania; this is the Nida bureau,
Here technocrats pollute the sea with oil.
We will play the last game with them,
And they will turn up their toes
Because of this anarchy.

Thus, concerts both in their contents and form were the place in which national rhetoric and national symbols were displayed and confirmed. The interesting aspect is the endings of those concerts. The minute of silence would turn national citizens into a single, atemporal community. Doubtless, it is difficult to attribute those concerts to either counterculture or popculture. However, one thing is obvious: such elements as death are not at all characteristic of the usual concert. Death is customarily excluded; it is not talked about. Yet in this case death and the dead were remembered. Everything ended with the National Hymn, which soon was to become the national anthem.

Death, reflections about the death and the exclusion of death from culture are very important. Death is the endpoint of every individual’s life. Death gives meaning to life, i.e. a human life has an end. Death is irreversible, and after death an individual’s life cannot be changed. Death becomes the point with regard to which the life is measured. Death is the end of the life history of a person, after which we acquire some sense of the meaning of his/her life. Historians of mentalities note that reflections about death serve as a mirror of our individuality. Death is a liminal point distinguishing Here from There. Each life is inscribed between these two poles, and the tension arising here can be transformed into different cultural logics. Search for the meaning of our own lives resides between these two poles.

Benedict Anderson stated that nationalism pays much attention to death. Nationalism unites the living with the dead. The nation exists not only in the present; it not only projects itself into the future but also lives in the past. According to Anderson, nationalism replaced the imagined religious communities that existed before. The power of nationalism resides in the fact that the cult of death helps to consolidate a present community. Emphasizing this idea, Anderson proposes to imagine for a short while the grave of an unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for dead liberals; this is a totally absurd idea. On the other hand, the grave of an unknown soldier is quite natural. Reflections about death in the discourse of nationalism unite people into a single community (Anderson, 1999: 24-25).

This idea can be illustrated by the speech of outstanding Lithuanian poet, Sigitas Geda, delivered at the mass gathering on July 8, 1988:
What will we say to them [our relatives], what will we say to ourselves when we’re alone, what will we say to those who were lain to rest in peace today, yesterday, the day before yesterday; to those who rest in the sacred land and all over the world: in Yakutia and Udmurtia, near the Arctic circle and here, shot in Vilnius’ gloomy maze of yards and cellars. We will tell them that we are one of the most ancient nations, that we had a large state but did not manage to preserve it, that we experienced a multitude of national desecrations, occupations, uprisings, deportations and revivals. Is this the way to talk to the living and the dead? (Atgimimo Balsai, Vilnius, 1991: 57)

It is obvious that at that time one of the main factors of the “national revival” was the remembrance of the history. And it was not just a simple history – the main element here was the remembrance of the “history of suffering”, i.e. deportations and post-war struggles.

In these speeches, the relation between the dead and the living was constructed. Death was not meaningless since, in this discourse, Lithuanians died in order that those participating in meetings, listening to or reading speeches might find the objectives of their lives. Doubtless, the dead were connected to the nation and its fate. The constructed community included not all the dead, but only the Lithuanian dead. Lithuanianness both gave meaning to people’s lives and made national symbols effective. Indeed, during the years of “Sąjūdis”, the rate of suicides in Lithuania decreased.

Along with this topic of death there was another topic – the telling of the truth about our history. Hidden history became a space to be discovered. The inter-war national discourse became the basis of this rediscovery. We can remember the boom of reissuing old historical books during 1988 – 1991: historical studies published in the inter-war period were printed again. Since during the Soviet years some historical facts were distorted, the historical discourse formed in the inter-war period automatically became the telling of the truth.

These topics – death and the telling of the truth – were used to construct an identity throughout history. It was essentially a restitution of nationness. It was a rebuilding of the nationness constructed at the end of the 19th century.

THE EROSION OF NATIONAL FEELING

The subject of national identity gradually lost its importance in the post-Sąjūdis period. Economic problems pushed the issue of nationality aside. The results of the European Values Survey carried out in 1990 and 1999 are very expressive. The respondents in both surveys were asked the same question: “With which group of these specified would you identify yourself first?” and had to select out of five geographical regions (locality or town
Lithuania and Europe: Possibilities for Reconstructing Identity

where they live; region of the country where they live; their country as a whole; Europe; the world as a whole), the one with which they identified most strongly. The comparison of the distribution of answers to this question (see Table 1) is somewhat complicated due to the fact that the EVS 1990 was carried out at the very moment of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the questionnaire used in 1990, identification with a region was phrased as identification with the Lithuanian Republic as one of the regions of the Soviet empire, meanwhile identification with a country as a whole, as identification with the USSR. Because of that, it is adequate to compare sel-identification of Lithuanians with a region in 1990 with their self-identification with a country as a whole in 1999. Comparing this way, one will see that in 1990, 66 percent of respondents pinpointed Lithuania as an object of their primary self-identification, whereas in 1999, this group melted to 38 percent. Meanwhile, the native city or settlement was mentioned by 25 percent of respondents in 1990 and 49 percent in 1999.

Table 1.
Individual self-identification with geographical regions in Lithuania, 1990-1999 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCALITY (city or settlement)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION (1990-Lithuania; 1999-Lithuanian region)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY (1990-USSR; 1999-Lithuania)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE WORLD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the question about self-identification with geographical regions, respondents to both surveys were asked the question: “Are you proud of being a resident of Lithuania?” The distribution of answers to this question is presented in Table 2. As one can see, the number of individuals “very proud” of their country decreased by 50 percent during the period between the two surveys, and the number of those “somewhat proud” and “not proud at all” grew three and ten times respectively. Obviously, such big disappointment in the native country resulted from multiple reasons: psychological, social, and economic. But in this special case I would like to highlight the trajectory – marking a shift from national identity (identifying oneself with Lithuania) to locality identity (identifying oneself with the place of residence), as well as a declining feeling of national pride. Various interpretations of this trajectory
are possible; however it testifies to a certain erosion of nationality.

Table 2.
National pride of Lithuanians, 1990-1999 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very proud</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather proud</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat proud</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not proud at all</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here we should also add an ironic approach towards national symbols, which surfaced in the pop-culture. Nationality and belief in national symbols went out of fashion. The symbols, which were reconstructed and brought back to life, lost their fight with real life as they were out of line with the new experience.

Moreover, to better understand this erosion of nationality, we should remember the growing disillusion in the situation of that period, the huge distrust in the state institutions, and lack of faith in the future. The surveys by Eurobarometr revealed the following: 27 percent of the Lithuanians, when asked if they expected any improvement of the situation, answered positively (the lowest figure among the candidate countries), versus 21 percent of the respondents, who believed it would worsen (this was the highest among the post-communist countries and third among the candidate countries, after Cyprus and Turkey (see <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion>).

All this had a negative effect on the previous sources of Lithuanian identity that somehow became less convincing to the new generation. This also could be seen from the survey carried out in 2003. If the elderly used to be proud of the Lithuanian language and Lithuanian history, former sources of Lithuanian identity, the young generation preferred different symbols: they were proud of famous Lithuanian basketball teams.

**TURNING POINTS IN TRAJECTORIES OF AWARENESS**

Thus, we come to the question of whether Lithuanian identity is possible. The most frequently suggested discourse today emphasizes the threat to the Lithuanian identity amid globalization, as well as the potential disappearance of it.

Here, I would like to prove that being a member state of the Euro-
Lithuania and Europe: Possibilities for Reconstructing Identity

To begin with trajectories of awareness, the celebrated Lithuanian sociologist, Vytautas Kavolis, wrote, “An expert in cultural history considers significant a shift of a differentiated organization of awareness from the text groups characteristic of one period to the text ensemble representing the identity of the later period, rather than the individuality of texts (or the biographies of their authors)” (Kavolis, 1991: 126).

There are options for our new identity. When entering the European Union, Lithuania continued an old cultural dialogue with Europe, too often disrupted in the course of history. When writing the word “cultural dialogue”, I mean symbolic, rather than cultural, exchange, and the values born through cultural communication. Specialists in culture semiotics say that every culture has its code and the discourses taken from one culture should be interpreted referring only to this. Thus, an opposite alternative is possible – knowing the code of an other culture leads to discourse modification. The analysis of the evolution of Lithuania’s image as the country of woods may be used to illustrate such cultural communication.

This image came up in the Middle Ages and was widespread in West Europe. Woods were perceived as a territory under the control of devil, demons and evil spirits (as paganism was attributed to the sphere of the activities of the devil). Alexander Guagnini wrote in his Sarmatiae Europeae Descriptio, well known in Europe of that period, “In that province [Samogitia] there are so many dense woods and virgin forests, where even ghosts can be seen sometimes” (see Jurginis, Šidlauskas, 1988: 66).

Forests were a threatening space full of dangers. Such image incited a response, which came in the form of the very first Lithuanian map of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GLD) commissioned in 1611 by the Radvila family, famous and powerful Lithuanian noblemen. The wooded areas on that map were considerably smaller (Alexandrowicz, 1989: 124). This could serve as a perfect illustration of how the West European cultural code (forest is a dangerous space) was used and the GLD “turned into” (at least within a symbolic space) a “tamed” country by reducing the forest areas at least on a map. Obviously, one map could hardly change the way Europeans imagined Lithuania. Therefore, at the beginning of the 19th century one of the generals of the army of Napoleon, who had never before been in Lithuania, wrote in a letter to his wife: “We are soon to enter the Lithuanian woods” (Trumpa, 1990: 231). Prosper Mérimée’s famous short story “The Bear” was a story of a Lithuanian nobleman who had torn his wife to pieces on their wedding night. The true reason of all this chilling mystery came out later: the nobleman was born to a woman and a bear, and so he was half human and half beast. This short story also contains vivid descriptions of Lithuanian forests, where all kinds of unpleasant things could happen (Mérimée, 1995: 18-19).

However, the rise of nationalism led to a remoulding of this image – the apotheosis of forests, which started with Simonas Daukantas, according to whom the forests turned into a symbol of Lithuania’s power. Lithuanians
drew strength from woods, and when those virgin forests began disappearing, Lithuania’s power and glory died away, too. This example shows how Daukantas used the ready-made image of Lithuania by offering an absolutely different interpretation of it, i.e. he transformed it from a negative to a positive one, as forests which were perceived as a threatening space turned into the national pride and sign of identity. This type of creative path proved very productive, and a forest as a subject in the Lithuanian culture became very significant. Antanas Baranauskas, Maironis, Vincas Krėvė, and many other Lithuanian writers later developed it in texts fundamental to Lithuanian culture.

This was how the negative images from another culture were used to build up our national identity through transforming their negative content into a positive one. Investing a positive content into such re-interpretation of negative stereotypes proved very productive in reconstructing the identity. We can trace similar attempts today too, such as the essays of Gintaras Beresnevičius, and particularly his book Imperijos Darymas (The Making an Empire). It contains the following idea: we have the experience of ruling an empire – the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – and we are barbarians by our nature deemed to be warriors and rulers. But the problem is that there has been no one to fight with or rule over in such a small Lithuania. Therefore, men are drinking, ruining themselves by excessive use of alcohol, fighting among themselves, and committing suicide. All this happens out of despair that surfaces when they have no one to fight with or rule over. But now we are in Europe. Upon becoming a member of that big family, we can see a wider space – entire Europe – opening for our activities. And, in Beresnevičius’ words, Europe has grown weaker and tired, and too pleased with itself. Eventually, it will be easy for us, barbarians, to rule it. He writes:

We should feel free of any inhibitions when gaining access to Europe, and not let feelings of submissiveness or insignificance worm their way into our brains. We are barbarians standing at the open gates of Rome, and are invited to take over the power there, as internal weakness and factions within its structure are hiding under the shining exterior. Only barbarians can breathe new life into the empire of Rome. The major issue is who they will be – us or the Moors. But we are closer to the European roots, since we are those roots. At the same time, we are the North, which always was major source of vitality needed by Europe for its expansion. (Beresnevičius, 2003: 67)

Beresnevičius is a real master of using a paradox to mingle the old myths about our glorious past with future visions. Beresnevičius has encroached upon our conceptions and inveterate stereotypes. He avoids demystifying, but prefers replacing them with new ones. His interpretation of the existing negative clichéd image of Lithuanians as savages turns into a positive
and is presented as the key condition for our future identity. Actually, he attempts doing what Daukantas did in the 19th century. The latter turned upside-down the stereotypes of that time so that their new interpretation laid down the grounds for the emerging Lithuanian nation. Beresnevičius uses similar methods. He also offers new concepts and new models of the activities of the nation.

However, we should notice here that Europe has been growing into the space suitable for the Lithuanian national identity to unfold. Europe, with all of its cultural meanings, has developed into a space of challenge to be taken up. Eventually, Europe has been growing into “something different”, which is most important for building the identity definition. At the same time, it is a prerequisite for the unfolding of the new Lithuanian identity.

THE LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND NATIONAL SYMBOLS

In speaking about globalization and capitalism we usually emphasize only one side of it – we present global capitalism as a phenomenon that promotes uniformization and annihilates differences. Airports are the same all around the world, say the followers of such an approach. But there is another side of it: global capitalism stimulates the survival of certain distinctions, and even helps to build them up. I have in mind the importance of tourism for the organization of culture, which is one of the most profitable businesses, as can be seen from statistics. In 1970, the number of tourists was 159.7 million and spent $17.9 billion; in 1980, their number grew to 284 million and the sum spent rose to $102.4 billion. In 1990, the figures respectively were 454.8 million and $255 billion, whereas in 1995, they grew further to 561 million and $380 billion. The World Tourism Organization forecasts the number of travelers to exceed 1 billion by 2010 (Held et al., 1999).

Tourism is not just traveling across geographic locations or a change of geographic climate. It is traveling via cultures and in time. A modern tourist is either a historian (since he tours historic places) or anthropologist (who travels to spaces which are absolutely strange to his civilization). Today’s traveler avoids locations that are empty or have not been given a cultural sense. He needs images and impressions to be ready for “consumption”.

To reach success in the sphere of tourism, Lithuania needs a successful myth about what Lithuania is, what makes it special, what Lithuanians are proud of, and what is worth seeing here. However, this myth cannot be superficial and suitable only for tourists; it must be a part of us. We can trace some indications of such myth already today, for example the ongoing rebuilding of the Palace of Rulers of the Lower Castle in Vilnius that used to be the heart of science and culture in the 16th century. The supporters of this project say it will serve both the historic self-awareness and national self-esteem, as well as stimulate tourism. In this case we can see very well how symbols of national identity go in line with the industry of tourism. So, this type of the logic of
capitalism (opposite to McDonaldization, which is uniform) will promote distinction rather than annihilation.

That’s precisely why certain symbols from the past, or cultural symbols, are created or reconstructed. Globalization by its logic not only eliminates cultural identity, but also helps to build it. Differences are needed to create economic values.

Thus, the vector of global capitalism may grow into a powerful force, which would support the phenomenon of identity. Eventually, the merger of the logic of global capitalism and turning points in the trajectories of awareness can offer grounds for the potential re-creation of the Lithuanian identity and survival in the post-modern world.

CONCLUSIONS

In 1988-1992, Lithuania brought back to life the national identity models used in the inter-war period. Delivering hidden truths and remembering the deaths of the compatriots in the post-war period contributed to the development of national identity among emigrants and created grounds for national identity to grow into the most important component of the public life.

In the post-Sąjūdis period, after the restoration of the country’s independence, the erosion of national identity started; it was accompanied by disappointment in national symbols and gradual disappearance of discussions about the national identity. Social surveys have shown a weakening role of national identity in the ten years of Independence.

But in analyzing the essays of the last years, we have discovered attempts to re-think the Lithuanian national identity. The essays by Gintaras Beresnevičius spurred our interest because he has been turning upside down the negative stereotypes about Lithuania and remaking them into components of likely identity. Europe has developed into a space suitable for the Lithuanian identity to unfold. Europe, with all its cultural meanings, has developed into a space of challenge to be taken up. Eventually, Europe has been growing into “something different”, which is most important for building the identity definition. At the same time, it becomes a prerequisite for the unfolding of the new Lithuanian identity.

In our analysis, we have underlined the logic of global capitalism, which not only annihilates local cultures but also contributes to building distinctions. All this offers opportunity for the emergence of a new national identity for intellectuals to reconsider.

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Lithuania
NOTES

1. In this way, contemporary human beings continue the biblical tradition of Adam: “And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.” (Genesis 2: 19).

2. Active campaigner of the national revival movement and popular singer of the time (editor’s note).

3. Prominent Lithuanian philosopher, one of the key figures of Sąjūdis movement (editor’s note).

4. Jacques Le Goff’s work about the notion of purgatory in the Christian culture is important in this respect. The French historian demonstrated convincingly that, along with the rethinking of the unearthly world, new cultural transformations took place in Western civilization.

5. Eminent Lithuanian folklorist, philologist and historian of the 19th century, famous also as the creator of the concept of the modern Lithuanian nation (editor’s note).

6. Contemporary Lithuanian writer, essayist and historian of religion (editor’s note).

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Trumpa, V. (1990) *Napoleonas, Baltija ir Lietuva* [Napoleon, the Baltics and Lithuania], Vilnius.
In Lithuania, as in other Western countries, at especially dramatic historical junctures interest has grown in “nonclassical” (as assessed from a traditional Eurocentric viewpoint) cultures, of which the great Eastern civilizations stand out as the more significant. Increasing contacts between cultures have periodically encouraged intellectuals to delve into the complex problems of the interaction between Eastern and Western cultural, philosophic and artistic traditions, and to grasp that each culture, despite its uniqueness, is a component part of universal world culture. In human cultural history, which spans many centuries, there exist unchanging truths and values that have not lost their relevance, ideals that unify the goals of mankind. At any given point in history, separate cultures embody, actualize and express, in their own way, these attitudes toward values.

A national culture to which “a longing for world culture” is foreign has no future. The better able a culture is to naturally assimilate the values of other cultures, the more deep its impulses to develop. Here, the problem of dialog between cultures arises – how authentically to transfer concepts from “foreign” cultures to one’s own. The boundaries between that which is “one’s own” and that which is “foreign” shift and constantly change, no matter what megacultural systems influence a national culture.

EARLY LITHUANIAN INTEREST IN THE EAST

Contrary to our stereotypical thinking, the history of culture does not provide a universal system of cultural models and categories. Indian, Chinese, Japanese, French, and Lithuanian culturological concepts are not equivalent and do not share coordinating systems. It is not possible, therefore, mechanically to transfer values from one culture to another without losing authenticity. On the other hand, world culture does contain values, truths, and ideals that express goals common to all people, that are universal and intelligible to all nations. For this reason, it is possible for values created by different cultures and civilizations freely to circulate and be exchanged.

One’s own culture can be better understood only by looking at it from the outside, by comparing its system of values and symbols to those of other cultures. “In order to see things objectively,” wrote Carl Gustav Jung, “one must always look at them from the outside. … Everything that annoys us in others helps us to understand ourselves. When we act this way, a dialog naturally develops between different cultural traditions, one that helps overcome
the isolation of a specific culture, the narrowness of its horizon” (Jung, 1992: 250).

A meaningful polylog (or interchange of various cultural voices) with other cultures and their spiritual values is possible only by maintaining the attitude of openness in which the communicating parties respect one another, do not avoid contact with one another, and recognize the importance of cultural values and symbols different from their own. On the other hand, any cultural polylog requires openness of thought to critical views and differences of opinion. Finally, a full-fledged polylog is impossible without a certain body of shared ideas that open up space both to a diversity of opinions and positions and to mutual communication. Indifference toward other cultures and exaggerated admiration of one’s own, its blind exaltation, are characteristic only of an uncultured person and merely attest to spiritual immaturity. If one does not respect the cultural values of other nations, one cannot meaningfully love one’s own culture or comprehend its position in the course of history and in the context of world culture. Moreover, contempt for other cultures is usually directly connected to trampling on one’s own ethnic traditions of culture.

Extremely important, therefore, for meaningful cultural contacts is a responsible attitude on the part of each participant toward their own tradition of ethnic culture as an open system of values and symbols able to provide nourishment for the further development of spiritual values. An ethnic tradition is transmitted while remaining stable in the constant elemental metamorphoses of life and culture. It is the change of all changes, invariable in its eternal variability. It is a refreshing wellspring of authentic values, constantly nourishing all the rootlets of culture. Attention to cultural values and symbols created in the past also opens up a space for the future, i.e. the experience of the road taken thus also ensures the future. A rich tradition of ethnic culture not only combines stability with a constant change of values, but is also the point of departure for intercultural polylog.

Fate or a hidden logic of historical development has cast Lithuanians, the last pagans of Europe, into an area of land between the Eastern and Western worlds. Here was that spiritual space, formed by “the hidden mind of history” (Hegel) where the creative energy of our nation unfolded along with the tragedy of her culture and existence; where the threat of national destruction and extinction constantly hovered about; and where, on the other hand, lay nestled the sources for original flights of our national spirit, for the tradition of marvelous harmonic singing and unique wooden folk sculpture. For centuries, Lithuanian culture has interacted with the cultures of neighboring nations, has experienced their influence, and has influenced them in turn.

When the historical metamorphoses of the Lithuanian reception of the East are analyzed, what becomes clear is the exceptional significance of the idea of the Orient in the search for Lithuanian cultural identity. For members of the Lithuanian intellectual elite, the East was often not so much the “other”, a distant exotic world, as something spiritually close, a magic mirror, as it were, in which they sought the origins of their own human physiognomy and mentality, which were different from those of the rational Christian West, and
where they sought to know themselves and fully understand the advantages and shortcomings of their own culture. For many of our most prominent intellectuals and artists, therefore, the East did not represent, as for many Westerners, self-knowledge through the “other”, because the Orient was imagined as a world of romantic dreams, as something half-forgotten, nestled in the depths of their subconscious. The discussions that constantly arose in Lithuania about cultural orientations to the East or to the West and the spontaneous efforts to be dissociated from the influence of Western Christian civilization allow one to grasp the undeniable importance of the idea of the Orient in the search for a Lithuanian cultural identity. This idea was often an intellectual means to help reveal the significance of the pagan Baltic substratum for Lithuanian cultural history and to fortify one’s own identity.

Problems of the interaction of Eastern and Western culture are extremely important for Lithuanians. Our ancestors almost certainly came to Europe from the continent of Asia; therefore, in language, mythology, folklore, works of art, musical harmonies, and various archetypal cultural forms there have survived many connections with the traditional forms of Eastern culture. Lithuanians created the greatest state in Europe – the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – in response to the rapacious expansion of the Teutonic orders and Western Christian civilization. The rulers of this state, however, because of their own expansion to the East, were unable to make Lithuanian the official written language of state administration. It existed only among the lower strata of the common people. As the territories inhabited by the Lithuanian ethnos continued to grow smaller, the failure to use Lithuanian in the administration of the state, in the educational system, and in the lives of the nobility determined the tragic history of the state and the nation.

Later, the historical Lithuanian nation and the state formed at the crossroads of Eastern and Western civilization, in struggles with the orders of the Teutonic Knights and the Brothers of the Sword as well as with various Russian duchies, the Tartars, Sweden, and other countries on which the Grand Duchy of Lithuania bordered or with which geopolitical interests conflicted. Over the centuries, Lithuanian culture has been influenced by various cultures far and near and has combined elements from the cultures of the Christian West as well as of Eastern Slavs, Karaimes, Tartars, Jews, and other peoples of the East. Although in the Late Middle Ages the Grand Duchy of Lithuania allied itself with Poland and officially became part of the Western Christian world, conservative peasant culture, as attested by many bishops and missionaries, staunchly preserved the old pagan Baltic religion until the end of the 17th century. In fact, many of the rudiments of this religion survived until the first half of the 19th century, when in ideological opposition to the social and political oppression of the Russian Empire and to the forced propagation of Orthodoxy the Catholic religion became firmly established.

It was not by accident that the prominent Lithuanian philosopher Stasys Šalkauskis connected the rebirth of Lithuanian national culture with a synthesis of the cultural values of Eastern and Western Christendom when he recognized the undoubted Eastern influence on the formation of the culture
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and mentality of the Lithuanians (Šalkauskis, 1995, vol. IV: 73). Indeed, an emphasis on contemplation rather than action, an emotional perception of the world, special reverence for nature and its various manifestations (trees and forests, springs and rivers, hills, grass snakes), the worshipful sacralization of nature, and many other things characteristic of the Lithuanian mentality bring us close to the Eastern Slavs and the traditional cultural forms of the East.

In Lithuania, as in other European countries, interest in the cultures of eastern nations had already begun during the times of missionary Orientalism. In those days, pilgrims and missionaries from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania traveled to the lands of the East and spread information about the countries they had visited. One of the best such descriptions was left by Mikalojus Kristupas Radvila. An account of his travels in 1582-1583 through Palestine, Egypt, and Syria was published in Latin as Hierosolymitana Peregrinatio (Pilgrimage to Jerusalem; Braunsberg (East Prussia), 1601). Received with great interest by readers in various European countries, this work later appeared in translations and new editions.

Lithuania especially desired to know more about the countries of the East when the ideologies of the Enlightenment and Romanticism were flourishing. During those times, the fashion of chinoiserie spread across Europe, “Chinese” rooms, gardens, and pavilions sprang up on country estates, and Chinese porcelain, art works, and trinkets of various kinds were passionately collected. At their country estates the magnates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – of the Radvila, Sapiega, Pacas, Chodkevičius, Tyszkiewicz, Ogiński, and other families – accumulated collections of art and various objects from Eastern nations; at some of these estates theatrical shows were put on even with exotic Eastern costumes. As Count Benedikt Tyszkiewicz’s surviving photographs attest, these traditions were still alive even at the beginning of the 20th century. One of the photographs from 1903 shows Benedikt Tyszkiewicz taking over from his father control of their estate while accompanied by a solemn procession dressed up in the theatrical costumes of Chinese mandarins and their servants. The Egyptological collections donated to the Louvre by the counts of the Tyszkiewicz family are the pride of this museum, but many of the other important collections of the magnates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were lost because of various calamities or ended up in the collections and museums of other countries.

