Globalization and Culture: Contemporary Social Cognition

Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, VII

Edited by
Jurate Morkuniene

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART I. SOCIAL COGNITION IN A NEW SOCIAL SPACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I. Changes in Philosophical Theories of Contemporary Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jurate Morkuniene</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II. Philosophy as Cultural Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Zibartas Jackunas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III. The Possibilities of Philosophy in Presentday Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Virginija Jakimenko</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV. Philosophical Thinking in a World without Landmarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Krescencijus Stoskas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V. Philosophy’s Integrative Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Romualdas Ozolas</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART II. UNDERSTANDING CULTURE AT A TURNING-POINT OF SOCIAL LIFE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI. Cultural Diversity, Social Transformations and Geopolitical Ambitions: the Lithuanian Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Juozas Algimantas Krikstopaitis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII. Shift in a Monologue-Dialogue Tradition as a Warrant for the Successful Development of a Culture of Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Laimute Jakavonyte</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VIII. Varieties of National and State Consciousness: An Anatomy of Divergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Romualdas Grigas</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART III. SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE CONTEXT OF A CHANGING SOCIAL ORDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IX. Changing Social Order and the Power of Sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Anele Vosyliute</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter X. Bioethics in a Multicultural Context: Toward Universal Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jonas Juskevicius, Kazys Meilius</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter XI. Biomedical Technologies in the Context of Critical Thinking
Irąda Jakusovaitė 143

Chapter XII. Looking for the Legal Preconditions of Contemporary Social Co-existence
Alfonsas Vaisvila 151

Chapter XIII. Problematizing the Discourse of Contemporary Social Development and Order
Vytautas Slapkauskas 165

Chapter XIV. Esthetics and/or Esthetology? Aisthesis: from Esthetics to Esthetology
Juozas Mureika 181

Index 209
INTRODUCTION

In order to improve our response to the challenges facing our society at the dawn of the 21st century it is important to bring about improved interaction between the world of research and the world of action, as well as to strengthen the links between theory and practice in the field of social development. The world of research and the world of action cannot continue to function in parallel, but must find new links. This volume aims to bridge the two by bringing them together.

This monograph concerns problems, related to contemporary social cognition as a foundation for a humane globalization. It is, in sum, the significance of the social sciences for the progressive development, identity and cultural diversity of global society. The authors searched for the philosophical foundations of social integration and intercultural dialogue in multinational social space. They considered the importance of a philosophical approach to contemporary problems in the process of rapid globalization. They analyzed challenges posed in the 21st century – by a new wave of globalization, higher technologies and information – for the civilization, social models, universally recognized human values, and ways of solving problems on these bases. Such important modern-day appearances as new possibilities and threats to dialogue and cosmopolitan identity, locality and globality fall within the reach of such discussion. The study emphasizes the diversity of cultures, limits of tolerance, the significance of education and innovation towards the individual development of each member of society, of cognition and the creation of a knowledge society, etc.

The contemporary social cognition as a foundation for progressive development and significance of social sciences to the cultural dialogue is analyzed in Part I. “Social Cognition in a New Social Space”.

Chapter I, by Jurate Morkuniene, “Tasks of Philosophy in a Contemporary Society”, examines a new philosophical image of the world. Contemporary philosophy generalizes such most complicated and rapidly changing objects as society and person. Consequently philosophy is always incomplete, relatively open and, therefore, theoretically “imperfect”, “non-systematic” and vulnerable. Morkuniene emphasizes that philosophy in the 21st century revives to the degree that its methods correspond to the present paradigm of science. It is important to understand that philosophy responds too slowly to the changing paradigm of science: it should change its very essence. It is no longer possible to study society solely from logical and moral approaches and consider it only as a subject to be studied. The task of contemporary philosophy is not only to attain truth, but also to show how this truth can become active: philosophy is the means of both thinking and action. Philosophy has no longer an absolutely accomplished truth: it is searching for the truth in its time. Truth can be ensured solely by our thinking and our actions. Cognition is now perceived as a constant,
uninterrupted dialogue with reality. Contemporary philosophy does not ‘kill’ a process, does not dissect into parts an integral, live social phenomenon, but ‘catches’ this phenomenon, its deeply rooted relations and contradictions. The goals, the methods and the results are connected by a feedback relation. This relation prevents philosophy from becoming an unshakable dogma. New problems need new means of research; philosophy creates a new network of concepts and applies new methods of cognition.

Morkuniene maintains that one should differentiate between direct experience and an abstract theoretical system expressed by language and symbols. Social reality cannot be immediately and directly explained by concepts and theories of a high level of abstraction. The relation among them is provided by special theories, concrete sciences of an ever-increasing level of concreteness and a lower level of generalization. Reality cannot substantially be explained on the grounds of ‘common sense’, neither can special sciences nor theories embrace the whole panorama of relations and causes, especially those that are deepest and most essential. On the other hand, philosophical notions are intermingled in various programs, declarations, etc. There they lose their depth, and this is natural. Consequently, a strict border should be drawn between philosophical principles and political, economic and other conceptions. Philosophical principles define the ultimate goals and evaluation criteria, but reality never perfectly corresponds to them. In its scientific system philosophy solves these tasks in another way than in real life.

Chapter II, by Zibartas Jackunas, “Philosophy as Cultural Tradition” analyzes the question whether philosophy is a dead museum-piece or an alive and indispensable cultural tradition. Relying on classic epistemology, the author argues in favour of the second part of the alternative. He treats philosophy as the meta-experience that satisfies social as well as personal needs for more rational and efficient activity. The author defines philosophy as the development of compensatory rationality, preserving and increasing functions inherent in the pre-theoretical and theoretical experience of humankind. So understood philosophy acts as a producer, protector and promoter of rationality in the most universal sense. Because of the universality of its meta-experience, philosophy is able to compensate for the unavoidable historical limitedness of generations. Therefore philosophy is an integral part of culture and, in spite of declarations of its death, remains a precious and indispensable part of meaningful cultural traditions.

Chapter III, by Virginija Jakimenko, “The Possibilities of Philosophy in Presentday Society” analyzes the ability of philosophy to influence social processes. These abilities have been valued in every society but in contrasting manners: at times people expected too much and at times they had no trust in philosophy. If the approach to philosophy depends on the peculiarities of society, the analysis of modern society could reveal the possibilities for philosophy today. Jakimenko maintains that our reality is changing ever faster and we are realizing very clearly that our world is not
developing toward a state of equal possibilities. This reality scares people, who then try to hide in a virtual reality. In this complicated situation philosophy is the only serious theory of thinking which could suggest ways to survive in contemporary hyper-dynamic circumstances.

Chapter IV, by Krescencijus Stoskus, “Philosophical Thinking in a World without Landmarks” maintains a guarded optimism in the face of the complicated situation of presentday philosophy. Ancient philosophy did not see the essential difference between the past, the present and the future – heroes of the past were highly respected and admired. Middle Age philosophy is personal salvation, defining one’s destiny from the very first till the end of the world. The philosophy of New Times, or Modern philosophy, is the philosophy of endless improvement of the world. It knows the primitive life of the past, today’s achievements and foresees the hardly imaginable, and ever expanding prosperity of the future. Contemporary philosophy begins with the collapse of human ideals. Stoskus emphasizes the role of contemporary critical philosophy, which actually seeks alternatives in the lives of humans, as well as of cultures and the state of the whole World. The factors that could change this state remain unknown, but a critical philosophy of hope can reactivate, support the search, prepare minds for breakdowns, forecast them, identify them earlier and speed up their approach.

Chapter V, by Romualdas Ozol, “Philosophy’s Integrative Function” declares that integration is the sole mission of philosophy, or at least its excuse and justification. For philosophy does not provide new knowledge – this is done by science; similarly, it does not offer beauty as does art, nor does it invite one contemplation as does faith; although philosophy does use these spiritual products and advises others to do the same. The author proposes ways to resurrect the former significance of philosophy.

Part II, “Understanding Culture at a Turning-Point of Social Life”, describes the current situation of Lithuanian society and searches for directions and principles which might guide the improvement of a disappointing social situation.

Chapter VI, by Juozas Algimantas Krikstopaitis, “Cultural Diversity, Social Transformations and Geopolitical Ambitions: the Lithuanian Experience” analyzes numerous new problems which emerge as mankind enters the era of global information technologies. Today it is clear that next to globalization with its political, social, and financial changes, there is another compulsive direction, namely, localization. This manifests itself as an effort for regional autonomy. These opposite trends are a consequence of the development of communication networks and of fear of the emerging information society which proclaims openness for all kinds of activity. Here the author focuses at first on the historical experience of the Baltic countries. The historical experience of the Baltic countries, consisting of military, political, mercantile and other results of change, bears testimony that the Baltic region’s unique, locally defined
Introduction

characteristic lies within the interactions of West-North-East context. The process of the integration of the Baltic States into the globalization process will be accompanied not only by this experience, but also with the newly expanded West-North-East directional nations. In the context of Lithuanian history “Go West” should be changed to “Foster Baltic Identity”. This describes the meaning of its unique regional locality in global processes, which began from integration into the European Union.

Chapter VII, by Laimute Jakavonyte, “Shift in a Monologue-Discourse Tradition as a Warrant for the Successful Development of a Culture of Tolerance” focuses on new configurations of Lithuanian culture. The philosophical analysis of the contemporary concept of a culture of tolerance focuses on the definition of tolerance as a counter to a fake tolerance that is based on separation of the notions ‘understanding’, ‘respect’, ‘willingness’, ‘debates’, ‘discussions’, ‘dialogue’, ‘monologue’. True tolerance is based on the evolution of the concurrent relationship between traditions of dialogue and tolerance, and on the role of intellectuals in the speeded ever more rapid development of historical consciousness and self-awareness of a society undergoing unprecedented transition. The process of the creation of a culture of tolerance unfolds as an essential shift or transition from a tradition of monologue to one of dialogue. One of the main challenges for the development of a culture of tolerance in Lithuania is a constructive approach in evaluating and overcoming the negatives of the Soviet past. The overview of the past is aimed at grasping the main tendencies of the Lithuanian present and future. An exploration of the main trends of the intellectual history of Lithuania during the decades of the Soviet rule leads to the assumption that the tradition of monologue became rooted deeply in the intellectual culture and became one of the main obstacles to a culture of dialogue and tolerance.

An analysis of the notions the ‘intellectuals’ and the ‘intelligentsia’ helps to trace the new roles of intellectuals in contemporary Lithuanian culture and to define various groups of intellectuals that have different points of view, considering their role in the process of transition to a democratic and tolerant society based on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Two opposite positions among intellectuals towards the political nation, civil society and politics provide the premises for overcoming the gap between culture, politics, and social reality through nurturing the tradition of dialogue. Democratic public space is ideologically anti-monumental and anti-monistic. It forces us to see the landscapes of our utterances and thrusts us into an existential ‘in-between world’ where meaning is not guaranteed or assured beforehand. The tradition of dialogue is a creative force for the development of a culture of tolerance that generates trust, widens the horizons of understanding, and transforms an arithmetical sum of individuals into a healthy dynamic democratic society.
Chapter VIII, by Romualdas Grigas, “Varieties of National and State Consciousness: an Anatomy of Divergence in the Case Study of the Lithuanian Nation” describes the influence of globalization on nations and national states by narrowing their sovereignty. Ever more prominence is given to the need for establishing and developing supranational and suprastate structures, institutions, and their functionality. Such a need is first of all based on purely pragmatic economic, political, ecological and other interests. This creates favorable conditions for the entrenchment of a global culture, eclectic by nature, which caters to those interests, free from the continuity of national cultures and national constraints. However, such culture is also less restricted by moral obligations or “the charge” of spiritual values, which used to “frame” and regulate human behavior by giving it a clearer meaningful direction, thus lending it integrity and linking the past with the present. This change undermines man’s attachment not only to his birthplace, but to his homeland as well.

The universal, increasingly cosmopolitan culture, stripped of its historical cultural heritage, becomes more susceptible to the pressures of capital, the hi-tech din, the cult of sense gratification and consumerism. Grigas argues for what should be the true balance between tradition and modernity, restraint and indulgence, authority and its “write-off”, altruism and selfishness, order and chaos; between the local and the universal; and between the national and the supranational.

Also freely chosen and presented here is one possible aspect of such analysis, which was “born” from the all too evident contradictions of modern Lithuanian reality. The state can never be stable if it functions apart from its ethnicity and from its nation. The nation is its sovereign, and the state is a way of national self-assertion and self-organization. Therefore, as such, it should never be reduced to gratifying and “servicing” only the purely pragmatic needs of the people or of organized groups. Statehood cannot be directed only at solving practical everyday issues of individuals or their society, and focused on the kind of social behavior which is reducible to the empirical and regulated by legal norms or political “games.” The author concludes that the stability of the state depends in equal measure also on the practice of historical memory and cultural heritage, i.e. on spiritualized social cohesion and connectivity. This should be one of the fundamental and most widely regarded criteria in any assessment of statehood.

Part III, “Social Sciences in the Context of a Changing Social Order”, directs attention to the social sciences and their general principles for understanding the contemporary social world.

Chapter IX, by Anele Vosyliute, “Changing Social Order and the Power of Sociology” analyzes the relations between sociology and social reality, and the changing functions of this science. Sociology in Lithuania is now a key agent in the struggle against civilizational and cultural backwardness. The power of contradictory theoretical positions or of different methods constitutes in sociology a permanent intellectual
discourse. Present day social science has more ability to represent various points of view; it can be based on patriarchal or feministic, macro or micro, positivistic or post-modernistic approaches. The power of the terminology and concepts of the social sciences are becoming one of the ways we perceive, describe, and analyze the world around us. The development of sociology is related to the diagnosis of the quality of life, social transformations, etc. New paradigms of science and the unveiling of new social phenomena enrich sociological knowledge. The new structures and features of society demanded this change of sociological methodology and a rethinking of the subject-matter of the sociological investigations.

Chapter X, by Jonas Juskevicius and Kazys Meilius, “Bioethics in a Multicultural Context: Toward Universal Guidelines” discusses bioethics and its potential to become an international system capable of formulating ethical guidelines which are universally valid. Alongside ideological controversies and methodological uncertainties there exist other disadvantages in bioethical discourse, which construct another task for bioethics: to develop dialogue between different ethnic and cultural outlooks existing either in Western civilization or beyond that area. At first sight multiculturalism could be a challenge for the search for universal standards for bioethics. However authors argue that despite these challenges it could provide a sound basis for such standards, particularly if a potential contribution of common values for cultures is taken into account. Since there are difficulties for bioethics in providing a normative framework for biomedical sciences, the said contribution together with human rights law could provide a legal fulcrum for a practical solution of problems related to the application of advances of biomedical sciences in the multicultural context of contemporary society. For that scope the possible solution for universalizing bioethics is the recognition of common and objective virtues, such as human dignity, one of the very few common values in a world of philosophical pluralism and multiculturalism. The principle of human dignity is universally accepted as the ground of human rights, and its reasonableness is not discussed at political and juridical level. Most people assume as an empirical fact that human beings have intrinsic dignity. Even if human dignity would not be empirically accepted by all, it nevertheless will have a transcendent value across time and space because it is postulated by ratio, regardless of one’s cultural subscriptions. Juskevicius and Meilius maintain that the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is a promising step toward general recognition of bioethical concerns which could facilitate and broaden international bioethical discourse. Human dignity has much to offer as the essential framework for a harmonization and development of bioethical principles. The premises for such harmonization exist. So, it is up to benevolent discussions between academia and practitioners and to the political will of the states to reach global solutions in the biomedical field.

Chapter XI, by Irayda Jakusovaite, “Biomedical Technologies in the Context of Critical Thinking” analyses the concept of medical
technology in the narrow and broad sense, stressing the interventive, expansive, disease-defining, generalizing, and liberating aspects of the concept. It is necessary to emphasize not only the economic effectiveness of the implementation of medical technologies, but also to reflect upon them in the context of critical thinking. The chapter discusses Aristotle’s structure of thinking, including theoretical, practical, and productive intellectual activity, applied through epistemē, phronesis and technē. The main challenge in modern health care is not technē itself, but phronesis.

Chapter XII, by Alfonsas Vaisvila, “Looking for the Legal Preconditions of Contemporary Social Co-existence” treats the legal personalism as a concept of law, based on the principles of market economy and democratic society. This concept of law is immediately derived from the four axioms: a) the priority of the individual to the state, b) the cultural deficiency of the individual to fulfill the diversity of his interests by his own effort, c) the need to overcome this deficiency by forcing individuals to cooperate – to exchange services, and d) to conduct this exchange of services on the basis of equality. The logic of these axioms forces one to start the definition of law with subjective right and to define law itself as the unity of permits (rights) and orders (duties).

Chapter XIII, by Vytautas Slapkauskas “Problematising the Discourse of Contemporary Social Development and Order” analyzes the basis of the development of the liberal democratic society as the actual implementation of human rights and freedoms. This implies that the social objective of law is to guarantee and protect human rights and freedoms. The author argues that in the present stage of the development of civic society this minimalist social objective of law proves insufficient in at least two aspects. First, there appears a tension between the human rights and freedoms of the first and second generation. The purpose of social, economic and cultural (socio-economic) human rights is to guarantee a respectable life for the people who find themselves below a certain margin of material and social welfare and education. This margin is not defined by political concepts, but by the level of economic, social and cultural development of a specific society (Rawls J.). On the other hand, socioeconomic rights impose responsibilities on the state and society, but they do not create any responsibilities for individuals themselves; as a result, individuals become passive in political life. Finally, no definition of the objective of law includes cherishing a communal society, i.e. to seek on the basis of law a social coexistence of members of society and a dynamic social balance that would not destroy social values. The analysis of these aspects shows that in the present stage of social development it is imperative to supplement the minimalist social objective of law with a sense of human responsibilities which could make members of society commit themselves not only to the protection of human rights, but also to the increase of social security and the creation of the quality of life. The legal system should be the basis for a constant creation and sustenance of trust, security and social concentration that overpower destructive
tendencies in society. This means that the legal system, alongside the moral, economic, political and other contiguous social systems, must meet the maximal social objectives of law: 1) to cherish and protect man’s basic interests; 2) to guarantee the social and political peace among different social groups; and 3) to stimulate the progressive development of social life. Within the context of the social objectives of law, the author develops an awareness that law must function in tune with other social regulators, especially with morality and religion.

Chapter XIV, by Juozas Mureika “Esthetics and/or Esthetology? Aisthesis: from Esthetics to Esthetology” analyzes the concept of esthetics in its historical and methodological variations, its structure and the factors that influence it. These issues require that the traditional perception of esthetics transform itself, so that its concepts and theories reflect the actual changes of esthetic activity and, the interpretations of such activity in the context of human culture, mentality and existential being. Now the notion of aesthesis is enriched by a new meaning referring to the universal concept of esthetology. The author reflects upon, whether the new interpretation of correlations between aesthesis and meaning may precondition the conversion of esthetics into a fundamentally new branch of humanitarian science – esthetology. These attempts are made to foresee the range of problems encountered at the inter-stiles where traditional esthetics and esthetology diverge or come together, and to elaborate on the formation of the aesthesis concept and its components, as well as on it’s influence on the derivation and origin of meanings.
PART I

SOCIAL COGNITION IN A NEW SOCIAL SPACE
CHAPTER I

CHANGES IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

JURATE MORKUNIENE

TASKS OF PHILOSOPHY IN A CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Contemporary philosophy generalizes the most complicated and rapidly changing objects such as society and man. In this sense social philosophy is always an incomplete, relatively open and, therefore, theoretically “imperfect”, “non-systematic” and vulnerable theory. Philosophy develops by reconsidering the problems of order and disorder, complexity and simplicity, evolution, truth and error, etc. Philosophy in the 21st century revives to the degree its methods correspond to the present paradigm of science. Before the task of all the sciences had been to eliminate vagueness, ambiguity and contradiction; contemporary science accepts a certain vagueness or incompleteness of the phenomena and even of the concepts employed in their explanation.

It is important to understand that as philosophy responds too slowly to the changing paradigm of science, philosophical knowledge should change in its very essence. It is no longer possible to study society solely in terms of logic and morals, considering it only as a subject to be studied. There is a pressing need to understand as most urgent the truth in contemporary social cognition, namely, that new problems require new means of research and that those new tools of cognition must be “forged”.

Philosophy will recover when it creates a new network of conceptions and applies new methods of cognition. It can develop by reconsidering the problems of order and disorder, complexity and simplicity, truth and error, etc. Cognition is presently understood as a continuous, uninterrupted dialogue with reality. It already has been understood that no philosophical theory can exhaust reality, stop the process and exhaust its object.

In solving the social questions philosophy searches for truth, but this is contemporary truth. Philosophy no longer has an absolutely accomplished truth: it is searching for the truth of its time. Truth can be ensured solely by our thinking, our actions. Cognition is presently perceived as a continuous, uninterrupted dialogue with reality. As contemporary philosophy is the means of this thinking and action, new methodologies begin to be applied for solving the problems of man and society. “Thus human consciousness becomes the new focus of attention” (G. McLean 2003, 6).
The present philosophy does not ‘kill’ a process, does not dissect an integral, live, social phenomenon into parts, but ‘catches’ this phenomenon, its deeply rooted relations and contradictions. The goals, the methods and the results are connected by a feedback relation which prevents philosophy from becoming an unshakable dogma.

Contemporary philosophy is characterized by what could be called a new anthropocentrism or new subjectivity. The old, that is, classical anthropocentrism is replaced by a new concept of the subject living in the world created by him-or herself. One is set up in the “center” only through one’s activity, creative work and knowledge, through one’s ability to perceive the processes going on in nature and society, to transform them by the methods that have been unknown before. Contemporary philosophy, reflecting a feedback between man and the world created by him, endows man’s “centricity” with only a vectorial meaning. Man is perceived as being in the “center” of the world only in terms of activity.

Contemporary philosophy is understood as conforming to the new paradigm of science. In this case what is important are such main methodological principles as understanding of the static and dynamic of the categories, the concept of systematization, the concept of preciseness, a new approach to rationality, the dilemma of idealization and adequacy to reality, etc. Such complicated, self-developing systems as society and man cannot be rendered in static categories. The basic theoretical principle of contemporary philosophy is to analyze both the present state of reality and its reflection in the concepts not as a stiff static structure, but as a process.

First of all, philosophy approaches the problems of society as an open society. Investigation of the features of both open societies and open personalities becomes a main task of contemporary philosophy. In the philosophical sense, man’s openness means human identity. The prerequisites of openness are equal opportunities, involvement, etc. Openness recognizes the individual’s priority over the whole; subjectivity’s priority over objectivity; of an individual’s priority over a collective, of a citizen’s over the state, etc. Openness exalts and accepts diversity, dialogue, co-operation and “equal opportunity”.

Contemporary social philosophy deals with yet another super-task. It becomes the plan of actions, the principle of actions, and the predilection for action. Without philosophy as a meta-theory any scientific activity in a social environment proceeds by the method of trial (probe) and error. This way is not productive and even dangerous while solving social problems, as it leads to experimenting with people and society. This entails the need for a philosophical education of society and of the individual as well. Every possibility to develop the individual’s responsibility and ability to decide is both a new level of his philosophical education and a new step of his civism. The sense of responsibility is the pith of the personality, its most significant feature and its most important indicator. With it, the person enters a new quality called culture. Only a person that does not fear and feels responsible can express his opinion. However, this is not enough, for
to have one’s own, independent position one must know the essence of the matter, to be informed. Here we encounter the problem of education. A direct relationship has been established between the rising level of education and the rising level of human responsibility for society and for others, thus the rising level of dialogue. Understanding the difference between “common sense” and the cultured, that is, cultivated, educated mind evokes a desire and striving, as M. Wertheimer would put it, not to be limited by “common sense” alone, but to try to perceive the essence of social life and to act accordingly.

Algirdas Greimas wrote:

Over the last three centuries mankind almost exceptionally has been taking care of the progress of natural sciences and the technology of their application. Meanwhile the problems of man and society were left aside as those belonging to the sphere of moral or ideology. Both moral and ideology is the formulation of good wishes rather than the conception of reality. This is why in the middle of the twentieth century we found ourselves in the situation when man, taking command of the electronic machine, is both powerful and helpless. He is strong, because he knows the machine he rules, but he remains the immature child where the knowledge of himself is concerned. This disproportion, inequality between the degrees of cognition of man and of nature naturally poses an enormous danger to the very existence of mankind. Therefore it seems to me that development of the sciences of man is not only the mission of the twentieth century, but also a necessity that predetermines the fate of the whole humankind (1990, 30).

K. R. Popper maintained that our cognitive forces actually are adequate to the problems that we face (1965, 397). Hence, the methods of study should also be adequate to the new problems and new goals of study. That is, according to W. Heisenberg, the method can no longer be separated from its subject (1974, 207). There are two approaches to understanding philosophical theory. In the first case the most important goal of theory is to substantiate or justify existing theory, conception or notion. In the second case the goal of theory is to solve the problem, even at the expense of the classical, totally accepted “purity” of the former conception, and not only to solve it theoretically, but also to attain the desired practical results.

What distinguishes the philosophy of our times from that of previous epochs is not so much the perception of man and the world itself as the new problems that emerge before man. In this case the commonly known concepts acquire a new content. For example, the idea of human value in contemporary social philosophy is expressed by the concepts of distinction, diversity both of the individual and society. This means
acceptance of the right to be distinct, to diversity of cultures, views, individualities, etc. (see Lévi-Strauss Cl., Peccei A.).

Even the content of personality has undergone considerable changes. Personality is one of the peculiarities of the most recent European culture. Manipulation of this concept without revealing its content contributes to its mythologization. The concept of personality and freedom is the basis of every modern civilization, and today the whole of political life rests upon it. But if they are merely myths, maintained U. Spirito, without their logical explanation they evoke the most diverse interpretations (1956, 105). The concepts of personality and freedom could become the signboards of various ideologies, and the banner of personality and freedom often mean the goals of egoism and egocentrism (ibid.). Obviously, the question of how this philosophy of ambitious man or of man as centre-of-the-world can be avoided is not senseless.

THE NETWORK OF THE CONCEPTS OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

I. Newton’s theory had induced the appearance of analogies in politics and philosophy, so the methods of contemporary science have their analogies or are just emerging in philosophy. In classical science there was a strict borderline between the simple and the complicated. Science was targeted at finding in complicated systems a certain simple level that is reflected by the deterministic and recurrent laws of nature, in which both the future and the past have equal rights. At present, science everywhere finds instability, imbalance, probability, irreversibility. This can be avoided neither by social sciences nor philosophy. The methods of philosophy are first of all modified by understanding that history is incomplete and cannot be stopped at a certain phase by declaring it the absolute solution of human needs, aspirations and problems. New concepts are being adopted in philosophy. Such concepts as: complexity, process, openness, probability, feedback relations, dialogue, entropy, etc., appear and, in turn, become philosophical concepts.

Complexity

Classical science strictly differentiated between the simple and the complex. The task of classical science was to find even in the most complicated systems a certain simple level, having in mind the level that is reflected by deterministic laws, reversible in time, in which both the past and the future have equal rights. Nor could methods of another kind exist in philosophy. Just as I. Newton’s model gave birth to analogies in politics and philosophy, and as Ch. Fourier based the conditions of a society of harmonious interests and the theory of harmony in human relations on the universal law of gravitation, the methods of contemporary science have their analogies in explaining the social processes. In this period industrial
society is turning into a high-technology society whose resources are information and new non-mechanical technologies, new methods to cognize the world are being found.

Attempts to define the interaction of man and society by analysis of isolated elements in a narrow, specialized sphere of science and then “to sum up” the results and present them as a certain arithmetical sum of ethical, political, ecological and other aspects cannot provide the desired integrated picture of man and society. Even today, priority often is given to mechanical, non-creative, and non-productive studies, out of desire to get the answer “immediately” and out of the habit of acting blindly when solitary, isolated problems are being solved. The most difficult questions are left behind, because to answer them enormous energy and productive thinking is needed. It is much more difficult to find a deep, essential relation than a partial criterion of a partial truth. The “trials and errors” of theoretical thinking means blind, accidental and sometimes dogmatic theorization. However, errors in society can hardly be corrected by applying a new method. Therefore from the very beginning the special theories that deal with society and personality should depend upon the conclusions and criteria of fundamental theories, not make suppositions or “reinvent the wheel”.

M. Wertheimer finds some social and psychological premises to explain why researchers are fond of analyzing separate elements and hastily systematizing them. What a subject regards as an essential relation depends on various conditions, forces, factors (pressure, career). To these factors can also be ascribed the inertia of habit, the principle of analyzing separate elements and the tendency to find pre-term relations among structurally alien elements. A scientific subject becomes a victim of the temptation to simplify a problem, to simplify a structure, and to make ill-grounded systematizations (1982, 279).

Scientists as systemizers seem like the mythical Procrustes in their eagerness to relate everything, even by inventing the missing links, guided by their sole desire to avoid any cracks in their system. Actually they exhibit only laziness of mind. The extreme love of truth of which the scientists are so proud often turns out to be but a weak-spirited fear of vitally important questions, of what is troublesome and important. A system in this case satisfies the need to escape contradictions.

Of course, this does not mean that here the importance of systematization in science is being negated. What is actually meant is that a system as a theory or as an ideal model cannot be satisfied by a description of a phenomenon but should describe or reflect the optimum level of development of this phenomenon, without regarding it as final or eternal. According to G. Hegel, a system is the “form of a fully developed totality”.

But in the approach that prefers analysis of separate elements, there is a danger of revealing accidental or “blind” relations. Relying on the analysis of separate elements it is impossible to give an adequate explanation of society as a complex social phenomenon. Indeed, its source
is the total social creative activities of the individuals, which modify the conditions of the development of persons. In complicated, self-developing systems, among which man and society are the most complicated, the properties of a whole cannot be derived from the sum of the properties of its constituents. What comprises the essence of a whole is not derived from the elements perceived as separate, kaleidoscopic fragments: this is a classical problem in the theory of systems. Quite the reverse, what is revealed in a fragment of this whole is delineated and predetermined by the internal laws of the whole. R. L. Ackoff and F. E. Emery are of the opinion that one of the basic characteristics of a system, which shows why a system is something more or something less than a mere sum of its constituents is the relation between its (systems) behavior and that of its elements, both regarded as individuals (1972, 205). In turn, a social system is one whose elements are individuals striving for the goal (ibid.). In an analogous case M. Wertheimer employs the concept of “striving to improve the situation”.

Thus, the contemporary scientific paradigm can no longer be satisfied with partial, fragmentary truths, but demands truth that is deep and substantial. The most important thing in the development of philosophy is this transition from a superficial, kaleidoscopic description to an adequate system of concepts. The whole as a system of concepts provides criteria for the evaluation of partial truths. Meanwhile an isolated explanation of partial, solitary phenomena provides no basis for deriving the criteria of evaluation. Experience or practice on the level of everyday consciousness is of no use here. Experience may mean collecting accidental facts and establishing simple factual, cause-and-effect connections. In M. Wertheimer’s opinion, as long as experience is expressed in terms of elements and blind relations, it cannot be the magic key to the solution of all problems. Knowing blind relations differs greatly from understanding or revealing the internal relation between the means and the goal.

When will the elements comprise not a sum, but a system? To analyze a whole does not mean to analyze all the facts. W. R. Ashby stresses that for this purpose it is necessary to select and study only those facts that are interesting to us from the standpoint of a definite goal (1964, 54). In creating an integral social fundamental theory it is necessary to select and study the relations and facts that are essential regarding the goals of social development.

Process

In the mechanistic age, traditional science paid most attention to what was static: stability, order and equilibrium. It explained the world from the standpoint of closed systems. Representation by static categories of such a complex, self-organizing system as society can sometimes be rather correct and precise. However, this represents only the status quo of relations, which automatically leads to attempting to preserve the existing state of things and to conform to the existing social relations. Studies of this
kind only describe the phenomena, but do not rise to their understanding, and cannot serve as a tool for action.

The task is to reveal the new content of the concepts on the grounds of substantiated criticism and constructive analysis of the existing abstract notions. The basic theoretical principle of constructive analysis is to perceive and analyze both the existing state of reality and its reflection in concepts, not as a stiff, static structure, but as an ordinary transitory phase or process.

Therefore we shall note two specific features of contemporary social philosophy. First, it is an open theory, as it explains social movement and discloses the essential internal contradictions of the social process with regard to their peculiarities, that is, to changeability, openness, and incompleteness. Second, philosophical theory is a reproduction of the real processes in scientific reflection in the form of a theoretical model. This model reflects not an arbitrarily selected state of social relations, a moment of the process of development, or the manifestations or elements of the progress, but an optimal state or, as M. Wertheimer puts it, an “illustrious process” (1982, 258). The comparison is of the existing state of a social phenomenon with the historically possible optimum state, expressed by means of a theoretical or ideal model. This is helpful in identifying the peculiarities of this less developed phenomenon and the degree of its maturity, and thus to reveal and delineate the ways and means of attaining this optimum state.

New rationality

An important methodological precondition is the approach to rationality. The absolutization of the rational principle formulated in the philosophy of R. Descartes, G. W. Leibniz, and later by “technological rationality” served as a strong foundation for scientism views, which reached their culmination in M. Weber’s “principle of rationality”: rationality denotes truth. However, the foundations of such absolute rationality were strongly shaken by K. Popper. In his opinion, the idea of “liberation through knowledge” is a powerful enemy of fanaticism in itself: it liberates us from our own ideas because of our critical approach to them, instead of identify ourselves with them (1968, 295). The “idea of error implies the idea of truth” (ibid).

The criteria of accuracy also undergo changes. Rationality is no longer identified with “definiteness” or accuracy, and probability with ignorance. M. Bachtin stressed that “accuracy implies the identity of a thing to itself” (1993, 81). In the sciences of man and society, accuracy means understanding the essence, i.e. certain “individualized methods” (H. Rickert). The criterion here is not the accuracy of cognition in the sense of the natural sciences, but profound perception and understanding of the essence. Of decisive significance in cognizing the processes of man and society is not mechanistic or arithmetic accuracy, but the depth of one’s
penetration into the essence. This means that in philosophy “accuracy” means adequate cognition of the relations and interactions, the more so as the statement: “each event has its cause” says nothing about accuracy (Popper K. R., 1965, 413).

Changes in the paradigm are evident when we compare J.P. Sartre’s philosophy with present day humanistic studies on man and society. Sartre’s essential question was “either–or”: either a system, that is dead, self-identical “being in itself” or a process that is a live man, “being for oneself”. In L. Althusser’s interpretation there is also a dilemma: either theory is a strict system – and then it is science; or theory is something amorphous – and then it is ideology. Both these approaches were preparing the transition from strict determinism, the “deterministic nightmare” according to K. Popper, which was equally applied to both organic and inorganic nature and society, to what presently is called “both–and”: both the process and the system (E. Morin). Late in the 20th century, E. Morin defined the changes in the paradigm of science: in the course of the last one hundred years the problem of determinism interpreted as strict causality, has undergone essential changes. Instead of the notions of the ultimate final laws which direct everything that takes place in nature, what become predominant are the laws of interaction. The problem of determinism thereby is turned into that of the order of the Universe. This order means the existence not only of “laws” of the world, but also of limitations, invariants, stability of relations, this or that regularity (1984, 314).

**Dialogic cognition**

Another concept – of “disorder” – follows from “dialogic” cognition (Bachtin M., 1993, 17; Maziarz Edward A., 1981, 149). When the dialogical activity (“dialog” with reality) of the cognizing subject or of a perpetual feedback relation which can be enhanced by conscious self-criticism (Popper K. R., 1965, 409) are meant the methodology goes into the laws of interaction, understood here as the organizing and creating principle.

By rejecting the strict determinism which K. Popper called “the deterministic nightmare”, the contemporary theories of society and man reject the purely genetic or socio-biological approach to the mysterious (i.e. not fully understood) phenomena of social behavior. Much of what was ascribed to the effects of biological reasons, or in other words to the

---

* This “both–and” method had already been applied by the Enlightenment which thought that by applying knowledge and enlightenment it is possible to modulate purposefully both the “environment” and “opinions”. Hence, there are no contradictions between the two but interaction. Thus the Enlightenment combined two fundamental theses in their doctrine: “the environment moulds opinions” and “opinions mould the environment”.
Changes in Philosophical Theories of Contemporary Society

The deterministic effect of genes, is already being explained by social interactions taking place in the conditions of an open system. Unfortunately, in social and philosophical theories strict determinism has survived even after W. K. Heisenberg, N. Bohr and other physicists had shaken its foundations. N. Wiener called this a “world of the process and not of the final dead equilibrium” (1964, 220).

Present-day philosophical theories adopt from contemporary natural sciences methods already sought by G. Hegel: the concept of relations-interactions, explanation of the processes, acknowledgement of the openness of theories. The merit of Hegel was confirmed by E. Fromm who acknowledged that the radical conception of Heraclitus and Hegel about life being a process and not a substance, in Eastern cultures corresponds Buddha’s philosophy. In Buddhism there is no concept of stable, unchanging substance, stable things or stable “ego”: nothing is true, except the processes. Contemporary scientific thought has become a renaissance of the philosophical conception of “thinking as a process” (Fromm E. 1976, 44).

Openness

Social systems are open systems; this means that it is impossible to try to explain them mechanistically as totally complete, that is, as totally closed (a closed “chain”). In philosophical cognition the description of the object in general cannot be final, exhaustive and “objective”. The course of events here cannot be stopped or repeated due to the understanding of existence as the “arrow of time” (see Prigogine I., Stengers J., 1984, 30); the social process is irreversible. Our approach is to seek a philosophical theory to explain man which is based on the principle that neither the world which we want to cognize, nor the sum total of concepts, methods, theories which we develop while cognizing the world are historically unchangeable. The world (that is, a process) is reflected by theories that are processes, that is, open theories.

J. Bahm in his book, “The Model of the Philosophers’ World,” states that too many philosophers in the past were engaged in solving problems in simple, small, static societies. Today we live in a rapidly changing, complicated, inter-tangled megapolic and global society. Therefore, ever more complicated conceptions are necessary. Complementariness, emphasis on novelty, dynamism and multi-dimensionality are used in both the synthetic and analytical methods of solving the problems (see 1981, 2). Development of this idea helped the new concept of an open world establish itself in philosophy. Because of human activities the material world is no longer beyond one but is embodied in the material and spiritual products of humans themselves, hence, the world can never be completed, closed, rigid in the form of an object or state. Because of human activities it is an incessant process of
formation, change and development (see Toulmin St., Prigogine I., Wertheimer M., Schrödinger E.).

**Subjectivity**

This problem can be well-illustrated by comparing conclusions made by B. Russell and E. Morin. In B. Russell’s opinion, perfect science tries to be impersonal and abstracted as far as possible from man (1948), whereas in E. Morin’s opinion, everywhere the need is born for science accompanied by consciousness. The time has come when consciousness is considered in the complexity of the whole of reality – physical, biological, human, social, political – and in the reality of complexity (1990, 127). Presently, not only man’s but nature’s world is no longer regarded as only an object of cognition existing in a natural completeness independent of consciousness. The world is presently being cognized as a product of the practical activities of man. W. Heisenberg wrote that natural science always implies the presence of man. The object of study in natural science is not nature itself, but nature as the object of human problems. “Presently we live in the world which has been so remarkably transformed by man, that everywhere and every hour we encounter the structures that have been called to life by man, and in this sense we encounter only ourselves” (1956, 12, 18).

Thus man again finds himself in the centre of the world. However, he is no longer considered the ruler, the conqueror or the master of the world and nature, but only the main actor or worker. Man brings novelty into the world; as he is not satisfied with himself, he always tends to “improve the situation” (M. Wertheimer). The principle that in the world we actually deal with nobody else but ourselves, is rather new. However, if we are to escape absolutization of any of the relative truths, we should bear in mind that this way of perceiving the world can be interpreted only as a vector, a direction, but not as the real state of the world. The same vector is the ascertainment of creativity in every man.

**Creativity**

In other words, the world is man himself in his material, intellectual, spiritual, sensual form. The world is not nature in its “intact” form, but a world that is incomplete. Hence these follow the image of the world as being created, or as open. The incomplete world, that is world-process, is reflected by theories-processes, i.e. open theories. For the philosophers to arrive at this conclusion, the theories of the natural scientists E. Schrödinger, W. Heisenberg, M. Born, I. Prigogin, etc. were

---

* Artists came to understand this long before. J. Goethe wrote that exactly what an ignorant man considers as nature in a work of art is not nature from the outside but man, that is nature from the inside.
Changes in Philosophical Theories of Contemporary Society

Material reality, that is the world or environment, is now perceived and explained not as finite, given once and for all and able to be observed and understood in a better or poorer fashion, but as an incessant process of formation, change and development, induced by human activities and practice. Thus nature is but the possibility of the material world or the world of practice. From the standpoint of contemporary social cognition, a description of any object cannot in principle be exhaustive, final and “objective”; society deals mostly with non-formalized phenomena and processes.

In H. Schelsky’s opinion, not only social reality but also scientific cognition regards the behavior and existence of man himself, which includes also the critical reflection of the subject, his consciousness, and his activities. For example, A. Maslow dwells upon the conception of vectorial, that is, purposeful, science. W. Schrödinger speaks about the “physicist’s subjectivity”. Characteristic is the statement that philosophers emphasize verification by way of participation, without limiting science by an “objective” approach. “Science will develop, and the laws of nature will be treated as involving man as individuality” (Miller III J. F., 1981, 244).

There is no branch of humanitarian or social science in which every new problem would be approached without one’s being guided by the principle of creativity and grounded in a concept of activity. In our cognition, information is not only related to the diversity of models, to paradigms, or to field theories, but we also acknowledge that, as individual human beings, we are the creative agents that create this relation. To paraphrase S. Kierkegaard’s idea that “truth is subjectivity”, we in our times know that “truth is creativity” (Rhodes W. E., 1981, 233), from which follows the idea of responsibility.

Responsibility

In I. Kant’s philosophy man regards his responsibility as duty to himself as a solely moral being. This duty is to him a formal correspondence between the maxims of man’s will and the value of humankind embodied in his personality. The most recent times, however, impose further corrections on the content and definition of personality. This is the individual not only “for himself” but also “for others”. No longer is it “me and the world”, but “me in the world”, in the environment, in cooperation. The “me–individual” expressing absolute meaning is replaced by “me–personality” claiming the right not only to original thinking, but also to original action.

Responsibility is becoming the core or main concept in contemporary philosophy. Formerly the individual was responsible for his actions, his activities; he bore the yoke of lonely responsibility. Presently, however, he becomes responsible also for the other; he cannot decline responsibility for the other, but must be capable of, and ready for, responsibility (see Fromm E., Losev A.). Only responsibility elevates
individuality; without it life cannot have any philosophy but would be accidental in principle (Bachtin M., 1993). E. Morin feels the absence of an expanded concept of responsibility in scientific philosophy, because good intentions are not enough for one to be really responsible. “Responsibility must confront the terrible uncertainty” (1990, 109).

This is “engaged thinking”, or self-engagement. Engaged thinking is the essential basis not only of present social philosophy, but also of science. This concept is becoming ever more popular in the works of philosophers. It was substantiated and applied by A. Toffler, J. Piaget, M. Bachtin, and M. Wertheimer in their theories. “Engaged thinking” is “the moment of fearlessness in cognition” (see M. Bachtin, 1993). However, as J. Piaget stressed, “philosophical courage” was needed to reach this quality of philosophical thinking. He pointed out not only the epistemological, but also the ideological and social obstacles that should be overcome while proceeding to this new methodology (1968, 6, 3–4). The things that “deprive” one of courage are: philosophical schools, philosophical programs, the scientific paradigm, conjuncture and ideology.

INTEGRATION AS A PRINCIPLE METHOD OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

The separate social problems are being dealt with by different sciences and conceptions. However, the arithmetical sum of the various approaches cannot provide the desirable integral image of man and the conditions for the realization of humaneness.

Without any doubt the solution of the problems of man and society is the sphere of studies. As contemporary philosophy is progressing in the context of the developing synthesis of the sciences, the effect of the method of integration here, as everywhere in contemporary science, is especially obvious. It is important, however, to avoid a straightforward transference of the methods and concepts of the natural sciences to a sphere where man and society are explained. According to M. Oelschlaeger, this kind of integration demands the new Renaissance generation of man, able to present assessments in several special sciences and to integrate this knowledge into a series of comprehensive systems (1981, 7).

The principle method of contemporary philosophy is integration on the level of conceptual analysis. Integration shows that contemporary theories emerge “in the clefts (splits) of the systems”. Philosophy borrows the concepts of the most advanced sciences, first of all cybernetics, theory of systems, theoretical biology, theoretical medicine, social psychology, political economy, etc.

On the level of philosophical abstraction, we could not find the equivalents of the explication of concepts. For instance, the content of the concept “creative personality” could be concretized only by showing the social, economic, political, technological and other conditions of the person’s activities. This is possible only by making use of the language and
methods of political economy, sociology, psychology and other sciences. E. Morin says, “The former anthropological substrate has been joined by the economical network” (1984, 328). In this interpretation philosophy loses its mysterious aura and becomes a “working”, open, provisional and transitory theory. G. Hegel maintains that a mature concept needs no myth.

The need arises to integrate, as is often the case, the concepts of political economy to explain activities: work, leisure, surplus product, demand, production conditions and other concepts; the concepts of psychology to explain the prerequisites of personality: talents, productive thinking, interests, and needs. Significant for the conceptions of activities of personality, are also the concepts of: 1) genetics: natural “background”, heredity; 2) theoretical biology: the openness of a system, the comfort of a system; 3) theoretical medicine: physical, spiritual and social health; 4) cybernetics: feedback relation, optimum, model; 5) theory of systems: system, elements; 6) physics: entropy, etc. What proceeds is a conceptual synthesis, a “joining” or intrusion into philosophy of the methods and language of the other sciences. The great discoveries and advanced theories emerge in the clefts of the systems, says E. Morin (1984, 328), though, the concepts are used in an adapted form.

Hence, the task of contemporary philosophy is not only to attain truth, but also to show how this truth can become active. Contemporary philosophy is the means of both thinking and action. Philosophy no longer has absolutely accomplished truth, but is searching for the truth of its time. Truth can be solely ensured by our thinking and our actions. Cognition is now perceived as a constant and uninterrupted dialogue with reality as the new methodologies now begin to be applied to solving the problems of man and society.

Mykolas Romeris University
Vilnius, Lithuania

REFERENCES

Fromm E. To have or to be? New York: Harper & Row, 1976.
CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHY AS CULTURAL TRADITION

ZIBARTAS JACKUNAS

The question concerning philosophy as cultural tradition is a meta-philosophical question. It arises and demands meta-philosophical reflection because philosophy does not appear to us in its pure essence, but takes multiple forms of expression in various concepts, theories, doctrines, and opinions signed by the idiosyncrasies of their authors and by the peculiarities of corresponding cultural and historical surroundings. These personal and cultural factors determine in many respects the content of those forms. Therefore the main task of meta-philosophical reflection is to detect the essence and separate it from accidental elements by means of careful examination of past and contemporary manifestations of philosophy. The detected and purified essence of philosophy could be treated as the common ground for all philosophical thinking and be called philosophical tradition.

Nevertheless, the majority of postmodernist theoreticians claim that it is not possible to find a feature common to all philosophical concepts, theories, doctrines, opinions. Therefore they negate the possibility to detect the permanent nature of philosophy, which would allow speaking of philosophy as of some cultural tradition. They regard the multiple forms of philosophical thought expression as insurmountable obstacles.

But the scholars who remain faithful to the principles of classical epistemology do not share this postmodern anti-essentialist attitude and continue their search for the general features, causes, and laws of philosophical thinking as for the foundations of the correct understanding and interpretation of reality. We will apply this attitude and will try to interpret philosophy as cultural tradition.

A PHILOSOPHY AS EXPERIENCE

The philosophical tradition can be treated as a kind of experience; for every tradition is some experience transmitted through generations. Although, according to M. Oakshott, the word experience, “of all the words in the philosophic vocabulary, is the most difficult to manage” (Oakshott M., 1991, 9), the general concept of experience ought to contain the common features of every kind of experience. The following features have to be taken into account in order to consider philosophy as a kind of experience:

The first, experience is a manifestation of meaning, a semantic artifact. D. Dennet soundly emphasizes that “experience is always and everywhere significant” (Dennet D. C., 1996, 14);
The second, experience is always generalization in which common properties and relationships of perceived phenomena are recorded and retained. As a rule, these properties and relations are practically and spiritually significant for individuals, belonging to the same society and culture. As A. Woozley notes: “Generality is an essential feature of the objects of experience itself, and reflection of this generality is shown in the vocabulary of any language, all the words of which (with the exception of proper names) are general” (Woozley A. D., 1996, 194);

Permanent recurrence in apprehension and action is the third important feature of experience. A piece of information, which does not recur, is contingent and therefore cannot be accepted as important enough to be considered as an element of experience;

Permanent verification in theory and practice is the fourth feature of experience. Every new generation verifies the content of inherited experience and purges it of untrustworthy elements; for the efficacy of social as well as personal activity depends on its reliability;

The fifth feature of experience, a cultural function, deserves special attention. No experience as a semantic artifact can be comprehended in abstraction from its application to social and personal life; for the cultural function of experience is the source of the semantic artifact: the latter is derived from the former. The emergence of social and personal needs is the immediate causes of that derivation.

Taking into account these features of experience, we will try to describe philosophy as a particular kind of experience.

Philosophical concepts, theories, doctrines, and opinions are verbal manifestations of an extremely large amount and variety of human experience: economic and social, juridical and ethical, artistic and religious, scientific and daily. It is tenable that the whole of human experience is the proper object of philosophical inquiry and interpretation. As the specific interpretation of the different kinds of experience, philosophical experience has to be treated as secondary or meta-experience.

The philosopher considers human experience in the most universal perspective, searching for the most general principles, causes and relationships. Aristotle defined his first philosophy (later Andronicus of Rhodes called it metaphysics) as “a science which investigates being qua being and its essential attributes. This science differs from all the so called special sciences in that none of the latter deals generally with being as such” (Aristotle, 1956, 115).

In general this antique definition is quite correct. Nevertheless one qualification seems necessary: philosophy investigates not so much being qua being as human experience that reflects being. Philosophy investigates and interprets the semiotic manifestations of experience: she is not the direct reflection of so-called objective reality. The meta-philosophical investigation, which deals with the results of philosophical reflection, is even more distant from that reality.
Philosophy investigates science, art, religion, morality, daily routine and other kinds of social and cultural activity. She searches for the general principles, causes, and relationships, which she defines and interprets, producing speculative theories. Since philosophy is interested in the most general elements of experience, it abstracts from its contingent features, relations, and circumstances, which do not become a part of generalized experience. But general theories produced by philosophy are necessary for the understanding and meaningful interpretation of any particular and even unique element of experience.

CULTURAL FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

As generalized experience, philosophy performs the cultural function of satisfying social and personal needs. (There is no experience, which is not related to practice.) Therefore Boethius represented philosophy as a woman, wearing clothes designated by the Greek letters “π” and “θ” (signifying, without doubt, practice and theory): the “π” imprinted on the lower part of the clothes and the “θ” – on the upper. These letters were connected by stairs by which everyone could ascend from the first letter to the second (Boethius, 2000, 37). That means that the cultural function of philosophy has to be taken into account whenever the nature of philosophy is considered.

However, to determine this function is such a difficult task that until now philosophers do not manage to provide a general definition and unambiguously to answer the questions concerning the practical purpose and significance of philosophy. Therefore, some philosophers come to skeptical conclusions. For instance, the Lithuanian philosopher, A. Maceina, asserts that “we do not know what philosophy is in itself, what she did throughout her long duration, what she tried to achieve and what has been achieved” (Maceina A., 1994, 12). A. W. Levi after considering the history of Western philosophy, claims that “it is difficult to determine whether any common element can be found within this diversity and whether any core meaning can be discovered for philosophy that could serve as a universal and all-inclusive definition” (Levi A. W., 1980, 248).

Three causes make it difficult to define the cultural function of philosophy: the relatively rapid modification of philosophical concepts and theories, as well as their astonishing quantity and diversity; the methodologically incorrect overestimation of the speculative function of philosophy along with an underestimation of the practical one; a fruitless efforts to define the purpose of philosophy based on the consideration of its utility and auxiliary functions performed in various spheres of social life.

In the already quoted article, Levi eloquently describes the historical variability of the understanding of philosophy. He writes: “Throughout its long and varied history in the West, “philosophy” has meant many different things. Some of these have been: a search for the wisdom of life (the meaning closest to the Greek words from which the
term is derived); an attempt to understand the universe as a whole; an examination of man’s moral responsibilities and his social obligations; an effort to fathom the divine intentions and man’s place with reference to them; an effort to ground the enterprise of the natural sciences; a rigorous examination of the origin, extent, and validity of men’s ideas; an exploration of the place of will or consciousness in the universe; examination of the values of truth, goodness, and beauty; and an effort to codify the rules of human thought in order to promote rationality and the extension of clear thinking” (Levi A. W., 1980, 248).

