The Idea of Solidarity: Philosophical and Social Contexts

Polish Philosophical Studies, X

Edited by
Dariusz Dobrzański

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
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*George F. McLean*


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INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s, ‘Solidarity’ suddenly emerged in Poland. It was not only the name of a trade union program but carried the weight of the rich cultural and religious heritage of the people. In the circumstances of Eastern Europe at the time it constituted a mass movement capable of sweeping aside not only the oppressive weight of post-World War II Soviet domination but even the Soviet Union itself. Among the movements of liberation from colonialism and racism, solidarity stands out as the most successful, the most swift and the most electrifying.

Because its roots were so deeply cultural and religious, despite its success it raises a series of questions regarding its compatibility with the individualism and pragmatism of the modern West of which we might mention the following three.

First, no matter how solidarity is understood: whether as a virtue of character represented by the attitude of the Good Samaritan, or as a feeling which is an attribute of human nature inevitably particular. This means that the precise form and content of the idea is defined on an individual basis by a particular community, which solidarity itself co-creates. Consequently, any claim to the universality of the concept may not be effective. This argument is sometimes supported additionally by another claim stating that the particularism assumed by solidarity inescapably leads to the exclusion of other communities, which are perceived as antagonistic.

Secondly, solidarity is criticized predominantly from the viewpoint of contemporary approaches related to liberal culture – usually incorporating such concepts as universality and a belief in the fundamental moral value of a free and responsible individual. In contrast, the collectivism postulated by solidarity attaches primary importance to community interests and values, and is regarded merely as an anachronistic legacy of pre-modern forms of collective identity, the essence of which does not lie on the individual. The individualism and nominalism of contemporary times is thus placed in opposition to “anachronistic” solidarity-based duties and obligations.

Thirdly, proposed structures of contemporary social order, which recognize solidarity as the overriding social principle, are often disapproved of. Some claims that the proposal for solidarity to regulate the organization of legal and procedural structures (e.g., of the state) potentially jeopardizes modern community institutions, such as the free market. They emphasize that solidarity, like charity, assumes something voluntary, which is why it cannot be recognized as a common law standard.

The present study was co-sponsored by the Institute of Philosophy of Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań and the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) in Washington. Its main aim is to explore the nature and to discuss thoroughly the criticisms and objections voiced regarding the idea of solidarity. The authors also attempt to reflect on
solidarity in the globalizing world of today. They analyze solidarity from three perspectives corresponding to (a) its essential nature, foundational principles, and praxis; (b) its ethical and moral implications; and (c) some related concrete socio-political issues its encounters. These three structure the work into three parts.


Chapter II, “From Freedom to Solidarity” by Tadeusz Buksiński, sets this theme in the context of the modern socio-political dynamics. In the West this encounters liberalism and its focus upon freedom. This engenders tension with individualism and equality. In the East solidarity emerges in the context of both the praxis and the ideology of Marxism and, famously, as its opponent in the 1980s.

Chapter III, “Religious Foundations of Solidarity” by John C. Carney, takes up this latter theme to show how it was implemented by John Paul II with the tools of phenomenology in the form of a cognitive praxis. This applied solidarity as a mass liberation movement which in the 1980s emerged swiftly and decisively on the world stage to end the Cold War and free the countries of Eastern Europe.

Chapter IV, “The Concept of Solidarity in August Cieszkowski’s Philosophical System” by Andrzej Wawrzynowicz, explores the religious roots of solidarity developed as a Christology. This begins from the terms “Our” in the Lord’s Prayer and expands to provide the universal and unitive vision of solidarity.

Chapter V, “On the Foundations of Human Solidarity: Gandhi’s Ideas of Non-Violence and on Christian All-embracing Love” by Włodzimierz Wilowski, extends the sense of solidarity to non-violence and explores the metaphysical justification of this in Gandhi’s Hindu thought and in Christian thought; with special concluding reference to the thought of John Paul II.

Part II, focuses on the ethical and moral import of solidarity. Here Chapter VI, “Solidarity and the Shape of Moral Space” by Piotr Boltuc, approaches the solidarity in terms of its establishment of moral space as non-homogeneous in its responsibilities but built, rather, in terms of patterns of solidarity.

Chapter VII, “The Golden Rule as an Ethos of Global Solidarity: A Philosophical Inquiry” by Josef Bordat, extends the range of solidarity in terms of the Golden Rule with its obligations of justice and benevolence. Solidarity directs us to take account not only of my needs and preferences but those of the other. The paper elaborates the implications for tolerance.

Chapter VIII, “Globalization and Recognition” by Jarema Jakubowski, approaches globalization from the Western perspective as a
process of its exteriorization. This is seen as entailing a process of recognition, which he studies and then applies to the global scale, with implication for removing development barriers and assuring world trade.

Part III turns to the socio-political order. Here Chapter IX, “Solidarity between Nature and Civilization” by Ryszard Liberkowski, works out an elaborate framework for locating solidarity in relation to both the evolution of nature and that of civilization as a whole. Here he focuses especially on human consciousness and ego formation as generating cultures and eventually civilizations.

Chapter X, “Cultural and Conceptual Meaning of Spiritual Identity: A Precondition of Human Solidarity” by Michal Jan Tadeusz Katafiasz, sees the need to separate the spiritual groundings of human identities from the particularities of specific cultures in order to make its proper contribution to unity and solidarity. This raises important issues of the feasibility and desirability of a spiritual force unrelated to the cultures by which people have shaped their identities.

Chapter XI, “The Problem of Moral Decline in Post-Soviet Ukraine” by Yaroslav Pasko, illustrates the problem by relating the moral decline of his post-Soviet Ukraine to such a back of cultural specificity by which the spiritual and moral forces of solidarity can be applied.

Chapter XII, “Freedom, Solidarity, Independence: Political Thought of the ‘Fighting Solidarity’ Organization” by Krzysztof Brzechczyn, presents an alternate form of solidarity. Its name “Fighting Solidarity” reflects its focus upon opposition to the Soviet imposition on Polish life. This received every limited support in contrast to the more positive effort of the solidarity movement as it held to and achieved its constructive agenda.

Chapter XIII, “The Rethoric of Solidarity and Identity in Belarusian Literary Sources: 6th-19th Centuries” by Olga Shutova, reflects the ambiguity of the Belarusia between Poland and the Lithuanian Kingdom on the one hand and Russia on the other. This leaves the great issue of how solidarity will function in the future as a unitive force in such border situations so crucial for building a new world order.

In sum, this work studies the nature of solidarity both as an idea and as a vast and transformative liberation movement in Eastern Europe and the Cold War; it proceeds to clarify its ethical and moral nature and implications; and concludes on a number of disputed issues such as its compatibility with the cosmopolitanism of the subsequent global age. It is truly a book for our times.
PART I

SOLIDARITY:
IT’S NATURE, PRINCIPLE AND PRAXIS
CHAPTER I

THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLIDARITY

DARIUSZ DOBRZANSKI

In contemporary culture reflection on human condition is now equipped with unique technical means and multiple possibilities of expression. All of these communicate the spirit of our time, namely freedom, which increasingly is becoming part of both the individual and the collective self-consciousness of our time. Formal and legal procedures in liberal democratic societies also provide guarantees for freedom.

All people want to be free, and freedom tends to be regarded as a natural entitlement. Societies which have enjoyed the benefit of freedom for a long time (that is, since the beginning of modern times) and which possess an institutional infrastructure necessary to achieve equal freedom (in economic, political, cultural aspects, etc.), tend to advocate joint and solidary restrictions on freedom, in the name of global responsibility. In contrast, societies which acquired freedom only recently and are currently struggling to manage it affectively (i.e. to institutionalise it), may be reluctant to curtail freedom in any aspect, even in the name of responsibility for a larger whole. Some even see any restriction of freedom as a limitation of the sovereign right to liberty and an attempt to sustain – or even extend – historic differences.

Regardless of what precisely is understood by freedom and what definition of freedom is adopted (and there is a plethora of them: be it “freedom from coercion”, “personal autonomy”, “self-rule” or “freedom from domination”), the contemporary shape of freedom is frequently debated. One of the questions often raised pertains to the status of freedom in the context of the growing interdependence between decision-makers, acting individuals, groups of people including societies, states, and institutional entities that by the development of technical knowledge go beyond the perspective of operating agents.

It does not seem likely that freedom, interpreted as a principle formally warranted by law and offering a foundation for human activity, can meet the demands of the human community currently undergoing the process of globalisation in its negative formula that is “freedom from”. Considering modern/post-modern practices of effective and axiologically valuable action, it seems crucial to reflect on yet other principles complementary to the principle of equal freedom. This is particularly a theme today, on account of the interdependency of processes with a concurrent deficiency of universally accepted authorities.
There are efforts to develop principles of responsibility, subsidiarity and solidarity as conceptualised by philosophy and law. Subsidiarity and solidarity are even institutionalised in the European law.

As Chantal Delsol points out, these principles stem from anthropologies related to the Aristotelian tradition, Christian thought (St. Thomas, Johannes Althusius) or the leftist 19th century thought (Leon Bourgeoise). Both principles are auxiliary in nature and even out the differences between the wealthy and the poor groups, regions and societies. Furthermore, they are applied in order to strengthen and stimulate action, enable autonomous decisions on the local level. Delsol explains the evident interest in the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity in Europe by invoking three phenomena which are inextricably linked to modernisation and integration processes, including:

a/ European integration, also in the political dimension (e.g. the idea of federalism),
b/ the questioning of the concept of the welfare state in the West due to the ongoing pauperisation of the public sector and the decline of civic attitudes, and
c/ the decline of totalitarian systems in Central and Eastern Europe.

Another author, Steinar Stjerno, in his recently published work *Solidarity in Europe. The History of an Idea* (2005), claims that the currently observed process of reflecting on solidarity has its roots in the growing cultural and ethnic European pluralism and is basically aimed at preventing the phenomena of xenophobia, exclusion and marginalisation by reflecting on commonly held values. In the future, it may lead to the establishment of international institutions operating on the basis of solidarity.

This study, focused on solidarity as a principle of action and cooperation from the viewpoint of social anthropology, will offer a brief outline of the history of the concept, deliberately passing over historic and semantic links of solidarity and its associated concept of fraternity. Then I will describe the attributes of solidarity. Finally, for discussion I will reconstruct the main political ideas related to the “practice of solidarity” realised by the Polish social movement, “Solidarity”, founded in 1980, and the current solidarity practice in Poland after 1989. I will put forward a thesis that it is freedom rather than solidarity that has been the central idea underlying the movement.

HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE IDEA OF SOLIDARITY

As Jadwiga Puzylnia notes, the family of words including the adjective *solidary* is international. The first European dictionary to list the adjective “solidary” was the dictionary of the French language (dating from the end of the 16th century), followed by English (1818) and German

The French adjective *solidaire* was initially used in the legal context, where it corresponded in meaning to the Latin legal term *in solidum*, i.e. “for the whole” or “jointly”, a phrase referring to the exercise of joint liabilities, mostly financial, between the debtor and the creditor. The term, used in the common law, after its codification by the Emperor Justinian the Great, found its place in *Corpus Iuris Civilis* (528–534). At that time, the common-usage meaning of the adjective “solidary” was “obligated to help family members”, respecting the maxim “all for one and one for all”.

Hauke Brunkhorst, in an extensive monograph on connections between democracy and solidarity, links the contemporary understanding of the concept to the creation and development of the republican tradition in politics (civic friendship) and Christian universalistic idea of brotherhood in love. According to J. E. S. Hayward, the history of the modern notion of solidarity is marked by a semantic evolution from the time when it signified *legal duty and obligation* until the period when solidarity – as a result of processes of democratisation and industrialisation (and the associated modern division of labour) – became a political and social idea and slogan. The latter period, Hayward claims, comprises three stages.

The first stage spans the period from the Great Revolution, 1789, until 1848, which Hayward refers to as a time of “solidarity as a mystique”. At the time, solidarity was a component of conservative speculations, “in the wave of Romantic and mystical nostalgia associated with so much of the reaction against rapid social change, consequent upon the intellectual, industrial, and political revolution which had first undermined and then destroyed the “organic” “closed” society.”

Solidarity as a mystique is discussed relatively extensively in the works of Joseph de Maistre.

The second stage distinguished by Hayward covers the period between 1849 and 1895 and is called “between mystique and politics”. The time was marked by a change in understanding solidarity: from a mystically perceived idea to a strictly political notion with a manifest practical and social slant. A major turning point in understanding solidarity in that way was the spectacular, though short-lived, success of the February Revolution of 1848, when selected social and political rights were granted to workers, including the right to strike, right of association, guaranteed employment and flexible working hours. The rights were achieved in a struggle under

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3 Ibidem, p. 257.
the banners of class solidarity. Consequently, the period may be called a time when solidarity expressed class interests.

Two activists are usually brought up when such issues are discussed: Louis Blanc, a revolutionary labour minister who established the so-called “social workshops” (a type of combined co-operative society and trade-union, where workmen contributed to the common benefit), and later, Leon Bourgeois, whom Hayward dubbed a secular “apostle of solidarity”. He was committed to the establishment of a programme of institutional social reforms called “solidarism”, which was supposed to execute projects of the solidarity-based republic initiated by Leroux, Comte, Blanc and Proudhon. As a result, solidarity came to be associated with the idea of social solidarism.

In a different article, Hayward observes that solidarism became the official social philosophy of the French Third Republic (1875–1914). It was critical of such programmes of organisation of social life as economic liberalism, Marxist collectivism, Catholic corporationism or anarchosyndicalism. Class solidarity was expressed with the language of rights, interests, emancipation, pursuit of freedom, class struggle and opposition. The period, Hayward claims, marks the third stage of the evolution of solidarity when it started to be associated with the idea of solidarism. Hayward stresses that from 1896 onwards solidarity fulfilled the role of a “dogmatic credo” in the process of implementing a number of social reforms, ranging from educational to political. Hayward also notes that in the period discussed it was actually fashionable to use the word “solidarity”, both in the language of the street and in the language of diplomacy.

Complementing Hayward’s exposition, it is interesting to note that the same period saw a parallel development of a current of thought concentrated around Christian solidarity. The main representative of the trend was Heinrich Pesch, a Jesuit priest and author of an extensive five-volume teaching guide to economics in which solidarity is discussed in four major areas: economy, politics, philosophy and social ethics. Priority is given to the idea of the solidarity of the entire humankind, rooted in the idea of the original sin and God’s family embracing all people.

The ideas put forward by Pesch were further developed in the area of Catholic social science by G. Gundlach, who also took up another problem, that of subsidiarity (Subsidiaritatsprinzip). The discussion was

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7. Gustav Gundlach, Solidarismus, Einzelmensch, Gemeinschaft (Gregorianum 17, 1936).
continued by John Paul II who treated solidarity not only as “the principle and obligation of appropriate social and individual development but also as a theological virtue”.