19th Century

Traditionally and thoroughly, in the context of the Western culture of that time, contact with Eastern cultures in the 19th century was given meaning through the artistic works of the Romantics born in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whose search for a cultural identity received impetus from the unique Orientalism of Adam Mickiewicz, a poet nurtured by the interaction of Lithuanian and Polish culture. At the time that so-called Romantic Orientalism was flourishing, the rudiments of academic Oriental studies began to form at Vilnius University. However, an insurrection followed by the
closing of the university broke off this new field of research in Lithuania, and scholars interested in the cultural traditions of Eastern nations spread out to various centers of learning in Western Europe and Russia.

Undoubtedly, the most significant figure in Lithuanian Oriental studies during those times was Józef Sękowski (1800–1858), who initiated Arabic studies in Lithuania and Russia. Born on the estate of Antagalony near Molėtai, this descendant of a noble family was inspired to take an interest in the East by his uncle Gabriel Grodeck and by Joachim Lelewel. In 1819, while a student at Vilnius University, he traveled to Constantinople, Syria, and Egypt, where he studied Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, as well as the cultural history of the nations of the Near East. In 1821 Sękowski returned to Lithuania, and in 1822 he became a professor at Vilnius University and taught Eastern languages. Soon, however, when the University of St. Petersburg dismissed two professors from the departments of Arabic and Turkish – J. F. Demagne and F. B. Charmoy, who were disciples of Silvestre de Sacy – for supporting the Decembrists, he was appointed ordinary professor at this university. For 25 years he chaired the department of Eastern languages and taught Arabic and Turkish. Famous for his wide-ranging erudition in the humanities, Sękowski mainly devoted his attention to pedagogical work and literary activity; he was an excellent storyteller and master of words. He became famous for literary works full of Oriental motifs, accounts of his travels, translations from Arabic literature, and a small number of theoretical studies about early Arabic poetics. In 1828, while still very young, Sękowski was elected corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences.

The process of national consciousness, promoted by individual Lithuanian intellectuals during the second half of the 19th century, and re-emergent historical reminiscences (foggy memories revived by the Romantics about a glorious historical Lithuanian past) bestowed, at the beginning of the 20th century, on the idea of the Orient an almost global historiosophic and existential meaning. Lithuanians were encouraged to take a deeper interest in the countries of the East not only by the growing ideology of national rebirth but also by widespread theories about the origin of the Lithuanian nation in India and about the closeness of Lithuanian to Sanskrit. People returning from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 disseminated many exotic objects from China, Japan, and other Far Eastern nations, and these objects also encouraged society to take a deeper interest in the cultures of the East.

20TH CENTURY

In the Lithuanian Orientalism of the 20th century and in the search for national identity closely connected with it, we can distinguish four basic periods, which are directly connected to historical upheavals. The first encompasses the beginning of the 20th century, from the lifting of the press ban to the first year of the consolidation of independence. The second is the two decades of the existence of an independent Lithuanian state, when the foundations were being laid for a modern Lithuanian national culture. The third is
the years of Soviet occupation, which lasted half a century. This latter period can be divided into two stages: the first – the time of Stalinist repression and of the inertia that appeared after that, the second – the so-called thaw, which ended with the second restoration of independence. During the first stage the intellectuals and artists who lived and created as emigrants were more active, while during the second the cultural processes in Lithuania were already gaining marked vitality. The fourth period is the present.

However, let us return to the beginning of the 20th century, when, after the ban on the Lithuanian press was lifted, great importance was attached to the problems of the restoration of independence and of the cultural orientation of a future independent Lithuania. On the eve of World War I, during this war, and especially in the early postwar years, with many of the traditional values of Western civilization discredited, the need arose to seek new vital sources of spiritual inspiration. At that time, in Lithuania, as in Finland at the other end of the Baltic Sea, the gaze of many people turned to the East, and chaotic discussions, often cut off from reality, flared up among intellectuals and artists as to which way the renascent Lithuanian culture should go – East or West? Because of Asiatic theories about Finno-Ugric origins, the Finnish elite more and more closely “approached” the East and sought inspiration even in distant Japan; the gaze of the Lithuanians did not extend that far. “Disputes about guidelines to orient the Lithuanian culture and illusory cultural projects did not change the elemental cultural process nourished by underground tributaries (atavistic subconscious phenomena, mythological images, ethical norms, attachment to a certain gamut of colors), but they did highlight and define the geopolitical situation in which the national culture was fated to be born and to develop. Lithuanian artists became aware that it was their lot to exist “on the boundary between two worlds”, to create in the crosswinds of East and West” (Kubilius, 1983: 66).

During this time of choice, only a few people – but they were among the most prominent figures in Lithuanian culture, especially Mikalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis, Mstislavas Dobužinskis, Petras Rimša, Stasys Šalkauskis, Vydūnas, Vincas Krėvė, Jurgis Baltrušaitis, Sr., Maironis, Juozas Albinaš Herbačauskas, Balys Sruoga, and others – turned their gaze to the East, where they sought original ways of making contact between Lithuanian culture and the great cultures of Eastern nations. The creative work of all these figures was connected not only with attention to various aspects of the culture of Eastern nations, but also with the idea of national self-determination, which was their fundamental position in life. That Orientalism formed the basis of how, at that time, the brightest stars of Lithuanian culture connected emotionally with the world is not at all amazing, for these were highly intellectual, diversely educated personalities who had traveled and seen much, could make comparisons, and had a better understanding of the issues of that time and the tasks that lay before Lithuanian culture. Many of them worked in different cultural fields, but they were united by similar worldviews, openness to other cultures, and the desire to integrate the values and symbols of those cultures into their own.
This Orientalistic search, which was closely connected to the problem of cultural identity, was most clearly revealed in the works of Čiurlionis, Vydaunas, and Krėvė. They were connected by Orientalistic motifs, national commitment, universalistic attitudes, and the philosophical nature of their creative work, but they were separated by their initial paths and the forms of Eastern culture toward which they were oriented. The study of the artistic culture of the world was, for them, inseparable from openness to the East and an orientation toward national artistic traditions. For all of them, Oriental ideas and the art, music, and lore of Lithuanian folk culture were the basis for a renascent national art.

Čiurlionis

Directly fused with national artistic traditions, Čiurlionis’ neoromantic and symbolist Orientalism was determined by the universalism characteristic of his feeling for the world and by the simply incredible receptiveness of contemporary Lithuanian peasant culture to the refined art of the Far East, which, in his opinion, could enrich the means of artistic expression of that time. Čiurlionis was convinced that the most authentic art of various nations and epochs was created by the people, and this understanding became especially clear in his mature work. He was inspired by eastern civilizations and by the rainy, foggy Lithuanian landscape of muted greens, the work of folk artists, and old songs. Čiurlionis’ Lithuanian character is revealed not in external form or theme but in the deep strata of his colors, harmony, and melodies.

Vydaunas

Another propagator of Oriental ideas – Vydaunas – was attracted to Indian philosophy in response to German pragmatism and rationalism. He was interested in various fields of the humanities – philosophy, religion, ethics, and sociology, as well as the history of philosophy, literature, and art – and as an external student studied at the universities of Greifswald (1896-1898), the Halle (1899), Leipzig (1900-1902), and after 1912 Berlin, where he attended the lectures of the famous professors Wilhelm Schuppe, Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Wundt, Johannes Volkelt, Adolf von Harnack, Ernst Troeltsch, Karl Lamprecht, and others, who opened up for him the diversity of the forms of world culture.

On the other hand, Vydaunas was strongly influenced by the ideas of eclectic theosophical Orientalism and by the desire to find new spiritual ideals to help revive Lithuanian national consciousness and authentic traditional culture, whose forms had been reduced to the lowest common denominator. In classical Indian philosophy (which according to his interpretation, was influenced by Schopenhauer and the theosophical tradition, exalted suffering, human moral consciousness, and inner discipline) Vydaunas found important ethical reference points that he believed would help his occupied fatherland.
achieve spiritual rebirth. The warp for creating his concept of national culture became clear in the studies Mūsų uždavinys (Our Task, 1911) and Tautos Gyvata (The Life of the Nation, 1920) and in the programmatic work Sieben Hundert Jahre deutsch-litauischer Beziehungen (Seven Hundred Years of German-Lithuanian Relations, 1932). In the latter book he revealed German-Lithuanian relations to be “a huge drama” and for the first time portrayed them from an Aistian viewpoint. Extremely important for him was the concept of fatherland, which was losing its meaning in East Prussia:

Surely, one’s Fatherland means so much because this is where everything was experienced for the first time: the self-sacrificing love of one’s mother, the tender care of one’s parents. Here, for the first time, one heard a human voice. Here, a mother’s warmth, a father’s reflectiveness let one, for the first time, experience humanity. Thus, in one’s Fatherland one was, for the first time, cloaked in the rays of the sun, wrapped in the darkness of night; here, the first spring blossomed, the first autumn withered, and luxuriant summer thrived, winter dawned with white wings. […] Indeed, one’s Fatherland is a space in a certain time. However, with it are united the characteristics of one’s nature. In one’s Fatherland, in the space of one’s youth, one begins to assimilate one’s existence. As consciousness matures, the content of one’s life grows, the whole world grows. In one’s Fatherland is the beginning of growing and becoming. (Vydūnas, 2001: 68)

The basis for the discovery of the fatherland and for the spiritual rebirth of the nation lay, Vydūnas believed, in raising the level of culture and becoming acquainted with the ethical values fostered for millennia in the East. These things, according to him, would help strengthen the traditional forms of Lithuanian culture, the ideals of national vitality and humanism. In this conception of national rebirth, the philosophy of the East emerged as the main ethical signpost and the catalyst for spiritual values.

Krėvė

Krėvė was moved to take an interest in the East by neoromantic Orientalism. He is one of the most complex and truly universal personalities of Lithuanian literature in the first half of the 20th century, the originator of a qualitatively new philosophical prose and dramaturgy. Like many intellectuals who had chosen a Lithuanian identity, in his youth he evolved from poetry written in Polish to national ideals. The Orientalistic tendencies in his work continued to grow stronger after his Indo-European studies at Kiev University. He even wrote scholarly Sanskritological studies (The Original Indo-European Homeland, 1909, and The Origin of the Names Buddha and Pratyekabuddha, 1913), and in 1912 he began giving lectures on the history
of Buddhism at Baku University. While living in Baku alongside magnificent 12th century architectural monuments, he came into direct contact with cultural vestiges of the great Eastern civilizations, and this experience led him to the deeper study of Indology and Zoroastrianism. Krėvė was connected to Indian idealism by basic attitudes that permeated his feeling for the world. It is no accident that not only his dramatic heroes Šarūnas and Skirgaila, who emerge from a glorious Lithuanian past, but also the characters he draws from the common people have many of the clear-cut features of Eastern sages.

INTER-WAR PERIOD

After the restoration of independence, Orientalism in Polish-occupied Vilnius and in the provisional capital of Kaunas developed in essentially different ways. After flourishing in the second half of the 19th century, Vilnius became a provincial corner of Poland, and Kaunas – the center of Lithuanian cultural life, with rapidly developing processes of national culture. Many of the intellectuals and artists who had emerged at the beginning of the century (except Čiurlionis, who died in 1911) continued developing their Orientalistic ideas. Because of a lack of specialists in the provisional capital, it was not possible to lay the foundations for systematic Oriental studies. Nonetheless, after Kaunas University was re-established, Sanskrit was taught there, lectures were given on the cultural history of Eastern countries, and students were acquainted with the culture and hieroglyphic writing of Egypt. Most active in this field were Ričardas Mironas, Marija Rudzinskaitė-Arcimavičienė, and Jurgis Baltrušaitis, Jr.

Mironas translated classical texts of Indian civilization from Sanskrit, while Rudzinskaitė-Arcimavičienė even began publishing a series of short books, Senovės Rytai (The Ancient East), of which five volumes appeared from 1932 to 1936. During 1933-1939, at Kaunas University, general and Oriental art history were taught by Jurgis Baltrušaitis, Jr., who had excellent training in these fields. However, this art historian of rare talent worked far too briefly as a teacher and lacked a specialized, properly trained body of students who could continue his Oriental and comparative studies. On the other hand, he finally developed as an original art historian of world stature only after leaving Lithuania. Thus, his field of influence was not great in inter-war Lithuania.

Alongside the cultural leaders of that first generation that had restored Lithuanian independence, Orientalistic ideas were also cultivated by the new generation of intellectuals and artists formed in a more open society. After drawing closer to Western civilization and seeing a multitude of its negative manifestations, they understood increasingly well that the Lithuanian nation was fated, because of its geopolitical position, to live and create between the worlds of the East and the West. On the other hand, as they understood the one-sidedness of the growing materialism of Western civilization, they felt a hunger to know the cultural and artistic values of the spiritually rich
Eastern nations idealized by the romantics (Kleopas Jurgelionis, Kazys Bin-
kis, Vytautas Mačernis).

The ever-closer cultural ties that artists maintained with various
countries, especially France, encouraged the spread of the ideas of French
Orientalism. The so-called Paris pilgrims – those highly gifted young special-
ists, scholars, and artists of various fields (Juozas Mikėnas, Juozas Miltinis,
Liudas Truikys, Jurgis Baltrušaitis, Jr., Ričardas Mironas, Algirdas Julius Grei-
mas, and a multitude of others) who were sent with scholarships from the state
to the leading centers of learning and art in France or who went there on their
own initiative – were precisely the ones who formed a new attitude toward the
cultures of Eastern nations and promoted the integration of various elements
of French Orientalism into Lithuanian culture and art. Unfortunately, many of
these extremely important, qualitatively new phenomena did not manage to
spread into Lithuanian culture and art during the brief period of independence,
which lasted barely two decades, because they began to emerge in many fields
only after 1936. This fruitful process of integrating the cultural traditions of
Eastern nations was broken off by the first Soviet occupation; the beginning
of World War II and the second Soviet occupation wreaked havoc on cultural
life, scattering many creative people throughout the world, from Stalin’s con-
centration camps in distant Siberia to America and Australia. Nevertheless,
the seeds were sown, and despite losses and broken lives, they gradually bore
fruit both in Lithuania and in the Diaspora.

POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD

After World War II many of the most prominent cultural leaders, people
who had grown up or matured intellectually during independence, now
cultivated their Orientalistic ideas – either in occupied Lithuania (Liudas Trui-
kys, Juozas Miltinis, Juozas Mikėnas) or in the diaspora (Jurgis Baltrušaitis,
Vytautas Kavolis, Jurgis Mačiūnas, Jonas Mekas, Alfonsas Lingys; this list
was later expanded by Tomas Venelova, Jonas Jurašas, and Algimantas Švėgž-
da) – on a higher level of theoretical and artistic reflection. An extremely
complicated social and psychological situation confronted that generation of
intellectuals and artists who had emerged during independence, propagating
the cultural traditions of Eastern nations, and who now remained in occupied
Lithuania, decimated by the repressions of the postwar years. Like many intel-
lectuals in the Soviet empire, they pursued their Orientalistic goals primarily
so that they could dissociate themselves from the ideological attitudes domi-
nant in the country or quietly resist the official Soviet system of values.

The spread of Orientalistic ideas during the so-called thaw years in
Lithuania was most influenced by three of the Paris pilgrims: the scenographer
Liudas Truikys, the director Juozas Miltinis, and the sculptor Juozas Mikėnas,
each of whom in his own way spread Eastern influences in Lithuanian art.
Intellect, education, and the power of talent made them bright stars in the
artistic firmament of Lithuania at that time.
Truikys

Undoubtedly, the most intellectual and refined of the artists who spread ideas of the Orient was Truikys, who thought and created on a much higher level than his contemporaries, dealing with complex problems of composition and the synthesis of different arts. It was a tremendous loss for Lithuanian culture that this highly professional artist, who had a sharp critical mind and placed great demands on himself, was not admitted to the Vilnius Art Institute by government machinery and his colleagues. Nevertheless, the Orientalism of Truikys’ outstanding personality spread through his creative work and the few students he had: Juozas Balčikonis, Regina Songailaitė-Balčikonienė, Vladas Daujotas, Bronius Leonavičius, Rimantas Dichavičius, and others. This influence was primarily expressed through Balčikonis, who was a devoted collector of Eastern works of art and for many years headed the Art Institute Textile Department, which has, to this day, maintained a consistently high level of professionalism.

Mikėnas

Mikėnas’ life was full of fateful twists. He was born in Latvia; during World War I he withdrew with his family to Russia, studied at a gymnasium in Voronezh, and later at the hydrotechnical school in Odessa; after the war he returned to Lithuania and enrolled in Kaunas Art School, where his extraordinary talent at drawing and sculpture emerged. The development of his talent in Paris at the studios of André Lhote and Vasily Shukhayev (1926-1927), at the École nationale supérieure des arts décoratifs, École nationale supérieure des beaux-arts, and Académie Jullian (1928-1931), and in private study (1932-1934) markedly broadened Mikėnas’ knowledge of ancient Eastern civilizations and of the world history of sculpture. In this artist’s work the monumentality, tranquility, and streamlined economy of form to be found in Egyptian, Assyrian, and Persian sculpture fused with the traditions of modernistic and Lithuanian folk sculpture.

Mikėnas’ Orientalism differed markedly from that of another pupil of the Paris school of art, Petras Rimša, in whose metal incrustations can be felt a strong influence of the Japonism – extravagant lines, spectacular details – characteristic of the art nouveau tradition. Mikėnas’ monumental Orientalism is, as it were, a response to the manneristic quality of Rimša’s Japonism. Obviously, the development of Mikėnas’ talent was greatly limited by the dogmatic outlook of socialist realism, to which he was forced to conform while teaching at the Art Institute, and this fact toned down the promising Orientalistic tendencies to be seen in his work. However, the synthesis that informs Mikėnas’ creative work of the artistic traditions of the Near East and Lithuanian folk culture became widespread in later Lithuanian sculpture, especially in the work of that monumentalist of rare talent, Gediminas Jakūbonis, and his students. Without stretching the truth, we can today state that this
is surely the most vital and aesthetically fruitful Lithuanian tradition of monumental sculpture, one that has almost completely forgotten its true sources.

_Miltinis_

Of the adherents of Lithuanian Orientalism under discussion, the most complex was Miltinis because he was often purposely reticent about the sources of many of the fundamental principles of his directorial work. He was the first Lithuanian professional director to be acquainted at first hand with the aesthetic principles of modern Western European and Far Eastern theater. Traditional Japanese theater had earlier greatly interested Antanas Sutkus, who in 1920 had already published the study “Apie japonų teatrę” (About Japanese Theater). However, Miltinis’ acquaintance with the principles of Eastern theater was much more diverse. When Miltinis, young and receptive to innovations, arrived in Paris from Kaunas, he was caught up in the colorful whirl of theatrical life in a big city during a time of important renewal for French theater. In Paris at that time, the principles of traditional Eastern theater, especially Japanese Noh, were a strong influence in the aesthetics and the training of actors. Especially solid in this field are the achievements of Jacques Copeau and of Miltinis’ teacher Charles Dullin. In his work as manager of the Théâtre du Vieux-Colombier, the former applied many elements of traditional Far Eastern theater. These Orientalistic views were shared by Dullin, a close friend of his youth who maintained that he had been inspired to reform Western theater by studies about the origin and history of traditional Eastern theater. Because Miltinis studied under Dullin, he did not always experience the aesthetic influence of Eastern theater at first hand; it spread through the creative work of Dullin, his comrades-in-arms Copeau, Louis Juvet, and Antonin Artaud, fellow students Jean Vilar and Jean-Louis Barrault, and other reformers of French theater, whose revolt against the principles of French classical theater, preference for a more restrained style of acting, emphasis on silences, pauses, and incompleteness, and use of austere, conventional scenery and costumes were powerfully influenced by the aesthetics of Eastern theater. Miltinis was also fascinated by the ideas of Paul Claudel and André Malraux, who propagated the principles of Eastern theater and art.

After returning to Lithuania, Miltinis was closely associated with Truikys and even lived in his apartment for a while. When speaking, Miltinis often used Oriental motifs that were not always intelligible to others; for example, his favorite allegory about a Chinese mandarin or a fisherman in a barrel “who is doing one thing but whose thoughts are flying about somewhere else” was of Chinese origin.

Various influences affected Miltinis’ consciousness and aesthetics in a singular fashion. After his studies in Paris, he became enthusiastic about the idea of having his own philosophical, intellectual theater and of forming a close-knit group of actors who shared his vision; he dreamt of creating his own system for training actors. Obviously, Miltinis was inspired by his experience of life in Paris and by Dullin’s Oriental aesthetics; the Théâtre de
l’Atelier, which Dullin had founded, was a school of theater based on special principles for training actors, like traditional Far Eastern theaters. It is not amazing that the model for the intellectual theater that Miltinis founded was based on Dullin’s aesthetic views, which took firm root in the young Lithuanian director’s consciousness and creative practice.

Miltinis took over many of Dullin’s Eastern principles for developing actors. For decades he nurtured his own theater and troupe of actors with an intellectual repertoire. For him, as for the creators of Far Eastern theater, the theater was a holy place with a sacral space separated from the sphere of the profane. Miltinis, like the creators of Noh theater, propagated the monastic, closed-off, ascetic lifestyle of people devoted only to the theater, dissociation from the outer world and moderate enjoyment of worldly pleasures. Therefore, in the theater there is no room for destructive quarrels, backbiting, intrigues, or narcissism, for anything that demoralizes the creator and promotes spiritual sloth and stagnation. True theater art demands a special fidelity and devotion, the subordination of one’s life to a special rhythm and outlook. Discipline and constant learning, the polishing of one’s skills are the basis of Miltinis’ theatrical system. The director himself, as is customary in Noh theater, taught primarily by personal example, was very demanding of himself, disciplined, did not have a personal life. He regarded artistic creation as a constant process and stressed the importance of self-discipline, a strict regimen, physical conditioning, the pursuit of spiritual perfection, and inner concentration.

In accord with the practice of Noh theater, Miltinis considered the studio an extremely important component part of the theater. By performing various jobs here from adolescence (he dreamt of accepting youths from the age of thirteen into a studio connected with the troupe) and observing a workshop of theatrical art, the future actor was naturally to absorb professional secrets and grow artistically in a consistent and purposeful manner. When speaking about how to perfect the actor’s art, the director always emphasized the importance of the union of instincts and intellect, of imitation, concise speech, the use of silence and pauses, inner concentration, attention to intonations, the development of intuition, listening to one’s fellow performers, leaving things unsaid, spontaneity, and improvisation. “Intonation,” he said, “is the actor’s philosophy”. In his teaching practice, as in the tradition of Noh theater, rehearsals were lessons. In the studio established at Miltinis’ theater, as in the traditional theater of India and the Far East, special attention was devoted to the mastery of professional secrets and the acquisition of a general grounding in the humanities. In this studio, in addition to the specialized disciplines, actors were also taught literature, aesthetics, fine arts, music, theater history, and philosophy. Here, healthy and natural competition was to prevail; the weaker were to yield to the stronger. “I want,” he said, “our troupe to be permanently young, alive, active, responsible, and tangibly productive.”

Consistently cultivated for many decades, Miltinis’ Orientalistic principles for training actors, for separating them from the outer world, his dream of creating a meditative theater of “silence,” in which “the actors will come on stage, sit down at a table, and be silent, communicate in silence, and the
entire audience will understand perfectly well what they are silent about,” and his many other ideas of Eastern origin took deep root in Lithuania on account of his authority as a director. They spread in the creative work of Jonas Jurašas, Eimuntas Nekrošius, Jonas Vaitkūs, Gintaras Varnas, Gytis Padegimas, and other Lithuanian theater directors as well as the actresses Eglė Mikulionytė and Birutė Marcinkevičiūtė. Among the most consistent promoters of Miltinis’ Orientalistic ideas in Lithuania was the talented Latvian pantomime theater director Modris Tenisons, who around 1968 created a troupe of actors, unique at that time, who were fanatically devoted to their work in this kind of theater. Unfortunately, this world-class theater, which created many very mature shows in terms of both plasticity of form and the embodiment of an idea, did not receive adequate understanding and attention from Lithuanian society and cultural institutions.

During Soviet times favorable conditions did not exist in Lithuania for academic Oriental and comparative studies because they were concentrated in three main centers – Moscow, Leningrad, and Ulan-Ude. On the other hand, the study of Eastern cultures traditionally attracted those people who were inclined to oppose the official ideology. For this reason, Soviet schools of Oriental studies operated like elite esoteric communities that had created their own learned microclimate and lived according to their own rules and value systems. Oriental studies, anti-Soviet attitudes, and nonconformism were closely connected things in the Soviet empire. In Lithuania, too, therefore, any phenomena connected with Oriental studies were closely watched by party and security organizations.