The diversity and incompatibility of these meanings is testified by the issue of its identity and faces a serious danger. So H. Duméry writes, “What is happening with it [philosophy] and what determines a loss of credit for it, is the loss of identity: not only is it unknown what it serves (it has never been “useful”), but also unknown are any determinate object or meaningful project to which it is adequate” (Duméry H., 1990, 69). Further he concludes, “Philosophy faces a threat because the notion of philosophy, the concept itself, is ill” (ibidem, 69). The illness of philosophy is acknowledged by other authors. According to A. Badiou, “There is no doubt that philosophy is ill” (Badiou A., 2003, 52).

As a rule, this opinion is followed by the negation of practical usefulness of philosophy. So, according to K. Jaspers, philosophy is unable to justify itself “by reference to something necessary” (Jaspers K., 1998, 16). According to J. Pieper, philosophy “doesn’t allow that it be used as a means for something else, it is unfitted for that” (Pieper J., 1992, 17). Lithuanian philosopher, J. Girnius, shares the same opinion: “As a means for something else philosophy is useless”. He rejects an instrumental approach to philosophy, maintaining that philosophy has its own value in itself: “not only is philosophy useless; everything is useless that is not a means. Acknowledging the “uselessness” of philosophy one has to remember, that all values are useless, nevertheless, in spite of their uselessness, they are valuable within themselves” (Girnius J., 1998, 265).

But the refutation of a utilitarian (instrumental) approach leaves open the question concerning the cultural function of philosophy. It seems that the best prospect for answering this question lies in linking philosophy with the wisdom inherent primarily in pre-theoretical experience and common sense. Wisdom consists of cognitive and estimative generalisations that function in many different areas of human activity and significantly contribute to its effectiveness and success.

Although from the very beginning of philosophy wisdom is regarded as something universal, it is possible to speak of national and personal wisdom as of some limited and peculiar parts of universal wisdom. Since the latter is the generalisation of experience of the whole humankind, it can compensate for the drawbacks of national and especially personal wisdom in understanding, estimating, and deciding. A nation or person accepts the elements of universal wisdom if his practice regularly confirms their rightness by increasing operative efficiency.
Taking into account the above indicated traits of wisdom, philosophy can be defined as the development of compensatory rationality, preserving and increasing functions inherent in the pre-theoretical and theoretical experience of humankind. So understood, philosophy is a guardian, producer, and promoter of rationality in social and personal life. Philosophical reflection is awakening every time a doubt arises whether the compass needle did not deflect from an epicentre of rationality conceived primarily as the reasonableness of activity (Toulmin S., 2001). It has a calling for elucidating, correcting and perfecting the standards of rational activities. These standards manifest themselves in real life. Not all of them are consciously apprehended but they are all determined by the corresponding historically constituted economic and cultural context of human activity. Philosophy does not elaborate standards for particular kinds of activity: economic, professional, artistic, recreative, etc. Each one develops its own standards, but philosophy provides them with the common principles of rationality without which no rational activity is possible.

These principles are changeable: their modifications follow the historical changes of the life of humankind. It is the duty of philosophy to reshape and adjust the general standards of rationality to new economic activities and the changing demands of social and cultural life. Therefore, all the talk about the death of philosophy is groundless. Continuously responding to changing life and reshaping the standards, philosophy changes itself, but at the same time preserves her own identity. At least the function of providing humanity with the common principles of rational activity always remains the same. Of course, philosophy has no power to enforce those principles on society and persons: it only proposes; people do not always follow her advice.

Philosophy, as has already been mentioned, is able to compensate for the unavoidable limitations in understanding, estimating and deciding of a particular generation; for it possesses the generalized experience of the whole of humankind and deals with the most general principles, causes, and laws of reality. Philosophical insights into reality are much deeper and universal than the insights of particular sciences, arts, and religions. Therefore philosophizing is an indispensable part of social, cultural, and personal life, provided that people strive for rational efficacy in their activity.

Philosophy consists of ontological, epistemological, and axiological components that execute different functions in philosophizing: the first assists in the understanding of the world and constituting a Weltanschauung; the second – in providing the self-consciousness of knowledge, i.e. in criticizing and perfecting theories and methods of knowledge; and the third – in elaborating the general criteria and ways of evaluation as the landmarks of rational activity. These functions are often executed by the different branches of philosophy: philosophy of nature, philosophy of science, philosophy of culture, moral philosophy, philosophy
of sport, etc. Performing those functions, philosophy certainly deserves “to wear the clothes” marked by Greek letter “π”.

Summarizing the discussion concerning philosophy as a cultural tradition, I would like to conclude that, in spite of all declarations of her illness and even of death, philosophy remains the precious and indispensable part of a meaningful cultural tradition.

Research Institute of Culture
Philosophy and Art, Lithuania

REFERENCES

Philosophy began as an autonomous “love for wisdom”, free thinking, quest for eternal and fixed truths in the context of a pluralism of opinions. And though philosophy itself constantly cared for the preservation of its own autonomy, the development of society conditioned not only the change of the role of philosophy (from science about the whole world to the “sciences of sciences”, “the queen of sciences” or even ideology), but it also brought in some doubts about the very significance of the autonomy of philosophy. Alternatively, the possibilities of philosophy in each society are understood and valued very controversially: either much is expected from it or, conversely, it is derogated to merely the function of “an assistant” to religion, science, etc. This peculiar, “fashionable” situation is complicated by a mysterious variety of concepts of philosophy itself which is also inherent in such cultural phenomena as art or science. Different evaluations of the same phenomenon are quite natural, yet, the single or predominant attitude to a certain issue should be a matter of great concern, as it means the deterioration of not only the freedom of thought but also of thinking itself. The peculiarities of a certain society determine not only the issues that are tackled by philosophy but also society’s attitude to philosophy itself. Thus, omitting a survey of the concepts of the role of philosophy in society, let us analyze the situation of philosophy in modern society.

At the end of the 20th century, a very popular term of scientific literature “postmodernism” is supplanted by the term “globalization” which reflects not only the development of information technologies and means of communication, but also transnational economic-financial links, international programs supporting culture, as well as other new inventions. Thus, the term “globalization” is not merely a fashionable fetish – it means an exceptional process of civilization provoking philosophical contemplation by the scope of its changes, complexity and discrepancy. All the social sciences and humanities contributed to this process: economics introduced the concept of global economy supplementing the concept of world economy; politology analyzed the influence of globalization on the new world order which is defined differently even by politologists themselves (the world without hegemony, the realization of the idea of neo-imperialism, global civil society); and experts in culture analyze and tackle the perspectives of global culture and its threats. Thus, globalization seems to be the entirety of rather controversial processes which should not be considered either a disaster or the embodiment of the dreams of humankind.
The same attitude pertains to evaluation as the ultimate objective of science and is the attempt to obtain more thorough theoretical explanations because “every explanation can be further explained on the basis of a more universal theory or prediction. There can be no explanation which should not need to be further explained” [4: 217].

Conversely, at present, it is due to globalization that the processes of the development of society constantly accelerate and we ourselves come to realize that we live in a continually and inevitably changing world. After all, the present world is a world of inequality and unequal possibilities in which the bulk of financial, scientific and technological resources are controlled by a small group of states and the processes of globalization only emphasize the social-economic differences of states and the problem of their inequality. Hence, today the perennial philosophical questions (if man can perceive the meaning of history, knowingly influence the development of society, etc.) reveal their new aspects and are conceptualized in a different way. Thus, perhaps the analysis of the processes of globalization in its quest for the answers to the questions “what is going on?” and “what is behind all this?” merely happens to be a modern way to disclose and perceive the present.

First, let us discuss the problem of the present: i.e. what is meant by “the present” if the change of the world is so manifest and inevitable? We consider this day to be the present though over the last few thousand years the people have been thinking the same because the present has always been as it is nowadays. Thus, how does the “old” present (to be more precise – the present of the past) become the “new” present? And is the modern concept of the present peculiar in any way?

Undoubtedly, “the present” is a relative concept, emphasizing the relation with another period of time (which has just finished or is about to begin) which provides us with a certain possibility of comparison or evaluation. Thus, over the last 3 to 4 millennia the present has been constantly mentioned, and it indicates that the present has always made people feel ill at ease. The present star of French literature, Frederic Beigbeder, associates the problem of modern man with boredom:

Only boredom allows man to enjoy the present but everybody seeks contrary things – not be bored, the Westerns resort to such things as television, cinema, internet, telephone, videogames or simple magazines. They are never totally absorbed in what they do – they live “according to authorization” as if to be satisfied with the fact that breathing here and now would be dishonest. When you are sitting in front of TV or an interactive page or are calling on your mobile phone or playing Play station you are not living. You are in a different place but not where you are. Maybe you are not dead but you are not entirely alive. It would be interesting to measure how
many hours a day we spend not in the present but somewhere else. Not where we are but somewhere else [1: 125].

Why does the modern “present” scare and even repel people? Perhaps because nowadays the content of concepts is rapidly changing, and there is less and less definition now while in the 19th or even at the beginning of 20th century most concepts were clear and defined. For instance, in economy, the role of modern international companies (there are tens of thousands of them even without their subsidiaries all over the world) is extremely important. These companies do not belong to any state and some of them are more powerful than a medium state: they employ especially talented people, possess the best laboratories and use state-of-the-art technologies. Although it would be really difficult to name the owner (in the old meaning of this word) of such a company, the very existence of these companies and their activities inevitably change the content of such widely spread concepts as “property”, “nation”, etc. As a result of this constant change, the well-known words “overgrow” with new meanings, new weird concepts spring up and the content of familiar concepts becomes vague, so that people inevitably begin to wonder if they mean anything at all. We also daily use familiar concepts, but simultaneously we doubt them more and more frequently. Due to the operation of phenomena whose essence we vaguely imagine (for instance, does every user know where is the internet, what is cyberspace, what processes take place in a cell, etc?), that doubt becomes part of the process of contemplation.

The peculiarity of both the present and the “modern” present could be formulated in a slightly paradoxical way – it is the decrease of the number of explicit concepts. One should be more precise speaking not only about the existence of this doubt as such, but more about giving prominence to such doubt. How is this perceived? Let us use a simple example: at school we were taught strict grammar rules and only much later did we realize that the usage of language is more important than rules and a variety of slang and jargon presents the possibility of more clearly expressing a concept (especially a new one) even through this violates the existing norms of grammar. But how should we evaluate those rules: to discard them or to violate them as the change of rules will always follow.

The speculation on the perspectives of mankind also gives a singular possibility to touch upon the present in a slightly different way; there are eventually more intensive changes in everyday life; indeed, only the end of the second millennium forced society to admit the threat of an ecological crisis. Although various prophesies associating the end of the world with the results of human activities were announced long ago, humankind experienced a threat to its physical existence only when such separate processes as expansion of production, the increase of population, the decrease of natural resources, holes in the ozone layer, etc., already had
considerably harmed our environment. These well-known trends gave rise to the construction of global models of the future of mankind. In their pessimism those models greatly surpassed the bravest predictions of the representatives of science fiction. Conversely, though the attempts of philosophers and scientists created numerous different tragic (or happy) models of the future of humankind, the value of these predictions is still considerably doubtful for society as an unusually complex and dynamic system whose development is influenced not only by presently known causality but also by queerly twisted controversial tendencies and unpredictable factors. Among them we can find causal efficiency of the abstract derivatives of the Third World, discerned and mentioned by philosopher K. R. Popper “how such non-physical things as aims, contemplations, plans, decisions, theories, inventions and values can cause physical changes in the physical world” [4:346].

Therefore, the most effective solution to the problem of the present is to analyze the existent transformations of the spiritual life of humankind, the rise of new forms of spiritual life of humankind and the relation of those forms to the development of information technologies and means of communication. In this context, the term “new forms of spiritual life” does not mean “more perfect” or “degenerate,” but merely different: they create new meanings which operate in a different way. One of those forms is the new technical-psychological phenomenon called “virtual reality”.

But this phenomenon has not emerged “from nowhere”; it has been the result of regular long-term attempts though the first definitions of the term “virtual reality” appeared only around 1989 and meant an artificial (“possible”, “supposed”, “future”) world created by means of the computer. Subsequently the number of its definitions increased and different classifications of virtual reality emerged. But how new is the phenomenon itself? After all, before this term appeared, while watching a film or just reading a book, one could easily find oneself in “another” world where one could “act” as an inquisitive observer. Thus, one was excited about the fate of heroes even though one could not change the flow of events. Cinematography and later television became a significance step towards virtual reality – it is due to these inventions that many people were given the ability to enter so strongly into the “events” of games or the characters of “soap operas” that they could not distinguish the role from the actor and looked forward to the next film series as an important event in their own lives.

Yet, books, television and the media are not virtual reality, though each of them has its own space and even affects our environment (for instance, the usage of our language), but they do not provide their audience with the real possibility to take part in the action or influence the events, i.e. they lack interactivity. Therefore, the possibility of virtual reality was anticipated by computer games. If the reader gets certain books as they are written by the author, he has to look forward to the sequel (if the author is still alive) or hope that it will be done by another author. The participant in
computer games can actively take part in certain events. The fact that those events do not seem real presents even more possibilities for the player to fantasize or imagine.

Nowadays there are no practical restrictions on the development of computer information technologies and the internet (i.e. the system of information search and transmission) which has appeared owing to these technologies is already changing the very communication between people and creating its own system of demand. The history of the internet began in 1969 when two computers exchanged the information along a telephone switchboard line. The first network was used by various institutions with the purpose of communication, but the modern internet appeared only when it began to serve social interaction, i.e. the creation of global community. Computer communication creates virtual reality. No one knows where it really is, but it becomes visible and accessible owing to the mediator – the computer. It is interesting to note that Marshall McLuhan’s book on the influence of the means of information transmission on society was published as early as 1964. In it, he emphasizes the need to understand the consequences of man’s creativity and thus man’s relation to technological production:

‘We have extended our nervous system by surrounding the Globe with it and by annihilating space and time on our planet. We are rapidly approaching the last stage of man’s extension – the simulation of technological consciousness when the creative process of cognition will be collectively and mutually expanded and it will encompass the whole human community, similarly how we have already expanded our senses and nerves by means of various medias.’

The history of philosophy has always comprised different approaches to the problem of reality but in this case it is not important how virtual reality itself is or how real our perception of reality is. If we tried to formulate the difference between virtual reality and actual reality, we would have to admit that, in fact, the main difference between them happens to be the degree of freedom of human actions. It determines the most important feature of virtual reality – the fact that the virtual world will never become a precise copy of the real world. However, for some persons who have difficulty in adapting themselves, virtual reality may supplant the real world. Having abandoned the real world and transferred to the internet, we would find an entirely different structure of reality: everything is happening only here and now. Virtual reality offers numerous virtual technologies: virtual banks or virtual shops which seem to perform the functions of real institutions, but simultaneously make an impression of a not very serious game.
But these and other ways of communication between people which appeared because of the development of information technologies and means of communication are not a real substitute for human relations, but merely a possible supplement which supplants equally insufficient communication on the phone. A very special way of communication creating an illusion of communication and camouflaging waste of time is chat portals which can be joined by anyone as there are no restrictions on age, gender or education; behind any mask one can talk about anything.

Yet, reality which has been familiar till now does not vanish. Virtuality is thought and its result; it is the product of imagination in a different form of its existence which can be called the world of meanings and their operation. But if the modern world can be called a world of nascent virtual culture, it does not mean an inevitable collapse of the existing culture. Science is just beginning to explore virtual space, its influence on our senses and physical and psychological health; it has unlimited possibilities for manipulating the subconscious of man in the system of virtual reality. But we are already aware of the danger of dependence which threatens those who use this system too frequently or just wish to “escape” from reality.

The present world, unlike the previous ones, does not inspire philosophers to create universal philosophical systems. Such phenomena as terrorism, wars, spread of the media and mass culture and their consequences not only brought some doubt to Western rationalism about man’s ability reasonably to solve the questions. They also manifestly demonstrated that nowadays it is too complicated to manipulate human solutions or influence the conscience of society. Conversely, even if Western, one-sided orientation towards the progress of science and technology disrupts the ties between man and nature, and if man is governed by technical, economic and political systems created by him, this does not altogether mean that his need for universal philosophical systems will never be regained.

Academic philosophy gave rise to numerous new trends, but all of them emphasize the need to be a professional in one’s own sphere, i.e. of focusing on one or two issues. This should not be surprising as the same tendency of narrow specialization is predominant in all modern sciences though the saying attributed to B. Shaw precisely reveals its weakness: it is impossible to become a narrow specialist without becoming, to put it precisely, “a half-wit”. Yet, separate branches of science are simultaneously being joined into new interdisciplinary complexes allowing a combination of various scientific approaches successfully to solve problems.

The situation with philosophy is entirely different: over the last decades there have been frequent talks about the crisis of philosophy, the end of traditional philosophy and even its “death”. What could it mean? It may be the old trick, attracting the attention of the gullible by bad news. Or it may be the reaction to a new spiritual situation – a peculiar expression of anxiety and helplessness.
American philosopher, Richard Rorty, whose evolution of philosophical views has reached the stage of the return to the tradition of national pragmatism contends that philosophy started as an attempt to escape to a world where nothing ever changes. It sounds paradoxical but, to the thinker’s mind, philosophy cannot “come to an end” until social and cultural changes take place in society, as they constantly provoke the need of a new philosophical language. Communication is the axis of modern society and R. Rorty’s approval of J. Dewey’s thesis repeatedly confirms that the task of a philosopher is to reconcile the old with the new; the professional function of the philosopher is to be an honorable mediator between different generations and to reconcile spheres of cultural activity with tradition. To listen to R. Rorty, the mission of the philosopher is the persuasion of people because our cultural traditions rest upon an old custom to consider people from other countries or of other religions, the untouchable, women, homosexuals, half-breeds or disabled people as inferior or unequal members of society. “Utopia will not set in, until all the people are not persuaded by the insignificance of those differences” [5:5-6]. Therefore, philosophy is going to exist as long as issues which are actual to most people and incapable of being solved in a narrow field of experts.

In modern culture, when everything is rapidly changing, old views are unmercifully rejected and many professions lose their need and become useless while some professions are compelled radically to change their functions. Earlier, from generation to generation, all the members of a family produced something together and passed the secrets of their craft to their offspring; in the 20th century one acquired a profession which was sufficient for one’s whole lifetime. Nowadays modern children have professions that their parents have not even heard of, and tomorrow they will have to be able to pursue occupations which were not necessary even yesterday. In such a complex situation it is imperative to have flexibility in thinking, prediction of possibilities and ability to look into the future, as we all live today in a world of probable events. Now every person has to learn to create a profession new to himself by means of his imagination and combination of the different activities to which he can bring his methods, programs or other intellectual productions. No science is able to train for such universal activities except philosophy. Therefore, today philosophy has a special role, for it remains the only serious theory of thinking and of productive behavior in these dynamic circumstances for the process of individual and mass thinking about the construction of appropriate methods.

Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

LITERATURE


CHAPTER IV
PHILOSOPHICAL THINKING IN A WORLD WITHOUT LANDMARKS
KRESCENCIJUS STOSKUS

Until almost the very end of recent times, or of modernity, philosophy behaved as if it embodied the absolutely pure mind of sovereigns and generalists; it derived all its strength – and innovations – from itself, independently of either the epoch or the national culture. Either directly or indirectly it claimed to possess universal fundamental knowledge, equally significant for every period in history and every human society. Both its universe, world or cosmic content and the logical form of reasoning common to all humankind had to maintain confidence that philosophy was interested in all that was general, universal, and valid for any real or even merely virtual human (or merely sapient) being. It could not even have been thought that rational people, enveloped in wise love and passion for knowledge, could give in to any influence of irrational external factors, and be dependent on such things that cannot even be named on the spot. If sometimes it came close to such an idea, it was ashamed to admit that the image of the world reached by its most difficult efforts might be determined by those local forms of life that are most often created by people who have nothing to do with philosophy.

The hardest thing for academic philosophy was to be reconciled with the paradox that the biggest changes in philosophy were often initiated not by its most qualified connoisseurs but by autodidacts and half-dilettantes. They forayed into philosophy from outside to radically change its settled direction. Academic philosophy viewed it as vandalism, or intellectual hooliganism, but in the course of time it was becoming obvious that, most probably on its own and as a form of culture respecting its traditions, philosophy would not be able to introduce such radical changes.

Such an adventurous, onslaught in the middle of the 19th century, marked the end of modern philosophy and the beginning of contemporary philosophy. This is represented in K. Marx’s theory of social stratification, F. Nietzsche’s theory of the superman and S. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of sub-consciousness, all having quite easily managed the classical philosophic problems. They do not even attempt to understand and assess philosophy from the inside, but just reject it from new positions dictated by the altered atmosphere of life and thinking. The entirety of modern philosophy was influenced by science and oriented towards gnoseological problems. In the middle of the 19th century that tendency was almost exhausted. First, one could have the impression that all its ontological content was already exhausted or nearly exhausted by specialized sciences.
Second, with the expansion of European liberalization, democratization and secularization, with society becoming involved in political life, and with social movements maturing, life’s problems anthropologized philosophy. Whereas before it studied the sources and opportunities of knowledge, it now took interest in human life, its activities and behavior, its social conditions, etc. Third, the emerging historical sagacity made one think that the time of more pragmatic positive thinking and acting had come, which was why philosophy, too, should be more adjusted to meet the needs of practical life.

The originators of the newest philosophy do not attain the subtlety, prudence, attention to changes in thoughts, honest interpretation, careful reading, analytic comprehensiveness and consistency necessary for a real theoretical critical competence. They do not even seek that. On the contrary, often they just attack their predecessors as if they were enemies of the critics and “unmask”, degrade, sneer and sometimes even openly mock and rail at them. They consider themselves as reformers of the world and act as conquerors ignoring the rules of the civilized world. Nietzsche was especially disdainful of them: G. Sand – “a milk cow with a grand manner”, Dante – “a hyena poetizing in a graveyard”, Saint-Beuve – “an anti-man with a woman’s vengefulness and a woman’s sensuousness”, Kant “Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent”, Rousseau – “half-woman” whose “instincts of revenge grunt and squeal”, Plato’s philosophy – “webs of concepts weaved by a recluse”, etc. Marx and Engels show much more respect for the classics but fight against their opponents and ideological enemies of their times in essentially the same manner as Nietzsche: B. Bauer – “a saintly epileptic” and “father of church” who “intoxicated, stammers a dithyramb to female beauty”; M. Stirner – “Saint Max” and “Saint Sanco”; and they both are referred to as “grand masters of the Holy Inquisition”. Marx and Engels are straightforward in saying, “Real humanism has no more dangerous enemy in Germany than spiritualism or speculative idealism.” For that reason they were determined to destroy it. Not to debate, not to polemicize, not to express their critical view but to destroy illusions and show, let us say, that Bauer’s monthly Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung is “the nonsense of German speculation in general,” having reached “its peak”, that it “distorts reality into an obvious comedy through philosophy.” Marx and Engels explain such a libelous manner saying that the above edition is “below the level already attained by German theoretical development.” This is why it itself makes it necessary “to assert, in contrast to it, the already achieved results as such” (Marx K., Engels F., 1960, 9-10). Nietzsche himself describes his most spiteful book Twilight of the Idols as philosophizing with a hammer, taking pride in its being negative, painful and destroying old values.

Freud is a man of academic character; libelous style is alien to him. However, his radicalism is even greater than his predecessors’ countercultural attitudes. Marx strives to crucify not only German spiritualism but also the entire bourgeois culture of the Western world. The
Philosophical Thinking in a World Without Landmarks

Manifesto of the Communist Party said that for the proletariat “law, morality and religion are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.” And still “the proletarians have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property” (1949, 18). Nietzsche attempts to kill Christian culture, but starts his assault with attacking Socrates, “the famous old snake in the grass”. He is said to have “overdevelopment of logical ability” and his characteristic “thwarted sarcasm”. And in general for him the great wise men are “decadents” who “limp on both legs” (1991, 508-510). Socrates and Plato are called tools of Greek dissolution, pseudo-Greek and anti-Greek as they opposed instincts. Freud goes even further than Nietzsche – he announces all culture to be opposed to the innate human instincts. True, he does not suggest destroying it: life without it would be even more monstrous. But at the same time he considers culture to be a permanent hindrance to realizing individual natural urges, which is why there are present in all men (but not to the same extent) “destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural, trends” (1992, 20).

Marx is a lawyer; Nietzsche is a philologist, and Freud a psychiatrist: all forayed into philosophy from outside. All in their way naturalize, reduce, desacralize, dehumanize, pragmatize and roughen man; in other words, he is regarded as a simpler, more earthly, more aggressive and irrational being than could be possible. They knock down the extremely elevated man to the dirt of the earth and expose him not from the viewpoint of those aspirations to what he would like to be and sometimes becomes, but from the viewpoint of that prosaic reality and triviality where a minimal man lives and to which people often fall who have not managed to realize their goals – those who are cracked, disenchanted with the world or marginalized by social conditions. A man of the newly modern times was the lord of the world, where the man of these reformers is governed by historical necessity, aggressive instincts and the will to rule. Marx sees him as alienated, unmanned and deprived of his human essence; according to Nietzsche, a man of the European culture is languid and feeble, having lost his life instinct and natural sensuousness; and Freud in general views man as an aggressive being, avoiding work, neglecting common sense and barbarously destroying values created by others – and, if needed, other people as well. They all follow the tradition that was started by ancient sophists and later restored by N. Machiavelli, T. Hobbes and C. A. Helvetius, that based state power and justice on “the rule of power”. In their opinion, man is better revealed through his natural, animal, carnal, orgiastic, barbarous or even psychopathological side than through his inner, spiritual and cultural side; better through his passions and instincts than reason; better through strength and physical violence than through good will, respect and self-sacrifice; better through property and economic interests than scientific and artistic achievements, religious, moral or philosophic motives.
This obviously was the very beginning of the revaluation of modern cultural values and the displacement of the science-equipped mind from the centre of culture. Here the concept of progress is also known. Even Nietzsche speaks about the superman as a being rising from man and belonging to the future. However that progress is already more like destiny, a certain return to the origins and fluctuations caused more by opposing instincts than willful realization of goals following a well-defined direction. Man himself is defined not from the viewpoint of the unique, superior skills of a personality, but on the basis of those inner interests characteristic of a person belonging to the crowd, the mass, the absolute majority: Marx’s proletarian, Nietzsche’s band member, Freud’s inferior. The first is charmed with him and announces him to be the creator of the future, the second despises him, simulating the aristocratism of a peculiar nouveau riche, and the third just considers him a normal person. But they all talk about the same phenomenon of the liberalization of the modern society – a mass individual whom later J. Ortega y Gasset related to the “revolt of the masses”. At first he seemed to be a revolutionist, or a rebel, and much later a mass consumer – both coming from the same mass production.

It was not those attackers of philosophy who invented such a man – they just could not but notice him and spoke up about his activity and certain added value. By their radical interference with history they, of course, encouraged one to turn one’s eyes from the ideal man towards the “real” one (common, typical, average, standard, simple, trivial) and sometimes even to identify oneself with him. The ideal man was constructed following the example of a philosopher, a churchman and a scientist, and his maturity is still measured with the development of spiritual strength or just sense. The real man is freed from social and cultural constraints, the requirements of Apollonic harmony, the ideological norms of the ruling class, the rigid censorship of the superego, in short, from conventions, the discipline of the Greek nomos (custom, law). He is encouraged instead to barbarize and naturalize, i.e. to lend an attentive ear to primary, elementary life instincts, spontaneous impulses, simple needs and desires. Apparently, it was time for thinkers from outside to come in to interest the reader in such a man. On the other hand, the reader, too, had to be disappointed with the efforts of the mind to reform the world in order to yield so soon, seduced by irrationality and petty, pragmatic interests.

For the ancient Greek, a real man whose example was worth following and to whom one desired to be close was a wise man; for the medieval Europeans – a saint; during the new times – a world reformer having accumulated scientific knowledge and deciphered the laws of nature; whereas the “crucifiers” of the new times philosophy became concerned with the mass of identical individuals, the crowd, a serial producer of serial production and later also the consumer. The crowd interested specialists of many fields: not only social scientists (Marxists, positivists) but also psychologists, physicians, lawyers, economists and historians. They accustomed people to think about those mechanisms –
suggestion, imitation, identification, sublimation, class interests and collective sub-consciousness – that govern people despite their sense, good will and self-sacrifice. G. Le Bon, the first to announce the arrival of the “era of the crowd” at the end of the 19th century (Psychologie des foules, 1895), associated the chaotic period emerging with the collapse of former “religious, political and social beliefs in which all the elements of our civilization are rooted”, and with the creation of new conditions of existence and thought “as the result of modern scientific and industrial discoveries” (1998, 125). During that period the crowd, acting as a destructive barbarous revolutionary force, while at the same time implementing civilization changes, is compared with microbes accelerating the decay of a feeble body or corpse. Here the most important thing is that the crowd acts as a factor grading the abilities of individuals and individual differences in general and eliminating rationality. Decisions that are taken even by clever men, but are affected by the crowd hardly differ from those made by fools.

From ancient times until Nietzsche the crowd was associated with a herd of animals, a wild horde, a gang of barbarians, robbers, rebels or Bacchanals. In recent times, with the third caste set free and having come to power, it is linked with the movement of the masses and revolutionary upheaval. Apart from those, history suggests another concept of the crowd, defining such a way of self-expression which is rooted in the conditions of absolutely stable democratic governance. One of its oldest descriptions is known to us from Plato’s Republic. Here the crowd is people flowing to the theatre, performances, folk events, courts, gathering in military camps, etc. As it comprises many very different people, its desires and tastes are extremely contradictory and erratic. By them it is impossible to decide what is good and what is evil, what is right and what is wrong, what is beautiful and what is ugly. A person formed in such an environment does not have his own character, beliefs or views: he easily turns into a demagogue, a sophist praising everything that is desired by the crowd and reproving what it hates at the moment.

All three of these concepts of the crowd are amalgamated in Le Bon’s concept. In all cases personalities and their consciousness disappear in the crowd: its individuals are ruled by common feelings and moods. From an intellectual point of view a famous mathematician may differ extremely from a shoemaker, but their character may be very similar. The crowd is ruled by its unconscious features: sense of overpowering forces, yielding to suggestion, aspiration to turn a suggested idea into action immediately. Individually, a man can be absolutely civilized; “in the crowd – he is a barbarian”, that is, exclusively governed by instinct. He demonstrates a more pronounced inclination to exercise his own will, to rage, to destroy but also to perform enthusiastic, heroic deeds characteristic of a primitive man. This similarity is the more enhanced because the man in the crowd very easily obeys words and images that cannot have any
influence on him while he is in an isolated position and behaves in a manner clearly contradictory to both his interests and habits (*ibid.*, 137).

The crowd of the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century was full of changes while that of the end of the 20th century was a consumer crowd. Mass production catering to the most elementary needs, likes and tastes of consumers enhanced their rapacity and voracity, awoke their sensitivity and made them post-modern hedonists. These voracious consumers warranted an unceasing development of production, the need for continuous updating of goods and fabrication of new trends and supporting tastes and needs. In the newest times production aimed at satisfying the needs of people, while new needs are discovered to expand production; in other words, production exists for the sake of production proper, and man is just an incentive and tool of its development. Before people ate in accordance with certain time rhythm coordinated with their physiological needs and the rhythm of working; now they eat almost without stopping as if they had bulimia.

The mass man participating in mass production found satisfaction in mass culture adjusted both to the acceleration of mass production and to the facilitation of its consumption. Personality and even a person started losing meaning and value; humanism started to become ridiculous. Man started withdrawing from art in a most radical and in a most dramatic manner. When Nietzsche announced the death of God, only a few understood that the sentence was addressed to man. However God was treated, he had always expressed, supported and strengthened man’s ideal strivings. The desacralized man in the end is the one who can no longer afford to respect, to value and to admire himself. Often he feels better if he is disgusted with himself, detests himself, mocks himself or just indifferently exposes his pathological inclinations (sadism, masochism, homosexuality, masturbation, etc.), massacre, tortures, violence, destruction, extermination, vulgarities, spiritual poverty and nonsense.

Having lost his ideal dimension, man also destroyed his future projection. Ancient philosophy was the philosophy of eternity that did not see any essential difference between past, present and future. Heroes of the past were respected and worshipped, their example was followed, and the application of the norms of the past to the present formed the future. Medieval philosophy was the philosophy of the salvation of man, defining man’s destiny from original sin till doomsday. There was the happy past in paradise, troubles in the present and hope of salvation in the afterlife. Modern philosophy is one of endless perfection of the world that has known primitive life in the past, its achievements in the present and a hardly imaginable but still more prominent prosperity in the future. Sometimes this turned into the embodiment of justice or humaneness, the rule of reason or conquest of the universe. Contemporary philosophy starts with the destruction of the man’s ideals, and thus, his visions of future prospects and progress. While man could look at himself from the viewpoint of his growing opportunities, he seemed to himself to be as grand and yet
immense, unknown and unpredictable as God, but when his illusions started fading away, when the power of his mind seemed limited, when disastrous effects of science and technology became apparent, the future became problematic, and in his own eyes he became a petty, contemptible and pathetic being (cynical and nihilistic). Having lost hope for a happy future, he now lives in today and avoids casting a glance beyond its horizon.

The link between disappointment with civilization and the reduced mass man is not necessary. Let us say, Ortega y Gasset depicts the mass man as a mediocre man fully satisfied with himself (Ortega y Gasset J., 1993). And such a mediocre man is ignorant of his own narrow-mindedness and has no determination to master it. His narrow-mindedness is understood only by the researchers of “the crowd” inclined to elitism and aristocratism. However, masses can be contaminated with the atmosphere of hopefulness. Today this is spread through various forms of the mass counterculture: fashion trends, lifestyles, religious sects, artistic movements, images created by the mass media, etc. To put it more precisely, they not so much spread the atmosphere of hopelessness, but rather create the image of the countercultural and destructive world and the experience of annihilating accordant values, meanings and significant objectives. The destructive virtual reality which intruded on man becomes a form of validating life destruction.

In this virtual world it is not hope that is destroyed, but the quality of life proper, and this is destroyed to such an extent that living in such a world becomes repulsive, absurd and meaningless. As a matter of fact, the man of the crowd does not even see any connection between the closure of the future horizon characteristic of modern civilization and the absurdity of the virtual world; nor does he even feel the absurdity of that repulsiveness. Quite the contrary, just like alcohol or drugs, he is stunned, pleasantly excited and impassioned by sights of brutal physical force, violence, sexual pathology, murder, destruction and obscenities. A barbarian awakened by commercial interests is never puzzled, even over someone manipulating him. Even intellectuals today are proud of their barbarity and sometimes also their affinity with the mass consumer. Declaring the return of Dionysus, they think that they show the best correlation with the spirit of the times, the new force of freedom and spontaneous creativity and even the vision of world renewal and liberation of the body from repressive culture. Apparently, they are not mistaken, for they fully correspond to the posture of the reduced man of the crowd. Like Plato’s sophists, they teach the crowd what they themselves have learnt from it. Nobody will say that these people are disappointed with civilization although they try to reduce it. They disrupt culture, but get support from the cultural fund to pay for that disruption. Mass man does not see that paradox. Being a phenomenon of crisis, he cannot see that man is reduced and deprived of his future dimension. This is human existence formed within a culture that lost its horizon of the future. Like Roman plebs, he contents himself with bread and circuses. He cannot but be a hedonist living today; he cannot but be
somewhat bulimic and a drug user rapt in voracious consumption and stimulation of sense impressions.

Disappointed with the future, this man is rather a cynic and nihilist. He takes the loss of the future hard and thus transposes the emptiness of the future to the present, feeling correctly that the present without the future has no meaning worth living. And a post-modern man considers such self-confinement in the present a norm of today’s life validating the possibility of living without meaning. Camus once advised the absurd man to rebel in order to endure being confronted with the absurd. However it may be, only an intellectual who grows accustomed to his vanguard mission as creator can deceive himself in this way. For that reason he lacks the courage to admit that rebellion proper in the absurd world is absurd. Common people of the crowd have the more reliable means of stimulating sensual experiences, intoxication, hallucinations and the newest goods that help to endure constant imprisonment in the present, in the dependence upon advertisements and in production for the sake of production. If the man is formed in an environment of such stimuli and lives among common consumers, it is difficult to imagine how he could consider such a state as abnormal. Abnormality here is a norm, pathology – a right of the social minority, barbarity – a counterculture, ignorance – a different opinion, chutzpah – a freedom of behavior, impudence – a courage to be natural, death – a destiny that must be taken easily. It is not a simple inversion of values, but accommodation to the abnormal state or, to be more precise, legitimating that state, its validation and admission that it is acceptable to live a life which is decay.

A cynic and a nihilist disappointed with the future stand up against being confined in the present. They remember the past atrophied in the present and still do not have anything to cherish. The real world has no value or meaning for them; they despise and annihilate it. Postmodernist devaluation and inversion of values only enhance the weight of denial. On the other hand, only because the present has destroyed the most important cultural values or devaluated them, does the future not promise anything to them and disappoints.

Postmodernist conformism and hopeless nihilism are the two extreme symptoms of the modern cultural crisis characteristic of the fundamental, present-oriented philosophy of these days, hopelessly attempting to endure its existence in the meaningless world. It is overcome by emotion, neurotic anxiety, and masochistic indulgence in the abomination of man, degeneration and decay. The man of the twentieth century discovers anew how pleasant it is to loathe (to satisfy curiosity, to intrigue, to awake the destructive instinct, to validate one’s own degradation, etc.); how good it feels to despise everything that was created by man and considered a value; how common it is to legitimate any somatic or psychic pathology by calling it a norm; how democratic it is to compare the talented with the talentless, the competent with the laity, the butcher
Philosophical Thinking in a World Without Landmarks

with the victim. And it is with such a world that the present philosophy tries to accommodate.

Less popular is critical philosophy, or the philosophy of foreseeing the opportunities to survive. A healthy man least thinks of his health and his death: he is preoccupied with the content of life and not its conditions. An ill one casts aside all his works: the preoccupation with the quality of life is replaced with the preoccupation of survival. But the most difficult is the critical condition when the man can no longer lead a normal life, but is not yet dying: he does not know what to clutch. At that moment he suffers most, and suffers primarily mentally as he is forced to await “a decision” which does not depend on him. It is like a court passing a death sentence. Then, hopes for life take turns with the desire to die but nothing happens, and ambiguity continues. An illness is an abnormal condition of life: through it the man “falls out” of life and postpones life to a later time. However, life plans are not destroyed by that. It is different when one finds oneself in a critical condition; with the horizon of the future closed, all plans lose their real value and are hung in the air: there is either… or… left.

A similar condition exists in modern culture: reliance on the principles of undoubted progress, science and rationality is becoming a thing of the past. Quoting K. Jaspers, “The question of the present position of the man as a result of becoming and his future opportunities is now posed more acutely than ever. Answers provide for some possibility of death and some possibility of a real start, but no augural answer is given” (Jaspers, 296). Both possibilities are equally probable and no one can provide any guarantee as to which of them will turn into reality. That uncertainty is too hard for people to do without prophets, astrologists, sorcerers, oracles and extrasensory people (clairvoyants), but theoretical sense can promise nothing here. J. Huizinga, the author of the famous A Diagnosis of the Spiritual Distemper of Our Time, in the preface to its seventh edition, replying to reflections that he provided no forecasts or cures in his book, explained that it would be an impertinence to do so “when the disease is so advanced. The most I could dare was to indicate the possibility of convalescence” (1992, 244). In a crisis that is quite a lot. The horizon of the future is kept ajar as the critical look at the modern world is maintained, threats and survival-guaranteeing tendencies are clearly named, and man is spurred to make a decision and to assume responsibility. It is believable that comprehension of the crisis will call for the forces of the society, peoples and states still absolutely free of the disease, offer moral support to the mind falling into despair and at the same time sober up a more independently thinking progressist (scientist, positivist, technocrat, etc.). Comprehension of the crisis is not a consequence of the simple critical attitude identified with Rousseauism, romanticism or American transcendentalism. The philosophy of crisis tries to explain why disappointment with man, his way, value and meaning of life is spreading; why he ceased to respect, praise and elevate himself and started depreciating, humiliating and despising himself, why he ceased to believe
in his growth, strengthening, improvement, perfection and started exposing his primitivism, vulgarity, brutality, disgust and morbidity. At last he discovers a connection between disdain for himself and that historical situation which he creates himself and in which he feels his helplessness. Before he felt absolutely dependent on the nature, gods and demons and on the almighty Creator of the world; now – on himself. However, dependence on oneself is dual. Both for man of the new times and for the ancient Stoic it meant sensible self-control, a free view of the world and its phenomena, autonomy of will, independent decision-making, taking life into one’s hands and management of oneself and the situation. The modern man has just the contrary dependence that could be called a frustrating, paralyzing and crippling dependence on what in us is irrational, unmanageable and uncontrollable, that is on blind instincts, spontaneous impulses, inextinguishable desires, unforeseeable and irresistible consequences, which however determine our lives. Before, culture seemed an advanced way for the man to conquer nature; now it more reminds one of a train going faster and faster without a driver. No one knows where it runs and how long in general the train can endure the increased acceleration, but all, according to their abilities, throw coal into the fire box of the steam engine to speed it up and to experience the euphoria caused by that movement. And this despite alarm signals; informing about the symptoms of the decay of the train. More simply, today man has become a hostage of his own creations and the inertia of his own established inclinations and needs, his own enemy, a self-repudiating schizophrenic expressed in alienated forms (characters, roles, masks, simulacra, images, symbols, technical means, etc.).

Critical philosophy starts analyzing disabilities, bad luck and losses of man and his culture unconsciously masked with trends of his growth and progress; this is an attempt to find some landmarks in an abnormal, critical historical situation. The critical mind creates critical philosophy devoted to criticizing reality, i.e. for disclosing its dark sides; a critical philosophy of crisis is spread in such times as a rational effort to understand the crisis, to isolate oneself from it and to foresee a possible way out. Certainly, such an effort exists just as long as does critical philosophy. To put it more precisely, the entire present-oriented philosophy of today is a philosophy of crisis, despite whether it understands it or not. The more it is submerged in crisis, the less it understands its morbidity. In this sense the philosophy of crisis proper is a symptom of cultural crisis, especially when it tries to smile sardonically and imagine that life is quite normal in its abnormality, i.e. absurdity, simulacra, morbidity (neuroticism, schizophrenia, asexuality, sadism, masochism, etc.), trifle nature, one-dimensionality and dying. Among postmodernists, no one understands that better than J. Baudrillard declaring the charm of disappearance, “If being a nihilist is to be obsessed with the mode of disappearance, and no longer with the mode of production, then I am a nihilist. Disappearance, aphesis, implosion, fury of the Verschwindens <…>. It does not even have anything in common with
disappointment, with the self-elevated, tempting and nostalgic tonality of
disappointment. This is simply disappointment and that is it” (2002, 184).
He calls that form of nihilism a nihilism of “transparency,” contrary to the
aesthetic (dandyism) and political, metaphysical nihilism (terrorism),
relating it with the spread of “simulation and intrusion” when the only thing
left in the entire world is

empty and indifferent forms, the charm of the system
annihilating us. And the latter <…> is a nihilistic passion
par excellence, which is a passion characteristic of
disappearance. We are charmed by all modes of
disappearance (our disappearance). Our general situation
in the era of involuntary poverty is defined by melancholy
and charm (ibid, 182).

So the philosophy of crisis of the modern culture is the philosophy
of crisis in a ternary sense: first, it is validation of an abnormal condition
through its existence (that is true today), that is its conversion into norms.
One must accept that form as it is impossible to avoid, and to claims that
there is even no need to avoid it. Second, it is disposition and explication of
the crisis proper, it is philosophy about crisis without experience of a
critical condition or philosophy about death without tragedy, catastrophe
and apocalyptic horror (the tragedy of death is possible only where life has
not lost its meaning and value). Third, and most properly it is a symptom of
the cultural crisis, the unhealthy thinking expressed in the decay of logical
bases, relativism, negativism, nihilism, absurdity, cynicism and vulgarity.
In all these aspects a critical philosophy of crisis tries to constitute an
alternative: identifying historical forms of crisis and their consequences in
the past, it goes beyond the boundaries of the present, seeks to avoid
repressing conformist nihilism, provides for the possibility of return of
normal life, and thus, the prospect of the future. Although quite unclear and
unwarranted it is quite possible and sufficient to make life worth living, and
hopeful that one can take some effort to overcome that crisis. However it is
no longer and can no longer be only a philosophy of the present in the
strictest sense of the word. It still preserves the measure of normality shared
by all humankind; it stands next to what is here and now to give a
diagnosis of the epoch foreseeing the possibility of positive changes. But,
on the other hand, it is a philosophy of the present in the sense that it thinks
of the modern human condition in the world and in culture and still tries to
help, as if somebody still would be missing such help. We do not know
what could change that condition, but a critical philosophy of hope may
activate and support pursuance, prepare minds for crises, forecast them,
note them more quickly and accelerate their arrival as far as they seem at
all possible. Honestly, living without hope is possible only in words. While
people live, they must feel that their efforts have value. When opportunities
in life are exhausted, hope evaporates, but then efforts also flag.
REFERENCES

Huizinga, J. *Homo ludens*. Moscow, 1992. С. 244.
CHAPTER V

PHILOSOPHY’S INTEGRATIVE FUNCTION

ROMUALDAS OZOLAS

Unification, or integration, is the sole mission of philosophy, or at least its excuse and justification. For philosophy does not provide new knowledge – this is done by science. Similarly, it does not offer beauty as doe’s art, nor does it invite one into a trance-like faith; though philosophy does use these spiritual products and advises others to do the same. Therefore, philosophy by its nature is closer to mythology or simply to the myth. Because philosophy does its job as does the myth: looking for veracity and employing veracity as an argument. There is but one difference between them: the myth seeks to convince the spirit by way of using empirical forms of veracity, while philosophy does so by using its rational forms. In any case, they have the same goal – reassurance of the spirit; in the myth, the spirit yet desires to know, while philosophy already knows.

Philosophy in recent years has been humiliated and despised – so much so that in Lithuania it was considered almost an insult to be invited to adhere to certain principles or to hold common values (except for the European ones, although everyone has their own understanding of them). I agree that since the time of the Greek we have not seen anything fundamentally new, that after Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle, there were only interpretations. The interpretations were powerful and productive, particularly in making the Judaic concept of the spirit, brought by Christianity, more mundane; out of those efforts through Augustine and Thomas European culture emerged. Compared to the discovery of the reason, or the Logos, by the Greeks, however, the European transcripts of the Greek ideas seem puerile.

What makes Greek thinking so extraordinary and epoch-making is its substantial quality. Indeed, it is fundamentally substantial – seeking to unite the world and discovering existence, seeking to cognize existence and creating the world. From the Pre-Socratics’ archē to Heraclitus’ Logos, Democritus’ atom, Plato’s idea and Aristotle’s Nous – the world is, even in the form of its pure existence or the absolute, the concentrate of substance. Democritus’ atom demonstrates this in the most obvious manner: even proof for its existence is based on the unification of thinking with the object of thinking; if we suppose that a thing can be divided infinitely, we will reach a limit that we will not be able to cross without destroying the thing, i.e. without denying the premise of thinking. The Greeks kept both feet on their ground; and so standing, they were thinking about their land – what it was like and why. Even the fact of language, of which Socrates was the first to become aware, did not split the Greek world dividing it into two spheres – that of words and that of things. Aristotle, immediately, found a way out
by composing his logic – a mechanism to assess the veracity and reliability of words. Since the structure of a syllogism is fundamentally integrating (Socrates is a man… and so forth), then logic, too, engaging in differentiating as it does, is fundamentally integral. But – unlike shamans and myth-tellers – it gives real knowing in the case of a correct application of these mechanisms. This is the horizon of a completely new world – the dawn of our world. The Greeks also exhibited another attempt to rationalize thinking. The most typical example would be Pythagoras with his philosophy of numbers and calculus that took no root either in antiquity or in the Europe up to Descartes inclusive, owing to the fact that it was a completely different way of thinking – a disintegrating thinking: if \( a \) is \( b \) in logic was uniting, then \( a = b \) in mathematics was not.

Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, looking for a way to link existence with the point or unit, had ascertained that it was not identical to any way of thinking, thus also denying the substantiality of thinking. Then the disintegrating trends in philosophy – previously disciplined by the scholastic system of cognitive competencies and sciences – ejected into the space such fireworks of increasingly specializing areas of the entirety of knowledge as to remind one of an explosion of a powerful supernova and to cover the very horizon of philosophy. In his efforts to brighten it up in the spirit of classical philosophy, Hegel, for the first time in history, almost openly linked philosophy to ideology. He no longer cared what, just recently and with zeal so characteristic of natural sciences, was explored by Kant or how the latter described the world’s pluralistic unity. Philosophy, as an attempt to solve the mystery of being, was subsequently finished off by two designers of life in the 20th century – Marx and Nietzsche.

Hence the self-denial of philosophy in its Greek sense is quite obvious. It is evident that the European green tree of life was only reflecting philosophy, while at all times it was fed by underground waters of finance circulating beneath the soil of economy. His studies of the depths of history enabled Fernand Braudel to find out in the mid-20th century that as far back as 1380, Europe, economically, focused around Venice. In the 1500s, there was a sudden giant leap from Venice to Antwerp; later, around 1550-1560, the economic centre of Europe returns to the Mediterranean – to Genoa; and finally, around 1590-1610 it moves to Amsterdam – staying there for nearly two centuries. In 1780-1815 the centre shifts to London, and in 1929 it would cross the Atlantic to settle in New York. The movement of these centers from place to place, according to Braudel, was accompanied by fights, clashes and major economic crises. Naturally, all that happens with no mathematical accuracy, Braudel maintains; he himself, however, explores history first of all using mathematical methods, supporting his statements with data so obtained, and makes forecasts. In 1976 Braudel claimed that he did not believe that the status of New York as the global centre of financial life could be weakened by a difficult situation of the world economy, since elsewhere the situation was even worse. Yet it is obvious, too, that Europe today is trying to win back the centre.
Philosophy’s Integrative Function

If in the areas so hard to mathematicize, such as history or economics, it was possible to produce accurate assertions and promising insights, it goes without saying that in physics, chemistry, philosophy, genetics and other branches of the entirety of knowledge, sciences generated sciences; and everything developed precisely, thanks to the mathematicization and physicization of knowing, and philosophy was left with a role of providing the rationale for the methods of these sciences. Even this role eventually turned out to be unnecessary because the practical benefit of the reflections and discoveries justified and legitimated everything, as well as making it all veracious. The truths of logic have been gradually ruined by the benefits of mathematics.

The goal was also there, namely, a universal welfare state, demanded by an increasingly democratizing subject of public life – the citizen. Born during the Great French Revolution and frozen in the East with Napoleon’s flags of peoples’ freedom, having assisted in creating the multinational and multiracial USA in the West, it withstood the opposition of the two ideology-based citizenships and, at the end of the 20th century, found itself able to pursue cosmopolitization of universal welfare. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, turned that process into a real war of every man against every man, as once envisaged by Hobbes, or – at best – an instrument whereby minorities exercised coercion over the majority.

The prerequisites were there, too: the capital accumulated by corporations in the Cold War years, often exceeding the budgets of national states; international law to ensure its functioning and the most necessary institutes of self-assertion, namely, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, provided the ability to regulate global political processes towards the construction of a unipolar world. Yet the unconditional striving for maximum profit brought about a new situation of global poverty and global luxury in society as well as global threats to the natural world. All this constitutes the content of the process of further global democratization and the creation of universal welfare.

Does this mean that the present day process of global democratization is the ultimate realization of the ideals of antiquity? Or that during World Wars I and II, the wars in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya over and over again the good triumphed? One could maintain, moreover, that the Greek ideal did not allow everyone to be citizens – that there were the redundant. Yet according to the Christian ideal, every soul per se is valuable, which concept, too, is under attack today. On the other hand, is it true that democracy in life can only be realized through killing philosophy or, at best, driving it out into a room of the mother-in-law?

This is, certainly, convenient: there won’t be any one to ask questions or provide answers, like what is going to happen to the products of this mathematicized entirety of knowledge – biorobots, clonoids and other meta-humanoids? What is humankind – having come into being
naturally and now electronicized and totally manipulated – going to be like? Will it remain just a redundant human biomass?