The most extensive analysis of solidarity proposed by John Paul II is included in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (*On Social Concern*). A significant novel element in Pope’s investigations, from the point of view of the social teaching of the Catholic Church, is the fact that the Pope presents solidarity not only as an attitude adopted by an individual, but as a virtue, as is illustrated in the quotation below:

A proper response to the interdependence thus understood (interdependence of processes operating in the contemporary world – note by D.D.) – as a moral and social attitude, as a *virtue* – is solidarity. It is not, therefore, an undetermined feeling of compassion or superficial sentiment arising in reaction to evil affecting people, either close or distant to you. Quite the opposite, solidarity signifies a strong and lasting will to be committed for the *common good*, that is the good of all the people and every single person, for we are *all* genuinely responsible for all others.⁹

Summing up Hayward and my argument so far, it should be noted that the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century saw an extension of the context in which “solidarity” was used.

The context went beyond the domain of law, and progressing politisation of the notion. In the period discussed, in addition to being a legal term, solidarity also grew into:

a/ a political idea and slogan, raised mainly by Socialist and Christian fractions and political groups,

b/ a liberal principle of cooperation acting as a foundation for the market economy. Progressing division of labour and unity of interests of employers and employees forces mutual interdependence (J. B. Say), and
c/ an argument in the criticism of the concept of organisation of social order in the millenaristic framework and, at the same time, a religious promise of deferred justice (J.M. de Maistre).

**THE NOTION OF SOLIDARITY**

Without going deep into historical details, it can be noted that the concept of solidarity in all the above-mentioned cases is used in two basic senses: *descriptive* and *normative*. At the descriptive level, the main focus

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⁹ Ibidem, p. 487.
Dariusz Dobrzanski

is on the description of actually existing bonds connecting people, groups or communities, and types of such bonds. On this plane, solidarity existing in real terms, be it within a family or a tribe, is the centre of attention. By contrast, at the normative level solidarity is used as a proposed, usually positively connotate, model of relationships between social entities. In this context, solidarity is a postulated good, a value functioning as a basis for relations connecting cooperating entities. Usually, when referring to normative solidarity, critical voices are raised against the status quo and changes are put forward in order to correct and eliminate any deficiency in cooperation with instrumental rationality. In fact, the rhetoric that mentions solidarity frequently takes the form of an appeal to the public to take joint actions. The first corollary from an inquiry into solidarity and its applications is that, as a rule, solidarity and community are connected genetically and semantically. Irrespective of whether one understands solidarity as some type of feeling between people, the principle describing the course of action to be followed, a value or a virtue – it is the community which determines the shape, character and strength of the bonds of solidarity. Although the semantic dimension of the links between solidarity and the community is obvious enough, the genetic connections between solidarity and the community are not. In terms of semantics, if one is a member of a family for example, one is connected with the other members by the natural semantic relationship – one is a father, a son, a husband, etc. But in terms of genetics, one can imagine a community, a soccer team for example, which is the result of common actions rather than their cause. This is also the case with conventional communities which arise from deliberate purposeful activities of individuals, and that is why the description of the character and nature of the community is very important for this type of solidarity. Both terms – solidarity and community – belong to the language of values and are valued positively by many standpoints in social, political and ethical questions. Although there exist many descriptions of community, we will employ here the one which bears out the moral dimension of solidarity. We will do so because the moral dimension implied by solidarity is in our opinion an indispensable semantic element of this concept. Following in the footsteps of Andrew Mason, we shall call it the moralised concept of community. From this standpoint, a community is not merely a group of people bound by the shared values and way of life and who identify themselves with the customary practices and recognise one another as members of the group. Community is also a collective whose members are bound together by solidarity, which means that they are

10 I am thinking here mainly about the so-called communitarians: Ch. Taylor, M. Walzer, Al. MacIntyre, and others.
motivated in their actions toward one another by axiological and not instrument rationality, and unfair distribution of goods cannot be found among them. We can turn to two traditions in philosophy when approaching the problem of the relationship between solidarity and community, that of Aristotle, who emphasised the natural origins of socio-political bonds and communities (koininia) in which people function, and that of the Sophists, who insisted on their conventional character. The later modern divisions introduced by F. Tonnies: community vs. society, Gesellschaft vs Gemeinshaft, and by E. Durkheim: mechanical solidarity vs. organic solidarity derive from this opposition.

A fact is being pointed out, which can be accepted as another rule, that the durability of the bonds of solidarity is a function of the size of the group, the latter understood most frequently as a collective of people working together for their shared advantage. The goal – its achievement for the benefit of the group members – is what keeps the group together and, as we have said, group solidarity diminishes with its increase in size, because the more numerous the group, the more difficult, it is argued, to agree on common goals and implement them. We should make a reservation, though, that if every community is a group then not every group is a community, because it lacks the constituent elements listed above. It remains an open question what other factors determine the durability of a community.

Another property of solidarity and the concept of solidarity to be underscored is the fact that solidarity implies the moral obligation to act or, at least, verbal commitment to do so. The moral dimension of solidarity can serve as a criterion for drawing the distinction between altruistic solidarity and self-seeking solidarity. The former can be illustrated by the situation in which the benefits of an action do not go to the person who took it but to somebody else. Another hallmark of altruistic solidarity is the selfless motivation of the acting person, taking care of the interests and values of other people as opposed to one’s own. For example raising money for a sick child among Internet users can serve as a good example of altruistic solidarity. On the other hand, the self-seeking solidarity is characterised by mutual co-operation with one’s own interests in mind. It is this concept of solidarity that is used by the trade unions, for example, when they defend the individual and simultaneously collective interests of the workers. The justification for the moral dimension of solidarity of individuals and groups is sought the most frequently in the fact that they belong to and participate in larger entities such as a family, a nation or a state. It is by this virtue that we have some natural moral obligations to mutual co-operation and helping other members which stem from the fact of being a part of a community, such community being a significant contributing factor to the development of an individual.

12 I employ here the term ‘axiological rationality’ in the sense defined by Tadeusz Buksinski in his work: Racjonalność Współdziałań [The Rationality of Co-operation], (Poznań: WIF, 1996).
The problem of exclusion that the concept of solidarity implies is another characteristic particularly attracting the attention of contemporary critics of solidarity as a normative concept\textsuperscript{13}. As such it is quoted as one of the reasons why all claims of the notion of solidarity to universality should be rejected. In the contemporary pluralist world of attitudes, lifestyles and world-views the concepts presupposing or implying exclusion encounter criticism, in particular on the part of those ideologies or philosophies which draw from the traditions of liberal culture. It is argued, moreover, that modern organisational forms of social life, like the states, for example, do not need to fall back on the terms characteristic of the vocabulary of pre-modern tribal societies, solidarity being in the opinion of critics one such terms. It is also claimed that the idea of substantial solidarity – tribal or national – can easily become a tool for manipulation and inciting ethnic conflicts. The growing phenomenon of exclusion and marginalisation of many social groups, which leads to the creation of social peripheries (peryferi) of poverty and crime, can be far more effectively held in check by the principle of universal citizenship. Far from antagonising through exclusion, the principle of universal citizenship embraces the rights, obligations and the membership in a community: without being burdened with particular, local connotations – as is the case with solidarity – it can more effectively induce active participation in public life.

Another point raised by the opponents of the idea of return to normative solidarity are the cultural, scientific and technological achievements of the modern liberal culture of the West, founded as it is, on the principles of individualism and autonomy deemed by those critics to be incompatible with solidarity. The principles of individualism and autonomy have found their practical expression, for example, in the institution of the human rights, which became not only the norm regulating the internal relations of states but also the standard of conduct in the international relations between the states. In this view the prosperity of the Western culture stems from an ongoing process of ethnic, national and communal de-solidarisation. A particular kind of ethnic solidarity, described as Asabiyah by Ibn Khalduna in the 14\textsuperscript{th} century, and understood as the principle of territorially and ethnically limited solidarity-motivated cooperation, which determines the economic actions and mutual moral obligations of a closed community and its members, still persists in many places of the globe. It is deemed to constitute the principal obstacle to progress.

Solidarity, whose properties we are analysing here, is often linked to and sometimes erroneously equalled with another concept to be found in similar social and moral contexts involving the public good, namely with

The Principle of Solidarity

The concept of charity. Charity occurs in two basic meanings: a/ religious, where it denotes Christian love (caritas) and b/ secular – where it denotes beneficence.¹⁴ In the former sense love (caritas, charity) is understood in the writings of the fathers of the church and St. Thomas Aquinas as the most profound of the theological virtues, the object of whom is God and one’s neighbour with a view to God.¹⁵ On the other hand, charity as beneficence is present in the ethical reflection and most frequently understood as charity duties. It is in the latter sense that I will employ it in my analysis.¹⁶ When Allen Buchanan characterises charity duties, he lists their four principal properties: a/ they are positive duties, i.e. the most frequently they call for taking actions as opposed to negative duties which call for refraining from actions; b/ charity duties cannot be imposed, for example, by force or legal sanction, c/ charity duties do not have a perfect character, which means that they are neither determined by a specific norm nor by the person at whom they are directed – the kind and amount of help given, as well as the choice of the beneficiary, may be accidental; c/ charity duties are not a matter to be dealt with by the law. Buchanan emphasises that it is not clear how the four mentioned properties interrelate with each other, and thus it is not easy to determine what makes given duties justice duties, for example, and not charity duties. He indicates, however, that the term duty is usually understood in such situations in the broad Kantian sense of a moral imperative. It should be borne in mind that Kant himself used the example of charity when illustrating the generalising power of the categorical imperative.¹⁷

One cannot fail to reflect on conclusions to be drawn from comparing charity duties on the one hand and solidarity and its properties listed earlier on the other. Firstly, both obligations have a moral character – the failure to undertake them does not entail legal sanction, only a moral one. Equally, both have a positive character, which is to say that they call for taking actions in order to achieve the intended good.

¹⁴ We translate the English term charity following the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, where it features both as: love – Christian caritas – and in the sense of beneficence and benevolence. In contemporary editions of the Gospels, love is translated by the Greek term agape.

¹⁵ It should be added that the theological virtues or the gifts of the Holy Ghost presuppose a significant distinction between those who are just (Christians) and those who are not. In the view of Marie V. Bilgrien, the recognition of solidarity as a virtue in everyone by Pope John Paul II relates solidarity more to love (caritas) than to justice. Marie V. Bilgrien, Solidarity: a Principle, an Attitude, a Duty? or the Virtue for an Interdependent World, (New York: Peter Lang 1999).


appeal which is often used to account for the absence of solidarity in modern political and ethical thought. Modern liberal culture is said to have an essentially negative character, i.e. it is dominated by concepts, norms and duties which do not encroach on the horizon of choices of individuals as it protects the fundamental principle of the autonomy of individuals. Both solidarity and charity duties involve actions of helping others. Both strive to achieve goals benefiting those social groups and individuals who are deemed disadvantaged. Thus it would be difficult to imagine a situation where pressure is exerted or force being used in order to discharge one’s own duties resulting from solidarity or charity. The acting individual himself decides about taking such actions each time. Secondly, both terms presuppose an altruistic intention of benefactors or those who undertook solidarity-motivated actions, at least if what we have in mind is the normative standpoint and not the descriptions of specific situations. Nevertheless, it should be underscored that the altruistic character of charity duties is more pronounced than that of solidarity. In spite of their common properties, there are also differences between the analysed concepts, the fundamental one being that an expectation of reciprocity can be involved in the case of solidarity. This is clearly visible in particular in situations when the word solidarity is used pejoratively, for example when one refers to the solidarity of gangsters, solidarity in the conspiracy of silence, etc. – in sum, when talking about solidarity of people involved in unholy alliances. On the other hand, charity duties do not presuppose an expectation of reciprocity. The selfless character of charity duties excludes by definition in a way both the expectation of reciprocity and the advancement of the interests (goals) of the benefactor. An example of charity duties can be found in the biblical character of the Good Samaritan, whose earnest help and care were neither linked to any expectation of reciprocity nor to the advancement of the Samaritan’s own goals. One more difference, which should be mentioned here, is that solidarity emerges where there is a common basis uniting those who mutually help one another, such basis being constituted by common origins, values, interests, and ideologies. Charity duties, on the other hand, are not predicated on this condition; we can give help to people (or not) when we have nothing in common with them or are not close to them in any way.

According to some philosophers, solidarity implies a moral obligation to cooperate for the benefit of other people just because they are human. Let me at this point set forth the argument concerning the problem of guilt (Die Schuldfrage) presented by Karl Jaspers. Jaspers lists four categories of guilt: criminal guilt, political guilt, moral guilt, and metaphysical guilt. Metaphysical guilt, Jaspers claims, is the source of the other three types. Metaphysical guilt is based on solidarity between people existing precisely because they are people. This gives rise to the “responsibility of each for one another” and occurs when the duty of absolute solidarity with people is violated. Just because we are humans, we
are under an absolute obligation to be solidary with others. Consequently, the notion of *metaphysical solidarity* arises.

In our brief analysis of the notion of solidarity, account should also be taken of the views proposed by the historian of ideas, Steinar Stjerno, who, referring to Reinhart Koselleck’s notion of conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*), he proposes a simple, yet useful and cognitively appealing scheme for explaining historical ideas, including the idea of solidarity. The methodological proposals, expressed in the form of questions, would be as follows.

When examining solidarity, it is – above all – necessary to establish its underlying basis, i.e. determine what type of bond it realises (e.g. based on common origin, interests, values, identity and struggle for recognition). Another problem that must be resolved is the goal which solidarity-based actions are supposed to accomplish, such as joint interests, establishment of the sense of identity with others, feelings of loyalty, a just and fair world, etc. Also, it is essential to determine the scope of solidarity, that is the degree of inclusivity. This is basically a question of the subject/subjects of solidarity: the entire humanity, family, group, class or a limited group of agents. The final point that needs to be considered is the effect of collective identity on individual identity. This aspect refers to the margin of autonomy, the extent of choice that is left to an individual in jointly taken actions and the degree to which solidary action is determined by collective identity.

**POLITICAL SOLIDARITY IN THE POLISH SOCIAL MOVEMENT, “SOLIDARITY”**

For Alaine Touraine and Michael Wieviorka, two researchers investigating social movements, social movements represent “organised conflicts”. Here, I adopt a number of assumptions. Firstly, I include the history of the Polish “Solidarity” analysed as a social movement. Secondly, I assume the existence of the collective identity of the social movement, and thus I will not avoid an anthropomorphisation of the movement. Thirdly, in my account, I will focus on a general and, of necessity, concise analysis of the political philosophy of “Solidarity”, propounded between 1980 and 1981, i.e. the year of declaration of the

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martial law. Historians typically refer to this period as the “carnival of Solidarity”, thus delineating the time frame when politics, as Aristotle understood it, was an art whose immanent goal was the achievement of welfare, justice and the happiness of citizens and the state. It was an art that went beyond the particular and mercenary context of privacy and the household (oikos).

Similarly to a number of scholars investigating political philosophies, I believe that the social and political programme put forth by the “Solidarity” movement was the last political utopia of the 20th century. At this point, it seems fitting to recount a couple of political principles that were at the very heart of “Solidarity”, all the more so because, due to the movement, the 19th century concept of solidarity once again found its way into the political philosophy dictionary.