Buddhist Literature

In Lithuania, as in the rest of the Soviet Empire, during 1960-1990 Orientalism became an important manifestation of opposition to, and alienation from, Marxist ideology. In those days, interest in the philosophy, religions, and the art of Eastern nations became for intellectuals and artists an increasingly popular way of fleeing from a gloomy and unacceptable reality. In the early 1970s great lodes of Buddhist literature were “encountered” in the library of Vilnius University and the central library of the Academy of Sciences: Buddhist literature translated by Russian scholars during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, studies and translations from the early post-Revolutionary years, some continuing studies from the late 19th century. An increase of diverse Orientalistic literature, in Western languages as well as Russian, was received through international library exchanges or quickly copied through samizdat channels – books by Alan Watts, Daisetz Taitaro Suzuki, Reginald Horace Blyth, Makoto Ueda, Ananda Coomaraswamy, and others. Of these, there stood out an original copy of a samizdat book published in Russian, Mysly budista (The Thoughts of a Buddhist), by the Buryat Buddhologist Bidiya Dandaron (1914-1974. He was a close friend of Vosylius Sezemanas, with whom he spent many years in Soviet concentration camps).
During those times, for many young Lithuanian intellectuals, artists, and writers who were seeking the meaning of life the road to knowledge of the Eastern world and Buddhist culture extended to distant Buryatia, the strongest citadel of Buddhism in the Soviet empire. The dominant forms of Buddhism in Buryatia and the people’s way of life were close to what existed in Tibet for centuries. At the time of my studies at Moscow University, I already spent my summers in Buryatia, and I had an excellent acquaintance with this land of rare beauty and its people.

Because I had been, for all practical purposes, in charge of the activities of the Lithuanian Association for Oriental Studies since 1979 and had formed contacts with various centers for Oriental studies in the Soviet empire, I was able to help those traveling to the Buddhist shrines and monasteries of Buryatia with recommendations and comprehensive explanations useful on journeys to distant unknown lands. This history of the pilgrimages of many Lithuanians from Kaunas, Vilnius, and Šiauliai to the East and of their complicated relations with security organizations is today practically unknown to anyone except the few people involved and needs to be more thoroughly researched.

Despite unfavorable conditions and repressions, which fell most heavily on those Lithuanians who associated with centers in Buryatia, in the late 1960s Lithuanian Orientalists markedly increased their activities: they broadened their contacts with the main Soviet centers for Oriental studies, from which there flowed a torrent of Orientalistic literature. In Lithuania, the number of enthusiasts interested in various aspects of Eastern cultures increased, and people appeared who understood the need to lay the foundations for professional Oriental studies. The leadership of the association that was established for Oriental studies strove to form scholarly contacts and unite people working in various Lithuanian institutions and interested in Eastern cultures.

When the torrent of foreign and samizdat literature increased, Oriental influences mainly affected the literature and philosophy of that time. The influence of Orientalism on literature and poetry of the period of thaw is a separate theme that requires thorough research. Excellent examples of Oriental influence can be seen in the intellectual Eduardas Mieželaitis’ finely wrought poetic cycles “Indiška mozaika” (Indian Mosaic), “Archajiškas lotosas” (Archaic Lotus), “Ramajanos atgarsiai” (Echoes of the Ramayana), and “Palmės šešėlis” (The Shadow of the Palm) in the book Aleliumai (Aleliumai, 1974), “Indiškas ornamentas” (Indian Ornament), “Indiškas ametistas” (Indian Amethyst), “Indiški reportažai” (Indian Reportage), “Mahabharata” (Mahabharata), and “Indiškas anachronizmas” (Indian Anachronism) in Monodrama (Monodrama, 1976), the huge section “Dar kartą Indija” (India Once More) in the book Pasaka (A Tale, 1980), and in other works inspired by impressions from travels through various regions of India.

Since the 1970s, in literature and especially in poetry, Eastern influences have essentially changed. They have usually spread through increasingly popular translations of Far Eastern classical poetry by Western and
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nonconformist Russian poets (the most eminent Russian poets in opposition to Soviet ideology translated many verses from the great classics of Chinese and Japanese poetry). Now, Oriental motifs and concise Far Eastern poetic forms are spreading in Lithuanian poetry. They have influenced the poetic style of Sigitas Geda, Tomas Venclova, Vytautas Bložė, Aleksas Dabulskis, Kornelijus Platelis, Gintaras Patackas, Donaldas Kajokas, Jonas Juškaitis, Vytautas Rubavičius, Alfonsas Andriuškevičius, and others and have strengthened their tendency toward conciseness of thought, metaphor, and associativeness.

We should especially note the phenomenon of Sigitas Geda’s Orientalism and how his feeling for the world and his creative work have been influenced by his acquaintance with the great poetic texts of Eastern nations, his study and translations of them, and his variations on themes and motifs from Eastern poetry. With his extremely professional translations Geda has revealed to the Lithuanian reader the charm, clarity of poetic thought, and new possibilities for poetic expression of the wonderful Hebrew *Song of Songs* and other fundamental poetic texts of Eastern nations. Years of work with translations of the great poetic texts of Eastern nations have strongly influenced his poetry, made it more intellectual, and changed his attitude toward the word and its finest shades of meaning.

**INDEPENDENT LITHUANIA**

When speaking about new manifestations that have emerged in independent Lithuania of the interaction between Eastern and Western culture, one should first discuss the Orientalistic tendency, symptomatic of present-day Lithuanian culture, that is connected with Algimantas Švėgžda, Paulius Normantas, and Jurga Ivanauskaitė.

Švėgžda

Despite the tragic fate determined by his marginality, the first of them – Algimantas Švėgžda (1941-1996) – is undoubtedly one of the most significant and loneliest personalities of intellectual Lithuanian art in the 20th century. This “last Lithuanian pagan and first European of the 21st century,” as he called himself, was an artist open to the world who, besides art, was interested in philosophy, psychology, the history of civilization, literature, music, and ancient Eastern and other non-European cultures. On the other hand, he was a profoundly reflective personality who had withdrawn into the world of his inner experiences and was full of inner tranquility, one who greatly loved Lithuania, her nature and fauna, her grass and insects, and who sought through his artistic work to rise above narrowly understood national feeling.

In order to grasp the distinctiveness of this artist’s creative work and his place in the history of Lithuanian art, it is necessary not only to examine the plastic, purely formal aspects of his art but also to devote unusual attention to the underlying conceptual attitudes of his philosophy and worldview, without which it is impossible adequately to grasp the essence of his creative
work. In this artist’s mature work, artistic form has coalesced with a syncretic pagan and Eastern philosophy of life.

This ultimate turn to the East, to the philosophy of Daoism and the relationship with nature that it glorifies – I can truly, without a doubt, make this assertion because at that time I was closely associated with him – was, for Švėgžda, one of the possible ways of surviving, of creating a distinctive harmonious antiworld that would help him withstand the growing pressure of an unacceptable Soviet reality during those years that were so difficult for people who refused to submit, when the all-powerful “security” sought to control everything. This is the real and fundamental reason that explains why the worldview and artistic work of the mature Švėgžda were greatly influenced by the Far Eastern philosophy of life and of artistic creation, especially that of Daoism, Chan, and Zen, and by the exaltation of a poetics of simplicity, of the significance of minimalism, and of an authentic relationship with nature and the world.

The work of this “poor Robinson in a spiritually exhausted Europe,” as he defined his place, has an air of disappointment in Western civilization, whose great values he sees as being in the irretrievable past. What emerged as extremely close to Švėgžda were the philosophy of Laozi, with its exaltation of human contact with nature, and the Far Eastern art influenced by this philosophy. This interest in the East did not wane even when Švėgžda left to live in Germany. While he was living in exile, the East became a peculiar source of refreshment, a means of flight from a new, not always pleasant reality to which he had to adjust. Doing so was not easy because everything dearest to him remained in Lithuania. At that time, tendencies inspired by minimalist Eastern aesthetics and art became especially clear in this artist’s work. These tendencies are obvious in the series he created in 1987, *Mano japoniškas sodas* (My Japanese Garden), in which he consciously avoids bombast and effectively uses the powerful emotional effect of blank space, of a great empty expanse. He focuses his attention on a head of garlic or a pomegranate, which assume a new aesthetic meaning against their surrounding background and create a special meditative mood.

Švėgžda greatly loved Lithuania, was attached to her landscape, but as a mature human being and humanist he felt painfully what was happening not only in his fatherland but also in the surrounding world. These feelings are attested by his conscious avoidance of a Eurocentric and racist worldview. “European egocentricity is a great misfortune of the 20th century. The assumption of the duty to bear civilization to other countries is a foolish conviction and a racist attitude. In this sense, I feel that as an artist I am living conscientiously. I do not force my art and my philosophy on anyone” (Švėgžda, 1993: 27). While the whole world was noisily celebrating the anniversary of the discovery of America, he reflected on the tragedy of the indigenous inhabitants of this continent, the Indians, and created a series devoted to them, *Amerikos čiabuviams* (For Native Americans), in which there is no pathos, only simple, ascetic details symbolizing the everyday life of the Indians. “I wanted to be a shaman or an oracle, and as I drew this series of sixteen pictures, I thought
about only one thing: “Strive, my red brothers, and powwow for your spiritual freedom and tree of justice…”

As Švęgžda observes the dramatic struggle for freedom in Lithuania, he speaks out with undisguised sympathy about the people of Tibet and their struggle for freedom. For him, freedom is a fundamental category, one that symbolizes the development of an authentic life and of space for constant creative work. It appears, constantly and with various connotations, in his philosophy of life and in his creative work. He shows his own longing for freedom and his solidarity with the aspirations of the Tibetan nation in the series of sixteen pictures created in 1991, *Tibeto piemenims* (For the Shepherds of Tibet), in which Eastern restraint, minimalism, and empathy for everyday objects reach their culmination. Like artists of the Daoist and Chan traditions, he seeks to express, through a tiny detail, through a few sticks integrated into a huge space, the essence of the phenomena that interest him.

During his mature period, Švęgžda was drawn to the East by the unified manner of his own living, creating, and thinking. In one interview, while discussing his work, he spoke like the great masters of Far Eastern art about the joining painting, philosophy and life into a single whole. Like the adepts of Daoism, Chan, and Zen, he is characterized by a pantheistic view of the world, a cult of nature, and a sharp eye that looks into every manifestation of nature and life, even the humblest, and discerns in it great meaning and poetry. In his works, as in those of Far Eastern artists, man is not given prominence but is regarded as a component part of the magnificent world of nature. “When I tell those who ask that I am an artist of the 21st century, I am not at all joking. We will have to return to nature, only some will go with new ideas, others will try to find what was lost a few hundred years ago. I will go forward into nature. Not to analyze its structure or anatomy, but to touch the wisdom of the heavenly expanse. It is in every leaf. I come to my beginning. I recognize myself in every molecule” (Švęgžda, 1993: 46-47). The artist’s attention increasingly focuses on seemingly everyday and insignificant manifestations of nature – the blossoms of flowers, pieces of wood, fruit, and insects – which, as it were, he gazes at through a magnifying glass and prepares to dissect.

Švęgžda’s art is one of deep contemplation, discernment, and meaningful silence. Like the artists of the Daoist and Zen traditions, he strove to cut himself off from the outside world, choosing solitude and an ascetic way of life. Pagan pantheism, the attentive observation of the surrounding world, and its spiritualization were naturally connected in the work of this artist with a view of nature, animals, plants, and even things characteristic of Daoism and the worldviews of Chan and Zen. Thus, the objects depicted in his pictures acquire a completely different ontological meaning because they reveal the harmony of the Universe, part of the truth of all-encompassing existence, and there appear in the image a special symbolism with many levels of meaning.

He especially valued incompleteness (“unfinished pictures are so real – although only just begun, they already possess great truth” (Švęgžda, 1993: 25)) and minimal means of artistic expression. Characteristic of this artist’s work is the aestheticization of simplicity and naturalness along with an em-
phasis on the everyday phenomena and things of life. His pictures distinctively intertwined a tendency to analytical thinking, to a rational understanding of form, and to a hyperrealistic treatment of reality with a profound empathy, characteristic of traditional Far Eastern art, for the object being created. As this artist himself said, he sought as much as possible to cleanse the form of all nonessential details, and in order to model it, he exploited the possibilities provided by light and shadow as well as by a transparent scumble.

This artist had an excellent understanding of both the pagan Lithuanian and the Eastern sources of his mature creative work, and Eastern philosophy was a kind of key that helped penetrate his world of artistic images. “Whoever studies Buddhist culture understands my pictures more easily and accepts them more naturally. For there are two different ways: Europeans want to imitate God – I am God, and I am creating a world. But in the East, people do not create a world; they go into the world, which has already been created” (Švėgžda, 1993: 25). Deep philosophical reflection, a conceptual theoretical basis for his creative principles, openness to impressions from life, immersion in the world of nature without any a priori dogmas or prejudices, fascination with its variety and aroma, which constantly changes and vanishes like drops of dew, and the revelation of everyday things, objects of nature, and edges and hues that often go unnoticed formed the essence of Švėgžda’s mature work and made him one of the most significant personalities in Lithuanian art.

Just before his death, out of a desire to remain faithful to his philosophy of life, Švėgžda donated over a thousand pictures to various museums in Lithuania. In his letter of donation he explained his attitude: “In the world there are many beautiful examples of how, after the artist has died, his relatives donate his creative legacy, his library, etc. to their country or city. … I am happier than I can say that I have lived to see the independence of Lithuania. We must all help her with whatever we can. Therefore, I am donating my pictures to Lithuania, pictures created while I was living in Germany” (Aš vargšas [Wretched Me], 1996: 50). This artist died in Berlin on July 4, 1996, and in accordance with the traditions of the East and his own wishes, his ashes were strewn over the Šventoji River.

Ivanauskaitė

The traveler and photographer Paulius Normantas and the writer Jurga Ivanauskaitė cultivate a relationship with Eastern cultures similar to that of Švėgžda. The intimacy and spiritual evolution of Ivanauskaitė’s “turn to Tibetan culture” are in many respects reminiscent of the nostalgia for the East of her teacher Švėgžda and her comrade-in-arms Normantas. They are united by the humanistic attitudes characteristic of mature personalities, a longing for wider spaces, and the fact that they spent important periods of their lives outside Lithuania and were able to look more deeply – from outside, as it were – at themselves and at the strong points of the culture of their native country as well as its problematic aspects. The way to the East of this artist, an intellectual who grew up in a family of intellectuals, and her search for a place in
the world are full of many experiences, both outer and inner, that have given her work a special authenticity.

For Ivanauskaitė, Tibet is really not only a spiritual state but also much more. It is a world of mysterious dreams, the Promised Land, a metaphor for true faith and authentic existence. Not by accident, her programmatic book *Prarasta pažadėtoji Žemė* (The Lost Promised Land) begins with philosophical reflections on this subject:

Tibet…. I have always dreamt about this country the way a homeless person led through the desert dreams about the Promised Land and a medieval mystic — about the kingdom of Christ, which will appear after the Apocalypse. During my most difficult hours, I would remind myself that this is not yet the abyss of sadness, that the real chasm opens up when there is a sudden upsurge of implacable longing for a country I have never seen. During my happiest moments, I knew that this is not yet the summit of bliss, that is there — in the Himalayas, on the Roof of the World. (Ivanauskaitė, 1999: 5)

In this writer’s work there is a great deal of refined intellectualism, powerful repressed desire, intimacy, desire to hide from the vulgar glances of strangers, and description of complex spiritual processes that are not only the facts of her creative biography but also a testimony to an intellectual and spiritual search in a specific time and region. Thus, Ivanauskaitė interests me not simply as a writer, artist, ethnologist, art photographer, journalist, and public figure, but primarily as a unique socio-cultural phenomenon, an intellectual personality who has been able to transform herself spiritually and rise to another level of existence and to understanding the processes of being foreign to the philistine consciousness.

During the last few years Ivanauskaitė’s work, interviews, and statements on various occasions highlighted an essential qualitative change, a transformation into a personality that subtly feels the metamorphoses of the processes of life and responsibility for what is happening in the world, in suffering and oppressed countries. These changes have become clear in all areas of her life and creative activity. Incidentally, this artist herself also speaks about constant personal change. “I am convinced that man, like a flowing river, constantly changes…. Certain basic moral and ethical norms persist, but everything else belongs to the realm of change and transformation” (*Lietuvos aidas* [Echo of Lithuania], June 3, 2000: 22).

For Ivanauskaitė, as for many Lithuanian artists of that time, the first contact with the East and Buddhist culture that “left an impression” was with Buryatia:

My first journey to a Buddhist country – Buryatia – was spontaneous”, she relates, “but after that I wanted at all costs
to reach, if not Tibet itself, then at least the center of Tibetan Buddhism in India – Dharamsala. The first time, I went there for one month, but this first journey so enchanted me that later (with interruptions) I spent almost five years in the Himalayas (in India, Nepal, and Tibet). Apart from Buryatia, the beginning of all those journeys (both inner and outer) was a meeting with the Dalai Lama at the archcathedral in Vilnius in 1991. (Savaitė [The Week], February 3-4, 2001: 3)

This writer conceives of travel as meditation or contemplation and not as a feat, exploit, or hunt for sensory impressions. Indeed, for a receptive person travel and a knowledge of other cultures, especially those of Eastern nations, which stand out for the richness of their traditions, often become an important source for knowledge of the world and of oneself. Her first, two-month-long journey to Dharamsala, where the main Tibetan diaspora lives in exile along with the Dalai Lama, opened up for this writer completely different aspects of the cultural history of the subjugated Tibetan people. Direct contact with Tibet and living in a Buddhist cultural space strongly influenced Ivanauskaitė’s feelings about the world, taught her patience and a different view of the world, people, and everyday life, and changed her system of values.

Ivanauskaitė is most widely known as the author of many short stories and novels as well as books devoted to the history of Tibetan culture. In the work of no other Lithuanian writer has there been such a powerful outpouring of an all-encompassing feminine desire that has assumed an almost cosmic meaning. As she herself affirms, she has written all her books driven by inner necessity. However, this artist also works in the fields of representational art and photography. In the spring of 1997, she held a public show, Mandalos [Mandalas], in which she exhibited 108 works created in the Himalayas using the mediums of watercolor, chalk, pencil, and felt-tip pen. Here, there is much refined stylization, and there are many distinctively transformed elements of the Indian miniature. Some of her collages use Himalayan plants. In this series there predominate five basic colors that have different symbolical meanings in various countries: white, red, yellow, blue, and green. These pictures give special importance to the open symbols of Tibet and other Eastern nations. This show was accompanied and supplemented by thirty photographs. Another photographic exhibition, Tibetas – Kita realybė (Tibet – Another Reality), was held at one of the LITEXPO exhibition halls in 1999. A third, Tibeto Mirusių-ju knyga (The Tibetan Book of the Dead), a series of twelve painted works, was put on in Vilnius and Kaunas in the summer of 2002. Ivanauskaitė’s artwork and photographs supplement, as it were, her literary work and expand its boundaries.

Ivanauskaitė’s photoplates reflect a world known from Normantas’ famous photographs, which have already become standard in this field; there appear to be the same countries, people, and landscapes, but despite the un-
doubted influence of her predecessor’s posterlike poetry, essential differences can nevertheless be seen. The world interpreted in Ivanauskaitė’s photoplates is more emotional, more vital, and more intimate; it gives a more important role to dynamic pictorial composition and to the powerful emotional effect of color. The way in which some of these photoplates are centered (Natiurmortas atsiskyrėlio celėje [Still Life in a Hermit’s Cell], Šventyklos grūvėsiai Lhasos mieste [Temple Ruins in the City of Lhasa]) is based on principles of composition taken from painting.

Ivanauskaitė’s various fields of creative expression show that she is “on the great Way to knowledge” that can initiate significant works. Traveling to the East and delving into the philosophy of Buddhism helped her understand the importance not only of a different hierarchy of values, but also, most especially, of an intense spiritual life. These pursuits helped her develop a different view of the history of civilization, nature, man, and his weaknesses; they helped her grasp the importance of understanding the cultural values of other nations and of openness to the world. Full of sincere and profound existential reflection, Ivanauskaitė’s books plunge into the human subconscious and examine the typology of the soul, the body, and the libido, i.e. the Great Desire, which preserves the human race and turns the great wheel of existence. Accusing these books of terrible sins says much more, it seems to me, about the critics themselves than about the object of their “keen-eyed” studies.

Ivanauskaitė’s work distinctively intertwines rational thought, the sublimation of desire, and flights of vivid intuition. Very important for her are personal and authentic experiences as well as the desire to break forth from a narrowly understood national space and see broad, intoxicating panoramas from mountaintops. Admirable are Ivanauskaitė’s self-discipline, her ability to overcome European egocentricity and Lithuanian narrowness of outlook, and her desire to change herself as a unique personality in time. For a woman, especially one from that closed world in which we lived for half a century, such metamorphoses are tantamount to a heroic exploit. She rebelled against the established world order and the trampling on the rights of oppressed peoples; she opposed dishonest social conventions and sought to expand their limits. This challenge to the powerful of the world created Ivanauskaitė as a personality and gave her work greater importance than that of a narrowly national phenomenon.

Ivanauskaitė devotes much time and energy to the struggle for the rights of subjugated peoples. She grieves that the most powerful states put their own interests first and regard those fighting for the freedom of Tibet and Chechnya with indifference. As this writer correctly observed in her book Ištremtas Tibetas (Exiled Tibet), the tragedy of Tibet reflects with great clarity the essence of the entire history of the 20th century. “For the free press, the silent suffering of Tibet and her mute cry for help seem insufficiently spectacular. … Did not Lithuania also suffer for long decades from that same resounding indifference of the world?” (Ivanauskaitė, 1996: 7, 9). This writer constantly reminds us that through indifference and silence we inexcusably betray those who are suffering. She is truly moved by the subjugation of na-
tions and the suffering of people: “Now, when the Indian state of Gujarat had an earthquake, I mourn as if this had happened in my second fatherland, whose people are as dear to me as brothers and sisters”.

*Consolidation of Orientalistic Interest*

No less important, even if not always clearly seen, were the changes that occurred in the field of philosophy, for individual institutions of higher education began to organize courses devoted to the history of the philosophy, aesthetics, and ethics of Eastern nations or parts of courses in more general programs. Gradually philosophers took the initiative in organizing conferences devoted to the problems of the interaction of Eastern and Western culture; the effect of these conferences on the consolidation of Orientalistic forces in Lithuania was highly significant. In 1984 Vilnius University held the first national scholarly conference on comparative philosophy – *The Problem of Man in the History of Philosophy: An Encounter between West and East* – which aroused great interest from scholars and the public. Many papers of a high scholarly level were read at this conference. Its success encouraged the organization of a second conference in 1988 – *The Interaction of Eastern and Western Culture* – which embraced a broader field of problems in the comparative study of culture. This time even more specialists prominent in the study of Eastern cultures participated. These forums made a strong impression on the cultural life of that time and encouraged the development of professional Oriental and comparative studies.

The Association for Oriental Studies also sought to acquire greater independence from the center: it undertook to establish centers for academic Oriental studies and a museum for Eastern art in the old mosque of Kaunas and to arrange exhibitions devoted to Eastern art in the museums of various cities.

A qualitatively new stage in the growth of Orientalism and academic Oriental studies began immediately after the restoration of independence. Routes that had opened up to Eastern countries and the opportunity for advanced study there directly influenced the development of new Oriental and comparative studies in Lithuania and, most importantly, their long-awaited institutionalization. Centers for Oriental studies were gradually established at Vilnius University and later at Vytautas the Great University in Kaunas and at Klaipėda University. In 1993, at the Institute for Culture and Art, I helped establish a group, consisting of the students with whom I worked most closely, to deal with problems in Oriental and comparative studies. Soon this group became the Department of Comparative Cultural Studies, Aesthetics, and Art Theory and the main center for scholarly research in this field.

Lithuania has seen a constant increase in the number of people who know Sanskrit, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, Tibetan, and other Eastern languages, who understand the characteristics of these cultures, and who are translating the fundamental texts of these great non-European civilizations. At the same time, dissertations have been written and defended. Thus, the situation
Searching for Lithuanian Identity Between East and West

has gradually changed, and this fact is attested by the appearance of the important specialized journals Acta Orientalia Vilnensis and Indra, the series of books Rytų klasika (Eastern Classics), Bibliotheca Orientalia et Comparativa, and Rytai-Vakarai: Komparatyvinės studijos (East-West: Comparative Studies), the first volume of Ėstetikos istorija. Antologija (The History of Aesthetics: An Anthology), entitled Senovės Rytai / Antika (The Ancient East / Classical Antiquity), two volumes of Religijos istorijos antologija (An Anthology of the History of Religion), Dalia Švambarytė’s Japonų-lietuvių kalbų hieroglifų žodynas (Japanese-Lithuanian Dictionary of Ideograms), and many other important books, the publication of classical texts of Eastern civilization translated from the original languages, and a torrent of worthwhile articles in Logos, Humanistica, Darbai ir dienos (Works and Days), Filosofija (Philosophy), Sociologija (Sociology), Liaudies kultūra (Folk Culture), Metai (The Year), Naujai Romuva (The New Romuva), Krantai (Shores), Kultūros barai (The Sphere of Culture), Šiaurės Atėnai (Athens of the North), and other periodicals. At Vilnius University the Center for Oriental Studies and the Comparative Study of Civilizations is expanding its activities. The Institute for Culture, Philosophy, and Art, Vilnius University, Vilnius Art Academy, Vytautas the Great University in Kaunas, and Klaipėda University are bringing together young specialists in Eastern civilizations, philosophy, aesthetics, art history, and the comparative study of civilizations.

During the last decade, work in the field of Eastern cultures has attracted the first generation of professional Orientalists and comparatists to mature under independence (Audrius Beinorius, Loreta Poškaitė, Dalia Švambarytė, Valdas Jaskūnas, Ieva Diemantaitė, Vytis Vidūnas, Karina Firkovičiūtė, Gabija Čepulionytė, Algirdas Kugevičius, Vladimiras Korobovas, Rima Sondaitė, Aistė Niunkaitė-Račiūnienė, and others), young people who base their research on primary sources written in Eastern languages and are attuned to trends in world scholarship.