If we define antiquity as the era of the rationalization of man and the Middle Ages as the era of his spiritualization, then modern times should be recognized as the era of the mathematicization of the human environment and of man himself. For what else is, say, genetic engineering if not yet another completely new reality, overwhelming the humanistic mind and spirit today which still remains both outside our awareness and scattered in a chaotic manner? Is this not the most serious fundamental challenge to our cognitive powers?

One small but significant fact in the philosophy of antiquity which Europe needs to appreciate continuously, with eyes open. It is a characteristic of existence that used to be avoided and rather attributed to the Absolute – namely, the free will whose reconciliation with the limitations and monotony of human existence is the focus of Eastern philosophies. Even under the conditions of total manipulation, every person – provided that he is an offspring of the natural genetic fund – will have an option of expressing his free will. Rising up against his social exclusion, his human wretchedness and finally against the absurdity of existence itself in any conditions, will remain exclusively his personal prerogative. Even without ontologizing or socializing this inherent quality, but just personalizing it, every human being, under any conditions, continues to be the subject of good and beauty. These may be the eternal origins of veracity and truth; the props of a life based on the benefit of truth and not the truth of benefit. Even if philosophy, having realized one of its ideals – that of democracy – becomes its own ideal, which necessitates its rebirth, then perhaps beyond the present-day democracy the fundamental questions can lead towards this rebirth: questions like truth or benefit, a war of every man against every man or total manipulation, a stable civilization on earth or cosmic emigration, etc. Consequently, philosophy has not been humiliated, but has simply exhausted one of its lines of thought and replaced the joy of thinking with rejoicing in the products created by thinking. There is even a growing awareness of the limits of this production without, unfortunately, a proper admission so far, although many are already inclined to state that the world has gone the wrong way.

There are two solutions to the problem. The first is to follow the same route, without thinking, and wait for its natural ending. We can even see the limits of this process in 11 September 2001 or 20 March 2003. The other way out is more philosophical. If, for the purposes of self-expression, politics could establish the United Nations, while capital set up the World Bank and the entire Holy Trinity, why, then, cannot human thought establish a standing institute of thought to search for answers to global questions? Not a congress of philosophers of the world that would gather from time to time, but a permanently operating institution. And if this global forum of thinkers were not able to propose anything, it would at least be clear that the philosophers are not able to produce anything yet. Then we
would not have reason to grumble about philosophers turning into political scientists (which is now a mass phenomenon in Lithuania). We would not need to look for famous names either – after all, it is not for free that they receive publicity. In that case it would also be easier to draw the final distinction: the successful would profess and implement the ideology of globalism more successfully, the unsuccessful or the redundant, would personally contemplate good and beauty, while all together would believe in the new myths.
PART II

UNDERSTANDING CULTURE AT
A TURNING-POINT OF SOCIAL LIFE
CHAPTER VI

CULTURAL DIVERSITY, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND GEOPOLITICAL AMBITIONS: THE LITHUANIAN EXPERIENCE

JUOZAS ALGIMANTAS KRIKSTOPAITIS

On the threshold of the third millennium, we witness numerous new problems as we enter the era of global information technologies. Today it is clear that next to globalization with its political, social, and financial changes, there is another compulsive direction, namely, localization. It manifests itself as an effort for regional autonomy. These opposite trends are a consequence of developments of communication networks and of fear of the emerging information society which proclaims openness for all kinds of activity. Here the author prefers to start his study by focusing at first on the historical experience of the Baltic countries.

HISTORICAL PRECONDITION OF CULTURAL INTERACTIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGES

The known civilizations of the past tried to encompass this entire surrounding world and convert it into the focus of its existence. The origin of this yearning is very old, shaped as it was by the development of tribes and ethnic groups and their eternal struggle for the extension of their boundaries. This goal reached its full potential only in the 20th century, when transportation and communication networks covered fully the whole planet, even out to the solar system and beyond.

The historical experience of the three Baltic countries was shaped by its geography and by the changing geopolitical interests of its neighbors. Of the three, Lithuania was the only one to become a powerful nation, one which experienced not only global ambitions during its days of glory, but also a tragic decline of its military and political power.

The 13th century saw the appearance of a rapidly strengthening and growing Lithuanian state, which by the end of the 15th century was in possession of a territory that spread from the Baltic to the Black Sea by the time Christopher Columbus came to the new world. New to the Europeans, Lithuania was a powerful state, blocking further expansion into Europe of the nomadic Tartars and Mongols. The Lithuanian state, constantly engaged in warfare on two fronts for the past two centuries, provided favorable conditions for the maturing and development of Slavic statehoods, and finally, of the Russian state, the main opponent which finally conquered Lithuania in 1797. Such tragic destiny was the result of a cluster of causes. One, which was significant for our discussion, was that global power
aspirations were frustrated by unresolved local social, economic and political problems. The reach exceeded the economic means, and the powerful nobility blocked political reforms. Military and political power stood on an economic base too narrow to match their global aspirations.

RUSSIAN DOMINATION

The other two Baltic Eastern shore nations, Estonia and Latvia, never managed to form their own nation states until the 20th century. They were subject to constant warfare between Lithuanian armed forces and Livonian knights. Another Baltic ethnic group located to the southwest of Lithuania, the Prussians, were subdued and forcefully baptized by the Crusader knights. That area became the nucleus of the Prussian principality at about the time Hernando Cortes conquered Mexico.

The Lithuanian state was powerful from the 13th century to the end of the 16th. But by the end of the 18th century, after internal frictions and due to the changing geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe, the Lithuanian-Polish union, founded in 1569, became a victim of its three imperial neighbors in the course of three partitions, the last one in 1797. During the next one hundred years Lithuania and Poland rose in rebellion three times against Russian domination. Each time the repression was severe, especially against Lithuania. Many of its citizens were exiled to Siberia; after the 1863 revolt, it was forbidden to use the Latin alphabet to print in Lithuanian. After forty years, this measure was rescinded as a result of universal, non-violent resistance. It became apparent to the Russian authorities that the prohibition and the persistent effort of Russianization only fostered a new generation of intellectuals inspired by nationalism of the kind that was spreading in Europe during the 19th century. This educated cohort of Lithuanian leaders was able to create very quickly, in two decades, a modern 20th century state once independence was achieved at the end of World War I. The state that they created was based on a community that conducted its affairs on the basis of higher education, ethnic culture, and native language.

SUPERPOWER GEOPOLITICAL GAMES

From the declaration of independence (1917-1918) the development of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia up to the beginning of the Second World War exhibited many common traits. That period saw a successful development of their academic and scientific communities, which through international ties with the West fostered modernization. In this modernization process two traditions met and played an important role. The Western tradition based on Catholic and Protestant values, and an Eastern tradition that was a representative of the Orthodox Christian heritage. In addition since the 14th century there was considerable Jewish and a tinge of Muslim presence. In this crossroads of civilizations grew the
unique Baltic culture, fairly open to all cultures. This was a natural, rather than a compulsory process of interaction, which influenced all those Lithuanians who sought higher education in the universities of Russia and Western Europe. After Lenin’s revolution, Lithuania was a refuge for Russian intellectual émigrés.

In addition to the academic, the other sectors, with an active exchange and diffusion of ideas were the fields of industry and engineering. The former was mostly in agriculture and husbandry, timber products and the processing of clay, limestone and slate. The latter was instrumental in re-constructing the infrastructure that was devastated during the First World War.

On the eve of World War II, the Baltic States found themselves an unwilling plaything in the superpower geopolitical game of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and soon experienced occupation and war. Once more, the three Baltic States suffered a similar fate. Only Finland, with its rocky, forested and lake filled territory, managed to resist. During the brief but intense Winter War (1939-1940) against the overwhelming might of the invading Red Army, Finland was able militarily to resist the Soviet invasion, which allowed Finland to remain independent despite loss of territory and considerable material costs, including reparations to the aggressor. But the three Baltic States were not that lucky. Their flat countryside offered no defensive advantages, and their fairly dense road and railroad network made invasion easy. In addition, the governments of the three Baltic nations made the decision not to resist by force of arms, and thus, while the world was absorbed in June of 1940 with the collapse of France, the Soviets occupied the Baltic States.

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY AND EDUCATION UNDER THE TOTALITARIAN REGIME

During the two decades of independence all three Baltic States and Finland were united by a common bond of intellectual and physical resistance to Russia born out of their 19th century experience. After the Winter War and the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, their histories took different turns. Finland was able to attach itself to its Scandinavian neighbors, while the Baltic States were incorporated into the Soviet Union for the next fifty years, except for the brief German occupation.

In the Baltic States the Soviet occupation from the very beginning took repressive measures directed against the political, economic, cultural and scientific leaders. Private property was abolished, and preparations were underway to completely annihilate all traditional agricultural, educational, and scientific systems. Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, launched in June of 1941, interrupted these destructive processes. The German occupation, which lasted over three years temporarily halted some of these destructive processes, but it, in turn did enormous damage: holocaust, forced labor in Germany’s war industries, and enormous
destruction during fighting; as the German’s withdrew they blew up everything of industrial or military value. The return of the Red Army produced a westward migration of over seventy percent of the most able scientists, engineers and intellectuals. The second Soviet occupation, intentionally and unintentionally, changed all Baltic nations from the ground up.

Baltic educational institutions were immediately incorporated into the Soviet educational system characterized by an enormous centralization, ideological commitment to Marxism and strict censorship. There was a strict separation of teaching and research. Education was the object of special ideological scrutiny, while research had a clear war orientation and funding for such research was not restricted. The talented people who were seeking higher education had an especially difficult time getting into the Soviet diplomatic service or the military naval and air force academies. Those few who did get in, had to content themselves with lower rank posts and duties. Only by deceit did a few manage to reach the higher ranks. But they were the exception that confirmed the rule. The film ‘Hunt for the Red October’ illustrated this.

Though the Soviet system provided ample funds both to universities and for science, this liberal funding masked the hidden agenda to push Baltic scientists, who could not be trusted politically, away from basic research, leaving them in either applied research or minor leftovers in basic research. Social sciences and the humanities were cut off from Western developments and, in any case, had to serve ideological needs of the totalitarian Soviet system.

During the second decade of occupation the Soviets began an intensive effort of industrial colonization. Soviet industrial units located in the Baltic countries supplied the Soviet superpower with military bases which could also serve as jumping off points in case of war and an invasion of Western Europe. Second, there was a demographic colonization by means of a transfer of colonists from deep inside the Soviet Union that served as skilled labor in those industrial units. Both goals complemented the sovietization and russification policies that were in place throughout the entire occupation. But, all these efforts ended in failure and total collapse of the Soviet system. The current warfare in Chechnya shows, even after more than a century and a half of occupation, the occupation and russification policy to be basically bankrupt.

**BETWEEN TWO WORLDWIDE TENDENCIES**

In evaluating the social, economic and political situation of the Baltic countries which developed in the last decade of 20th century we have to recognize dramatic changes. Industry and agriculture being unable to adjust to free markets are brought to their knees. Obsolete technology and crumbling hopes of investments deepen the economic and financial degradation. Science and studies, engulfed by endless reforms, are also
Cultural Diversity and Social Transformations

quite poor. The public, having suffered the loss of past values, finds itself at a new crossroads. After having generalized the local situation in the Baltic countries, let us look at it in a broader context (Z. Bauman, 1988; Z. Brzezinski, 1993; V. Cable, 1996; J. Friedman, 1995).1-4

Baltic society, imbedded in its own troubles, has been subjected to two expanding worldwide tendencies: globalization from one side and localization (autonomization) from the other. These tendencies present a challenge particularly relevant to small states that have had economic difficulties. Here, a decisive role will be played out through the selection of a suitable strategy and through its careful evaluation: an absolutization of the selected direction is dangerous, and as any other extreme measure is capable of unbalancing society.

Globalization, emerging from the rapid development of information and other high technologies, embraces all aspects of activity. In this path of developing civilizations states that have not created a strong foundation for economic production and political activities will succumb to the onslaught of aggressive bidders and influence (E. Hobsbawn, 1997). Small states will become peripheral pools that perform service and utility functions. Globalization which proceeds along with a cosmopolitan mentality is not conducive to nationally, historically and ethnically-oriented consciousness. Here one has to keep in mind that in the sphere of the Western mentality (particularly in the Anglo-Saxon culture) nationalist concepts are bonded with chauvinism and separatism. Because of their specific historical experience, in the Baltic countries these concepts are distinctly separate. Here nationalism is connected with ethnic culture, which is understood as a source of stability and strength, nourishing the defence mechanisms of the nation. Fifty years of Soviet rule only strengthened this consciousness.

Localization, the second tendency, emerges as a search by national states independently to manage and authentically identify themselves in the diversified culture of Europe. Localized tendencies emerge as expressions of the search for autonomy. When considering this tendency as an alternative globalization, one has to keep in mind that new ideas, theories, projects are born as creative acts by talented individuals, i.e. the new appears as an autonomous act, defined locally and personally. Later the results of the local phenomenon, having suffered trials and spread further, become a universal value.

Localization as well as globalization has another side: the danger of its alternative. In this instance, localization appears to close one in peripheral needs and “eternal” convictions and circles of myths. Eventually this pushes society toward the periphery of civilization, thus forming a non-self-reliant (totally dependent on external forces) pseudo State, analogous to ethnic group preserves, dependent on pleasure industries and human charities. The tendency toward this extreme is one of the causes of our present failures as seen in the past decade. After recreating independence, the three Baltic States distanced themselves from one another so that post-
Soviet history as such developed locally. Seeking an ambitious autonomic expression, the three states established their own structures of statehood. Ignoring the common experience of the past century – its rich historical value – they did not create a common economic policy, or systems of communications and shipping, of energy and defence. They showed no desire to conduct joint science and research projects, saw no reason to coordinate their activities and to prepare a strategy for common actions. The super local isolationism, thrown in with uncritical opening up to the West, prevented the narrow locales from useful regional co-operation, i.e. a unique alliance of the three Baltic States, which would have been useful and interesting to the West, North and the East.

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

Having stated these propositions, one can begin to ask for a middle way between the global and the local which promises a better outcome. Today forming a useful concrete scenario for action and for living is still complicated. However, one can offer a few strategically promising priorities toward which the society of small states could orient itself in the hope of preserving its own character and still becoming on equally worthy partner in the activities of global associations. The short titles of suggested priorities are: 1) intellectual potential, 2) information and high technologies, and 3) institutions of science, research and education.

The first priority. The intellectual potential of a state and of society consists of: a) active, creative people, who have the highest available university education, and b) their highest non-material value creations – ideas, concepts, theories, publications, projects, without which there can be no innovations, material value and multifaceted social progress. We could interpret intellectual potential as a national resource serving a civic state seeking to become a historically significant political entity (subject).

The second priority. Information and high technology changes all fields of action and living by originating a digital reality. Created by electronic technology and enveloping all entities into a network of global communication, this reality forms as a special social derivation the information society.

The third priority. Even if science and research (study) institutions are part of the general intellectual potential, there is reason to give them separate attention, for their role is special. Science and study institutions in their entirety form the foundation of the first and second priorities, without which there would be no way to have what is contained in the first two priorities. In addition academic structures and research centres foster creative powers and civic consciousness.

If the first and third priorities open possibilities to strengthen autonomous, locally active powers of the state, the second one universalises the localized sphere by taking it into a common development process of civilization.
Furthermore: it is not difficult to note that the foundation and fundamental value orientation of the three priorities is scientific knowledge, its production and internalisation, compilation and transmission.

**INTER STATE CO-OPERATION**

Having properly evaluated the results of the previously mentioned extremes which led to the mutual barriers of separation among the Baltic States, there is need to consider the manner of a tighter interstate co-operation, but that is a matter for another special topic. Within the framework of our discussion, the education and study perspectives unifying the Baltic States could be discussed.

Today great hopes are generated by the first steps of closer co-operation that bear testimony to the internalization and awareness of this need. Two examples are worthy of note: 1) the leaders of the governments meet more often to discuss common issues. 2) The cultural festival of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, encompassing the Nordic countries as well, is a common project.

Having summarized and evaluated the meaning of partnership and alliance for the benefit of successful state action, the collaboration and co-operation of the three Baltic States is a fourth strategic priority. An inevitable question for the historians of science is how these priorities relate in the context of our historical experience? Based on the findings of my research, it can be asserted that the national movement within the Baltic States in the year 1918, which resulted in declarations of independence of all three states, was based on three fundamental values: native language, national culture and education (J. A. Krikstopaitis, 1997, 1996).

**AROUND THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE**

The three Baltic States developed relying on these values during the period between the two World Wars. They successfully expanded their systems of education, science, and research, agriculture and small-scale industry. During the Soviet period, when the private landholdings and industry were nationalized and military industrialization began, the national fundamentals were replaced officially by Soviet values which were discordant with the moral and democratic conceptions developed in European culture. The national values – native language, ethnic-culture and erudition- remained as if hidden principles of resistance. In the context of present tendencies and the priorities referenced here, the historical values of the early 20th century melted away, with the exception of education.

At present, education and knowledge have become the foundation of the three above-mentioned priorities. The native language is suffering under the influence of English which has become the universal means of communication. A silent struggle goes on between the native and the universal languages. The native language loses out to the new technology,
for computers and information systems cannot deal with the requirements of
the nation terminology. It passively retreats from the business, advertisement, service and entertainment industries. In the area of language
this lays a heavy burden on the shoulders of scientists and particularly humanitarians. If we do not succeed in adapting our own language to the rapid changes occurring in civilization, it will remain, together with our ethnic culture, a historical treasure exhibited in the ethnographic museums of Baltic countries, which we may yet succeed in establishing.

In view of the above regarding the background of the history of the Baltic States, we can derive some conclusions.

First, three values were instrumental in the resistance effort – native language, national culture and higher education. They were instrumental in the 19th century national movement and were the basis of the Baltic States independent existence. They created the intellectual and political potential that later enabled resistance to overcome the Soviet occupation.

Second, in universities and science research centers there quickly matured intellectually well-prepared new generations, able not only to compensate for the losses caused by war and emigration, but also able to slow down and prevent total sovietization. Thus, we can claim that higher education and persistent efforts to widen research in all areas created good opportunities for the expression of all forms of non-violent resistance.

INTEGRATION AND THE CHALLENGE FOR INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY

The last decade of the 20th century saw the meltdown of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, which meant changes in all spheres of activity. Once the Baltic countries became independent it became clear that their non-violent form of resistance was the wrong sort of experience for dealing with the open society and the market economies of the democratic world. The experience and behavior pattern so useful in the past was an historical residue, not very useful or practical in a changed world and in new circumstances. The lightning developments of information technology are changing social relations from the ground up, as well as the governmental structures of nations and their governments. Now there is need for the new kinds of skills and experiences that are acquired in competing in free markets and financial centers. These are rapidly becoming global, forming new and easily identifiable overlapping super systems, which do not reside in a particular nation-state, no matter how big.

The current process of integration into these new structures is extremely difficult, both physically and mentally, because the switch from one value system developed to resist Russian and Soviet rule without resorting to violence, to a new system of values where past experience is of little use. We see a liberation from closed military, totalitarian systems aimed at global control, and entry into its opposite, namely, an open system
extending into every corner of the globe and using non-violent means. This is our challenge because for the scientific communities it offers new possibilities which present themselves only for those who compete in the field of ideas and innovations.

BALTIC STATES IN THE EUROPEAN FAMILY

To conclude the analysis of our theme I would turn to a sub-theme that touches on our historical experience. First, we often hear in multiple forms: “Go West”.

Taking up this theme, the politicians converted it into a slogan, exploiting it intensively in election campaigns. At the time of liberation from the totalitarian system, it served as a road sign to freedom. However, now “Go West”, expresses only a one-sided process of globalization, it is not the only alternative or panacea from possible “errors”. The ideology of one single path, as the historical experience well shows, creates the basic assumptions for a totalitarian or at best autocratic rule.

The historical experience of the Baltic countries, consisting of military, political, mercantile and other resultant changes bear testimony that the Baltic region’s unique locally defined characteristic lies within West-North-East interactions. Our participation in globalization has fairly good basic assumptions that promise to lead to a multicultural phenomenon (C. U. Schwerup, 1994), provided we apply them to the creation of a three-state strategy of common action. In the context of our history, “Go West” should be changed to “Foster the Baltic Identity”, as a unique regional locality in the global process, that begins from integration into the European Union. We could name this period “Baltic Consolidation in the European Family”.

The historical heritage of the past becomes a set of values when each epoch and each generation evaluate, analyze and rethink anew its accumulated treasured experiences. Rethought and expressed in current terms, meaningful values become valuable guidelines useful for problem solving today and at the same time serve as a good projection of possible future courses of action.

Research Institute of Culture, Philosophy and Art, Lithuania

REFERENCES


CHAPTER VII

SHIFT IN A MONOLOGUE-DIALOGUE:
TRADITION AS A WARRANT FOR THE
SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF
A CULTURE OF TOLERANCE

LAİMUTE JAKAVONYTE

QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED AND OBJECTIVES TO BE INVESTIGATED

On May 1, 2004, Lithuania joined the European Union, founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the all Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (the Constitution for Europe 2004). To make these values work as the guidelines of full-scale cultural significance in daily life requires a profound shift in ways of thinking. Most of the mentioned values can be integrated by a concept of a culture of tolerance. What are the main obstacles and the main premises for the successful development of a culture of tolerance? Our analysis of the contemporary concept of a culture of tolerance is focused on the relationship between the tradition of dialogue and the tradition of monologue, seeking to substantiate the complementary relation between tolerance and dialogical or non-linear thinking.

A qualitative research strategy is defined by a mixed methodological approach. This involves combining different methods (comparative analysis, multidisciplinary approach, etc.) and aims to reveal different dimensions and the essential shifts in the relationship between the tradition of dialogue and the culture of tolerance. This represents concrete ways of overcoming the tradition of monologue that became rooted deeply in the intellectual culture of Lithuania during the decades of Soviet rule and its objectified totalitarian mentality.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Latin terms ‘tolerare’ and ‘tolerantia’ imply enduring, suffering, bearing, and forbearance. Ancient Greek terms, which may also have influenced philosophical thinking on toleration, include: ‘phoretos’ which means bearable, endurable, or ‘phoreo’, literally ‘to carry’, and ‘anektikos’ meaning bearable, sufferable, and tolerable, from ‘anexo’ – ‘to hold up’ (The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Toleration).
Philosophical exploration of tolerance requires the separation of the phenomenon of tolerance from its concept (epistemological, moral, political toleration) and from tolerance as a practical value in general. Only the conjunction of a concept of tolerance with recognition of its social value can transform it into a principle dictating a norm of conscious behavior.

A philosophical understanding of tolerance applies to how we treat people with whom we disagree, not how we treat ideas we think are false. The principle of tolerance requires that all persons be treated courteously, no matter what their views, even if it doesn’t mean that all views have equal worth, merit, or truth. To argue that some views are false, immoral, or just plain silly does not violate any meaningful definition or standard of tolerance. The principle of tolerance calls for being egalitarian regarding persons but elitist regarding ideas.

According to the classical notion of tolerance, one cannot tolerate someone unless one disagrees with him. We don’t tolerate people who share our views. Tolerance is applicable to those who we think are wrong, yet we still choose to treat them decently and with respect. We need to understand the ideas and principles that are different or even contradict our own to be able respect the owners of the ideas and principles, so there is a deep need for a dialogue as a basis for tolerance.

Dialogue itself is one of the most difficult subjects in psychology, philosophy, hermeneutics and other sciences (Bohm 1996). According to modern science, dialogue is in fact ubiquitous: it is not limited only to humans. Dialogue is information-generative in the sense that no party has any means of foretelling how other parties might respond. Only after the events have occurred does every party involved in a dialogue come to know what the other parties would say. Contrary to monologue, both spatial and temporal horizons are finite to the agents involved in the dialogue. Mutual communication between biological organisms through feeding on, and being fed upon, is a form of dialogue, because each party can detect what other parties have done only after the events (Koshiro 1989).

The real dialogue among humans happens only when all personal certainty is left behind, all preconceptions, all authorities are given up, only when one fully engages in the encounter with the other and carries on a respectful dialogue with them. Once again philosophical exploration of dialogue among humans requires the separation of the phenomenon of dialogue from its concept (epistemological, moral, political, theological, etc.) and from dialogue as a value in modern democratic society. Exploration of the concept of dialogue as a special kind of communication makes it necessary to distinguish between debate, discussion, and dialogue. Discussion, from an etymological point of view, means to break things apart. Discussion represents the true consideration of participants in the matter that is a subject of discussion. By contrast, debate is often like a game where the object is to win the point. This is a win-lose game, whereas dialogue is a win-win deal. Dialogue broadens the horizons of
understanding and creativity of all its participants and in this sense represents a special non-linear mode of thought.

Monologue and dialogue are two constant trends in the development of Western culture. Ancient Oikumene did not know the word ‘monologue’. Monologue is a verbal construction similar to other modern words that have Greek origin. It doesn’t mean there was no monologue as a mode of thought and expression; but only that the dialogue culture was dominant in Ancient times. Monologue culture sometimes becomes dominant and usually indicates periods of social crisis and political oppression. Dialogue as a way of communication itself contains the “seeds” of quick conversion into monologue or some kind of a caricature or fake dialogue: the conversational narcissism, the pursuit of attention and domination as the basic need for communication, elitism and disrespect towards the other person, an ignorance of the subject of communication, stubbornness, folly, etc. (Sliogeris 1995, 354-359).

The strategy of a fake dialogue usually camouflages different kinds of a fake tolerance. It ranges from complete ignorance, via “passive aggressive tolerance tricks” (Frank Beckwith states that using the modern definition of tolerance, one will see that no one is tolerant, or ever can be (Beckwith 1998, 59), to directly “repressive tolerance,” in the terms of Herbert Marcuse (1965, 81-117).

Most of what passes for fake tolerance is a kind of intellectual ignorance or cowardice, a fear of intelligent engagement, an unwillingness to be challenged by other views, to grapple with contrary opinions, or even to consider them, and thus to seek for true mutual understanding and respect.

Pluralism is a key statement of a concept of a modern tolerance and in the Constitution for Europe it is listed as a desired feature, number one of Member States in EU (the Constitution for Europe 2004). Does this undermine the main classic principle: be elitist regarding ideas?

The situation of modern people is a tragic one, because both the pluralism of opinion and the daily need to choose between alternatives with irreversible consequences are rapidly increasing in speed. The plurality of values is itself just a generally shared value that tends to be considered universal. Nevertheless, the post-modern attitude rejects an eternal and universal character of values in general. What value has plurality itself as a universal value in this case? Every issue of concrete strategic (ethical or political) choice or commitment reduces an actual and practical value of pluralism: it forces a person to put together the particular (his own reality) and the universal (the ideal: scientific, religious, ethical, political, etc. norm). It raises again and again the question of the possibility of the right choice based on the truth or at least on foresight. The actual and practical value of pluralism is limited, dependent on the possibility of mutual understanding, dialog and ways for a mutually acceptable consensus regarding ideas and actions.
GEOGRAPHICAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL TOPOGRAPHY OF LITHUANIA AS PRECONDITIONS FOR THE CREATION OF A CULTURE OF TOLERANCE

The French Institute Geographique National placed the Centre of Europe 25 km north of Vilnius (at 54° 55’ north latitude and 25° 19’ east longitude) in 1989. Though Lithuania is then at the geographical centre of Europe, it is frequently regarded as part of Eastern Europe due to its political dependence on its Eastern neighbor, Russia, in recent centuries. According to cultural topography, however, Lithuania belongs to Central Europe. Individual farms, a civil society, Catholicism and a Western outlook have existed in Lithuania since the Middle Ages. When Lithuania joined the EU it had not returned to Europe in the sense of cultural topography because Lithuania never really left it. Nevertheless, Lithuanians live in the period of an essential transition from the cultural space of post-Soviet Eastern Europe to the common European home. Does a newly expanded European Union have a unifying cultural idea? The culture of tolerance seems to be the most real concept that can play the role of a unifying cultural idea in the Constitution for Europe. Joint attempts to establish a solid basis for a culture of tolerance began in Lithuania after the fall of the totalitarian Soviet regime when Lithuania restored its independence. This process is under way. Warnings of the danger that the process will be misled into a fake tolerance are real.

HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

The main patterns of a culture of tolerance and dialogical thinking historically were forged first and foremost by intellectual elites. The need to forge national identity during the occupations of the 19-20th centuries, and its frequent resort to a “non-political politics” of culture in the face of foreign occupation and cultural domination combined to give the Lithuanian intellectual elite an importance and prestige quite out of proportion to its real social and political weight.

One of the main problems concerning the development of a culture of tolerance in Lithuania is to determine constructive approaches in the evaluation and overcoming of the negatives of the Soviet past. Indeed Soviet politics is often called a kind of genocide against the Lithuanian intellectual elite and the key positions in Lithuanian cultural policy, especially at the universities where a new generation is being formed, were long occupied by the representatives of so-called Soviet intelligentsia. The overview of the past is aimed at grasping the main tendencies of the present and tracing some tendencies of the future. National myths are very important for the moral and political sense of a healthy psychological atmosphere of any society, but have special importance in a society undergoing an essential transition. Rollo May challenges us to consider that “there is urgency in the need for myths in our day. Many of the problems of
our society (…) can be traced to the lack of myths which will give us as individuals the inner security we need in order to live adequately in our day. (…) A myth is a way of making sense of a senseless world. Myth-making is essential in gaining mental health” (May, 1991, 9-14). The situation in Lithuania today can be described as the “ruins of the old national myths.” Are new myths replacing the old ones, are there new ones which will give us as individuals the inner security we need in order to live adequately in our day?

Lithuanian intellectuals of the interwar period created myths of the nation’s historic grandeur and its future mission on the crossroads between East and West. This tradition dominated lately the resistance movement and Lithuanian émigré culture. There were some signs of a national pomposity and national egoism that occupied a very visible place in the first few years of Lithuanian independence. Lithuanians were proud of being the last pagan country in Mediaeval Europe, of the Lithuanian “Golden Age” in the 16th century when Lithuania was ahead of most countries in Europe due to its advanced political system, based on the seedling principles of democracy, human rights, and a developed legal system. They were proud of being one of the first countries to escape Soviet rule at the end of last century. Many Lithuanian philosophers, artists, intellectuals, professionals and workers joined the Lithuanian independence movement, Sajudis, in late 80s of the last century and felt like national heroes at the time of liberation.

Recently there are some unexpected signs of a quite opposite mood emerging: a lack in the sense of being a full-fledged nation, because of economic problems, governmental corruption, and the erosion or exposure of some cherished images and myths from Lithuania’s glorious past. Lithuanians are no longer sure whether to be proud about being the last pagan country in Europe. This means that Lithuania was late in the processes of modernization and civilization, that the rudiments of this deviation from the mainstream of the process of European modernization are still strong and influential in the social consciousness. The new myth about Lithuanians as a nation of persecutors of the Jews during the Holocaust is changing an old one about tolerance being one of the main features of the Lithuanian national character. All this changes the sense of what it means to be a Lithuanian. National identity is still a very important feature of European mentality and different configurations of the national identity can help to bring out the best as well as the worst in people. There is a good deal of anxiety about being a Member State of the European Union: will EU cultural policy be favorable to the development of a small and relatively poor nation? Lithuania as a State disappeared from the map of Europe after the third partition of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth (1795) when the greater part of ethnic Lithuania fell to Russia, whereas the area beyond the Nemunas River was allocated to Prussia. The Lithuanian State was reborn with the same name twice in the 20th century (1918 and 1990).
The old threat of a vanished national State becomes realistic again, and it is even more frightening that there are no foreign enemies to blame for this. Surveys conducted in 2004, after Lithuania joined the EU, indicate that 70 to 90 percent of Lithuanian youth (15-24 years old) expressed the desire to emigrate, and they successfully obtain their desire as the country’s population continues to shrink. The website of the Lithuanian Department of Statistics reports that the number of people living in Lithuania decreased from 3.4255 to 3.4032 million during the years 2004-2006, due to negative natural increase and mainly to migration. According to the European Commission report of 2002, Lithuania will need 31 years for its citizens to achieve just 75 percent of the average living standards of citizens of the EU.

Historically Lithuania lacked and still lacks a tradition of paradigmatic and controversial thought, as well as dialogue among intellectuals in general, and a deep respect for academic, intellectual work in particular. Lithuanian culture is still monologic (Sliogeris 1995, 48-54). Lithuanian intellectuals who escaped Nazi camps and Soviet gulag archipelagos (and not just Siberia’s islands, since the entire Soviet Union became a kind of prison behind the “iron curtain”) and settled in different countries of the Western world had chosen the position of adaptation to a new world. There are very few exceptions of Lithuanians who returned back to Soviet Lithuania or were deported from Western countries because of their activities in Marxist parties. Thus adaptation is varied from complete assimilation in a new society to the settlements (some kind of ethnic ghetto) where time and history stopped in the 40s of the last century. This isolation leads to an alienation of these Lithuanians from the real Lithuania which differs essentially from the ideal homeland that exists only in their imaginations. The moderate adaptation of members of the Lithuanian Diaspora created some prosperity, background and the possibility to preserve their moral integrity and ethnicity. Vytautas Kavolis pointed out that the uprooted community of exiled intellectuals was disproportionably stronger and richer in creative accomplishments than its counterparts in Soviet Lithuania: “In intellectual activity, Soviet Lithuania, when compared with the highest achievement of the few émigré intellectuals, is still an Ethiopia looking to Paris” (Kavolis 1983, 50). One can see many features of dialogical or non-linear thinking in many interesting discussions among Lithuanian intellectuals in émigré magazines Metmenys and Aidai that show the various political and philosophical positions of their participants. Some statements made by Vytautas Kavolis
sound very disturbing and, even if his assumptions are only partly true, they have some actuality even today: “There have not been, nor are there now, any paradigmatic texts written in Lithuanian – dangerous and unexplainable texts containing multiple meanings – to which the intellectual could come back again and again and constantly find in them new inspirations” (Kavolis, 1983, 39).

The fruitful creative activity of the Lithuanian émigré Diaspora has indeed clear features of monologue in the sense that all this activity was orientated to their counterparts in the homeland, but there was almost no chance that they would read the works and reply. A tragic example of friendship continued for many years is the letters of Jonas Girnius who lived in the West to Jonas Repsys who stayed in Lithuania. There were so many places with the words: “It is a pity we can’t discuss this topic…” It was a true dialog between two philosophers who had much deeper mutual understanding of each other than many others who were not separated by the Iron Curtain. Still there was an absence of free choice in the topics; there was no choice for Jonas Repsys to freely express his opinion; there was no chance for both philosophers to feel the natural joy of certainty that they understood each other and sheared their opinion (Girnius, Repsys 1998, 146-164).

Lithuanian intellectuals in exile and their counterparts at home had lost their heroic “auras” of resistance during the first years of Lithuania’s second independence due to mutual judgmental accusations of collaboration with both Soviet and Nazi occupational regimes in the past, and their failures in political practice in present-day political life. Some are still influential in major political parties and have occupied some key positions as ministerial and presidential advisers, as well as in the diplomatic service.

Before Lithuanian independence the attitudes of intellectuals in Lithuania and those in the Western Diaspora towards each other had been much friendlier. Closeness has frightened, disappointed and sometimes shocked. Some representatives of the Diaspora demonstrated the tragic phenomena of the double refugee that gives birth to some kind of fanaticism and intolerance. Exiled intellectuals lost sight of the realities of Lithuania, not wanting to see any progress and achievements in their homeland. Marked by anger, suspicion, and pomposity of absolute rightness, this kind of ‘patriotic’ position is a bit similar to Soviet ideological monism. Intolerance and a linear way of thought marked the relations of intellectuals in exile, who had all the freedom that their compatriots-intellectuals in Lithuania lacked, towards each other and towards their compatriots. This raised a suggestion that it is based on some weakness of Lithuanian intellectual tradition in general. It appears as the binary tradition of thought, which is typical of a small nation: strangers and ourselves, where strangers are all who think, live, act, look, etc. differently.

There are very few examples of émigré return in today’s Lithuania, contrary to the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia, for example. This circumstance diminishes the entire role of Lithuanian émigré intellectuals.
It is a pity, but true, that the Lithuanian patriots of the resistance whose bravery in confronting the Soviet regime represents the highest standard of patriotic self-devotion did not succeed in combating a monologic thought tradition. The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania reflected and stressed the resistance efforts of Catholics, but the unifying tendency of anti-Soviet resistance among members of the resistance movement did not prevail. Despite all this The Chronicle was the unique example of a dissident press in Lithuania and became the main source for the ‘whispered dialogues’ and discussions that took place in the small ‘kruchovka’ type kitchens of many Lithuanians. The Catholic Church represents an important cultural intellectual power in today’s Poland, but it has not such influence in Lithuania. Intolerance and a linear way of thought, as well as preoccupation with issues of material wealth have diminished the important role that Catholic Church had played during the years of occupations.

There hadn’t actually been an ‘intellectualist’ resistance or dissident press in Lithuania, though that does not mean that there was no resistance by intellectuals here. The new discourses of Marxist political mythology were imposed aggressively and violently created a new fake realm of philosophical and political meanings, serving only the purpose of manipulation. The resistance of those who escaped or survived in Siberia, who lived under continual fear, took by necessity very delicate and firm forms. The main idea of books, paintings, movies, etc. usually was hidden deeply in the contextual depths. This multi-contextuality in Soviet Lithuanian culture gave birth to a unique phenomenon – readers, audiences, and spectators read, heard and saw more then authors often intended to say. People were re-constrcuting the meanings according to their intellectual capacities. Texts, objects of art and intellectual practice were only “raw material” for an intellectual “game”’. This practice presents some very special hidden “semiotic space”: non-verbal language of ethnic and cultural meanings contained in the historical heritage of “nation”. It appeared often to be a very dangerous and self-sacrificing intellectual luxury in the totalitarian state and led many intellectuals to prisons and psychiatric hospitals.

One of the most unique features of the hard times was irony. The only thing people perhaps sometimes miss today from the spiritual atmosphere of the Soviet past is an irony and humor that were so amazing, rich and colorful in sharp criticism of political anecdotes and humorous pieces that helped intellectuals to preserve national and human dignity during all the years of suppression. It seems that intellectuals were much braver under the Communist regime, since the laughter that monologues of the new Nomenclature (a term used in the Soviet Union for members of the Communist Party who had more authority and enjoyed special privileges) can provoke today doesn’t vibrate between the lines in writings.

Ironic mimicry of culture in Soviet Lithuania can be described as a unique feature of culture based on a very special type of dialogic thought:
not only in the sense of many complementary opinions but in that of a playful kaleidoscope of many meanings that one was free to find in every single opinion.

The “pure” intellectualism of a monologue type is presented by intellectuals who had become “skilled in being oppressed”. Two kinds of “smart” intellectuals can be tracked: those who expressed pure conformism and those who expressed pure despair.

The pure conformists represent a sophistic mode of fake intellectual activity in philosophy, historiography etc. where truth and values aren’t important and where imitation of intellectual creativity is the best means to achieve a better “social position”. There is no basis for even a slight possibility of dialogue in this kind of “intellectual creativity,” because dialogue is non-conformist in nature.

The second type is more difficult. There we can recall many intellectuals whose intellectual life can be described as outward conformism and as inner resistance of despair, where a rich and exciting inner intellectual world possibly existed but there was no evidence of it. Those intellectuals often ended as drunkards or drug addicts since only in an irresponsible state could they express themselves. Those were people totally alienated not only from the fake values of the regime (some were even Soviet functionaries) but actually from ethnic and even human values in general. Cynical attitudes, despair, alcoholism, heedless material greed, etc. were features of agonizing deformations of the national and human mentality during the Soviet times.

The pure type of monologue intellectual activity is represented tragically by Lithuanian intellectuals in the humanities who lived a “double ambiguous life” in the Soviet time. Marxist philosophy and ideology had been criticized by Communist intelligentsia even in the language of Aesop. This trend of the intellectual life created a paranoid censorship. The best example here was an attack of censors against the creative work of theatre director, Jonas Jurasas, and dramaturge, Juozas Grusas, on a performance of the historical drama ‘Barbora Radvilaiite’ in 1972. The conflict with censors resulted finally in Jurasas’ emigration to the West. If there was a critical article about the ideological position or philosophical approach in Soviet mass media this was in no way an invitation for a dialogue or discussion. It meant simply the harsh treatment of an inconvenient and “intellectually disobedient” person. It made no sense to discuss the topic, to try to explain, or, even more, to combat the accusations.

Another essential feature of the monologic way of thought of Soviet culture was its anonymous character. There is no such thing as a simple phrase “I think”, “I suppose”, “I assume”, etc. and not just in political, but in all kinds of texts. Most philosophical writings were incredibly standardized: no individual language style, no individual way of thinking. It is not too much to assert that there was a strong dimension of demagogy in the anonymous culture. There were also very obvious elements of “semiotics of participation”: in the ritual “scientific”
conferences dedicated to the anniversaries of those loyal to the Soviet ideology and other formal events, where speeches were long and boring and where it really didn’t matter who was reading one or another paper. Anonymous consciousness contains only technical dimensions and simplicity of ideological cliché; there was no room for individuality, passion or talent in this world of function or functionaries.

The Soviet system created some features of the Masonic spirit of the “elect” among Lithuanian intellectuals. For example, the powerful Soviet state established ‘special founds’ at the libraries and prohibited photocopies and saw a free photocopier as a ‘lethal weapon’. This actually gave disproportionate importance to speech, and thus to the intellectuals. This secret access made intellectuals feel “elect”, which psychologically is a sweet feeling of self-importance and excellence. The elitist spirit is also a monologic way of thought where the subordination of teacher-disciple, master-servant is directed in “one-way”.

The most intriguing thing is that even in the relatively free private ‘inner’ intellectual space of Soviet intelligentsia the monologue was the dominant way of thought. Deep and overwhelming feelings of guilt and inferiority activated the subconscious mechanisms of a “shutdown of conscience”. Inner dialogue supposes two inner interlocutors where one is a conscience; if one of the subjects is inhibited or “disconnected” then we can talk about only an inner monologue.

How to evaluate the role of intellectuals during the most controversial and tragic period of Lithuanian history; how to predict their future role? Today’s spiritual crisis of our society is deep; the transformation of the whole system of the traditional values of the national culture is unprecedented. What is the role of dialogue among intellectuals considering strategies of creating a culture of tolerance, ideals and values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities? Are Lithuanian intellectuals capable of creating unifying ideas that would replace the outlived ones and prevent the dissemination of dangerous and unproductive ones? Moreover, how will intellectuals select the best new ideas in the post-modern relativist era? What is the meaning of a new vocabulary where the notion ‘intelligentsia’ is replaced with ‘intellectuals’?

DEFINING THE NOTIONS THE ‘INTELLECTUALS’ AND THE ‘INTELLIGENTSIA’

The term ‘intelligentsia’ was brought into theoretical and intellectual circulation at the end of the 60s in 19th century in Russia to stress the moral and social responsibility of intellectuals. They were to see the sense of their existence and its real purpose in the fight for social and intellectual progress. The term ‘intelligentsia’ underwent essential transformations in Soviet times, becoming a quite broad term. The
representatives of the intelligentsia were considered to be nearly all those who were educated at universities and had to perform the role of propagators of the Soviet ideology, even though they often lacked genuine education, true erudition and professionalism. As Z. Bauman, states the word ‘intellectuals’ in the public discourses was used for the first time in 1898 in France. The term was then used to refer to the first-class specialists, experts, who assumed that their right and duty was to protect the most important values that were under the threat of government actions (Bauman 1995, 223). Intellectuals had creative power and were involved in the process of creating new ideas; some of their ideas could challenge society for political awakening as well.

Both terms changed their meanings in 1968 when left wing intellectuals were ‘seduced’ by the ideological claims of Marx, Marcuse and Mao that “We can change the world!” This shifted the meaning of the term ‘intellectuals’ much closer to the meaning of ‘intelligentsia’ during the revolutionary upheaval in France. In Czechoslovakia, the Prague Spring, the reform movement within the government and the Communist Party to bring about “socialism with a human face” and eliminate the Stalinist distortion of socialism, was crushed by the intervention of Russian tanks. This sowed the seeds of the new vision of intelligentsia as the force that could challenge the system behind the Iron Curtain. After the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia ‘intelligentsia’ no longer meant only servants of Soviet system. There were some exceptions among the members of the academic community and the first-class specialists in all the Eastern Europe countries whose characteristics would better suit the Western definition of intellectuals, than of the intelligentsia, even though they were formally ascribed to the latter during the Soviet times.

We can conclude that the difference between the notions the ‘intelligentsia’ and the ‘intellectuals’ is as follows: an intellectual is simply a man creating ideas and living in them, while a representative of the intelligentsia is an ideologist, a man with moral principles, who skillfully makes use of ideals and ideas so that they on the whole serve concrete political and practical purposes and social engineering (Donskis, 2002).

The Soviet ‘intelligentsia’, corresponded to the Western notion of ‘intellectuals’, was the main ideologist and leader of the post-Soviet revolution. The disillusionment of intellectuals and their disappointment in the years following the transition essentially changed the old social roles. The economic and political changes taking place in Lithuania had broken the old organization of intellectual life and now the social structure of society had to correspond to the new situation. The notion ‘intelligentsia’ is no longer used as a dominant and universal term defining social morphology. Intellectuals can indeed be seen as those rich in the ‘cultural capital’ of erudition, knowledge and know-how, and poor in the ‘political capital’ and ‘social capital’ of power and influence, which is held by the bureaucrats and ‘new rich’. In this perspective, the coming of democracy and the development of the market economy after 1989 represents a kind of
gigantic currency trading session, a hectic scramble to convert varied currencies of status and power under the old system into something equally bankable in the new order. The representatives of so-called Soviet nomenclature were best able to convert their symbolic capital of status and power into financial capital. But what is happening with the cultural capital of intellectuals that did not belong to Soviet nomenclature?

**TRANSFORMING THE CULTURAL TRADITION OF MONOLOGUE INTO A TRADITION OF DIALOGUE**

Lithuanian society has finally returned to the common European home. The culture of tolerance is based on a tradition of dialogue which has to do with healthy, dynamic and respectful relationships in society. The quality of relationships determines the quality of thinking; in turn, the quality of thinking determines the quality of actions, the quality of actions determines the quality of results, which, in turn, determines the quality of relationships, and so on. This is what we can call the virtuous cycle of dialogue.

The most striking phenomenon, common to all the post-Soviet countries, is a process in which the role of the prophet based on monologue must be replaced by that of the intellectual based on dialogue for those intellectuals who have chosen to seek their further influence and role in society. How to seek political compromises while remaining morally and socially responsible?

Intellectuals play a much more important role in totalitarian societies than in open societies. Culture, in all its forms, took the lead when politics could not during the years of oppression. Nevertheless, in general, no country in the world needs ‘pure’ intellectuals in power. Real intellectuals usually make very bad politicians. Intellectuals do not accept the world as it is, they ask unpleasant questions, and turn the established order upside down. More than anything else, they are capable of doubt (Bourdieu 1989, 99-110). An active politician cannot allow himself such a luxury. Politicians cannot postpone decisions until they have gathered all the information and the views of more people are superfluous. In a democracy such a time will never come. Politicians have to decide today, politicians deal in “half truths”. That is the reason why real politics doesn’t mean diminishing the role of intellectuals; as in a State strategy they are creators and keepers of the moral order of the political arena.

The monologue-based former Soviet mentality as a ‘pure’ Communist intellectuality (in the sense of the complete rejection of national, religious, individualistic values) is pushed away by surrogates of a ‘new’ aggressive and suppressive mentality that reflects the standard needs of consuming Western mass culture. The forbidden fruits that Soviets were hiding behind the Iron Curtain were very attractive. Lithuanian intellectuals are paying the price for non-criticism towards values of Western mass culture today. State institutions, dominated by technocratic reasoning, are
projecting Lithuania as an uninteresting country, consuming “according to European standards,” which often means accepting the waste products of advanced European countries. Lithuania becomes a country of second-hand clothes, cars, technologies, etc. The globalization process is a challenge for the national and cultural policy of the country that regained its independence just in the last decade of 20th century. Lithuanian national culture has survived centuries of occupation; will it survive globalization?

The attempt of the intellectuals to convert their symbolic ‘cultural capital’ into bankable capital (capital of status, and capital of power) has not been very successful. The gap between the elite culture and culture for the new elite deepens here in Lithuania. Obviously there is an exclusion of certain strata of the population (various low income groups) from any regular social life, including cultural life. Unfortunately, writers and librarians, teachers and artists, musicians and scientists, various groups of the Lithuanian intellectuals are very close or even belong to that lower income group today. The economic and political elite and the so-called masses (where the masses still meet only one common criterion: a low income) diverge more and more as autonomous social groups which have fewer and fewer cultural and political values in common. This gap doesn’t help create a society based on dialogue culture, if toleration means toleration of one’s poverty and cultural exclusion. On the other hand, Michel Foucault warns against the dangers of the welfare state. It paralyses social activity and vitality and is a most dangerous mimicry of the totalitarian power in the West (Foucault 1975, 75).

One of many reasons for the failure of dissemination of the tradition of dialogue and of academic tolerance in the intellectual and academic communities is a new gap between intellectuals and the ‘operators’ of culture – the crude ‘contact groups’ and a swarm of lobbies that have taken place. They are battling it out between them, creating new obstacles for the dialogue and cooperation between business and science, sciences and politics rather than overcoming them. The ‘thrift’ of academic ‘operators’ makes university professors work with large classes of students, and these numbers are increasing rapidly. This ‘thrift’ destroys the historical heritage of the dialogic character of education at the universities; students have no opportunity to cultivate the skills of intellectual communication and dialogue.

This results in a withdrawal of a young generation of intellectuals from the cultural process as active participants whose role is considered to be important. If educators are to function as public intellectuals they need to provide opportunities for students to learn that the relationship between knowledge and power can be emancipatory, that their histories and experiences matter, and that what students say and do counts in their struggle to unlearn privileges, productively reconstruct their relations with others, and transform, when necessary, the world around them.

In academic circles the directions of scientific research and frequently its results are now being determined by those best able to convert
their symbolic ‘cultural capital’ into financial capital. Scientific conferences that represent the ‘privileged space’ for intellectual gatherings best illustrate this tendency toward a lack of dialogue. Those who provide the financing determine what conferences and what academic gatherings will take place and who will be invited as speakers to this particular academic ‘circle’. The speakers arrive and deliver their twenty-minute monologues on cue: after applause and congratulations, they often take their leave immediately, since they are not interested in having dialogue or even participating in the discussions. Today academic internal hierarchies are often defined by an individual’s ability to generate funds, not new ideas. However, funds can often generate only academicians who are skilled in being close to funds: politicians and academic hierarchies. By way of compensation, or more precisely, as a reward, all intellectuals ‘of second’ role and importance are allowed a moderate promotion within the academic and university hierarchies under the supervision of the ‘fund generators’ who lay down the conditions for this promotion. That is why many gifted and talented young intellectuals are leaving Lithuania, hoping to find a better life in the West. However, some are already coming back not only because they did not succeed in achieving a higher level of consumption in the West, but because they failed to find a much higher quality of life. This includes problems of cultural identity and the possibility of true dialogue with those who are intellectually close.

According to Robert Murphy, “culture is (...) a set of mechanisms for survival, but it also provides us with a definition of reality. It is the matrix we are born with; it is the anvil upon which our persons and destinies are forged” (Murphy 1986, 14). Sometimes political and historical communities do not coincide, and there may well be a growing number of states in the world today where national sensibilities and intuitions are not readily shared in common; the sharing takes place in smaller units (Walzer 1983, 28).

Nation, national character, homeland, and fatherland, patriotism – all these abstractions have less philosophical and sociological meaning compared with their instrumental and ideological importance, and their rich manipulative role in the arsenal of politicians as well. However, if in the matters of morality, the argument is the simple appeal to common meanings that create a basis for understanding and dialogue, economics and politics always establish their own bonds of commonality. Two trump cards dominate in all kinds of political monologues today: patriotism which became more word than action for politicians and the foreign threat which also is used mostly as a means against those who have a different vision of the political processes. There is a shortage of understanding and consensus among all the subjects of social relations since debate is the type of communication which prevails and the common interest is mostly of no consideration.

After all it is too early to cry for the vanishing role of intellectuals in modern Lithuanian society. The importance and prestige of intellectuals
is being balanced according to their real responsibility in the age of transition. Intellectuals who are searching for their new roles in contemporary Lithuanian society represent various groups that have serious difficulties trying to establish a dialogue, considering the priorities and values that are of full-scale cultural significance today.