WHAT ARE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The two scholars mentioned above, Touraine and Wieviorka, claim that modern social movements arise in the context of socially critical phenomena accompanying the process of industrialisation. They operate by united forms of protest, including strikes, demonstrations and protest rallies. Strategies employed by activists are geared towards the achievement of emancipatory goals such as gaining rights and privileges. The movements have typically operated within nation-states. It is notable that social movements do not strive to take over power. The collective identity of the movement is defined with the political adversary on the one hand, and with the fulfilment of certain goals on the other. While in traditional labour movements it is easy to pinpoint the adversary (the capitalist state), in the current era of new global social (terrorist, environmental, feminist, human rights) movements, the definition of the “enemy” becomes elusive.

The 1970s marked the beginning of the process of redefining the attitude of social movements towards politics. New programmes were proposed, claiming that all areas of life were political, and undermining the modern distinction between private and public life.

POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OF “SOLIDARITY”

It is difficult to state unequivocally whether “Solidarity” was a modern social movement. It certainly did meet all the above-mentioned criteria defining social movements as such. Nevertheless, there are a number of essential factors which seem to show that “Solidarity” was a unique phenomenon.

The first of these aspects is the mass character of the organisation. In 1980, a registered membership of 10 million activists gave the “Solidarity” movement a practically unlimited political mandate to take decisions on behalf of the entire nation. By the same token, “Solidarity” is sometimes referred to as a revolution or a national uprising. After 1989, it
was the number of members, the huge popularity and recognition which the movement had gained in the eyes of the democratic world that laid the foundations for the “Solidarity myth” so often invoked by contemporary political parties.

In the political dimension, “Solidarity” was a freedom and emancipation-oriented movement geared towards gaining labour and civic rights and privileges. The main method employed in the pursuit of these goals was to practice politics as “anti-politics” as it was called. The object of anti-politics is not the state but the society, the overriding goal being achievement of a civil society. Politics interpreted this way as abandoning attributes traditionally associated with the state, i.e. violence and coercion. Political consensus, being an autotelic value, is achieved in dialogue, deliberation and the free, unconstrained exchange of views. Anti-politics, is not supposed to be free from unrestrained expression of emotions and feelings, or valuation and judgement. These features, in particular, distinguish it from the so-called “real politics”. Anti-politics, in fact, never shuns allusions to such values as truth, courage, honour or co-responsibility. By doing so, it goes beyond the catalogue of rational principles and utilitarian values. As for links between politics and economy, anti-politics seeks solutions transgressing the laws of the liberal market.

According to David Ost, the anti-political quality of the Polish democratic opposition, and later “Solidarity”, had a favourable influence on the transformation of the political system in Poland. On the other hand, its major weakness was inherent aversion to the institution of the state, which made the activists inadequately prepared to take over power in the post-1989 period. It should also be noted that politics, understood as anti-politics, is the feature linking “Solidarity” with the students’ contestation movements of the late 1960s.\footnote{David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics. Opposition and Reform in Poland Since 1968 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).}

The “Solidarity” social movement was distinctive for its wide inclusivity. Membership was open even to activists of the regime’s communist party which “Solidarity” opposed. On the other hand, the fact that “Solidarity” lacked restrictive and unambiguous rules of affiliation (e.g. based on ethnicity, class or religion) opens comparisons with a political community design based on communication.\footnote{Jurgen Habermas, Teoria działania komunikacyjnego, [Theory of Communicative Action] (Warszawa: PWN, 2002).}

Communicative community has a very particular mechanism of action. It is communication-oriented, based on communicative rationality. Communication is the basic factor responsible for coordinating activities. As opposed to particular communities based on shared qualities (such as background, race, religion, etc.) and equipped with “collective identity”, communicative community eagerly embraces differences in lifestyle and pluralism of values. Members
of communicative communities are obliged, one to another, to mutually justify and clarify their communicative acts.

Religion played a significant role in building the identity of the movement’s followers. In attempts to account for the collective identity of the movement, scholars investigating the history of “Solidarity” always point to religiousness as a formative factor. Both the grassroots and the leaders publicly displayed their dedication to religious symbols. According to recognised theories of modernity, religious attachment and declared strong ties with religion, faith and the church made “Solidarity” a pre-modern movement. Modernity – alongside a number of other attributes: individualisation and instrumental rationalisation – is defined with phenomena related to secularisation and privatisation of religion. On the other hand it can be said that the Polish church had traditionally occupied a prominent position in politics, especially in breakthroughs and critical times. For example, during the period of martial law, the church performed the function of the public domain, where citizens could voice their protests, articulate demands and explore their points of view. The public sphere, as related to the activity of the Catholic Church, may be used as an argument by those who underscore its contribution to modernisation.23

It should also be noted that the attitude which “Solidarity” had towards democracy found practical expression in the idea of a self-governing republic and democratic system of electing its authorities. As the movement became institutionalised into a trade union, democracy was the factor responsible for the political integration of its members.

Previous sections of this paper, referred to the views proposed by Aristotle, the founding father of the science of politics. In these terms, it may be concluded that the attribute defining the external policy of “Solidarity” towards the communist powers was the Aristotelian virtue of prudence (phronesis, prudentia; also referred to as phronesis or practical wisdom).

As practical wisdom, it refers to the ability to manage the life of the citizen and the city-state (polis) which formed a whole. As a virtue, prudence indicates appropriate (i.e. ethical and praxeological) means. Prudence is a virtue of deliberation about that which is good and useful for the people and their city. Not each deliberation of ends and means is the object of that virtue – only one revolving around living well (eu zen). By being constrained to achieving a good life, the proprietor of the virtue is a mature human being (phronimos). Aristotle explicitly notes that prudence does not refer to knowledge about things that are unchanging and permanent. Quite the opposite: by focusing on things human (anthropia), it is concerned with what is variable and inconstant.

By contrast, the internal politics of “Solidarity” was notable for its democratic spirit of contention, conflict and struggle with arguments (agon), restricted only by the occasional pragmatics of the situation. I have already hinted at the special and extraordinary nature of the “Solidarity” movement. The claim can be supported by yet another argument related to the problem of leadership. “Solidarity”, similarly to all other human communities, organised its political activities through a group of leaders. In addition to democratic procedures and recognition of political conflicts as a normal state of affairs, an unquestionable strong point of the movement was the fact that it had a genuinely charismatic leader with labour class background. Wałęsa’s leadership was a consequence of both his personality and the natural demand of a leader, noted in any political community. In his political initiatives, Walesa repeatedly demonstrated a certain trait of character which Max Scheler defined as being conscious of one’s worth, regardless of the acceptance offered by obedient followers. Walesa’s political style, which was frequently contradictory, combining consistency with unpredictability, blending civil courage with petitifogging, pragmatism with messianism, never prevented him from taking decisions that were unpopular among “Solidarity” members. It should also be stressed that Wałęsa’s leadership was not only highly esteemed by labourers, but also acclaimed by the intelligentsia. Even Czesław Miłosz, winner of the 1980 Nobel Prize in literature, once came under the personal spell of Walesa and – in recognition of the latter’s merits – devoted one of his poems to him.

Political principles governing the “Solidarity” movement specified above, including anti-political qualities, wide inclusivity, religiousness, prudence in external politics and approval of conflict in internal politics, were both mutually complementary and restrictive in practical life, together making up the notion of political solidarity.

Clearly, the picture of “Solidarity” outlined in this brief study is rather heavily idealised and, at points, perhaps exaggerated. The movement was not free from faults and vices associated with the times when it emerged and shaped its identity. On the other hand, contemporary politics is in dire need of positive models. I believe that one of them can be solidarity, though not necessarily spelt with the capital “s”. In analysing the history and experience of the movement, the question we are left with is whether “real” politics, embraced by contemporary states, has any room for political solidarity, and if it does what are the preconditions for the adoption.

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CHAPTER II
FROM FREEDOM TO SOLIDARITY

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THE PRINCIPLE OF LIBERAL FREEDOM

This article will seek to demonstrate that the idea of solidarity, which took shape in modern history, found its first full realisation in the social and political movement initiated by the “Solidarity” trade union of workers founded in Gdansk in August 1980. The movement still continues to expand, and its effects are difficult to foresee. A thesis thus formulated is particularly important in the light of the fact that the Solidarity labour union, along with the social and political movement which the former spurred, is not typically associated with the modern idea of solidarity. The name of the trade union is usually regarded as incidental, devoid of any philosophical meaning, while the social and political transformations we have been witnessing tend to be interpreted in the categories of freedom or equality.¹

As has been repeatedly shown, the term “solidarity” originated in the Roman law, where it is used to mean a guarantee for someone or taking up responsibility for someone else’s behaviour, for example, for their incurred debts.² The term has also frequently appeared in works by religious – chiefly Christian – thinkers and activists, and in documents of the Catholic Church. Since the 19th century, the idea has taken the form of the so-called class solidarity which was contrasted with the class struggle postulated by Marxists and socialists.³

In the commonly held and most popular approaches, the category of solidarity is associated with – or its political meaning is derived from – the motto of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, brotherhood (liberté, égalité, fraternité), though in actual fact the tripartite category appears neither in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen adopted in 1789, nor in any of the French Constitutions, nor in any other official document issued during the period of the French Revolution. In the French Constitution of 1791 there is only a brief mention that national festivals should be instituted to commemorate the Revolution, maintain fraternity

³ Ibidem, pp. 45, 83.
between citizens and bind them to the Constitution and statute laws. It seems, however, that the above sequence of categories offers a good reflection of the succession of ideas cherished in Western Civilisation since the 18th century. Let me now briefly describe the process of realisation of the three ideas: values, standards, principles.

All the declarations, constitutions and speeches of the French Revolution were directed against the feudal, royal and clerical authorities of the day, and against any external superior authority using violent repression. They formulated certain ideas as positive moral values which – at the same time – had the function of legal rules, i.e. general standards which were supposed to be enforced by means of statute laws binding all the people in a given area. Statute laws were to specify legal principles. The main idea of the French Revolution was the idea of liberty which recurred in a number of versions and contexts in all the documents and speeches, beside such principles of law (legal rights) as ownership, safety, right to resistance, equality before the law and happiness. It was recognised that these freedoms (rights) were natural and inalienable. The source of statute laws was the nation as a sovereign entity, though it was not entitled to undermine any of the inalienable rights. Similar ideas and principles of law were pursued during the Revolution of 1688 in England and during the American Revolution of 1775: they are brought up in all the official documents, including the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 12 June 1776, the Declaration of Independence of 4 July 1776, the USA Constitution and the Bill of Rights of 15 December 1791.

At the time, personal liberty was recognised as a natural right, binding at law and applicable to the same extent to all white owners enjoying citizenship in a given state. As each adult white man was, to a certain degree, recognised as an owner (for he owned his body and soul), he enjoyed civil liberties. White adult men were guaranteed equal rights to dispose of their labour, as well as the freedom of movement, opinion and expression, choice of religion, personal inviolability and ownership of property. The civil liberty thus understood was placed in opposition to servitude on one level, class privileges on another, and arbitrary – particularly absolute – political authority on yet another plane. Civil liberty was supposed to safeguard people against constraint, lawlessness and violence exercised by the political power and fellow people. It served the protection of life and health, unrestricted disposal of property, freedom of movement and economic activity. It had a moral and political/legal dimension. It was to be enforced by virtue of constitutions, laws, separation...

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of powers and – above all – citizen representation. Political freedom consisted in the right to elect political representatives by property owners.

The right of citizens- or property owners (henceforth, “citizens-owners”), to select their representatives was recognised as an inherent constituent of freedom. Citizens’ representatives in the parliament (national assembly) co-ruled the state (as in England) or independently governed the country (as in the United States or in France). The choice of representation by election, as opposed to appointment by the sovereign (as in the Middle Ages), and its power to co-decide on the fate of the state, became manifestations of the political liberty of citizen-property owners. Political freedom was thus more limited in scope than civil liberty, since it was conferred by bourgeois revolutions only upon tax-paying property owners. The sphere of liberty (both civil and political) permitted the flourishing of private, business and industrial actions, stimulating citizen activity.

The realisation of civil and political liberal freedom led to the stratification of the society into classes and the progressive exploitation of one group of free (poor) subjects by another group of free (rich) citizens. Individuals started to attach the highest value to their selfish (typically material) interests and looked after them alone. Representatives routinely used their position to pursue their own interests, ceasing to take any interest in the general society, the state and the public life. The rich no longer cared about other people. “The other” was reduced to the role of an object that only served the fulfilment of its own interests or hampered the accomplishment of goals. Civil liberty and restricted political liberty thus enabled the subordination of one group by another within the limits permitted by the law. These processes contributed to the separation of the private sphere from the public domain on the one hand, and its isolation on the other, with ensuing class divisions and conflicts.6

Labour and socialist movements, which escalated in the second half of the 19th century along with the development of the heavy industry, forced the extension of political liberties to those residents of the state who were not property holders and severance of ties between political liberties and ownership (property qualification). As a result, in Western countries in the second half of the 19th century, civil and political liberties were gradually extended to cover new social strata and classes: working men, the educated, all adult men and finally – in the 20th century, all women. The extension of voting rights (suffrage) was a development of particular importance, as it resulted in more positive attitudes of citizens toward the state and state authority. Citizens acquired an influence on the selection of authorities, which made it possible to contain certain negative side-effects of civil liberties, such as extreme exploitation, poverty, inhumane working conditions. The authorities had to enact regulations aimed at improving the standard of life and health of those voters who were the worst-off in the

society, since they also determined their political fate. Thanks to political practice, citizens became increasingly competent at coercing the state authority into introducing beneficial legal and economic changes. In this way all people became equally free by law.

EQUALITY IN FREEDOM

Equality has accompanied liberty from its very beginnings. Freedom, debated by philosophers and fought for by revolutionaries, was external, i.e. socially created, not natural. It was constituted by means of legal and political measures. It restricted the freedom of actions taken by one group of citizens towards another group. However its main task was to confine arbitrary political authority. It created for the residents of the state a certain sphere of action independent of the state and political power. Liberty, thus understood, was enjoyed by specific social strata, classes and groups. It regulated relations within these social entities and between them, which is why it had to have a clearly defined scope. It was customarily recognised that freedom is self-limiting, based on the criterion of its equal entitlement to all the people or all the citizens or all the individuals of a specific type. Consequently, civil liberty in the 18th century instituted equal rights of property holders towards the political authority and the law (for example equal opportunities of property disposal: acquisition, sale, donation). In turn, political freedom in liberal political systems in Western Europe at the time treated property owners differently from other state residents and, within the group of property holders, it also granted active and passive electoral rights in an unequal manner, for the rights were determined by the value of the property and the amount of paid taxes. Such inequalities are to be found in all the constitutions which came into force in the period of the French Revolution. As mentioned above, labour and socialist movements – particularly during the Spring of Nations and worker strikes of the second half of the 19th century – contributed to the introduction of political freedom among all the male citizens of a given state, while the 20th century saw the extension of civil and political freedom to women, as well. In this way, liberal political systems were transformed into democracies.