An increasing number of other people have also devoted themselves to comparative research and the cultural traditions of Eastern nations. Now there are completely different opportunities – to see with one’s own eyes and to come into direct contact with the cultural values of Eastern nations. The rapid establishment of Oriental studies in Lithuanian culture is also shown by the rebirth of an annual conference – Asian Studies: Research and Problems – devoted to the interaction of Eastern and Western culture and since 2000 organized at the Center for Oriental Studies of Vilnius University.

During the years of restored independence, the prestige of Oriental and comparative studies has grown immensely in Lithuania. The principles of comparative methodology dominant in today’s humanities are penetrating Lithuanian scholarly discourse; they are especially popular among the youngest generation of scholars, who sensitively react to the processes of interaction between the cultural values and symbols of various civilizations. The growing interest in Oriental studies and the comparative study of civilizations is shown by the tremendous competition in Lithuania to major in this field at Vilnius University.
CONCLUSIONS

When we treat manifestations of Oriental themes in Lithuania during recent decades, the question constantly arises: is it an accident that Švėgžda, Normantas, Ivanauskaitė, and many other Lithuanian intellectuals and artists have given special attention to the faraway, exotic, and isolated culture of Tibet? In view of the tragic history of our nation’s struggle for independence, it is entirely understandable that many Lithuanians feel solidarity with the nations of Tibet and Chechnya as they suffer oppression. Obviously, the works of these artists are far more complicated and significant phenomena of newly independent Lithuania than many in this country imagine. An expansive view of the world has helped free them from Lithuanian provincialism and inferiority complexes and helped them feel responsibility for the oppressed nations of the world. Their interest in what is relevant in world culture, their original interpretation of these ideas, and their efforts to draw them into our cultural fund attest that Lithuanian culture has, after regaining its independence, risen to a new stage of development. Despite numerous opponents who live intoxicated by an old and simplistically interpreted national mythology, these people and others like them are changing the modern Lithuanian mentality, opening it up to new value systems and areas of knowledge.

Research Institute for Culture, Philosophy, and Arts
Lithuania

NOTE

1. Translator’s note: He was widely known by his nickname Našlaitėlis – the Little Orphan. The Polish form of his name is, perhaps, better known outside Lithuania – Mikolaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł Sierotka.

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Part II

Culture in Transition: Empirical Perspectives
Chapter V

Self-Identification: Sociological Research Data

Arvydas Virgilijus Matulionis

The end of the 20th century, which saw major political breaks and significant changes in the map of Europe, the fall of the Soviet Union, the return of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to the community of free nations, the unification of Germany, disunification of Yugoslavia, and the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, has increased attention to the issue of social identity. For example, nations of the Baltic States, which have regained their statehood, had to self-identify as inhabitants of free states, but not of the former large Soviet empire. This is not an unambiguous process.

The Soviet period had a song “Where the Homeland Starts…” from the then popular movie “Seventeen Moments of Spring”. It emphasized the fact that the homeland starts at the threshold of home. But that homeland had naturally to be understood as the Soviet Union. Another popular song directly stated that “Your address is not a house, a street; your address is the Soviet Union”. An idea was promoted to many people who came to Lithuania from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus that everything belonged to them. To many Lithuanians that ideological pressure only caused resistance, which was especially active during the period of “the singing revolution”.

If in the Soviet period national issues were analyzed only by representatives of scientific communism, and sociologists stayed away from these issues, after the restoration of the statehood attention to the issues of national identity has increased (Matulionis, 1999).

In Lithuania, identity from the sociological point of view has been widely analyzed by sociologists of the Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology. In cooperation with their Swedish colleagues, they have published Changes of Identity in Modern Lithuania (1996). They have also published the following monographs in Lithuanian: Vilniečio portretas: sociologiniai metmenys [The Portrait of Vilnius Dweller: Sociological Sketch] (1995); Miestiečiai. Vilniečių ir kauniečių tapatumo, savivokos bei požiūrių sociologinė analizė [City Dwellers. Sociological Analysis of the Identity, Self-Perception and Views of the Inhabitants of Vilnius and Kaunas] (1997); Europos keliu. Lietuvos socialinis ir kultūrinis savitumas integruojantis į Europos Sąjungą [On the European Road. Social and Cultural Distinctiveness of Lithuania Joining the European Union] (2000). Professor Romualdas Grigas has also analyzed different aspects of this self-identification (Grigas, 1991, 1993, 1995).

However, social identity is not limited merely by self-identification with the nation. In sociology, social identity is understood as aspects of individual self-awareness arising from belonging to different social categories and from self-attribution to them, which is especially vivid when those social...
categories become significant. A distinction should be made between social self-identification and identification which is related to forming of “self” and covers personality and psychological matters related to human socialization. It also covers identification with gender, race, generation, etc. Cultural identification is also necessary, including linguistic identity. Certainly, many of these indicators are also social, but social identification is related, first of all, with such characteristics as nature, country, territory, class, religion, etc. Time or historical self-identification is very important when self-identifying with the epoch.

Post-communist countries pay great attention to these issues of social identity. For example, the book Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition (1998), by Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalem, analyzes the aspects of values, including identification. Works of Polish authors, e.g. Władysław Adamski (Sisyphus. Sociological Studies, since 1991), should also be singled out.

Since Lithuania became a member of the European Union and NATO, in analyzing the issues of social identity it is important to find out whether any change in the attitude of inhabitants towards their self-identification as Lithuanian nationals has occurred. Has a tendency characteristic of other EU countries (the first fifteen countries), when people first of all identify themselves with the place of residence, been observed: I am a Parisian, a Berliner, a Salzburger, etc., or consider himself or herself a representative of a region: I am a Sicilian, a Bavarian, etc.? Their belonging to a country – France, Germany, or Austria – is a matter-of-course, which need not be declared or emphasized. On the second hand, such attitudes are consistent with self-identification with Europe or, in general, with the world. This has been revealed by the European Value Survey; and the Baltic States have carried out such a survey since they regained their independence (Matulionis, Juknevičius, Mitrikas et al., 2001; Juknevičius et al., 2003).

In November 2004, the Institute of Social Research carried out a representative survey of Lithuanian society stratification, the questionnaire of which included a question on identity. 1500 respondents were interviewed. This allows comparison of the data of 1990, 1999, and 2004, and highlights general tendencies. Only repetitive researches allow highlighting the dynamics of the process and finding out the degree of society democratization.

In the European value project, several answers were given with regard to the question on identity with a location: 1) identification with a town/village/settlement in which a respondent lives; 2) with a region within the country, e.g. Dzūkija or Aukštaitija in Lithuania; Bavaria or Thüringen land in Germany; 3) with the country; 4) with Europe; 5) with the world. Several levels have been offered for the analyzing, and choices covered the first and second priority of self-identification and no identification at all. In 2004, we revised this methodology and singled out five levels: 1 – the first priority of self-identification, 5 – no identification at all. As the aspect of the European Union was of great importance, we included a question on the self-identification of a respondent with the European Union. Thus, at the outset of this
paper, we will give a more detailed view of Lithuanian inhabitants’ self-identification in 2004.

**LITHUANIA, 2004**

We will start the analysis with the self-identification of Lithuanian inhabitants at the end of 2004. We see that the priority of Lithuanians’ self-identification is as follows: identification with Lithuania, with a settlement, with a region, with the European Union, with the world (see Figure 1). Differences in the self-identification as being a resident of Lithuania and one’s town (village) are not vivid, while the identification with the world is low.

![Figure 1. Self-indentification of Lithuania inhabitants with...](average, 5 point scale)

Let’s get deeper into the identity. First of all, the respondents usually identify themselves with Lithuania and with their place of residence, i.e. a town/a village; then, with a place of residence, with Lithuania and with a region (Žemaitija, Suvalkija, etc.); third, with a region, with Lithuania; fourth, with the European Union; fifth, with the world (see Figure 2).
Correlation between the importance of a town / a village for a respondent and the importance of a region, Lithuania, the European Union and the world reveals that more than a half of those who considered the identification with the place of residence as the first priority, gave the second priority to Lithuania, while 43 percent gave the third priority to the region. 44 percent of those, who gave the first priority to the place of residence, gave the second priority to a region, and 38 percent of respondents gave the third priority to Lithuania. Nine of ten of those who gave priority to the place of residence emphasized identification with Lithuania. Some respondents ranked the importance of their town/village third, fourth, or even fifth (respectively 76, 58, and 42 percent). This shows the predominance of identification with Lithuania.

More than a half of those who hardly self-identify with the place of residence (fourth or fifth priority) gave the second priority to the European Union. Besides, more than a half of those who hardly self-identified with their town/village ranked their self-identification with the world first.

More than a half of those who hardly self-identified with the place of residence (fourth and fifth priority) gave the second priority to the European Union. Also more than a half of those who hardly self-identified with a town/a village gave the first priority to the world. This once more proves the tendency that the weaker the relation of a respondent with the place of residence, the stronger the self-identification with Europe and the world.
LITHUANIA, 1990 – 1999 – 2004

One survey allows making only “a snapshot”. In order to define changes, it is necessary to compare the data of several surveys and to see the dynamics of self-identification. However, these surveys employed slightly different methodologies, which should be taken into account. Analysis is slightly aggravated by the fact that in the questionnaire competed at the beginning of 1990 Lithuania was a part of the Soviet Union, thus the answer “region” meant Lithuania, and the answer “country” meant the Soviet Union. It is obvious that direct comparison would give a twisted view; thus, it was necessary to make a generalization.

In 1990 as many as 2/3 of respondents identified themselves with Lithuania (see Figure 3). Besides, every fifth respondent gave second priority to Lithuania. Thus, almost nine of ten respondents identified themselves with Lithuania. Obviously, in 1999, when Lithuania had been independent for almost ten years, the number of people with this self-identification was considerably low, although two-thirds of all respondents (both first and second priority) is not a low proportion. The year 2004 was special for Lithuania, as on the 1st of May it became a member of the European Union and of NATO. It is natural that national self-awareness has also increased: almost half of respondents identified themselves with Lithuania, and together with those whose second priority was Lithuania their number reached ¾. We are Lithuania, and not a periphery of Europe.

In 1990 more people gave second priority to self-identification with Europe and the world than in 1999. This could be easily explained: opposing Lithuania to the Soviet Union, the second priority was given to self-identification with Europe and the World, but not with the East. In 2004, self-identification with Europe and the world did not show great increase: most probably self-awareness that we are citizens of both the European Union and the free world needs time.

On the second hand, we have already emphasized that, for a European, self-identification with Europe is evident, thus in self-identification one gives the first priority to his/her place of residence, i.e. a town/village, in which he/she lives. In 2004, the number of those who self-identified with a town/village even decreased due to a greater self-identification, as mentioned above, with the country; however, if we add together those who self-identify with the place of residence, then their number has even increased: if in 1999 their number was seven of ten, then now it is ¾. Thus, in this aspect, inhabitants of Lithuania become “more European”.

Both in 1999 and in 2004 a low number of respondents self-identified with the region. On the surface, it seems strange, as, for example, those who live in Žemaitija often emphasize their independent state. However, in Lithuania most socio-economic issues are being solved not in the region but in a specific place of residence. Counties still fail to realize their purpose, although their functioning has been entrenched in the Constitution of the republic of Lithuania. Besides, counties have been formed not by historical division...
of Lithuania, but according to the present territorial structure, when industrialization resulted in the growth of Alytus, Utena, and Tauragė, alongside of the five big towns of Lithuania and alongside of Telšiai and Marijampolė, the capitals respectively Žemaitija and Suvalkija. Disputes concerning the number of counties continue. Besides, thinking about the prospects of regions/counties, it should be taken into account that the European Union pays great attention to regional policy. However, in Lithuania self-identification data are not very beneficial for regions: if in 1999 four of ten respondents self-identified with a region, in 2004 they accounted only for 3 respondents of ten.

Figure 3. Self-identification of inhabitants of Lithuania with ... (percent)

Self-identification with Lithuania has already been discussed here; nevertheless, in the questionnaire of 1999 the percentage of respondents who did not self-identify with the country is rather high, i.e. every fourth respondent. This, most probably, has been predetermined by a national composition of inhabitants of certain regions of the country, e.g. in Southern Lithuania inhabitants mostly self-identify with their place of residence but not with the country. In 2004 eight percent of respondents did not self-identify with Lithuania. This number is not low, and it could be assumed that these people are apt to migrate. Still, positive changes are also evident.

Only several percent of the respondents gave the first or the second priority to self-identification with Europe and the world. In 1999, self-identification with Europe overtook that with the world, but in 2004 this tendency was not observed. In 1999, every fourth respondent self-identified with the world, and every fifth self-identified with Europe. It could be assumed that in
1999, with the predominating propaganda of the EU accession, Europe looked more attractive and, with “the door of Europe open,” the rest of the world became increasingly attractive, too. It is important to note that the number of those who refused to state their self-identification is low.

Now we will correlate self-identification with the socio-demographic indicators alongside the comparison of the trends of 2004 and 1999. As revealed by correlation coefficients, gender hardly has impact on self-identification women are slightly more inclined to self-identify with the region, while men with the European Union and the world (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Dependence of self-identification on gender (average)

Age has great influence on self-identification (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Dependence of self-identification on age (average)
The peak of self-identification with a settlement falls to the oldest respondents: they are not going to change their place of residence and self-identify with the place in which they have lived all of their lives. In 1999, the peak fell to 21-30 and 31-40 year old respondents, i.e. to those who at that stage were educated and had a profession as well as a place of residence, were married and had children, etc. Those were matters that identified them with a specific place of residence, i.e. a settlement/a town/a village. In 2004, 41-50 year old respondents were in their mature and most employable stage when they needed stability and, especially, a place of residence. On the contrary, younger respondents – up to age 20 – are still students and the place they live is very important to them. The difference between young people (21-30) in 2004 and in 1999 could be explained by the fact that at present a greater number of young people are still students, as they work and study.

Mostly senior respondents (61-70) self-identify with the region. This is also an expression of a pursuit of happiness. In 1999, self-identification with the region was most popular among the youngest respondents (up to age 20). This was also definitely related to the future plans: to return to a native town/region after studies. The youth of 2004 is different: after accession to the EU a region is no longer attractive to them.

Commonly 41-50 year old respondents, i.e. those who fifteen years ago actively participated in the restoration of Lithuania’s statehood, self-identify with Lithuania. Besides, they are people of most mature employable age and it is too late for them to look for other alternatives; they must realize themselves in Lithuania. Such a situation was seen also in 1999, thus the trend is very vivid.

As we have already mentioned, the number of respondents who self-identify with Europe and the world is not great and the differences among senior age groups are not significant. However, a greater number of the respondents who self-identify with Europe is among 21-30 year old respondents, and with the world – 51-60. A similar situation was seen in 1999.

A certain impact of a nationality has also been observed: the greatest self-identification with a settlement has been observed (see Figure 6). This tendency is rather constant, as in 1999 the Polish had the same self-identification. Poles live in Lithuania in a rather compact way: most of them live in Vilnius and the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions. They mostly self-identify with their village or town but not with Lithuania or a region.

The highest self-identification with the region is seen among Lithuanians who think they belong to Lithuania. It is important that the highest self-identification with Lithuania is also seen among Russians. This trend is rather new, as in 1999 the number of such respondents was lower. Self-identification with Lithuania of other nationality respondents (Jews, Latvians, etc.) is more conditional.
A rather vivid correlation of self-identification with the place of residence is seen. Inhabitants of villages self-identify with their village and with the region where they live (see Figure 7). In Vilnius, as well as in other cities that have one hundred thousand to half a million inhabitants (Kaunas, Klaipėda, Šiauliai and Panevėžys), the number of people identifying themselves with their city or with the region is lower. Thus, the size of the settlement has influence on self-identification. The smaller the settlement, the greater the number of respondents who self-identify with that settlement. This trend is rather vivid and was observed in 1999. Mostly inhabitants of regional
centers self-identify with Lithuania, although Vilnius and other big towns do not lag behind.

Lower education respondents usually self-identify with the settlement, while the respondents with higher education usually self-identify with Lithuania (see Figure 8). Such trend was also observed in 1999.

Figure 8. Dependence of self-identification on education (average)

Respondents with higher education also self-identified with the European Union and the world, while such self-identification among respondents with primary education was lower.

Rather vivid differentiation of answers was influenced by social status and class: the lower the social statues, the more usual the self-identification with the settlement and the region; the higher social status, the more vivid self-identification with Lithuania, the European Union, and the world (see Figure 9).
Income (per one household member) makes certain impact, too. Usually respondents with low income self-identify with the settlement, and those with higher income self-identify with Lithuania (see Figure 10). Richer respondents rather often self-identify with Europe and the world. These tendencies were also observed in 1999.
COMPARISON OF THE SITUATION OF LITHUANIA WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

As the last European Value Survey was carried out in 1999, we will compare self-identification of Lithuanians and inhabitants of other European countries that participated in the Survey. The results of the comparison are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Self identification with a place (rating)

<table>
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Settlement

The data reveal that inhabitants of almost all countries of Europe (except Iceland, Portugal, and the Netherlands) usually self-identified with a town/village/settlement in which they lived. Quantitative analysis shows that the greatest number of respondents (about 2/3) who self-identify with a settlement is seen in Hungary, Belarus, Poland, Northern Ireland, and the lowest number is seen (about one third of respondents) in Belgium, Austria, Portugal. Inhabitants of Lithuania account for an average number, meanwhile self-identification of Latvians and Estonians with a settlement is rather away from the average number: Estonians are among those who have the highest self-identification, while Latvians are among those who have the lowest self-identification.

If we add those who give the first priority and second priority to self-identification with a settlement, then the greatest numbers (84 percent) are seen among Belarusians and the Irish, almost the same number is found among Hungarians, and the lowest number is seen among Austrians and Belgians.

The number of Lithuanians who self identify with the settlement (first and second priority) is almost 2/3, which is below the European average. In this aspect Latvia meets the European average, while Estonia overtakes it, as more than ¾ of Estonian respondents have such a self-identification.

The greatest number of respondents who emphatically refuse to self-identify with a settlement is seen in Belarus (18 percent), Russia and Ukraine (17 percent each), while the European average is nine percent. In Lithuania such respondents account for five percent, the same as in Latvia, and in Estonia they account only for three percent. It should be noted that the figure does not give the data of Sweden, as the questionnaires of that country did not include such a question.

Region

The greatest self-identification with the region (second priority by rating) is seen among Germans, Austrians and Danes. In these countries regions – lands – play an economic and administrative role, and this is reflected in the indicators of self-identification with the region. In other countries, a region is given the third priority. In Luxembourg and also in post-Soviet countries – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus – the number of respondents self-identifying with the region was low. While in Luxembourg this fact is related to the size of this small duchy, in other countries regions are more related to bureaucracy than to pride in a country.

Every third Austrian and German self-identify with a region, while the number of respondents who think this way in Belarus accounts only for one percent. In Lithuania, the number of such a self-identification is lower compared with the European average, while in Estonia, and especially in Latvia, it reaches the average.
If we add together those who self-identify with the region (both first and second priority), we see that Germany takes the first place and Austria is overtaken by Northern Ireland. Iceland, Netherlands and Bulgaria lag behind (less than 3 of 10).

The greatest number of respondents who emphatically refuse to self-identify with the region is seen in Portugal (20 percent) and the lowest number is seen in Austria, Germany and Hungary (only several percents). In Lithuania, the number of such respondents is rather high (13 percent), more than in Latvia and much more than in Estonia (4 percent).

Country

Inhabitants of Iceland, Portugal and Netherlands usually self-identify with the country, although in other countries (except Germany, Austria and Denmark) the number of people with such a self-identification is also great and rates as the second priority.

One of the key indicators that could allow seeing the attitude towards the homeland – Lithuania, in our case – and nationality is self-identification with the country in which one lives. More than a half of Icelanders self-identify with Iceland, while in Portugal, Netherlands and Bulgaria the number of thinking this way is four of ten. Meanwhile, such self-identification is characteristic of every ten Germans. It is obvious that in the country the self-identification with “the land” is more important, as all issues of importance to a citizen are being solved there. In spite of the fact that in Austria the greatest number of respondents self-identify with the region, self-identification with the country is rather close to the European average here. The greatest deviations, as has been mentioned already, are seen in Iceland (to the positive side) and in Germany (to the negative side).

Lithuania and Latvia are among the countries that have a great number of respondents who self-identify with the country. This reflects that “the singing revolution”, when the countries struggled to become free from the Soviet Union and to restore their independence, is still alive. However, in Estonia self-identification with the country, i.e. with Estonia, is much lower, and it is similar to that in Poland.

Having added those who self-identify with the country (the first and the second priority) we see that Latvia is the first and overtakes even Iceland. As many as eight of ten respondents of Latvia choose such self-identification. Lithuania is among “the leaders” having 2/3 of respondents who think that way. However, in Lithuania, as in Belarus and Ukraine, the number of people who emphatically refused to self-identify with the country was high, while in Iceland, the Netherlands, Poland and Latvia such respondents hardly existed.

Europe

Only in Luxembourg does the number of those who self-identify with the European Union take the third priority, while in other countries it takes the
last priority. In a number of countries, in which the number of people with such self-identification takes the fourth place, this difference is insignificant and, in general, the number thinking this way is small. 13 percent of respondents in Luxembourg and every eleventh respondent in Belgium self-identified with Europe, while in Russia such respondents were hardly seen (0.2 percent).

Lithuania meets the average of Europe, i.e. three percent of respondents in Lithuania self-identified with Europe. A similar situation is seen in Latvia and Estonia, as we see that the number of people with such self-identification is not high.

If we add together all respondents (first and second priority) who self-identified with Europe, we see that “leaders” are the same and that Luxembourg inhabitants are the first, as one third of them self-identify with Europe, in Belgium – every fourth, in Russia – only two percent. In Lithuania, every eleventh respondent thought like that, which fully corresponds to the European average, while Latvia and Estonia lag behind.

Four of ten Greeks and one third of Germans emphatically refused to self-identify with Europe. In Lithuania, every fifth respondent thought like that, similar to Estonia and Latvia. In Netherlands, every eleventh respondent refused to self-identify with Europe.

*The World*

In Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the world is given third priority accordingly to the frequency of self-identification. Most probably such self-identification is predetermined by a still existing reminiscence of the former Soviet Union as one of the greatest powers of the world. However, in most countries “the world” takes fourth priority in frequency of self-identification. 16 percent of respondents in Russia and 15 percent in Ukraine self-identified with the world, while in Poland and Ireland such respondents accounted for one percent. Russia and Ukraine are the leaders if we add together all respondents (first and second priority) who self-identified with the world. In the Baltic States, the number of respondents with such a self-identification was low, even lower than the European average.

The number of respondents who refused to self-identify with the world is much higher than of those who refused to self-identify with Europe. In this aspect Poland and Austria are the leaders, as 8 of 10 respondents in these countries have lowest self-identification with the world, the same as in Denmark – ¾ of respondents. In Lithuania, the number of such skeptics is only 28 percent (a lower number is seen only in Portugal – every fourth), while in Latvia and Estonia 2/3 of respondents think that way.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Self-identification with the country, a region, a settlement, Europe or the world to a great extent depends on the situation in the country, on its economic and geographical situation, traditions, and administrative structure.
In the democratic countries of the European Union, inhabitants usually self-identify with a specific settlement – a town or a village, in which they live. There, first of all, their social and domestic, and often economic, issues are being solved; thus it is natural that people relate themselves to the location in which their life goes on. In some countries, e.g. Germany, the administrative structure predetermines that most of these issues to a great extent depend on the region – the land – thus its meaning is emphasized. Meanwhile in a small country of Iceland, which is also an island, most people self-identify with the country and not the settlement in which they live.

Post-communist countries now are in a special development stage. Thus it is natural that during transformation into a democratic society, when the statehood of the country had to be stated and external dangers had to be overcome, self-identification with the country is very important, and is reflected in the answers of respondents. In 1990, respondents of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other post-communist countries first of all self-identified with their country. After the dangers were overcome and societies became more democratic, the number of those who self-identify with a specific settlement has risen.

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REFERENCES


Chapter VI

Religiosity and the Moral Values of Lithuanians in the European Context

Stanislovas Juknevičius

INTRODUCTION

Lithuanians were the last christened in Europe – is said sometimes with dignity, sometimes with regret in this country. Comparatively late (in 1387), the christening of Lithuania indicated the slow and hard penetration of Christianity into the consciousness of Lithuanians. The author of the first printed book in the Lithuanian language, Martynas Mažvydas, characterizing the state of religiosity in the 16th century, wrote:

... how uncultured and dark, unfamiliar with any piety and Christian religion our nation is in contrast with the others, you can find very few men of the people who were capable of pronouncing at least the first words of the Lord’s Prayer, to say nothing of true and full knowledge of the Catechism. And what is more – and it is still more terrible to hear – many of them officiate patently at pagan rituals and profess paganism openly, even nowadays: some worship trees, rivers, others grass snakes or something else, glorifying them as gods. Some of them vow to Perkūnas (the Thunder), others glorify Laukosargas (the god of Fields) to save their crop or Žemėpatis (the god of Earth) for their livestock. Those who are prone to evil intentions profess goblins and sprites as their gods. (Mažvydas, 2001: 184)

Pagan traditions survived in folk beliefs and superstitions mostly, however they influenced the intelligentsia as well. In Soviet times participation in the activity of the organization of pagan beliefs, Romuva, was one of the ways to resist the official regime. When independence had been regained, the activity of the organization was expanded and intensified. In 1995 a bill was propounded to Seimas (the legislative organ of Lithuania) to acknowledge the ancient Balts beliefs as one of the traditional Lithuania’s religions. In 2003 Seimas passed a law about pronouncing one of the main former pagan feasts - Joninės (St. John’s day on the 22nd of June) - a day off.