A first group is represented by intelligentsia in the sense of the Russian classical tradition of 19th century. This is a select group of educated ‘intellectual aristocracy’. They are critical thinkers disinterestedly (in the sense of their ability to generate funds) thinking through the problems of society. They mold and shape public opinion as spokesmen of the weakest and most vulnerable strata of the society.

The Soviet intelligentsia, as an educated stratum extending far beyond more defined intellectual and cultural elites, was united, amongst other things, by a ‘status inconsistency,’ which saw it benefit from the cultural and educational opportunities available under socialism, without gaining political influence, economic power or material reward. At first sight, this group of former Soviet intelligentsia completely corresponds to the Western notion of ‘intellectuals,’ as creative and socially responsible strata among well-educated citizens. Nevertheless, the formation of the cultural identities of these intellectuals was much indebted to romanticism in general and Polish romanticism in particular. It was based on an abstract idea of ‘old Europe’ and its classical culture that was created in an Enlightenment era and reveals a strained love-hate relationship towards the native country and its culture.

Many old-fashioned Lithuanian intellectuals joined the Lithuanian independence movement, Sajudis, in late 80s of the last century and felt like prophets at the time of the liberation. Nevertheless, those people were soon to notice that their role in society diminished, their social status declined, and their economic situation worsened. Soon it became again very “politically incorrect” to criticize those who orchestrate social life. It seems that under the Communist regime, in spite of the risks encountered, some intellectuals were much braver. Socialism collapsed, but the dissident movement did not win – it seems as if the two sank together. The tendency toward escapism and mimicry of Lithuanian intellectuals, which developed as a reaction to Soviet ideological and political oppression, undoubtedly deepened the gap between culture, politics, and social reality. Disinterestedly thinking through the problems of society means self-withdrawal from the decision making process, and this self-withdrawal diminishes the value of ‘purely’ intellectual dialogue of old fashioned intellectuals.

A second group is represented by the intelligentsia corresponding to the sense that Soviet ideology had given to this term. It is a so-called intellectual nomenclature, a class of propagandists, uncritical servants of the State, a class in and for itself, caught up in the gap between state power and the fight for personal privileges. The former Communist intelligentsia as a new nomenclature accommodated itself best to the changes in the new
social reality, thanks to their Marxist Weltanschauung (outlook on the world). Marxist ideology represents a mix of the boredom of classicism, the manipulative and consuming dimensions of the pure modernity of scientism and some deconstructive and indifferent features of post-modernism. One of the reasons why post-modernism became so popular in Eastern European countries is this internal similarity among two (initially) opposing approaches: Marxism and post-modernism.

The new Lithuanian intellectual nomenclature is advanced, compared to all other strata of intellectuals considering their self-identification with common EU ideology due above all to empirical reasons. They live in an “other Lithuania”, their standard of living matches EU standards, they have more certainty about their own future in the EU, and so they are devoted Euro-optimists and inspired ‘multicultural’ propagandists. Even though these cultural operators occupy key positions today and dispose of the greatest social power and influence, they are not interested in social dialogue since their aim is to preserve their status.

A third group is a hybridized product of the era of mass culture and digital technologies: ‘intellectual’ showmen who produce ‘simulacra’ products of culture for sale. The main division between this new stratum of intellectuals and the old Soviet ideologues and propagandists among intelligentsia is moral in character. As the Soviet intelligentsia lived in a totalitarian society of constant threat and danger, cultural mimicry was often the only way to survive. The acknowledged new cultural ‘stars’ of the mass culture voluntarily became the showmen (if not clowns) of great status. They may hold forth on every topic under the sun: they are allowed to comment on any issue of universal import because of the very definition of their role, just as long as they take care not to address the real problems faced by society. Even though they don’t have any real political power, their social role is increasing at a great tempo. In stark contrast, the real professionals of culture and academicians may only appear in the role of ‘footmen’. ‘Intellectual’ showmen are not interested in dialogue, since all they seek is to make an impression and to win debates, being actually disinterested in the subject.

A fourth group is formed by intellectuals as a formally created abstract and amorphous sociological unit, embracing people with higher education of different professions who have no ambition to participate in social dialogue and to play a special role in the creation of the culture of tolerance.

A fifth group consists of ‘future’ intellectuals – the young generation who will either join one of the four groups described above or compose a new group of intellectuals whose values and principles will reflect prospective tendencies and needs.

Two opposite positions can be found among intellectuals towards civil society and politics. The first one stresses that public life is being depoliticized and a false notion is spread that what really matters in the life of intellectuals is “above” politics. Realism in politics worries people, and
they seek refuge from it in an infinite (and thus irresponsible) discourse about eternal values. The rhetoric of many Lithuanian intellectuals compensates for their lack of political realism with a lyrical statement that Lithuanians are possessed of eternal values which are not relative. This radical discourse is founded on a dichotomy between “decent people” and “politicians,” or “civil society” and “parties.” The second message of intellectuals claims “everything is politics, nothing is politically neutral.” This is a far-reaching message considering society’s post-modern condition and stresses the pervasive politicization of all aspects of human life today. This point of view maintains a challenge that no intellectual is truly independent. Indeed, intellectuals must be deeply critical of their own authority and how it structures public spheres and cultural practices. In this way, the authority they exercise in the public spheres would become both an object of self-critique and a critical referent for expressing a more fundamental dispute with authority itself.

A political nation emerges when the tension between the realistic political time – the time within which we have to make decisions – and the infinite time of values, faith or morality is legitimately resolved (Belohradsky 1988).

An inability to integrate the relative and contradictory nature of values into the dialogue of intellectuals about the future of the nation and thus an inability to create a functional basis for a political nation are the worrisome configurations of modern Lithuanian culture. Democratic public space is anti-monumental; it forces us to see the landscapes of our utterances and thrusts us into an existentialist’s ‘in-between world,’ where meaning is not guaranteed or assured by anything beforehand. Integration into national life of the relative and contradictory nature of values and the development of the ability to become a political nation are the most important tasks of contemporary Lithuanian civil society that is shaping the boundaries and perspectives of a changing role for intellectuals. There seems to be a degree of agreement today among intellectuals that the main aspect of social transition is transition to the realm of new values.

CONCLUSIONS

In mapping the new configurations of Lithuanian culture the creation of a culture of tolerance is considered of great significance.

The philosophical analysis of the contemporary concept of a culture of tolerance focuses on the definition of tolerance that is based on separation of the notions ‘understanding’, ‘respect’, ‘willingness’, ‘debate’, ‘discussion’, ‘dialogue’, ‘monologue’, on the inquiry of the concurrent relationship between traditions of dialogue and tolerance, and on the role of intellectuals in the increased development of historical consciousness and self-awareness of a society undergoing an unprecedented transition.

The process of the creation of culture of tolerance in Lithuania unfolds as an essential shift or transition from a tradition of monologue to
one of dialogue. Lithuanian society has finally returned to the common European home where healthy, dynamic, respectful relationships in society prevail. The quality of relationships determines the quality of thinking; in turn, the quality of thinking determines the quality of actions, the quality of actions determines the quality of results, which, in turn, determines the quality of relationships in what can be called a virtuous cycle of dialogue.

One of the main problems considering the perspectives of the development of a culture of tolerance in Lithuania concerns a constructive approach to evaluating and overcoming the negatives of the Soviet past. The overview of the past is aimed at grasping the main tendencies of the Lithuanian present and future. An exploration of the main trends of the intellectual history of Lithuania during the decades of Soviet rule leads to the assumption that the tradition of monologue became rooted deeply in the intellectual culture of Lithuania during the decades of Soviet rule and became one of the main obstacles on the way to a culture of dialogue and tolerance today. Historically, Lithuania lacked and still lacks a tradition of paradigmatic and controversial thought, dialogue among intellectuals in general, as well as deep respect for academic, intellectual work. Lithuanian culture is still dominated by a monologic tradition.

It is too early to cry for the vanishing role of intellectuals in modern Lithuanian society. The importance and prestige of intellectuals are just being balanced according to their real responsibility in the age of transition. Intellectuals are searching for their new roles in contemporary Lithuanian society. An analysis of the notions, the ‘intellectuals’ and the ‘intelligentsia,’ helps to trace the new roles of intellectuals in contemporary Lithuanian culture and to define various groups of intellectuals that have different points of view considering their role in the process of transition to a democratic and tolerant society, based on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. The role of the prophet based on monologue must be replaced by that of intellectual based on dialogue for those intellectuals who have chosen to seek further influence in society.

Two opposite positions among intellectuals towards the nation, civil society and politics unfold the premises of overcoming the gap between culture, politics, and social reality through nurturing the tradition of dialogue. This is a creative force for the development of a culture of tolerance that generates trust and broadens the horizons of understanding; it transforms an arithmetical sum of individuals into healthy, dynamic democratic society. Intellectuals must be deeply critical of their own authority and how it structures public spheres and cultural practices. In this way, the authority they establish in the public spheres may become both an object of self-critique and a critical referent for expressing a more fundamental dispute with authority itself. The dialogue between intellectuals considering the key values that constitute the ‘spine’ of society never ends.
Vilnius University, 
Lithuania

REFERENCE

http://europa.eu/constitution/index_en.htm [2006.05.15]
The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Tolerance. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/tolerati.htm [2006.05.15]
CHAPTER VIII

VARIETIES OF NATIONAL AND STATE CONSCIOUSNESS:
THE ANATOMY OF DIVERGENCE

ROMUALDAS GRIGAS

The social world transforms itself by changing its fundamental patterns, their mode of functioning, and their points of interconnection – the formative context of human mentality and behaviour. This transmutes the way people relate to the great narratives of history (meta-narratives) and the manner in which theoretic explanations of the world and symbolic expressions of culture are built.

The influence of modern globalization speeds up the changes in the role of nations and national states by narrowing their sovereignty. Ever more prominence is given to the need for establishing and developing supranational and supra-state structures, institutions, and their functionality. Such a need is first of all based on purely pragmatic economic (material consumption), political (security issues), ecological (preservation of environment and nature), communicational and other interests. This, likewise, creates favourable conditions for an entrenchment of global culture, eclectic by nature, which caters to those interests, free from the continuity of national cultures and national constraints. However, such culture is also less restricted by moral obligations or “the charge” of spiritual values, which used to “frame” and regulate human behaviour by giving it a clearer, more meaningful direction, thus lending it integrity and linking the past with the present. This undermines not only man’s attachment to his birthplace, but to his homeland as well.

The universal, increasingly cosmopolitan culture, stripped of its historical cultural heritage, becomes more susceptible to the pressures of capital, to hi-tech din, the cult of sense gratification and consumerism – the very permanence and meaning of our civilization being as if naturally diminished. Globalization not only solves, but also creates problems of global integration and social order. Again and again in the great arena we face the same challenges or questions posed by our civilization: what should be the true balance between tradition and modernity, restraint and indulgence, authority and its “write-off”, altruism and selfishness, order and chaos; between the local and the universal, between the national and the supranational?

This study chooses the continuous nation, deliberately chosen as an object of socio-philosophical analysis, just as other authors in other instances may have decided to focus their research on ethnic group, nation,
state or civic society. It will focus in one possible aspect of such analysis, “born” from the all too evident contradictions of modern Lithuanian reality.

**INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS**

Many theories of state admit that those countries, where the majority of the population speaks the same language and is characterized by inherent ethno-cultural and ethno-psychological homogeneity, and which share a common experience of the historical past and cultural symbols, present more favourable conditions for finding better solutions to arising conflicts and accommodating economic and political interests. This contrasts with those characterized by more heterogeneous societies, as well as by predominant cultural diversity and social dispersion.

There is a sound enough foundation behind the assertion made by the American professor, R. Brubaker, that the modern state is not only a territorial unit integrated into a system of equal territorial states, but a national state, as well. It is true, however, as this author circumspectly notes, that the concept of national state is more ambiguous than that of territorial state: therefore there is a question whether the former concept is suitable for analyzing states of the modern world. After his own critical evaluation of this circumstance, Brubaker still maintains that almost every modern state is, or aspires to be, a national state, espousing the legitimizing doctrine of national or people sovereignty. Nearly all of them claim to draw their state power from their respective nations or peoples, and to use it only for the benefit of those nations or peoples, not simply for governing them.

Nowadays every, or almost every, author analyzing state structure agrees that the modern state is becoming increasingly more bureaucratic. According to D.A. Smith, the world-famous sociologist and political scientist, the majority of people become apathetic, alienated, and intellectuals get especially disappointed and upset, as the state continuously strips the society of its individuality, as its bureaucratic controls become ever more mechanical, centralized, and removed from the populace (15). But there are other parallel and interesting features of this general process. According to Smith, the modern bureaucratic state revives the longing for a national identity, a native home – a homeland (15). Smith further elaborates by saying that an ethnic nation provides its intellectuals – the segment of the population most effected by bureaucratic self-will – with a new way of integrating themselves into other social strata from which they had been distanced by secular education and commitment to rationalistic modernization (15). So the idea of national identity even becomes a kind of rebellion against further modernization and embodies the yearning for a “homeland”. In agreement with Smith it can be said, that globalization also gives rise to and establishes a rekindled desire for ethnic, national values and interests, or, in other words, a modernized longing for guidelines of identity.
The famous thinker of the mid-twentieth century, P. Teilhard de Chardin, claimed that social evolution, i.e. the development of humanity, proceeds toward universal integration – which entails the merger not only of nations but of all races as well. However, the same author has also stated that this process of unification is conceivable only within focused, self-integrated centres, since otherwise social chaos would increasingly prevail (14). It is not hard to realize what kind of centres is meant here. First of all, we see that economic, industrial (purely pragmatic) structures are closely related to territorial organization, the latter being linked to states, established and functioning on national, civil and cultural basis, which in turn further separate into lower-level business, territorial government, local self-administration, religious and similar mutually integrated organizations and communities. Even under the conditions of post-modernity, the fundamental form of such centres and their integration still remains ethnic or a continuous nation; only afterwards and on its basis do the political nation and national state emerge. In short, the ethnic or political nation still remains a fairly ideal form of accumulating historical cultural memory, cherishing spiritual (ideal) values, i.e. maintaining culture along with its “consumption” and its continuity. All this is due to the fact that national culture, together with national self-awareness and self-perception, can fill human existence with moral values, kindness in human relations, and aspiration to communal accord much more easily and more naturally than can a civic society more focused on pure pragmatism and based on economic interests, legal norms, or other utilitarian needs.

When national identity is stripped away, no attention is left for history, great narratives (meta-narratives), common experiences, and ethnocultural legacy all those spiritual (ideal) values and arte-facts unify rather than divide the people of a given country; they shape a more harmonious communal accord based on spiritual bonds. If we strip away the diversity of the social world and aim it only in one, especially pragmatized, direction, we can be sure that not only human beings, but our civilization itself will begin to choke in a cage of its own design and creation.

Taking into account all of the above, we can argue that the prospects of the European Union (EU) and its vitality will greatly, perhaps even crucially, depend on the extent to which the diversity of its national cultures is maintained, i.e. how the EU manages to cherish the historical-cultural memory of its member nations and states along with their interaction based on this memory. On the other hand, however, the practice of the EU community demonstrates that, for objective reasons, its aspiration to universality and pure rationality, coupled with the expansion of supranational forces stimulated by globalization is also not about to give up its positions. It is likely that whether this contradiction is overcome or not will now depend greatly also on the demeanour of the original members of the EU, which have painfully gone through, and are still going through, the twists and turns in the destiny of their own national identity. If the slogan “through cultural diversity to unity” becomes a reality and a benchmark for
practice, then Western civilization in Europe will have an easier time assuring its own future as well as its competitive resilience in relation to other civilizations and cultures.

THE DICHOTOMY OF SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The development of civilization is a contradictory process. On the one hand, it depreciates traditional regional cultural integrity and connectivity, while, on the other hand, it offers supranational pragmatic (technological, economic, political, informational, etc.) coherence.

Our civilization, beset by the din of post-modernity, has come to face quite obvious discrepancies in the cultural value of its structures, or perhaps, putting it more precisely, their dichotomic, contradictory nature. Thoughts voiced by other authors will help us clarify this statement. For instance, one of the most prominent researchers of socio-political organization, Louis Dumont, holds that the main issue for all civilizations is the relation between holism (consistency, unity) and individuality. According to him, social holism is the dominant principle of all traditional (ancient) civilizations, whereas the hierarchy of values in the West today is the reverse, divergent from what this scientist considers to be a normal case of civilization. Vytautas Kavolis, a renowned expert on comparative analysis of civilizations, wrote in agreement with this author: “If we assume that the main issue is the relation between an individual and a social whole, then the Western principle is indeed that of predominance of individualism over holism” (12). We suggest that individualism should be understood in a broader sense, without limiting it to the individual and his behaviour, and should rather mean the establishment of views and mentality oriented toward “pure” self-interest and pragmatism along with the corresponding way of life and structures representing them.

Holism and individualism express two complementary but mutually opposing realms. Here we have complementary trajectories, which determine the stability of the nation (and its state), intersecting in various forms and ways, clashing as they struggle and emit sparks. We have no right to absolutely defend one of them while condemning another. But we have the right to talk about their equilibrium and to emphasize it. We have the right to draw parallels between forms and varieties of consciousness and communal accord which are divergent by nature – and to do so according to the principle of national and state stability, according to the understanding that social agreement and action have a dual nature. This is based not only on historic continuity, tradition, and spiritual (symbolic) values, but also on pure pragmatism and self-interest, without which no progress is conceivable.

1 Here the concept of sociopolitical organization is used as a synonym for the manifestation of nation and state in their organic unity, as a mode of civilized national self-organization.
An extreme form of the dichotomy of the social world has been pointed out already by E. Durkheim, as he attempted to define religion, which divides the world into two domains: the first one containing everything that is sacral, and the second – all that is secular. According to him, these two realms are perceived by the religious mentality as separate and mutually opposed; a wish to belong to one is understood as a demand to renounce the other (E. Durkheim).

This small theoretical digression allows us to make our previous statement about the dichotomy of socio-political organization more concrete. In this case regarding two varieties of consciousness and communality, which supports the vitality of nation and state but are constantly “at odds” and in conflict especially nowadays. We shall tentatively name them as follows: a) utilitarian-pragmatic and b) historical-cultural. The former will be closer to manifestations of individualism (and self-interest), while the latter – to holism (and altruism). How do we interpret them?

The utilitarian-pragmatic variety comprises elements which are increasingly (and ever more forcefully) ingrained in people’s consciousness, in their actions and the structures governing these actions – namely, the elements of rationality, catering to the men of everyday life; in other words, the elements of utilitarian pragmatism, consumerism and sensuality. This also includes the elements of individual, group and institutional egocentrism, even of uncompromising selfishness which sprout deep roots on such a foundation. This is an entire pattern of behaviour characteristic of people loyal to their state and enjoying their civil rights – people living for today and for their immediate concerns. This whole group, on its own initiative and especially supported by the state mechanism, addresses its purely practical, utilitarian needs and issues: economic and legal, communicational and political; overcoming current conflicts and confrontations; maintaining social security.

2 The concept of “historical-cultural consciousness and communal accord” was inspired by the concept of “historical cultural community” presented by Saulius Arlauskas in his book “Turiningieji teises pagrindai,” 2004).

3 It is even possible to determine a rather exact beginning of super pragmatist ideology. The post-war years and “the ghost of communitarianism” creeping all over Europe incited a number of now famous advocates of free market to flock together into a club of intellectuals. They were: K. Popper, L. von Mieses, M. Friedman, W. Lippmann and others. Their meeting took place on April 10, 1947 at the foot of Mont Pelerin in Switzerland. Already then certain rather influential club members proclaimed the doctrine of global economic policy: the influence of the state had to be radically reduced while the role of free market had to become absolute. In other words, the state itself had
Rather closely related to the utilitarian-pragmatic variety of consciousness and communality is political-civic engagement – the addressing of very definite issues, mostly pertaining to material consumption, health, even physical safety – and the communal accord based upon it. However, such communality is rather motley and, we would say, in most instances it tends toward selfishness. No other alternative is possible, since everything is decided by the incredibly fast-spreading consumerist mentality – which upholds no scruples or ideological values – as well as by the competitiveness and routine struggle for survival dictated by it. Needless to say, individualism and the attitude of catering to individual or group (corporate) interests by making them paramount has its positive aspect – it offers more freedom for creative potential to unfold. However, human consciousness and communality based on pure pragmatism will always be similar to the interaction of magnetic fields and an oscillating needle; it will always drift toward conflicts and perennial confrontations, if there is no compensating mechanism and no culture which could block such behaviour.

“McDonaldization” can serve as a classic example of utilitarian-pragmatic variety of consciousness. And we do not mean just fast-food restaurants, springing up like mushrooms after rainfall nearly all over the world, but also other similar patterns of social behaviour and activity, focused on achieving only strictly defined pragmatic goals, and “rejecting” any thought about the consequences of such activity.

Show business and TV programs, designed first of all to attract the largest possible mass audiences, could also be another suitable example. This brings an inevitable need to conform to the taste dictated by its interests. Thus an increasingly shallower process in regard of cultural values is set in motion, which in turn gives greater impetus to extreme rationality and pragmatism.

The extreme variety of utilitarian-pragmatic consciousness is displayed by a subject of social action when he removes common, national, and state-stabilizing interests into the far and farthest background, while instead demonstrating selfishness and satisfying only his own interests and senses. The entrenchment of this variety of consciousness is also evident in bureaucratized behaviour of institutional employees and their arrogant attitude toward fellow citizens.

to develop economic pragmatism at the expense of its national historic memory and cultural heritage.
The historical-cultural variety of state consciousness and communal identity is actually the mechanism which blocks and compensates social selfishness, utilitarianism, and confrontation. It accumulates not only the individual and collective memory of the people living in the territory of the state but also their ethno-cultural heritage, which manifests itself in materialized symbols and aesthetic, ethical, and religious beliefs, as well as the unspoken precepts of those who had lived before, who had departed to the hereafter, who fought for the liberty of the nation or the state. Throughout historical times, human spiritual life has been represented and regulated by religious and church organizations. The historical-cultural variety of state consciousness and communal identity serves to set up values of a more stable and continuous nature: national identity and patriotism are thus established and on this basis social agreement between community members and their common actions are realized, and social order is assured. Historical-cultural heritage and its continuity here play the role of fundamental guidelines and unquestionable moral authority. It comprises that meaningful context without which the very existence of people and nation would become pointless, directed only at material consumption and constantly recurring confrontations, but not at the creation of culture.

There is a current phrase among politicians and lawyers that “the state is made by the people”. Logically thinking, however, this is a clear overestimation of the populace of a country who live in the present and for the present. The state is constantly being created by the whole historical-cultural heritage of its nation, the heritage accumulated by many generations. Only, unlike living human beings, it is mute, unassertive, and latent. And if such heritage in one way or another is eliminated from the life of the people, then constant dangers of this or that nature again and again threaten the stability of the state.

In this case it would make sense to employ a concept such as “adoption” or aparentation, i.e. the practice of historical ethno-cultural heritage, its introduction into the public life of a society, and, of course, its clever modernization. Therefore, all the way down to the breakthrough of modernity and in parallel with utilitarian-pragmatic communal identity, the so-called eternal verities have been painstakingly preserved and passed on from generation to generation, together with ancestor worship, religious beliefs and rites. Needless to say, all these layers of pure, i.e. practical traditional culture have been fetters and constraints on human liberty – and, in the final analysis, on powers of national creativity. But in return, they

---

4 The concept of aparentation (“adoption”< Lat. “parens”, meaning father) was first introduced, it seems, by the famous English historian A. Toynbee.

The Irish folk ensemble “Lord of the Dance” is a typical instance of “adoption” of historical-cultural heritage. In their case everything was joined together: the melodies of ancient Celtic music, the manner of singing, the costumes, and especially the Irish style of dancing. However, all this was presented to the audience in a modernized form.
have provided humans with direction and meaning for life, as well as psychological stability. A human being, free from a community based on traditional values, experiences more acute and more frequent loneliness and despair.

But having said this, we must note that stability and continuity are unthinkable without certain structures which represent pragmatism: business and financial, commercial and judicial, scientific and educational, political and health-care, and many other similar structures. However, according to the prominent theoretician of history, A. Toynbee, civilizations used to crumble or be destroyed by barbarians not so much because they lacked pragmatism, but rather, on the contrary since they had it in twisted excess. Was it not because of “blurred” philosophy of life and the lack of such spiritual values which normally bind segments of society together, that not only the Roman and Byzantine Empires collapsed, but also the Soviet Union disintegrated in front of our eyes?

The historical-cultural variety of consciousness and communality is that eternal river which flows from the past into the future, and which endows the life of nation, society and state with the necessary stability and particular direction. Meanwhile, the utilitarian-pragmatic variety is not only inevitable and indispensable for everyday human needs, but it is also the vociferous, noisy, “selfish” present, focused only on consumption, on the future. Take away the past with its profound undercurrents, and “the present” will begin to fall apart, to scatter; it will come to openly display its pollutants and its confrontational, conflicting segments which it passes on into the future. When these profound undercurrents run dry and vanish, a considerable part of the cohesive material (substance) which serves to frame and regulate people’s everyday concerns, political discords, selfish excesses, and social confrontations is lost. The future itself, in terms of both structure and content, becomes uncertain, even frightening.

As these undercurrents are drained, as they turn shallow and depleted, so does national passion. Most importantly, the world culture loses one of its feeding, enriching sources.

**ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIATION FOR THE TRANSITION OF DICHOTOMY**

To quite a few our endeavour may appear as a “tilting with windmills.” We ourselves could strengthen this unfavourable impression by quoting certain statements from a number of well-known authors.

“Free movement of global finance, commerce and information […] aimed at achieving own goals depends on fragmentation of the world scene,” writes the founder of the sociological theory of post-modernity Z. Bauman. “We could say that “weak states” are very useful for the processes which take place within all these three areas of the economy” (1). According to this author, the interstate and supranational institutions, which have been allowed to operate in agreement with “the global capital,
deliberately or not, but in a coordinated manner, are pressuring all member and independent states methodically to destroy everything, just so they could hold up or slow down the free movement of capital and restrict free market”. And further on: “Weak states are just what is needed by the New World Order” (1).

“It is not hard to force these weak quasi-states to play the (useful) role of local police precincts.” Such a role, according to this representative of social thinking, is needed in order to assure (for these very “precincts”) their own minimal internal order which would serve exclusively their business interests, and, by the same token, would render them incapable “of restricting the freedom of global companies in any effective manner” (1). Is not this class of phenomena – i.e. artefacts, historical events, and symbols expressing continuous spiritual culture (their verbal and materialized memory), in short, everything that can be undoubtedly attributed to the historical-cultural variety of consciousness and social accord – also included in the suppression and destruction of everything “that could hold up or slow down free movement of capital and restrict free market?” Does not this sphere of life of the people and the nation pose the main danger to consumerism mania and financial capital, as well as to the instinct of selfishness which begets them both?

Social Darwinism (not readily recognized by the scientific community in its own time) has nowadays metamorphosed from an “impertinent” theoretical construct into a naked, glaring reality. Under the influence of globalization, the world is gradually saying farewell to the utopia which for over two hundred years has been the great goal of Western politics: a democratically organized society of autonomous individuals in which those very individuals determine the forms of their common existence – asserts one of the more “impertinent” modern thinkers, Horst Kurnitzky. He is sure that our society has come under control of huge globally operating enterprises which finance political campaigns, bribe politicians, and turn democratic elections into farce. He feels, that proponents of radical economic liberalism have radically turned away from “education and thinking,” thus renouncing “all humanist goals” as well, and becoming advocates of merciless social competition. Risk has become the essential feature of culture, and the stock exchange has turned into the model of society. The pure form of struggle for survival is coming to reign in the so-called civilized society (13). H. Kurnitzky asserts, in his characteristically emotional manner, that there, where only profit-seeking rules, where the life-and-death struggle of everyone against everyone rages, there both democracy and lawful state disappear. And globalization itself is, according to him, first and foremost the enormous capital which uncontrollably moves all over the world and the global expansion of business which can ruin industrial systems of whole countries by its sheer economic power (13).

The worldwide philanthropist and financier, George Soros, could hardly be accused by anyone of socialist leanings. He assumes that the
principle of laissez faire, extolled by liberals, has turned into a relic; that this concept should be replaced with the notion of market fundamentalism which rather more effectively defines the nature of the modern world. According to him, capitalist entrepreneurship is becoming the absolute pattern of behaviour by eliminating all obstacles in its way; by subjecting to its interests political, national, ethical, and even aesthetic beliefs and ideals along with their supporting structures. This author likewise does not shun the thought that the states associated with capitalism and free market economy are temporary, ephemeral, and in an ethical sense tend to be indifferent to a more natural kind of social unification. Soros is convinced, that in most cases people vote with their wallets and support laws which serve their personal interests. The elected representatives also often raise their own personal interests above common ones (16). As if to sum up these thoughts, he states: market fundamentalism has become so powerful that all political forces trying to resist it are branded as sentimental, illogical, and naïve.

We shall conclude this brief introduction by “introducing” yet another renowned scholar, an expert on comparative law, Professor H. Berman, from the USA. Viewing today’s world from a different vantage point than the authors quoted above, he states, that in the twentieth century, Western tradition of law, as well as Western civilization itself, have undergone their worst-ever crisis. According to him, we are in the middle of an unprecedented value crisis of legal and judicial thinking. These fundamental shifts in legal culture, he maintains, have been caused by social, economic, and political changes of amazing magnitude (2). Such crisis becomes especially evident in relations with non-Western civilizations – which are based on an holistic, rather than individualistic, imperative. If we read between the lines, it is not hard to realize, that the main cause of the crisis of Western law to H. Berman is its breakaway from culture. We mean the breakaway of modern law from the living (organic) culture, i.e. from the culture naturally regulating human life, and the metamorphosis of law (as well as its deliberate transformation) into a basic instrument of “market fundamentalism.” We mean the catering to purely pragmatic utilitarian interests – the servicing of financial, informational, and political powers. We also mean criminality, which is restrained not by means of culture, not through communal accord, but by resorting to the very same law which has turned into a bought-and-sold instrument.

These illustrations are sufficient to support the following statement: the entrenchment and preponderance of utilitarianism and pragmatism, even in the countries of full-fledged democracy, creates conditions of striking inequality. Meanwhile, in the countries which are trying to “catch up” with democracy, the near-absolute minority wields enormous real power and the near-absolute majority is forced to be content with leftovers from the table of democracy and declarations of “equal rights.” The formation of an “outsider class”, its establishment, and
criminalization of its behaviour becomes the toll which must be paid for the bipolarity of both culture and values, and of the socio-political behaviour.

This toll grows in direct proportion to the extent to which the state concentrates on pure pragmatism, or to which it forgets yet another one of its vitally important missions: the spreading of historical and cultural memory and the aparentation (“adoption”) which makes it meaningful.

Devaluation of the unifying historical memory of the nation and the fading spiritual tradition of human existence backfire by promoting alienation-prone segmentation of society and state along with fierce competition, or even open confrontation, between those segments. It is true, that connectedness and communal accord are occasionally recalled, but only in order to secure more space for the almighty capital and to support business and consumption, and the political forces which serve them.

We shall conclude these gloomy reflections on a lighter note.

J. Tomlinson, a researcher of globalization who has systemized and critically evaluated all aspects of this contradictory evolutionary process, maintains, that globalization is not just a one-sided process which determines the course of events through enormous global structures, but also presents an opportunity for local processes to get involved in global developments (17). This means, that the historical-cultural variety of consciousness and the social accord based on it are not a mere “cry in the wild.” Consciousness and social accord are a real, actually operating power, capable of affecting even that which to many may appear as inconceivable and preordained.

A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE TRANSITION OF DICHOTOMY IN LITHUANIA

The integration into the EU and the joining of the community of European nations gives Lithuania and Lithuanian people additional, and, it is important to emphasize, more natural and spontaneous chances and possibilities for economic, cultural and political evolution, as well as for national accord. Concern is expressed in the EU that the old continent of Western civilization should not turn into an inert subject of globalization; that it should manage to resist the pressure of consumerist culture and cosmopolitan liberalism, which not only leads to devaluation of diversity of national cultures, but to social anarchy as well. However, this pressure has found an especially fertile ground in Lithuania with its newly restored independence. Therefore, the very process of integration into the EU seems to make persistent demands for a more thorough analysis of the situation which has presently taken shape here.

On the bases of my own previously published studies and analytic reviews5, and a critical evaluation of publications by others authors, there is

well-founded reason to believe that the Lithuanian nation (and Lithuania as a state) has reached the situation of transition, characterized by demographic “decay”, moral devaluation, waning of national consciousness, and social, as well as political, confrontation. It has reached the condition where its social retina, based on continuous spiritual values, is in decline. The metaphor of “national walkout,” once voiced by a poet, has become the ominous reality which diminishes Lithuania’s participation in the development of the EU, and tarnishes its national statehood and self-esteem.

History itself would seem again and again to be inciting Lithuanians to think of what they were in the outset of history; what features later on impinged upon them; what they have become today and what they will become tomorrow? What have Lithuanians given to the world, and are they now capable of giving it anything quite original? Do the Lithuanian nation and its present state have stability? In general, should a nation retain its stability in an increasingly unified world? The search for answers to questions of a similar nature requires more courageous, critically diagnostic thinking, and more innovative sociological conceptuality.

The dramatic nature of Lithuanian socio-political organization is informative. To a significant extent it is determined by the obvious disruption of balance between the historical-cultural and the utilitarian-pragmatic varieties of consciousness and communality – the very balance which is needed to assure the continuity of the Lithuanian nation, as well as the stability of its state under conditions of Euro-integration and globalization.

This balance is disrupted not only in the thinking of politicians and the behaviour of business organizations, the owners and managers of which, in contrast to their counterparts in, let us say, Japan or Norway, are almost demonstratively inclined to distance themselves from Lithuanian selfhood and the tradition of its continuity (thus, of course, also diminishing their own ability to compete). This balance is disrupted not only in the “major” media, exclusively concentrated on utilitarianism and on current, superficial, and “sensation-smelling”

“Tautinė savivoka” dedicated to discussion on civilization at handicaps of the Lithuanian nation (2001). Critical analysis is presented in a number of my articles, as well as in my book of essays “The Search for Selfhood or Letters to Lithuanian Americans” (2004). The above mentioned monographs received the Lithuanian Science Award in 2002.

6 We know from our “living practice” that those Lithuanian businessmen, who are most notably selfish, are also characterized by ethnic and even national indifference; by their desire to distance themselves from national or even state interests.
events. This balance is disrupted in the self-awareness of many people, especially of the younger generation, and in their value-based orientation, which is obviously being dominated by purely consumerist, materialistic (and hedonistic) attitudes. These attitudes arise and thrive not just in the medium of the Soviet legacy, which still has not lost its vitality, but also under the influence of globalization, and especially under the influence of lifestyles focused on consumption and hedonism. This is the source that feeds the “national walkout.” Quite a few Lithuanians emigrate – permanently or temporarily – leaving their homeland without the spiritual baggage of culture and identity which would allow them, in countries of their destination, to avoid the fate of joining the crowds of the marginalized, i.e. people who have found themselves on the margins of culture and are oriented only towards pragmatism and utilitarianism.

The depreciation (and devaluation!) of the historical-cultural variety of consciousness and communality should be viewed as the basic civilizational handicap of Lithuanian nation. Using the language of philosophy, it can be described also as a disruption of the relation between “to be” and “to have”, the “honest” and the “useful”, the “moral” and the “amoral” (understandably, at the expense of the former members of these oppositions), this is demonstrated primarily by the structures which organize the social process, and especially, which have real powers at their disposal.

Already in the beginning of 2005, Lithuanian society got a few baffling “surprises.” Our courts then acquitted a number of corruption-tainted judges, two diplomats and the mayor of Vilnius, along with the president of a large corporation, who had transgressed every moral and judicial norm and were publicly “berated” by the media. A

---

7 By “civilizational handicap” we mean those exclusive areas of national existence and, especially, of state management which are filled with the by-far-not-constructive activity and interaction of its subjects – not with thorough solving of arising problems, but with deviation of greater or lesser extent, with shadiness, confrontation, and even criminality; with unwise, strategically thoughtless actions (which cause additional confusion); with tardiness of social progress, social arrhythmia, anomaly, social fatigue, etc.

high-ranking government official, who had been poaching at night in the woods with his friends, was also fully acquitted. It was a routine display of nihilism in terms of moral values and social accord.

We can hypothetically assume that this civilizational handicap – the depreciation of spiritual values – also infects national and ethnic minorities residing in Lithuania, together with a growing number of immigrants. This creates unfavourable conditions for their integration into Lithuanian society and hampers their ability to become full-fledged subjects of our political nation. And the nation itself, as a subject of a broader community (e.g. that of the EU), becomes less consolidated.

Such socio-cultural contradictions, and fundamental, constant conflict with changing patterns of expression, resulting from an unbalanced relation between the above-mentioned varieties of consciousness and communality, is experienced neither by the former “fellow member of the socialist camps”, the Czechs and Hungarians, nor by Lithuania’s closest neighbours, the Polish people. Nor is it experienced by the Russians, who have endured seventy years of self-inflicted Bolshevik terror and the pressures of Soviet ideology. The Russians, living in their reborn state which has difficulties turning to the path of democracy, not only manage to make wider use of their historical memory and the preserved elements of their aristocratic culture and ethno-cultural heritage, but, just as in previous (i.e. Tsarist) times, they rather successfully employ the Russian Orthodox church – which constitutes a special, exclusive part of Russia’s national historical-cultural heritage – for establishing their statehood and national consciousness. The Russian Orthodox Church has never lacked Russian spirit. It has contributed in a most active way to the building of the Russian nation and to the reinforcement of its powers in the form of a vast empire, which it continues to do to the present day.

The civilizational handicap or bereavement, which we are discussing, goes back much further than the Soviet-era disruption of the normal evolution of the Lithuanian nation and state. Its sources lie in much earlier historical times. The several centuries filled by Rzeczpospolita (Republic of Both Nations) and Tsarist Russia, which in essence was a period of polonization (especially of the nobility) and russification, have left in the Lithuanian mentality a gaping hole of inadequacy in terms of European modernity. After Lithuanians lost their aristocracy (and their aristocratic spirit as a model of sensitivity and behaviour), they began to perceive their historical memory and cultural heritage according to the norms of peasant mentality and defensiveness, i.e. in a more mythological,
drastic and heroic manner, cut off from the process of European modernization and especially from the practice of state management. One should note also of the synergetic effect which results from the contact of practical, utilitarian action with national history and culture, made meaningful through its embodiment in certain forms, as well as with human nature and subconscious archetypes permeated by historical and cultural memory. Nation, which manifests itself namely through its historical and cultural memory and consciousness, is not only one of the fundamental (and often essential) pillars of man’s spirituality and accord with others, but also one of the sources which provide the world with focused social energy. But then again – a nation can exist only as long as the people exist who practice its historical-cultural memory.

Cultural depreciation and the resulting inferiority of political action (including political cynicism) could possibly serve to explain the phenomenon, so characteristic of Lithuania, which has been the focus of numerous theories of state and which was defined by P. Dunleavy and B. O’Leary as the model of a “faceless state.” Here we mean the state which distances itself from the practice of its historical consciousness and cultural heritage, and so diminishes its moral capacity and internal integrity; it turns into a passive mechanism, controlled by the forces which operate already outside the boundaries of formal, official politics. The actual power here belongs only to certain social groups which control special levers of influence. Here it is much easier for laicism (absolutization of “laissez faire” principle) in the economy and violence in the society to spread their black wings. According to H. Kurnitzky, these are two sides of the same coin, and both are signs of the collapse of civilized society.

It is hard to imagine a “faceless state” with a mature civil society – members of the latter would maintain a different, i.e. more mature, culture of political thinking and social behaviour; a higher standard of solidarity and consciousness of those involved in the social process, both in terms of people and institutions. The “faceless state”, in order to defend its own positions, will always tend to curtail the development of civil society – as can be observed in the case of Lithuania.

When we talk about participation of people, we particularly have in mind those forms and ways of civic expression and cooperation, those basic values, which constitute not just pragmatic, everyday utilitarian interests, but also the inner experience of a continuous nation, of its stability and focused statehood.

The spells of Lithuanian (and not only Lithuanian) national rebirth have always been accompanied by activated historical cultural
consciousness and collectivized action based on it. This was the situation immediately before the declaration of Lithuania’s independence in 1918. This, or a similar, situation repeated itself just before March 11, 1990 (the last declaration of Lithuanian independence). However, after such victories, the composition of activists on the social arena underwent a rather rapid change: idealists were replaced by pragmatists, who had been waiting out the upheaval in the wings. We shall not analyze the causes of this transformation here. It will be sufficient to note that for a nation without deeper traditions of authentic statehood, for a nation where altruism and accord have not yet acquired a stable, structured, or institutionalized form, such upheavals are usually very detrimental.9

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

From the vantage point of the sociological structure of Lithuanian reality and its analysis, we can add a few generalizing statements.

The state can never be stable if it functions apart from its ethnicity and from its nation. The nation is its sovereign, and the state is a way of national self-assertion and self-organization. Therefore, as such, it should never be reduced to gratifying and “servicing” only purely pragmatic needs (including their totality) of the people or of organized groups. Statehood cannot be directed only at solving practical everyday issues of individuals or their society, and focused on the kind of social behaviour which is reducible to empiricism and regulated by legal norms or political “games.” Stability of the state in equal measure depends also on the practice of historical memory and cultural heritage, i.e. on spiritualized social cohesion and connectivity. This should be one of the fundamental and most widely regarded criteria in any assessment of statehood.10

Our analysis shows that Lithuanian socio-political organization is losing the binding material which holds its separate segments together. This

9 We could hardly attribute authentic statehood to the Republic of Both Nations (Rzeczpospolita, lasted from 1569 to 1793), or even to its predecessor, the Great Duchy of Lithuania. Only the Lithuanian state between the two World Wars (brief period from 1918 to 1940) would meet this criterion.

10 Experiencing the contradictory nature of sociopolitical organization in his own way, Z. Brzezinski stated, more than a decade ago, that American society can not set an example for the world – either in terms of morality, or practical economy – if its essence is defined by the predominantly cornucopian ethics (absolutization of hedonistic needs – R. G.). According to him, too much attention for gratification of material desires, which keep growing and get out of control, can only deepen the objective abyss already dividing mankind (Zbigniew Brzezinski. Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century (In Lithuanian). Vilnius: Tvermė, 1998.

The effect of cornucopia is even reflected in the anthropological features of humans. Experts maintain that human faces in modern portrait photographs lack spirituality in comparison with those of earlier years.
loss varies in its forms and nature: it ranges from the waning of religious and family traditions to the lifestyle resembling the condition of a human being in an airport or onboard a plane. From this lack of the “binding material” we derive the characteristically Lithuanian irritability, passivity during elections, lack of optimism, idle lamentations, neuroses, the by-now-routine display of political ambitions, open cynicism, ostentatious activity and confrontation, corrupt behaviour of bureaucrats and politicians, declining national self-esteem and communal accord, depreciation of moral culture, lack of value-based orientation (especially in the younger generation), etc.11 All such phenomena are spreading throughout the social space and showing their gargoyle-like offshoots. The structure of both the state and the society develops fissures and becomes permeable to evil crosswinds, i.e. susceptible to the negative aspects of globalization. A nation which loses its memory becomes an outcast among nations with adequate identities and can not hope to have a future. No appeal for civil responsibility and for development of civil society has (or can have) a firm basis, if it is not reinforced by the emphasis on the coherence of a continuous nation.

Thus we have reason to make the following statement: the continuity of the Lithuanian nation, its meaningful existence (both in the context of the European Union and the World), as well as its all-state (and all-European) integration and stability, depends, and will depend, directly on the extent to which its historical cultural memory is respected within the state; on how the national consciousness of its citizens and of its governmental and private institutions is, and will be, developed. Without the latter component, it is hard to imagine how the constantly recurring confrontations of economic, political, socio-cultural and purely psychological nature could be “blocked,” including the “modern conflict” which arises between the great powers of capitalism and democracy (as formulated by R. Dahrendorf). It is likewise hard to imagine how the flows of migration, which adversely effect (and surely will effect the whole Lithuanian socio-political organization), could be reduced. The place and contribution of Lithuanian people as nation and of their country as a state, in the now common home of the European Union will largely depend on a solution to this contradiction.

The above thoughts and statements are also applicable to other nations with a similar destiny and similar history.

---
11 According to the data of research conducted by the Euro-barometer agency in 2002, 45 percent of Lithuanians were not proud of their nation, while among our closest neighbors, Latvians, this figure was 15 percent, and among Poles – only 8 percent.

Another research conducted by same agency in 2005 has shown, that Lithuanians were the people most dissatisfied with their life in the whole Europe – 44 percent (European average being 19 percent).
A couple of decades ago, issues of social ecology gained wider recognition and much more was being said and written on how to preserve historical memory and cultural heritage, as well as the spiritual life and traditions, of all smaller or larger regions, of every nation. Later on, in the clamour of globalization, this direction of scholarly thought lost some of its volume. Perhaps it was replaced by such verbal constructs as “sustainable development”? Anyway, the vision of a stable evolution, which cherishes human and national spirit, remains alive and vibrant.

We conclude the present narrative-study with a reference to one of the most eminent representatives of sociological theoretical thinking, M. Castells. He believes in rationality, and that it is possible to appeal to wisdom. He believes in the viability of thoughtful social action. And, regardless of the tradition of occasional tragic intellectual mistakes, he still believes that observation, analysis, and theory-building stimulate the creation of a new, better world (4).

These statements reflect the position of constructivist epistemology. This scientific position is close to ours, and is based on the conviction that it is not just circumstance, but also thinking, that produces and determines action; the conviction, that how our world, as such, is structured, the world in which we live, and feel either comfortable, or on the contrary – uncomfortable depends on human thought.

Vilnius Pedagogical University
Lithuania

REFERENCES

PART III

SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE CONTEXT OF
A CHANGING SOCIAL ORDER
CHAPTER IX

THE CHANGING POWER OF SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

ANELE VOSYLIUTE

INTRODUCTION

Sociology (as society’s self-knowledge and the possibility of deeper reflection on society’s features) in post-socialistic Lithuania is an agent in the struggle against civilization and cultural backwardness. The power of the vocabulary and concepts of the social sciences is becoming one of the ways we perceive, describe, and analyse the world around us. The development of sociology is related to diagnosing the quality of life, social transformation, social structure and involvement in the investigation of new problems. Modern social science has more possibilities to represent various points: sociology, for example, can be based on patriarchal or feministic, central or marginal, macro or micro, positivistic or post-modernistic approaches. The power of contradicting theoretical positions or different methods constructs in sociology a permanent intellectual discourse. Social and human disciplines are important actors which keep some groups of society under control. New paradigms of science and the revelation of new social phenomena enrich sociological knowledge. The approaches of sociology reveal different relations between knowledge and domination; the dominator acquires knowledge about the dominated, which reinforces its/his power.

After the fall of collectivist ideology and responsibility in post-socialistic Lithuania, all forms of modern individualization and new solidarity found their way into society. The establishment of many private firms in the economic field, great activity of political parties and non-governmental organizations reflected the initiative of individuals who sought to be new actors in social life. New forms of personal realization in sociology were to change its identity. This coincided with the enhancement of the personal capacities and interests of the sociologists; the affect of Lithuanian sociology came through knowledge of works in this field, the teaching of sociological disciplines in universities and personal research. The reformation of scientific institutions and new identities of sociologists were buttressed by market relations and interests. The new historical and social context contributed to a growth of the national, cultural, religious and political identities of people; new meanings and narratives of belongings which were hidden as “dangerous” in Soviet times (expatriates, believers, dissidents) opened new issues in public discourse and enriched social investigations. The ability of sociologists to choose their field of research
was enhanced. At the same time an internal “brain drain” enabled one to move from academic work into the career of politician or businessman.

The decline of socialist hegemonic paradigm opened the way in sociology for a search for new transitional theories, diverse and contested models of understanding. Now we can see a theoretical eclecticism, pluralism and competition – this is a normal situation. The increasing pluralism of discipline need not lead to disintegration, for the problem is only that of understanding each other. The maintenance of disciplinary coherence is related with the recognition and integration of diverse and contested models of understanding and their intellectual approaches. The relations and contacts in the scientific community with representatives of different branches of Western sociology and their active participation in sociological practice ensure the growth of the discipline. These contacts, in turn, become a positive factor for the appropriation of new methodological elements which enliven the discipline. But this phenomenon could also interfere with national science or culture, and constitute a “colonisation” of the social sciences.

Independent Lithuania has brought radical changes to the environment of the social sciences and its paradigms. The new structures and features of society demand a change of sociological research methodology and a rethinking of the subject-matter of sociological investigations. The epistemological foundations of science, with their theoretical and methodological problems for sociology, are being analyzed in the journals “Sociologija”, “Filosofija. Sociologija”.

Post-socialist Lithuania is connected with the process of democratization, national freedom, economic, social and cultural reforms and new socio-political reality. Public opinion is characterized by pluralism of political views, differences in attitudes to state and private property (emerging new institutions of the market economy), and new concepts of everyday life styles. New social movements (those of landowners, women, businessmen, and peasants) provide potential for new needs and interests. Social scientists become like “keepers” of those categories which reflect the new active practices of the people, the importance of theoretical discussions on citizenship and democracy, and the new social mobilization of the country. Such concepts as ‘change’, ‘modernization’, ‘pluralism’, ‘democracy’, ‘national state’, ‘civil society’, ‘new identity’, ‘social change’ are used frequently in common usage and in the analyses of sociologists. The importance of a market system with dominant private ownership and civil society (which is impossible in totalitarian political system) is emphasized in public discourse as the social ideal of the definition of the welfare state; the interests of state and civil society coincide. Such terms as ‘social initiatives’, ‘welfare state’, ‘global ecological problems’, ‘voluntary associations and movements’, ‘openness’, reflect new features of social science debates and produce new research materials. In this sense the sociologists have expanded their knowledge into entirely new fields. This is their collective attempt to refine and change the identity of this science.
National science may become mature by integrating knowledge of national attitudes, the character of the social relations of localities, and the heritage of international sociology. The individual initiatives and responsibility of sociologists are related with the demands of social practice and administrative institutions of the future; society will need the expertise and scientific authority of sociologists. Sociological work also integrates the power of the self-reflectivity of the people; sociologists will be useful in modern society as experts in various spheres and as social leaders, critics and scholars. The prestige of the sociologist will increase and his/her writings will be a significant form of society’s social and symbolic capital.

Scientific relations are developing in two ways: 1) through traditional meetings with foreign sociologists, and 2) through increasing anonymous interchange through books and the internet. Now sociology is searching for new orientations and identities (the proliferation of eclecticism is characteristic) and is experiencing an increase in fragmentation; it is always ‘under construction’ [1]. Despite the efforts of Lithuanian social scholarship to develop sociological research and teaching, new financial limitations have appeared.

The motives of sociologists vary: the search for their personal identity and to achieve social status, or the wish to participate in the construction of a world order through renewal and portrayal of the social world.

THE FEATURES OF CONSUMPTION

Globalization is impacting the economic and social subsystem; this factor effects the interpretation of organization, social actions and the situations of others spheres. Sociologists are responsible for involving in their research an analysis of the reaction of social and political institutions, as well as human reactions to globalization. This could represent a rich field of interest which might increase knowledge and improve both interpretation and the methodologies used in the analyses of social phenomena.

Since 1990 Lithuanian sociologists have gradually assimilated the ‘universal experience’ of world sociology, understanding that they form part of something greater. Sociologists have begun to feel a greater stability in their works as they became able to identify themselves with the world sociological community. Sociological heritages are for them points of reference. A large influence is the emergent possibility of drawing on the writings of Western sociologists, which has helped them create independent works. This is a great creative stimulant.

The broadening of social horizons, the diversification of patterns of economic, political and cultural life increases the dynamic of change in the social sciences. The ideological influence from the side of Soviet Union has declined, as the need to be autonomous and to adhere to standards of Western science has increased. At the beginning of the social transition the socio-political context of sociology was dominant. Sociologists, together
with politicians, were active participants in creating new civilizing projects of social order which had the goal of helping any nation-state to become a respected member of international society.

The present significant function of sociology (and social science) in democratic society is to provide thinking with modern categories. This means the extension of the understanding and activities of being in the network, in circulation, in touch with a variety of behavior forms and fashions which keep on changing, and with different modes of perception and of feeling. The sociological imagination is a very efficient form of self-consciousness which helps the individual to conceptualize oneself, especially in the new free-market economy and democratic conditions. On the other hand, sociology can help individuals build a better view of the world, deleting from the memory some peculiarities of the dominant traditional thinking.