New social groups were granted the same liberties as those traditionally enjoyed by property holders, educated people, male citizens. This fact meant that the freedoms of the traditional factions became limited, they simply ceased to be privileged. Consequently, in their actions they had to take into consideration the opinions and interests of newly entitled individuals and groups. Equal access of citizens to liberty also entailed that the freedom of actions taken by the state was further curtailed. The state authority had to take into account the views of an increasing number of citizens. New regulations put up barriers restricting exploitation, freedom in administration and decision-taking for those that had no right to vote. As a result, social relations became more tolerable for everyone.
The principle of equality, on the one hand, extended the application of the principle of liberty and, on the other hand, it limited the freedom of its interpretation and implementation, on account of increasingly unambiguous boundaries. Gradually, not only the scope of applications of equal liberties became broader (with equal rights being extended to cover successive social entities), but they broadened, as well. In addition to equality before the law (also commonly referred to as formal equality) which was regarded as an effect of the consistent implementation of the principle of liberty, the notion of real equality (also called real liberty) was introduced. Real equality is about providing equal opportunities in exercising formal rights to all social groups, including the poorest, to exercise formal rights. This was the guiding principle behind the process which began in the second half of the 19th century, and which aimed at providing material support to those most deprived. Legislation entitled the poorest groups to free health care, education, disability and old-age pensions, decent jobs, acceptable working conditions and pay. The extension of political liberty discussed above favoured the process which gradually gave rise to the social state and eventually the welfare state. Actual inequalities in terms of taking advantage of available freedoms (opportunities) were being compensated which, however, does not mean that they became equalised. What was achieved was in fact a restriction of extreme material inequalities and their adverse effects, affecting predominantly the most economically underprivileged groups.

Towards the end of the 19th century and in the 20th century, these trends led to the development of ever stronger state (bureaucratic) structures and vertical relationships which – slowly but surely – became more important than horizontal relations. People ceased to directly relate to and identify with one another in favour of indirect identification via institutional structures. More and more problems became nationalised or otherwise institutionalised.

In the wake of increasingly effective achievement of the equality of liberty (and freedom), the Western state grew more people-friendly on the one hand and – on the other – became powerful and all-embracing, taking over from the citizens the care of social life. Bureaucracy grew; new institutions were established, gradually capturing and controlling successive new areas of the private and social life of citizens. Still new legal regulations were laid down to regulate the rights of citizens, institutions and authorities and define their mutual relations. All these actions led to people’s mutual moral indifference and caused a decline in day-to-day, spontaneous interpersonal solidarity. What happened was that the state, along with its institutions and legal regulations, engaged in a total

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mediation in all actions undertaken by individuals, and determined both the form and content of cooperation between human beings.

Paradoxically, then, the pursuit to ensure citizens equal freedom towards the state and other individuals – guaranteed both institutionally and legally – led to the people’s material dependence on the state, social atomisation and moral indifference. This was a new type of dependence. Citizens grew independent of the will of the arbitrary political authority and the wilfulness of others, while becoming subordinated to the legal will and experiencing social atomisation.

EQUALITY AGAINST FREEDOM

The problem of equality and freedom was handled completely differently in the communist system which emerged in Russia following the events of 1917. Equality was recognised as a fundamental social and political value and, in this sense, was considered to be more important than freedom. Equality was pursued at the expense of civil and political liberties achieved in bourgeois revolutions. A proletarian revolution raised the slogans of radically understood, substantial (real) equality. The achievement of real equality was supposed to ensure so-called real freedom, radically understood as rule over the conditions of one’s existence around the globe. Civil and political liberties were abolished precisely in the name of equality thus interpreted. In fact, these liberties were typically referred to by the communists as bourgeois freedoms, for they constituted freedoms of choice based on egoistic decisions and preferences or as formal liberties, since they enabled an unequal exercise of legal guarantees for rights, with some (the poorest) groups being altogether deprived of them. Finally, they labelled these liberties false freedoms; they claimed effectively they led to differences and actual inequalities, exploitation of some groups by others and subordination of people by other people. Communists wanted to release people from freedom and equality thus understood, freeing them from having to choose between different religions and parties, from pursuing the ownership of property, purely formal rights, inequalities and actual dependencies. Real equality was to liberate people from superfluous needs and concerns, thus making them free in actual terms. In this way, they intended – in a sense – to reinstate natural freedoms which people enjoyed when they were not familiar with the idea of private property.

According to Marxists, the introduction of private property brought the establishment of the state as a body of oppression and exploitation, repressing those that had not managed to acquire any property. This is why one of the assumptions of communism was to release people from the state by abolishing it altogether. Lenin wrote that the future system will not need any rule or management from above: “For when all have learned to manage, and independently are actually managing by themselves social production, keeping accounts, controlling the idlers, the gentlefolk, the swindlers and similar “guardians of capitalist traditions”, then the escape
From Freedom to Solidarity

From this national recording and control will inevitably become so increasingly difficult, such a rare exception, and will probably be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for armed workers are men of practical life, not sentimental intellectuals, and they will scarcely allow anyone to trifle with them), that very soon the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of everyday social life in common will have become a habit. "The state will then be ruled by the principle followed by everyone voluntarily: "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs,". In practice, the view came down to institutional efforts to change the selfish human nature. Consequently, real communism authoritatively declared people equal and equalised the material and spiritual circumstances of their existence. The conditions of existence were, in fact, reduced to the most basic level that could be provided by the communist state. Equality was achieved in the possession of material goods (or rather lack of them), education, opinions, needs, views, thinking, clothing and behaviour. Inequality emerged only within the scope of possessed political power, as the elite of the communist party controlled the remaining masses and decided on the selection of the most loyal supporters of the headquarters. Not only was the state not abolished but it was, in fact, strengthened. It became a totalitarian state. In the communist system, individuals were granted a sense of existence and defined their value exclusively on the basis of the contribution they made to the social whole. Within the whole, the individual performed the role of a functional module, a tool determining its existence. The individual existed within collective associations and was authoritatively moulded in these by the political and ideological power. Individual interests became entirely subordinated to the interests of the whole. The policy of radical real equality in effect caused atomistic equalisation and total dependence of individuals on the communist state. The communist dependence was much more pronounced than that in Western states, for the communist system actually eradicated all liberal civil and political freedoms, particularly the right to private property. In terms of social policy, the communist system had a dual nature. On the one hand, communists used the slogan of “Proletarians of all countries, unite!” thus exhorting to class solidarity on a global scale. On

10 Ibidem, p. 204.
the other hand, however, communism strove to suppress any signs of interpersonal, spontaneous, independent grassroots solidarity in all its countries. It consciously and intentionally endeavoured to destroy all community ties based on selfless religious principles, moral standards, customs and traditions. Communists regarded these as factors limiting people’s freedom and equality, as barriers hampering the process of creating the universal man, without any particular features. Communism also destroyed solidarity ties based on interests, considering them an expression of egoism and an attempt at exploiting others. Authoritative control, spying, supervision, expansion of the state’s investigation machinery and secret police were exercised to track down and eliminate all solidarity ties between people.\[12\]

Summing up, the principle of equal freedom generated individualistic liberalism in the West, while practices employed to bring in real equality gave rise to collectivist socialism (communism) in Eastern Europe. The two systems were contradictory and fought each other. However, both were institutionally complex, made people dependent on the state and eventually led to the atomisation of the society. In the liberal system, the phenomenon occurred voluntarily and on a smaller scale, whereas in communism it was compulsory and acquired an all-encompassing dimension.

“SOLIDARITY” AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The “Solidarity” trade union founded by striking workers in Gdansk, in August 1980, initiated a protest movement against the communist system and authoritative induction of the principles of real equality which led to the emergence of equality in poverty. At the same time, however, “Solidarity” rose up against restrictions of liberal civil and political freedom. The movement also struggled to give a new meaning to the modern ideas of freedom and equality, combining them with the idea of solidarity and forming a comprehensive composition. The idea of solidarity became the basic value and legal standard of actions taken against the totalitarian system. Just as in the past when freedom was directed against the privileges and arbitrariness of authority, and then equality was raised against actual inequalities, bondage, economic repression and unjust law, now solidarity strives to fight the totalitarian authority of the state and its

institutions, as well as endeavouring to limit their influence and the measures of repression it uses against society. However, it struggles against violence under the banners of a new value, and hopes to avoid the negative effects which emerged in the wake of realisation of ideas of previous revolutions. It was primarily aimed against the totalitarian system in Eastern European countries, however it also developed and expanded to other countries controlled by totalitarian systems (Ukraine, Georgia, Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union). It further exerted an impact on Western European countries, being simultaneously aimed at eliminating degenerations emerging as side-effects of equal freedom in the form of excessive development of the state apparatus, citizens’ dependence on the state, atomisation of the society and the withering of interpersonal, spontaneous grassroots solidarity. The revolution of solidarity which we are witnessing now is a bloodless one. It is a continuation of the previous two types of revolution, complementing modernity, understood as an axiological, social and political structure.

Since its very beginnings, the “Solidarity” movement has embraced a number of ideological streams and a wide scope of social tendencies. It was founded in a period marked by economic and ideological crisis of the communist system, and it united representatives of opposition groups with different philosophies, religious beliefs and political opinions. Still, some views and judgements were shared by all or the vast majority of the communist system’s opponents. Let me focus on those that were the most crucial from the ideological and philosophical perspective. These were first and foremost slogans of self-governing and independence of organisations (including trade unions, social and public institutions) from any external political authority (parties, state, bureaucracy). The slogans appeared repeatedly in documents, declarations and leaflets. The first thesis of the Programme of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity”, adopted by the First National Congress of “Solidarity” Delegates in Gdansk, was: We demand that, at every level of leadership, a democratic, self-management reform should enable the new economic and social system to combine planning, autonomy and the market, while “thesis twenty” spelt out that genuine workers’ self-management is the basis of the self-governing Republic. The banners were strictly associated with the postulates to involve all citizens in cooperation in the extra-political sphere


in order to sustain its viability. The actions were governed not by legal regulations but shared moral values and standards: mutual integrity, trust, dedication, selflessness, truth, justice, reciprocal respect, responsibility for entrusted tasks and property. Morality was the normative foundation that united individuals and groups. On the very first pages of the “Solidarity’s” Programme cited above, its authors emphasised that for none of us was it just a question of material conditions – although we did live badly, working hard, often for no purpose. History has taught us that there can be no bread without freedom. We also wanted justice, democracy, truth, freedom of opinion, a reconstructed republic […] Economic protest was also social protest, and social protest was also moral protest. “Solidarity” was a movement against the rule of violence and ideology, instigated to overcome fear: the state must serve people instead of dominating them.

A somewhat ambiguous role in the “Solidarity” movement was played by the idea of interests. As commonly known, communists constantly called for sacrifices for the sake of the state and the society. They led a policy of restricting the role of individual interests in actions taken to cater for interests of the entire communist community or demanded actions motivated by utmost loyalty to the communist ideology. Obviously enough, “Solidarity” fought this approach, however – at the same time – it did not absolutise individual material interests. Naturally, “Solidarity” has always struggled to improve people’s material status, regarding it as a prominent issue. Yet, by the same token, “Solidarity” also spared no effort to improve the conditions of spiritual development, to achieve a freedom of self-fulfilment and create conducive climate for voluntary cooperation. Material circumstances were seen merely as a constituent of a broader programme of spiritual (axiological) transformations of the society. The ideological principle of solidarity functions as social glue, competitive towards the political authority, rule, money, selfish interests and legal regulations. At the same time, it marks the boundary for state intervention in the life of individuals and communities. The principle is mainly understood as a moral value and standard, embracing community life based on free communication, life in truth, freedom and cooperation, based on mutual trust, respect and integrity. This was a programme of moral unity in a strong sense. The status of the principle of solidarity is essentially similar to the principle of human dignity. It may not be imposed authoritatively, however it should be realised from the grassroots upward by cherishing proper customs, traditions, social habits. It thus also performs the function of a legal principle, though one that is valid even though it is not concretised in the form of statute law. Let me quote the Final Provision of the Resolution No. 1 of 14 July 1981, adopted at the by the First National Congress of “Solidarity” Delegates in Gdansk: “Work and existence, truth and law, democracy and self-government are the main areas of the Union’s

15 Ibidem.
16 Ibidem.
activity. Dignity, integrity and justice are the main guiding principles of “Solidarity” members.\(^{17}\)

In this sense, the union movement has consistently represented a naïve ideology based on the belief that moral feelings and attitudes will prove effective and will bring beneficial material, political and spiritual effects for everyone. The belief has so far been effective as a cementing force that mobilised the society to battle communism and post-communism. Shared ideological principles and values, as well as a community of material interests – all independent of the state and political authority – are still the foundation of the genuine movement.

The “Solidarity” movement did something more that coming out against the totalitarian state in the name of the independent society. What is even more important, it created the society in the process of civil contestation. “Solidarity” was a movement guided by a moral rebellion against evil and, as with any rebellion, it formed a front of state citizens who recognise one another as free, equal and solidary. Such solidarity-based society emerges in the process of defying evil and – in this sense – it represents power.\(^{18}\) Nevertheless, it is the power of the powerless, i.e. those that resist fear and hypocrisy without the use of violence. “Solidarity” proponents rise up against instances of violating of human and civic rights, injustice and humiliation. And they forced a transition from the oppressive state, which will make it possible to fulfil these principles.\(^ {19}\)

“Solidarity” exposed what freedom and equality-oriented movements disguised and could not cope with: detail, specificity, particularity and the combination of them without any exclusions and without any *Gleichschaltung*. This is why such great importance is attached to self-government, self-development, activity, regionalist features and communities. The “Solidarity” movement is marked by a collaboration of ethnos and demos. Traditional communities are not excluded; however they are incorporated into the civil discourse – hence they are elevated to the rank of one of the pillars of the civic society. The programme thus goes beyond the boundaries of communitarianism, though it does not disregard the community dimension of solidarity-based relationships. It gives community relationships a public meaning and transforms them into civil relations, open to others, satisfying the rule of equality towards those who

\(^{17}\) Report from the First National Congress of Solidarity Delegates, Warsaw, October 1981, p. 31 (printout).


do not share the identity of the particular community. It builds a superstructure of partner relationships on community-grounded relations.20

Thanks to steadily developed solidarity-based relations, individuals felt safe, secure and free to expand their autonomy. The “Solidarity“ movement created a society of people who have been liberated from fear, repression, violence and lies – the people were free as a result of cooperation, mutual assistance and communication.