This comparatively unsteady faith of Lithuania stipulated the opportunity for some non-Christian beliefs, and first of all, Hinduism to appear. The writer and philosopher, Vydūnas (1868-1953), played a big part in the process. He tried to join the ideas of the national rebirth and Indian philosophy. The popularity of the thinker in Lithuania is displayed in the fact that he
Religiosity and the Moral Values of Lithuanians

is portrayed on the banknote of 200 Litas – one of the biggest monetary units in Lithuania. Vydūnas’ Association functions, exploring and popularizing his heritage in Lithuania even now.

Catholicism is still the main Lithuanian religion. One for the reasons of the exceptional role of Catholicism in Lithuanian life was the close historical relation with Poland, crowned with the establishment of the Union of Two States in 1569. After the loss of statehood in 1795, the collective fight for independence united Lithuanian and Poles. This culminated in several unfortunate but heroic rebellions (in 1830 - 1831 and 1863). During the inter-war period (1919 – 1939) disputes on the territory obscured these relationships, but when independence was gained for the second time, Poland became something like Lithuania’s attorney in the process of its accession to the European Union and NATO. There is no question about the role of Catholicism in Poland. Thus, there is no wonder that by the Law on Religious Communities and Associations, Catholicism was pronounced as one of the traditional religions the Lithuanian state supports.

With respect to the role of religion in post-soviet Lithuanian culture two opposite hypotheses could be formed. On the one hand, it can be expected that after the end of the compulsory atheisation of the society and the considerable growth of Church activities, religiosity in Lithuania will consolidate. On the other hand, considering that Lithuania is comprehensively trying to integrate into Europe where secularization is an important culture development feature (see Wilson, 1982; Berger, 1991), decline in religiosity is possible. How have personal religiosity, denominational affiliation, church attendance, beliefs and confidence in the church changed during the period of the independence and how do these changes look in the context of processes ongoing in the other, and first of all in the neighboring, countries? This is the first group of problems with which this chapter will deal.

The atheisation executed during Soviet times influenced all spheres of life, but morality was injured the most. Firstly, Marxism and Bolshevism much devalued the understanding of morality Lenin said that everything was moral that served the dictatorship of the proletariat. Practically this meant: everything was moral that served the Communist Party. Humanistic morality was either forgotten or destroyed. The saying “We lived in the shadow of the devil for fifty years” was very popular in the first years of independence in Lithuania. Such a situation absolutely satisfied the governing elite but not the people who preserved the remains of their decency. A small part of them openly declared resistance against the governing regime and became dissidents; another part learned to hide their true thoughts and feelings: they thought in one way and spoke in another. After independence was gained the demand for dissimulation disappeared, however people still hadn’t got their spiritual integrity back. The duplicity prevailing during the socialist period was changed into the duality specific to the West: the wish to be both moral and prosperous that is to say to be in the service both of God and of Money. What is the meaning of this for the life of the Lithuanians? How has the attitude of Lithuania’s people changed towards adultery, abortions and other phenomena which reli-
gion traditionally condemns? What are the trends in the development of civic morality in post-communist Lithuania? This is the second group of problems with which this chapter deals.

Becoming a member of the European Union, Lithuania, as well as the other post-communist countries, opened to a new economical, political and cultural space. Religiosity and morality varies differently in various countries. What groups of countries can be distinguished according to religiosity in contemporary Europe and what are the developmental tendencies of religiosity and morality in every of these groups and in Europe generally? Particular attention is paid to the analysis of these problems in this chapter as well.

In this chapter, the data on the development of religious and moral values in Lithuania and other European countries is based on the surveys initiated by the European Values Study Group (EVSG) in the years 1980-1981, 1990-1991 and 1999-2000. The information on the attitudes and values of modern Lithuania’s inhabitants is also based on the survey conducted by the Public Opinion and Market Research Center, “Vilmorus,” at the request of the Lithuanian Institute of Culture and Arts in 1997.

RELIGIOSITY IN POST-COMMUNIST LITHUANIA

Personal Religiosity

Personal religiosity changed dramatically during the years of independence. The number of people considering themselves to be religious increased by 39 percent (from 45 percent to 84 percent), the percentage of those saying they were “not religious” decreased by 28 percent, undecided - by 15 percent.

In 1990, 57 percent of the inhabitants of Europe considered themselves to be religious, however, in Catholic countries these figures are considerably higher (Poland - 96 percent, Italy - 82 percent, Ireland - 71 percent; see Zulehner, Denz, 1994: 18-19). In nine years these figures changed slowly: “For Europe as a whole, the conclusion is justifiable that religious decline has more or less come to a standstill, but due to the replacement of cohorts, the average level of religiosity in most countries is still falling and will continue to fall” (Easter, Halman, de Moor, 1993: 52).

In Lithuania, the rapid growth in the number of the inhabitants seeing themselves as “religious persons” could be explained by changes in political circumstances; however, that would not be sufficient. Although the political future of the country could be seen as somewhat doubtful at that time, during the 1990’s study Lithuania had already been independent, and church discrimination had already been terminated, so it would be incorrect to consider that a part of the respondents were afraid to express their authentic attitudes for one or another reason, even in an anonymous questionnaire. On the other hand, it would be too brave to state that so many people suddenly became religious. There are a lot of historical examples of converting to religion, but, when more than one third of inhabitants change their religious attitudes in such a
short period, it is an exceptional occurrence. In our opinion, the explanation
could be found in the psychological arena. Most people do not consider them-
selves as either religious or non-religious persons; they are “not so religious”.
They ascribe themselves to the one or other group depending on the prevalent
attitudes in the society.

To verify this proposition the following question was included into the
successive study:

Do you consider yourself as a religious person?
1. Yes.
2. I think I am not too religious.
3. No.
4. Do not know.

The answers were following: 1) 37 percent; 2) 43 percent; 3) 19 percent; 4) one percent.

As could be seen, not 84 percent but only 37 percent of Lithuanian in-
habitants considered themselves to be religious, while about 43 percent were
“not too religious”. In 1990 when the atheization consequences were still felt
strongly in the society, the bigger part of this group ascribed themselves to the
non-religious and atheists. In nine years of independence the role of religion
became stronger and it became fashionable to be religious and therefore all
“not too religious” Lithuanian inhabitants considered themselves as religious
and only 1 percent saw themselves as atheists.

Denominational Affiliation

In the EVS questionnaire two questions were included to study reli-
gious denominations. The first one was “Do you belong to a religious denomi-
nation”? The second was “Which one?”

In 1990 63 percent of Lithuanian population related themselves to
religious denominations. Within nine years of independence this figure in-
creased by 18 percent and reached 81 percent of population.

The highest percentages of population attributed themselves to reli-
gious denominations in Malta (99 percent), in Greece (97 percent), in Poland
and in Spain (96 percent each), the lowest percentages – in Estonia (25 per-
cent) and in Czech Republic (34 percent) (Halman, 2001: 81).

Distribution among the concrete denominations did not change much
and in 1999 they were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholics</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Church</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The majority of the population that did not attribute themselves to any denomination in 1990; attributed themselves to Catholicism in 1999, however some part of the Lithuanian population chose non-traditional beliefs. Since the number of such people did not exceeded one percent, in the sociological inquiries they fall into the position of “others”; nevertheless their role in the religious life of the country is quite sizable.

Through the years of independence, the protestant religious Christian communities were established and started to function actively. The first of all are the All Gospel Church and Neuapostolische Kirche. Both have more than 5000 participants, with communities in the main cities and active participation in the cultural and religious life of the country. Besides them, there are such communities as Church of Jesus Christ of Latter –Day Saints (Mormons), Emanuel, Church of Christ and others (see Peškaitis, Glodenis, 2000: 56-112).

The influence of globalization on Lithuanian religious life manifested itself in the growing number of non-Christian communities during the years of independence. In Soviet times, besides the organization of pagan belief, Romové, mentioned above, a small Society for Krishna Consciousness existed. There have been more than 20 religious organizations and communities registered lately in Lithuania. The most numerous are Buddhists, Shri Sathya Sai Baba movement, Bahai Communities (Lietuvos statistikos metraštis, 2002: 298 – 299).

Both in philosophy and in sociology the formation and growth of the market of religions is considered to be not unequivocal in value. In the sociology of religion, an opinion exists that the growth of the assortment of religious leads to a more active religious life. According to R. Stark, one religion is not capable of fulfilling the whole variety of the population’s needs. Consequently, the participation in religious life in the communities, where the market of religions is monopolized by one religion, is not high. The comparative analysis of religious life of various countries confirms this opinion, at least partly (Stark, Iannaccone, 1996: 265-271). Nevertheless, an approach that the weakening of traditional belief negatively influences the cultural and spiritual life of the nation is no less grounded. It would be worth remembering I. Swedenborg’s statement that it is improper to abandon the belief of one’s own ancestors, because every man belongs to that spiritual territory where his nation is born (see Strinberg, 1998: 108). In addition, people unsatisfied with their traditional belief more often choose the easiest, the most attractive and the most available forms of religiosity. As Liliane Voye notes, an intrinsic characteristic of the religiosity of people of the contemporary European communities is “the whipped codes” manifesting people internalizing elements of institutional and popular religions, with their own peculiar logic and elements resembling more the magic than the religion. Likewise, in the worldview the elements from the both systems of religious significations and of scientific discourse are whipped (Voye, 2000: 195-212). A well-known law in economics is the bigger the market, the cheaper goods. In this sense religion is no exception.
Beliefs

The EVS group tried to find out to what extent traditional Christian doctrine is followed in contemporary Western society by asking respondents whether they believe in God, sin, life after death, heaven, hell, reincarnation and telepathy. All these questions (except belief in God) were not included in the 1990 questionnaire in Lithuania and are available for the year 1999.

The analysis of the data revealed that the majority of Lithuanians believed in sin (90 percent), followed by life after death (79 percent), heaven (71 percent) and hell (68 percent). The ideas of Hinduism are popular in this country, too. 44 percent of the Lithuanian believe in reincarnation. This is the highest figure in Europe. About 90 percent of those who believe in reincarnation think that they are Catholics as well. 79 percent of the Lithuanian believes in telepathy. This is a typical example of what is usually called “religious bricolage” (see Dobbelaire, 2000: 31). 50 percent of the Lithuanian believed in God in 1990 and 86 percent in 1999.

One of the questions in the questionnaire was aimed at defining the object of this belief and was formulated as follows:

Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs?
A. There is a personal God.
B. There is some sort of spirit or life force.
C. I don’t really know what to think.
D. I don’t really think there is any sort of spirit, God or force of Life.
E. Don’t know.

The first statement is the closest to the Christian attitudes. 20 percent of the population shared this attitude in year 1990 and 51 percent in 1999. The increase of belief in personal God through nine years of independence was caused by the intensive religious — the first of all Catholicism — propaganda. The establishment of scripture reading in schools played a significant role also.

The second statement - belief in some spirit or life force - reflects deistic attitudes; the third statement is the closest to the agnostic attitudes, and the fourth statement reflects atheistic attitudes. In the nine years of independence, the percentage of the population sharing these attitudes decreased.

Belief in a personal God is widespread mainly in traditionally Catholic countries. In 1999, the first statement was approved by 83 percent of the inhabitants in Poland, 64 percent — in Ireland, and by 71 percent of the inhabitants in Italy. Belief in some spirit or life force was most widespread in Northern and Western Europe — traditionally Protestant countries. In 1999 49 percent, 52 percent and 40 percent of the population in Estonia, Sweden, and Great Britain approved the second statement. In terms of this parameter, Lithuania was closer to Protestant countries in 1990 and closer to Catholic countries in 1999.
Comparing religiosity and belief in God, there were rather unexpected results. 23 percent of the religious respondents believed neither in personal God nor in any spirit or life force. On the other hand, 27 percent of the respondents believing in a personal God, some spirit or life force did not consider themselves to be religious. In Western countries this difference is significant as well. According to the data of the year 1981, 23 percent of Western Europe inhabitants believed in God, though they did not consider themselves religious (see Stoetzel, 1983: 119). This could be explained by the fact that the majority of people perceive religion as participation in religious services or at least as a membership in some religious denomination, but not as belief in God. Therefore, people who believe in God but do not participate in religious services often do not consider themselves as religious, while some people, not believing in God but participating in religious services at times, do. Besides, as we have already mentioned, this was influenced by the formulation of the question, i.e. the respondents were initially able to choose among three alternatives — “religious”, “not religious” and “atheists”. When the alternative “not too religious” was added, almost all non-believers ascribed themselves to “not religious” or “not too religious”.

**Church Attendance**

Church attendance increased in Lithuania in the nine years of independence. The most significant shift is observed in the percentage of the inhabitants attending church once a month (from 10 percent to 19 percent), there was a lower increase (from 47 percent to 53 percent) in the percentage of those attending church only on specific holy days, once a year or less often. The number of those attending Church once a week and more often did not change (about 15 percent).

Though church attendance in Lithuania has increased, it is less than the average in Europe, not to speak of traditional Catholic countries. For example, in 1999 the percentage of those who attended church more than once a month in Ireland and Poland was 67 percent and 78 percent respectively. However, unlike in Lithuania, church attendance in Europe is declining. In this way, a number of the people attending church once a week or more frequently in Western Europe decreased by 20 percent in 1981-1990 (Harding, Phillips, Fogatry, 1986: 124).

**Confidence in the Church**

About 70 percent of the Lithuanian population have confidence in the church. During the years of independence this figure has not changed much. The highest confidence in church is in Malta and Romania (83 percent each) and in Portugal (80 percent), the lowest in the Czech Republic (21 percent; see Halman, 2001: 185).

One of the manifestations of secularization is the decline in the discrepancy of the views concerning particular life issues among the populations
of the secularized and what have traditionally been thought to be religious countries. This concerns confidence in the church, as well. In the traditionally religious regions, the confidence in the church is higher, but when the particular aspects of this confidence undergo investigation, these discrepancies prove not to be so deep and sometimes are even not to the advantage of the religious countries. We will illustrate this with an example.

Poland is a country with deep religious traditions, followed at some distance by Lithuania. Estonia and the Czech Republic are among the most secularized European countries. Now let’s consider an attitude towards the relationship between religion and politics of populations of these four countries. Four questions were designed in the EVS questionnaire to investigate this problem. The results are presented in the figures below.

Figure 1. Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections (agree, strongly agree, percent)

Figure 2. It would be better for our country if more people with religious beliefs held public service positions (agree, strongly agree, percent)
Figure 3. Religious leaders should not influence government decisions
(agree, strongly agree, percent)

Figure 4. Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office
(agree, strongly agree, percent)

As can be seen, the Lithuanian attitude towards the relationship between religion and politics is the most orthodox. They tend to judge atheist politicians most strictly and appreciate the most the religious people holding public services. However their approach to religious leaders, the attitude toward the influence of religious leaders on elections coincides with the Czech, and the attitude toward religious leaders influencing government decision making is close to Czech and Estonian.

Poles are the most negative toward religious leaders influencing elections and government decision making in comparison with the populations of the other three countries. Presumably too active participation in politics of some priests in this country evoked an adverse reaction. The attitude of the Polish population, contrary to what could be expected, appeared to be closer to the Estonian but not the Lithuanian. This confirms the assumption that belonging to a religious denomination or having confidence in a church does not
influence the solutions of particular questions on the relation of religion and politics.

The figures presented above ground another inference. In all countries analyzed, the confidence in the church is higher than confidence in religious leaders' capacity to influence elections or government decisions correctly. This concerns not only these four countries, but practically all European countries. In Europe one has confidence in the Church, but not in churchmen.

The main conclusions of this section would be as follows. In the last ten years of independence the religious commitment of the inhabitants of Lithuania has increased: people go to church more often, more people wish to have religious ceremonies to mark births, marriages and deaths, more and more people believe themselves to be religious; the image of a Christian God has strengthened. However, a religious bricolage floating in the West is characteristic of this country, as well. On belief in reincarnation, Lithuanians, most of whom regard themselves as Christians, are in the lead in Europe. A mix of different and often mutually contradictory dogmas and beliefs in the worldview of a person may be considered an attribute of secularization, because the person who believes everything believes nothing. One more significant attribute of secularization is the decline in discrepancy of the views concerning the particular questions of life among the populations of the most and the least secularized countries. We have demonstrated this with just one example – the attitude toward the involvement of priests and religious leaders in politics, but there is no doubt that this concerns other areas of life as well. All this raises a presumption that the strengthening of religiosity in Lithuania is superficial and has not touched the very essence of the spiritual life. An analysis of the development of morality confirms this suggestion.

MORALITY IN POST-COMMUNIST LITHUANIA

The Meaning of Life

The answers of the Lithuanian population to the EVS questionnaire covering different aspects of the meaning of life, presented in 1990 (the respondents where able to choose several options) were as follows:

If you have lived your life, death is a natural resting point – 89 percent;
The meaning of life is that you try to get the best of it – 59 percent;
Death has a meaning only if you believe in God – 49 percent;
Death is inevitable; it is pointless to worry about it – 36 percent;
In my opinion, sorrow and suffering only have meaning if you believe in God – 32 percent;
Life is meaningful only because God exists – 28 percent;
Life has no meaning – 5 percent.
This question was not included into the EVS questionnaire in 1999, but we included a similar question in the research done in 1997. In order to better uncover the variety of attitudes on the meaning of life we changed several versions of the possible answers. First of all, among the possible variants of the meaning of life, we mentioned self-actualization. The other variant of the meaning of life may be specific for the Lithuanian public, namely children and grandchildren. The results of the research carried out by scientists of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology in 1993 revealed that the highest value of three Lithuanian generations – parents, grandparents and great grandparents – are children, children’s happiness, family, grandchildren (Astra, 1996: 125). Among the possible answers we included the option that represents a moderate hedonism (“the meaning of life is material well-being, a peaceful and guaranteed future”). The answers were as follows:

The meaning of life is to raise good children and grandchildren and to leave good memories about yourself – 93 percent;
Life is meaningful because only existence enables one to realize one’s abilities, create and materialize plans and dreams – 76 percent;
Death is inevitable; it is pointless to worry about it – 67 percent;
The meaning of life is to try to get the best of it – 53 percent;
The meaning of life is material well being, a peaceful and guaranteed future – 51 percent;
Life is meaningful only because God exists – 38 percent;
Life has no meaning – 5 percent.

As can be seen, even 92 percent of Lithuanian population thinks that the meaning of life is to raise good children and grandchildren and to leave good memories about oneself, and 76 percent agrees that life is meaningful because only existence enables one to realize one’s abilities, create and materialize plans and dreams. Hence, the most important versions of the meaning of life in Lithuania were not mentioned in the EVS questionnaire. This confirms an opinion that questionnaires designed for many countries quite often do not characterize the peculiarities of each particular country, and also that God is not so important.

Permissiveness and Civic Morality

Robert N. Bellah sums up permissiveness in these words: “If you want to go in your house and smoke marijuana and shoot dope and get al. screwed up, that’s your business, but don’t bring that out on the street, don’t expose my children to it, just do your thing” (Bellah, 1986: 7).

In the nine years since Lithuania has regained independence, permissiveness has undergone the shifts that are set out in the Figure 5 below.
The results reveal that in most categories permissiveness in Lithuania has increased. One item in particular, euthanasia, shows the most obvious increase (from 3.6 to 5.4 on a ten-point rating scale).

EVS studies show that permissiveness is growing but most in European countries: “How did the degree of permissiveness change during the eighties? The general picture is that it increased; in a number of countries the increase was dramatic. In Great Britain, however, the level stabilized, whereas in Denmark and somewhat less in Sweden a marked change was observed in the direction of a greater moral strictness” (Ester, Halman, de Moor, 1993: 59).

Civic morality was measured according to nine parameters. The changes over a nine-year period are set out in the Figure 6 below. As these figures show (i.e. the higher the number, the lower the morality), there has been an overall decrease in civic morality. Specifically, it decreased in four out of the seven categories, increased in two and remained about the same in one. That is, disapproval of driving under the influence and joyriding strengthened, and the attitude to someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duty showed virtually no change.

There is just one step from the violation of civic morality to crime, and more and more people make this step. Despite the fact that Lithuania is the most religious Baltic state, the number of crimes the citizens of Lithuania commits abroad is the highest. Thus in 1980 – 2000, just in Sweden, Lithuanians have committed 1437 crimes (Latvians – 182, Estonians – 183; see Lietuvos rytas, No. 4, 06.01.2001).

It would be difficult to pinpoint any general trends in the development of civic morality in Europe. In Western Europe, “Civic morality is highest in Denmark, lowest in France and Belgium, immediately followed by most other countries. Shifts in civic morality are quite diverse. In West Germany,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Northern Ireland and Canada, there are not only large differences between age cohorts, but also a decrease of civic morality since 1981. France and the US showed a slight decrease for their population as a whole, but the final outcome was the result of counteracting developments (...). In Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Ireland differences between cohorts are large, as well; but they all developed a somewhat stronger sense of civic morality. Denmark and Sweden are typical because cohorts are almost equally characterized by a relatively high appreciation of civic virtues, which even increased among all cohorts since 1981” (Ester, Halman, de Moor, 2003: 61).

Figure 6. Civic morality of Lithuanians in 1990 and 1999 (1-10 rating scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items of civic morality</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving under the influence</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Littering in public place</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claiming state benefits you are not entitled to</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lying in your own interest(s)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheating on tax if you have a chance</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summarizing the material of this section it could be said, that in Lithuania morality declined in the nine years of independence. First of all this decline manifested itself in an increase in permissiveness. Civic morality slightly declined as well. For some people God plays a certain role in perceiving the meaning of life; however, for the absolute majority of the Lithuania population, the meaning of life consists of the happiness of their children and grandchildren, a peaceful and secure future and other secular values.

“To be Lithuanian means to be Catholic” – they often say in this country. That may imply two things: either an elevation of the average Lithuanian to the level of Catholic or a trivialization of Catholicism to the level of average Lithuanian. Practice shows that the latter version is closer to truth. Religion in Lithuania, as overall in the West, is accepted as long as it does not bother life. A long while ago most people ceased to look for a meaning of life, spiritual strength or ideals in religion, but certain religious sentiments have remained till now. Accordingly, if religion does not intrude into their lives too urgently, they tend to keep it somewhere at the edges of their spiritual life.
TYPES AND MAIN TENDENCIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOSITY IN EUROPE

The Main Types of European Countries

Paul M. Zulehner and Hermann Denz have analyzed two attributes of religiosity – the image of God and the rate of church attendance – and separated out five main types of the Western countries: churchy, cultural-churchy, religious, cultural-religious and non-religious. Countries dominated by the Christian image of God and where the majority of inhabitants go to church on Sundays belong to the first type. The authors classify Ireland, Poland, Italy and the US in this type. Cultural-churchy type of countries are dominated by the educative image of God, but the majority of population goes to church on Sundays. This type of countries does not currently exist in the West. In the countries of religious culture – Iceland and Portugal – the Christian image of God is vital, but only a few go to church on Sundays. Cultural-religious countries are dominated by the educative image of God, churches are few. The authors divide these regions into three groups. They classify Slovakia, Belgium, Holland, Austria and the former West Germany in the first group; Finland, Spain, Hungary, Canada, Great Britain – in the second; and Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden, France, Slovenia and the Baltic states – in the third. One country – the former Democratic Republic of Germany – is classified as the non-religious type (Zulehner, Denz, 1994: 39-40).

It is obvious, that the results of any classification depend on the criteria applied to it. We will try to classify the European countries according not only to religiosity of their inhabitants but to their morality, as well.

Depending on the morality approach three types of people may be separated. The first group consists of people, who practically never follow any morality. They are people for whom, according to one of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s heroes, “everything is allowed”. For the people of the second group, morality is coincident with law. The slogan of such people is “Everything which is not forbidden is allowed”. Prohibition in this case is conceived in a purely juridical sense. The third group consists of people who more or less often follow certain moralities. We will separate three more subtypes in this group and determine them as occasionally moral, selectively moral and consistently moral. People who accept the rules of a certain moral system and follow them in their lives we consider consistently moral. Undoubtedly sometimes they transgress these rules, but at least they are conscious of their transgressions and have regrets about doing so. People classified as selectively moral reject certain demands of morality they estimate as too severe or not corresponding to the spirit of their times, but more or less consistently follow the easier and simpler ones. And finally, occasionally moral people do not accept any moral system, but either by accident or for certain goals sometimes behave morally.

Depending on the relation to religious morality, we may speak about three types of religious people: religious by conviction, religious by tradition, religious by inertia. People who are religious by conviction belong to a certain
religious community and strive to fulfill all demands of religious morality. They are representatives of a consistent religious morality. People religious by tradition belong to a religious community, but follow only certain demands of religious morality. They are representatives of selective morality. People religious by inertia do not belong or belong nominally to a certain community, but still have some sentiments regarding religion. The religious morality of such people may be either selective or occasional.

To make a more concrete classification we use these questions from EVS questionnaire:

- Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are: a religious person; not a religious person; a convinced atheist.
- How important is religion in your life?
- Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?
- Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card: lying in your own interest; married men/women having an affair; abortion; divorce; homosexuality; prostitution; euthanasia; suicide.

We consider that people are religious when to the question “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are …” they answer “A religious person”; and not religious, when they answer “Not a religious person” or “A convinced atheist”.

People thinking that religion plays a very important role in their lives and condemning the same phenomena the church condemns: abortions, adultery, homosexuality, etc., we determine as religious by conviction.