The slowdown in post-socialist transition in Eastern European societies is described by the Polish sociologist, P. Sztompka, with the help of the concept of "civilizational incompetence", comprising deficiencies in: 1) entrepreneurial culture, 2) civil or political culture, 3) culture of discourse, and 4) everyday culture, indispensable for daily existence in advanced, urbanized, technologically saturated and consumer-oriented society. Some of the components of everyday culture include: personal neatness and cleanliness, punctuality, body care, fitness, healthy eating, skills in handling household appliances, and the like. Decades of socialism have not only hindered the formation of civilizational competence, but in many ways have helped to shape quite an opposite cultural syndrome – civilizational incompetence [2: 89].

The modernizing processes in post-socialistic Lithuania have not led to a higher degree of social equality, but the determinative power of social structures is operating as a mechanism for reproducing inequality. New social opportunities and social positions, and the diversity of individual orientations in society are increasing. New impressions and possibilities for participation are contributing to a new image of modern society in the country as more open and pluralistic.

After 1990 the restoration of civil society began by mass organizations re-establishing societies that functioned before 1940, by de-sovietization of large quasi-voluntary organisations partly closing or splitting them into smaller units. New societies (of cultural or social character) were established of which many stressed national, political and cultural values. The voluntary field has helped to de-sovietize and construct a democratic and pluralistic society.

Sociologists are involved in new administrative, communicational, educational structures; they participate actively in the public sphere (mass media) in which new meanings of social change and cultural life are discussed. The writings and the data of sociologists in ‘virtual’ space can influence public opinion and the formation of civil society. Journalists,
The Changing Power of Sociology and the Social Order

leaders of social movements, associations and political parties, engage sociologists as experts in the creation of an open public sphere.

Consumption is a significant process related with the reproduction of the way of life of the people; it is a system of organized relations among society and the environment. Not only productive or freetime activities, but also the level of consumption is a basis for differences in society. The attitudes and patterns of behaviour in the consumption sphere are an important resource of new life strategies, especially in the newly independent countries. The system of public opinion is characterized by a pluralism of political views, differences in attitudes toward state and private property, new forms of consumption and a new concept of comfort in everyday life. Lithuanian society moves away from post-socialist state of lawlessness by gaining experience in different activities, connected with newly purchased ownership and private property. Social actions are becoming more oriented towards such achievements as the acquisition of material goods and property. The need for new choices in society leads to confusion. More and more different interest groups emerge who want their material, political and cultural rights represented in different fields of influence. As Vosyliute noted, national independence of Lithuania also manifests itself in the orientation toward European culture, way of life and social and political norms. In the public consciousness this phenomenon is reflected as the search for cultural pluralism, involvement in a variety of choices, transition to a world “without frontiers”, turning to new directions, toward the post-modern. People of the post-Soviet countries are preparing to live in a social space in which the distribution of wealth and risk overlap. According to Luhmann, liberal ideology contains a “hidden program for adjusting society to risks”.

Foreign goods are important for the society not only with regard to their function, but as symbols of abundance, marking the end of the constant shortages of different consumer goods in the Soviet period. These goods also make it possible to become familiar with the European, Asian, American consumer culture and way of life.

Consumption and everyday experience tend to standardize tastes and values. Many middle-class families have replaced Russian-made cars (which now are out of fashion) by Western cars (Audi, BMW, Volvo, Opel, Mercedes and others). This process reflects a social and cultural change of orientation toward Western goods and culture. The display of material goods is part of a system of a person’s reputation and a mark of the competition of tastes. People today use consumptive behaviour to signify who they are to other people from whom they hope to gain approval.

Since Independence we have had many discussions focused on the production and dissemination of various goods and services. The advertising of various material and spiritual goods of local places can invite the potential consumer or visitor to be a member of this imagined community and to form his or her identity according to its features. Events express the differences and similarities of various parts of the country and
shape their particular images in the social and cultural consciousness. Thus, Lithuania is constructed from invented, historic and cultural versions of identity. Despite difficulties in economic life, the population has preserved a relatively high purchasing power, which it can now use in Lithuanian shopping centres sized and structured according to Western standards. Earlier, people had to travel long distances to shops in other cities or even in other republics of the USSR to satisfy their consumer needs.

Nowadays consumption is an element that can structure (isolate or integrate) people in a new way. Based on the content and the level of consumption we can distinguish several specific subcultures: those of rich people, commercial circles, of the poor, of young people, of pensioners, of town-dwellers and people living in the countryside, of people who are oriented towards foreign goods and those who prefer domestic products. The level and structure of consumption, as well as social attitudes thereto, depend on some variables, namely, social class, age, sex, as well as on the situation (every day activities or festive occasions). For P. Bourdieu, lifestyle is an expression of class position, which is identifiable according to the composition of types of capital – economic, cultural, social and symbolic. According to him the styles of consumption are the means not just of deploying economic resources, but especially of exhibiting ‘cultural capital’. Thus, social distinction is marked by tastes which are formed as part of class habits [5].

Our study of some 100 interviews about the consumption behaviour and strategies of life of old people in one of Vilnius’ old-city districts reveals the differences in living conditions and consumption that depend on income, family structure and health. Many people interviewed did not like the questions about the quality of their life, since it was not pleasant for them to admit their poverty. Most felt hurt because they had been deprived of their savings. Their consumption has a domestic character. Women are acquiring more responsibility and power than men in the process of distribution of means of subsistence. The role of women is very significant in the preparation of traditional meals for holidays and celebrations. Such meals are a cultural symbol, an element of historic memory.

The identity of pensioners is usually connected with the image of outsiders, who need assistance and compensation to be able to pay for public utilities. Some of them experience fear and have no strength to fight for a better life. Unlike the elite or middle class who are constantly looking for new fashions, new styles of consumption, new sensations and experience, pensioners have a model of consumption that is determined by their poverty and living conditions. The city space of these inhabitants is very narrow, limited by shops, and occasionally, church and market. In the summer they spend their time in a public park near Vilnius. The spiritual experience of old people is often related to suffering that can be explained by their small income and poor health. Some poor people, unemployed
people and socially neglected persons receive meals from charities in special dining rooms.

At the same time, officials, politicians, top managers, owners of companies buy expensive, high-quality clothes in special shops with foreign goods. Well-off people, having cars, often visit wholesale depots. However, rich people have their own problems. They worry about their property, about their families and their own physical safety. Psychiatrists maintain that often personal affluence changes the psychological state of the very rich.

Self-expression through consumption (especially clothes) is characteristic for the young, especially women. Young people frequent large market places where they look for cheap fashionable goods. Both the needy and the artistic like second-hand shops. Dresses express female subjectivity; they provide the possibility for women to construct their identities. Women continue to dress in imaginative, playful and aesthetic manners. We associate the expressiveness of beauty with female decorativeness.

In recent times the formation of many women’s identities is closely related to the process and experience of consumption. The young girls especially actively participate in the process of the aesthetization of everyday life through the perception of the rapid flow of signs and images which saturate the fabric of life. Post-modern thinking emphasizes the new role – and the central one – of images in the consumer society [6]. Young people are oriented to new professions, such as cultural intermediaries, managers, artists and become more open to visual forms of art. The old distinction between high and mass culture is gradually disappearing. The number of picture galleries, studios, exhibitions is increasing, which testifies again to the aesthetization of life. The artists, the new taste-makers, are perceived as heroes in the subculture of the young, whose lifestyles are influenced by their art. The subculture of young people has some features, characteristic of post-modernism – transformation of reality into images, living in a simulated world, in an aesthetic hallucination of reality, in hyperspace. The understanding of consumption as an indispensable matter for existence that “the proper end of taking food is the preservation of the body by nutrition”, (as noted for example by Thomas Aquinas) is discussed now in terms of the actual status of consumption in modern and post-modern society. Consumption has become a central mode of people’s existence and movement towards mass consumption is accompanied by a general reorganization of everyday life and experience. A tension has emerged between self-discipline and pleasurable consumption: the generation of needs does not stop after one of them has been satisfied, new needs “come up all the time” without being necessary.

The cultural and technological changes, the norms of civilization have made the woman’s body a significant topic of public opinion. The process of aestheticization of life, the growth of mass sport and leisure has identified personal worth with the beauty of the body. In some spheres of
social life the ‘quality’ of a woman’s body is very important, and its presentation is connected with her and her family’s worth and social prestige. In public debates there are views that the woman’s body is a social construction, produced by social practices. Now we can see in the Lithuanian press and especially in magazines much that is erotic; we can speak about the new image of women, sexually engaged and sexually aggressive, who wish to be beautiful and rich. As noted, M. Foucault (7), the body has become in modern societies the target of endless, minute and detailed forms of surveillance, discipline and control. The analysis of the features of women’s images in the Lithuanian mass media (in women journals) reveals the dominant images of women: a mature woman and a dependent woman (8: 95-100). Diverse conversations, discussions, articles and interviews with women help to reveal general characteristics and distinguishing features of these two images of woman: 1) the mature woman: feels safe in the surrounding world, brave, strict to herself, and knows how to take care of herself and others. Her main principle – to remain herself, to be modern, free and independent from old stereotypes; 2) the dependent woman: unable to act for herself, is irresolute in making her own decisions in critical situations, and lives in a man’s shadow.

Lithuanian sociologists present in their writings problems related to the different issues of the society’s social structure [9] and the life of the poor. For example, the authors of the sociological monograph “The Poor: the Mode of Living and Values” [10] reveal the features of a vagabond subculture, the situation of the beggars and poor in traditional Lithuanian culture and in modern social structures, their relations with more successful strata of society. In the research some scientific approaches are outlined: interpretation, phenomenological, existential.

In the sociological monograph some features of poor social status, their life conditions (food, shelter), and their identification with different places are investigated. The space is always socially reconstructed; as D. Massey noted [11], places have multiple identities. Poor people are connected with places physically or in memory and imagination. Places are constructed out of a particular constellation of relations articulated together at a particular locus, particular interactions and mutual articulations of social relations, social processes, experiences and understandings. Many poor people are homeless; as a site of everyday, ‘magical’ and tactile resource for the making of identity, the home for them does not exist. Their small communities construct some social networks, which help to cope with their troublesome social practices. The consumption of the poor is very bad; they speak of being hungry, weak, sick, exhausted, in pain or mentally distressed. Many women’s life stories are related with consumption events, especially with the consumption of alcohol by their husbands and sons. Mental health problems – stress, anxiety, depression, lack of self-esteem – are among the more commonly identified effects of poverty and ill-being among the poor. Because they are as „others”, they feel distinct from normal society; their self-definition is grounded on their conduct, individual
experience as ‘bomza’, unlucky, miserable, victim, unfortunate. Sometimes they are associated with aggressiveness and violence.

On the other hand, in the mode of life of marginal people our society can see their endeavour to be free, the will to live self-sustaining lives. Marginal peoples keep themselves at some distance from society; most of them are in conflict with society and their family members. After the social and economic changes of post-socialistic society they are in social exclusion, unable to adapt to the new social situation. They lack material resources for subsistence, are unemployed or homeless. In the consciousness of marginal people there are feelings of helplessness; their communication is not intensive, their life is isolated. They live on charity; poorhouses have long been characteristic of the country. The poor are collectors of food and things from the rubbish heaps and dustbins of the town. So the marginal participate in the creation for the market of the second-hand things and clothing. The process of marginalization experienced by the poor is connected mostly with negative self-evaluation and negative feelings, with anxiety and shame before the other members of the community.

As the research shows, it is important to involve the poor in different social activities and social contacts. The possession of more social capital (measured by social participation, interpersonal trust, close personal ties and happiness) can make their life more successful.

HIGHLIGHTING THE SPACE

According to H. Lefebvre, space is the primary element: “space “decides” what activity may appear, but even this “decision” has limits placed upon it. Space lays down the law because it implies a certain order – and hence also a certain disorder. Interpretation comes later, almost as an afterthought. Space commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes and distances to be covered [12: 143].

The urban landscape (and such sites as governmental, historical, business and market, sacred and profane places) is the scene of people expressions, experiences and discourses. Inhabitants, as the users of space, are participants in the flow of social and cultural signs and images. The streets of the city and their places of commerce, representation, the parks and squares have comprised a large part of any city; streets are the daily routines for people walking and driving, they are places of sociability. The different old buildings – churches, halls, banks, residences, hospitals, factories, and railway stations have their functions and meanings, their history. They are needed by people not only in practical, but in the symbolic aspects as well. The places and their objects provide the society with much experience as well as the possibility for actions and for emotions.

The including of investigation of emotions in the analysis of social processes takes sociology in a new direction. Sociologists can reveal new
perspectives and key aspects of social structures, social actions, and social change by using a fresh understanding of emotions. In the investigation of city life we can analyse such aspects as fear (security or insecurity), resentment, vengefulness, shame (e.g., with environmental conditions), and confidence of people in each other. The importance for social processes of research on emotions becomes significant, because it gives witness to the quality of life: the satisfaction with life conditions, the needs of different classes of the inhabitants. Social relationships are defined by the meaning – idea, values – shared by social actors who have a common understanding of their situation.

As D. Massey noted, “The terms space and place have long histories and bear with them a multiplicity of meanings and connotations which reverberate with other debates and many aspects of life. “Space’ may call to mind the realm of the dead or the chaos of simultaneity and multiplicity” [11,1]. According to the concept of Mircea Eliade, all space is not equal; there can be sacred places which are important while other places are without such meanings: sacred space is a magical space. The landscape of every old nation is saturated with representation of sacrality; there are centres of religious practice, and the landscape is saturated with places and routes to the sacred places. Place is understood as the necessary context for religious actions; through such places the people are related to the milieu and to the self. The relation to self extends the meaning of place to include religious, aesthetic, moral and transcendental aspects. The experience of the sacred is related with the sacred space; the people presented there their basic aesthetic needs. Despite cultural and individual differences and historical variability, these are among the most basic and universal needs of man.

Since the institutionalization of Catholicism in Lithuania, religious practice and the traditions of society’s spiritual life were related with sacred art, both professional and folklorist character. Church architecture and interiors, paintings, sacral music, such events, as the Church processions and their artistic decoration in the space of towns and villages have been unchanged since old times. During the wars many churches suffered much, but folk memorial monuments – crosses and roadside poles with statuettes of the saints – have survived in small towns, villages and in cities. For example, the churches located at the West Lithuanian border were greatly destroyed during World Wars I and II. Some of the churches are being rebuilt; some functions are held in other buildings adapted to church purposes. As is noted “many valuable works of art and liturgical articles were destroyed or scattered over other places by the wars and robberies that took place in the churches closed during the Soviet years” [13: 15]. Researchers of art are gathering data on the destroyed sacred objects. The relicts of the old Lithuanian pagan faith survived in various spheres of folk culture. In the 18th-20th centuries in the country there exist wayside shrines and litltops. The authentic sacral art lasted for centuries for there was more
to folk art than ornamentation and colour. Thus all the sacred places have an interpretation.

***

The way to a mature national science is the integration of knowledge about national attitudes, the character of a locality’s social relations and the sociological heritage of international sociology. The intensification of relations among sociologists, the representation their research projects, the evaluation of each others writings wholesome competition among theoretical orientations and the level of their works are the main condition for confirming their community as the assumption and location of national sociological discourse.

The modernising processes in post-socialist Lithuania have not led to a higher degree of social equality, but the determinative power of social structure is operating as a mechanism reproducing inequality. With new social opportunities and positions, the orientation to individualisation in society increases. New impressions and possibilities for participation are contributing to a new image of modern society in the country as more open and pluralistic.

The increasing of flexibility, the isolation from traditional sources of security and from traditional certainties mean that the individual is disoriented, suffering from status inconsistencies. This situation increases not only the self-reflexivity of people, but the disintegration of society. This makes discussions and work by sociologists on the processes of personal and collective identity formation very important.

Institute for Social Research
Lithuania

REFERENCES


CHAPTER X

BIOETHICS IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: TOWARD UNIVERSAL GUIDELINES

JONAS JUSKEVICIUS AND KAZIMIERAS MEILIUS

INTRODUCTION

In the last five decades Western societies have become the main destination of the flow of new global migrations. At the same time ethnic, racial and religious diversity has become evident as a feature of contemporary society. The phenomenon of multiculturalism is an attendant circumstance of the broader globalization process.

Though the word “multiculturalism” is relatively new, historically multiculturalism is not a new phenomenon, as there have been considerable ethnic, religious and racial variations within certain societies. *The Oxford English Dictionary* traces it back to the late 1950s and early 1960s. Multiculturalism means – among other things – the coexistence in the same political society of a number of sizeable cultural groups which differ from one another by their own customs, conventions and religious practices who wish and in principle are able to maintain their distinct identity. However, like most things in our post-modern world, “multiculturalism” is a contested concept with multiple meanings at different societal levels (McGoldrick).

Multiculturalism has moved in the last decades into areas traditionally considered national domains, such as healthcare, which it has a substantial potentiality to reshape. Healthcare and biomedicine were generally regulated exclusively by the professional regulatory system known as medical ethics. The continued existence of medical ethics as a professionally influential normative system is being challenged, however, by many elements of modern life including achievements in biomedical sciences. Medical practitioners and scientists realized that medical ethics alone cannot provide answers to the questions raised by biomedicine. The solution of emergent ethical problems was assumed to be a task of bioethics. The term “bioethics” was coined in the United States in 1970 by the oncologist, Van Renssalaer Potter (Potter 1970; 1971). According to the widely accepted definition by the *Encyclopedia of Bioethics*, 1978, “Bioethics is an area of research which makes use of an interdisciplinary methodology and has as its aim the systematic analysis of human behavior in the field of biomedical sciences and health, where this behavior is examined in the light of moral values and principles.”

The modern globalization in biomedicine was accompanied by double phenomena according to Ch. Byk: by the emergence of “new
biomedical power” and “crisis of universal ethics” (Byk). The first phenomenon is qualified as the “control of life” which concerns our daily life and is becoming fairly commonplace. Pursuit of longevity, control of procreation and genetic manipulation – these are just a few tangible testimonies of the new power of physicians, researchers, and institutions (public or private), which have significant impact on us and which had been little reflected in political and legal doctrine. The second phenomenon encompasses the rejection of common ethical values, which are “imposed”

either by the religion or the State. In the context of ethical relativism, democratic rules imply critical discussions; consequently, it is impossible a priori to choose and justify one or another ethics as a basic one.

Parallel with the rapid development of biomedicine the social phenomenon of global migration contributes to the complexity of medical ethics. These phenomena engender difficulties in the social network. In practice the rapid implementation of achievements in biomedical sciences creates unforeseen problems both at the individual and social level. Bioethics is an increasingly broad field and includes reflection on the role of individuals in society, environment, human rights, discrimination, confidentiality, etc. Multiculturalism, pluralistic society, law, religion etc., now constitute wide horizons where there is need for universal solutions of bioethics. This need for universal standards is felt by many since the application of progress of life sciences and the process of globalization in its all aspects are closely interconnected (Report of IBC). A good example is UNESCO’s attempt to elaborate a universal instrument on bioethics. In October 2005, UNESCO’s 33rd general conference adopted the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, which aims to set universal standards in bioethics, with „due regard for human dignity, human rights and freedoms”. It is important to raise the following question: does the current existence of diverse perceptions of bioethical issues in diverse cultures, which Engelhardt (1986) states is variable subject to the culture, leave in principle any possibility for bioethics to become universal (or international) and to overcome multiculturalism, not to mention ethical plurality within cultures.

Multiculturalism at first sight could be a challenge for the research of universal standards for bioethics. However the article argues that despite these challenges multiculturalism itself can provide a sound basis for such standards, particularly if the potential contribution of common values for all cultures is taken into account.

---

1 Ch. Byk uses the term „imposed“, which could be appropriate to the thinking of legal positivism in its libertarian meaning. We would rather say that „imposed values“ reflect the state of mind of modern individual when he or she seeks to shuffle off the sense of guilty (Meilius et al.)
MULTICULTURALISM

Contemporary Western societies are experiencing multicultural and multiethnic transformations through intensifying migration. Multiculturalism in Central and Eastern Europe raises different issues where national minorities historically have inhabited particular areas. The assertion of independence by various social groups within a nation-based State fuels the process of differentiation. Contemporary differentiation is a complex process which encompasses a response to a globalized media and counter-cultural movements, questioning the traditional assimilation approach exercised by hosting societies, etc. In principle multiculturalism represents a call for greater understanding, tolerance and appreciation of cultural diversity. Speaking in political-practical terms, multiculturalism as a policy – among other things – includes public and private cross-cultural training programs for greater understanding of ethnic and religious differences, as well as social justice initiatives to ensure equality in participation and access to a range of social services. These change the ways (including the structures) in which public and private institutions are related to the client/patient/citizen, etc. Joseph Raz suggests not to “think of multiculturalism primarily as an ethical or political theory, but as a way of marking a renewed sensitivity, a heightened awareness of certain issues and certain needs people encounter in today’s political reality” (Raz). Feeling comfortable when belonging to a minority group cannot be derived exclusively from doctrines of non-discrimination but rather from changes in attitudes.

In our “epoch of rights” (Bobbio, 1992), given that we have civil and political rights, including the right to non-discrimination, it could seem legitimate to include among fundamental rights the right to diversity which safeguards the identity of each individual, as well as the existence of various “collective identities” (Giordan). In an influential account, Charles Taylor argues that respect for, and preservation of, a group’s culture is of vital significance for the personal identity of its members (Taylor). That means that ethnicity and culture are relevant to the ideal of individual freedoms and rights. The view that individuals are constituted by their cultural identity has received attention, appearing in communitarian as well as liberal writings. Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka and Martha Nussbaum (2000) have advanced arguments concerning the particular challenge to Western liberalism posed by multiculturalism and the claims of various national, religious and ethnic minorities to special group rights within contemporary liberal-democratic nation-states. In liberal political philosophy, ethnicity is frequently oversimplified to fit within a theoretical distinction between the capacities of the individual for free choice and the arbitrary circumstances of life which limit that capacity. Modes of thought or behavior, understood as elements of culture, often are treated as irrelevant to individual rights, because they are thought either to be freely chosen, as in the case of religious beliefs, or not to impinge on the
individual’s ability to think rationally, as in the case of languages (Kymlicka).

Respect for the cultural identity of the individual was provided for by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 when Art. 22 stated that everyone is entitled to realization of, among others, the “cultural rights indispensable for dignity and the free development of personality”. Of special importance is Art. 27 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states that “in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities should not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language”. Afterwards, efforts have been made by various international inter-governmental organizations to codify formally a set of minority rights as rights of groups. These include the 1992 Declaration of the United Nations on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe which entered into force 2 January, 1998.

Multiculturalism as a policy instrument itself is evaluated both positively and negatively. By acknowledging the cultural rights of individuals and groups, advocates of multiculturalism maintain that political action based on these considerations reduces the pressure of social conflict based on disadvantage and inequality. Another argument is that the multicultural approach to policy enriches the society as a whole. From the other side, multicultural and multiethnic societies today pose fundamental questions regarding the future of our civilization, which require speaking about the end of the myth of the State as a culturally homogeneous unit (Kymlicka). The demand of persons and groups for equal recognition and respect is a defining mark of our life and our vision of social justice (Taylor). Thus, the degree of a liberal society is measured by its capacity to “recognize” the diversity of individuals who are strangers to the common objectives of the host society and its efficiency in guaranteeing the protection of such individuals understood as a fundamental right to diversity. Unlike the moderate authors who accept multicultural reality as a self-evident fact and look for the best pragmatic solution, for others such processes portray the danger of increasing segmentation or divisiveness of modern societies. One of the most prominent critiques of multiculturalism relies on Huntington’s thesis on the clash of civilizations in which religion is argued as playing a crucial role (Huntington 1992, 1996). In support of this position one may cite the resurgence of ethnic and religious conflicts which have tended to merge into international terrorism in the last decade. Some are apprehensive of cultural rights which would inhere in the group itself and take priority over individual rights. Though nobody countenances group rights which explicitly and legally empower groups to violate individual rights, nonetheless, in reality they justify de facto group rights
that serve to protect minority cultures with an oppressive inequality of status, opportunity, freedom, identity etc (Doppelt). In other words, cultural minority rights which safeguard the interests of minority groups and minority rights which aim to impose restrictions on the members of one group undermine the legal protection of civil, political, and social rights that are normally offered by liberal states to individual members of minority groups (Barry). However, group rights as a whole are not rejected by liberal critics: these rights could be justified “only if, when, and where the legal and cultural requirements of a robust liberalism are already embedded in the relations and identities of persons and groups” (Doppelt).

Another contentious point of multiculturalism is related with the celebration of the “other” (Nussbaum). Some authors argue (Bond) that an uncritical approach simply represents relativistic thinking, where a human education should strip first-grade students of the cultural narrow-mindedness of their birth communities, telling them other ways of thinking so as to turn them into world citizens, thus, creating a peril for civil society. Other authors argue that multiculturalism and the adoration of the other are inseparable (Gottfried). Thus, multiculturalism means the privileging of non-Western, non-Christian cultures that are engaged in struggles against Western or relatively Western societies. By the same token, for instance, in the past decade multiculturalists displayed little or no moral interest in the persecution of Christians in the Sudan.

Although multiculturalism still has a number of critics, including advocates of assimilation, diversity and dissent have come largely to overshadow the communitarian consensus. Today, therefore, the assimilation model is not only seen as descriptively inaccurate, but is increasingly perceived as normatively undesirable. Multiculturalism becomes a favored alternative policy model (Machacek). Usually at the national level multiculturalism as a policy is advocated by minority groups and their supporters. On the part of minority cultures an extremely wide variety of rights are demanded, and the attempt to generalize about their justification is difficult. The international community, often under the stewardship of the United Nations, presses for the entrenchment of human rights as the primary means for protecting minorities from injustice and discrimination. These rights range from freedom of religion to the right to work.

Multiculturalism cannot be dissociated from religious diversity. Manifestations of religious freedom and freedom of religion are concurrent with the modern history of Christian civilization. Such manifestations traditionally take the form of a demand that the State should stay out of the religious realm, a view shared both by liberal and Marxist thinking. Currently, another way of conceiving respect for religion is connected with the values of religious diversity and multiculturalism (Meyerson). From the point of view of law, such respect for religious diversity is a positive right that the State should actively facilitate and publicly accommodate the free exercise of religion. Speaking in sociological terms and paraphrasing
Charles Taylor, one could easily agree that religion plays a crucial role in the preservation of a group’s culture and the personal identity of its members.

Growing religious diversity is a parallel phenomenon to the differentiation of Western societies. Two aspects of religious diversity could be distinguished: religious diversity fueled by immigration processes, and religious pluralism which arises within societies quasi-independently from immigration.

Religious diversity which derives from immigration, however, has its own peculiarities in the United States and Europe. While in the United States the new immigrant religions have contributed to the further expansion of an already vibrant American religious pluralism, in the case of Europe immigrant religions present a greater challenge to local traditionally limited religious pluralism (Casanova). In their dealing with immigrant religions European countries, like the United States, tend to replicate their particular model of separation of Church and State and the patterns of regulation of their own religious minorities. However, looking at Europe, the most fundamental difference with the situation in the United States has to do with the role of religion and religious group identities in public life and in the organization of civil society. In European countries the relationships between religion and State have a different shape: from separation (more or less strict) between church and state (France, to some extent Ireland), to cooperative links to various extents between the two (Spain, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Poland, and Lithuania), or national church systems (Scandinavian countries, UK, Greece). These systems and their respective evolution are often deeply rooted in legal and cultural historic traditions developed throughout the past centuries. In general, European societies are deeply secular, shaped by secularist political regimes, influenced by France’s etatist model and the political culture of laïcité which requires the strict privatization of religion, eliminating religion from any public forum. European societies tend to tolerate and respect individual religious freedom, but have much greater difficulties in recognizing any legitimate public role for collective religious identities.

Regarding religious pluralism, Peter Berger has helped to clarify its central character as a distinctive aspect of the era of secularization. The consolidation of religious individualism or the privatization of the religious dimension as a typical element of the end of modernity resulted in a new kind of religious pluralism, where religion is no longer a destiny but a subject of individual choice (Berger). Religious pluralism is thus turning into a supermarket of beliefs where a consumer’s choice is targeted to the ‘best-value’ product and not to the preservation of a traditional faith. In such a context of post-modernity there could be observed the growth of the area of so called alternative religiosity which in turn has a character of volatility. After the period of the new religious movements of the 1980s, which still had a clear-cut sociological character, and the New Age movements of the 1990s – a typical veiled religiosity with apocalypse in the
background – there came the era of a protest religiosity based on ecology, an “anarchic” response to the radical challenges of globalization (Filoramo). Consider religious topics circulating among “unchurched believers” as apocalyptic commitments, the sacralization of the Self; reincarnation and finally various esoteric themes. Even though the majority of the European population has ceased participating in traditional religious services, (at least on a regular basis,) a relatively high level of private religious beliefs is still maintained. Thus, religiosity is, step by step, again becoming an evident factor of the public life. This kind of religiosity creates difficulties for the State, because now it has to consider not a few traditional religious denominations but a large number of fluid movements.

BIOETHICS

Bioethics, overlapping with medical ethics, now is less directly concerned with regulation of the medical profession and the responsibilities of health professionals to patients. Understood more broadly (Callahan D. 1995), it is not only a field involving the application of moral philosophy to ethical problems in the biomedical sciences, but also has spread into other fields. As normative ethics, bioethics has an important non-legal regulatory role in such areas as reproductive and end-of-life issues; genetic testing, manipulation, and data storage; as well as biodiversity, and environmental protection. Its pre-norms also attempt to regulate the conduct of scientific research, as well as access, quality and safety of biotechnology, medical services, essential medicines, and other preconditions for health. It becomes relevant in law and public policy, and in literary, cultural, and historical studies.

Such an extension of bioethics from the traditional field of medical ethics to other socially relevant fields is illustrated by the definition of health by the World Health Organization (WHO) as “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being” (WHO Constitution).

There are two approaches to bioethics regarding the relationship between medical ethics and bioethics. The American, more restrictive approach could be defined by the reluctance to adopt a broader understanding of health than the merely biomedical in the lexicon of bioethics (Knowles), seen as an area which represents a transformation of the traditional domain of medical ethics (Callahan 1995). The relationship between humans and nature in the biomedical world is understood largely in instrumental terms (Knowles). For example, it is argued that the use of genetically modified crops resistant to certain pests reduces the need to spray toxins, which in turn reduces health risks to farm workers.

“European bioethics” emerged later than the American one – in the beginning of 1980s. Whereas “American bioethics” entered a pragmatic stage, the “European bioethics” revived discussion of the principle questions, addressed issues in healthcare, human rights, biotechnology and the environment, and thus linked directly the policy of science with
principles of solidarity, sustainability and precaution. In particular, one should emphasize the principle of precaution (Jonas), which has rapidly risen to the rank of a general principle of European Community law. The precautionary principle implies the adoption of a structured strategy for the adoption of decisions which include preventive assessment, risk management and communication of potential risks (Talacchini). Returning to the example of genetically modified organisms, for Europeans the essential point of the debate is how to indicate and define possible long-term risks to human health and biodiversity.

Alongside diversity in the meaning of bioethics, bioethics itself suffers from another kind of difficulty. In the Western world, especially in the US, and like political philosophy, bioethics is in the “business” of providing pre-norms for institutions (Ainslie; Maljean-Dubois). However, like political philosophers who have traditionally tried to justify the state’s power by appealing to their preferred theories of justice, bioethicists also try to set the terms for norm creation by appealing to their preferred moral theories, such as utilitarianism, principlism, etc. Bioethicists subscribe to one or another theory and, relying on them in policy-making, tend to give a highly ideological character to bioethics. We often assume that conversation and dialogue can render positive results in bioethical discourse, particularly if, as Engelhardt argues, all interlocutors desire a “peaceable dialogue” (Engelhardt 1992). However, the reality is that such a conversation among people with opposite beliefs is extremely difficult (Thomasma). Some authors (Jonsen) argue that this ideological load of bioethics is inevitable, keeping in mind that the birth of bioethics, especially in the US, corresponded to political liberalism which dominated academia and the political elite (Callahan 1993). Because a study of bioethics is substantially influenced by the methodology and rhetoric of political sciences one could agree with D. Thomasma’s affirmation that the discourse method of bioethics is often faulted for being too lax on analysis.

Another difficulty with bioethics becomes apparent. An interdisciplinary field such as bioethics is not necessarily well served by a strict methodology (Callahan 1995). Its very purpose is to be open to the different perspectives and methodologies of various disciplines. Although some parts of bioethics might be rigorous – for example, the legal parts taken individually – the field as a whole suffers from pervasive vagueness. It is not easy for bioethical practitioners to find the right balance of breadth, complexity, and analytical rigor.

Alongside ideological controversies and methodological uncertainties, there exist other disadvantages in bioethical discourse which constitute another task for bioethics: to develop dialogue between different ethnic and cultural outlooks in Western civilization and beyond. There are two strongly inter-related phenomena: ethical pluralism, born inside a certain culture, and cultural diversity which overlaps the ethical politeia (and besides ethics there are religious conceptions, traditions, mores, etc.) (Palazzani 2002). Initially, bioethical discourse took place at the level of
ethical pluralism, first of all with reference to Western culture, the birthplace of bioethics. Precisely in this geographical zone of “technologically advanced societies” bioethics was born and has grown. In the context of globalization the influence of these societies expanded to other non-Western cultures as these societies experienced multicultural transformation through an intensifying migration from “Third World” countries.

In sum, it could be said that in practice bioethics encounters problems of development, communication, interpretation and credibility. Since bioethics has difficulty in providing a normative framework for biomedical sciences, there are appeals to traditional law (Juskevicius 2004) and human rights law (Juskevicius, 2006) which could have a double purpose. Firstly, closer connection between bioethics and law and human rights may direct bioethics in pursuit of its practical vocation. Secondly, such linkage offers reasonable assumptions for universal bioethics standards which in turn could serve as a good instrument dealing with bioethical issues in the multicultural context of contemporary society.

**LAW**

Biomedical practices already go far beyond the field of professional deontology and are legally relevant. So, binding bioethical discourse to legal constructions and concepts could be an efficient approval (Melnikoff; Smith; D’Agostino 2001, Palazzani 2002). The idea itself merits much attention, because it has sound assumptions. Sophisticated modern legal thought based on the conviction that law is a complete, formal and coordinated system, which satisfies legal parameters of objectivity and coherence, could offer reasonable solutions. However, if classical legal thinking in many fields still has rather steady positions, in the biomedical field it encounters serious difficulties. Many observers tend to explain these difficulties by the inflexibility and incapacity on the part of law to keep up with the newest achievements of science. Such incapacity is said to be determined by outmoded legal concepts and constructs which risk blocking the progress of science. However, such claims seem superficial. Of course, it would be naïve to deny the inertia of law, especially in the field of biomedicine. One could also not deny a scarcity of knowledge of biomedicine among lawyers. Each intervention of law requires profound reflection in order to introduce a new, effective and long-term legal norm, or at least an interpretation of an existing norm. Keeping in mind that the time span between the moment of scientific discovery or invention and its practical application is being reduced to a minimum, the possibilities for legal scholars, practitioners and legislators to provide timely and satisfactory legal solutions to the eventual issues are limited. Moreover, accomplished facts in biomedical practice could lead us to give these facts the status of juridical norms, according to a positivist tendency of sociological jurisprudence doctrine which accepts an empirically grounded,
observable reality for the creation of norms. That is to say, to make what already is the principle of what ought to be (Caparos).

In the field of biomedicine some practices raise doubts about the impartiality of science and thus the capability of jurisprudence founded on “science and technology” once envisaged by François Gény. Let us name just a few problems which could undermine the credibility of science. The first one is a bias in biomedical publications, where a tendency is evidenced for papers with statistically significant “positive” results (for example, those showing that a new treatment works better) to be published in favor of papers with statistically non-significant “negative” results (for example, those showing that a new treatment does not have any effect or does not work any better than other treatments). Studies have shown that such publication bias exists, but its extent is unknown and controversial (Rennie, Flanagin 1994). Second, the tendency of authors not to submit negative results for publication because the findings are incomplete or non-significant and the bias in the reception and interpretation of published research data by researchers, funding agencies, editors, and the media may create more substantial problems: inappropriate medical policies and treatment decisions, especially with new or controversial therapies. Third, financial conflicts of interest in the increased commercialization of science are now recognized as another issue related to the credibility of science which has social implications (DeAngelis et al.).

Aside from the above mentioned problems in the biomedical field, however, it would be reasonable to say that a problem of not the least importance which impedes the penetration of law in the field of biomedicine is the fact that bioethics discourse itself is shaped by post-modern thinking. The actual situation in bioethics perfectly correlates with trends of post-modern legal thinking which is already clearly represented by movements which flourished during last decades of 20th century. Post-modernism in legal sciences takes its birth from the conviction that the research of new theories and so called legal meta-narratives in order to resolve legal problems are already exhausted. Such exhaustion is determined by disbelief towards “meta-narratives” (Lyotard). That is, in legal thinking post-modernism dissociates itself from interpretation based on belief in the existence of universal verities, common essences or foundational theories. Since post-modernism is also an aesthetic practice which opposes generalization, postmodern legal scholars are keen on the use of local strategies fitted for the solution of small-scale problems in order to suggest new questions on the relationship between law, policy and culture. In practice this is reflected in encouraging everyone to look to the courts for the redress of their grievances. Since the litigation is more apt to produce winners and losers than to discover and enlarge common ground, the whole development contributes to right-mindedness (Glendon).

The emergence of different approaches in legal studies undermines global and foundational explanations of law (Minda). It becomes evident that traditional foundations of law in reality are based on challenging
translations of legal text interpreted by particular juridical subjects through cultural practices. Members of different cultural and intellectual communities defend their own points of view, or are more concerned with “righting wrongs” than with careful analysis or doctrinal coherence (Glendon), thus shaping an intellectual or academic legal subculture which proposes diverse theoretical and normative perspectives for legal studies. Norberto Bobbio at the daybreak of post-modernism ironically noticed that post-modernism tends to imply “a plenary absolution of even shameless forms of biased thinking” (Bobbio 1970). Multiculturalism – the key word that alludes either to diversity or to culture – is challenging the status and prestige of universal concepts and ideas of traditional or modern legal theories. The diversity of images of law requires the present generation of scholars to reflect more explicitly upon the difficulties and opportunities for achieving an accord and consensus in a multicultural world.

In the actual context how should we deal with bioethical issues? Should we apply traditional legal constructions and concepts? As bioethics is largely affected by post-modernist discourse it is natural to expect that bioethical issues would be dealt with by applying post-modern legal theories. The difficulty is that such theories are numerous and conflict not only with traditional theories, but in a majority of cases even among themselves. In addition, the claims for cultural rights from ethnic, religious and other groups which could take priority over individual rights do not facilitate the task. Should we relax our laws at times in order to respect cultural diversity, thus bringing into the legal system elements of uncertainty? Immediately many considerations come into play, such as: the nature of cultural practice; the importance of the practice for the group itself; and its conformity with “ordinary” law and human rights. The effects of such differentiated treatment upon non-members should also be considered.

MULTICULTURALISM AND BIOETHICAL DISCOURSE

The discourse of pluralism in contemporary bioethics could be explained by the phenomenon of secularization. Sergio Cotta revealed, though at first glance it could seem paradoxical, that the diffusion of secularization in the field of anthropology and morality in particular reduces pluralism to a neat dualism: on the one hand, there is an immanent secular culture and practice; on the other hand, there is the religious culture of transcendence and subsistence (Cotta). From here a convergence between public ethics and the law could be drawn while dissociating the ontological reality of human being in favor of the foundations of the empiric – conventional nature of human beings. At the same time, it is important to differentiate between moral and cultural pluralism (Levy). The identification of the two in daily discourse leads to misinterpretation of both notions. Some structural differences between pluralism and multiculturalism are underlined by Michael Walzer. Pluralism substantially
concerns the individual because, according to contemporary theories, an autonomous individual is the source of morality, while multiculturalism as a complex reality gravitates around the group. This could be said in an analogous way regarding the distinction between religious pluralities where religion is a function of individual choice and religious diversity, where religion is a historical and consolidating element of the group.

As the field of bioethics developed, cultural issues became more evident and important. The real practice of multiculturalism could be found in hundreds of aspects of daily life. In general, the multicultural character of contemporary society complicates bioethical discourse. To implant a multicultural approach in bioethics, in order to elaborate some universal standards, would present serious difficulties.

The most important point of contention in bioethics in its multicultural dimension is a heavy emphasis on the moral principle of autonomy or self-determination in Western bioethics. Western bioethics itself is not homogeneous regarding the priority of the principle of autonomy (Baker 2001, Knowles). In contrast to the United States, where this principle is considered as sacrosanct by virtue of individual civil rights based on noninterference, many European countries tend to emphasize principles of solidarity and precaution which place the principle of autonomy to the same hierarchical level. When a multiethnic society has to deal with practical healthcare issues of bioethical interest the individualistic principle of autonomy means almost nothing to the patients with non-Western background. If one wants to elevate the issue to a theoretical universal level, the confrontation between Western individualistic and non-Western communitarian approaches is inevitable. R. Baker offers an excellent illustration on the example of the Asian and the American principles of autonomy (Baker 2001). The Asian principle states that “every agent should be able to make his or her decisions or actions harmoniously in cooperation with other relevant persons,” such as members of the extended family. American bioethicists, in contrast, assert autonomy to protect individuals, even from their families, because “the patient’s closest family members” can be “demonstrably unsatisfactory” decision-makers if “a devoted [family is] under a burdensome financial arrangement in paying for [a patient’s] care” (Beauchamp, Childress). The Asian principle permits families to resolve such conflicts; while Americans justify the clinician’s intrusion on family autonomy, thereby prioritizing the individual over the family. The Asian concept of family autonomy thus conflicts with the American concept of individual autonomy, supported by a libertarian individual rights framework. Consequently, the respect for individual privacy which in a Western context is ranked among fundamental rights has almost no sense in many Asian countries.

However, since the complexity of bioethical issues is very intensive, there is a certain paradoxical amalgamation of irreconcilable meanings of autonomy in certain practical cases. Consider, for example, the case of prenatal genetic testing. Despite its highly controversial character
which is related with substantial fears of proliferation of eugenetic practices through abortion, the access to such tests is not restricted in some countries, such as the United Kingdom, because such restriction would not be justified by the principle of a woman’s autonomy, which implies freedom of choice. In some Hindu communities such access guaranteed by British regulation facilitates early sex identification in order to eliminate girls, though such practice is unanimously condemned. Here we are encounter a hypocritical situation, when a woman’s freedom of choice, seen as a fundamental right in the hosting society, sharply conflicts with the autonomy of the Hindu woman, when her choice to abort girls is largely determined by her family and traditions.

Of particular interest in the multicultural approach to bioethics is the troubling conflicts that can arise between the exercise of religion and other people rights with regard to biomedicine. Of course, conflicts between cultural practices and other people rights which are normally offered by State to individual members of minority groups can also occur on the traditional conception of religious freedom, and when they do occur they are not easy to resolve. In some cases it is relatively obvious that certain religio-cultural practices infringe the rights of others protected by law and thus cannot be considered as private practice which would entail that the State abstain from interference in the religious realm. Consider, for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses who forbid blood transfusions and thus deny that vital treatment to minors, who can not express their own will without parents’ or guardians' consent. Another example is female circumcision among some cultural minorities, which conflicts with the conception of human dignity, namely personal integrity protected by the human rights framework.

PREMISES FOR UNIVERSAL BIOETHICS PRINCIPLES

While there exists complexity in bioethical issues with multicultural dimensions, multiculturalism itself could provide sound basis for universally accepted bioethics (Juskevicius, 2006). What are the theoretical assumptions for the emergence of such principles? One can single out two ways to achieve that goal. Uniformization of bioethics which is rejected by almost all interlocutors, though there exist practical (though not justifiable) assumptions: bioethics emerged in Western cultures which first encountered the problems caused by the progress of biomedical sciences. Thus, consciously or not, these problems as reflected in the Western tradition are presented as paradigmatic (Palazzani 2002). When a Western culture more advanced in technological progress confronts other cultures, it naturally suggests a solution of assimilation through adaptation of Western parameters and criteria, with little respect to other cultural traditions, customs, etc. This is evident first of all in Western multiethnic societies where it is believed that immigrants should gradually integrate into the culture of the hosting society even at the expense of their own
on the inadmissibility of such a uniform approach there is no need to present many arguments: the absoluteness of the particular culture implies discrimination and rejects intercultural dialogue.

Another way to achieve ethical standards which would be valid universally is harmonization of existing plural bioethics. This is the way of UNESCO in elaborating universal instruments on bioethics. There exist a few theories on the possibility of formulating common criteria (Palazzani 2003).

A procedural theory (Baker 1998, 1998a) suggests elaboration of a rational moral and legal system on a conventional basis: the sole and exclusive source of legitimacy of ethical and legal norms is an agreement. The procedure examines the spaces within a certain culture, where, on the one hand, there is a will to negotiate or even to agree on compromise, and, on the other hand, where there exist primary undeniable cultural differences, the questioning of which would be tantamount to denial of the very culture (Marshall et al.). The theory, however, suffers from the inconsistency of “undeniable differences” with traditional “indivisible human rights” (Maclin 1998). When certain “undeniable differences” seem to contradict human rights, how can one legitimize an absolute prohibition of human rights violations?

The second theory – principlism – supposes the existence of international bioethics at the level of principles, on the assumption that it is a possible to reach a “consensus” or a “convergence” among cultures on the acceptability of some principles (Maclin 1998, 1998a). On the ground of such principles, biomedical policy and practice are formulated, namely, respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. These principles are formulated in a manner sufficient for guiding the resolution of pressing practical problems (Beauchamp, Childress), because the principles of bioethics would be more widely accepted “if separated from some of their underlying justifications” in philosophical ethics. However, the theory provokes criticism, especially in relation to the multicultural question. Once these principles are enumerated, one can trace the Western cultural matrix there. These primary principles are not at all of primary importance for all cultures (for example, Eastern cultures emphasize dependency, harmony, communal dimension, piety and fidelity).

The objectivistic theory seeks to universalize bioethics through recognition of one or more common and objective virtues, such as human dignity which lies in human nature itself and which could postulate bioethical norms at the universal level (Pellegrino; D’Agostino 1993). Human dignity is one of the very few common values in our world of philosophical pluralism (Andorno). The principle of human dignity is universally accepted as the ground of human rights, and its reasonableness is not discussed at political and juridical levels. Most people assume as an empirical fact that human beings have an intrinsic dignity. This common intuition may be called a “standard attitude” (Egonsson). Even if human dignity would not be actually accepted by all, nevertheless it has a value
transcending time and space because it is postulated by ratio, regardless of cultural subscription (Dalla Torre). Bioethics already is influenced substantially by the notions of human dignity and human rights along two broad streams (UNESCO, Explanatory Memorandum). One of these, present since ancient times, derives from reflections on medical practice and on the conduct of medical professionals. The other, conceptualized in more recent times, has drawn upon the developing international human rights law. However though theoretically such an approach, labeled by some as fundamentalist, looks impeccable its practical implementation in bioethics encounters difficulties conditioned by post-modern relativism.

The first and most obvious obstacle is a striking contrast between the unquestionable function of the concept of human dignity as a normative principle in law and its controversial reception in bioethics by deconstruction of the perceived assumptions of the philosophical tradition (Andorno). There seem to be some promises that universal guidelines, such as the mentioned Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, will overcome that obstacle by establishing a first principle – the „respect of human dignity and human rights“(Article 3) – that is conformity of bioethics with international human rights law. The notion of dignity is already inherent in a series of international statements and declarations. For example, the “Universal Declaration of the Human Genome and Human Rights” approved by UNESCO in 1997 gives a central role to the principle of human dignity. The preamble to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that signatories to the Convention should “take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine”. Similarly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides in Article 1 that “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.”

Another obstacle is represented by fear that respect for cultural diversity could easily be used to override any other moral consideration, including the inviolability of human dignity. The text of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights therefore adds the proviso that this principle cannot be used to limit the application of the other universal principles: “Such considerations shall not be invoked to infringe upon human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms nor upon the principles set out in this Declaration or to limit their scope”.

The objectivistic theory and its partial adoption in the UNESCO declaration provide premises for the advance of bioethics in at least two ways: First, it may promote general recognition of bioethical concerns; elaboration and consolidation of other universally accepted principles, such as social responsibility; and the need for mechanisms to uphold these principles of bioethics. Second, it may provide a legal fulcrum for practical efforts to achieve bioethics goals.
CONCLUSIONS

Bioethics discourse in and of itself has limited potential to become an international system capable of discussing and formulating ethical guidelines which are universally valid. Alongside a ideological controversies and methodological uncertainties there exist other disadvantages in bioethical discourse, which construct another task for bioethics: to develop dialogue between different ethnic and cultural outlooks existing either in Western civilization or beyond its area. Multiculturalism at first sight could be a challenge for the research of universal standards for bioethics. However, we argue that despite these challenges multiculturalism itself could provide sound basis for such standards, particularly if a potential contribution of common values for cultures is taken into account. Since there are difficulties for bioethics in providing a normative framework for biomedical sciences the said contribution together with human rights law could provide a legal fulcrum for practical solution of problems in relation to the application of advances of biomedical sciences in the multicultural context of contemporary society.

For that scope the possible solution for universalizing bioethics is the recognition of one or more common and objective virtues, such as human dignity, one of the very few common values in a world of philosophical pluralism and multiculturalism. The principle of human dignity is universally accepted as the ground of human rights, and its reasonableness is not discussed at political and juridical level. Most people assume as fact that human beings have an intrinsic dignity. Even if human dignity would not be empirically accepted by all, it nevertheless will have a transcendent value over time and space because is postulated by ratio, regardless of cultural subscription.

The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is a promising step toward general recognition of bioethics concerns which could facilitate and broaden international bioethics discourse. Human dignity has much to offer as the essential framework for harmonization and development of bioethical principles. The premises for such harmonization exist. It is up to benevolent discussions in academia and among practitioners and to the political will of the states to reach a global solution in the biomedical field.

Mykolas Romeris University
Vilnius, Lithuania

REFERENCES


Capararos E., *Some Myths and Some Realities in the Contemporary World of Law*, in 35 American Journal of Jurisprudence, (1990), 87-104.


Juskevicius J., *Biotecnologijų iššūkiai: nuo bioetikos link bioteisės*, in *Sveikatos mokslo*, 2004 (14), 3 (34), 70-76.


Bioethics in a Multicultural Context  


*Report of International Bioethics Committee on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Document on Bioethics*, (Ref. SHS/EST/02/CIB-9/5 (Rev. 3).


CHAPTER XI

BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES IN THE CONTEXT OF CRITICAL THINKING

IRAYDA JAKUSOVAITE

The period in which we live may be called one of essential change in society, including changes in philosophy, ideology, mentality, social organization, and management systems. These essential changes involve medicine as well and were influenced mostly by scientific-technical progress. This made medicine highly ambitious and aggressive, as if pervaded by the belief that new technologies would enable it to cure all diseases and disorders.

The term “medical technology” is used both in a narrow and a broader sense. In its narrow sense it embraces apparatuses, instruments, equipment, and materials for medical diagnostics, treatment, and prevention. However, the understanding of medical technology as a collection of products or artifacts leaves out other important aspects. Medical technology in its broad sense embraces knowledge and methodology for the creation and application of diagnostic, treatment, and prevention knowledge, as well as the organization and coordination of various types of activity for certain diagnostic, therapeutic, or preventive aims. The definition of the technology may be the following:

- Intervention: Through technology medicine has changed from assisting the healing capacity of nature to controlling and manipulating bodily healing itself.
- Expansion: Due to its interventive capacity technology has greatly expanded the field of medicine and increased its specialization.
- Defining disease: By providing the basic phenomena to be studied and manipulated in medicine, technology strongly influences the concept of disease, and hence medical action. It defines what is diagnosed and what is treated.
- Generalization: It represents a general method for diagnosis, palliation and treatment. Its ability to generate reproducible results has made medicine a science.
- Liberation: Technology has made medical knowledge independent of the subjective experience of the patient. [5, 336].

The combination of the aforementioned aspects provides technology with a specific logic that could be called technical or instrumental rationality. Actions are rational when they are maximally adapted to attaining the set goal. The main questions are whether there are
suitable means for achieving the set aims, what values provide a basis for this activity, and whether this activity is meaningful at all. Today there is a threat that medical ethics may lose its critical force and merge with medical practice. The question of whether what is done has any sense is discussed when all the possibilities of the activity have already been tried. In such case ethics as such becomes a certain technology that legitimates what is already done, rather than promoting critical evaluation of medical thinking and activity [4, 262]. In recent years research on the evaluation of technology is developing into a new branch of science. The principal aim of such research is to avoid the negative impact of technology. This means not only direct and foreseen consequences of the application of technologies, but also indirect and long-term consequences that at first sight are not as obvious.