“Solidarity” also rejected the Communist thesis which said that each individual is formed by the surrounding social and political system. The movement accepted each individual the way they were: neither good nor evil, but striving for good. It contrasted the particular man, maintaining relations with others, with the former universal man, authoritatively and uniformly politicised. It rendered citizens independent of the state – they were supposed to get back on their feet again, thanks to direct collaboration with others. “Solidarity” provided such people with affirmation. It did not endeavour to change them, top-down, according to any ideological schemes, but rather wanted to foster such conditions that would reveal their good features. It assumed people’s nature as given, partially undefined and prone to slow change. As such, it should not be disregarded. People are able to alter it to a certain degree in a bottom-up process of mutual voluntary interactions. The “I” personality takes shape in the process of both voluntary and enforced contacts, in a perspective of mutual references, conflicts and cooperative activities. It may not be construed from the outside, which would undermine human dignity.21

SOLIDARITY AS AN IDEA

In the preceding section, I emphasised features characteristic for the solidary social movement that developed in post-communist states in the wake of formation of the “Solidarity” trade union in 1980. However, the movement also has a substantial universal meaning: it raised specific ideas and modernised those values and standards that were also highly esteemed by other countries, including Western states. Usually, works discussing the idea (principle, value) of solidarity invoke various types of legal regulations enacted in the past to demonstrate that the principle has long been embraced in the legal and political practices of Western countries. It can be argued that such references are based on the mistaken view of the sense of the idea (principle) of solidarity and mislead the reader as to the nature of social relationships developing in the age of modernity. For example, authors cite

England’s Poor Law of 1601 which decreed that assistance to the poor should be administered at parish level, or the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 that ordered aid to those unfit for work.\textsuperscript{22} However, the legislators themselves pointed out that the laws were not introduced to help the impoverished but to help the police clamp down on crime and prevent it from spreading.\textsuperscript{23} On the other hand, the genuine motive behind Bismarck’s social legislation of 1883-1889, which introduced the old age and disability pension programme financed by a tax on workers, was a political one. The laws were passed in response to the growing importance of socialist movements, in order to weaken the influence that socialists and the Catholic Church had on worker masses.\textsuperscript{24}

It is thus evident that such actions have little in common with the principle of solidarity. Even leaving aside any subjective grounds that could have accompanied the introduction of such “welfare” legislation, it is plain to see (a fact already indicated in the discussion above) that, starting from the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, it was forced by aspirations of selected social groups striving towards equality or was a sign of principles and attitudes based on mercy, compassion and charity towards those worse-off or hit by fate. These were unilateral and unidirectional actions, institutional and authoritatively organised. Furthermore, they are mostly concerned with the provision of financial aid. This by no means suggests that they should be disregarded or undervalued. They are extremely important, and some of them may even contain seeds of solidarity. Also, this does not mean that there are no genuine solidarity phenomena in Western countries – quite the contrary, there are a number of self-help and support groups, and there is a great degree of willingness to provide financial aid to those that have been seriously afflicted by fate. These are constituent elements of the process of implementing the principle of solidarity. However, they fail to exhaust its meaning.

Just by analysing the linguistic meaning of the word “solidarity” and the contexts in which it has been used by various social movements, one can venture to represent in greater detail the semantic components of the idea of solidarity. Solidarity as a social movement and as a moral principle emerged in opposition to the totalitarian state and system. Still, similarly to freedom and equality, solidarity acquired positive connotations and became a foundation of the programme aimed at building a solidary


society. Basically speaking, solidarity as an idea and the axiological principle is not about philanthropy, that is to say, unilateral aid – for example given by the rich to the poor, not the formal definition of subsistence level and delivery of welfare benefits by the state. In principle in solidarity is then not much room for giving alms or one-way aid, as such acts imply that social relations are imbalanced: the rich or more able, by helping the poor or the weaker, which at the same time, emphasises and solidifies existing inequalities. One-way aid also has its place within the solidarity social relations, however it is regarded as temporary, delivered only in exceptional circumstances with a view to making others equal partners within the community. Love, compassions or charity are not the main components of solidarity either. Solidarity also could not be reduced to the sense of unity based on feeling and emotions, or to the cooperation based on kinship ties, blood relationship, shared tradition or religious beliefs. All these factors determined the unity of traditional communities.

It must be stressed that the solidarity community is not identical with the traditional one. The solidarity society is marked by a collaboration of groups of ethnos, demos and moral individuals. The traditional communities are not excluded but incorporated into the civil discourse as one of many subjects- hence they are elevated to the rank of one of pillars of the civic society and transformed into more tolerance and openness. The main aspect of solidarity is to build the superstructure of partner relationships between individuals and groups and mutual cooperation of equal citizens and communities for the sake of the day-to-day creation of social relations based on morality and free communication. Solidarity assumes acts of mutual recognition, without bloody struggles in order to be recognised and without any acts granted by the state. People of solidarity are expected to find such forms of social relationships that will rest on mutual interdependencies and relatively reciprocal assistance. Such relationships are voluntary. They take into account individual specific interests, but go beyond them. They hinge on shared values, goods and standards. Such social relations become valuable in themselves. Individuals make sacrifices to create and maintain them.

Solidarity aimed at fulfilling the goal of social integration is different from solidarity material interests (which determine market relations) or solidarity due to a threat of violence (which forms the foundation of unity on the political level). People’s inherent egoism could be limited on the pre-political and pre-state level in consequence of rational self-limitations imposed by individuals (and not forced upon them in the form of statute laws and state regulations). The function of solidarity stems

from the anthropological predisposition of humans to take cooperative actions and their inherent inability to live in solitude.\textsuperscript{26}

Unity based on solidarity is first of all axiological and moral (shared values and standards). It is constituted voluntarily and intentionally, in a communicative and cooperative fashion. Its overriding goal is the common good. It is not mediated either by the state or law or external political institutions. Solidarity-based relationships are rational. They embrace elements of the selfish interests of participants, elements of common material and symbolic interests, as well as principles of selfless cooperation resulting from the understanding of humans as beings who shape their identity in voluntary and freedom-giving joint actions to achieve better conditions of collective life. In this sense, a constituent of these relationships are specific beliefs about human dignified life. These views are expressed in a certain vision of solidary social life, which vision provides guidance in joint actions.\textsuperscript{27}

A significant semantic component of solidarity-based actions is the awareness of being responsible for the fate of the entire community. The awareness is distributed according to the position held within the group, individual capacities and status of consciousness. Therefore, the solidary movement strives to prevail over the one-sidedness of liberal individualism, and communist and communitarianist collectivism.

The idea of solidarity towards freedom and equality is by no means unequivocal. Solidarity curbs liberal negative freedom, as – on the one hand – it emphasises the need to base one’s actions not only on particular interests but also moral standards and values and – on the other – highlights the significance of citizen involvement in the public life, in the self-governing activity regulated by public moral standards. One element of freedom is to become independent of the dominance of some people over others, of class rule, bondage and dependence of one nation upon another. Solidary freedom is the freedom of joint, rational creation of living conditions in an atmosphere of free communication and consent to the common good. The scope of freedom is inextricably connected with the scope of responsibility. Civic virtues are necessary preconditions for the solidarity-based society to function properly. Such freedom goes beyond liberal civic and political liberties: it does not negate them, regarding them as preconditions for solidary freedom and, at the same time, pointing out their limitations, and trying to avoid the adverse consequences of their excessively formalist application. Solidarity thus becomes a type of activity in the horizon of sense of the social whole (i.e. nation, culture, civilisation, humanity) in the prospect of determining conditions of common future.

\textsuperscript{26} Compare Piotr Kropotkin, \textit{Pomoc wzajemna jako czynnik rozwoju, [Mutual Aid, a Factor of Evolution]} (Lódz: Red Rat 1946); P. Kropotkin, \textit{Etyka współczesna, [The Contemporary Ethics]}, (Warszawa: WS “Książka”1929).

Solidarity also undermines socialist (communist) equality. It shares the collective approach to resolving social issues, however not at the expense of freedom. It rejects the authoritarian rule and equalising people which destroy distinctness and diversity. Solidarity replaces ideologies with its own rational, situational identification by active subjects. It does not struggle to achieve material equality, but to ensure suitable spiritual and material conditions for acting, matching the capabilities and aptitudes of each individuals – and supports them in taking action. If citizens are provided with minimum material conditions of existence, they become immune to ideological or economic pressures from the outside, corruption temptations and demoralisation. This is precisely why the struggle to secure decent material conditions for the people’s dignified life occupies such an important position. In the solidarity outlook, neither formal equality (before the law), nor actual equality is able to satisfy essential human desires and vital features of the desirable social life. Humans want to co-exist with other people and expect reciprocal recognition of their particular identity – even in modern communities, where in large groups of people individuals largely do not know one another. Solidary society is supposed to fulfil such desires. Solidarity claims liberation from violence to benefit lives that an self-defined in processes of mutual recognition and confirmation of its legitimacy.28

Solidarity should also be clearly distinguished from justice. Distributive justice – which plays a very important part in contemporary society – requires a certain objectivity of judgement according to accepted criteria for allocation of goods (based on services, labour, needs, positions, etc.) and obligation conditions formalised in contracts. It also entails an obligatory implementation in the form of specific concrete legal regulations and accompanying sanctions. Solidarity, in turn, requires actions taken for others without any particular criteria of assessing equal contribution. The principle of solidarity does not determine any mandatory duties – only strongly moral obligations. A solidary person takes just and fair actions not because this is the way he has to act, but because he wants to live in a just and fair society. He feels co-responsible for the social whole and for others, not because he was mandated to represent them, but because he holds rational opinions about what is good and proper for others and for the society. A solidary person helps others unasked, because to feel hurt and need help are universal experiences. He protects and defends his group identity, his own traditions and customs which he cherishes as major values, while not depreciating identities and traditions of other people, as long as they are not aggressive and totalitarian. He pursues his own interests, but also takes into account those of other people. Solidarity means

that individuals count on the energies and resources of their community, and do not count on official institutions and the state.\textsuperscript{29}

The role of the state and its institutions in the concept of solidarity-based society requires a separate discussion. As we have repeatedly pointed out, a solidarity-based state by definition emerges \textit{beyond} the state and hampers the aspiration of the totalitarian state to control the entire social life or the ambition of the welfare state to leave citizens to the mercy of the state. Solidarity constitutes a society resting on independent moral foundations of communication and cooperation which are supposed to protect citizens against alienation, atomisation and dependence on external institutions. At the same time, the solidarity society is not anarchist. It creates a vision of the solidarity-based state. The solidarity-based state is placed in opposition to the totalitarian state and the liberal state. It confronts the material and spiritual problems of humanity and helps resolve them (without taking any decisions for citizens or removing them into the private sphere). What is more, the solidarity-based state does not converge with the Christian vision of the subsidiary state, for the latter functions mainly as an institution providing one-way aid to the poor and the underprivileged. A positive dimension of social solidarity is expressed, among others, in the fact that the state is treated as one of partners in a dialogue – a very important partner. The state is called upon to create appropriate conditions for free, independent cooperation between individuals and social groups. The conditions may and must also take a specific legal form: for example, as laws securing the development of self-government, the public life, and rank-and-file organisations, laws to combat crime and corruption, restricting growth of the common good, as well as ensuring good material conditions fostering education, upbringing and family growth.\textsuperscript{30}

It should, however, be noted that full institutionalisation and legalisation of conditions of the solidary society may in effect cause formalisation and deformation of solidarity on the social level – as was the case with freedom and equality. Institutionalisation typically eradicates spontaneity, the individual personal responsibility and personal morality which form axiological foundations for solidary relationships. The problem is extremely delicate, for as it consolidates, the solidarity movement demonstrates a natural tendency to institutionalise its actions, keep on introducing new regulations, take over political” authority and authoritatively enforce the principle of solidarity. The role of material and egotist interests also increases in the process. However, as these tendencies


are fulfilled, the solidarity-based society becomes increasingly weak. Direct communication, mutual help, grassroots initiatives, spontaneous responses to evil, self-administration activity become compromised as the state and the market grow in strength. And yet the solidarity-based society can only remain viable if it also expands beyond the official, formalised political structures; if it comes up with new types of unformalized and uncoerced joint actions, even though it has political significance and affects the domain of politics or even realises political ideas, for example ideas of the solidarity-based state, self-government, democracy, freedom, equality. Nevertheless, it may neither be absorbed by the state (even the solidary state), nor identified with political structures. It must be constantly in a state of tension and dialogue with states and entities that are political sensu stricte (political parties, governments). It must be incorporated into the politics-independent public sphere and the domain of civic society within states and on the global level. Similar tensions, relationships of mutual dependence and limitations occur between the solidarity-based society and the free market.

This leads to the inevitable conclusion that solidarity is a paradoxical venture.

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CHAPTER III

THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF SOLIDARITY

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One of the most persistent claims of the ideology of the atheism whether it be from the philosophy of Bertrand Russell, the pen of Gore Vidal or the sarcasm of Christopher Hitchens, is that religion stands in the way of human freedom or perhaps in the way of all that is dignified about human existence. Despite the fact that religion is responsible in large measure not only for advancing civilization but also for a permanent negation of the human community through forms of pagan barbarism that history has evinced on many occasions, this perspective seems to persist and live on as a kind of parody of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence of the same. This can perhaps be explained or excused on the basis of the ahistorical reason that is so much a part of our postmodern media culture. But it really cannot be explained away especially when religion played such a major role in an event that it is often celebrated by atheists as well as believers, the fall of communist totalitarianism in Eastern Europe. So, it may be useful by way of a powerful counter – example to this aspect of the atheist’s criticisms, to revisit the role of religion in one of history’s greatest moments of liberation. In order to underscore this point, our analysis will highlight not only the manner in which the politics of liberation was pursued on the basis of religious belief, but the indebtedness of the very concept of liberation to the Judeo-Christian tradition in political thought. Finally, to bring the point home even further, our study will examine the role and agency of the last Pope, John Paul II, since the papacy in the view of many atheists is the very epitome of all that religion does to inhibit human freedom.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW: WHAT IS SOLIDARITY?

One initial question regarding the concept of solidarity is its history as a concept. Here it may be useful to recall that one of the ways that Political Philosophy has approached the question of politics is from the distinction between the Hebraic and Greek traditions. The Greek tradition in political philosophy stems from Plato and Aristotle and runs through modernity via Hobbes, Locke and J.S. Mill. In it, man is defined as essentially ego, with a definite emphasis on the will. This tradition of political philosophy gave rise to the liberal democratic idea with all that it implies, including rights-based concepts of justice, which have a considerable emphasis on the faculty of the will. It is worth noting, though,
that even the origins of Greek philosophy had a religious basis, for it is inconceivable that human existence, at least in the view of the ancient playwrights, such as Aeschylus, could have emerged from the violence of the tribe and the clan to achieve a universal form of justice without the higher standard of universal justice and morals represented by religion.

The other tradition, the Hebraic, is traced back to Hegel and Marx, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and, ultimately the prophets of the Old Testament. The prophets were invariably rejected, and yet willingly, as in Isaiah, or less willingly as in the prophet Jonah, they succeeded in delivering the claims of justice to power. In this second tradition there are specific events in the Bible that deserve special attention. These events are momentous ones not only for the ancient Hebrews, but for those whose normative political tradition traces to the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this regard, H. Mark Roelofs argues that, more than any other events, the appearance of Moses at Sinai, of Joshua at Shechem and of Josiah and Ezra in Jerusalem are foundational for the Western political tradition.1

It is in the context of the great dialogue between the Greek and Hebraic traditions in political philosophy that the concept of solidarity should be located.2 For there was, in fact, a great deal about John Paul II’s presence in Poland in the summer of 1979 that recalled the tradition of the prophets speaking truth to power, wherein, as Roelofs notes, “The prophet’s address brings history into focus, the people’s history as they are led to understand it.”3 John Paul’s appearance in Poland was a catalyst for the transformation of a nation just as, in the prophetic tradition, and, as like the Old Testament tradition, John Paul came to epitomize the nation of Poland.