People thinking that religion plays a very important or important role in their lives, attending church regularly but not condemning one or some phenomena the church condemns, we determine as religious by tradition.

And finally we consider people as religious by inertia when they do not attend church regularly, do not condemn the majority or all the phenomena church condemns, but regard themselves as religious people. If there were other options to answer the question about the personal religiosity they would likely say that they are “not too religious”.

Depending on the kind of people prevailing in one or another country, it is possible to speak about the two main types of countries: religious and non-religious. We consider a country to be religious when more than half of its inhabitants regard themselves as religious, and non-religious when more than half of its inhabitants regard themselves as non-religious. We separate two subgroups among non-religious countries. The first consists of the countries where less than half but more than a quarter of population regard themselves as non-religious, the second group consists of the remaining countries. Countries of the first subgroup we determine as non-religious, and countries of the second subgroup as completely non-religious. Equally we separate three types of religious countries: countries of strong religiosity, traditional religi-
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Osity and inert religiosity. In order to better reflect a real diversity of concrete countries, we divide all three types into subtypes: countries of very strong and strong religiosity, strong traditional and traditional religiosity, strong inert and inert religiosity. Thus we separate and explore eight types of countries.

Countries of strong religiosity refer to countries where people religious by conviction dominate. In such countries more then a half the population think that religion plays a very important role in their life, go to church on Sundays and condemn all the phenomena the Church condemns. The first subgroup of this type of country – countries of very strong religiosity – consists of the countries where more then three quarters of inhabitants think that religion plays a very important role in their life; the second subgroup consists of the countries where more then half, but less then three quarters of inhabitants think so.

Countries of traditional religiosity refer to countries, where religion is very important to less then half of the population, but church attendance is relatively high. Inhabitants of these countries go to church not because they are very religious, but because it is the custom with them, because their ancestors did so and their parents are still doing so. The first subgroup of these countries consists of the countries where more then half the population go to church on Sundays; the second subgroup consists of the countries, where less then half but more then a quarter of the population do so.

Religious by inertia countries we consider to be countries where more then half of the population regard themselves as religious, but less then a quarter of their inhabitants attend church. In these countries the importance of religion, as a rule, is not great. This type of country we divide into subgroups according to their level of moral permissiveness. The first subgroup – one of strong inert religiosity – consists of the countries where the rate of moral permissiveness is less then two parameters higher then 0,5, the second subgroup consists of the countries where the rate of moral permissiveness is more then two parameters higher then 0,5.

When such criteria are adopted, a classification of the European countries may be supposed as follows (Inglehart et al., 2004). In Europe there are no countries of very strong religiosity, that is, countries where religion is very important to more than 75 percent of the population. The majority of Islamic countries – Indonesia, Egypt, and Jordan – belong to this type. The only country in Europe where religion is very important to 66 percent of the population is Malta. Among other countries of this type, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa may be mentioned. In all these countries religion is very important to more than half but less then three quarters of the population, more then half the population go to church once a week and condemn all the phenomena the church condemns. Likewise in Europe, there are no strongly non-religious countries, namely where less then 25 percent of the population regard themselves as religious. Typical example of such a country is China, where 15 percent of the population regard themselves as religious. So in Europe both the top and the bottom categories of religious-moral qualification are empty. In the other line the countries that took part in EVS distribute about as follows:
Countries of very strong religiosity: None.
Countries of strong religiosity: Malta.
Countries of strong traditional religiosity: Ireland, Poland.
Countries of traditional religiosity: Italy, Croatia, Romania, Portugal.
Countries of strong inert religiosity: Greece, Spain, Germany, Austria, Finland, Slovakia, Latvia, Hungary, Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria, Lithuania.
Countries of inert religiosity: Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Iceland, Slovenia.
Non-religious countries: Great Britain, France, Norway, Czech Republic, Estonia, Belarus.
Completely non-religious countries: None.

With this classification the development of secularization in Europe may figure as a transformation of the countries of strong religiosity into the countries of traditional religiosity and the countries of traditional religiosity into those of inert religiosity and the latter ones into non-religious countries. However this process has its peculiarities, both in various groups of countries and in various regions. We shall now deal with some of these peculiarities.

Some Developmental Tendencies and Perspectives of Religiosity in Europe

The importance of religion declines slowly but consistently in most European countries. In the last decade of the twentieth century the number of people thinking that religion is very important to them increased significantly only in Portugal and reached just 27 percent of population. Consequently, it should not be expected that more countries of strong religiosity would appear in Europe. On the other hand, a rather considerable probability exists for the first completely non-religious country on the continent – Belarus – to appear. During the last decade the number of people regarding themselves as religious has decreased by 13 percent there and it is now the lowest in Europe – 28 percent.

Significant changes take place in the group of countries of traditional religiosity. In Ireland and Poland church attendance has decreased and in Portugal and Romania has increased during the last decade of the twentieth century. If these tendencies still persist, Ireland and Poland may change places with Portugal and Romania: Ireland and Poland will make a move from the group of the countries of strong traditional religiosity to the group of the countries of traditional religiosity, and Portugal and Romania – vice versa. With respect to Malta, as now the most religious country in Europe (it is hard to judge on the ongoing changes in this country because it did not participate in this study in 1990), we note a common shift of religiosity to the south of Europe.

Another country of traditional religiosity – Croatia – did not participate in the study of 1990, so there is no information about ongoing changes in this country. In Italy church attendance has almost not changed, but permissiveness with regard to practically all the phenomena the church condemns
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has increased. It is possible that in the future Italy will be the first of the countries of traditional religiosity to move to the group of the counties of inert religiosity. Permissiveness has increased in all the countries of strong inert religiosity, consequently in the future most of countries of this group, including Lithuania, will become simply inert religious. However the possibility of the countries of inert religiosity becoming non-religious are not high. In such countries the number of people regarding themselves as non-religious has not changed or has decreased.

A substantial feature of secularization in a decline of the discrepancies between religious and non-religious countries. This involves all aspects of religiosity. First, the differences in the importance of religion decrease. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the most pronounced alterations took place in Poland and Ireland. If in 1990 48 percent of the population of Ireland thought that religion played a very important role in their lives, in 1999 just 32 percent stated the same. In Poland these numbers are 53 percent and 45 percent respectively. In the countries where the importance of religion was the least – in Estonia and Denmark – it practically did not change. Tendencies in the sphere of personal religiosity are similar. In most of the artificially atheized East European countries personal religiosity increased, while in some West European countries it decreased. However, the most rapid changes are in the attitude to the phenomena the church traditionally condemns. If in the eighties there might have been some uncertainties about the directions of the ongoing changes, then in the last decade of the twentieth century moral permissiveness increased in practically all countries, with the biggest changes taking place in the East European countries. Despite the fact that moral permissiveness is stricter in this region, its rate of growth is higher there and consequently differences among the various countries in this sphere decline most quickly. It may be said that the inhabitants of Eastern Europe behave in respect to westerners as children behave in respect to adults: they imitate their good as well as bad habits, hoping the quicker to become adults in this way.

Summarizing the results of the 1990-1999 study, Zulehner and Denz write, “The tendency to the personal invisible religiosity is quite in character for Europe” (Zulehner, Denz, 1993: 234). In our opinion, this conclusion is more than true. In most of the European countries religiosity turns out to be so invisible that it is very hard and practically impossible to record it.

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A deficiency of a culture of trust is often said to be a serious obstacle for further development of democracy in the post-communist countries of East and Central Europe. One essential factor for the development of democracy is generalized trust (Sztompka, 1999; Uslaner, 1999a; Newton, 1999, 2001; Inglehart, 1996). Generalized trust allows people to see other members of the community not as enemies or strangers, but as fellow citizens; it encourages tolerance for pluralism and a variety of ways of life. This is necessary for the implementation of fundamental human rights and freedoms in a democratic society. It also enables a peaceful resolution of political conflicts seeking compromises and consensus. This is possible only when participants of the political processes adhere to the same fundamental democratic values and principles. Finally, generalized trust facilitates cooperation of individuals for mutual benefit in the society. More than other forms of trust it could be a source of “positive social capital,” since it opens possibilities for communication and collective activity not only among people who are of the same sort (with regard to values, way of life or other important characteristics in social life), but also among those who are different.

Given the importance of generalized trust for democracy and the economic prosperity of the modern societies, it is worth the intellectual effort to understand the mechanism of the formation of generalized trust. The main goal of this article is to present an analysis of generalized trust in Lithuania at the individual and collective levels. The main sources of data used in the article are European Value Surveys, conducted in 1990 and 1999. Before the empirical analysis is started a short overview of the theoretical background of the analyses will be given.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Four questions that should be answered before proceeding to an empirical analysis: What is trust? What functions does it perform? What sort of trust is called generalized trust? What factors determine the development of generalized trust?

What Is Trust?

In a most general sense trust is an opinion about actions of other people. This is a cognitive phenomenon: trust is based on the evaluation of probability that actions of others will satisfy or at least not harm our interests.
In the words of Piotr Sztompka, “Trust is a bet on the future contingent actions of others” (Sztompka, 1996: 39). Such a notion of trust has a number of implications, some of which are to be mentioned here.

First, the object of trust is actions of other people, not things or natural events (Sztompka, 1996; Offe, 1999). Although the Age of Advertising has taught us to trust washing powder “X”, which excels in washing out spots of n-sorts and is cheap, relations of trust between human beings have a different nature, since human beings are able to know that they are trusted.

Second, by trusting people we get involved in some sort of activity. For example, we trust lending money to someone or asking for advice on an issue requiring confidentiality. This activity is based on the expectation that the actions of the trustee will be useful for the one who trusts: that the borrowed money will be returned for lender; that the person entrusted with confidential information will not disclose it to someone who is not supposed to know it.

Third, trust is directed to uncertain events. We cannot know for sure that people will behave the way we expect. In other words, one of essential properties of trust is risk (Coleman, 1990; Sztompka, 1996; Offe, 1999). By trusting we risk not only to make wrong prediction regarding the trustworthiness of others, but also to suffer moral and material damage. The rational actor takes into consideration such risks, which differentiate him/her from one who “trusts blindly”.

Fourth, since trust is coupled with the risk of losing, people strive to find out whether others are worthy of their trust. Such an evaluation of trustworthiness requires some expenditure (time, energy, money) induced by acquiring and checking information on a potential trustee. On the other hand, there is no rule defining how much investment is enough in order to trust safely. However, it is obvious that when one starts trusting he/she wins at least in one respect – the above-mentioned expenditures disappear.

Fifth, when the risk of trusting is large and potential loss exceeds potential gain, it is possible to speak about distrust as a functional alternative of trust (Misztal, 1996). From the point of view of the individual this alternative is rational in certain social situations and contexts.

The notion of trust presented here is usually applied in the analysis of elementary, long-lasting, face-to-face human relations. Such relations provide the possibility for individuals to form an opinion about each other’s trustworthiness from the history of their interaction. It is knowledge-based opinion about the reputation and performance of others (Sztompka, 1999), their interest in behaving in the interest of the one who trusts (Hardin, 1998). In addition, long lasting relations could be characterized not only by trust stemming from experience and knowledge, but also by trust born of moral obligations: by an act of trust we oblige people to behave in accordance with our expectations (Offe, 1999).
**Functions of Trust**

What are the functions of trust? By facilitating collective action, trust enables individuals to reach goals that require collaboration between individuals which would not be achieved otherwise. Trust is beneficial for the participants of social interaction because it helps them save resources used for social control and thus reduces the cost of collective action (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Sztompka, 1996; Offe, 1999; Uslaner, 1999a). If an individual trusts, he/she need not continually supervise and check on the actions of others. He/she does not need to force others to provide one or another service, to perform one or another task for him/her. The individual does not need to buy guarantees that others will behave in his/her interest. Trust is also desirable from the point of view of the one trusted, because it is a sort of credit that creates more space for “non-conformity, innovation, originality or – to put it briefly – freedom of action” (Sztompka, 1996: 44).

Sztompka cites Niklas Luhmann’s summary of the functions of trust: “Possibilities of action increase proportionally to the increase in trust” (Sztompka, 1996: 44). However, as long as we focus our attention only on personalized trust that is based on face-to-face relationships of family, friends and acquaintances, the area of trust relations looks very small compared to the extent of modern societies. In essence, we speak about “premodern trust” (Fukuyama, 1995: 11), a remaining island of social relations typical for small traditional communities on the level of complex, differentiated, anonymous modern societies. Such notion of trust is not enough if we seek to understand the meaning of trust in contemporary social and political life. In modern societies the individual daily encounters strangers, in these societies only a small part of the benefit is derived from strong, personal social relations.

Some authors such as Giddens (1990), Sztompka (1999), Warren (1999a) stress that the problem of trust becomes particularly salient in modern societies. This could be explained by some unique characteristics of the contemporary world, some of which must be mentioned for the sake of clarity here. First, “The world in which we live is influenced to a growing extend by purposive human actions; societies are shaped and reshaped, history is made and remade (by charismatic leaders, legislators, social movements, political parties, governments, parliaments, innovators, discoverers, reformers, etc.” (Sztompka, 1999: 11). Second, processes of globalization increase the interdependence of people all around the world, whether in the sphere of economy, politics or culture. Third, modern societies are complex and the well-being of the individual depends on so many factors that the individual can neither conceive or control them all. Finally, in modern societies the well-being of the individual depends to a great extent on impersonal and anonymous relations among people.
Generalized Trust

All the aspects mentioned above testify to the need to trust not only family members, friends or acquaintances, whom we know long enough to make an experience-based judgment on their trustworthiness, but first of all, strangers. We speak about generalized trust, which could be understood as an optimistic attitude that most people have the same fundamental values as we (Uslaner, 1999a), “a belief in the benevolence of human nature in general” (Yamagishi, Yamagishi, 1994: 139). Various names could be found for generalized trust in social science literature: “impersonal trust” (Putnam, 1993), “social trust” (Newton, 1997), “diffuse trust” (Sztompka, 1999), “universal trust” (Offe, 1999).

It is generalized trust that helps individuals diminish the complexity of modern societies and makes their relation with the future easier (Giddens, 1990: 83). By extending social interaction among strangers in a society and enabling higher density of interpersonal contacts, generalized trust facilitates communication and cooperation between people for mutual benefit; promotes tolerance, recognition of cultural and political differences; and enables civilized resolution of social conflicts and peaceful reconciliation of interests (Sztompka, 1996; Misztal, 1996; Putnam, 1993; Warren, 1999). When generalized trust is a rare phenomenon in a society, the niche left by it could be filled by various undesirable functional alternatives: fatalism, corruption, strong social control and surveillance, longing for authoritarian leaders, ghettoization (Giddens, 1990; Inglehart, 1996; Misztal, 1996; Uslaner, 1999; Offe, 1999; Sztompka, 1999).

The Development of Generalized Trust

Given the significance of generalized trust, the next question is “What factors determine the formation of generalized trust?”. In social science literature a number of factors are identified: some of them are on the individual level, some on the societal level. The factors to be discussed below facilitate not only generalized trust but interpersonal trust as well. However, in the case of trust between strangers, when there is no prehistory of face-to-face interaction or possibilities for control the one trusted, some societal level factors discussed below are of crucial importance particularly, for generalized trust.

Let’s start from individual level factors. Some authors note that trust relations do not always depend on rational calculations of an individual evaluating potential gains and losses; sometimes trust is generated by an individual’s predisposition to trust. Sztompka calls this predisposition “trusting impulse” (Sztompka, 1999). It is believed that the predisposition to trust is developed during early socialization in childhood and might be secured as a trait of personality without being necessarily strengthened by a positive experience of reciprocity in later life (Uslaner, 1999b). It is important to emphasizes, that a predisposition to trust others might take both rational and irrational forms.
However, it is more important to find out whether and how generalized trust might be learned in adulthood.

Putnam (1993) believes that the form of trust discussed here is generated mainly by interaction of individuals in networks of civic engagement. According to the author, we learn to trust by communication and cooperation with others in civic associations. However this insight of Putnam was later severely criticized by many authors (see Newton, 1999, 2001; Stolle, 2001; Uslaner, 1999a) who analyzed the relation between membership in voluntary associations and generalized trust. Without denying that participation in civic organizations can facilitate or strengthen generalized trust, it is obvious that participation and trust do not always go together. Kenneth Newton provided one argument against the exaggeration of the role of voluntary association in the generation of trust:

The great majority of people devote more time, emotional energy, and commitment to school, family, and work than to either voluntary associations or loose networks of social contacts. School, work and family also teach the values of reciprocity, trust, compromise, and cooperation, and they account for a far higher proportion of the lives of most citizens. It seems, on the face of it, implausible to ascribe a crucial role to organizational membership and civic engagement which, at best and then only for a small proportion of the adult population, accounts for a relatively few hours per week or month of modern life (Newton, 1999: 16; emphasis added).

That is why a considerable number of authors (Foley, Edwards, 1998; Wuthnow, 2002; Delhey, Newton, 2003) give priority to informal social networks (face-to-face interaction with family members, friends, and acquaintances) as a source of generalized trust. The informal social networks are important not only for teaching “the virtue of trust” but also for mitigating risks related to trusting strangers.

Another risk reducing factor is the objective and subjective well-being of the individual. Inadvertent trust in strangers for poor people might cause relatively larger losses than for rich members of society. Analyses performed by various social scientists reveal that generalized trust is more often a feature of people who are rich, have higher socio-economic status and who feel happy and satisfied about their lives (Inglehart, 1996, 2000; Newton, 1999, 2001; Uslaner, 1999; Offe, 1999; Patterson, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow, 2002; Dekker et al., 2003). Following this “social success and well-being theory” (Delhey, Newton, 2003), generalized trust is an outcome of adult life experience: “Those who have been treated kindly and generously by life are more likely to trust than those who suffer from poverty, unemployment, discrimination, exploitation and social exclusion” (Delhey, Newton, 2003: 96).
Nevertheless, the most important place in the process of formation of generalized trust by many authors is attributed not to the factors mentioned above, but for institutions and legal norms (Levi, 1996; Sztompka, 1999; Offe, 1999; Cohen, 1999; Warren, 1999b; Misztal, 2001). The latter are important for the same reason as individual well-being and membership in social networks: they reduce risks related to trust. However, in contrast to the previously discussed factors, institutions and legal norms are able, to a considerably larger extent, to create favorable conditions for the spread of generalized trust in a society. If the rights of individuals are efficiently protected by institutionalized norms, and there are well-functioning mechanisms of damage compensation, individuals will be more likely to trust others than in social contexts where no institutional leverages for cases of trust abuse are available or they are inefficient (Sztompka, 1999; Warren, 1999b; Hardin, 1999; Offe, 1999; Cohen, 1999; Misztal, 2001). Institutions, supervising actors and those empowered to sanction them, ensure accountability, which is a strong incentive for people to avoid abusing trust. An effective institutional order and legal system mean that it will be difficult for an actor to abuse the trust of others for his/her interest, ignoring the damage caused for one who trusts the action, because such an action will not remain unnoticed and unpunished.

The level of generalized trust in a given society is also influenced by such macro-level factors as economic development (Inglehart, 1996, 2000; Sztompka, 1999; Dekker et al., 2003), the extent of social conflicts (Misztal, 1996; Knack, Keefer, 1997; Uslaner, 1999) or type of political system (Sztompka, 1999; Uslaner, 1999). Economic development mainly creates better conditions for trusting one’s fellow citizens by improving the objective well-being of the population, thus reducing the risks related to trust relations. Social conflicts, dividing society into two or more parts fighting against each other and rejecting compromise, create obstacles for the development of generalized trust and facilitate particularistic or categorical trust (when only people of your own kind are trusted). Briefly explaining the importance of the political system for the development of generalized trust, Eric Uslaner’s statement – “Only in democracies is trust a rational gamble” - might be of help (Uslaner, 1999a: 141). In totalitarian societies, where the state strives to control all spheres of the citizens’ life, trust in most co-citizens may cause huge losses. That is why it is difficult to trust anyone other than members of one’s family and very close friends in this type of political environment. In democratic societies, trust in strangers has a greater chance to be justified and beneficial for individuals.

Finally, the spread of generalized trust can be facilitated or inhibited by the cultural context. Trust becomes part of culture when it is rooted not only in individual attitudes, but also when it pervades various areas of social life and becomes the normative expectation (Sztompka, 1999). These normative expectations regulate behavior not only of the person who trusts, but also that of the person who is trusted. In other words, there is normative obligation to trust, and there is normative obligation to be trustworthy. When a culture of trust prevails in a society, development of trust relations is easier than in
the societies where different spheres of social life are pervaded by distrust. However one should be careful in defining a culture of trust as a source of generalized trust, because statements may easily turn to tautology. In societies characterized by a prevailing culture of distrust, most people do not trust other members of society. However, what kind of culture prevails in the society – trust or distrust - is defined on the bases of a number of people who think that most people can be trusted. In this respect it is important to stress that we are interested not in the level of trust in a given society, but in the cultural factors that might influence the individual’s attitudes towards benevolence of most people in their society.

**DYNAMICS OF GENERALIZED TRUST IN POST-COMMUNIST LITHUANIA**

In analyzing survey data an indicator of generalized trust is the answers of respondents to the question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? a) most people can be trusted; b) can’t be too careful” (Inglehart, 1996, 1997, 2000; Rose, 1995; Uslaner, 1999a; Stolle, Rochon, 1999; Delhey, Newton, 2003; Dekker et al., 2003). Some authors insist that such a measurement instrument is not sufficient to measure such a complex attitude as trust in other people (Letki, Evans, 2001). As Wuthnow notes, there is a huge need for qualitative research which would provide information on what people have in mind when choosing one of two answer alternatives (Wuthnow, 2002). In the words of the author, when respondents are given the possibility to express their agreement or disagreement on each statement separately, they do not understand them as mutually exclusive. That is why, in research of trust, more complex scales are often used, that encompass not only the indicator mentioned above, but also indicators of belief in the honesty and benevolence of others (Yamagishi, Yamagishi, 1994; Brehm, Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Narayan, Cassidy, 2001; Letki, Evans, 2001).

While recognizing that complex scales of generalized trust might be more reliable, in longitudinal researches carried out in Lithuania they have not been applied. That is the reason why in the analysis presented below only the indicator of generalized trust defined above will be used.

The possibility to look at the dynamics of generalized trust in Lithuania during the decade after the collapse of communist regime is based on the data of the European Value Study (EVS), conducted in 1990 and 1999, and World Value Study (WVS), conducted in the country in 1996. As could be seen from the data in Figure 1, in 1990, generalized trust was characteristic of a one third of the Lithuanian population.
During the seven years after the Declaration of Independence of Lithuania the level of generalized trust dropped – in 1996 only two in ten Lithuanians thought that most people can be trusted, and, at least till 1999, this number did not change significantly. It is difficult to say when the largest fall in the level of generalized trust in the society took place. We can only note that in the country there were twice fewer people who thought that most people could be trusted in 1995 than in 1990 (Rose, 1995). The collected data is helpful in answering three questions. First, why the level of generalized trust is low in Lithuania? Second, what factors do account for the decrease of generalized trust in the society during the several years after the beginning of radical social, political and economic reforms? Third, while generalized distrust is a feature of a majority of the population, in what social categories is it more widespread and in what less? An answer to the first two questions requires societal level analysis, the answer to the third question could be provided by individual level data analysis.

**INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF GENERALIZED TRUST**

Delhey and Newton (2003) have developed an attractive model for analysis of determinants of generalized trust that I will try to apply for individual-level data analysis of trust in Lithuania. These authors, using Euromodule surveys data from seven societies, tested how much the factors identified by various authors as determinants of trust (and that were discussed briefly above) actually do explain trust in the societies. The results of their analysis showed that some of the factors, namely – the well-being of the individual, his/her integration into informal social networks and societal conditions (perceived level of social conflicts in the society and public safety) – are associated with trust, and some factors – personality traits conductive to trust, voluntary organizations, size and characteristics of the community in which an individual
lives – fare rather poorly in explaining generalized trust. The European Value Survey data provide the possibility of testing the influence of four factors on trust in post-communist Lithuania: 1) individual well-being, 2) participation in voluntary organizations, 3) membership in informal networks, 4) perception of social and political environment.

First of all, it should be said that binary analysis of the data of the European Value Surveys conducted in 1990 and 1999 in Lithuania has confirmed a majority of the regularities established by various authors in their analysis of generalized trust. First, the data of both surveys show that generalized trust is more often a feature of people who belong to the category of “winners”: those who feel happy and satisfied about their lives, have higher income and higher professional status. Second, people that actively participate in the work of voluntary associations more frequently are endowed with the attitude that most people can be trusted. Third, the data of both surveys show an association between membership in informal social networks and trust: respondents who indicated that friends are very important in their lives, that once a month and more frequently they spend time with friends or colleagues outside the workplace, were more frequently among those who said that most people can be trusted. Fourth, generalized trust is associated with perception of social and political conditions in the country. In 1990, the spirit of “singing revolution”, expectations and hopes projected for the establishment of market economy and democracy in the country provided a base at least for some people to take a positive attitude towards the trustworthiness of most people in society. According to the 1990 data, generalized trust at that time was more often characteristic of people who supported political changes that had been started in Lithuania. There were more trusting respondents in the category of those who supported activity of Sąjūdis, trusted the Supreme Council and Government of Lithuania, believed that the overall way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action, thought that in the future society would be characterized by higher morality, there would be less uncertainty than at that moment about the future, people will be less self-interest driven.

The social and political context of 1999 formed new attitudes in the population. When democracy and market economy were already institution-alized, the perception and evaluation of the functioning of the new political system became important with regard to generalized trust. The 1999 European Value Survey provides two general indicators that reveal how much people feel satisfied about the changed political, economic and social conditions of the society: satisfaction with the way democracy is developed in the country and the evaluation of the state of human rights in the country. Data show that those respondents who were satisfied about the way democracy is developed and who believed that human rights are respected in the country, more frequently than those who had negative attitudes on these two issues, expressed the attitude that most people can be trusted.