At present, the evaluation of technologies is a part of medical and healthcare policy. Political and strategic decisions are also characterized by technical rationality allowing for such management of technological progress that would ensure the achievement of concrete aims the society deems desirable. Despite good intentions and the possibilities of concrete realizations, only a few studies on the evaluation of medical technologies take into account the ethical aspect of investigations. The studies on the evaluation of medical technologies are mostly related to the determination of effectiveness and to economic analyses. Ethical issues related to the application of medical technologies are considered to be secondary consequences of technologies. The underlying idea is that we first face new technology, and only later see its ethical consequences for the society. This is inappropriate for technologies are an integral part of the society and culture. However, technology is not only the product; it is also the creator of culture. This is not a unidirectional relationship. Technology entails social consequences, but also brings about certain social practices in which the technology can be used. Thus, ethical issues should be discussed not only as evaluated consequences of the application of medical technologies. Ethical questions should be raised both before and during the creation of technology as social practice [4, 263]. Failure to do this results in missing important aspects of medical technology despite its detailed evaluation. In order to avoid this, the development of competence in critical thinking is of uttermost importance.

This competence ranks among the most important aims of philosophical studies. Philosophy has always been the cradle of critical thinking. Western European culture began with the development of a close relationship between identification and elucidation of essential, fundamental problems in theoretical thinking and practical activity. This was first achieved by the Greeks and the tradition of openness to understanding the world is being reborn in modern science and philosophy [10, 81]. The critical approach to the present is an important precondition for the development of critical competence. According to R. Barnett – one of the most famous strategists of higher education – the understanding of
critical thinking in Western universities is too narrow and cannot satisfy the needs of the 21st century; it must include the identification of causes, self-analysis, and actions in three projections of cognition – the knowledge, the self, and the world [1]. Critical thinking enables the identification of preconditions, evaluation of the importance of circumstances, and insight and study of possible alternatives. The principal element of critical thinking is action.

Aristotle has indicated that thinking manifests itself through theoretical knowledge (epistemē), practical mind (phronesis), and practical skills (technē). On the basis of Aristotle’s concept, one can state that theoretical knowledge embodies scientific, reasoned knowledge; practical skills are related to abilities and productive actions; and the practical mind is associated with knowledge of how to behave in a certain situation in order to achieve the aims of professional practice. Practical skills are only instrumental means. Practical mind, or intellect, is knowledge providing information on how to behave and react to situations and challenges on the basis of the universal expectations of the profession; it is the basis for professional wisdom. In other words, it rises from the internal manners and values of the profession, and may be defined as the practice of justice in concrete situations. It embraces the making of moral decisions on the basis of professional values [8, 79]. For this reason, being a professional means not only the ability to do something competently; being a professional is also a personal characteristic. Thus, there is a difference between technical productivity and the skills efficient for the performance of profession-related work on the one hand and the practical mind on the other. This difference is similar to that between people who understand music and are musicians, between those who know about philosophy and are philosophers, and between people who know how to make the diagnosis and write a prescription (physicians-craftsmen) and physicians who treat not only the body but also the soul. When comparing medicine and music, practical skills define technical skills needed for playing a certain instrument, but they do not say anything about a person’s musicianship [13, 117-124].

By nature healthcare engages physicians in certain activity and raises the question of whether the activity may be more valuable than theoretical knowledge. As long as practical skills are the clear priority in medical education, the practical mind in medicine was not studied extensively due to the difficulty in its description and evaluation. The main attention in medical practice is focused on instrumental and procedural actions that can be defined by Aristotle’s term “technē” (practical skills). In other words, medical education at universities first and foremost focuses its attention on the technical, instrumental healthcare practice, rather than on the development of practical wisdom related to moral efforts to identify and evaluate the situation. According to R. Barnett, a wider concept of critical thinking embracing practical knowledge as the synthesis of personal experience and professional wisdom should be the core of healthcare. The
practical mind should become an indispensable element of modern medical practice [13, 119].

Today the greatest challenge in healthcare is morality rather than equipment or procedures. How to behave in order to ensure maximum benefit for the patient? Physicians are continuously experiencing doubts in making decisions that can be decisive for the patient, may influence the statements that are firmly set in the world order, and may impact the unique patient-physician relationships. The center of the dilemma of clinical decisions is that clinical decisions are made for an individual suffering person, but these decisions are based on knowledge obtained from similar clinical experience of other people who experienced suffering under different circumstances. In addition to that, clinical decisions are made against the background of the continuously changing environment that influences the patient-physician relationships, the patients’ expectations, and the physicians’ understanding of their role in the society.

The need for competence in critical thinking is of special importance when talking about modern medical technologies. Rapid development of genetics and health informatics in clinical sciences and healthcare management (DNA registries or health information management systems, such as patients’ electronic registry, etc.) shows that the modern system of medicine and healthcare is becoming increasingly information-oriented. First of all, medicine is based on biology, and biology itself is gradually becoming an information science depending on information management on the cell, protein, and gene levels. The status of bioinformatics rose especially upon the completion of the human genome project.

One of the novel fields of health technologies is the “new genetics” that includes fertilization, telemedicine, magnetic resonance, therapeutic cloning, stem cell studies, transplantations, etc. These technologies define the position and the field of activity of medicine in society, as well as the limits of the possibilities of medicine. “New genetics” is capable of making the diagnosis, assigning treatment, and even preventing diseases and disorders. The genetic body model allows for the definition of the limits of normality and deviation from the norm, and for the modernization of the programs of birth defects as inadequacy of normal development. The recognition of these limits with the help of genetics will allow for the detection of diseases in their early stages. The intrusion of genetics into medicine, as well as the decoding of, and various manipulations with, the genetic code reflect the increasingly prominent fact that medicine is becoming more and more dependent on biological sciences, engineering, and informatics – i.e. on information technologies that can turn the human being into an information carrier or an information cluster. The influence of the implementation of information technologies and telecommunication (ITT) in the healthcare sector is unquestioned. The strong sides of this influence are the possibility to enhance the service network and to increase the quality of services. Tele-consultations and
medical technologies allow for obtaining more detailed information about the health status, factors, and service provision, thus increasing the efficiency of services. However, the weak sides are also apparent – the polarization of ITT users and non-users, excessive load of information, provision of consumers with non-subject-related or incorrect information, and dissemination of destructive information within the system or with the help of the system.

There is a possibility of violations of the confidentiality or ethic principles [11, 198-204]. One can start to look at a person as an information carrier or an information cluster. Both fundamental and applied scientific studies clearly showed that a person is more than a physical reality. Increasing confidence in genetic research and experimentation with the human genome indicate something that Pixton called the transition from “biographic medicine” to “techno medicine”. The pharmaceutical and medical industry condition a shift from social problems of public health towards technological fetishism [2, 31-56]. Thus, increasing uncertainty related to risky diagnoses and clinical understanding stimulates the need for more precise concrete technical information that would serve as a means to evaluate the advantages of a concrete intervention, including genetic tests, specialized surgery, and dislocation of outdated technologies. However, the study that ensures more stable technical security creates significant problems in the patient-physician relationships. Hi-tech medicine emphasizes the forms of diagnosis that depend more on the probability of risk factors than on pathological causes, e.g. genetic diagnostics creates new pre-symptomatic “patient” categories and reveals the risk for future possibilities. These genetic and informational stages of disease modeling weaken the epistemological and professional influence of medical science and practice [14, 443–457]. There is a wide ongoing discussion of changes in the physician’s profession under the influence of new technologies. The more the activity is based on technical knowledge alone rather than on peoples mutual trust, the colder will be the relationships between patients and physicians, and the issues related to the physician’s status will be re-defined, taking into consideration solely technical matters. Every day medical specialists are becoming increasingly similar to the so-called “body technologists” rather than to “physicians”. Frequently patients are inclined to ignore the specialist’s advice if it is based only on technical competences. A physician should always work as a moral agent. Thus, we face two levels of the approach towards a human being and his/her subsistence – the physical and the metaphysical. However “magic” might be gene technology, its related decisions, the hierarchy of values, and even the mode of activity should be conditioned by the vision of a person and his/her mission. Biosciences which propose that medicine use increasingly open gene pool should not forget the transcendental nature of a human being. A science which being the indicator of the progress of the society, rejects the connection between human body and soul, and negates the psychophysical nature of a person, equates a human to any live being that has a physical
form but does not have a spiritual essence. New technologies allowed the medical insight to shift from superficial, visible anatomy to internal physiology of the body (via the application of various mechanic technologies – X-ray, laser, different radiation, etc.) and even deeper – to genetics [14, 445]. This also broadened the understanding of the human body. The main reasons for the interest in the body were two. First of all, it is the consumerist approach to the human subsistence, resulting in increasing attention to body care. This cult of the body has emerged in the consumerist culture of many postmodern societies. The other reason is the increased possibilities of the modern medicine to change the human body. Medicine has significantly broadened the limits of its influence on the human body, especially in such fields as organ transplantation, gene engineering, microsurgery, and plastic surgery, which changed the understanding of the human body by attributing increasing significance to the social factor.

The implementation of new technologies especially complicates the issue of the body as a person’s identity. It turns out that our understanding of what the body is and what it may become is starting to be increasingly problematic. The body has become a “project” that can be constructed. The paradox is that the more we control our bodies, the less authentic they become. “The cyborg” is the social and scientific reality of our time. This is not only a being from scientific literature, cinema or television. In fact, even the “shortest voyage” through the human body from the head to the toes reveals a multitude of examples of how medicine can turn people into “cyborgs” not only through renewal or normalization of their body functions, but also through their reconfiguration. Professional “body remakers” offer corrections of the nose, eyes, breast, buttocks, etc., and sometimes even dictate a certain fashion. This is seen from the cosmetic surgery boom. All this shows that the human body is no longer the basis of human identity [6].

The competence of critical thinking is important when speaking about new reproductive technologies – in vitro fertilization, implantation of the fetus, freezing and storage of embryos and seeds, and cloning. These new possibilities raise the question of the extent to which medical technology can intrude into our bodies. Nowadays new life may be begotten in ways that do not necessitate “old-fashioned” sexual intercourse. The last three decades saw the emergence of such technological means as medicines for fertility enhancement, in vitro fertilization, donor ova, donor semen, donor embryos, and substitute mothers. This entails the emergence of new legal and moral problems related to legitimating biological and social parenthood, the status of an in vitro fertilized embryo, the rights of a person begotten in a test-tube, the therapeutic perspectives of human embryonic stem cell research, and the possibility of the application of new technologies for eugenic purposes, etc [3]. Important issues associated with the relationship between the person and the body arise – whether the body is personal or public property, who is entitled to determine the fate of the
body, where the border lies between medical control and human freedom with respect to his/her body, who is responsible for critical decisions, and where are the limits to medical competence. At all times, the majority of the social regulatory functions were attributed to the institutions of law, religion, and medicine, especially at the moments of human birth and death. Today medicine is beginning to act as a powerful form of social control, pushing aside such traditional controlling authorities as religion and law [12]. This makes one think about the possibility of manifestations of Frankenstein’s “mad science” nightmare in medicine.

Medical technologies are a manifestation of human power that becomes threatening not only when it is abused, but also when it is used for noble purposes. Technological power is always based more on technical or management knowledge than on legal or moral power. This privileges the needs and wishes of one group of people. These services are absolutely necessary for the customer, and therefore those who provide them gain certain advantages. When something that is widely used and universally desired belongs to one certain group, a situation develops where this group begins to dominate. The providers of the service may determine its accessibility without taking into account possible significant differences between the interests of the providers and the consumers. Although it is usually emphasized that all progress in medicine is oriented towards the consumer and his/her needs, studies performed by E. Freidson, M. Foucault, and others, showed that in reality this is not the case. Medical practice may embody interests that are very different from the interest of the consumers [7, 76-77]. Although the perspectives opened up by new medical technologies – and especially studies of the human genome – cannot be denied, neither should the metaphysical aspect of the issue be ignored. Technological medicine is merely a tool for the realization of people’s aims ad values. The principles of thinking in medicine as well as the content of its main concepts were at all times conditioned by the contemporary paradigm of critical thinking. The present period is one of “instability of the paradigm” for medicine, requiring rethinking and redefining its aims and system of values in the context of critical thinking.

Kaunas University of Medicine
Kaunas, Lithuania

REFERENCE


Morkuniene J. *Socialine filosofija*. V., 2002. (Social philosophy) (in Lithuanian)


GLOBALIZATION REQUIRES CO-EXISTENCE-ORIENTED LAW

In the age of globalization and nuclear technologies social co-existence becomes the main concern for philosophy in order to fit into today’s human existence. Co-existence is the way of the human being’s presence in the world without which contemporary humankind, in moving towards globalization, would not be able to guarantee its further survival and prosperity.

In the ancient world Plato and Aristotle justified the necessity of co-living by proving personal cultural inadequacy and made communal living the way to deal with the threat to one’s existence caused by this inadequacy. At the same time the internal inconsistency of such life was recognized. While life in society eliminates some threats for the person’s existence, at the same time it creates new ones, since life in society causes the danger for a person to become a victim of exploitation, crime or other violence and humiliation. This continually raises the issue of improvement of co-living, i.e., what principles should the social order be based upon to cause as few threats to different interest holders as possible and to achieve a certain unity in the variety of different interests and cultures?

This issue is given more prominence today by the intensifying wave of terrorism that brings new threats not only to basic human rights, but also to democracy itself, as well as by unsuccessful attempts to fight terrorism by absoluting police measures and military forces. All this makes one reconsider the possibilities of the measures that have, in one or other way, guaranteed social life to date and to turn back to the dominant legal principle: have the powers for renewal and strengthening of social life lying dormant in it been fully tested? The supremacy of the law has with its initial forms of implementation proven its ability to humanize social relations much more effectively than the attempt to reach the same goal by means of “class struggle” and socialist revolutions which used to give priority to conflict and measures of violence. However, seeking to arouse the powers lying dormant in the law and its dominion that have not been fully utilized for the development of social co-existence and to direct them to cope with the new social tensions currently arising. It is first of all necessary to answer the old question: how should we today comprehend the law itself so that it would be able to rule the policy of a democratic state trying to create an order of modern social life? While answering this question it is
important to acknowledge the historic nature of the law as “obliging” one to consider the goals and needs of the times. It is created to implement and humanize and not just to define the law in general terms. This is why one has to approach the law as an open process having no fully completed form, since only in this way may the law claim effective participation in the development of life together in the historically changing world.

The direction of contemporary law is and will undoubtedly be determined in the future by the on-going integration (globalization) of human activity which primarily expresses itself by an attempt of different civilizations, cultures and social groups to ally with each other, to cooperate and to co-exist. Thus it requires law to embody tolerance with respect to various interests, different ways of life and cultures in the behavioral standards it formulates. This suggests dialogue and compromises that harmonize and balance – in other words – seek a certain unity in the variety of opposite interests. Tolerance of opposite interests, their harmonization in dialogue and compromise are considered measures that create the balance of interests (justice) or only the essence of contemporary procedural justice (J. Rawls (1), J. Habermas (2) etc.). Therefore, raising the problem of the conception of law actually means further elaboration of the problem of procedurally understandable justice and its return to the sphere of law.

If we proceed in this direction, it is important to choose the initial point of departure and to follow it consistently in order to avoid subjectivity in legal definitions. This presupposes the need to make a certain concept of law axiomatic and hence the question of the selection of axioms themselves: where should the understanding of law begin – from the individual or the state, from subjective or objective law?

Since ancient times two main methodological possibilities of understanding law are known. Plato and Aristotle in solving the relation of the whole and the part (the individual and the society), preferred the whole (the state, the society) which they considered logically prior to its “parts” or citizens. Therefore, methodologically they were determined to define law as the law of authority. This was to develop an etatist concept of law, which maintains the priority of objective law over subjective right. This methodological attitude in defining law became a lasting tradition and was especially developed by legal positivism which eliminated the need for law to depend on justice.

But if we explain the relation of the whole and the part based on the priority of the individual and not the state (Epicurus, Cicero, A. Volanas, T. Hobbes, J. Locke, etc.), this supposition requires that one develop the theory of the “public contract”, according to which private persons are logically and historically prior to the state as their creation, and

---

1 In the interpretations of Plato and Aristotle etatism did not bear the meaning which later was imparted to the term by legal positivism, as in their opinion law was not yet separated from justice.
law itself is derived from the exchange of services among individuals, the modern nature of which is described by the principles of market economy and democracy. These principles could become the axioms of the contemporary concept of law and allow it to construct the essence of modern law and its peculiarity, as well as to reduce the negative effect of subjectivism and voluntarism on the quality of this construction.

THE AXIOMS OF LAW OR THE MODEL OF FOUR AXIOMS

The personalist concept of law is based on four axioms:

1. Priority of the value of the individual with respect to the state and other social formations: all individuals are equal according to their rights and main values (the life, health, freedom of any individual is not superior to the same values of other individuals);
2. Every individual is culturally insufficient to himself with respect to his efforts to fulfill the diversity of his interests (rights);
3. The need to overcome (compensate) this cultural deficiency forces the individual to associate with other individuals – to exchange services (produced goods) with them; this exchange of services is the true essence and necessity of human communication;
4. Free and equal individuals cannot exchange services in any other manner than on the basis of equality of services.

The first two axioms mean that free (not belonging to each other by proprietary right) and equal (on the above mentioned grounds) individuals, in order to fulfill their interests, to defend them in case of breach, and to face their cultural deficiency cannot create (produce) all measures necessary for the fulfillment of all of one’s interests. A lawyer only knows how to provide legal services. He does not know how and does not have the possibility to manufacture shoes, cars, construct houses, etc., but he needs all the mentioned goods to fulfill his interests. This cultural deficiency of the individual for himself was stated in ancient times by Plato and Aristotle.

The need to compensate for this cultural deficiency forces every individual to communicate with other individuals. And this communication cannot assume any other nature than that of exchange of services. This exchange of services must not become inter-individual aggression: exploitation or subjugation of one another. The recognition of equality of all individuals’ demands that the exchange of services be based on equality: the individual has the right to demand from another individual reversible service of such quality and amount as he has provided to that individual.
The recognition of the system of these axioms already requires defining law only as the balance (unity) of permits (rights) and orders (duties).

The model of the four axioms determining a certain concept of law is objective in the sense that it is not devised by someone arbitrarily or established by the will of state; it derives from natural interrelation of individuals, determined by the needs of survival and prosperity of the same individuals.

This model, methodologically requiring that the understanding of law begin from the individual, also demands that one start formulating the law not from objective, but from subjective rights, as directly belonging to the individual and created by him. The definition of law is not constructed as arbitrary, it is just “found” in the interrelation of individuals, which emerges and functions on the basis of equal exchange. Whereas in beginning the cognition of law from objective (established by the state) law, it would not be clear where the definition of law comes from and what form the law should assume. How would we know what content the law as a rule of conduct should hold? The approach of legal positivism (etatism) would be the only correct approach, which defines law as a rule of conduct with all content established and enforced by the state. This would mean that we remain on the level of a certain abstraction, which will not allow the law of democratic society to be separated from the law of totalitarian regimes, as in both cases would be possible to define law as a compulsory rule of conduct.

Today the positivist perception of law as a compulsory rule of conduct becomes insufficient. This rule has to be specified with respect to the differentiation of the interests of various social groups and the need to equally recognize those interests in the law, coordinate them, make compromises, and guarantee their fulfillment by measures of equal efficiency. The means for overcoming the abstraction of the positivist definitions of law are provided by the mentioned model of four axioms and the recognition of the priority of the individual and the subjective right determined by it.

FACTORS DETERMINING THE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHT

Subjective right and its peculiarity derive from the efforts of the individual to protect his interests from those risks that arise from his living in society with other individuals. This danger makes the individual treat his interest (life, health, freedom, property...) as significant to his existence and to demand that other individuals refrain from detrimental behavior directed towards this interest.

This intuition of interest perceived as a value and the effort to protect it determines the initial structure of subjective right at two levels (elements): 1) the valuable and 2) the normative (voluntary). The valuable
level of law is the interests-values of the individual, which he wants to protect, create or acquire by regulating his own behavior and the behavior of other individuals and institutions. Generally they could be called the object of law (something to which the requirement of respect is oriented). This object may be material and spiritual; material objects include the sensual values of the individual: life, health, property, etc., and the spiritual objects embracing intellectual, psychological and other spiritual states of the individual (freedom, dignity, safety, qualification, etc.). The spiritual states (values) are realized as the inward ability of the individual to create the material for the fulfillment of one’s own interests in order to become the legal subject of one’s own destiny, the legal subject of the protection and exercise of one’s rights on this basis.

The normative (voluntary) level of law is the subjective requirement of respect for the existential values of the individual (the object of law). This requirement is addressed to other individuals, so that they refrain from detrimental behavior towards the holder of the value, that they not violate it or interfere with its legal purchase, that they not interfere with its creation, use, and disposal. Thus the need to protect life is manifested as the effort of an individual to obtain the subjective right to live, the need to protect one’s property – the objective to obtain the proprietary right, etc. By requesting respect the individual strives to protect his values, and in other cases to create or obtain the desired value.

The object of law (the valuable level) and the voluntary requirement of respect for it (normal level of law) interrelate as the aim and the means to achieve it.

The requirement of respect is legalized by the obligation to respect. But the same requirement of respect for one’s interest is not yet subjective right, it is only a claim to such law; it is just an ordinary declaration (demonstration) of the egoism of the individual for the society, and therefore it may be perceived as an aggressive claim of the individual: why should other individuals heed such requirements?

In order to eliminate such suspicions, in order for law to bring not only aggression to the society but also concord, it is necessary to legalize such requirements-claims in the society, so that it would be not only compulsory for the other individuals to execute, but would also be advantageous to them. Therefore the individual with such claims should balance his claim with the obligations to respect the corresponding egoistic claim of the other individuals. By this obligation the individual legalizes his requirement of respect for his interests, undertakes to coordinate his own benefit with the benefit of the other individuals, in other words, creates a state that we call the coincidence of “individual and public interests”, the end of the war of everybody against everybody.

From this we can derive an initial definition of law: law is a request for respect and an obligation to respect, or in philosophical categories: law
is the unity of egoism and altruism, and in legal terms – the unity of rights (permits) and duties (orders). This means that the individual cannot legally (in a civilized manner) protect his own interests (the object of law) in any other way than by respecting the same rights of the other individuals. The necessity of such duties arises not from simple altruism (renunciation of oneself), but from the love of one’s own interests – from egoism. When we think of ourselves we demand rights, when we think about concord with the other individuals we legalize our rights by executing our duties. With respect to rights the individual is an egoist, with respect to duties – an altruist, with respect to their unity – a socialized individual, where this unity means that individuals reject aggression: exploitation and subjugation and pass to the state of cooperation and mutual services. Altruism then becomes the obligatory way to egoism and makes the egoism to be civilized or legal.

Thus the requirement of respect, coordinated with the obligation to respect the same right of the other individuals, changes from an egoist claim to a legal, socialized subjective right, and the individual then starts to feel that this law protects his interests (the object of law) and that his interests are safe not only due to his power (physical, economic, political) to withstand the aggression of the other individuals, but also due to the public contract at the base of this obligation. Thus the individual perceives other individuals as partners in protecting his rights.

The nature of law as the unity of oppositions. Egoism (law) and altruism (obligation) arise as two main opposites, united by an inseparable internal bond within law and expressing the authentic nature of law (socialized behavior) that is not distorted by the arbitrary use of force. This unity of oppositions means that it is impossible to become a legal egoist (object of law) without becoming an altruist (executor of obligations). This is the dynamic nature of law.

From the unity of rights and duties – the relativity of all subjective right. Approach to law as the unity of permits and orders reveals the relativity of all rights of individuals and finds the basis (cause) of such relativity within law. The relativity of rights is not imparted from outside, is not established arbitrarily by the state, but arises from the balance of rights and duties as a compulsory consequence thereof: there are no subjective rights which do not have to be guaranteed by the execution of certain duties, and there are no duties if they do not create and guarantee rights. The legal requirement of respect is impossible without the obligation to respect. Every refusal of such duties (duties) is also a voluntary refusal of respective subjective right, guaranteed by the duties. Subjective right, if separated from obligations, would become a privilege (aggression against the other individuals), just as obligation, which does not create or guarantee the subjective right would become a duty (exploitation, subjugation of oneself for the benefit of another individual or institution).
Due to this positive internal inconsistency, law does not provide privileges, as it does not permit the requirement of respect without the obligation to respect, it does not allow one individual to exercise his right by limiting the rights of the other individuals. Privilege may be only a category of positive law, because it can be provided only by the legislation of an arbitrary power-state, which makes illegal laws. The Romans were right in saying: *Privilegium est quasi privata lex* (privilege is similar to a private law), thus, it is a law of the individual acting in his own interests, and this causes conflicts and therefore is not a law. But if the privilege arises not from the exchange between individuals of equal services, not from mutual interest, not from coexistence, but from the self-will of the legislator, it can be implemented only by force, as it is derived from force. It would be difficult to believe that the privilege of one individual would be voluntarily guaranteed by the other individuals by gratuitous work. The privilege which is contrary to the nature of free market is also contrary to the nature of law. Therefore, it is understandable why the need for force in society increases with privileges, and is reduced with the unity of rights and duties. This internal inconsistency of law does not allow for a generalization of any of the oppositions, makes them relative and non-existent without each other. Thus it preserves their nature only due to unity, and enables law to create public benefit, i.e. the benefit of one individual is coordinated with the benefit of other individuals and thus social concord and cooperation is achieved in the society. Therefore attempts to define subjective right not by its opposition – obligation – would also mean an attempt to change the nature of law, to eliminate law from the competence of jurisprudence on the whole and thus would make it incognizable and mystical.

Meanwhile, the unity of rights and duties protects the individual from subjugation to society (generalization of duties), and protects society from the aggression of individuals (generalization of rights). This internal balance of law brings concord and social quiet into the interrelations of individuals, while privileges and duties bring an imbalance of rights and duties and its consequences: conflict and destruction. The unity of rights and duties integrates the society, whereas the opposition of privileges and duties destroys it from within.

*The unity of rights and duties is an expression of the public contract.* Law perceived in this manner becomes a public contract (convention); conventionalism is the essence of law; only due to this is law able to create and support the ability of individuals to live in concord (sociality), to achieve a certain unity of interests, to reduce the need of force in the relations of individuals. Furthermore – the balance of rights and duties creates society as the coexistence of individuals with opposite interests, and, at the same time, this balance is meaningful only within the society. Individuals can coexist peacefully only when they obey the contract concluded by them – the rule of conduct that has assumed the shape of a
balance of rights and duties. Based on this the individual guarantees his
civil rights, without endangering the rights of the other individuals. It is clear
then, why I. Kant perceives law as the sum of conditions, under which the
self-will of one individual can exist alongside the self-will of another
individual without breaching the principle of general freedom. Law may
arise only from the mutual contract of individuals, as conditions may be
established only by an agreement in order for the self-will of one individual
to exist alongside the self-will of another individual. The public spirit of
law always manifests itself as the coordination of opposite interests, where
to exist means to coexist. In subjective right the individual exists, with the
introduction of duties the individual coexists. Sociality is the quintessence
of law.

The approach to law as a unity of permits and orders sometimes
doubts the existence of a mechanism for the establishment of such balance:
how does one “weigh” (compare) rights and duties? The unity (balance) of
rights and duties is established not by “scales”, not by the directives of the
authorities, but by contracts of citizens, who actively and in an organized
manner defend their rights, also by the parliamentary groups, representing
the interests of various social groups, by discussions and compromises. This
balance of rights and duties, agreed on by the parties and which is nearly
satisfactory at the moment, is the balance of rights and duties adequate to
the situation (to the definite proportion of social powers, to the level of
social activity of the participants in the relation), as established in the laws
and the public transactions. Therefore, it is always a definite, approximate,
temporary legal form of momentary justice, constantly searching for
perfection in the new imbalances and the new compromises and contracts.

The unity of rights and duties is the nature of law only in
democratic societies. The unity of subjective rights and duties is also
significant in that it reveals the democratic nature of law, i.e. it states the
equal natural value of all individuals, their legal equality, prohibits any
discrimination, obliges one to coordinate opposite interests and to strive for
their compromise by imparting to the opposition of those interests the form
and nature of the mentioned balance. It becomes obvious in this way that
democracy is the content of law only if the law exists as the unity of rights
and duties.

But law perceived in this manner does not have and cannot have
historic universality, as its content – democracy – does not hold such
universality. According to the approach of legal personalism the public law
of the slaveholding, feudal state does not have the conceptual ground to be
called law as this law did not mean the balance of subjective rights and
duties, rather it meant their disproportion. This disproportion was not
accidental, it was a conscious act, and because the privileged position in the
society of slaveholders and feudal lords was created on the basis of the
superiority of rights over duties (their aggression against all other groups of
the society was legalized). But this disproportion of rights and duties is not
a category of law but of laws. Here law and laws are clearly distinguished: the self-will of any authority in possession of force may become the law, while law is the rule of conduct establishing equal respect for the participants of the relation. Therefore we do not know when the history of laws begins, but it begins with the state. Meanwhile the history of law begins with democracy, with the rule of law. The history of law is quite recent, whereas the history of laws comes from unmemorable times.

Mutual services of individuals on an equal basis are the basic idea embodied in the unity of rights and duties. This unity, being the essence of subjective right, is also the essence of civil law. Therefore it is understandable why civil law under the conditions of democracy becomes an example (model) towards which the creation of the “public” law or modern law in general is oriented.

THE PROBLEM OF REGULATING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS

In the international documents and in the legal literature the tendency to analyze rights and duties as not organically interrelated is often observed. The French “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” (1789), “The Declaration of Human Rights” (1948), and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) all declare human rights. Only Article 29 of the “Declaration of Human Rights” speaks about duties, and this only negatively, demanding that the individual exercising his rights would not limit the rights of another individual. The same provision is copied into the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (Art. 28). Here only the conditions for exercising right are mentioned, but not the conditions under which the individual obtains the subjective right.

This simplicity and liberality of declarations of human rights has begun to be perceived lately. But this simplicity is being remedied by another simplicity – that of duties. An international organization “Inter Action Council” (its members are former heads of different states and governments) established in 1983 in Rome, took the initiative and in 1997 announced the “Universal Declaration of Human Duties”. The existence of the two declarations shows that upon searching for the nature of law, a certain separation between two extremes – rights and duties – is observed in both, though both of these values, as we already saw, are two sides of one and the same process.

Recently there have been attempts to overcome this metaphysical or mechanistic approach – to pass from the opposition of rights and duties to “balancing rights and duties”. This imperative is formulated as “the permanent responsibility of politicians and citizens” by the Swiss and German professors, H. Kung and H. Schmidt; “Without the feeling of responsibility freedom may become the domination of the strong and the powerful”. They think that:
Today, half a century after the announcement of the “Declaration of Human Rights”, the moral imperative for humankind of the declaration <…> is in danger. First of all, the term “human rights” is used by some Western, especially American, politicians as a slogan for combat and as an aggressive instrument of influencing the foreign politics. Most often this is done quite selectively: against China, Iran or Libya, but not against Saudi Arabia, Israel or Nigeria.

Secondly, human rights are considered a typically Western concept and sometimes even an instrument intended for the expansion of the domination of the West by some Muslims, Hindu and Confucianists. Besides, we hear <…> accusations, which should be taken seriously and which have a serious foundation, that the concept of fundamental rights ignores or even is incapable of recognizing the necessity of duties and obligations of the individual to the family, the community, the society and the state.

H. Schmidt also admits that the issue of the proportion of rights and duties in Germany is not solved:

Today in Germany we elevate rights over duties. Requirements are often spoken aloud, but in many spheres of society every individual is taught responsibility very rarely, therefore duties are hardly perceived. Many politicians, the majority of powerful businessmen do not execute their obligations… The education system allows a lot of freedom, it is simply orientated towards the fundamental rights, and the fundamental duties are hardly ever mentioned. Careless egoistic “personal satisfaction” is elevated as an ideal and general prosperity is just an empty word. <…> some unemployed people “find” that they can use the support of state and live on it. They are satisfied with that which is why they do not even intend to trouble themselves with the burden of a standard business week (3).

Man the consumer (homo consumens) is concerned with the declaration of this superiority of rights. He is concerned that the capacity of the individual mean the same as the subjective right, because he strives to transfer the duties created by his subjective right to others. The demand for subjective rights without duties is a demand to legalize the economic aggression of individuals of certain categories against the society. Man the
creator (*homo creator*), on the contrary, declares the unity of rights and
duties, as he knows that without the duty to create consumer goods and
equality of exchange, he cannot have civilized subjective rights that do not
endanger advance of society which is also free from exploitation and
subjugation. He has capacity without duties, but the formal right to
education itself will not make you educated just as the right (permit) to
obtain property will not make you rich.

Therefore a question arises: where is the society going by
propagating the superiority of rights over duties, by what value orientation
does this tendency promote the individual and how long can it be tolerated
by the needs of cultural advancement?

The social nature of law requires the synthesis of these
declarations, towards which is oriented the “American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man” of May 2, 1948, accepted in the 9th Conference
of American states in Bogotá. The Preamble of the Declaration states:

> The execution of the duties of every individual is a
> prerequisite of all human rights. Rights and duties are
> interrelated in all social and political activities of man. As
> rights are a prerequisite of freedom of man, duties express
> the value of this freedom.

The personalist concept of law that is formulated by us may also
aspire to the theoretical foundation of this nature, this concept founds the
origin and nature of law on the mentioned “model of four axioms”. It is the
legalization of values common to all individuals. Upon postulating the
equality of all legal interests of the individual, by inducing the individuals
with different interests to compromises and contracts, this concept opens
the possibility for cooperation by people, not only with different interests
but, of different religions and cultures. It enables them to avoid the so-
called “clash of civilizations”, and to contribute to the elimination of the
underlying causes which motivate and support modern terrorism. In this
respect legal personalism may lay claim to becoming the legal ideology of
coexistence and cooperation of individuals with opposed interests.

The peculiarities of objective law arise from the peculiarities of
subjective right. I call the concept of law based on the model of four axioms
personalist (4), as law is derived from the needs of the individual (Lat.
*persona* – person) and from the exchange of services among individuals on
an equal basis. This presumption “obliges” one to begin the concept of
law not from objective but from subjective right, as only the nature of
subjective right is characterized by the unity of rights and duties. The nature
of objective law, to the extent that it can mean the legalized self-will of
authorities, cannot be predicted in advance. The concept of law based on
the priority of the state, as mentioned, is forced to admit the priority of
objective law, where subjective right means just the assignment of
imperatives established by objective law to a certain individual. Therefore subjective right, as a derivative, will be insignificant in such a case: it does not affect the peculiarity of objective law, but is only a form of implementation of the latter. The question, how does objective law “know” what the content of law should be, is actually left to the will of the legislator: only he can establish the nature that the rule of conduct – called law – shall have.

The approach of legal personalism considers subjective right not as granted by objective law, but as acquired by the cultural activity of the individual – the fulfillment of the respective duties to the society (for the benefit of other individuals). State authority in general authorizes only the matters that arise from the equality of exchange and from the social solidarity of individuals. This is their obligation for mutual aid in those cases, when one of them cannot be the subject of equal exchange due to objective reasons, and therefore cannot assure at least the minimal protection of his legal interests on the basis of unity of permits and orders.

The unity of rights and duties, to the extent that it is not established by the state, but arises from the exchange of services among citizens on an equal basis, as mentioned, is the peculiarity of subjective right. Therefore, as logically and historically prior to the law created by the state (objective), it “sets the fashion” for objective law in a democratic society. This demands that objective law on the whole be created and developed according to the basic characteristic of subjective right – the unity of rights and duties – and that this unity becomes equally obligatory and significant to all individuals. It is then demanded from the legislator that the laws made by the state (objective law) mean not only the rule of conduct on the whole, but the balance of permits and orders, i.e. coordination of the interests of different social groups on the basis of compromises.

Of course with the recognition of economic, cultural and other rights, individual modern objective law is not included by the peculiarity of subjective right. This does not provide legal arguments for the legalization of second generation subjective rights of the individual (economic, social, and cultural). Meanwhile, objective law fixes them, but only for the individuals who due to objective reasons cannot guarantee their existence on the basis of the balance of rights and duties. Therefore we say that “second generation rights of the individual” are not specifically legal, as capacity here is translated into subjective right without the interference of the duties of the holder of that right. That is why they are not stable: they depend on the economic capacity of the state to accept the duties of such individuals. Second generation rights of the individual by their nature are moral rights, which can be translated into statutory ones, but not legal ones.

But “second generation rights of the individual” are also characterized by the same unity of rights and duties. The only difference is that subjective rights are granted to physically, psychologically or socially incapable individuals. The subject who exercises the rights and the subject who fulfills the duties is not the same individual. Duties, whose fulfillment
by individuals would create a certain good and thus acquire a subjective right, are voluntarily taken by another subject (family, society, state). This demonstrates that in this case also the unity of rights and duties is valid, the only difference being that this unity is created not by the effort of one subject as is usual but by the effort of two subjects.

CONCLUSION

Legal personalism is a concept of law, based on the principles of the market economy and democratic society; it is the description of such principles in the categories of law. It is that concept of the origin and nature of law which founds the priority of subjective right over objective law on the basis of the priority of the individual and at the same time, develops objective law by orienting it towards the peculiarity of subjective right.

This concept of law is immediately derived from the four axioms: a) with respect of priority of the individual to the state, b) the cultural deficiency of the individual to fulfill the diversity of his interests by his own effort, c) the need to overcome this deficiency forces individuals to cooperate – to exchange services, and d) the exchange of services is conducted on the basis of equal exchange.

The logic of these axioms forces one to begin the definition of law with subjective right and to define law itself as the unity of permits (rights) and orders (duties).

This unity (balance):

- expresses a public contract which is not formalized,
- coordinates the benefit of one individual with the benefit of other individuals by a social compromise and thus founds the relativity of all subjective rights of the individual: subjective rights are acquired, legalized by the fulfillment of duties and they are lost upon refusing to fulfill the duties legalizing them; therefore the individual himself is perceived as the subject of increasing and limiting his own rights;
- contains not only the limit (duty) of the rights of the individual, but also the criteria of those limits – the rights of other individuals;
- achieved when the participants of the relation actively and in an organized manner protect their rights,
- helps consciously to separate subjective right from capacity, privilege, and duties – from duties,
- founds the right of the individual not as a characteristic of the individual, but as a social relation (multiple predicates);
- is “natural” according to its origin, as it is not established by the state but arises from the interrelation of individuals on the basis of equal exchange of services; and
- defines law not as the law of authority, but as the law of man;
It is also admitted that the peculiarity of objective law is not exhausted by the peculiarity of subjective right, as categories of individuals (the handicapped, unemployed) incapable of acting according to the balance of rights and duties exist under the conditions of a market economy. Their capacity is translated into subjective right by the laws of the state without the fulfillment of the respective duties. These duties are taken over by the state on the basis of solidarity in order to maintain social stability as the basic guarantee of human rights in the society. This exception from the rule does not violate the principles of legal personalism, but serves to witness that their correctness, just as the correctness of science on the whole, is statistical in nature.

Mykolas Romeris University
Vilnius, Lithuania

REFERENCES


With respect to terminology, legal personalism is related to so-called philosophic personalism – one of the branches of Catholic philosophy of the 20th century, which treated the creative springs of the individual as spiritual existence and the reality of the world – as the expression of the creative activity of the individual. The term “personalism” (*Lat. persona* – person) itself was first used by American authors V. Whitmen (1819-1892) and A. Alcott (1799 – 1888), who opposed the personality of God to pantheism. The father of personalism as a philosophy is considered the French philosopher Neo-Kantist, Ch. Renouvier (1815-1903), who published *Le Personalisme*, (1903). It is a certain Catholic individualism, but spiritualized and deified as it is derived from and based upon the concept of God-man.

The concept of personalism was introduced to legal philosophy in the beginning of the 19th century by the Italian philosopher Antonio Rosmini in his book “*Filosofia del diritto*”. He attempted to identify personality with law, imparted both of these concepts with indefiniteness, and made law a category of world outlook.

The legal personalism formulated here is related to the mentioned tradition only due to the fact that the terms are similar and the individual primacy is recognized.
CHAPTER XIII

PROBLEMATIZING THE DISCOURSE OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ORDER

VYTAUTAS SLAPKAUSKAS

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DISCOURSE OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ORDER

Due to the vigorous efforts of Western countries, today’s world has witnessed the gaining in currency and the acknowledgement of the following values: the idea that human rights are of fundamental importance; the understanding that democracy is more powerful than tyranny; the idea that free market is more effective than command economy; and that openness is more rewarding than self-isolation. Yet do these values have sufficient social ground to find their place as regulators of social order in a world haunted by globalization?

This analysis of the discourse of contemporary social development and order has been influenced by three interrelated global processes: 1) the formation of an informational civilization that determines the dynamics of the social world; 2) the formation of supra-national political communities and identities that are transforming the social world and exacerbating the problem of national identity; 3) the spread of globalization, with all of its positive and especially negative social consequences, as they are seen in their broadest sense. These global processes of different scale are the contemporary sources and factors of the new transformations of the social world and its order. Under their impact, the issue of social and cultural heterogeneity will continue to be exacerbated. Within this context, therefore, the question of the ability of the European Union to form itself as an open society of cooperating members, to name but one example, is not purely rhetorical.

The information revolution has brought about a deep transformation in the spatial and temporal forms of social relations, as electronic networks enable people easily and rapidly to interconnect with one another regardless of their location on the map of the world. However, the global aspect of communications and the new communities being created on their basis modify our habitual understanding of space, time and social order. This is a meta-space which operates as both a specific (internet) background for the interaction of the new communities and a universal context that embraces customary geographical spaces. This is a world without boundaries, one that is losing its previous meanings of territory and distance, as well as gaining new empirical contours. Within
this social world the flow of time increases: things that used to be done in a few months or years are now done in a few days. The processes of social interaction have become so intensive that they are showing patterns of unrecognizable development. In other words, today’s human essence has acquired a new dimension – globality (Grani globalizacijii, 2003, 31-46).

Globalization has precipitated and uncovered a number of negative social phenomena, such as threatening demographic and ecological changes, extreme poverty, drug addiction and terrorism, shadow economy, international crime and others, all of which go beyond the powers of social containment of any single country. Most significantly, the usual means of social control, coordination and management on the national level are losing their efficiency in the increasingly globalized world. Since 9/11, 2001 the liberal social order of the democratic world has turned to more stringent imperatives in order to guarantee social security. As economic globalization links with international terrorism we are faced with the problem of the interrelationship between social security and the human freedoms implicated in human rights; this does not have a final solution.

The content of human rights responds to different interpretations, depending on the notions of freedom and security operating in a given society and which of these notions society will take as a priority under given circumstances. Since the end of World War II, Western societies have lived in the conditions of expanding freedom, which not only generated tolerant thinking, but also promoted a hedonistic way of life. Although in the second half of the 20th century the consequences of Japan’s and Western countries’ transition from the industrial to the information era could still be compensated by adequate policies in country, “this transition was followed by severe deteriorations in the social conditions” (Fukuyama F., 2003, 13-14). However, the global processes unleashed by the fall of “the iron curtain” inevitably accelerated the social changes not only in the West, but also in the societies of other civilizations – social changes which could no longer be controlled by a single state power, however big it might be. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the context of economic globalization entails political globalization, too. Unfortunately, in the European Union, for example, institutional changes have been arriving too slowly, although its political elite understands that under the circumstances of economic globalization self-isolating policies cause stagnation and deterioration in the social conditions. A number of countries, especially large ones, have been finding it very difficult to restrain their boundless ambitions even in the face of a possible social catastrophe. Thus it is no wonder that most people’s experience of life in the conditions of freedom reduces their ability to understand the complexity of the problem of social security and its lasting significance within the context of global changes.

To “save” the situation, Western countries usually resort to the possibilities provided by statutory law. They promote the idea of modern law as an instrument of state power and forget that the fundamental basis of social order is the evaluative and normative pluralism of social control.
Under the circumstances of globalization this basis of social order is promptly diluted by technical law, which takes the role of a meta-regulator. In other words, modern Western countries regulate social relations through law, which obscures other social regulators or subjects them to its own power. At the same time, the emergence of statutory law as a meta-regulator provides a basis for the establishment of the culture of groups linked to the state apparatus and media. The danger of this culture is that it overshadows and even suppresses the development of the culture of the middle social stratum, which performs the essential function of social integration. T. S. Eliot warned of these dangerous tendencies in the middle of the 20th century, pointing out that as society develops in the direction of functional complexity and differentiation, we may expect the rise of two cultural strata: either that of class or that of group culture. Eliot emphasized that the significance of the culture linked to any social group or class is different from that linked to the whole society (Bell D., 2003, p. 145-146). With this in mind, we may make a reserved statement that while attempting to control global processes and strengthen the social integrality of present societies exceptionally through statutory law, we will achieve reverse ends: within the context of the intensive processes of social differentiations there should gradually arise new forms of social integration, which will be different from the present societies.

LOCAL SOCIAL ORDER: AN OBSTACLE TO GLOBALIZATION?

From a sociological point of view, society cannot be compared to a bag of peas, which fall apart once you’ve emptied the bag. The peas have no relations connecting them to one another and the bag is the only thing that gives them a temporary form of unity. In contrast, individuals in society are interconnected by various social relations. Society is a dynamic and ever-developing system of people and their social relations. People communicate and cooperate not randomly, but with regard to certain values, social statuses and the requirements for specific social roles which are voiced by the culture of the society and its social groups. In other words, they follow the rules of the local social order. The local social order is an established and evolving totality of communal relations and their properties in a given society, the practicing of which helps an ever-larger number of members of society or the social group to survive and achieve higher living standards.

Usually people know what behavior is expected from them and what behavior they might expect from others in the different situations in life, because they coordinate their actions on the basis of certain rules and values. This enables each and every one of us to continue our activities. Only because each society has an order, which may be called a system in which and according to which its members live their lives, can people anticipate events and live harmoniously with others (Evans-Prichard E. E.,...
Were this order to be absent, none of us could manage our activities or even meet our basic needs.

How does this social order arise, what is its nature? The emergence and development of the social order is a process related to meeting basic human needs. Abraham Maslow has pointed out that

These needs or values are interconnected hierarchically and evolutionarily - according to strength and precedence. For example, the need for safety is stronger and more powerful, prompter, prior to and more vital than the need for love, and the need for food is usually stronger than any other. Besides all of these needs, may be considered a chronological movement towards self-actualization, which embraces all of the physical needs (Maslow, A., 1959, p. 122).

Thus the processes of meeting basic human needs inevitably constructs the rules of social behavior which not only help to survive for the people who practice them, but also assist them in achieving higher living standards. In other words, the processes of meeting basic human needs formed and are still forming the systems of social norms and values: the normative judgment of what is happening, what is good, what is evil, what should be sought and what should be avoided, how one should behave in a certain situation, etc. On the basis of these systems we decide what is the meaning of one or another event or phenomenon (the system of meanings), and what are the relations among events, phenomena, and things (the system of relations). All of the above are the essential elements of social culture, the homogeneity of which modern society is being deprived due to increasing cultural heterogeneity.

In general, social order is conceptualized as man’s inevitable and perpetual creation that exists only as man’s creative product. Yet does this human creation always have a set purpose? Is social order created consciously? In his book Fable of the Bees, Bernard de Mandeville comments on a paradox, where “individual vices”, such as selfishness, can benefit the community in social terms. He notes that individuals who act upon different motivations make up a commercial society, even though none of them has had this intention. The idea that the development of human institutions has enabled individuals to provide services to one another, even if their motivations have been selfish, was later elaborated on by Scottish philosophers of the Enlightenment (Ashford N., 2003, p. 108-109). One of them, Adam Ferguson, has emphasized that nation’s stumble upon institutions which are in effect a product of human activity, but not a product of human agenda (Ferguson A., 1767, p. 187).

The main difference between these two categories – the product of human activity and the product of human agenda – has given Friedrich A. Hayek a basis for exploring self-organizing systems and conceptualizing
The Discourse of Contemporary Social Development and Order

There are two kinds of social order: 1) the social order that emerges spontaneously, as if from within, and shows no sign of external effort and 2) the man-made social order which is consciously created by external efforts (Hayek Fr., I, 1998, p. 65-67). It is important to note that the rules of the spontaneous social order which control man’s behavior and make it rational have two characteristic features: 1) individuals follow these rules in their activities, although they do not have them in an articulated form; these rules simply appear as regularity of actions which can be explicitly described; 2) individuals follow these rules not because they are familiar with them, but because they provide to the group that follows them a sense of superiority over other groups (ibid., p. 36-37).

Hayek aptly shows that although the spontaneous order and the organized order always coexist, their principles cannot be combined unsystematically because in defining the two social orders we have to refer to different rules. The rules which regulate the activities within organizations are meant to implement specific goals. The rules of the spontaneous order, on the other hand, must not depend on any goals and must be valid for all members or at least for their non-individualized groups or classes. This means that the general rules which are at the basis of the spontaneous order are oriented towards an abstract order, whose specific content is neither known nor inferred, while the decrees and rules on which the organization operates serve the interests of the heads of the organization. The more complex the intended order, the greater the degree to which individual actions depend on circumstances unknown to those who control the totality, and the more this control depends on the rules and not on the specific decrees that administer it (ibid, p. 80-81).

Nowadays social order is commonly defined as a unity between people or social peace (Ashford N., 2003, p.108). Yet this notion of peace may be a fragile one in the globalized world as globalization leads us into the empirical being – a complex interlinking that is evident in the whole world. The most outstanding feature of this interlinking is an increased variety of social relations that cannot be covered and regulated only through universal rules of organization. Although there have been various attempts to conceptualize the architecture of the political order of the world (Grani Globalizaciji, 2003, p. 245-248), the ambitions to substitute the principles of the spontaneous order functioning in societies of different civilizations for universal principles will inevitably cause conflicts that will be our main anchors in the further development of globalization. This is constantly signaled by conflicts over the implementation of human rights in Asia.

According to Andrew Hurrell, the Bangkok Declaration (1993) openly states that Asia has been opposed not only to the ways in which human rights are implemented, but also to their content (Hurrell A., 1999, p. 291-297). Western civilization, however, should not be surprised at this, seeing as history remembers the stormy battles over the implementation of natural rights in Western societies.
The creation of the normative and evaluative universalism of social order as an inter-civilizational meta-space is the most difficult social problem to solve, if it can be solved at all. It is more plausible that this type of meta-space will arise spontaneously, seeing as the scope of dialogues between members of different civilizations is increasing, including the encounters in virtual space. Yet such cautious optimism is restrained by the obvious fact that the present social order precedes an individual’s organic development. Although the openness to the world is characteristic of man’s biological nature, it is the social order that takes priority. This means that the social order transforms man’s biologically determined openness to the world into a relative isolation from the world. This somewhat artificial isolation is what usually gives direction and stability to the majority of man’s actions (L., Luckmann Th., 1999, p. 72). Thus the social order, while providing stability to society, also limits its openness to the world. In other words, the evaluative and normative nature of the social order controls society’s openness to globalization.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM: A PROBLEMATIC RELATION

The global nature of human existence and the new challenges related to this dimension invite us to explore the dialectic of social security and individual freedom which is at the heart of the exacerbating cultural polemic in today’s Western societies. This polemic embraces not only the interrelationships between diverse cultures, but the coexistence of different cultural traditions within one society. The implementation and use of the means for the prevention of terrorism have given rise to dissatisfaction among many people as if under the circumstances of increased danger it were possible to retain the same standards of individual freedom that are applied in peaceful times, without taking on certain new responsibilities.

The relationship between social security and individual freedom is not a given, and we cannot define it as a standard that would not be subject to social changes. During periods of war, chaos or social reconstruction, society gives priority to social security and restricts the scope of individual freedom. On the contrary, during the periods of the growth in living standards society emphasizes the formation of tolerance and the expansion of individual freedom. It is therefore understandable that with the growth of their living standards Western societies have established human rights as the standard defining the relationship between social security and individual freedom.

International terrorism and the threat of terrorist activities have negative effects on the quality of life. Therefore the implementation of human rights as the standard defining the relationship between social security and individual freedom is not sufficient fully to defend the quality of life under the new circumstances of social development. We have to understand that the attacks of international terrorism seek to intimidate
societies and cause crises in their social developments. Under such circumstances, if we do not take efficient preventive measures, our usual peaceful co-existence might turn into a simulacrum.

The problem is that Western societies are reluctant to accept and demand human responsibilities that correspond to human rights. To this day, these responsibilities have not yet been formally defined. Under the intensive influence of the interrelationship between a hedonistic way of life and human rights, in the last quarter of the century Western societies have formulated a perverse notion of political correctness, in the context of which members of society have difficulty understanding that social relations should be based on the unity of human rights and human responsibilities.