Central to this transformation was John Paul II’s concept of solidarity which encompassed the idea of solidarity as a form of praxis. As a student of twentieth-century philosophy, Karol Wojtyla was already familiar with the major philosophies of the day.4 So it is likely that he was already familiar with solidarity as a concept that was used by early social theorists, including utopians such as Charles Fourier in his depiction of the

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2 For example, the concept of alienation is treated differently in the Greek and Hebraic tradition, and this is reflected in what counts as liberation within each of these traditions. One way of expressing this difference in approach can be seen in the question of whether or not human alienation is alleviated by political means alone, including political education, or if it is something that involves the human condition *per se*, as one finds famously described in the *Book of Job*.

3 Roelofs, op. cit.

4 This aspect of the development of John Paul II’s thought was recently explicated by Professor George F. McLean in a paper entitled *Karol Wojtyla, Cardinal of Krakow: From the Liberation of Eastern Europe to a Mission for our Global Future at the Conference on Karol Wojtyla’s Philosophical Legacy*, March 22-23, 2006, West Hartford, Ct.
ideal society and others, such as Emma Goldman. For theorists of this tradition, solidarity entails resoluteness towards those with whom one shares an identity. However, for these earlier theorists the identity involved, while political, was often circumscribed by the non-identity of others, members of the bourgeoisie for example. In other words, solidarity in the context of the early social theorists was particular as opposed to universal and was not exactly tailor-made for religiously-based social movements. The term solidarity itself was used also by Marx and those in the Marxist tradition. For Marx and his adherents, solidarity was first and foremost solidarity against the Capitalist class and so solidarity was subservient to the idea of class struggle. These early uses of the concept of solidarity, then, were lacking in the universality one would expect from a universal church. An interesting shift took place in late modernity when solidarity was invoked by critical theorists for whom the emphasis was on the development of an ethics of solidarity with less attention paid to the category of identity.

Recently, the concept of solidarity has received renewed attention, especially in political theory, where a number of recent works trace the history of the concept as well as its use in studying social movements. However, in many of these works the emphasis is on the idea of solidarity as either a form of political discourse or an ethic that entails a specific political action. Yet what is unique about the concept of solidarity is that it departs from most concepts of freedom or liberty because it entails an ontology of relations, whereas both political discourse and ethical action may be perceived as derivative of ontology. As an ontology of relations, solidarity is a form of praxis that entails a gestalt in which solidarity is the

5 It is true, as Carol Gould and others note in their analyses of Marx’s concept of ontology that the idea of an ontology of relationships is a core element of his concept of man. However, the issue here is the scope of the category of solidarity which, in the case of Marx, is thoroughly informed by the idea of class struggle.

6 There is, of course, a sense in which Marxists may argue that the application of solidarity to the working class is actually universal by dint of the nature of the working class (as the universal class). However, the fact remains that it is particular because the concept of working class is a correlative term that implies the capitalist class.

7 For example, a recent book by Steinar Stjerno provides a full historical study of the concept (Steinar Stjerno, Solidarity in Europe: The History of Idea, Cambridge, U.K., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). We can also see its importance in a recent study by S. Laurel Weldon in the American Political Science Review that examines the concept of solidarity and uses it to study the “Global Movement against Gender Violence.”

8 The author is aware that this is a complex issue with a considerable amount of debate and controversy. In this context, the intention is to underscore the relationship between de-ontic accounts of human existence and positivist, de-ontic ones.
most universal of categories for, as depicted by John Paul it was tantamount to being-in-the-world, as such. One can see this, perhaps more clearly, in the historical context of John Paul’s concept, for it negates the categorical limitations of earlier political philosophy that was tied to a particular identity with all that that implied, the implied ‘other’. Instead, the origins of the Solidarity Movement are a form of praxis of which John Paul II was an activist and de-facto theorist. He reinterpreted the concept of solidarity as a more fundamental relationship between the individual and the community, wherein the praxis of solidarity became the basis of a religious commitment to the human community as such. This was universalized in a new and literal way. On the theoretical side of things, the idea of solidarity became inextricably connected to John Paul’s concept of the person in which the relationship between the individual and the community gives rise to ethics and not the reverse as is sometimes perceived.\footnote{In fact, in his unpublished introduction to his article in the Review of Metaphysics, “The Person: Subject and Community,” he maintains that it, “is at the basis of human ‘praxis’ and morality (and consequently ethics) and at the basis of culture, civilization and politics.” The author would like to thank Professor George F. McLean for sharing this unpublished Introduction to the Review of Metaphysics article.}

In order to delve more deeply into John Paul II’s concept of solidarity it may be useful to examine the political and historical context of the concept of solidarity in both theory and practice, or, as praxis. For one of the things that praxis does when it is a part of mass movements is to resocialize individual members of a movement on the basis of their own actions.\footnote{The literature on social movements theory is full of references to occasions wherein individuals are resocialized on the basis of their own praxis.} So, having considered the conceptual outline of solidarity the analysis will now focus on how this concept became an informing principle of political action in the context of the bi-polar world of the late 1970s and 1980s. Doing so will also underscore the religious foundations of solidarity, even while demonstrating how the role of religion as a force for liberation should continue to receive attention.

THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF SOLIDARITY

The first step in providing an exposition of the idea of solidarity as a form of praxis rooted in a social movement is the description of the political and social context out of which any particular form of praxis developed. Often, during the course of a social movement, specific forms of praxis, as both Gramsci and Sartre note in their descriptions of it, will emerge as a response to political and social conditions. One consequence of this is that the paradigm for such political manifestations as the politics of solidarity does not exist prior to their initiation as a group, existential
response, a phenomenon in the life of social movements that Sartre termed the development of the group-in-union. From an historical point of view, then, one needs to ask what the state of politics was at the natality of the “Solidarity” Movement. It may be recalled that around the time of John Paul’s election to the papacy the state of political philosophy mirrored that of global politics. This was the bi-polar world order in which the claims of Marxist analysis competed with those of the liberal democratic tradition. An alternative third way, that of Eurocommunism, was considered at the time to be a plausible third way. But, at the same time still other voices such as Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan, each in slightly different ways questioned the usefulness, if not to say the validity of universals of any sort, including the idea of a universal political identity and struggle. From a dialectical point of view, a term which John Paul frequently uses, the empirical state of politics was quite otherwise. While espousing the universalism of democratic and market ideals, the public policy and rhetoric of the administration of President Ronald Reagan was overtly hostile to universal social welfare as it identified the state itself as an essential political problem in both domestic public policy as well as ideology. Thus, while promoting idealist universalism, the actual conduct of American domestic and foreign policy-makers was thoroughly individualistic and even hostile to a universal concept of praxis, be it human liberation or social welfare. Thus it underscores the Cold War posture of American foreign policy and some of the ironies that it helped create. As scholars have noted, many of these ironies are to be found on the Soviet side of the coin, but one need only reflect on the simultaneous attack of the Reagan White House on the American labor movement, including the infamous crushing of the Air Traffic Controllers union, on the one hand, and its support for a Polish union effort, on the other, to appreciate that the Cold War created paradoxes and ironies across the political spectrum.

On the other side of bi-polar politics, the situation was otherwise. The Soviet Union took pains to point out, through its news agency, Tass, and its newspapers such as Pravda, the gross inequalities of American society which it claimed to be, inevitable consequences of capitalism. On this topic, documentaries were often run on its state-run media reflecting the plight of the poor and marginalized.

Within the Soviet Bloc, dissident voices, most notably Alexander Solzhenitsyn, highlighted forms of political alienation of a different sort, including the waging of a relentless psychological war on its subjects, seeking to control human praxis as well as ideology. Everything including the praxis, of science and art were subjected to psychological and ideological scrutiny. In fact, the movement within the Soviet Union that came to be known as Soviet Jewry included prominent scientists such as Andre Sakharov, who, through the course of their scientific inquiries recoiled against inhuman telos they saw behind the facade of Soviet science and technology. So, even in areas far removed from politics narrowly construed, there were deeply disturbing issues different from those
experienced in the West. Nevertheless, at the level of ideology the Soviet Union viewed itself as the global vanguard of worker rights and freedoms.

So on the eve of John Paul’s elevation to the papacy the world was, indeed, in opposition. At the level of ideology, individualism and solidarity were in conflict, while at the level of practical politics the same was true but in reverse – the West stood for individualist *praxis* and the East for universal social welfare. John Paul II, whom his biographers note had a wonderfully keen sense of historical irony, the kind of discernment of irony that one would expect in a playwright and philosopher, insisted on the dignity of the individual worker in the worker’s State, even while pointing out the false promises of the consumer society and the dangers posed to authentic human existence by technology.

The world was hopeful about the elevation of Karol Wojtyla, the Cardinal from the Soviet bloc, but not utopian. It had already seen the Soviet tanks roll into Hungary in 1956 and then again into Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, in retrospect there may have been more reasons for optimism and hope. On the one hand, within the Soviet bloc the moral pressure against its control and domination had fermented in the years since Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as well as the earlier resistance of the Church in Poland. In addition, political scientists have long noted that regimes are weaker when they actually have recourse to the use of force and are in fact weakened each time they have to use it. So, to a certain extent, the Soviet intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia weakened the Soviet Union, because it held out the possibility that others would resist as well. Ideologically, of course, it also weakened the Soviet Union since it was plain to most members of the United Nations that its interventions violated International Law.\textsuperscript{11}

However, on the other side of the bi-polar world the foreign policy of the United States left it in a weakened position to condemn the ever-present threat of Soviet intervention. The Vietnam War had left in its wake the “Vietnam Syndrome”, according to which, not only was the U.S. less likely to intervene again militarily, but its moral legitimacy had been severely tarnished which ushered in a new era of extreme cynicism in the political world. In addition, the U.S. role in Latin America was coming under increased scrutiny and criticism with critics and supporters of the Soviet Union. The pointed to the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic as equivalent to Czechoslovakia, and the Monroe Doctrine as the West’s equivalent to the dreaded Brezhnev Doctrine. In terms of traditional approaches to politics, both sides, along with their

\textsuperscript{11} Invariably, the Soviet representatives at the U.N. would cite various articles of the U.N. Charter including *Article 51* to support their claim that they had been rendering “fraternal assistance” to a neighbor. While this did occasion a huge debate over the meaning and scope of various U.N. Articles, there was little or no debate about the nature of the intervention in the court of world opinion, if not to say within the world’s moral conscience.
supporters, had checkmated one another, and the need for a new politics was acute.

However, 1979 was not 1968, and one major reason why there were additional grounds for hope was that the Soviet Union was already bogged down as never before in an intervention within what it considered its orbit, Afghanistan. Whereas most scholars believed the fault line between the East and West to be Berlin, in fact, it was the emergence of a new regional power, that of Islamic nationalism, that threatened Soviet hegemony. The irony here is that the Soviet view was that its greatest threat came not from its Southern borders, but from the West and from China. In fact, its own ethnic and nationalities problems seemed to Soviet leaders to pale in comparison to the threat posed by China and the West. The irony also consists in the fact that Soviet political and military calculations seemed to reflect the same arrogance that asked decades earlier how many divisions the Pope had. So, it probably seemed that Afghanistan represented little more than business as usual for the Soviet political leadership. In large measure as recent scholarship has underscored, many CIA activities made their way often through elaborate intergovernmental working groups, to support the Afghanistan resistance.\[12\]

That things turned out to be otherwise had a two-fold impact on the situation in Poland. On the one hand, during the initial phase the Soviet Union was opposed ideologically by President Jimmy Carter and his foreign policy team, led by his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and later on it was opposed by the Reagan administration’s more extensive covert support of Afghan resistance. Interestingly, while most observers viewed the Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini as a threat to U.S. and Western interests, in fact because of its border with Iran and its own Islamic population and its historical “nationalities issue,” the Iranian revolution represented a serious, if underestimated, threat to the Soviet Union.

In sum, most political scientists believe that the Soviet Union was actually in no position to intervene once again in Eastern Europe on the eve of John Paul II’s pontificate. However, it must also be acknowledged that hegemony was exercised primarily through the threat of intervention and the internalized social control it elicited. Overcoming the totalitarian rule exerted on Poland as an essential first step resistance to the psychology of social control and the language of inevitability. What emerged in Poland was a new cognitive praxis that evinced a new historical consciousness and marked the initiation of a new social movement, including a new concept that was very much an historical response, in both a theoretical and practical way, to the specific aspect of social control. The origins of solidarity, then, may be depicted as a praxis-driven and emerged not

ideologically, from the pen of this or that analyst; but rather from the human existential response to alienation.

The new Pope lived solidarity with his fellow Poles before the word was an articulated concept within political philosophy and before it was the name of a mass movement that helped liberate Poland. Thus, solidarity for John Paul II was a form of praxis that was a lived action and not an abstract concept. Years later John Paul expressed this idea in his book, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, where he noted this aspect of experience, “You will remember that my first encyclical “On the Redeemer of Man” (Redemptor Hominis) appeared a few months after my election on October 16, 1978. This means that I was actually carrying its contents within me. I had only to ‘copy’ from memory and experience what I had already been living on the threshold of the papacy.” That is to say, it was not a concept that was derived from abstract forms of theory that can be separated from experience, but from actual encounters in the world, including the everyday political world. His experiences from both World War II and the Cold War equipped him with a first hand grasp of both the politics of the Other, as well as the need for resistance to evil. Political philosophers use the term praxis to express the idea that an individuals’ life is itself an act of politics. It may be further added that contemporary political theorists usually cite the works of Aristotle and the revival of Aristotle’s concept of praxis in the work of Hannah Arendt. So, in the idea of solidarity as a form of praxis we see the Greek origins of solidarity or the influence of the Greek tradition as a complement to the Hebraic tradition mentioned earlier.

We can see the influence of this approach in John Paul II’s approach to labor which he considers to be transformational and uplifting. For John Paul II there is something special about human labor that makes it other than mere behavior. We have seen that at the theoretical level, solidarity as praxis negates the particularism of the ideologies of liberalism and communism, even as at the practical level, the praxis of solidarity negates human physical activity as mere rote behavior or extrinsic action what Arendt dismissed as beast-like labor. Solidarity as an ontology of relations renders human action, transcendent to mere physical, even mental labor. For example, in *Laborem Ex Excens*, John Paul locates solidarity as a kind of praxis that works against the structures of sin. For John Paul, sin is


14 In several of her works, Arendt in her works maintains that praxis developed out of the Aristotelian tradition in which the emphasis is on a kind of contemplation. Praxis is thought or thinking for its own sake and it defines Philosophy. For Arendt this kind of intrinsic thinking is of a qualitatively different order than everyday human labor. This is in sharp contrast with the thought of John Paul II who, in *Laborem Excercenes* places great value and dignity on labor, no matter how physical.
often as much a negative social category like imperialism, idolatry, class, technology and exploitative economic relationships. He maintains that “solidarity conquers these structures.”

SOLIDARITY AT WORK IN THE MOBILIZATION OF POLAND

There have been numerous biographies of John Paul II and many of them recount the seeming inevitability of the trip to Poland and the eventual confrontation, first with Polish political and military leadership and eventually, Soviet leadership, culminating in John Paul II’s letter to Leonard Brezhnev in December of 1980, when, with Warsaw Pact troops massed on the border with Poland, he resisted an overly cautious approach and tone and instead gave full encouragement to his fellow Poles and thereby expressed through his praxis his total solidarity with them. In order to bring this aspect of his concept of solidarity into clearer view, it may be useful to look at it from the perspective of social movement theory.\footnote{George Weigel discusses the Soviet response to Solidarity in his biography of John Paul II, Witness to Hope, (New York: Clifff Street Books, 1999), see especially pages 405-406.} Social movement theory provides additional concepts and processes that help to shed light on the phenomenology of solidarity as praxis.