In order to establish the relative importance of the factors just discussed, there has been a logistic regression analysis of generalized trust with
the data of 1999. As could be seen from the regression results, presented in Table 1, data of Lithuania confirms findings of Delhey and Newton (2003) – subjective well-being (as measured by subjective happiness), membership in informal social networks (frequent contacts with friends and acquaintances) and positive evaluation of social and political conditions in the country (judgment of the state of human rights) – have the strongest association with generalized trust. Meanwhile association between trust and indicators of objective well-being (income and professional status), participation in voluntary organizations lose statistical significance when the influence of other variables is controlled.

Table 1. Results of logistic regression analysis of generalized trust (1999, EVS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>B (Exp.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.066***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic characteristics:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (1 - male)</td>
<td>1.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: (ref.: tertiary)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary</td>
<td>0.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary</td>
<td>0.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary organizations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active membership in at least one voluntary organizations (1 – yes)</td>
<td>1.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal social networks:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spent time with friends (1 – once a month and more frequently)</td>
<td>1.858**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spent time with colleagues outside workplace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 – once a month and more frequently)</td>
<td>1.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-being:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling of happiness (1 – feel very happy/happy)</td>
<td>1.885*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (ref.: high)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>0.679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional status (ref: employer, manager, higher level specialist)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior level specialist</td>
<td>1.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual worker</td>
<td>0.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled and unskilled manual worker</td>
<td>1.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-political attitudes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>0.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of the state of human rights in the country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 – human rights respected)</td>
<td>1.887**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 692
Model Chi-Square = 35.121***
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.114
Percent of correct predictions: 73 percent

Statistical significance: * p<0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001
I do not think that it would be right to finish the analysis of trust determinants at the individual level with only conclusions from logistic regression. I feel especially unsatisfied about considering associations as autonomous theories without clearly defined or, at least, discussed possible links among them at the conceptional level. The European Value Study was not devoted to research on the culture of trust or of distrust in European societies. As usually happens when an attempt is made to apply secondary data for purposes for which they were not initially meant, unanswered research questions outweigh answered questions. Definitely, it is not enough to say that the importance of friends, being happy and a positive evaluation of the state of human rights in the society have influence on the disposition of individuals to trust most people in the society. Variables are only more or less strong (reliable if you want) indicators of factors. That is why it is worth attempting to unite these factors (having in mind insights of authors reviewed in the first part of the article) into one scheme aimed at explaining trust. A result of such efforts is presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Determinants of generalized trust
The base for generalized trust is the sense of security of an individual, which is to a large extent related to his/her evaluation of the risks of suffering damage from actions of other people in the social environment in which the individual lives. The security of the individual is understood not only as physical security, but in a broader sense, as social, economic and political security, the normative referent of which could be a conception of human rights and liberties in modern democratic societies. This security is a composite of factors developed from the interplay of other factors such as the well-being of the individual, his/her social integration, his/her perception of social environment and his/her personal values that encourage him/her to seek for independence and autonomy. Each of these later factors is more or less shaped by macro-level forces: economic development of the country, efficiency of political system, level of social conflicts, prevailing cultural norms and values. Moving from individual to collective level of analysis, new possibilities are opened to look for answers not only to the question of why some individuals trust strangers and others do not, but also of why the level of generalized trust is higher in one society and lower in another, of what accounts for rises and falls of level of generalized trust in certain periods of time. In applying the scheme presented in Figure 2, an attempt will be made, briefly, to discuss the level and dynamics of generalized trust in Lithuania, introducing into the analysis a comparative perspective to other countries.

Collective-level Analysis of Generalized Trust

Comparing Lithuania to other countries of Europe, one can see that Lithuania does not differ greatly by its low level of generalized trust from other countries of Europe including countries that have long-term traditions of democracy. Only five in 27 countries, that took part in European Value Study in 1999, have a generalized trust level above 50 percent (see Figure 3).

On the other hand the data reveal that an average level of trust in post-communist countries of Europe is 21 percent, which is twice smaller than the average level of trust in Western Europe countries (41 percent). An understanding of the differences between countries should be sought in the interaction of social, political, economic and cultural factors that in turn influence the well-being, social integration, perception of the social environment and the value orientations of individuals. Each of these dimensions, as well as macro-level forces that have influence on them, will be discussed below.
Figure 3. Level of generalized trust in European countries
(1999 EVS, *1999 WVS)
The Anatomy of Generalized Trust

The Well-Being of the Individual and the Level of Economic Development

Well-being of individual is often analyzed in two aspects – objective and subjective. Indicators of objective well-being are income, standard of living, and those of subjective well-being – subjective feeling of happiness and satisfaction with one’s life. Individual level analysis of trust in various countries reveals that subjective well-being has a stronger influence on generalized trust than objective (Delthey, Newton, 2003). Making the transition from individual to collective level of analysis, we can ask, “How many Lithuanians feel satisfied about their life?” “How did the level of life satisfaction in the country change over the decade after the collapse of the communist regime?”

According to data of the European Value Survey, in 1990 less than half of the population (44 percent) was satisfied with life in Lithuania. In 1999 the people who felt satisfied about their life constituted only a one third of population (33 percent). The numbers become more informative with regard to prevailing distrust in the society, when they are presented in the context of other European countries (see Figure 4). As one can see, there is a much lower rate of life-satisfaction in post-communist Europe countries than in Western Europe countries.

Although in social science literature it is often emphasized that subjective well-being does not necessarily coincide with objective well-being, at the same time it is admitted that the level of economic development of the country has a strong influence on the life satisfaction of the population, since economic achievements determine the economic security of the people (Inglehart, 2000). Economic factors are of particular importance in countries where economic conditions are difficult and where citizens have to spend a large amount of their time solving the material problems of their life. During the Soviet period, the centralized economy was not able to answer the various needs of population, however economic instability, the fall of the standard of living, the rising unemployment that accompanied transition to the market economy worsened the economic situation of many people in Lithuania. This, in turn, was reflected in the decrease of the level of subjective well-being not only in this country, but also in other post-communist countries that underwent sudden economic changes.

On the other hand, the time that passed from the collapse of the communist regime was marked not only by economic decline, but also by economic growth. Considering the positive changes, one could say that one of the preconditions necessarily for the spread of generalized trust has been appearing in post-communist societies. Unfortunately these changes are not sufficient. Generalized trust is not as dynamic as economic processes, and the subjective well-being of individuals as well as other factors crucial for trust are much slower in bearing the awaited harvest.
Social Integration of Individuals

Some authors do not agree with an assumption that it is the communist regime that undermined the fundamentals of a culture of trust in many East and Central Europe societies. It is argued that in former communist countries trust in fellow citizens was more important for the daily life of people than in democratic and economically developed Western countries. Such an argument is explained by pointing out that the inefficient economic system of the communist regime, institutional uncertainty and unpredictability stimulated mutual cooperation between people and reliance on oral agreements, while in the countries where citizens were satisfied about economic and political system and where there was an efficient social security system, people were less in need of informational networks of social relations (Letki, Evans, 2001).
Following this argument one could expect that informal relations with friends and acquaintances in post-communist countries would be more valued than in economically developed Western countries. However, this is not supported by empirical evidence.

According to data of the EVS 1999, friends and acquaintances are less important for people of East and Central Europe than for those of advanced Western Europe countries (see Figure 5). Respectively, people in former countries spend less time with friends. In Western Europe, on average, six in ten people at least once a week spent time with friends, while the analogous number for post-communist countries is four in ten. Data on time spend in clubs and voluntary organizations also reveal a significant difference between the two groups of countries: in Western Europe on average four in ten people do this at least once a month, while in Central and Eastern Europe – two in ten. The differences between post-communist countries and Western Europe countries are confirmed by the analyses of other authors, who applied more precise indicators of relations with friends: numbers of close friends, frequency of contacts with friends, etc. (Delthey, Newton, 2003).

Figure 5. Importance of friends and generalized trust (EVS 1999)
Authors who speak about widespread trust in fellow citizens under communist regimes seem to mix two different things: the dependence of the objective well-being of individuals on cooperation with family members, friends and relations of “blat” (i.e. corruption) and generalized trust as a belief in the benevolence and honesty of most people. The second does not follow from the first. Strong informal networks helped people to cope with institutional and social uncertainties in daily life; however it does not mean that people trusted most other people. Trust in family members and friends is a form of trust which is knowledge-based, while generalized trust is trust in strangers. What differentiates post-communist countries from at least some Western Europe countries is not trust in family members, friends, and acquaintances, but trusting only in friends without trusting most other people.

On the other hand, going back to the difference in the importance of friends between post-communist and Western Europe societies, one could hypothesize that in the value hierarchies of former societies, friends are given a lower place than in Western societies. This has an influence on social activity, as well as on the social integration of people, which in turn affects generalized trust.

PERCEPTION OF SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT, INSTITUTIONAL EFFICIENCY AND EFFICIENCY OF NEW POLITICAL REGIME

In the analysis of determinants of generalized trust at the individual level it was found that there is an association between the attitude that most people can be trusted and evaluation of the state of human rights in the country. This variable provides only a part of the information about the perception of aspects of social and political environment that are important for trust in fellow citizens. An opinion of individuals about the behavioral characteristics of most people in the society (their morality), the evaluation of public safety (fear of becoming crime victims), evaluation of the efficiency of institutions responsible for ensuring order and the rule of law – are other indicators worth including in analyses of the determinants of trust.

Looking for the answer to question of why, in Lithuania, there is a prevailing distrust of fellow citizens, it is important to have in mind not only the legacies of the communist regime, but also some features of the transition period. One of the important factors that facilitated the decline in the level of generalized trust in the society was the normative disorganization or social anomic brought about by the radical political, economic and social transformations of the society. Rapid erosion of old norms and values and a much slower development of a new normative system, regulating the activity of the people in a new political and economic system, provided fertile soil for the growth of feelings of insecurity and a proliferation of distrust in other people. In the survey conducted in 1997 by the Institute of Culture and Arts 52 percent of respondents, in answering question, “Do you feel physically safe or to put in otherwise, aren’t you afraid of being attacked, beaten and robbed?” indicated that they did not feel safe. Keeping in mind the relation
found between the evaluation of public safety and generalized trust in other European countries (Delthey, Newton 2003; Uslaner, 2002), one could state that one of the reasons of pervasive distrust in Lithuania is a widespread fear of becoming crime victims.

Another factor that must be taken into consideration in explaining the low level of generalized trust in the society is the weak trust of people in public institutions. Although binary analysis of generalized trust and institutional trust does not show statistically significant differences between the members in society who trust most people and those who do not with regard to institutional trust, there is no reason to claim that institutional trust is an equally insignificant factor in explaining why so many people in Lithuania do not trust their fellow citizens.

Comparison of data on institutional trust in the countries of Europe shows that in Western Europe countries there are, on average, more people who trust police, courts, civil servants, parliament, social security system than in post-communist countries. The institutional trust is highest in the countries that also have the highest levels of generalized trust, namely, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands (see Inglehart et al., 2004). In Lithuania, as well as in many of other post-communist countries, one of the serious obstacles for formation of generalized trust is the insufficiency of police and courts and low trust of citizens in these institutions. Binary analysis of the relationship between generalized trust and institutional trust in European countries shows that trust in courts, more than trust in any other institution, does the job of differentiating those who think that most people can be trusted and those who think that one should be careful in dealing with people. In half the countries (12 of 24), differences between those who trust in courts and those who do not are statistically significant with regard to generalized trust. It should be noted that countries with no statistically significant relation between the two variables are post-communist countries (except in the case of France, Ireland and Finland), where there are observed low levels of both forms of trust.

As was emphasized in the theoretical part of the article, effective institutions reduce the risk of suffering damage from the actions of strangers. Some preconditions are required for institutions to perform this function – (relative) stability of the social order, transparency and accountability of institutions (Sztompka, 1999). On the one hand, for the emergence of these preconditions, purposive actions of social agents for their realization is of crucial importance; on the other hand – it takes a long time. In Lithuania as well as in other post-communist countries, issues of institutional efficiency, transparency of their activity and accountability recently have been receiving great attention in public policy. However, much still remains to be done, and the slowest part of it will be a change in attitudes of people towards the functioning of institutions.

Finally, it is relevant to discuss political conditions in the countries with regard to generalized trust. On the one hand, processes of democratization created more favorable conditions for trust in fellow-citizens. Data of New Baltic Barometer show that in 1994 the absolute majority of people
thought of the new political regime as much better than the communist regime with respect to the civil and political freedoms of an individual (Rose, Maley, 1994). However despite almost unanimous recognition of the advantages of the new political system, people in Lithuania as well as in other countries of East and Central Europe, evaluate as much worse the efficiency of the political regime than people in Western Europe countries.

Data of EVS reveal that in 1999 only a one quarter (25 percent) of Lithuanians were satisfied with the way democracy developed in the country. For the sake of clarity, it could be indicated that an average percentage of those satisfied with democracy in East and Central Europe countries was 29 percent, and in Western Europe countries – 61 percent, that is twice more than in the former group of countries. In turn, prevailing dissatisfaction with the new regime points to the obstacles for the spread of generalized trust in these societies. Another question is what are these obstacles? What factors determine the evaluation of the efficiency of the political regime – is it a state of implementation of civil and political rights of individual or social and economic rights?

It is obvious, for generalized trust, that both types of rights are of crucial importance. The individual-level analysis of trust has revealed an association between variables of trust and evaluation of the state of human rights in the country. What do people have in mind when they choose the response “respected” or “not respected”. Data of the survey conducted in Lithuania in 2001 show that the majority of Lithuanians, when speaking about disrespect for human rights in the country, most often have in mind socio-economic problems: the right to have and choose a job (that this right is not sufficiently protected in Lithuania indicated 85 percent of respondents), right to proper standards of living (79 percent), right to just payment for work (76 percent), right to social security (56 percent), etc. (HR, 2001). It is also worth noting that in the majority of the post-communist countries people associate democracy not only with political liberties, but also with social equality. According to data of the second wave of the Post-Communist Publics Study, carried out in 1998-2000, in Lithuania 50 percent of respondents think that political liberties and greater social equality have equally to do with democracy, 11 percent think that social equality is more important for democracy, and 39 percent thought that political liberties have more to do with democracy than social equality (Edeltraud Roller et al., ref. Klingelmann, 2004).

Undoubtedly, ensuring the implementation of human rights is an important step in the formation of conditions favorable for generalized trust in the society. Comparing European countries with respect for human rights, one could see that the level of generalized trust is the lowest in the countries where a very small part of the population considers that human rights are very respected in the country (see Figure 6). On the contrary, if there are more people in the country that evaluate very positively the state of human rights, there are also more people who think that most people can be trusted. Yet I would like to say once more that generalized trust is necessary for positive political and social-economic outputs of democratic performance. The spread of general-
ized trust in Lithuania, as well as in other post-communist countries, is inhibited by difficulties in guaranteeing implementation of the social and economic rights of individuals, which is mainly determined by the level of economic development of these countries.

Figure 6. Evaluation of the state of human rights and generalized trust (1999 EVS)

Autonomy of the Individual and Culture

In completing the collective-level trust analysis, the last aspect to be discussed in seeking to explain the low level of generalized trust in the society is the role of cultural factors, grasped by the classic individualism-collectivism dichotomy. Going back to the security of the individual as a base for generalized trust, we can assume that feeling of the social and economic security of individuals partially depends on the value orientations that define
their responsibility for subjective well-being (Fuchs, Klingelmann, 2000). Values of individualism or collectivism determine the expectations of individuals about the sources of their subjective well-being and their relations with other people.

Jüri Allik and Anu Realo (2004) have performed an analysis of data from 42 countries of Europe, South and North America which revealed a strong correlation between individualism and generalized trust. As the authors note, their finding confirms an insight of Emile Durkheim that when individuals become more autonomous, they become more strongly related to the society: “Autonomy and independence are necessary conditions for the development of interpersonal cooperation and social solidarity” (Allik, Realo, 2004: 29).

Value orientations, associated with the expectation that the state has to ensure the well-being of every individual, are one of the legacies of the communist regime in many Eastern and Central Europe countries. In the European Value Survey, respondents were asked to place their views on the scale where one means “individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves”, and ten, “the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”. Data show that in post-communist countries, including Lithuania, there is a smaller percentage of respondents who agreed with the first statement (see Figure 7).

It could be argued that collectivistic value-orientation associates with avoidance of taking more responsibility for one’s individual well-being and more active participation in civic activities. This in turn significantly hinders the development of the culture of trust in the post-communist Lithuania. Trust analysis at the individual-level reveals that generalized trust is more frequently a feature of people who participate in various forms of political action (signing petitions, joining boycotts and legal demonstrations). In the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, fewer respondents indicate that they have done or might do any of these things. Generalized trust is related not only with the experience of participation, but also with understanding the possibilities to struggle for one’s own interest, to have an influence on the decisions of government. It is to be stressed that the disposition to participate in various forms of political action is the opposite of a passive stance of individuals, or in other words to a sense of being powerless to change anything about present social, economic and political relations. This, in turn, is a conductive factor to generalized trust and is not so widespread in Lithuanian society.
CONCLUSION

Generalized trust is an indicator of the society’s “health”, the level of social integration of its members. The foundation of generalized trust is a feeling of security for the individual that should be understood in the broad sense as physical, social, economic and political. Analysis of the determinants of generalized trust in Lithuanian society confirms the crucial importance of risk reducing and mitigating factors stressed by many authors. Such factors are individual well-being, integration into social networks, perception of the social, economic and political environment, value orientations that encourage the individual to seek autonomy and independence. Explaining the level of generalized trust at the collective level, one should take into consideration to what extent preconditions of generalized trust are safeguarded by macro-level...
factors with regard to the majority of the population. In the case of Lithuania, as well as many other post-communist countries, macro-level factors so far do not ensure conditions for the spread of generalized trust in the society.

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REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

This article is devoted to the investigation of the subjective view of Lithuanian people towards their quality of life during the first decade of Independence. This decade was one of most difficult periods for the majority of the Lithuanian population as it marked crucial transformations in the economic, political and social spheres. The collapse of centralized economy, the breakdown of great industrial companies and the privatization process in industrial and agricultural areas seriously destroyed the accustomed order of economic life. The loss of deposits in the Central Bank of the former Soviet Union, the speculation of financial pyramids, inflation and destruction of the state welfare system essentially worsened the financial situation of almost the entire population. Turbulence within the political system – the appearance of numerous parties and interest groups, followed by aberrant political fights for power, together with increased distrust and dissatisfaction – radically changed the previous sense of stability and social solidarity. In turn these new developments affected everyone’s life: the majority lost their jobs or were forced to change professions, part of the population became disoriented and lost in the face of newly spreading capitalist and individualist values, while others managed to adapt to the new environment.

There are many studies of objective indicators of quality of life that measure external conditions of well-being and are independent of personal evaluations, such as living conditions, unemployment rate, the poverty rate, working hours per week, or the prenatal mortality rate, etc. (Noll, 2005). However, the recent development in quality of life studies shows increasing interest towards subjective social indicators as informative measures of people’s well-being (Cummins et al., 2002; Schimmack et al., 2003). Such a shift of focus is grounded on the assumption that it is not sufficient to examine living standard, level and style of life without taking into account the evaluation of these life conditions by individuals themselves. For example, a person can consider his or her life conditions as objectively bad, but at the same time he or she can be satisfied with such situation because these material conditions have little value for him or her. Therefore, the subjective evaluation of the quality of life becomes very important when we want to deal directly with priorities of individuals, their life experiences and sense of well-being.
Among the subjective indicators of the quality of life used in various studies are subjective evaluations of numerous spheres of an individual’s life: good health, successful work, sufficient money, good relations within family and with friends, environment, leisure and many others. Nevertheless, all these indicators can be collected in the self-rating of happiness as a more general measure of the quality of life. According to Harding, the pilot work during the preliminary stages of the Values project revealed that happiness appeared as the pre-eminent concern to most British people. The respondents were asked open-ended question: “What values or goals in life do you think are most worth striving for, either for yourself or for society as a whole?” Analysis of the results revealed that “happiness” or “being generally happy” was the most frequently mentioned value followed by references to family life, income/standard of living, and health (Harding, 1986). Therefore, for the majority of the Western population, happiness is the main value of life and superior goal.

Another subjective indicator of well-being, namely “satisfaction with life as a whole”, is of similar general nature. Thus the analysis of general satisfaction of life can be performed by the examination of satisfaction with constitutive parts of life: satisfaction with family relations, financial situation, work, etc. (Michalos, 1980). Therefore, the notion of life satisfaction includes various aspects of life and can be understood as an “essential indicator of the correspondence between expectations and results” (Mukherjee, 1989: 57). Some social scientists consider the self-rating of happiness and satisfaction with life as being interchangeable, while others, such as Frank M. Andrews and Aubrey C. McKennel (1980), clearly separate them by arguing that questions about life satisfaction and feeling of happiness will provide different results.

In the European Value Study 1990 and 1999/2000 was included both subjective indicators of the quality of life: self-rating of happiness in four levels and a ten-point satisfaction with life scale. Therefore, this article will focus on the examination of the main patterns of subjective evaluation at the cross-national level, as well as of the relation between these two subjective indicators. Secondly, an attempt will be made to analyze the factors that influence the subjective understanding of the quality of life: economic, socio-demographic, and determinants based on such values as voluntarism, etc. Because of the participation of almost all Western, Central and East European countries, the data gathered allow a comparison of the similarities and differences in subjective evaluations of the quality of life in Lithuania and other countries. Besides, such analysis reveals the impact of specific cultural traditions and different socio-economic situations on people’s feeling of happiness and satisfaction with life. The most bothersome questions here are how different socio-economic conditions and cultural traditions are reflected in the subjective evaluation of the quality of life, what can be done in order to improve this evaluation in post-communist countries, and in turn to bring the two parts of Europe closer to each other.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EVALUATION OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING

The analysis of the factors that influence subjective evaluations of the quality of life will basically follow the need-gratification theory of well-being proposed by Maslow (1970). The basic assumption of this theory states that the degree of basic need gratification is positively correlated with the degree of life satisfaction. Besides, the basic needs have a hierarchical organization: physiological needs (e.g., food, thirst) are most basic, followed by safety needs (e.g., security, protection), love needs (e.g., affection, belongingness), esteem needs (e.g., self-respect, freedom), and idiosyncratic self-actualization needs at the top of the hierarchy. Maslow postulates that higher needs become salient as lower needs are gratified (Maslow, 1970). Therefore, it can be supposed that people in economically poorer countries often suffer from a lack of financial security and adequate housing, thus physiological and safety needs can be more salient in these countries than in wealthy ones.

The fruitfulness of Maslow’s theory for the life satisfaction analysis in different countries is demonstrated by Shigehiro Oishi and his colleagues’ current findings which confirm that people in wealthier nations tend to be more satisfied with their lives. Besides people in wealthier nations tend to base their life satisfaction judgments on the level of gratification of higher needs (Oishi et al., 1999). The impact of the economic situation is emphasized by many researchers of the quality of life; for example, Ronald Inglehart also states that there is positive correlation between economic welfare and life satisfaction: economic security enlarges the dominant life satisfaction in society (Inglehart, 1997). According to these assumptions, it can be expected that in Lithuania and other post-communist countries people will be less satisfied with their lives in comparison with wealthier countries.

Among the socio-demographical determinants of the quality of life can be mentioned a number of variables, such as health, age, occupational status, marital status, education, place of living and the like. However, we will concentrate on two most evident cases of influence: marital status and age, as they, differently from health issues, can be expected to be of distinct importance in wealthier and poorer countries. In general, researchers agree that the strongest relationship with subjective well-being can be observed in the marital status of people: people who have a stable relationship report significantly greater satisfaction and happiness with life than do others – particularly the divorced/separated and widowed. For example, Harding points out, the widowed are the most likely of all to say that, taking all things together, they were not very or not at all happy (Harding, 1986).

Another important demographical factor that shows greater relationship with subjective evaluation of the quality of life is age. However, as Harding argues, age per se is not a strong predictor either of satisfaction with life or happiness, except as part of broader life-cycle changes. Happiness ratings in Western societies, according to him, appear to decline with age, but the only significant drop occurs among those aged 65 and over, among
whom retirement and widowhood are common occurrences (Harding, 1986). Nevertheless, Inglehart claims that in societies that have experienced a long period of rising economic and physical security, we will find substantial differences between the value priorities of older and younger groups: the young are much likelier to emphasize the values of well-being than the old. This reflects the fact that the younger generation experienced greater security during their formative years than did the older generation (Inglehart, 1997). Therefore, in respect of socio-demographical factors it can be expected that the subjective evaluation of the quality of life is higher among young people and that subjective well-being is higher among people who have stable relationships in their personal life.

The third bloc of factors that can influence the subjective evaluation of the quality of life is related with different value orientations within the population of one society and across the different societies. Following the theoretical assumptions of Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism, the value orientations are strongly related with life satisfaction and feelings of happiness. Such assumptions actually are deeply rooted in Maslow’s insights, as Inglehart states that “in cross-national perspective, post-modern values will be most widespread in the richest and most secure societies; the publics of the impoverished societies will place more emphasis on survival values” (Inglehart, 1997: 45). For Inglehart, even the increase of emphasis on the importance of subjective evaluation of well-being is related with enlarged economic security in advanced Western societies, as subjective well-being and quality of life concerns for many people “become higher priorities than economic growth” (Inglehart, 1997: 44). Such claims suggest comparing the subjective well-being among people from stable and economically safe Western societies and people from new democracies in Central-East European countries, in particular the Lithuanian situation. It can be assumed that in poorer and less stable countries the life satisfaction of people will be more related with the gratification of economic needs and less related with post-materialist value orientation than in wealthier countries.