Most people expect a rapid elimination of terrorist groups and sources of terrorism. They do not seek to define the society’s social and psychological state which presupposes an awareness of latent possibilities of causing unexpected if minute war actions on any spot in the world. This awareness, whose negative value increases with the increasing number of acts of terrorism covered in the media, hinders the philosophy of customary peaceful co-existence. This leads us to the question: what do we call the social order whose norms and values do not correspond to either the order of peaceful co-existence or to that of war?

Different forms of social order imply different relations between social security and individual freedom, which, in their turn, determine the human possibilities to lead a dignified life. To analyze the dialectic between social security and individual freedom, it is important to highlight: 1) What distinguishes man’s life from the life of any other living being is the self-consciousness of a conscious being; 2) Man lives in a constant tension of relative insecurity; 3) Sooner or later people spontaneously master the tension of insecurity. This creates a social order that generates mutual trust and helps not only to survive, but also to construct the world of individual life.

Hans-Georg Gadamer has called man’s ability to be self-conscious a relation that conveys a perspective allowing us to act “irrespective of what we find in the world, so that we may imagine it as it is” (Gadamer H.G., 1975, p. 402). In Gadamer’s view, this unique perspective enables man to inhabit the world, to move from existence within the surroundings (Umwelt) to the human life in the world (Welt). To have a “world” is to take a position in relation to this world. Gadamer’s reasoning about consciousness and self-consciousness as uniquely human traits allows us to claim that human consciousness is social in nature. Gerd Haeffner reiterates this idea, saying that “subjectivity and the world coexist. The subject is distinguished from the object by the fact that the subject has the world” (Haeffner G., 1989, p. 25).

What is the significance of the social nature of man’s consciousness? The most usual answer to this question emphasizes its psychological aspect: man becomes man only in the process of
communicating and working with other people. But the philosophical aspect of a possible answer to this question is also important: our natural and characteristic sense of humanity includes our sense of position in the holistic environment we inhabit. It is holistic because we tend to understand this environment as a whole in which all the parts more or less conform to one another. When some aspects of our experience no longer correspond to the changed reality, we attempt to reveal the essence of these changes. We refer to this process when we say that we are trying to reveal the meaning of what is happening. Thus man lives in a qualitative process of “the recycling of information” or “the revealing of meaning”, which implies our attempts to understand the whole. In other words, people seek to know and make sense of the given order of the world and to expand it by means of the social order they create.

However, our ability to understand our consciousness does not entail that our relation to the world is one of instrumentality or dominance. On the contrary, we inhabit the world and participate in it. Martin Buber has explained the difference:

An animal in the environment of its consciousness is like a fruit in its skin; man in this world, on the other hand, may be compared to an inhabitant of a large building, whose boundaries are constantly extended and beyond which he cannot penetrate, but with which he nevertheless is familiar like he is familiar with the house he lives in because he can embrace the wholeness of the building as such (Buber M., 1965, p. 61).

Our birth throws us into a social “arena”, where we have to find links and anchors; hence we experience this world not only as personal, but also as intersubjective, that is as a unique social community (a source of trust) which is constructed among subjects in the course of transmitting experiences that function as a system of reference in the form of “knowledge at hand”. “All the interpretations of the world are based on the resources of earlier experiences: our own or those which have been passed down to us by our parents or teachers” (Schutz A., 1962, p. 6). Unfortunately, we possess very little experience of living in a globalized world under the circumstances of peaceful life with strong antiterrorist preventive measures which we could pass down as “knowledge at hand” to society and to our children. However, it is reasonable to expect that this kind of “knowledge at hand” will take shape in the course of implementing formalized human responsibilities.

The formalization of human rights and responsibilities is made necessary by the understanding that man constantly lives in a state of relative insecurity. Security may be defined as a state of protection and self-protection against dangers and of trust in one’s knowledge. This notion entails objective security as well as one’s sense of security (subjective
security). In our analysis of the notion of security we face the problems of protecting various values. However, the protection of such values as, for example, life, health, status, welfare, freedom, is very complicated because in case of loss, they are very difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to restore. This is why it is easier to apply the notion of security to things than to people. The security of people and societies is the most important social issue. This makes us constantly highlight and examine the threats to people’s security. As Barry Buzan notes, most threats to individuals arise from the fact that people live in a social environment that generates inevitable social, economic and political pressures (Buzan B., 1997, p. 71).

The threats individuals face in society uncover a huge dilemma that exists at the basis of political philosophy: how do we accommodate individual freedom of action so that it does not pose real or potential threats to other individuals’ freedoms, and how do we increase the community’s freedom without increasing state oppression? A range of theories of social contract have been conceptualized to solve this dilemma by way of looking for a balance in the relationships between individuals and society (state). But this dilemma cannot be solved once and for all, because both individuals and society can exist only in perpetually, even if unconsciously, creating conditions for their more rewarding existence. Any kind of stagnation or slowdown of their social development exacerbates the problem of security. The conscious maintaining and creation of the conditions of our existence, however, also alerts us to the importance of the issue of security. In other words, as individuals and society always operate within a relative tension of insecurity, security has to be constantly maintained and created. Creating security and trust is an individual’s and society’s (state’s) permanent condition and activity.

The fact that security and trust have to be constantly created does not entail that this process cannot lead to any definite forms of stable balance in the interrelationship between an individual and society (state). The characteristic features of the formation and development of a particular societies’ social structures define the boundaries of the reproduction of the material means of human existence. Society is a system of real relations in which people participate in everyday routines. Gradually there emerges a communal coherence, the so-called social structure, which gives sense to the existence of the whole society: by way of employing legal norms, society (community) begins to maintain the conditions necessary for the reproduction of the means of human existence and for its own regeneration. These conditions comprise the unity of social space (territory under control), unity of economic and juridical space, common language, and unity of social norms, stereotypes and values. These are the conditions that enable groups of people to develop permanent forms of interaction.

Presumably, sooner or later people are bound to develop relations of trust; otherwise, they would not be able to live in a community. Thus the social order we are talking about is one that engenders trust. This type of social order is more valuable than an untrustworthy social order in at least
two respects: 1) it requires fewer additional expenses for the control of individual actions in the attempt to ensure the successful functioning of the social order itself; 2) it builds trust as a kind of social wealth necessary for the efficiency of democracy (Putnam R.D., 1993) and economic growth (Fukuyama F., 1995).

Trust is a sense of security and comfort in people’s relationships that is necessary in the creation of their welfare and security. Trust is indispensable when it comes to having good and intimate relationships. On the one hand, through trust we emphasize a subjective security that need not entail real security; on the other hand, subjective security implies man’s given status in society and the threats s/he faces. Therefore the growing sense of trust is primarily related to becoming familiar with “what must be done and what is forbidden under certain circumstances. In avoiding danger it is as much important to know what must not be done as what must be done to achieve a specific result” (Hayek Fr. A., 1998, p. 36).

Therefore, on the one hand, we must find courage to admit that international terrorism has become a permanent threat; on the other, we must also have faith in man’s creative ability to withstand this demonic power. Man has an adaptive and creative personality capable of creating communal peace. Therefore, sooner or later antiterrorist prevention will develop not only organized, but also spontaneous forms; its construction will depend on the lifestyles of different societies. Hayek notes that social lifestyles are not societies’ conscious choices, rather, societies are involved in a process of unconscious adaptation. For various reasons, some societies adapt to the given circumstances in one way, others in another, still others do not adapt at all. Adaptation is not a conscious choice, and people that comprise a society are not always aware of what they do; they are aware only of the fact that a certain choice will benefit them, even if it appears incomprehensible to others (Hayek Fr. A., 1998, p. 58).

However, one should not completely depend on the process of unconscious adaptation and should actively formulate a social philosophy of life that would not deny human rights under the circumstances of reduced social security. Rather, it would emphasize the value of the organic link between human rights and responsibilities in order to manage the new threats. In other words, it is necessary to shape a social thinking that would be based on the renewal of society’s moral state, i.e. the social awareness of human rights and responsibilities.

Western societies are becoming increasingly less aware of the fact that human rights are moral in nature: they imply certain human responsibilities because we expect every individual and government to acknowledge and practice human dignity. Human self-creation is always and inevitably a communal process because homo sapiens always and to the same degree is a homo socius. Any attempts to delimit these values lead to extremes: the role either of the community or the individual is given absolute value. Under the circumstances of globalization, it is crucial to return to an idea of individualism that is not opposed to communality.
In turn, respect for individual human dignity should not be opposed to social security because social insecurity notably diminishes the possibilities of realizing such dignity.

The understanding of contemporary security as a social issue and its creation are concurrent with the implementation of human rights and responsibilities as much within the boundaries of one country as in international space. The establishment of the guarantees of individual security is a minimal essential basis for ensuring security not only in a society and country, but also on the international level. The implementation of the legal guarantees of human rights and responsibilities on any social level must be a constant process of the creation of security. There is never absolute security; security is always a relative thing. Therefore, in this respect, the creation of legal guarantees for the implementation of human rights and responsibilities is also a never-ending process.


One of the oldest problems known to Western civilization is the problematic interrelationship between justice and the social order. This used to be solved on the basis of moral judgment. Early works of ancient Greek poets, such as Hesiod’s Theogony and Works and Days, testify to a wish to bring a just order to the world: justice is distinguished from injustice, especially from non-professional interpretations of law (The History of European Mentality, 1998, p. 430). In the view of Linas Baublys, a law professor at Mykolas Riomeris University in Vilnius, the Romans, who gave birth to the Western legal tradition, not only took over the more socialized image of Themis of the ancient Greeks, but also expanded the notion of statutory justice. Baublys notes that for Romans, justice was one of the main principles of legislation that made them abandon their outdated norms and create new ones in order to establish a balance in the new social relations (Baublys L., 2004, p. 196). Not surprisingly, Iustinianus’s “Digesta” in his Corpus Iuris opens with Domitiius Ulpianus’s definition of law: “est [ius] autem a iustitia appelatum.” This fact is of notable importance since Ulpianus based his notion of law on Aulus Cornelius Celsus’s statement “ius est ars boni et aequi.” Thus at the basis of classical Roman law is a close interrelationship between moral values and law and order.

However, in the course of time this close interrelationship waned and efficient legislation did not prevent, but rather accelerated the moral downfall of Roman society, thereby leading to the final collapse of the Roman Empire. Within the context of globalization it is imperative to keep in mind the typologies of European societies and the social consequences following the divorce of social morality, as suggested by Ferdinand Tonnies. Tonnies claims that
Often the description of the drafting, universalization, systematization and codification of laws came alongside the portrayal of the downfall of life following political triumph, smooth administration, and efficient liberal legislation. But not everybody could see the interconnection, unity and interdependence of the two tendencies. Even the connoisseurs have not always been able to go beyond their prejudices and form a non-biased, strictly objective image of the physiology and pathology of social life. They admired the Roman Empire and Roman law; they loathed the downfall of family and other social structures, but they could not see the interdependence of the two phenomena (Nisbet R., 2000, p. 130)

This passage from Tonnies shows how liberal legislation can stimulate the downfall within the general context of weakening social relations. The history of Western civilization has witnessed recurrent phases of violent revolutions, when the former systems of political, legal, economic, religious, cultural and other social relations, institutions, beliefs, values and objectives were overthrown and replaced by a new system. According to Harold J. Berman, our inability to foresee fundamental changes and give a timely reaction to them may be determined by an internal contradiction which resides in the nature of the tradition of Western law that has two objectives: to protect the order and to implement justice. The toppling of the previous law as order was justifiable through the revival of the more fundamental law as justice. It was the idea that law had betrayed its most supreme objective and mission that led to each of the greatest revolutions (Berman H. J., 1999, p. 38-41).

Under the circumstances of globalization it is very difficult to anticipate and manage the changes that arise from opposing law as order to law as justice. This opposition between the two notions of law has the greatest potential in contrasting civilizations. All civilizations consider justice as the fundamental principle of social life and the differences between civilizations have more to do with the forms of establishing this principle. In the West the main instrument to ensure justice is law; in Islamic countries it is religion; in India, China and Japan it is moral norms; and in African countries it is customs. In the West, justice is first of all related to the protection of every individual and the notion of human rights serves this purpose; in other legal traditions, the interests of the community are given priority to those of the individual. While the West emphasizes social life, other legal traditions often view man and community as integral parts of the all-embracing cosmic order (Baublys L., 2004, p. 198).

It would be possible to oppose law as order to law as justice in the West, too, since law has no officially formulated social objectives. Many works on jurisprudence describe the social objectives to which law should be oriented as moral imperatives. Other authors claim that all laws have
specific objectives which enable us to measure their efficiency. The critics of the latter call this idea “naïve instrumentalism” (Summers R. S., 1977, p. 97).

The West views contemporary law as an independent means of social control and management as well as an instrument of implementing state power. But when law is considered to be only an instrument of state power, it is also considered to be autonomous, that is independent of other systems of social regulation, especially those of morality and customs. This means that law is no longer seen to be efficient in its congruence with the nation’s customs. On the contrary, the efficiency of law is seen as coming from the concentration of its political power. The modern legal system appears as a specific set of state power mechanisms which follows a rational legal doctrine that is created, interpreted and applied by specialized legal institutions of the state. Yet the interrelationships between law (as norms used by the state institutions to make decisions) and morality (as factual models of thinking and behavior operating in society) seem to be losing their significance in the minds of people and are likely to disappear completely. Today’s legislators and ordinary citizens tend to view law only as a form of purely technical regulation which usually lacks an explicit moral element (ibid., p. 64-66).

Therefore modern, or otherwise technical, law is analyzed on two planes: 1) in its relation to the government and 2) in its relation to society. Its relation to the government foregrounds the positive side of modern law: law, as a technical rule, may be employed to achieve any regulatory purpose. Separating law from its previous social context is seen as liberation of law as a mechanism of management and control. This kind of modern law becomes an instrument of the modern state. But in its relation to society the above mentioned positive side of law becomes its drawback: in the minds of the social groups which law regulates, the separation of law from customs finally causes its factual disappearance from the consciousness of most of the citizens. In our attempts to establish law as an efficient and independent means of social management and control, we ultimately achieve a reverse end: as the law that society does not recognize, it cannot be efficient.

It is reasonable to claim that the current power of Western countries has its roots in the establishment of the notion of law as order: the West promotes the idea of modern law as a large-scope instrument of social and economic planning. The motivation behind this tendency emphasizes the need to influence social changes through legal changes. A number of lawyers have commented on the idea that it is possible to shape society on the basis of the functioning of law. This idea has made many lawyers overlook or ignore previous sociological interpretations of law (Savigny Fr. K., Of the Vocation of our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, 1831; Sumner W. G., Folkways, 1996; Ehrlich E., Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, 1936) which argued for a notion of law that has roots in the experience of everyday social life and pointed out the significance of
the spontaneous legislation. Perhaps in order to reduce the possibilities of opposing law as order to law as justice, David J. Danelski has invited the representatives of social and legal sciences to analyze the ethical limits of law (Danelski D., 1974, p. 24).

But on the level of civic society the social objectives of law should be common to all and should be oriented towards the subordination of other divisions – the objectives of legislation, courts and other legal institutions – because the attribute “social” implies a reference to the whole society and to the interests of all of its members. Nowadays the word “social” has developed certain connotations of moral judgment (Hayek Fr. A., II, 1998, p. 130), but as Nisbet points out, the referent of “the social” has almost always been “the communal” (Nisbet R. A., 2000, p. 101).

In his analysis of the interrelationship between the notion of law and the objectives of law, Alfonsas Vaisvila has shown that the social objectives of law are a historical phenomenon that changes according to the changes in the interpretations of the notion of law and the social structures and powers that define it. If we accept the idea of legal etatism, then the social objective of law is to carry out the will of the state and the economically and politically dominant group (class) that stands behind it; if we follow the notion of civil law, then the objective of law is to protect the basic rights and freedoms of all the members of society by equally efficient means (Vaisvila A., 2000, p. 138).

The basis of the development of the liberal democratic society is the actual implementation of human rights and freedoms. This implies that the social objective of law is to guarantee and protect human rights and freedoms. But in the present stage of the development of civic society this minimalist social objective of law proves insufficient in at least two aspects:

1. There appears a tension between the human rights and freedoms of the first and second generation. The purpose of social, economic and cultural (socio-economic) human rights is to guarantee a respectable life for the people who find themselves below a certain margin of material and social welfare and education. This margin is not defined by political concepts, but by the level of economic, social and cultural development of a specific society (Rawls J., 2002, p. 197-201). On the other hand, “socioeconomic rights impose responsibilities on the state and society, but they do not create any responsibilities for individuals themselves; <…> as a result, individuals become passive in political life; socioeconomic rights disrupt the purpose of individual and political rights and freedoms to guarantee an independent and autonomous individual existence” (Spruogis E., 2002, p. 120).

2. There is no definition of the objective of law to cherish a communal society, i.e. to seek on the basis of law a social coexistence of members of society and a dynamic social balance that would not destroy social values and interests.
The analysis of these aspects shows that in the present stage of social development it is imperative to supplement the minimalist social objective of law with the notion of human responsibilities which could make members of society commit themselves not only to the protection of human rights, but also to the increase of social security and the creation of the quality of life for all.

The legal system in force and the implementation of legal norms should be the basis for a constant creation and sustenance of the tendencies of trust, security and social concentration that overpower destructive tendencies in society. This means that the legal system alongside the moral, economic, political and other contiguous social systems must meet the maximal social objectives of law: 1) to cherish and protect man’s basic interests; 2) to guarantee the social and political peace among different social groups; 3) to stimulate the progressive development of social life. Although the social objectives of law are indivisible, we emphasize their aspects in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. Thus the contemporary social objectives of law are to cherish and protect human rights and responsibilities and to provide possibilities for the development of a legal society that would ensure the enhancement of the quality of social life.

Within the context of the social objectives of law, we develop an awareness that law must function in tune with other social regulators, especially with morality and religion. This means that the legal norms created by the legislators must not contradict the social objectives of law itself, and the implementation of these norms must not cause side effects that have negative consequences in society and undermine people’s trust in fundamental social values.

Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania

REFERENCES

Buzan B. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security


Danelski D.J. The Limits of Law // The Limits of Law, Nomos XV.

Europäische Mentalitätsgeschichte. Hauptthemen in Einzeldarstellungen.


CHAPTER XIV

ESTHETICS AND/OR ESTHETOLOGY?

AISTHESIS: FROM SENSES TO INSIGHTS AND FROM AESTHETICS TO ESTHETOLOGY

JUOZAS MUREIKA

The subject matter of the article is focused on the conception of esthetics in its historical and methodological variation, its structure and the factors that influence it. Herein raised issue deals with to what extent and how the traditional conception of aesthetics should transform so that its concepts and theories could reflect the actual changes of aesthetic activity and the interpretations of such activity in the context of human culture, mentality and existential being. The notion of aethesia now is enriched by a new meaning referring to the universal concept of esthetology. The article reflects upon whether the new interpretation of correlations between aethesia and the meaning may precondition the conversion of aesthetics into a fundamentally new branch of humanitarian science or sciences – esthetology. Attempts are made to foresee the field of problems to be explored at the intersection points, where the traditional aesthetics and esthetology diverge or come in affinity, to elaborate on the formation of aethesia concept and its components as well as on its influence upon the derivation and origin of meanings.

Alois Halder maintains that the times of aesthetics are coming to an end and it will be replaced by the philosophy of art addressing the issue of truth (Halder 2000). In a certain sense it could be admitted on condition that 1) the conception of aesthetics is left resting within the confines of traditional, classical aesthetics omitting the fundamental changes that the conception of aesthetic activity has undergone; 2) the two are thought as being overlapping; 3) the mission of aesthetic and artistic activity is believed to be only of cognitive nature. We could further go on with numerous ‘ifs’, however, given the existence of those three, there is hardly any sense in doing that to be able to ascertain the fallibility of such assumptions. I venture to state that the times of aesthetics are nothing less than coming to an end; we have just come to the point where we can witness the transformation of aesthetics into esthetology. Our own involvement in the process is urgent and welcome in every possible way. Therefore, I suggest that we proceed from what I would define as esthetology, pondering on the insights that could be brought in to reason the trend-setting interpretation of aisthesis and the conclusions that may be

* The Lithuanian term ‘pajauta’ has no adequate equivalent in other languages; I decided to leave the Greek term aisthesis as used by Aristotle.
derived from those interpretations. It is on the cards that esthetology will duly rank among logics, philosophy and axiology and take up the role of the interaction link between these disciplines the absence of which so far could be only apprehended.

Aisthesis is one of the ways how meanings originate and are derived and it represents their original source. From this source we derive meanings which, in turns, are the inevitable prerequisite for any human activity. Therefore, aesthetics in the epoch of postmodernism and globalization can hardly have any other alternatives but esthetology. Philosophy, basically, addresses the general fundamentals of rationalism. However, it cannot overlook the general fundamentals and principles of aesthesis, on the one hand, and the internal structure of this concept and its basic components, on the other hand. Esthetology, as one may see, shall search for and find the interconnections with the aesthetic activity. Esthetology is supposed to come up with one or another philosophic interpretation of aisthesis. After all, it is not the issue of significance whether this task is fulfilled by philosophic aesthetics, philosophy or esthetology itself. More important is that it should be realized in the light of paradigms of philosophic speculation. It will have to include into the circle of its speculations the interrelations of aisthesis with intellection, values, imagination, purpose, language and other spiritual powers and existential states. The manifestations of aisthesis in different areas of activity, including science, education, art, and in the conventional manifestations and material forms of cultural values are also supposed to fall within the spectrum of its focus. However, an in-depth and wide coverage of absolutely everything can hardly be feasible within the framework of this article. Therefore, we will endeavour to focus only on certain shifts observed within the conception of aesthetics and propose a new interpretation of aisthesis and reveal the essential interrelations of this conception with the origin and derivation of meanings.

Esthetology (gr. aisthesis – the Lithuanian ‘pajauta’ + logos – science), I suppose, could be defined as a complex of theories or disciplines exploring or construing aisthesis, its components and relations with meanings, language and intellection as well as with evaluating and cognitive activity. Or alternatively, it could be viewed as a theory on the derivation of meanings through experience. Since the notion of aisthesis within my conception implies three basic constituents, i.e. senses, experiences and insights, each of these terms, coming together in a mutual

hope that the way how the notion, for which this term stands, in my reflections has transformed into a universal esthetological category and a key concept for esthetics will unfold further as we move down through the lines of the article. I envisaged a prospect in considering what, according to W. Welsch, was not historically applied from the Aristotle theory of aisthesis and, therefore, remained unexplored.
concatenation, in exceptional cases, when taken individually, may be used as the synonym of \textit{aisthesis}. Such could be its hypothetical description. In narrower terms, it could be viewed as a science analyzing and construing \textit{aisthesis} – the constitutional foundation of human aesthetic activity, likewise logic or the whole of its different branches exploring human reason, its forms and laws. However, this similarity may be drawn only insofar as both thinking and \textit{aisthesis} refer to the existential states and spiritual powers of a human being.

To our knowledge, the word from the collocation \textit{aesthetic logical truth} (in the sense of sensually cognitive truth), which comes close in meaning, was first used by the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten acknowledged as the founder of aesthetics as a scientific discipline. One of the originators of the German philosophic anthropology – Helmut Plessner, who focused on the senses as the fundamental element of anthropological aesthetic experience and entertained E. Bloch’s and F. Nietzsche’s impulses in approaching the variations of esthetic judgments, introduced a neologism – \textit{spiritual aestheticology} (Plessner 1923). An attempt was made as the author himself, put it to bridge between mental and physical phenomena.

Some components of \textit{aisthesis} are explored, or should be explored, in their different aspects by a variety of disciplines. First, is philosophy, the prime example of which was developed by I. Kant including individual speculations over the models of sensitive and sensual \textit{aesthesis}, but in different aspects. Thus came first in his \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, and second in his \textit{Critique of Judgement}.

Philosophy and philosophic aesthetics are given the task of building a constructive background for the understanding of \textit{aesthesis} and its components, i.e. to provide a philosophic interpretation of \textit{aisthesis}. An integral interdisciplinary approach suggests that philosophy should discuss \textit{aesthesis} as a specific process of derivation of meanings and creation of artifacts, i.e. as a component determining the specific features of aesthetic activity and, at the same time, as a spiritual power and a spiritual event or existential state experienced by a human being through an immense diversity of specific modes (existential) of \textit{aisthesis}. It is also supposed to elucidate the relations of \textit{aisthesis} with the origin of meanings and values.

Esthetology prioritizes the understanding of relations between \textit{aisthesis} and language, intellection, imagination and art, games, design, rhetoric, politics, religion and other entities of experience, as well as the scope that the notion of \textit{aisthesis} covers. The modern interpretation of \textit{aisthesis} is inevitably associated with the interdisciplinary explorations integrating culture. Aesthetics, by virtue of Baumgarten effort having been transformed into an independent discipline, from its original conformation has veered towards the analysis of cognitive aspects of \textit{aisthesis} and the cognitive approach applied for developing judgments on what should be considered as aesthetic. Thanks to I. Kant, H. Lotze, F. Brentano, W. Dilthey, E. Husserl, F. Nietzsche, M. Scheler, H. Bergson, M. Merleau-Ponty, H.-G. Gadamer, A.-J. Greimas and many other thinkers, eventually
it was realized that entity of *aisthesis* is the basic condition for the experiential perception of values and that sensual experience may carry aesthetic value.

The traditional aesthetic horizon appeared to be not sufficiently broad and versatile for the prevailing modernism and literally controversial to the changes within the aesthetic culture. In the first half of the 20th century the terms *Age of Sensibility* and *Zeitalter der Empfindsamkeit* were mentioned for the first time. H.-G. Gadamer in his famous introduction to M. Heidegger’s work *The origin of artwork* emphasized the need to overcome the superstitious beliefs lying behind the conception of philosophic aesthetics, i.e. the need for revising the conception of aesthetics itself. Traditional aesthetics had rested too long upon a conceptual model of aesthetics, which supported its reduction to the theory of beauty again with a tendency to approach the form as absolute or to return to the philosophy of art or quite a weird combination bringing together the theory of beauty and the philosophy of art.

But aesthetics has inevitably arrived at the point where its transformation becomes necessary, since there have already emerged the signs of its crisis (Dziamski 1996). When for aesthetics the key issue was raised by a society become pluralistic (W. Welsch), the old conception became too narrow. It appeared to be incapable of correcting its subject and providing a more comprehensive and conclusive explanation of the conceivability of art and its necessity for human existence, the purport of existential aesthetic activity or its manifold specificity and, at the same time, new manifestations of aesthetic activity and their relation to the derivation of meanings and values.

Aesthetics itself, according to the German philosopher Wolfgang Welsch, is already over surpassing its own ambit (Welsch 1996). The inadequate understanding of the aesthetic activity vexes and elicits serious doubts, not only due to the aforementioned efforts to reduce the model of the discipline, but due to initiatives suggesting that it is inappropriate to attribute esthetics to the area of science. In fact, the problem on the status of aesthetics cannot be resolved so easily and unambiguously as by way of denomination.

*Aisthesis*, as manifest by the activity which can be reflected upon within this conception, has its most precise equivalent in the Lithuanian term – *pajauta*. It is a universal notion, philosophically referred to as the concept. It encompasses all modes and forms of *aisthesis* process and becoming: sensual, somatic and extrasensory; the *aisthesis* of feelings, emotions, affects, apprehensions, moods and experiences; the *aisthesis* of cultural values or philosophical and theoretical insights.

In other words, the phenomenon of *aisthesis*, in precise terms, bespeaks other than lingual or logical experience, which is sensed through experiencing its relevance, purposefulness, value, significance, beauty, pleasure and other responses. The experience of *aisthesis* is beneficial and necessary for a human being in developing personal attitudes and setting
priorities. The importance of experiencing *aisthesis* emerges and is actualized at moments when we face the need to choose the appreciable state of existential freedom or dependence, decency, justice, and to decide upon the values to pursue. *Aisthesis* is always the experience of something, some kind of entity, while at the same time performing the role of mediator between the human being and his whole environment, between the nature and the culture, between the truths and the values. This circumstance brings about the problem in the relations between *aisthesis* and speculation, meanings, imagination, comprehension, simulation and their verbal or logical expression. Thus, can we assume that there could be any other science exploring *aisthesis* but esthetology?

FORMULATION OF THE CONCEPTION OF AESTHETICS AND ITS STRUCTURAL CHANGES

To shed light upon the situation and the motives and reasons thereof, let us make a brief excursion back to its predecessor, i.e. aesthetics, and try to trace the history of its conception with its structural changes, as may be seen from the point of view of any modern interpretation. To reflect the changes through which the situation has evolved over the period time, note that its definition reads: aesthetics is a theoretical interpretation of spiritually meaningful activity self-actualized at the intersection of senses, emotions, cultural conventions and values and oriented towards manifestation, expression and perception through experience (*aisthesis*).

Thus, its contemporary model already encompasses analytic exploration and theoretical interpretation of the origin of aesthetic phenomena, its specifics, entity, expression and perception, as well as the conception of aesthetics which is partly covered by the philosophic aesthetics.

Depending on the purpose and character of explorations and interpretations, there may be distinguished the philosophic (theoretical, descriptive or normative) aesthetics and the empiric (partially experimental) or applied esthetics. Based on the distinctive features of aesthetic activities within the area of art it can be split further into the esthetics of architecture, literature, music and theatre.

Depending on how the aesthetic activity or its strains are interpreted and conceptualized within philosophic systems and general scientific theories, theoretical esthetics diverges undertaking such trends (scientific directions) as analytic, essentialist, existentialist, thomistic, comparative, information, hermeneutic, phenomenological, linguistic, metaphysical, semantic, semiotic, neomarxist, pragmatic, structural, post modernistic, feminist, etc.

Further, there can be distinguished the historical – ancient, Hellenic, Renaissance, modernistic and ethnic (English, Japanese, Lithuanian, French, German, etc.) trends of esthetics. The multidimensional character of esthetics raises the question: is there any evidence in the
The theoretical rudiments of esthetic thinking can be traced back to the times of the ancient Egypt, India, China and Greece (Plato, Aristotle, Plotine). This epoch was marked by the formation of concepts specifying the esthetic experience: pleasure, beauty, ugliness, majesty, canon, mimesis, symmetry, catharsis, harmony, proportion, perfection, tragedy, comedy, light, music, image, sign, etc. and by the attempts to analyze the relations between the object and its image, creation and imitation, art and its interpretation. It should be noted that in Plato’s work *Faidon or On Soul* pleasure, pain and other spiritual experiences were contemplated as existential states. There were also held discussions on different experiences of *aisthesis*.

In the Middle Ages, the notions of beauty and art were further elaborated and the theocentric speculations on the conception of metaphysical beauty were enhanced by reflection on free and mechanical arts, the artistic means of expression and the relations between sign and meaning, art and nature (St. A. Augustine, Boetius, Thomas Aquinas). The rich variety of experiences revealed by St. A. Augustine in his *Confessions* is truly amazing.

The interpretations of esthetic phenomena prevailing in the epoch of the Renaissance, proclaimed the ideal of a free and harmonious human nature, carried the anthropocentric in spirit and identified the nature of the sphere attributed to esthetics as autonomous, against any canons or rules. It considered artistic creativity and fantasy (Avicena, L. B. Alberti, A. Durer, Pico della Mirandola, L. Valla, M. Ficino) to be the most important. M. Montaigne and B. Pascal attempted to found a particular school of ‘heart’, i.e. the philosophy of feeling. However, neither their contemporaries nor later philosophers duly appreciated their effort, though the topic of emotional entities and its relevance was not absolutely ignored. In any case, its place within the structure of sciences remained undefined.

The post Renaissance epoch gave birth to two trends in esthetics – the normative rationalistic (classicism, academism) and the sensualistic irrationalistic (baroque, romanticism, symbolism). Among the theoreticians representing the first trend were C. Batteux, N. Boileau, A. G. Baumgarten, while the irrationalistic direction was associated with such names as A. Shaftsbury, H. Home, E. Burke, A. Schopenhauer, who joined them at a later stage, and B. Croce. Their developed theories preconditioned the formation of the philosophy of art. In the middle of the 18th century, A. G. Baumgarten his work *Aesthetica acromatica* – (a series of talks on esthetics), Volume 2 (1750-58) – introduced the term defining esthetics as a an independent scientific discipline of science and substantiated its theory. He viewed esthetics as the science on *cognitio sensitiva*, i.e. on the sense-based knowledge, its methods and development and on the embodiment of beauty and majesty in free arts: in narrower terms – the theory of free arts.
The period from the middle of the 18th and onwards through almost the entire 19th century, classical esthetics experienced a process of evolution. There prevailed philosophic esthetics, often viewed as a part of philosophic systems, basically, in contemplating the objective essentials of beauty, harmony and taste, the theory of esthetic education as well as issues or the development of art and the interpretation of esthetic values. Under the influence of the English sensualists, I. Kant philosophically conceptualized the subjective aspects of esthetic activity (the origin of the esthetic value is the human being, the subject, together with his feelings, free play of imagination and intellectual powers). The esthetics of F. Shelling and G.W.F. Hegel constitutes an intersection of the theory of beauty and the philosophy of art.

S. Kierkegaard and F. Nietzsche contribute to the emergence of neoclassical esthetics, which further evolved through the stages of modernism (the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century) and postmodernism (the second half of the 20th century).

In 1896 G. Santayana, in his work *Sense of beauty*, suggested that esthetics should be associated with the perception of values and address the issues of pleasure and pain. In the 20th century, esthetic value, having become a type of existentiality, a manifestation of aisthesis and a protest against intellectualism, brought up-to-date the multidimensional topic of homo aestheticus (Ferry 1992). The conception of the esthetic object and the idea of interconnection between art and esthetics were deepened and expanded by searching for new ways to define the specifics of art and by supporting the postulates of the originality and universal humanity of esthetic creative work. This period was also marked by the effort to elaborate the interaction and specifics of the Eastern and the Western schools, a stronger focus on the category of esthetic conception; and discussion of the prospects for the development of esthetics as a discipline of science (synergetic paradigm). Along with its status, subject matter, methodology and interrelations with other disciplines, the discipline was undergoing the so-called the linguistic and the esthetic turns. R. Barthes, J. Baudrillard, J. Derrida, G. Deleuze, J. Kristeva, J. F. Lyotard, F. Jameson, W. Welsch et al., representing the postmodernistic trend in esthetics, in attempting to overcome the logo centric rationalism, came to deny the natural systematic character of classical and modern esthetics, and the idea of beauty as the centre of esthetics; they questioned as well the precision of concepts and the autonomy of art. They affirmed deconstructive thinking, the new sensuality, the polylogic mind and a theoretical pluralism. They insisted on the need to consider changes in the society, culture and human mentality and to turn away from the sign – the stability of cohesion in meaning, maintaining that pop art, performances and happenings had ended the hostility between the elitist and mass culture.

Sensual conception professedly does not complement logic but is understood as an urge for perceiving esthetic reality. Once again there emerges the idea of sensual experience formerly raised by E. Husserl,
which M. Merleau-Ponty further meaningfully relates with the phenomenology of perception and the physical entity stating that sensual experience is primary and, therefore, forms the substratum for perception.

Attempts at deeper insight into the coherence of problems addressed by esthetics and ethics have become quite common (Ferry 1992; Adorno 1995; Welsch 1996).

M. Foucault distinguishes two trends in postwar French philosophy: one, the philosophy of sensual experience (to be more precise, the experience of aisthesis) and the subject; the other, the philosophy of cognition, rationality and concepts. This attitude also speaks quite explicitly in favor of esthetology.

Ortega y Gasset, in analyzing the works of P. Picasso, M. Proust, J. Joyce and others, suggests that the time has come to speak about the new esthetic sensuality. This conception (often expressed by different terms, e.g. new sensitiveness, post modernistic sensuality), appearing in a number of variations, began insensibly to move away from the peripheries of philosophy and to return towards the centre of speculations, irrespective of its paradoxical denial of a paradigm of centre itself (R. Barthes, G. Deleuze, J. Derrida, F. Guattari, F. Jamesson, J.-F. Lyotard, J. Kristeva et al.).

Speaking in terms of synergy, within the conception of theoretical esthetics the relative order is gradually being replaced by dissonance and chaos, following which there is likely to emerge a more rational theoretical level. This seems will be attributable to esthetology.

It is quite obvious that the esthetics of the 20th century was influenced by different methods and disciplines. Exploring different aspects of esthetic objects and areas of esthetic activity, contemporary esthetes have differentiated the topic of esthetics, while at the same time retaining two rather relative trends, which date back to the 19th century: applied empirical and analytical research and interpretative philosophical esthetics.

Though having undergone many changes, the so-called esthetics from the bottom” or psychological, empirical (G. T. Fechner, R. Frances, R. Huyghe) esthetics gave rise to the psychology of art; and “esthetics from the top,” which partially overlapped with the philosophy of art, were also explored. Their interpretation of esthetic phenomena was based on the philosophical postulates (F. Schelling, G. W. F. Hegel, H. Bergson, B. Croce, J. Ortega y Gasset, C. Fiedler, A. Riegl, R. G. Collingwood, T. Adorno, M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer, J. -P. Sartre, M. Dufrenne, M. Merleau-Ponty, P. Ricoeur, A. Malraux).

The work of European thinkers was joined by US theoreticians (M. C. Beardsley, T. Binkley, A. Danto, G. Dickie, N. Goodman, S. Langer, J. Margolis, T. Munro, M. Weitz et al.). Their theories focused on the topic of art philosophy applying anti-essentialistic and anti-metaphysical approaches and criticizing the traditional theory of the philosophy of art. In the second half of the 20th century, from the sociological esthetics there evolved the sociology of art. C. Lalo, E. Souriau, M. Mauss, P. Francastel, A. Hauser, P. Bourdieu, J. Duvignaud. This brought out the practical, technical (G.
Esthetics and/or Esthetology? Aisthesis

Semper, J. Ruskin, W. Morris, W. Gropius, H. Meyer); the experimental (G. Th. Fechner, H. S. Eysenck), the applied or digital (G. Birkhoff, M. Bense, S. Masser); and the environmental, natural, and ecological (A. Berleant, G. Bohme, Y. Sepanmaa). Also emerging have been the esthetics of image (M. Seel); of mass media (F. Rotzer, R. Schnell); and of reason (M. Mamardashvili). Soma esthetics (R. Shusterman), comparative esthetics (A. Andrijauskas), an esthetic of sensual culture (J. F. Lyotard), existential esthetics (M. Foucault), an esthetics of horror (K. H. Bohrer) and violence (W. Lepenies) and many other more or less independent, though often mutually interrelated, disciplines or theories claim to be part of esthetics.

Philosophical aesthetics continues to address the issues on the prospects, prerequisites and background of the theoretical reflection of aesthetic phenomena. It critically explores the interpretations and manifestations of beauty, ugliness and other esthetic phenomena and the diversity of art theories; it also provides philosophical interpretations of esthetic activity and analyses the esthetic taste-based judgments.

The conception of philosophic esthetics has never been and is not likely to become homogenous in terms of the meanings it implies, which vary depending on the philosophic interpretations. However, despite this polysemy attributed to the fundamental elements of philosophic esthetics, its conception shows certain trends, which take prevalence. These address the issues pertaining to the theoretical, philosophic interpretation of esthetics, primarily focusing on the critical interpretation of beauty and art theories, the object of esthetics and, according to H.G. Gadamer, endeavor at finding new ways of thinking, bringing them closer to the point, at unearthing the anthropological roots and reverting to much more valuable human experiences. In fact, these efforts were directed at overcoming the logo-centric rationality and turning away from attaching absolute value to individual components of aisthesis (sensual-intuitive or emotional). The theoretical foundations for the future esthetics, however, are believed to be still in the process of development (Neumaier, 1999).

To the philosophic esthetics there is often attributed the role of metatheory helping to ‘inventory’ the theoretical models of esthetic activity, the conception of esthetic value as such and other theories as well as to define the boundaries of their competence. V. Sezeman views esthetics as a branch of philosophy – a science on esthetic values dealing with the genius of esthetic phenomena and interpreting their nature and meaning (Sezeman 1970, 10, 11).

Unfortunately, the possibilities of this idea was not appreciated by other authors and the comparative nature of esthetic activity in relation to aisthesis was not duly considered. Instead, much more focus was put on the indifference of the form, esthetic language and esthetic pleasure. Some maintain that the philosophic esthetics enables the explanation of the transcendental purport of beauty and art. We agree however with R. Shusterman insisting that the soma esthetic experience should not be either
(Shusterman 2001, 225-255) as it helps by the idea that *aisthesis* as a link between the subject and the object helps move beyond their. The thinker’s urge to focus more on numerous somatic practices, based on which we endeavor to create and cognize ourselves, seek for true values, wisdom and beauty, nowadays appears to be very relevant.

The topic of esthetics arises out of the fact that esthetic activity, being meaningful and valuable in its singularity and originality, is, basically, opposite to the theoretical reflection, which always leads to the generalization and search of a common denominator in the direction of transcendence. Senses, feelings, will and mind; experience, imagination and intellectual intuition; the faculty of perceiving and consciously actualizing esthetic attitudes and memorizing the sensual experience create and penetrate esthetic speech and form the constituent components of the esthetic activity.

Their interface with the empiric forms existing within the environment (natural and cultural) and their significance as experienced by a human being enable the creation of cultural conventions. By way of adding esthetic signs to meanings and opening doors to the individual play of perception, these form the field for the explorations and interpretations of esthetic problems. Therefore, speculations focused on the esthetic phenomena, especially in the 20th century, became more and more exposed to the effective impact of different methods and disciplines. Hence, they contributed to the elaboration of the topic covered by esthetic explorations.

In the 20th century, it becomes apparent that whatever base is taken for constructing further esthetic speculations – the nature, any technical entities or those of art and beauty, the process of esthetic creation or perception, taste-based esthetic judgments or artistic imagination, perception of cultural conventions or signs, or the existential, cognitive or ethical aspects of esthetic mode – we will always have to deal with the point of *cohesion* between these or similar phenomena, demonstrated and actualized by esthetic activity (*aisthesis*). This is an esthetic mode, which within the act of perception senses the existential experience. The latter, in fact, is subsequent to *aisthesis* manifesting the formation of meanings, i.e. personification of beauty and, what is more important, numerous other values or to put it in other terms – the formation and assigning of meanings on the basis of *aisthesis* and not conception.

Here, we stand at the open door leading to understanding one of the most sophisticated interpretational problems. If we follow this way, we may find a clue to the theoretical understanding explaining the method of how meanings originate. This, however, was omitted by G. Deleuze in his famous work *Logics of Meaning*. If we look back, we shall see that neither and I. Kant, in fact, manage to avoid in his interpretations of esthetic activity the apologetics of cognitive activity and rationalism. It is no wonder then that the postmodernists attended to textualism.

Contemporary esthetics seems to have become almost free of any attributions to disciplines focused on cognition, the philosophy of art and
the theory of beauty so as to be view as part of any philosophic system. Now, probably, it has transformed rather into the family of close disciplines (theories) – esthetolog, united by the focus of all analytic and interpretative speculations – of esthetic activity and its singularities focused around its semantic centre, i.e., aisthesis.

It is reasonable to believe that esthetics is undergoing a transformation underlying its gradual conversion into esthetology. Subject to certain reservations, esthetology should be treated as an open system of logically interrelated theories or all the sciences including the theories exploring the elements of aisthesis, their nature and purport as well as the derivation of meanings and values and their assimilation through aisthesis.

Any discourse, which, insofar as it aims at the systematic understanding of oppositions and operates the terminology of philosophy and other disciplines, addresses the phenomena of esthetics, i.e. those related with the elements of aisthesis; may be viewed as a theory attributable to esthetology. The integrated understanding of oppositions and recognition of their mutual concurrence is one of the prerequisites for the interpretation of esthetic phenomena. Without discerning the difference between beauty and the aisthesis of its oppositional modifications or aesthesis as a universal philosophic category, neither the integrity of the esthetological topic, nor the value of general pre-theoretical experience or the constituting elements of the human existential state, including aisthesis as a spiritual power, can be possibly penetrated.

The history of esthetics bespeaks that between the analytical, empirical exploration and the philosophical, theoretical interpretation of esthetic artifacts there has always been certain tension. This tension, together with another conflict existing between the actual esthetic activity and its theoretical reflection, originate from the most powerful sources giving way to the development of esthetics.

Philosopfic esthetics, as a discipline forming the theoretical core (in terms of methodology) of esthetology, addresses aisthesis not as a process which is singular or mentally individual, but rather as a process encompassing all aspects referring to its universal and general nature, its theoretical interpretation emphasizing the relation of aisthesis with the origin of meanings and the values, the incarnation of aisthesis in the processes of culture, and its relation with contemplation, language, conception and imagination. It also deals with the explanation of aisthesis as a type of existential being, cultural phenomenon and the power of human spirit, and it analyses the importance of these in elucidating the specifics of esthetic activity.

When talking about esthetology as a branch of science, we should have in mind the heterogeneous nature of its subject and, as to its theoretical content, its structural composition rendering esthetology a whole of theories, the specifics of which depends on how the subject matter of esthetics is approached. Here we should not forget that, while providing philosophic interpretations of esthetic activity, aisthesis, esthetic language,
experience, esthetic categories, it can hardly do without the analysis and generalizations of specific manifestations of esthetic activity. Therefore, it is reasonable to speak about esthetology (in traditional terms – aesthetics) as a division of the humanities containing within its framework the levels of philosophic interpretation, research and application.

In treating esthetics as devoid of any metaphysic speculations while encouraging it to face the real yearning for metaphysics, the above mentioned two levels of the discipline become the most solid guarantee of its development and effective impact upon humanity. The critical approach to metaphysics should not translate into criticism of the process of transcendence, especially nowadays, when human beings are exposed to the increasing number of threats menacing one’s physical and mental health.

The profound understanding of esthetological issues may offer a number of ways of handling these threats. The issues on overcoming stress and the role of positive experience come out as the indispensable part of personal spiritual culture (Goleman 1995; Wassmann 2002). However, this does not imply that the interdependent development of esthetic theory and esthetic culture has no impact on the philosophical, ideological attitude or other methodological measures.

I have endeavored to discuss this aspect with varying success in my book *Lithuanian materialistic esthetics, (Lithuanian)* 1981. There are two sets of complementary intentions. The first is dedicated to fragments and to generalizing the theoretical heterogeneity and multiplicity of esthetics. The second specifies the structure and conventionality of the conception of esthetics, relates the explorations of esthetic activity with intersubjective knowledge, and links their stringency and meanings with the theoretical analysis of esthetic conception and the context of culture. Both seem to have reason, but in no way should be understood as seeking to attribute this to a discipline of the natural sciences. On the other hand, the esthetics resting on the ‘author’ cannot stand secluded. Here I refer to a felicitous phrase, which Darius Kovzanas used for describing M. Bachtin’s conception – solitary esthetics.

Contemporary culture now witnesses an outburst of global subjectivism, visualization and, in general, esthetics. This is associated with the increased focus on esthetics in all domains of life. This prevalence of esthetics, according to W. Welsch, while implying the menace of an anesthetizing (insensibilizing) effect, makes the explorations of esthetic activity especially relevant to the entire culture of our epoch. On the other hand, it has brought the philosophical and scientific exploration of esthetics together and entailed the need for the theoretical reflection of esthetic activity more than that for the empiric studies. This reflection is based on the conception affirming: the expression of mind (Brandom 2000), the instrumental purpose of theories, the polylogic and synergetic paradigm of becoming, the unity of universal human diversity, and the openness of theory to esthetical practice.
Such theoretical reflection opens up for new concepts or a new interpretation of old ideas. At the same time, opposes the normativism, the ideological insularity, and the dictates of formal logic, as well as any constraints of theoretical thinking and any totality or absolutes or other claims to supreme and absolute truth.

The historical insight into the reflection of esthetic activity and a rather versatile conception of esthetics as a science arising out of such reflection pose fundamental questions. For example, why has not esthetics up till now come up with a more widely acceptable formulation of its subject matter or, at least, area of focus. It is quite possible that the theory of beauty, the philosophy of art or other conceptions explaining evaluation-based activities, including the studies of culture and axiology, could identify this element within the conception of aisthesis, not yet duly elucidated and unfolded, which should become the subject of esthetology shifting away from esthetics. Furthermore, it could be quite possible to agree, refraining from any thoughtless breaking of tradition that classical esthetics should remain, as partially it used to be, a fairly independent theory of beauty. And the time for it to happen, of course, is not the main point.

The search for answers to the questions -- how we derive meanings, assimilate values, how aisthesis and the mind interact in the act of perception and what role these different ways of aisthesis perform in this process; how the experience and the cognition interact in the process of self-perception and understanding of the world magnitude, in the impersonation of truths, norms and values; what are the real and imaginary relations between the aisthesis and the meaning, the language of meanings and signs, between the aisthesis and the perception, the meaning and the logical expression; or, for instance, how the issues on the reciprocal effect of aisthesis and theoretical contemplation should be construed, etc.

What were the reasons which impeded and still hinder the conversion of esthetics into esthetology? There were and still are quite a number of them, but the following seem to be the basic ones: within the variety of aisthesis forms the moment of affinity uniting this rich variety was missed and the conception of esthetic value due to reductionism always suffered from the lack of logical background and appropriate conceptual expression. Therefore, there prevailed the tendency to identify the esthetic value with the form, its elements or material and sign-conveyed expression. Certain confusion in the terminology was not avoided, either. The attitude assumed by the early H. – G. Gadamer, based on which everything that is understandable is explainable (Alles Verstehen ist Auslegen), was very viable.

With alternative periodicity, dominance used to be taken either by the objectivistic or by the subjectivist tendency (leaving aside their complexity and the backgrounds presupposing the possibility for their meaningful coherence); for a long time the efforts to disclose the individual specifics of the humanities, hence of esthetics, too, with respect to the
process of esthetic activity and its outcomes remained fruitless; the understanding of the relations and the interaction between esthetics and axiology (or aisthesis and meanings/values) was very vague or almost not realized; too often there was a plain linear either – or way of thinking; there was not established any dialogue between the philosophic lines focusing either on aisthesis or contemplation (opposition of heart and mind), which, since they were treated following a strictly binary principle, could not be accommodated (the first line to a certain extent was represented by Plotinus, St. A. Augustine, B. Pascal, W. Dilthey, S. Kierkegaard, A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, H. Bergson, M. Sheller, E. Husserl, H.–G. Gadamer and almost the entire Eastern tradition of esthetics, while the second one was associated with the advocators of the Cartesian rationalism characterized by the apology of cognitive activity, mind and theoretical thinking); esthetic activity was frequently reduced to the sensual perception of beauty and the esthetic of language; the conception of aisthesis elements, even in cases where the sensual and the emotional moments used to diverge or converge, lacked clear definition; not enough focus was put on interdisciplinary research, and integrating methodological approach or dynamic esthetic experience or practice. Proper understanding of the reasons behind the weak points that the methodology of esthetics suffers is the basic precondition for conceptualizing esthetology.

A brief look into how the conception of esthetics developed, which, in this particular case, probably aims just at naming certain things rather than at providing the analytical evidence, helps to disclose in the most general terms, the need for an evolutionary conversion of esthetics into esthetology and to provide at least the most important arguments for such a need. How and to what extent the project of esthetology and the hypotheses will transform into a full scientific program and an individual humanitarian discipline or a complex of these, and what position it will assume with respect to the classical esthetics will unfold together with further speculations on esthetology. However, the individual efforts are not sufficient to make these speculations part of reality. It is obvious, that this should be the subject of concern to all humanitarian disciplines, not just philosophy. The issues to be addressed in the search of new interpretations are far from being simple, since they require both the experience of aisthesis and the skills of theoretical reflection; these imply the need for sophistication preconditioned by the complexity of the subject. Naturally, the efforts should be focused also on the task of cognizing and understanding the history of esthetics, the materialized conventional expressions of esthetic activity areas and the ever shifting language of esthetics and esthetic language.

Therefore, it is necessary to have deep knowledge of philosophy, culturology, axiology, psychology, semiotics, science, logic, epistemology, phenomenology, hermeneutics and other areas of cognition, which maintain meaningful links with aisthesis. The knowledge of esthetic activity and its theoretical reconstruction, unfortunately, requires a lot of time, much
experience in *aisthesis* and tremendous effort in theoretical reflection. Apparently, that is why even the most prominent thinkers, such as I. Kant, G. Hegel, N. Hartman, Th. Adorno, H.-G. Gadamer, A.-J. Greimas, M. Mamardashvili and V. Sezeman, wrote their best works only as they approached the end of their life, when they were experienced and wise persons, with little trace of intolerance to otherness.