One of these concepts is the idea of “cognitive praxis,” a footnote to praxis theory wherein, as Eyerman and Jamison note, there are linkages established that pertain, not only to shared identities but to ideas and transmission of these ideas. Social movements like the solidarity movement, in other words, convey a new interpretation of reality and help to disseminate new views of the self and the community. They represent the attempt by social movements to redefine history, the current political and social context, as well as the nature of the obstacles faced. Eyerman and Jamison cite Alberto Melucci to note that the praxis of social movements transforms the meaning of the movement itself for those who are committed to it, thereby transcending their own present character to become signs. According to Melucci: “They do this in the sense that they translate their action into symbolic challenges that upset the dominant cultural codes and reveal their irrationality and partiality by acting at the levels (of information and communication) at which the new forms of technocratic power also operate.”\footnote{Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach, (University Park, PA.: Penn State Press, 1991), p. 48.}

This cognitive praxis of social movements often entails the redirection of consciousness or its intentionality away from the present towards significant moments in a movement’s past or its potential new beginning. It represents a new paradigm for thinking about the individual and the way the individual relates to the wider community, the first step of which involves a recovery of one’s place in history, coupled with a
recontextualizing of identity. Here religious symbols, anniversaries and significant texts take on additional importance and perform the task of transmitting the ideas of cognitive praxis. Participation in the life of the social movement, in others words, is tantamount to immersion in the cognitive praxis of social transformation.

A second aspect of social movement theory that is especially relevant to John Paul II’s participation in the Solidarity movement is that social movements comprise not only the organized and explicit face they present to the world, but, through unconscious intentionality, they also express the deep, often historical longing of the people. John Paul’s pilgrimage to Poland and the important national shrines there reminded his compatriots not only of their dignity, but of their history. At the same time, his presence also had the effect of expanding the scope of the struggle between the Church and the State because, though Polish, he occupied a position of such great prominence in the West.

In addition, social movement scholars maintain that special holidays, major anniversaries, sites of significant historical importance such as shrines are reminders of identity and always present the possibility for mobilization. Thus, John Paul II’s sermons and homilies at the shrine to Our Lady of Czestochowa, and the very celebration of Mass on the feast of St. Stanislaw were monumental events because of the intentional horizons they evoked. So, to the extent that one can ever identify a precise origin to the initiation of a new beginning like Solidarity, it seems clear that these events and John Paul II’s direct participation in them were a new beginning for Poland. For his actions focused Polish energy, and one can say that the eventual demands “Solidarity” made on the Polish and Soviet political structure began with the earlier mobilization of consciousness and praxis during his 1979 visit. The words that John Paul spoke to the citizens of Poland in June, 1979, were magnified because of the setting and historical circumstances, but they also brought forth the unconscious hopes of the participants. And in June, 1979 there were thirteen millions Polish citizens who heard those words.17

The words that John Paul spoke were the instruments for the transcendence of current political limitations. Beyond their everyday or mundane meanings they are, under these settings, what Karl Jaspers called ciphers, signs that point beyond the mundane to the transcendental horizon of intentionality. Under these circumstances, the existence and identity of the participants is reawakened as true compatriots, wherein one comes to view one’s self as other than one currently is. Looking back at Solidarity and John Paul’s visit one can imagine a worker saying the following: “Yes, it’s true I am now a lowly shipyard worker in Gdansk, Poland; but in the presence of the Pope and through the recognition of all these other Poles, I can see myself as a free man.” The praxis of solidarity, in other words was a total transformation not only of social relationships, but of the self-

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17 Weigel, p. 320.
concept of those involved as well.\textsuperscript{18} This is one of the hallmarks of solidarity as a form of transformational \textit{praxis}.

The recovery or retrieval of history is significant for the \textit{praxis} of solidarity in that it allows those who are oppressed to be resocialized on the basis of their own authentic historical identity, that is, as immanently defined and emergent, and thereby it overcomes the legacy of oppression and the cycle of what Sartre in his later works on social theory referred to as \textit{alterity}.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, as an historical category the \textit{praxis} of solidarity for John Paul II was also explicitly political as evinced in his letter to Brezhnev. For the very mention of human dignity and human rights in a letter to the head of the Soviet Union, founded to promote the freedom of workers, carries with it an implicit reminder of Soviet Communism’s own lost history and potential.

As John Paul saw it, solidarity is a moral obligation that binds Catholics to transcend pure identity with the State. In \textit{Sollicitudo Rei Socialis}, he notes that because the Church is distinct from the State, its assessment of what counts as a just pattern of development is not commensurate with the mere accumulation of consumer products and wealth, which may or may not suffice for the State.\textsuperscript{20} For example, for John Paul II, the concept of solidarity is a guide to the politics of development. There is more subtlety to this position than may appear to be the case, for development is not to be construed as a national problem or one that takes place somewhere else. Rather it is necessarily global, owing not only to the movements of markets but to the reality, or exigencies of human social needs. In other words, the underdevelopment of some nations of the South is directly related to other aspects of globalization such as immigration, and it is a global category at every stage.

One interesting illustration of this, albeit from a negative perspective, is the failure of “communism in one nation”, according to which the bi-polar conditions of the Cold War could be bracketed within

\textsuperscript{18} The author is indebted to h. Mark Roelofs for his description in his lectures of this aspect of transformational \textit{praxis}.

\textsuperscript{19} An important historical and theoretical application of this principle is Misciagno’s work on \textit{de facto} feminism wherein women, who don’t identify themselves as feminist, develop feminist consciousness on the basis of their own resistance to patriarchal conditions. As Misciagno put it, “What is more important for this analysis than the conflict between opposing ideologies is the facticity implied by the ontology of \textit{praxis}, which is illustrated by the fact that \textit{de facto} feminist \textit{praxis} works toward, on the one hand, a different socialization pattern, and on the other, an empirical erosion of patriarchy through daily activity and decision making.” Patricia Misciagno, \textit{Rethinking Feminist Identification} (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 92.

\textsuperscript{20} This continues to be an area of friction between Church and State, as evinced in the tension over immigration that exists between the United States government, including its elected representatives, interest groups and constituencies, on the one hand, and the Church on the other.
any specific nation. Instead, what appears to have been the case was that communism and capitalism were incompatible on a global basis. In a sense then, globalization before it became such a ubiquitous term existed as the global conflict between two power blocs. Thus, globalization is not an extraordinary state of the political order, and therefore tensions that arise from globalization are frequently more international than they may initially appear. Yet the political constituencies involved tend to reinforce the desire for national political, often exclusionary, solutions. We can see this in the equally chilly climate afforded immigrant workers from Mexico and Latin America in the United States, Chinese workers in Indonesia and Turkish workers in Germany. It is in this sense that John Paul maintains that Catholics have a “duty of solidarity” towards those less fortunate than themselves and his insistence on a globally based universal outlook.

One can perhaps underscore this by contrasting the Pope’s leadership with that of the modern political leader in the liberal tradition. The modern political leader remains very much in the mold of Machiavelli’s famous work, The Prince. The nomenclature of the modern political campaign, replete with focus groups, instant polling and image handlers, stands in sharp contrast with the direct moral leadership exercised by John Paul II. The tendency in recent years has been that the modern style of political leadership has become increasingly global, so that the same techniques that are used by political leaders in the United States may be easily and efficiently transported to other areas of the globe. In this context, politics becomes largely a matter of managing or massaging public opinion, complete with code words and euphuisms often intended to generate fear, or to reinforce long established patterns of acquiescence to political cues. The essential thing for the late-modern “prince” then, is to appear strong and well, and so commentary on modern leadership is as likely to be as much about the quality of the leader’s attire as it is about his or her message. Defenders of this amoral style of leadership, a style that Machiavelli famously outlined, note that all of this may serve good purposes. The modern political “prince” is likely to say that these techniques are but the coin of the realm and are sometimes necessary in order to have a seat at the table, to enact pro-human policies including humane foreign policy and so forth.

In fact, the techniques of post-modern political leadership are only part of the story. The other is the growth of a post-modern media culture that promotes a cult of personality and celebrity on the one hand, and then takes whatever steps are necessary to tear down the carefully constructed image that the media itself helped to create. This state of affairs and the paradigm just described is nothing less than the predictable cycle of postmodern media culture, one that has been played out time and time again in country after country. However, in the model proposed by Machiavelli it is necessary that the leader have a sufficient aura and distance in order to present the idealized type of leadership that brings with it success. The difficulty is that, as Misciagno notes, the postmodern media is designed to
remove exactly that distance and to undermine exactly that type of posture. In this context, the search for proof sources escalates as political leaders come to recognize that the widespread cynicism that this culture and style of leadership generates leaves little room for persuasion, itself often presented as the essential, or core aspect of power, especially at the national level.

So it is that in this context the leadership of John Paul II is truly extraordinary. For, instead of grounding his arguments in technique, or through the adoption of media savvy, he led through moral persuasion. It is the effectiveness of this more than anything else that provides such a basis for hope not only to his compatriots but to the wider global community, at the same time he insisted on a realistic analysis of the human condition. The enduring political lesson of his praxis-derived political leadership is that for postmodern men and women, at least, the only type of leadership that can endure the glare and intensity of postmodern media culture is the praxis of solidarity as a form of moral leadership.

THE ROLE OF JOHN PAUL II

In summing up this part of our study, the one thing that stands out about the Solidarity Movement and the redefinition of the concept of solidarity itself is the role of religion in politics. The two were considered by some to be antithetical from a humanist perspective. Yet the passing of John Paul II was remarkable precisely because he was a political activist both in a practical way and a theoretical one, and so the spontaneity of the outpouring of affection from the millions who turned out in Saint Peter’s Square to pay their respects was perhaps all the more remarkable for the discipline of philosophy and in particular political philosophy. In sum, the death of John Paul II represented a very explicit moment in the history of social thought. For here was a figure of world historical proportions who had lived through and experienced in both an existential and active way two of the major forms of evil on a grand scale – Nazi Fascism and Soviet Totalitarianism. Here we are dealing not merely with the march of historical events but rather their manifestation as oppositional praxis the agency of a particular individual, who at the same time, was a phenomenologist. Taking a step back, as phenomenologists, such as John Paul would suggest, we see that the intellectual currents that informed the life and times of the late Pope also shed light on the human condition in a dialectical way. Liberation advanced beyond a certain oppositional alterity, or conflict between the two major powers to philosophical thought, reflecting upon itself as dialectical but politically opposed.

21 Patricia Misciagno, “Rethinking the Mythic Presidency.”
22 Ibid.
23 The term liberation appears to be a co-relative one that stands in direct opposition to oppression or, perhaps, to use a better word might be alienation. It
The life of John Paul II, especially during the days of the solidarity movement serves as window into the study of the relationship between politics and religion, because it marked a convergence between the goals and aspirations of a politics of action on the one hand, and the theoretical vantage point not only of liberalism but the deeper wellsprings of an ontology of human relationships. For John Paul II, not only politics but hope itself is rooted ultimately in his belief in the irreducibility of the human person beyond their relationship to God and in this aspect of his philosophy he is squarely in the footsteps of the Christian tradition.

However, it was based also on an empirical position, namely that of the progressive liberation of the human person in history. As Eric Fromm noted, during the Twentieth-Century the parameters of the obstacles to human freedom changed from merely physical chains to become psychological in nature. These have been viewed, under various nomenclatures, from Aristotle on, as rooted in political socialization. Time and again John Paul explicated often in detailed ways, the precise nature of what the human project was up against and was not afraid to address evil by its name, but at the time in posing the issue of solidarity he recalled for humanity its dignity and the phenomenological fact of its struggle. Even now it is worth reflecting on the fact of Solidarity and what seemed at the time a most preposterous idea – that a worker’s movement in an obscure shipyard somewhere in Eastern Europe would set in motion a series of events that would lead to the fall of one of the most gargantuan regimes in the history of the planet. Today the sheer facticity of that event still resonates as a vindication of the basis of John Paul II’s hope.

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may be a more accurate term in that the philosophical tradition has identified two forms of alienation. The first is a political one or one that can be reduced to politics via an inquiry into political economy, culture or even mundane history. Here the very earliest works of philosophers mention the word “strife” as a primal condition that defines the parameters of the human condition. The other tradition however, the Hebraic one, identifies alienation as being primarily a spiritual phenomenon – a sickness of the soul. This latter condition has sometimes been said to merge with political alienation and the result is a kind of plague, a metaphor of course, but one that does capture the complex interaction between these two forms of alienation.
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CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY IN AUGUST CIESZKOWSKI’S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

ANDRZEJ WAWRZYNOWICZ

This study concerns problems and issues related to “Solidarity“ (understood as a social and political movement) in the horizon of the Polish philosophy of the 19th century. It is an attempt at finding the broader ideological framework which formed the intermediate historical background in the process of development of Polish political thought and atmosphere of the second half of the 20th century. Polish interpretation of the notion of social solidarity inherently related to the idea of political freedom rooted in the republican heritage of Pre-Partition Poland\(^1\) and constantly was present throughout Poland’s entire independent-oriented national tradition of the last two centuries. It found its specific philosophical shape in the doctrine proposed by August Cieszkowski,\(^2\) one of the main representatives of the philosophical thought of the so-called inter-insurrection period (1831-1863). The aim of the reflections presented in this study is to highlight the specific features of Cieszkowski’s proposed interpretation of the notion of solidarity and bring into relief the role of this notion in the structure of Cieszkowski’s Ojcze nasz\(^3\) [Our Father] – work containing a distinctive synthesis of the Polish philosophy of his period.

Issues related specifically to solidarity are taken up and explored in detail in the second volume of Cieszkowski’s opus magnum, in one of the

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\(^1\) Pre-Partition Poland (i.e. until 1795) was a multiethnic state with long republican traditions which, during the Enlightenment (and later), found its reflection in progressive perfectly conforming to Western standards and political thought based on the modern concept of the nation as a political community – cf. Andrzej Walicki, Idea narodu w polskiej myśl oświeceniowej, Warszawa 2000, p. 10 and next [Andrzej Wawlicki, The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood. Polish Political Thought from the Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kościuszko, 1989].

\(^2\) Cieszkowski August (1814-1894) – philosopher, economist, social and political activist; one of the main representatives of Polish national philosophy of the 19th century; author of Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (1838), Gott und Paligenesie (1842), Ojcze nasz (1848-1906).

sections devoted to the philosophical exegesis of the invocation. This fragment of Cieszkowski’s comprehensive philosophical study which – in the intention of the author – was supposed to combine the historiographical perspective with his individually understood philosophy of revelation, contains Cieszkowski’s extensive deliberations centred on the meaning of just one component of the first line of the Lord’s Prayer “Our Father, which art in Heaven”, namely, the interpretation of the word our. The foundation of the discussion is an analysis of the symbolic context of using the personal pronoun our in the Pater Noster, a context treated here as an expression of a certain historic turning point, i.e. the discovery (by human kind) of the essence of social solidarity.