THE QUALITY OF LIFE AND LIVING STANDARDS

The majority of works that examine the factors that influence the feeling of happiness and life satisfaction emphasize the major impact of such economic factors as the gross national product (GNP), household or individual income, and evaluation of the financial situation. Nevertheless, the GNP seems to be a highly questionable factor. In the case of post-communist countries this factor seems quite relevant: in countries with a greater GNP (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia) both subjective indicators of the quality of life are considerably higher than in countries with a lower GNP such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. However, in Western countries this factor cannot explain the different patterns of life satisfaction and happiness. Therefore, the cases of marked differences between the GNP and similar level of life satisfaction (as is the case, for example, of Ireland and the Scandinavian countries) impel one
to look for other than macro-economic factors of influence.

In our research the dependence of the quality of life on living standards is demonstrated by the results of the cluster analysis presented in Table 1. The examination of the relationship between two subjective indicators of the quality of life by using the clustering technique clearly differentiated two clusters. The first includes all Western European countries (with the exception of Great Britain, because the question about happiness was not included in the questionnaire for this country) and two post-communist countries, namely, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. These countries are tied by the more positive subjective evaluation of the quality of life: people in these countries declared stronger feelings of happiness and more satisfaction with life.

The second cluster includes the remaining Central and East European countries with the exception of Greece, as not a post-communist country. In comparison with the first cluster, people from these countries consider their happiness and lives satisfaction less positively: inhabitants of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus are almost twice less satisfied with their life than inhabitants of Ireland or Denmark. Therefore this differentiation allows one to speak generally about the evident distinction in respect of the level of subjective well-being in Western and Central-East European countries.

The results, which show two different patterns of subjective evaluation of the quality of life (highly positive evaluation in Western Europe and more negative in Central and East European countries), generally reflect the main division between Western industrially advanced European countries and evidently less developed post-communist countries. Consequently, these data seem to confirm the great impact of the economic situation on subjective evaluation of the quality of life: people of poorer countries are less satisfied with life.

Besides, these results show the strong relationship between both subjective indicators of the quality of life. In most cases, people who state a higher level of happiness also tend to evaluate their life satisfaction more positively. However, they also show that the results from these two questions are quite different: there are a number of countries where the feeling of happiness is stronger than life satisfaction, thus these two indicators can hardly be considered as interchangeable. Therefore, the results of the relations between two subjective indicators of the quality of life support the idea that questions about happiness and life satisfaction provide different answers.

If one looks at the situation of Lithuania, the subjective evaluation of the quality of life of its population clearly reflects the general situation of post-communist countries, as included in the second cluster. In more detailed analysis, however, this subjective evaluation undergoes significant changes.
Table 1. European countries by subjective indicators of well-being, 1999

<table>
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<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Silhouette value</th>
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<th>Life satisfaction</th>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparing the data from the 1990 and 1999 study, the tendency is towards a decrease of satisfaction with life. As can be seen from Figure 1, after the decade of transformation satisfaction with life decreased from 44 percent till 34 percent. Even more evident is the percentage of dissatisfied population, which increased from 24 percent in 1990 till 38 percent in 1999. This change evidently reflects the worsening of the economic situation of the majority of the Lithuanian population during the transformation period. It is also confirmed by the correlation of data presented in Table 2, which shows the relation between subjective evaluation of satisfaction with life and income as the most influential factor in explaining such decrease in 1999. As we can see from Table 2, the lower the people’s incomes, the less their satisfaction with life, and vice versa. Similar impact is made also by the status of occupation: unemployed people are less satisfied with life than salaried ones or businessmen; nevertheless, this basically reflects the differences in the financial situation.

The same interconnection between subjective evaluation of the quality of life and economic factors can be found also in data about the financial situation of households in other European countries. Harding and his colleagues, in their analysis of the relation between income and satisfaction with life, also claim that these variables are strongly correlated at the individual level, and this might appear to explain why countries with higher average per capita income have higher average satisfaction levels. Indeed, if the cross-national comparisons involve underdeveloped and developing nations, as well as industrialized countries, such a relationship is quite apparent. However, according to them, within the developed nations of Western Europe such simple hypothesis is less convincing. It would not help to explain, for example, the
relatively high levels of dissatisfaction reported among those in the top income groups in France (Harding et al., 1986).

Table 2. The factor of incomes and life satisfaction in Lithuania, 1999 (percent)

Incomes | Satisfaction with life (percent)
--- | ---
Less than 100 Lt | 25
101 – 300 | 26
301 – 500 | 34
501 – 1000 | 49
More than 1001 Lt | 65

Our results of logistic regression also reflect the strongest relationship between subjective well-being and household incomes in comparison with other socio-economic factors both in Western and Central and East European countries (see Table 3). Nevertheless, such relationship is evidently stronger in most Central and East European countries than in Western countries. Therefore, such evidence strongly supports our expectation that in poorer countries the life satisfaction of people is more related with gratification of economic needs than in wealthier countries. The more negative evaluation of the financial situation and consequently the prevailing feeling of being economically unsafe can be clearly explained by rapid socio-economic changes in most post-communist countries. However, despite the similar experience of these changes, some Central European countries, as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, succeeded in overcoming most difficulties in a shorter period of time and experienced an increase of GNP, as well as household incomes. Other countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus faced much worse situations. Such economic differentiation among the post-communist bloc of countries can explain the higher subjective evaluation of the quality of life in the first mentioned group (Gečienė, 2001). Besides, it again confirms the importance of gratification of basic needs in poorer countries for higher life satisfaction.

Table 3. Wald coefficient of binary logistic regression with independent variable of life satisfaction in West and Central East European regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable as value</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.7**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friends, acquaintances</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.2**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leisure time</td>
<td>24.6**</td>
<td>10.7**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overall</td>
<td>9.4**</td>
<td>11.5**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The arguments that in the majority of post-communist countries the satisfaction with life is caused more by material than post-material values can be found also in Inglehart’s and Baker’s comparison of countries by the distribution of survival and self-expression values. According to them, despite the common cultural tradition in post-communist countries, the countries that experienced the decrease of economics – Russia, Belarus, Baltic countries, etc. – show a stronger emphasis on survival values, while others – Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, etc, that experienced economic betterment – stress increased orientation towards the self-expression values (Inglehart, Baker, 2000).

Nevertheless, comparing the factors that influence the satisfaction with life and feeling of happiness, it appears that there are considerable differences between the relation of these two subjective indicators of well-being with economic factors and that these require deeper explanation. As can be seen from Table 4, the level of incomes again is one of strongest factors influencing the level of happiness both in Western and post-communist countries. However, in comparison with life satisfaction this indicator is considerably weaker. Besides in the case of Western Europe societies it becomes less important than the factor of stable relationships. This emphasizes the distinction between both subjective indicators of the quality of life and those differences related with the different strength of various influences. Most authors emphasize the nature of happiness as being more related with a transient emotional state, short-lived and unstable. Others show the existence of a happiness trait that consists of self-esteem, personal control, optimism, and extraversion (Lu, 1999). It can be also observed that the base of happiness is more rooted in inward matters of individuals, while the base of life satisfaction lies in material conditions (Gečienė, 2000).

Table 4. Wald coefficient of binary logistic regression with independent variable of happiness in West and East regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable as value</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>work</td>
<td>5.1*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family</td>
<td>10.6*</td>
<td>41.1**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friends, acquaintances</td>
<td>23.5*</td>
<td>43.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leisure time</td>
<td>30.8**</td>
<td>52.6**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The difference between these two indicators of the quality of life can be noted also in the more detailed analysis of changes in the feeling of happiness in Lithuania. First of all, it can be noted that the life satisfaction of the Lithuanian population is relatively lower than in some other post-communist countries, such as Slovakia, Poland and Croatia, while the feeling of happiness is quite similar and reaches 2.8 from a possible 4 points (see Table 1). Further, the analysis of the changes of feelings of happiness during the first decade of regained independence reveals that, if satisfaction with life decreased, the feeling of happiness increased, as can be noticed from comparison of Figure 1 and Figure 2.

According to the data, in 1990 only 48 percent of respondents said that they are happy, while in 1999 there were 61 percent of such answers. The difference between satisfaction with life and the feeling of happiness also becomes clear if one looks at what are the main factors that have impact on the level of the feeling of happiness. If, for life satisfaction in Lithuania, the strongest factor was the level of incomes, for the feeling of happiness these factors are:
factors are age and stable relationships, while the impact of other factors such as incomes or occupational status is not statistically significant. Therefore, such a situation inspires one to look at the possible causes of the evident difference that rest not only on economic performance.

**SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND WELL-BEING**

According to the data presented in Tables 3 and 4, the second block of factors that impacts on the subjective evaluation of the quality of life consists of the presence of stable relationships and age. These factors have less strong, yet significant relation with life satisfaction and especially with feelings of happiness. Nevertheless, the presence of stable relations is a much stronger factor that influences the satisfaction with life in Western societies than in Central East European countries. It can be supposed, if, to use Maslow’s assumptions that people in poorer post-communist countries suffer more from a lack of financial security than in advanced Western countries, thus such needs as love, belongingness and stable relationships count less than incomes for satisfaction with life.

However, for feelings of happiness it seems that the presence of stable relations is of similar importance in both the Western and the Central East parts of Europe. There is only the distinction that this factor is the most important for feelings of happiness in Western European countries, while in post-communist countries it is the second one after income, which again shows the essential difference of the factors that cause the satisfaction with life and feelings of happiness. Thus in general, feeling of happiness more reflect some inward matters than does satisfaction with life and is more related with the higher needs gratification described by Maslow.

In the case of the other demographic factor – age – the results also revealed that it has a strong relationship with happiness in all Central and East European countries: people at an older age report a lower level of happiness than the young. In Lithuania only 26 percent of people over 41 years old declare that they are satisfied with life, while this percent among people between 21-40 years reaches 33. However, if age is the second important factor in post-communist countries after income, it has little relevance in Western European countries in both subjective indicators of quality of life. This distinction may be explained by considerable differences in the life conditions of older people in both parts of Europe. From the one side, the older people in Western countries enjoy essential security of their economic and social lives, while in post-communist countries, older people, especially pensioners, experience a lack of financial security in the changing economic situation, thus their situation differs crucially from people of the same age in Western Europe. But here it can be supposed that not actually is age the factor that impacts the subjective evaluation of quality of life, but lower financial resources and higher economic insecurity among these people.

On the other hand, one can assume a great cultural change in respect of generations in post-communist countries: younger people are less affected
by the communist ideology, more economically active, more adaptive and innovative. Such generational differences are more evident in the circumstances of rapid change, thus there is also background for the explanation of the lack of such differences in case of the more stable advanced Western countries. However, the mentioned insignificance of age in subjective evaluation of well-being in Western countries questions the validity of the Inglehart assumption about clear division in this respect between the older and younger generations; though it can also be interpreted as a consequence in the great change of values from the traditional to the post-modern in these countries.

VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING

Comparing the strength of expressed post-modern values in causing greater subjective evaluation of the quality of life our data do not support the expectation that in poorer and less stable countries the life satisfaction of people will be less related with post-materialist value orientation than in wealthier countries. Actually, in the case of post-communist countries, such post-materialist values as a high evaluation of friends and leisure in personal life in relation with higher evaluation of the quality of life, the post-communist countries show an even slightly greater correspondence than Western countries. In general it can be said that, with respect to post-materialist values, the results of regression analysis do not show any meaningful differences between these two groups of European countries.

Such an absence of a stronger tendency to demonstrate higher life satisfaction among people who value friends and leisure time is not easy to explain. Inglehart himself, in supporting his theory of post-materialism, explains that “the linkage between post-materialism and subjective well-being is a cultural syndrome, not an individual-level ideology” (Inglehart, 1997: 87). His arguments are grounded on the basis that “far from being a paradox, this is central to their nature”, because post-materialists “take economic security for granted and go on to emphasize other (non-material) goals. Moreover, they have relatively demanding standards for these other aspects of life – to such an extent that they often manifest lower levels of overall life satisfaction than do materialists in the same society” (Inglehart, 1997: 87).

In general the importance of value orientations on subjective well-being is clearly much weaker, as usually can be observed in “soft” cultural variables. From the data presented in Tables 3 and 4, in Western countries the highest importance is found in the case of leisure evaluation, but we need to have in mind that this relation with life satisfaction is ten times weaker than with the level of income. The same situation can be observed in the case of post-communist societies. Nevertheless, if to look at the relation of life satisfaction with the overall importance of work, family, friends, leisure, politics and religion, it appears, especially in case of taking only radical evaluation (1-7 vs. 8-10, where 8-10 means that mentioned values are very important), that this factor becomes the third in rank.
In the case of happiness such a phenomenon is even more evident, which is proved once again by a greater relation of happiness with value orientations than with material matters in comparison with life satisfaction. Thus the overall importance of values appears as a second factor (in Western countries) after stable relationships and third (in case of Central-East European countries) after stable relationships and year of birth in relation with higher levels of happiness. Such evidence shows, as a common feature of societies in both parts of Europe, that subjective evaluation of well-being is based not only on the economic situation, but also on the particular type of personal orientation towards higher evaluation of the importance of the main values in their life.

These results also show the possible interconnection between the level of declared subjective evaluation of the quality of life and the strength of declared overall importance of all values. From the data we can assume that these people who moderately evaluate the importance (fewer answers such as “very important”) of all the following values - work, family, friends, leisure, politics and religion - in their lives, tend to give more moderate answers, also, in the case of subjective evaluation of quality of life. Such a situation reflects some general cultural traditions in some societies not to show exaggerated evaluations that, in turn, can also create biases in filling out questionnaires. Such cultural trends were nicely described by Anna L. D. Lau and Robert A. Cummins who compared the subjective well-being of Asian populations and Western counterparts. After the comparison they concluded that the lower evaluation of happiness in the population of Hong Kong can be explained by cultural response bias that discourages “strong positive appraisals of personal life satisfaction” in Asian society more than in Western, when other determinants such as age, gender, income and education are the same (Lau, Cummins, 2003: 249). Thus it can be assumed that the lower or reserved subjective evaluation of quality of life in post-communist countries and particularly in Lithuania can also be influenced by cultural biases of similar origin.

Other relationships between value orientations and subjective evaluation of the quality of life can be observed in more detailed analysis of the Lithuanian case, where it is possible to check the influence on satisfaction with life and feelings of happiness by such cultural variables as optimist and pessimist orientations, voluntarism and fatalism, self-dependence, etc. The optimist and pessimist orientations were assessed using the question in the 1990 questionnaire about what characteristics will be widespread in future Lithuanian society: social equality, effort to live not worse than others, effort to use maximally the situation, uncertainty, high morality and striving for high ideals. Thus these optimists, who said that uncertainty will be less characteristic in future society more frequently declare being happy (75 percent) than do pessimists (49 percent). Similarly, people who expect that future society will be characterized by high morality and striving for high ideals more frequently declare themselves more happy (respectively 61 and 36 percent) than pessimists (respectively 10 and 19 percent). Besides, satisfaction with life had significant correlation with social equality, effort to live not worse than
others, and to use maximally the situation, while feelings of happiness correlated only with anxiety, high morals and striving for high ideals. This again supports the idea that the later indicator is more connected with inward issues than with material ones.

Different aspects of the subjective evaluation of the quality of life are revealed by analysis of such orientation as freedom to choose (see Table 5). Here it is possible to distinguish two main groups among the population: fatalists and voluntarists. To the group of fatalists we assign people who consider that little in life depends on the person, while in the opinion of voluntarists people have completely free choice and control over their lives. According to data from 1990 and 1999, voluntarists considerably more frequently said that they were happy than did the fatalists.

Table 5. The impact of personal characteristics on satisfaction with life and feeling of happiness in Lithuania, 1990 and 1999 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal characteristics</th>
<th>Happy 1990</th>
<th>Happy 1999</th>
<th>Satisfied with life 1990</th>
<th>Satisfied with life 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatalism</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarism</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, similar results were found both in the case of satisfaction with life and feelings of happiness. With such interdependence also are related the results of analysis of self-dependence (see Table 6). Self-dependence is measured by the positive answers toward the 1990 questionnaire questions: can respondents characterize themselves by following features of personality - believe in their success, achieve what they want, and be inclined to take responsibility. The results presented in Table 6 show that self-dependence is closely related with both subjective evaluations of quality of life.

In general the percentage of self-dependent people and voluntarists is lower in all post-communist countries, which in turn negatively influences satisfaction with life and feelings of happiness in such societies. This situation is reflected in significantly greater numbers of state-oriented people in post-communist countries, in comparison to Western countries, especially in Northern countries, where we find a greater percentage of voluntarists. The evidence that subjective evaluation of the quality of life is strongly related with voluntarist orientation is supported by a positive correlation between these two variables in all European countries. But in the case of the relation between life satisfaction and orientation towards the state, there occurred as a common feature only in post-communist countries, a negative correlation between higher levels of happiness and orientation towards dependency on the state (Gečienė, 2001). Therefore, it is possible to reveal one more cultural discrepancy between Western and Central East societies – the level and origin...
of greater state dependence of the post-communist population.

Table 6. The impact of self-dependence on satisfaction with life and feeling of happiness in Lithuania, 1990 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Unhappy</th>
<th>Satisfied with life</th>
<th>Unsatisfied with life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Believe in their success</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve that they want</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are inclined to take responsibility</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such a cultural tendency is rooted in the experience of communist regimes in these countries, as this regime was oriented towards state patronage in every aspect of everyday life, starting from job, income, insurance security and to limited self-decision making for every person of these societies. As a result, even after the collapse of the communist regime, the prevailing orientations of the population remains the same: all post-communist countries can be characterized by the larger number of state-oriented people who think that the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for, while this factor in Western countries has little or no importance at all. This state-dependence orientation is more characteristic among older people, which, together with worse financial situation, also partly explains the tendency to evaluate their quality of lives more negatively.

Some differences in the subjective evaluation of quality of life between distinct post-communist countries can also be explained by an unequal period of influence of the communist ideology. The least happy people are in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, which experienced the longest (almost 70 years) impact of this ideology, while other post-communist countries and particularly Lithuania, show a slightly higher evaluation of quality of life (Gečienė, 2001). Nevertheless, all post-communist countries for several generations were forced to be passive and unreservedly accept the regulations of state. During decades such a world-view became a tradition, which after the collapse of communism constituted an unavoidable obstacle for large numbers of people to adapt to the new socio-economic and political situation. Thus it can be assumed that in the face of radical changes, people of post-communist countries have the most difficulty with the crisis of worldview that affects their evaluation of quality of life. These people, who still expect that the state will provide for basic needs, experience a discrepancy between their expecta-
tions and reality where post-communist states are impoverished by the process of transformation and cannot keep previous social policies. This discrepancy consequently determines the dissatisfaction of people from post-communist countries with the changes, state policy and their own life as well.

Thus it is possible to speak about at least two main groups of European countries characterized by different cultural patterns: if the populations of post-communist countries still have a predominant orientation towards society and state, Western European countries have a bigger accent on the individual and on freedom of choice. In this respect, there is a danger of underestimating the effect of the cultural factors that relate with higher life satisfaction and happiness. The reduction of an obsolete orientation towards complete state dependency and the development of a more voluntaristic orientation towards self-development and self-actualization in post-communist transformational societies are important for the cultural integration of Western and Central-Eastern Europe and the improvement of their subjective evaluations of the quality of life.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the analysis of the European Value Study 1990 and 1999 data on subjective indicators of the quality of life (level of happiness and life satisfaction) in Lithuania and other European countries reveal the complexity of the nature of subjective well-being both in Western and Central-East European groups. As Harding and his colleagues emphasize, “Many differences between these countries – per capita income, employment, population trends, political ideologies, religion, etc. – show that there is no simple explanation” (Harding et al., 1986: 187). Therefore, a satisfactory explanation of these cross-national variations is likely to be difficult and to reflect the values prevailing in different countries, as well as the structural and demographic distinctions between them.

Nevertheless, by using cluster analysis we extracted two main groups, which show two different patterns of subjective evaluation of the quality of life: a highly positive evaluation of well-being in Western Europe and a more negative evaluation that prevails in Central and East European countries. These results generally reflect the main division between Western industrially advanced European countries and evidently less developed post-communist countries. Consequently, these data seem to confirm our expectation about the great impact of economic factors on the subjective evaluation of the quality of life: people of poorer countries are less satisfied with life. However, some cases, especially Slovenia and Czech Republic that are in the same level of subjective well-being as Latin European countries and do not fit precisely in this grouping allow one to expect further development towards a more mixed picture of future Europe.

Among the economic factors in our analysis, the strongest association is shown by higher levels of income and life satisfaction in both Western and Central-East European countries, while the relation between subjective
indicators and such “soft” variables as different values is not so direct and unambiguous. Nevertheless, there are remarkable differences: in post-communist countries, income is more strongly related with life satisfaction and especially with the level of happiness, while in most Western countries income loses its importance in association with happiness. Therefore, the expected tendency that in poorer countries the relation of life satisfaction with gratification of economic needs is stronger than in wealthier countries was supported by the data.

Besides, different results in comparing life satisfaction and the level of happiness reveal crucial differences in the factors associated with higher levels of the subjective evaluation of the quality of life. Happiness is evidently weaker in relation to income than to life satisfaction and shows a greater dependence on inner issues, especially in the case of Western countries. Such a situation confirms the assumptions that questions about life satisfaction and happiness will provide different results, not only in terms of quantity but in terms of quality as well.

With respect to socio-demographic factors we focused mainly on having stable relationships, age and the association with subjective indicators of well-being. However, if age is a stronger factor in Central East European countries, having stable relationships evidently is stronger in Western counterparts. As it can be supposed that people in poorer post-communist countries suffer more from a lack of financial security than in advanced Western countries, such needs as belongingness and stable relationships count less than income towards being satisfied with life. Age seems also to be related with the economic situation of older people in post-communist countries, as they experience higher financial and social insecurity than do people of the same age in Western countries.

Nevertheless, the situation seems more complicated if one takes into account that age in post-communist countries is related not only to the financial situation, but also to particular value orientations such as state-dependency, fatalism and pessimism. We suppose that the roots of this phenomenon are grounded in long-lasting cultural traditions and the policy of political regimes differs considerably in Western and Central-European countries. This distinction, first of all, deals with the self-determination of individuals with respect to relations with other individuals, the world and especially the state in the case of post-communist countries. Thus it is possible to speak about at least two main groups of countries characterized by different cultural patterns: if post-communist societies developed stronger orientation towards society and the state during the communist regime, in Western European countries the accent was upon the individual and freedom of choice.

Keeping in mind that voluntarism, self-dependence and positive future expectances are strongly related to a higher subjective evaluation of the quality of life, it can be supposed that, despite the less visible (soft) character of cultural factors, they are significant in causing greater satisfaction with life and especially, greater feelings of happiness. Besides, we found a positive relation between the lower subjective evaluation of quality of life in post-com-
munist countries and the evaluation of the importance of such main values as work, family, friends, leisure, politics and religion in their lives. This can cause cultural biases in relating the more moderate subjective evaluation of satisfaction with life and the feeling of happiness. In general such evidence shows as a common feature of societies in both parts of Europe that the subjective evaluation of well-being is based not only on the economic situation, but also on the particular type of personal value orientation.

To sum up, despite the complexity of explanations of the subjective evaluation of the quality of life in different European countries, it can be argued that the level of life satisfaction and happiness is most closely related with economic factors (especially income), and less importantly with the presence of stable relationships, age (in post-communist countries) and particular personality traits (overall high evaluation of values as well as voluntarism, self-dependence, etc.). Besides, according to Peter Ester and his colleagues, differences between subjective evaluation of life satisfaction in Western and Eastern Europe show, from the one side, “the existence of long-lasting cultural components”, from the other side, “the possibility of momentary or short-term fluctuations of life satisfaction, which depends on some economic, social and political events” (Ester et al., 1997: 76).

Lithuanian society clearly reflects the main tendencies that can be found in post-communist countries: low level of satisfaction with life, based on economic shortages and overall insecurity regarding the future, together with a persistence of long-lasting cultural patterns of state-dependency, low level of voluntarism and less positive evaluation of the future. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that it would be plausible to observe an increase of the subjective level of the well-being of the population with a stabilization of the political situation and improvement of economic and social conditions in post-communist countries. Nonetheless, these improvements must go hand in hand with the reduction of state dependency and developing more voluntaristic orientation towards self-development and self-actualization in the post-communist transforming societies, and in Lithuania in particular.

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Lithuania

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THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH
IN VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY

PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to
the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our
environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political
life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom
is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s deci-
sions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other
parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots
of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the con-
ceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are
structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must
be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for set-
ting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global
circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest
dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Studies in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who
share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabili-
ties in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in
which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear there-
upon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various
regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and
publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever
more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The
development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

PROJECTS

A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations
   for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers
   prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding
differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings
of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to
respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.

2. Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues. This series of 10 week cross-
cultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

3. Joint-Colloquia with Institutes of Philosophy of the National Academies of
   Science, university philosophy departments, and societies. Underway since 1976 in
   Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these concern the person in contemporary
   society.

4. Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development. A study in
   values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and
   scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of edu-
   cation and character development. This work has been underway since 1980.

The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to
contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in
contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a
non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Colombia, looks to various pri-
ivate foundations, public programs and enterprises.
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