‘AISTHESIS’ AS ONE OF THE KEY NOTIONS OF ESTHETOLOGY

*Aisthesis*, i.e., sensual perception, experience gained through senses, emotional sensual experience or theoretical cultural insight, is understood as experience, which, together with contemplation, belief, imagination, language, understanding, memory and meaning form one of the most fundamental powers of the human spirit and existential state. It is rooted in the biological, social, cultural and spiritual nature of human personality. The place of *aisthesis* within the content of aesthetic theories is very similar to that occupied by the mind within the scientific framework of logic.

The conception of *aisthesis* may be defined in two ways – as a process and a result, referred to as the meaning. This category of esthetology denotes the semantic centre of aesthetic activity. The distinction and the affinity of *aisthesis* with instincts, sense-based and intellectual intuition and its varied relations with language and thinking, as well as with values, denotations and meanings have for a long time impeded its theoretically complicated reconstruction and the appearance of more comprehensive interpretations, though the fact that there have been many accurate, though fragmentary, insights deserves acknowledgment.

The reason behind this statement can be discovered in the topic and problem issues of interest to St. A. Augustine, M. Montaigne, B. Pascal, the English sensualists, I. Kant, W. Dilthey, M. Sheller, A. Lotze, S. Kierkegaard, the romanticists, F. Nietzsche, E. Husserl, H.-G. Gadamer, G. Deleuze, J. Kristeva, W. Welsch, J. Lacan and other thinkers. This tendency of philosophic discourses, which also extend beyond the framework of philosophy, is especially obvious when we compare these ideas with the basic elements of conceptual reasoning in the Eastern school of esthetics.

The concept of *aisthesis* has a heterogeneous structure, which can be partially explained by the fact that there exists a wide variety of its interpretations, already traceable in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Even the ancient Greeks were familiar with the manifestations of sensual and emotional *aisthesis*. They discussed their individual shapes defining them in terms of such notions as moderation, pleasure, harmony, symmetry, beauty, ugliness, form, etc.

Plato’s *Socrates* identifies virtues and knowledge, while Aristotle differentiates good and other virtues (values) typical to each specific area of
activity. *Techne* and *episteme* enable action, whereas *phronesis* suggests that it is necessary to appreciate the experience of good and evil and comprehend the situation. W. Welsch, who deeply explored the Aristotle’s conceptions, holds that *phronesis*, inasmuch as this term is inclined towards singularity, means *aisthesis* in Rome matters.

Contrary to the aforementioned, the cognition focused on generalities (*episteme*) *phronesis* directs human consciousness towards how to handle each particular situation. It leads to the understanding of meaningfulness and the awareness of what has to be done right here and right now. This is more likely the *aisthesis* of values and proper behavior, which, together with the knowledge of generalities, was identified as wisdom. However, thus far there has not been adopted any uniform approach with respect to the above discussed notions.

Contemplation of *aisthesis*, as perceived nowadays, was prompted by the need for theoretical reflection of aesthetic activity. This made one realize the need to develop a totally new conception. We may already have come across the latter in a considerable number of post modernistic discourses. The German esthetologist W. Welsch notes that the conception of *aisthesis* may imply the meaning of sense and perception, feeling and cognition or sensual experience and sensual observation. The paradigm of *homo aestheticus* has brought many authors to the so-called new sensual insights.

For instance, J. Kristeva’s concern is focused rather on the mental than the personal rebellion and, subsequently, *on the form of its aesthetic expression*, which the author unequivocally associates with the link between *aisthesis* and meaning. She has discovered the widest spectrum of experiences and convention-invoked emotional modes giving deep spiritual impulse to sensual revival, creative power and new consciousness.

However, neither the German nor the English, French or Russian languages have any terms adequately corresponding to the Lithuanian conception referred to under the word *pajauta* and its meaning, as implied by the author of the script. The Lithuanian word *pajauta*, as a concept of philosophic character, points out one aspect which puts under a single umbrella a variety of, in principle, agnate phenomena. As a notion, it encompasses and may imply the sensual, extrasensory and somatic *aisthesis*, the *aisthesis* of experienced emotions, feelings, affects, insights and moods and, eventually, the *aisthesis* of experience as such. Further, it can also reveal the *aisthesis* of intellectual scientific intuition, cultural conventions and philosophic insight.

The conception of *aisthesis* focuses on other than the intellectual or cognitive experience. *Aisthesis* is not and cannot be the analogue of intellection, as believed by A. G. Baumgarten. But, at the same time sensual *aisthesis* is viewed as being close to it, since both *aisthesis* and intellection express the states of human spiritual power and existence, though of different nature and purpose. *Aisthesis* manifests itself with regularity different from the laws of logic governing the intellectual mind: it is
oriented towards singularity rather than generality, towards the meaning and sense of intimate experience rather than their denotation; it is focused on the priority-based choice of posture and personification of socially significant values.

Aisthesis manifests itself as an active response to the world, an outburst of being and the experience leading towards meaning and comprehension. This longing for meaning, its anticipation, is one of the most fundamental human yearnings. This direction of spiritual movement is opposite to transcendence. Aisthesis is actualized by a human being acting as the author and the participant of events and situations, which are associated with the subject’s mode of existence – the activity.

Aisthesis, just like intellection, is understood as an existential state. Both the theoretical contemplation of aisthesis and the aisthesis of numerous modes of contemplation (coming out as insights) are absolutely reasonable spiritual motions.

The conception of aisthesis shall not be limited down to just sensual capture, nor even to the theory of beauty, or associated exclusively with the area of art or just with the element of aesthetic language, i.e. the form, or with a single manner of speech – the verbal text. The orientation towards textualism observed with respect to J. Derrida, G. Deleuze and other deconstructionists gave very controversial results, which appeared to bear little positive significance to the theoretical reflection of aisthesis, though some interpretations they had come up had already been stated upon contemplation of individual aspects of aisthesis touched upon by J. J. Rousseau, B. Spinoza, I. Kant and E. Husserl and of Bergson’s intuition. However, G. Deleuze’s statement that meaning cannot exist without the sentence hindered them from discovering new interpretations to explain the origin of meanings.

The expression of aisthesis in art is a special case. Its understanding would have to grow up from clear, but not simulated real direct aisthesis and from the analysis of its components. The integrated interpretation of aisthesis can help us to understand why art is possible and necessary for humanity, why it can not be changed by any other cultural form, what are the conditions and preconditions of its derivation, what is its nature and purpose, why in our century its happening at the first sight is not understood and looks like absurd transformations of art.

What are politics manipulations by human consciousness based upon and what do they want? Why aesthetic understanding engages not only sensitivity, but the full junction of aesthetic branches; and why more and more theoretic and practical models of the world are orientated to aisthesis, while emotional understanding is more intellectual (conceptual art)? Why is the politic life esthetized? If the massive cultural industry works just for profit and greed, why is the cult of pleasure and drugs spreading by never before experienced?

All life is a solution of problems – affirms K. Popper (1994, 257). The validity of this statement touches all sides of human activities, all
spheres of their life. All linguistic inquests about these problems are led by
waiting for sense and by a will to understand. The whole realization of
those solutions is hidden not only in theoretic knowledge as well as in the
life practice it grounds, but for both sides personifying and giving a sense
aisthesis.

Aisthesis (with its positive components: love, liking, empathy,
admiration, gratitude, dignity, respect, tolerance, sympathy, beauty, justice,
good will, self-criticism, happiness, the joy of communicating and
knowing, etc.) is emotional creativity, self creativity, and all positive but
not destructive powers of activity. (That does not mean that destructive
activity or its consequences are not felt.) Theoretically its reflection has
strong impulses in the 20th and 21st century cultures which formed new
esthetics as a conception of esthetology. By using it we can think over art
philosophy, the theory of beauty and all thematic (genitive case) esthetics
and conceptions of design, as well as of ambivalent aestheticizing.

Theoretical aesthetic expression and the description of it’s
reflection, its logic connection, and this opening insight of esthetics to the
disciplines’ interpretation perhaps promises a meaning similar to the impact
had by Kant on the development of esthetics, or W. Dilthey’s conception
which revealed interaction between realizing, experiencing, expression and
understanding.

Afterwards Descartes’ cogito was changed by a combine – I think,
I want, I feel. Reaching out from the illuminated logo-centrism J. G. Herder
affirmed: I feel myself that I think. Modern person can also say: I feel that I
think and not just think but also feel the purpose of the thinking, I feel that I
exist in the systems of nature, socium, culture and spirit and that aisthesis,
not something else, opens myself to me and the Other as well as to my
existing I. In the path of aisthesis, coming back from transcendention things
become things for us. All the variety of external world meanings can
become one’s own, close and set to significant and good willing dialog with
Other. One of the most important things in the region of this activity,
according to M. Buber, becomes the reality of dialog’s aisthesis. This way
of discourse warrants a thinking harmony with aisthesis strategy which
protects from anthropocentric conclusions, logical thinking and knowledge
activity that absolutizes leads many aisthesis components to a belittling,
even cynical aisthetic human discrediting and depreciation; and led to a
body and spirit opposition (M. Merleau-Ponty, R. Shusterman) over many
centuries.

The new aisthesis interpretation is directed at developing up-to
date esthetics and esthetics concepts. For this the variety the parts of
aesthetic activity and the manifestations of aisthesis components are not so
important, though all this belong to separate esthetics disciplines
investigation and interpretation space. Aisthesis as spiritual self creation and
the existing state leading to creation of sense establishment in conceptual
theoretical systems is much more important. Besides, we can ask the well-
founded question: do linguistic and logic senses in their derivation relates
with *aisthesis*? No less important, particularly in a pedagogical sense, is the development of *aesthetic* structures, derivations, and purposes. And, also in the influence of *aisthesis* – growing happiness, improvement, freedom, responsibility and tolerance; statements that human feelings not be somebody else’s. The same is true of the logical combination of this conception with its discrepant harmony with other interpretations of theoretical spiritual powers. This is why esthetics has to transcend itself in identifying with the theory of beauty and philosophy of art, and overcome the limitation in sensitive and emotional, or informal and semiotical phenomenons, and game words and texts. According to J. Lacan that is in the field of *linguistery* (Kristeva 1996). *Aisthesis* is not a text and not a discourse either, but personal human experience, the way of establishing and giving senses. By already articulated shape not becoming sense development *aisthesis* can grow together with some visual or acoustic expression and can have gestures or some other somatic language form, as a form of spoken or written speech. So aesthetic investigations and the space of interpretation world’s harmony and chaos may assume importance to man and community, its importance is reflected in the *aisthesis* value giving.

The *Aisthesis* concept is an abstraction which marks the way of making sense; this has some of the concretizing components we talked about before. Its mode of thinking is probably in the sphere of esthetology and not esthetics.

It is very important for the new esthetics conception to clear up different *aisthesis* parts: specific, monosemantic, and many layered relations with logical thinking verbal and inverbal languages. One speaks of symbols and simulacra, allegory and metaphor, mythological views and previews, material shapes of reality, structural and logical constructions. To speak about esthetics of thinking (M. Mamardashvili) means thinking *aisthesis* in intellectual esthetics or cultural or philosophical insight.

This is equally extrasensory and somatic, and is little investigated because of the difficulties. Joy and other good emotions can be causes not only by theoretical insights of great value – but also by their glamorous stylistic, logical expressions and conceptually ideal constructions. To experience to rouse *aisthesis*, to express them spontaneously and deliberately, and to articulate them in a new and original way is the purpose of esthetic language.

The experiencing concept as a special form of experience of *aisthesis* makes the investigation of esthetic experience possible. It is a paradox because of the purpose of esthetic language, namely, to combine conflicting tendencies. One of them needs to use all possible created and understood visual, dynamic and sound signs, symbols, light and colors effects, deformation and different strange ways of their combinations which by eliminating clichés and stereotypes can rouse new *aisthesis* and senses with emotional influence.
Another, opposite, tendency makes the creator of esthetic language feel responsibility and moderation in order not to be misunderstood and create an *esthetic* chaos zone where significant communication can become impossible. It is able to do this together with other ways of using the turns from meanings to senses and from senses to meanings. These are formed not only in the experience of art creation, but in all traditions of life *aisthesis*. Esthetics or / maybe esthetology, will have to think over esthetic language and interactions with *aisthesis*, with sense as well as verbal and logical expression. It will be necessary to reveal what is specific to *aisthesis* and the place in the structure of esthetic activity which varies a lot and depends on mentality of the community, from the context of its culture and traditions. It is not possible to solve these tasks – even to understand them – if we understand esthetics from the traditional point of view.

For esthetology *aisthesis* expressions as an object of investigations and interpretation is important from different aspects than psychology. Psychology’s experiences are more important as the acts of individual psychic activity, but for esthetology it will be necessary to explain *aisthesis* derivation by integrating universal community with singular aspects, clarify the originality of components from the actual standpoint, and to think it over in the philosophical anthropology context of spiritual powers, cultural challenges, language, and other values. It is very important to understand *aisthesis* as a basic condition of sense derivation and to grasp its connection with immanence and transcendence. We have to use such perspective of interpretation which becomes clear when we understand that *aisthesis* means overcoming the conflict between subject and object.

‘*AISTHESIS*’ (PAJAUTA) – THE WAY OF ESTABLISHMENT OF SENSES

The human world seems for us to be full of sense. World can be called ‘human’ only if it means something – affirms a representative structural semantics, A.-J. Greimas.

Sense actually is a many-layered concept which has many meanings: it can be explained as individual, personal value; the moment of existence; one of the inner inducements of human being in his value orientation forms, and it can be explained as the main concept of logical semantic which has bright expression and direct combination with the event. Interpretation of sense is mostly productive in esthetics when seen from the point of integration. It is the feature behind the phenomenon or having a situation which determines the event. Sense connects the phenomenon to the context of each event or it comes from the same context, giving to its (phenomenon) understanding features of tidiness or chaos, harmony, indifference, justice, interest, beauty, fittingness or others.

The derivation of sense, its nature and purpose are the most important questions from the standpoint of esthetology. The concept of
sense is correlative with the event, experience, liking, \textit{aisthesis}, thinking, understanding, sign, expression, meaning and situation.

Sense, as a category of esthetology, is very urgent and important for interpretation of esthetic activity and for researching esthetic phenomena. This gives phenomena an opportunity to become necessary and the expression of the realization of freedom as well as fulfillment of wishes and purposes in the spiritual field. From this field sense can be transferred into the practical realization and material aspirations and moved into the life of esthetic values as in creating artifacts.

The culture of human culture has taught us to mark the senses. Though a combination of meaningless signs can grow up by accident, this can hardly survive as a cultural fact. The sensible text or other result of human activities if saved and recreated in culture can stimulate the creation of new texts and senses.

R. Pavilionis sees sense as the logical conclusion of mind, language and concepts, which designates the interaction of being. According to A.-J. Greimas a meaning is not other than language level transplantation to the other, and sense is not other than this coding opportunity.

Such and similar descriptions of sense can be drawn up along textological or theoretical paradigms. It is possible to define a conventional way of establishing sense. Let us say, in the art shop the piece of art to the seller can have just a sense of good. But the history of theories of meanings shows that these paradigms are not alone. It is not true that we understand what we are speaking about; senses can appear just from games with verbal texts or from logical discussions or conventions. Also \textit{aisthesis} is another way of establishing sense. Till now the derivation of senses, as we know, has not been investigated exhaustively and it is possible that in the future such investigations will be the prerogative of essayists or probably of esthetology.

Though the concept of sense is still not exactly formed, but it prevailed in the whole metaphysics of Aristotle. We can recognize this from his thought on natures and the worlds’ processes, affirms the researcher of ancient Greek philosophy, V.F. Asmus. This still not clearly formed source of conception can be found in the philosophy of Plato and the Stoics, who started to use the conception of sense in their philosophizing. Their thinking derives sense phenomena from expediency, only the explanations of expediency varied. The interpretations of aspirations and senses were different as were the opinions about the proper or improper realizations including the \textit{aisthesis} of pleasant or unpleasant. Historian of esthetic A. F. Losev stressed that the world of Plato’s ideas is this space of senses in which the divine and created worlds are contiguous.

In semiotics the sense and meaning of significant expression or sign can be excluded. Meaning in this case is that position of things in the concrete significant situation or in the system signs. One and the same sign
can show, according to the situation, different things and also can mark other signs.

Sign not also shows something, but also marks and tells something else, emphasizes something or raises significantly important peculiarities of that sign or of its signification. Conventional affirmation or code becomes the condition of the sense of sign; this can be changed by text and context if situated with the concrete event. Linguistic semantics gives some sense of reference of the text to realia.

Socially the texts that have meanings of general cultural realities can present cultural values and successfully realize oppositions of senses and meanings. Hermeneutically treated the text needs to relate not only to historical and socio-cultural realities, but also to the reconstruction of the intentions of the text’s creator. This is because sense does not exist in the signs, but appears only when touched by consciousness, which feels the thinking. The signs and their sets in texts are the realization of creator’s intentions, which expresses the creators’ sense by material/significant form which is not sense but just its sign.

It is the condition of communication which gives an opportunity for sense to become a meaning. Its purpose is not to limit itself by opining concrete meaning, but first of all to be able by its distinctness to stimulate experiences and other forms of aisthesis. In them is hidden what is urgent and alive, still lacking the form of language derivation of sense is hidden. The intention, motives and wishes of the creator who creates signs, has very significant impact on the context where the situation forms and develops the need of the spiritual event which prompts the establishment of the senses.

We must never forget that the event can be significant really formed material and phenomenal preconditions. However, the event already belongs to the world of phenomenon, which is essentially characterized by senses and any understanding can happen without it. Any situation, if there are no early fragments of sense or pre-sense components which would rouse mental activity, would be absurd and completely meaningless. This would destroy the possibility of each activity as well as it would forbid self-knowledge and self-understanding. Such pre sense components are the human body, unreflective experience, self-understanding, subconsciousness and the dynamics of physical, cultural and emotional needs.

The derivation of sense is ensured by aisthesis. Why is aisthesis one of the most important ways of establishment/giving sense? Because the aisthesis process crystallizes the base of the difference between values and nonvalues, between the experiences of positive, negative or of compound nature. Human emotions are made in such way as to be enabled instinctively; when it is understood-deliberately they avoid destructive experiences and emotions. Positive, negative and the emotions of a compound nature directly participate in the establishment of sense. They create the connection between senses, valuable activity and the world of values. Grown from aisthesis and based on them senses usually are
unverbalized and left without special forms of logical understanding which is characteristic of reflection.

As knowledge, even in Antiquity, they were named dark knowing or even opinion. However, epistemology is not that sphere of reflection which allows one to look for answers about the derivation of sense, its nature and purpose or their ontological localization; this sphere resembles to Plato eidos world. Though senses’ relation with language, experience, imagination, truth and knowledge information is questionized, esthetology is mostly interested the aspect of relations where the participating role of aisthesis revealed and where the types of aisthesis clears up when derived from the senses. The application of sense meanings to philosophical thinking on immanence and transcendence, to recognition of culture and values are partly culturological or probably a related problem of esthetics or esthetology.

The postmodern interpretation of sense, according to formation philosopher G. Deleuze, states that world of sense has the problematic position. This statement, as it seems, is based upon fundamental postmodern cultural idea about total postmodern cultural chaos, which J. Kristeva described as the confidence of being meaningless. J. Baudrillard speaks of this a little more liberally: we live in the universe in which everyday is more and more information and less and less sense. It is the catastrophe of sense, – affirms the philosopher.

We can easily mention that the diminution of sense connects with experience’s atrophy and anesthesia, with narrowing scales of values or with a deformed hierarchy, as well as with, the emotional poverty of a great part of humanity. It’s true to say that the problem is that in some point we are very indifferent. This is a meaningful proposition which reveals the challenge to enlightenment rationalism of the 20th century and to the apologists of knowledge activities for whom sometimes linguistic, sometimes logical discourse prevails.

Mostly it is theoretical thinking which raises above all branches of human activity and which sees everything by only its theoretical aspect. This ignores aisthesis and its meaning for axiological development as well as for practice. Conceptually a flat rationalism and utilitarism having arisen to the top often treats emotions like atavism and the lack of mind like degeneration. Actually, this perspective is rejected because of a wish to avoid the different types of aesthetic conflicts in theoretical thinking and rationalism. Aisthesis of a chaotic and broken postmodern world verbal terms is dictating many languages in the region of thought – non-canonical discourse’s strategies, polylogic, instability of a text’s semantics’, the chaos of meanings and codes, the disappearance of values and non-values, and oppositional logical structures and their bounds. It is difficult to disagree with all this recognition, but do we always understand the ambivalence of such phenomena?

The interpretation of the sense in Arabian Muslim’s philosophy is very different from its explanation in classical and postmodern Western
philosophy. The concepts of sense relation with the thing, as with the thing that is marked and with the sign, are understood differently than the tradition of the West affirms. Oriental thinking does not specially define sense. The context of conception comes from universally understood references to the sense when it is affirmed by writing, quest, mimic by fingers position and the position of things.

Word needs to be understood like a structure, in which affirmation is fixed with the sense relation. Such relation is understood not as accidental but as a correct relation. So affirmation is different from meaningless sound which does not give sense and from sign which can be used for accidental showings to some things, whereas the human is different as a chosen and given name.

The mental move from aisthesis to sense during affirmation in verbal or non-verbal texts, and also in the opposite direction could be accepted as an establishment of sense, but also as understanding because it very often understands by using synonyms. Understanding proceeds accidentally and expresses like the illumination of consciousness. P. Ricoeur marks another aspect: it is necessary to delimit two steps of understanding: ‘senses’ or what was said and ‘meaning’s’ when the sense is taken by the reader in his experience. So the concrete truth and its meaning can be opened for the understanding person; the sense hides in itself the aisthesis event. The expression of sense establishes the personification of the meaningful values to the community. This may have two directions: one, when the sense becomes a universally valuable meaning, and the second, when human values by the way of aisthesis are personified and take on individual sense. The first version prevails in different branches of creation, the second in education and development. For the natural creation of sense and its right understanding sometimes affirmation is adverbialized by a figurative sense or allegory. Then affirmation consciously is fit not for its own but for the other sense.

The affirmation/sense of binary combine is explained in the thinking of Arabian Muslim’s by another fundamental couple of concepts – obvious/hidden. So understanding reveals as obvious the hidden sense’s transformation to the obvious and present. The presence of various senses in one affirmation is acknowledged in rhetoric and poetry as well as the opportunity to show one or the same sense by different affirmations.

An original opportunity for sense’s formation appears when the understanding person creates them from aisthesis, which arise not by means of verbal expression. Mostly non-verbal code is deployed in design, in various ceremonies and games, art, theatre, pantomime, music, and cinema.

Helped by hermeneutics, esthetology affirms that experiences, given according to truth’s significance and value, are rooted in our living situations. That means: our interests calling back experienced aisthesis senses participating in inside conversation which we continue with ourselves and with others. Our inner soul’s conversation is opposing the
possibility of explaining the sense of self, whether willed or using self – discretion.

The ability to establish sense from aisthesis, the ability to express them, to criticize, and using them as an intellectual place and space is *verbium interius*; it is conversation with myself by which everyone is given over to the self understanding implicated by aisthesis and achieves self-understanding. Any conversation with me has as one of the most important conditions – aisthesis, as a precondition of our being and by the signs of different languages able to participate in communication. The reference of H. – G. Gadamer to inside conversation (meaning dialogue) related, according to Jean Grondin, with Heidegger’s reading of St. A. Augustin: that learning about *verbium interius* is an answer about hermeneutics universality (Grondin 2001). That *verbium interius*, according to St. A. Augustin is the voice of heart, in presenday horizons seems like aisthesis, only with cover of verbal language.

For us, the statement of Gadamer could also mean that question about the connection between aisthesis components, understanding and the origin of sense are essentially situated with esthetics transformation to esthetology and foresees the acknowledgement of esthetic activity as its object or the field of its investigations. Moreover – in aisthesis the senses with respect to formation have pre linguistic and linguistic phases. A pre-linguistic phase does not mean intellectual and linguistic value, but just a formative position in the respect to time. If logic can be treated as a general theory of truth, then esthetics could be the theory of establishing senses by the way of aisthesis. This theory would be valid not only to sensitive and emotional experiences, but also to intellectual aisthesis insights. With some smile, in the end such a proposition is possible: aisthesis is the mother of sense, thinking – its father; and language – its midwife. Speaking seriously, it must be stated that esthetology will feel the need to obtain some philosophical interpretation of aisthesis, to return to theoretical and practical problems of spirituality and the education of creativity, to form new humanitarian education, the strategies of self understanding and self creativity, which need nowadays can not be overestimated.

*Lithuanian Association of Aesthetes
Vilnius, Lithuania*

**REFERENCES**


*Aisthesis: Wahrnehmung heute oder Perspektiven einer anderer Aesthetik.


INDEX

A
academic philosophy, 36, 39
Ackoff, 16
Aidai, 74
aisthesis, 181-205
Althusser, L., 18
altruism, 5
ancient philosophy, 3, 44
Aristotle, 7, 26, 51, 145, 151-153, 186, 195, 201
Arrow of Time, 19
Ashby W. R., 16
Ashford N., 168, 169
Augustine A., 51, 186, 194, 195
autonomy, 31, 48, 63, 134, 136

B
Bachtin M., 17-18, 22, 192
Badiou A., 28
Bahm J., 19
Baltic countries, 3-4, 59-67
Baltic Identity, 4, 67
Barnett R., 144-145
Barthes R., 187
Baudrillard J., 48, 203
Bauman Z., 63, 79, 96
Baumgarten A. G., 186, 196
Beardsley, M. C., 188
Beauchamp, 134, 136
Belohradsky V., 85
Bergson H., 183, 188, 194
bioethics, 6, 123-124, 129-138
biomedical sciences, 6, 123-124, 129, 131, 135, 138
Bobbio N., 133
Boethius A. M., 27
Bohm, 70
Boh N., 19
boredom, 32
Born M., 20
Bourdieu P., 80, 116, 188
Braudel F., 52
Brzezinski Z., 63
Buddha, 19
Cable V., 63
Callahan, 129, 130
Camus A., 46
Castells M., 106
causal efficiency, 34
chaos, 5, 120
Christianity, 53, 76
Cicero, 152
civil society, 4, 85, 103, 105, 112
civilizations, 59, 60, 96, 98, 152
civism, 12
common sense, 2, 13, 28, 41
communication, 3, 31, 34, 35, 36, 59, 64-65, 70-71, 82, 119, 130, 131, 153, 200, 205
comparative esthetic, 189
complexity, 11, 14, 20
conformism, 46, 77
consumption, 44, 46, 113-118
contemporary philosophy, 1, 3, 11-12, 17, 21, 23, 39, 44
contradiction, 11
Cotta S., 133
creativity, 20-21, 45, 71
critical approach, 17, 144
Croce B., 186
Crusader knights, 60
cultural diversity, 1, 7, 12, 14, 21, 27-28, 90-91, 114, 130, 133, 137, 153
cultural heritage, 5, 82, 89, 95, 102-106
culture, 2, 12, 25-29, 30-31, 36, 39-42, 45, 48, 61, 63, 65, 66, 69, 71-76, 80-86, 112, 114-115, 120, 126, 133
culture of tolerance, 4, 69, 72, 78, 80, 84, 85, 86
cybernetics, 22, 23

D

D’Agostino, 131, 136
Dahrendorf R., 105
Danelski D., 178
Dante, 40
Deleuze G., 188, 190, 195, 197, 203
democracy, 4, 53-54, 69, 73, 97-98, 112, 153
Democritus, 51
Demtrid J., 188, 197
Descartes R., 17, 52, 198
destiny, 42, 44, 46, 59
determinism, 14, 18
Dewey J., 37
dialogue, 1-2, 4, 6, 11-14, 18, 23, 69-71, 74, 77-78, 80-86, 152
Dilthey W., 183, 194-195, 198
discussion, 1, 30, 59, 70, 77, 85
disorder, 11, 18, 119
distinction, 13
dogma, 2, 12
Duméry H., 28
duties, 7, 62, 154-164

E

Eastern culture, 19
ecology, 5, 15, 112
education, 1, 7, 13, 60-61, 64-66
Eliade M., 120
Emery F. E., 16
Engelhardt, 124, 130
entropy, 14, 23
Epicurus, 152
equality, 7, 69, 121, 153, 158, 162
equilibrium, 16, 19
esthetic, 8, 183-205
esthetology, 8, 181-182, 185-195, 198-205
Estonia, 60, 65, 75
ethnic culture, 60, 63, 66
European culture, 14, 51, 144
European Union, 4, 67, 69, 72-73, 91, 105, 165-166
Evans-Prichard E., 167
evolution, 4, 11

F

fanaticism, 17, 75
feedback relation, 2, 12, 14, 18, 23
feminist, 6, 111
Finland, 61
Foucault M., 81, 118, 149, 188-189
Fourier Ch., 14
freedom, 14, 31, 45, 53, 69, 75, 112, 153, 159
Freidson E., 149
Freud S., 39
Friedman J., 63
Fromm E., 19, 21
Fukuyama F., 166, 174
fundamental theories, 15

G

Gadamer H. G., 171, 184, 189, 193, 195, 205
Gény Fr., 132
Girnius J., 28, 75
Glendon M. A., 132-133
globalization, 1, 19, 31-34, 53, 59, 63, 67, 81, 97, 99, 100, 106, 113, 166-170, 174-176
Go West, 67
Goethe J., 20
Greimas A., 13, 183, 195, 200-201
Grusas Juozas, 77

H

Habermas J., 152
Haeflner G., 171
Hayek Fr., 169
healthcare, 123, 129, 134, 144, 145, 146
Hegel G., 15, 19, 23, 188, 195
Heisenberg W., 13, 19-20
Helvetius C. A., 41
Heraclitus, 19, 51
historical consciousness, 4, 85, 103
historical memory, 5, 99, 102, 104, 106
Hobbes T., 41, 53, 152
Hobsbawn E., 63
Huizinga J., 47
human being, 6, 21, 54, 133, 136, 138, 146, 147, 151
human dignity, 4, 6, 69, 76, 78, 124, 135, 136, 137, 138
human genome, 137, 146-149
human values, 1, 13, 77, 204
humaneness, 22, 44
humankind, 2, 13, 21, 28-31, 33-34, 39, 49, 53

I

identity, 1, 28-29, 72-73, 111-118, 121
images of woman, 118
imbalance, 11, 14, 17, 157
information, 1, 3, 15, 21, 26, 31, 34-36, 59, 63-66, 70
infrastructure, 61
integration, 3, 22, 51, 67, 112, 121, 167
intellectuals, 4, 45, 60, 62, 64, 69, 72-86, 111, 136
intelligentsia, 4, 72, 77-79, 83-86
interdisciplinary, 56, 130
invariants, 18
irony, 76
irreversibility, 14

J

Jaspers K., 28, 47
Jewish, 60
Jonas, 77, 130
Jonsen, 130

K

Kant I., 21
Kavolis V., 74, 92
Kierkegaard S., 21, 187, 194
Knowles, 129, 134
Kristeva J., 196
Kung H., 159
Kurnitzky H., 103
Kymlicka W., 125

L

Lacan J., 199
Latvia, 60, 65, 75
Lefebvre H., 119
legal personalism, 158
Leibniz G. W., 17, 52
Levi A. W., 27
Lévi-Strauss Cl., 14
lifestyle, 45, 116
limitations, 18, 29, 54, 113
Lithuania, 3-4, 59, 60, 65, 69, 74-78, 83-86, 99, 114-115, 118
locality, 1, 3-5, 59, 63-64, 67, 121
Locke J., 152
logic, 7, 11, 52-53
Losev A., 21
Luhmann, 115
Lytard J. F., 132, 140, 189

M

Maceina A., 27
Machacek, 127
Machiavelli N., 41
Maclin, 136
Maljean-Dubois, 130
Marcuse H., 71
marginal, 111, 119
Marshall, 136
Martin Buber, 172
Marx K., 39-40
Maslow A., 21, 168
mass culture, 36, 44, 80, 84, 117, 187
Massey D., 118, 120
Mauss M., 188
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May R.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maziarz Edward A.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLean G.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLuhan M.</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medical ethics</td>
<td>123-124, 129, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medical technology</td>
<td>7, 143-144, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merleau-Ponty M.</td>
<td>183, 188, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meta-philosophy</td>
<td>2, 12, 25-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metmenys</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meyerson D.</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miller III J. F.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minorities</td>
<td>4, 53, 69, 78, 86, 125-127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modern culture</td>
<td>3, 14, 31, 37, 42, 45-449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modernity</td>
<td>5, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monologue</td>
<td>4, 69-71, 75-78, 80, 85-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montaigne M.</td>
<td>186, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morin E.</td>
<td>18, 20, 22-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiculturalism</td>
<td>6, 124-127, 133-135, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munro T.</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murphy R.</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myths</td>
<td>14, 23, 51-52, 55, 63, 72-73, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nation</td>
<td>4-5, 28, 39, 53, 59, 60, 63-66, 73-77, 81, 91, 99-103, 111-115, 120-121, 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>native language</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural sciences</td>
<td>13, 17, 19, 22, 28, 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton I.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nietzsche</td>
<td>39, 41-44, 52, 183, 187, 194-195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nisbet R.</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomenclature</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nussbaum M.</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakshott M.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oelschlaeger M.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>openness</td>
<td>3, 12, 14, 17, 19-20, 23, 59, 66, 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>order</td>
<td>5, 11, 16, 31, 111, 119, 164, 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ortega y Gasset J.</td>
<td>42, 45, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palazzani</td>
<td>130, 135-136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paradigm</td>
<td>12, 16, 18, 22, 112, 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paradigm of science</td>
<td>1, 6, 11-12, 18, 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascal B.</td>
<td>186, 194, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pececi A.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pellegrino</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personality</td>
<td>1, 12-15, 21-23, 28, 42-44, 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>philosophy of art</td>
<td>181, 184, 187-188, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piaget J.</td>
<td>22, 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato</td>
<td>40-45, 51, 151-153, 186, 194-195, 201, 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pluralism</td>
<td>31, 69, 71, 112, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popper K. R.</td>
<td>13, 17-18, 93, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practice</td>
<td>16, 21, 27-28, 112, 113, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prigogine I.</td>
<td>19, 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probability</td>
<td>14, 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>process</td>
<td>12, 14, 17-19, 53, 73, 112, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procrustes</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>productive thinking</td>
<td>15, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussians</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public space</td>
<td>4, 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pythagoras</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quality of life</td>
<td>6, 7, 45, 47, 111, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratio</td>
<td>6, 137, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rationality</td>
<td>12, 28-29, 43, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawls J.</td>
<td>7, 152, 178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
regional autonomy, 3, 59
relation, 69
religious diversity, 123, 127-128, 134
religious pluralism, 128
Repsys J., 75
resistance, 60-61, 65-66, 73-77
responsibility, 12, 21, 47, 111, 113, 116
Rickert H., 17
Rorty R., 37
Rousseau, 40
rule of law, 4, 69, 78, 159
Russell B., 20
Russianization, 60

S

Sajudis, 73, 83
Sand G., 40
Santayana G., 187
Sartre J. P., 18
Schelsky H., 21
Schmidt H., 159
Schopenhauer A., 186, 194
Schrödinger E., 20-21
Schutz A., 172
secularization, 40, 128, 133
self-assertion, 5, 53
self-awareness, 4, 101
self-criticism, 18
self-developing systems, 12, 16
Sezeman V., 189, 195
Shaftsbury A., 186
simulacra, 48, 84, 199
Sliogeris, 87
Smith D. A., 90
social behavior, 5, 18, 168
social development, 1, 7, 16, 165, 170, 173, 179
social integration, 1, 167
social philosophy, 11-13, 22
social psychology, 22
social sciences, 1, 5-6, 14, 31, 111-113
social security, 7, 93, 166, 174-175, 179
social space, 1, 115
sociality, 1, 32, 37, 47, 69-72, 74, 118, 120
society, 5, 23, 111-114, 119, 121
Socrates, 41
Soviet Union, 4, 62-63, 66, 69, 73, 76, 79
Spinoza B., 52, 197
Spirito U., 14
spiritual life, 5, 34, 95, 120
stability, 16, 18, 63, 113, 164
statehood, 5, 64, 103-104
static, 12, 16, 17, 19
Stengers J., 19
supranational, 5, 89-92, 96
system, 15-16, 18, 23, 34-35, 49, 59, 73, 115

T

Taylor Ch., 125
technological rationality, 17, 144
technological security, 147
telecommunication, 146
terrorism, 36, 49, 151, 161, 166, 170-171, 174
theory of systems, 14, 16-17, 19-20, 22-23
Thomas Aquinas, 117
Thommasa D., 130
Toffler A., 22
tolerance, 4, 67-73, 81, 86, 125, 152
Toulmin St., 20, 29
tradition, 4-5, 25, 41, 69, 73-76, 86
trial and error, 15
truth, 1, 11, 15-17, 21, 23, 28, 54

U

universal, 5-6, 26-29, 32, 36-37, 39, 53, 63, 65, 71, 113

V

values, 4, 6-7, 28, 34, 40-42, 45-46, 51, 60, 63-66, 69, 71, 77-86,
Index

114-115, 120, 124, 138, 153, 183-197, 200-204
virtual reality, 3, 34-36, 45
Volanas A., 152

Weber M., 17
Wertheimer M., 13-17, 20, 22
Western civilization, 6, 60, 92, 98-99, 169, 175-176
Wiener N., 19
Woozley A., 26
World War I., 60
World War II, 61, 166

Walzer M., 82, 133
THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH
IN VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY

PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Studies in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

PROJECTS

A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.

2. Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues. This series of 10 week crosscultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.
3. Joint-Colloquia with Institutes of Philosophy of the National Academies of Science, university philosophy departments, and societies. Underway since 1976 in Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these concern the person in contemporary society.

4. Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development. A study in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of education and character development. This work has been underway since 1980.

The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Colombia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.

PUBLICATIONS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CONTEMPORARY CHANGE

Series I. Culture and Values
Series II. Africa
Series IIA. Islam
Series III. Asia
Series IV. W. Europe and North America
Series IVA. Central and Eastern Europe
Series V. Latin America
Series VI. Foundations of Moral Education
Series VII. Seminars on Culture and Values

*****************************************************************

CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CONTEMPORARY CHANGE

Series I. Culture and Values

1.1 Research on Culture and Values: Intersection of Universities, Churches and Nations. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 0819173533 (paper); 0819173525 (cloth).

1.2 The Knowledge of Values: A Methodological Introduction to the Study of Values; A. Lopez Quintas, ed. ISBN 081917419x (paper); 0819174181 (cloth).

1.3 Reading Philosophy for the XX1st Century. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 0819174157 (paper); 0819174149 (cloth).

1.4 Relations Between Cultures. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180089 (paper); 1565180097 (cloth).

1.5 Urbanization and Values. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180100 (paper); 1565180119 (cloth).
I.6 The Place of the Person in Social Life. Paul Peachey and John A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 1565180127 (paper); 156518013-5 (cloth).


I.17 Ways to God, Personal and Social at the Turn of Millennia: The Iqbal Lecture, Lahore. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181239 (paper).


I.25 Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness, Vietnamese Philosophical Studies, I. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181662 (paper).

I.35 Karol Wojtyla’s Philosophical Legacy. Agnes B. Curry, Nancy Mardas and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 9781565182479 (paper).

Series II. Africa

II.1 Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies: I. Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, eds. ISBN 1565180046 (paper); 1565180054 (cloth).
II.3 Identity and Change in Nigeria: Nigerian Philosophical Studies, I. Theophilus Okere, ed. ISBN 1565180682 (paper).


Series IIA. Islam


IIA.3 Philosophy in Pakistan. Naeem Ahmad, ed. ISBN 1565181085 (paper).

IIA.4 The Authenticity of the Text in Hermeneutics. Seyed Musa Dibadj. ISBN 1565181174 (paper).


IIA.6 Ways to God, Personal and Social at the Turn of Millennia: The Iqbal Lectures, Lahore. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181239 (paper).


IIA.8 Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, III. Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X (paper).
IIA.9 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History. Russian Philosophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev, Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 1565181336 (paper).


IIA.14 Philosophy of the Muslim World; Authors and Principal Themes. Joseph Kenny. ISBN 1565181794 (paper).

IIA.15 Islam and Its Quest for Peace: Jihad, Justice and Education. Mustafa Köylü. ISBN 1565181808 (paper).


IIA.17 Hermeneutics, Faith, and Relations between Cultures: Lectures in Qom, Iran. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181913 (paper).

IIA.18 Change and Essence: Dialectical Relations between Change and Continuity in the Turkish Intellectual Tradition. Sinasi Gunduz and Cafer S. Yaran, eds. ISBN 1565182227 (paper).


Series III. Asia

III.1 Man and Nature: Chinese Philosophical Studies, I. Tang Yi-jie, Li Zhen, eds. ISBN 0819174130 (paper); 0819174122 (cloth).

III.2 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development: Chinese Philosophical Studies, II. Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN 1565180321 (paper); 156518033X (cloth).

III.3 Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture: Chinese Philosophical Studies, III. Tang Yijie. ISBN 1565180348 (paper); 156518035-6 (cloth).

III.4 Morality, Metaphysics and Chinese Culture (Metaphysics, Culture and Morality, I). Vincent Shen and Tran van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180275 (paper); 156518026-7 (cloth).

III.5 Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565180313 (paper); 156518030-5 (cloth).

III.6 Psychology, Phenomenology and Chinese Philosophy: Chinese Philosophical Studies, VI. Vincent Shen, Richard Knowles and Tran Van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180453 (paper); 1565180445 (cloth).
III.7 Values in Philippine Culture and Education: Philippine Philosophical Studies, I. Manuel B. Dy, Jr., ed. ISBN 1565180412 (paper); 156518040-2 (cloth).


III.8 The Filipino Mind: Philippine Philosophical Studies II. Leonardo N. Mercado. ISBN 156518064X (paper); 156518063-1 (cloth).

III.9 Philosophy of Science and Education: Chinese Philosophical Studies IX. Vincent Shen and Tran Van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180763 (paper); 156518075-5 (cloth).


III.18 The Poverty of Ideological Education: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XVIII. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181646 (paper).


III.20 Cultural Impact on International Relations: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XX. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 156518176X (paper).

III.21 Cultural Factors in International Relations: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXI. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 1565182049 (paper).

III.22 Wisdom in China and the West: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXII. Vincent Shen and Willard Oxtoby †. ISBN 1565182057 (paper).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III.24</td>
<td>Shanghai: Its Urbanization and Culture: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXIV. Yu Xuanmeng and He Xirong, eds. ISBN 1565182073 (paper).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.26</td>
<td>Rethinking Marx: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXVI. Zou Shipeng and Yang Xuegong, eds. ISBN 9781565182448 (paper).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.27</td>
<td>Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Prospect: Chinese Philosophical Studies XXVII. Vincent Shen and Kwong-loi Shun, eds. ISBN 9781565182455 (paper).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB.1</td>
<td>Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger: Indian Philosophical Studies, I. Vensus A. George. ISBN 1565181190 (paper).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB.2</td>
<td>The Experience of Being as Goal of Human Existence: The Heideggerian Approach: Indian Philosophical Studies, II. Vensus A. George. ISBN 156518145X (paper).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB.4</td>
<td>Self-Realization [Brahmaanubhava]: The Advaitic Perspective of Shankara: Indian Philosophical Studies, IV. Vensus A. George. ISBN 1565181549 (paper).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB.5</td>
<td>Gandhi: The Meaning of Mahatma for the Millennium: Indian Philosophical Studies, V. Kuruvilla Pandikattu, ed. ISBN 1565181565 (paper).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB.6</td>
<td>Civil Society in Indian Cultures: Indian Philosophical Studies, VI. Asha Mukherjee, Sabujkali Sen (Mitra) and K. Bagchi, eds. ISBN 1565181573 (paper).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB.9</td>
<td>Sufism and Bhakti, a Comparative Study: Indian Philosophical Studies, VII. Md. Sirajul Islam. ISBN 1565181980 (paper).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB.11</td>
<td>Lifeworlds and Ethics: Studies in Several Keys: Indian Philosophical Studies, IX. Margaret Chatterjee. ISBN 9781565182332 (paper).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IIIB.13 *Faith, Reason, Science: Philosophical Reflections with Special Reference to Fides et Ratio: Indian Philosophical Studies, XIII.* Varghese Manimala, ed. ISBN 9781565182554 (paper).

IIIC.1 *Spiritual Values and Social Progress: Uzbekistan Philosophical Studies, I.* Said Shermukhamedov and Victoriya Levinskaya, eds. ISBN 1565181433 (paper).


IIIC.3 *Social Memory and Contemporaneity: Kyrgyz Philosophical Studies, I.* Gulnara A. Bakieva. ISBN 9781565182349 (paper).

IIID.1 *Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness: Vietnamese Philosophical Studies, I.* Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181662 (paper).


IIID.4 *Filipino Cultural Traits: Claro R. Ceniza Lectures.* Rolando M. Gripaldo, ed. ISBN 1565182251 (paper).


IIID.6 *Relations between Religions and Cultures in Southeast Asia.* Gadis Arivia and Donny Gahral Adian, eds. ISBN 9781565182509 (paper).

Series IV. Western Europe and North America


IV.4 *Speaking of God.* Carlo Huber. ISBN 1565181697 (paper).

IV.5 *The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age.* Paulo Janni and George F. McLean, eds. ISBB 1565181778 (paper).


Series IVA. Central and Eastern Europe

IVA.1 *The Philosophy of Person: Solidarity and Cultural Creativity: Polish Philosophical Studies, I.* A. Tischner, J.M. Zycinski, eds. ISBN 1565180496 (paper); 156518048-8 (cloth).
IVA.2 Public and Private Social Inventions in Modern Societies: Polish Philosophical Studies, II. L. Dyczewski, P. Peachey, J.A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN.paper 1565180518 (paper); 156518050X (cloth).
IVA.3 Traditions and Present Problems of Czech Political Culture: Czechoslovak Philosophical Studies, I. M. Bednár and M. Vejraka, eds. ISBN 1565180577 (paper); 156518056-9 (cloth).
IVA.4 Czech Philosophy in the XXth Century: Czech Philosophical Studies, II. Lubomír Nový and Jirí Gabriel, eds. ISBN 1565180291 (paper); 156518028-3 (cloth).
IVA.5 Language, Values and the Slovak Nation: Slovak Philosophical Studies, I. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gašparí-ková, eds. ISBN 1565180372 (paper); 156518036-4 (cloth).
IVA.6 Morality and Public Life in a Time of Change: Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, I. V. Prodanov and A. Davidov, eds. ISBN 1565180550 (paper); 1565180542 (cloth).
IVA.7 Knowledge and Morality: Georgian Philosophical Studies, I. N.V. Chavchavadze, G. Nodia and P. Peachey, eds. ISBN 1565180534 (paper); 1565180526 (cloth).
IVA.8 Cultural Heritage and Social Change: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, I. Bronius Kuzmickas and Aleksandr Dobrynin, eds. ISBN 1565180399 (paper); 1565180380 (cloth).
IVA.12 Creating Democratic Societies: Values and Norms: Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, II. Plamen Makariev, Andrew M. Blasko and Asen Davidov, eds. ISBN 156518131X (paper).
IVA.13 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History: Russian Philosophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 1565181336 (paper).
IVA.14 Values and Education in Romania Today: Romanian Philosophical Studies, I. Marin Calin and Magdalena Dumitrana, eds. ISBN 1565181344 (paper).
IVA.18 Human Dignity: Values and Justice: Czech Philosophical Studies, III. Miloslav Bednar, ed. ISBN 1565181409 (paper).
IVA.19 **Values in the Polish Cultural Tradition: Polish Philosophical Studies, III.** Leon Dyczewski, ed. ISBN 1565181425 (paper).

IVA.20 **Liberalization and Transformation of Morality in Post-communist Countries: Polish Philosophical Studies, IV.** Tadeusz Buksinski. ISBN 1565181786 (paper).

IVA.21 **Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, III.** Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X (paper).

IVA.22 **Moral, Legal and Political Values in Romanian Culture: Romanian Philosophical Studies, IV.** Mihaela Czobor-Lupp and J. Stefan Lupp, eds. ISBN 1565181700 (paper).


IVA.24 **Romania: Cultural Identity and Education for Civil Society: Romanian Philosophical Studies, V.** Magdalena Dumitrana, ed. ISBN 156518209X (paper).

IVA.25 **Polish Axiology: the 20th Century and Beyond: Polish Philosophical Studies, V.** Stanislaw Jedynak, ed. ISBN 1565181417 (paper).

IVA.26 **Contemporary Philosophical Discourse in Lithuania: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, IV.** Jurate Baranova, ed. ISBN 1565182154 (paper).

IVA.27 **Eastern Europe and the Challenges of Globalization: Polish Philosophical Studies, VI.** Tadeusz Buksinski and Dariusz Dobrzanski, ed. ISBN 1565182189 (paper).

IVA.28 **Church, State, and Society in Eastern Europe: Hungarian Philosophical Studies, I.** Miklós Tomka. ISBN 156518226X (paper).


IVA.30 **Comparative Ethics in a Global Age: Russian Philosophical Studies II.** Marietta T. Stepanyants, eds. ISBN 978-1565182356 (paper).

IVA.31 **Identity and Values of Lithuanians: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, V.** Aida Savicka, eds. ISBN 9781565182367 (paper).


IVA.33 **Diversity and Dialogue: Culture and Values in the Age of Globalization: Essays in Honour of Professor George F. McLean.** Andrew Blasko and Plamen Makariev, eds. ISBN 9781565182387 (paper).

IVA.34 **Civil Society, Pluralism and Universalism: Polish Philosophical Studies, VIII.** Eugeniusz Gorski. ISBN 9781565182417 (paper).

IVA.35 **Romanian Philosophical Culture, Globalization, and Education: Romanian Philosophical Studies VI.** Stefan Popenici and Alin Tat and, eds. ISBN 9781565182424 (paper).
IVA.36  Political Transformation and Changing Identities in Central and Eastern Europe: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, VI. Andrew Blasko and Diana Janušauskienė, eds. ISBN 9781565182462 (paper).

IVA.37  Truth and Morality: The Role of Truth in Public Life: Romanian Philosophical Studies, VII. Wilhelm Dancă, ed. ISBN 9781565182493 (paper).


IVA.39  Knowledge and Belief in the Dialogue of Cultures, Russian Philosophical Studies, III. Marietta Stepanyants, ed. ISBN 9781565182622 (paper).


IVA.41  Dialogue among Civilizations, Russian Philosophical Studies, IV. Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 9781565182653 (paper).


Series V. Latin America

V.1  The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth).


V.4  Love as the Foundation of Moral Education and Character Development. Luis Ugalde, Nicolas Barros and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180801 (paper).


Series VI. Foundations of Moral Education


VI.3  Character Development in Schools and Beyond. Kevin Ryan and Thomas Lickona, eds. ISBN 1565180593 (paper); 156518058-5 (cloth).

VI.4  The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth).
VI.5 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development. Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN 1565180321 (paper); 156518033 (cloth).
VI.6 Love as the Foundation of Moral Education and Character Development. Luis Ugalde, Nicolas Barros and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180801 (paper).

Series VII. Seminars on Culture and Values

VII.1 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth).
VII.3 Relations Between Cultures. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180089 (paper); 1565180097 (cloth).
VII.7 Hermeneutics and Inculturation. George F. McLean, Antonio Gallo, Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181840 (paper).
VII.8 Culture, Evangelization, and Dialogue. Antonio Gallo and Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181832 (paper).
VII.9 The Place of the Person in Social Life. Paul Peachey and John A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 1565180127 (paper); 1565180135 (cloth).
VII.10 Urbanization and Values. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180100 (paper); 1565180119 (cloth).
VII.14 Democracy: In the Throes of Liberalism and Totalitarianism. George F. McLean, Robert Magliola, William Fox, eds. ISBN 1565181956 (paper).


VII.22 *Civil Society as Democratic Practice*. Antonio F. Perez, Semou Pathé Gueye, Yang Fengeong, eds. ISBN 1565182146 (paper).


VII.25 *Globalization and Identity*. Andrew Blasko, Taras Dobko, Pham Van Duc and George Pattery, eds. ISBN 1565182200 (paper).


**The International Society for Metaphysics**

ISM.1 *Person and Nature*. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819170267 (paper); 0819170259 (cloth).

ISM.2 *Person and Society*. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819169250 (paper); 0819169242 (cloth).

ISM.3 *Person and God*. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819169382 (paper); 0819169374 (cloth).

ISM.4 *The Nature of Metaphysical Knowledge*. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819169277 (paper); 0819169269 (cloth).

ISM.5 *Philosophical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization*. Oliva Blanchette, Tonomobu Imamichi and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565181298 (paper).