Cieszkowski interprets the Lord’s Prayer as a symbolic written Testament of Jesus Christ. Christian revelation could not express directly this Polish philosopher’s claims to complete realisation of a project of eschatological future and ultimate fulfilment of human destinies. This was condensed into a daily prayer containing a motto of the Gospels and accompanying humankind throughout the entire Christian age as a specific form of directions guiding community expectations. In Cieszkowski’s interpretation, the Lord’s Prayer, which is the symbolic quintessence of fundamental needs and pursuits of the human community, becomes a specific task, both historic and eschatological, to be fulfilled, which encourages all communities that are within its range of influence constantly to overcome their own barriers in the pursuit of objective fulfilment. It is underpinned by historical Christian culture, functions within its orbit of influence regardless of subsequent processes of secularisation, as a kind of community ideology, which, uninterruptedly, has mobilised social solidarity resources and generated objective changes in the organisation of people’s lives. The overriding goal of the changes is to take into account the requirements of this solidarity to a greater extent. These create

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5 Ibidem, p. 76 [August Cieszkowski, The Desire of All Nations, op. cit., p. 128].
7 Ibidem, p. 9 and next [August Cieszkowski, The Desire of All Nations, op. cit., pp. 22-23].
9 Antoni Roszkowski – one of Polish investigators of social views promoted by A. Cieszkowski – describes the general slant of Cieszkowski’s doctrine as liberal solidarism, or moderate liberalism combined with solidarism – compare Antoni Roszkowski, Poglady społeczne i ekonomiczne Augusta Cieszkowskiego, Poznań 1923, p. 162.
increasingly solid foundations for a collective existence and provide a
canon of objective interpersonal relations which gradually embrace the
whole world. Cieszkowski’s *Our Father* presents, as the philosopher
himself highlights, a systematic justification of the logic of the process.

A distinct feature of the framework which is used to investigate
social and political life in *Our Father* is its integral link with the broad
religious context.\(^{10}\) In Cieszkowski’s view, religion is never something
exclusively personal or private. Quite the contrary, it is an overwhelmingly
social element which, at the same time, is an invisible driving force for the
public life in general. Investigating relations between different societies
existing throughout the human history, together with their systems of
beliefs, two mutually complementary dimensions of community life
emerge. Religion functions as the soul of the political state, mustering up
individuals to unite into communities and constantly renew the bond that
underlies their mutual coexistence, not infrequently above all particular
interests of individuals. On the other hand, the political state is the *body*
of religion, endowing the human spiritual community with a concrete
institutional shape and objective authority.\(^{11}\) “Religion in its nature and
root-meaning is a bond, a union, a reconciliation. Not only is it a bond
between God and the world, but even one binding the world with itself –
joining individual spirits set within the limits of space and time to one
another”\(^{12}\).

The opposition between religion and politics manifesting itself so
clearly in modern times is – in Cieszkowski’s opinion – merely a function
of a certain dualism marking the Christian age. The religious revolution
started by Luther was admittedly one of the first signs and symptoms of the
crisis of the particular time in which it emerged, but not of religiousness as
such. The Christian age has been marked by a struggle between religion and
politics from its very beginnings, so the Reformation movement was not, in
fact, as revolutionary as is commonly believed. A genuine religious
revolution actually took place much earlier, and its true initiator was Jesus
Christ.

The perception of Christ as a key link in human history enabled
Cieszkowski’s historiosophical reflection to break out of its initial Hegelian
confinesto.\(^{13}\) While maintaining the fundamental dialectic structure of history,

\(^{10}\) Compare August Cieszkowski, *Ojcze nasz*, v. III, op. cit., pp. 80-82.
\(^{13}\) Hegel himself regards the moment of emergence of the Christian
principle in history as a fundamental historic turning point – compare Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, in:
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Werke*: [in 20 Bänden], Bd. 12, (Frankfurt am
Cieszkowski proposes a partial reinterpretation of the importance of certain historical moments on the basis of a millenarist doctrine of development which is in line with a tradition going back many hundreds of years. This goes at least, to the time of Joachim of Fiore who suggested a division of history into three successive fundamental epochs: the Age of the Father, the Age of the Son and the Age of the Holy Spirit.\footnote{Main 1970), p. 414; however it is not adequately reflected in Hegel’s proposed general historiosophic structure in which the German Christian world is presented as the fourth consecutive epoch in history and is, \textit{de facto}, opposed directly only to the preceding third epoch, i.e. the Roman world – compare ibidem, p. 415.}

The idea of a progressive development of humanity was adopted under the direct influence of Saint-Simonism. The modern notion of progress has its origins in the Western philosophy of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, long before Cieszkowski, in the doctrines proposed e.g. by Turgot, Lessing, Kant, Herder and Condorcet. It finds its ultimate reflection in Cieszkowski, via Saint-Simon and his followers. The progressive development of humanity was viewed by Saint-Simon and representatives of the Saint-Simonian movement, in line with their professed spirit of the Enlightenment, as progress towards a fraternity of all the people. The aim of the development was to attain a universal supranational union that eventually would lead human solidarity towards fulfilment in actual political relationships.\footnote{Basically speaking, a reference to the millenarist scheme appears already in Hegel’s views, though merely as an element of a description of the internal dynamics of the German Christian world – compare ibidem, p. 417.} Cieszkowski analyses the issue in a similar vein, although he distances himself from the primacy of the supranational aspect of solidarity. The orientation towards future amalgamation of nations within a universal organisation of a collective existence of the entire humanity – an idea pervading the socialist thought – is absent from Cieszkowski’s system.

In the doctrine proposed by the Polish philosopher, the development of humanity as a whole consists of progressive creation of the notion of solidarity as a function of ever-increasing connection with God and, therefore, as a function of humanity’s perception of its absolute identity with itself. Hence the following three levels of human communication with God, i.e. three forms in which humanity experiences the absolute revelation. The forms also represent the spirit of essential historic transformations marking religious relations.

The first of the forms was God’s manifestation as the \textit{Lord} and the Creator. Humanity, initially confined to just one nation, Israel, experienced
its revelation thanks to Moses.\(^{16}\) At the time, Moses was still recognised exclusively as the leader of the chosen nation. Christ gave the absolute manifestation of a universal dimension embracing the all human kind. Consequently, the higher form of capturing God is to perceive Him as the Father. This confronts people with two prospects. On the one hand, there is the religious prospect of a universal Divine Sonship which recognises people as Children who are all given equal rights. On the other hand – since religious relations provide a direct model for general human relationships – it marks the moment of opening up to a general social solidarity.\(^{17}\) This is, therefore, a moment of discovery of the social state as human destiny and human nature.

It is not the direct natural state which forms the essence of a human being, but the community-oriented social state. The revelation of Christ is a moment of complete realisation of the idea of humanity, a moment of experiencing general human community in its fullest sense. This moment, Cieszkowski claims, marks a major decisive moment in human history, an historic turning point, after which social relations based on submission and bondage underwent a radical revaluation. The human kind entered a path of freedom which, from then on, it would never abandon in any circumstances. This does not, however, mean that human freedom is something acquired only outwardly. On the opposite, this point of view (whose roots go back as far into human history as the ancient Greek and Roman cultures) linking freedom exclusively to high birth or social status is transformed in the Christian world. According to Christian thought, freedom is regarded as a suprahistorical essence of humanity which – admittedly – is only realised at a certain stage of historical development, but this does not imply that only history gives rise to freedom. Human freedom is absolutely inalienable and irreducible to anything else. The Christian world merely discloses the truth and turns it into a universal foundation of collective life.\(^{18}\)

However, the attainment of this freedom means directly only that historical development is back on track. This entails neither the end of development nor the highest form of absolute revelation (truth). The inherent dualism of the Father and the Son still requires an abolition, which means that it is necessary for humans to be freely reconciled, with their

\(^{16}\) August Cieszkowski, Ojce nasz, v. II, op. cit., p. 80. [August Cieszkowski, The Desire of All Nations, op. cit., p. 130].

\(^{17}\) Ibidem, p. 92. [August Cieszkowski, The Desire of All Nations, op. cit., p. 134].

destiny and realise the message of Jesus Christ, i.e. fulfilment of social solidarity. Consequently, we are facing the prospect of the second turning point in history, whose task is no longer another revaluation, but rather a radical transformation of social relations. Humanity must, thus, ultimately experience the third form of revelation, i.e. manifestation of the Holy Spirit—the Comforter (Paraclete). In this interpretation, human freedom can only be fully realised if it becomes social reality. Cieszkowski contends that the development of humanity (seen as a gradual growth of human unification in active cooperation stemming from the mutual feeling of solidarity) will reach its apex precisely in the third epoch.19

The three successive stages of revelation: the first headed by Moses, the second by Christ and the third, in the future, by Paraclete thus basically define the sequence of historical epochs and determine the nature of pervading social relations. Cieszkowski interprets each of the epochs of human development as a reflection of one of the three basic levels of people’s communication with God and, at the same time, the three forms of basic relations between politics and religion in social life. Antiquity was marked by a primary unification of religion and politics. On the plane of religious relations, two distinctive features of the age were the outward rule of polytheism and the budding inner monotheism in its pre-Christian Mosaic form. Social relations of that age were dominated by despotic rule and slavery.

In contrast, the Christian age embraces a rejection of politics by religion and, broadly speaking, a struggle between religion and politics. Social relations, in turn, are overwhelmingly dominated by monotheism, while social and political life are based on both political domination of the Church and the relation of submission.

The oncoming third, and final epoch will be marked by reunification of religion and politics. This new sphere of religious relations is aimed to achieve a fulfilment of Christianity in the spirit of universal social solidarism. Shared social organisation of united humanity is to create a political Church20 made up of federations of sovereign national church bodies. Submission and bondage will be superseded by brotherhood of free participants of public life who are all granted equal rights. As opposed to the essentially collectivist spirit of socialist designs of the future society, Cieszkowski’s vision places a strong emphasis on decentralisation21 and subjectivity. The foundation of the latter is civil liberty at the level of

19 Compare Antoni Roszkowski, Poglądy społeczne i ekonomiczne Augusta Cieszkowskiego, op. cit., p. 136.
21 Roszkowski, op. cit., p. 149-151.

This national\footnote{Ibidem. [August Cieszkowski, \textit{The Desire of All Nations}, op. cit., ibidem].} trait in the idea of universal social solidarism, so strongly accented by Cieszkowski, is a distinct Polish element in Cieszkowski’s doctrine. Ultimately, the author of \textit{Our Father} presents a concept of social solidarity which essentially does not collide with liberty (both civil and national), but rests upon the foundation provided by it. Regardless of unmistakable French influences which characterise Cieszkowski’s philosophical system in general, this aspect is undoubtedly an independent (and relatively free from such influences) achievement of Polish philosophical thought. Polish philosophy, during the period, developed at the time when Poland was deprived of autonomous state and irrespective of the presence of consciously or unconsciously incorporated. Or, perhaps thanks to those hopes, Poland was particularly sensitized to the position of the national factor in social life. Nowhere in Europe, except Poland, was the idea of solidarity of all nations treated on a par with the idea of an (internal) national solidarity. Quite the reverse, throughout the 19th century and nearly the whole 20th century, the two ideas were typically placed in opposition to each other. Free European nations either failed to appreciate adequately the importance of the national factor and, consequently, were much more liable to overrate supranational homogeneous collectivism, or – vice versa – they effectively disregarded the importance of supranational solidarity and gave in to one-sided nationalism. The former trend indirectly produced the revolutionary spirit of collectivist socialism, whereas the latter brought radical attitudes associated with national socialism. Transplanted into the spheres of social and political reality in 20th century Europe, both of these extremes culminated in two competing forms of state totalitarianism.

It appears that the relatively common belief currently held in Western European countries (particularly in political circles) concerning the existence of a coherent idea of European solidarity, is, historically speaking, a form of idealisation of the actual events that took place during the past two centuries. The idea of solidarity has been uninterruptedly present ever since the age of the Enlightenment and has gradually attracted others its orbit of influence Successive countries of the European continent, some of them unenlightened, including – at the end of the 20th century – Poland together with the other countries of the former Eastern bloc, felt this influence. On the other hand, belief in solidarity was a clear manifestation of a peculiar Western European ethnocentrism. From the purely political point of view, the belief disregards the actual role of the USA in shaping the foundations of European solidarity after WWII. As regards the history
of ideas, belief in solidarity takes no notice of the existence of a particular and uniquely Polish interpretation of the notion of social solidarity that developed gradually on the base of historical national consciousness of Poles for the last century. The Polish notion was ultimately crowned with the emergence (towards the end of the 20th century) of the social and political “Solidarity” movement. The problem, which is merely glossed over in this paper, is a part of a broader evolution of the concept of nation in modern Polish and European thought, as practice on the one hand, and also as matter of theoretical evaluation of the process on the other.24 The modern idea of nation as a political community was deeply ingrained in the political culture of Pre-Partition Poland and has been evolving in the national consciousness of Poles in a way similar to Western Europe and in permanent contact with the entire progressive political thought of the West. To treat the idea as specific for Western European thought and to place it in opposition to the supposedly typically Eastern concept of the nation as an ethnic and cultural community is a theoretical generalisation deprived of any historical justification.25

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24 An analysis of the problem is presented in one of the previously quoted works by Andrzej Walicki – compare Andrzej Walicki, Idea narodu w polskiej myśli oświeczeniowej, op. cit. [Andrzej Wawlicki, The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood, Polish Political Thought from the Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kościuszko, op. cit.].

25 Ibidem, p. 140. [Andrzej Wawlicki, The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood, Polish Political Thought from the Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kościuszko, op. cit.].
What are the sources of human solidarity? Are there any absolute preconditions for solidarity to manifest itself? In order to determine sources of solidarity, is it necessary to explore such issues as human nature or genesis or perhaps it is only social and economic factors that trigger the emergence of solidarity, e.g. as an expression of civil disobedience.\(^1\)

These and similar questions are also a subject of investigation for social philosophy.\(^2\) Although existing throughout the ages, they seem to be acquiring a new quality today, determined not only by the evident decline of human solidarity in daily life, but also its spontaneous emergence in critical situations. Although in today’s world one could argue for axiological changes, these seem contradicted by natural humane reactions arising during natural disasters or situations where lives are directly endangerment.

The representation of reality in the context outlined above seems to carry an inherent contradiction. On the one hand, in terms of day-to-day relations between the society and the individual, one can notice a trend towards objectifying people, constraining and subordinating them e.g. to the power of the media, as well as terrorism and violence, not only within the society and in diverse forms.\(^3\) On the other hand, there are also

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\(^1\) Looking for justification or sources of solidarity between people, one can naturally analyse a range of issues, e.g. reasons for civil disobedience or opposition, limits of social bondage, social intolerance, principles of the social order, the idea of justice, but also problems concerning the nature of human beings, their motivations, justifications, speciesism (or social selfishness, group selfishness, professional selfishness), social and individual values.

\(^2\) What I mean here is social philosophy which was originated by the Sophists, Cynics, Plato and Aristotle. Social philosophy in the sense of reflection on types of social bonds deals more precisely with questions pertaining to the nature of such bonds, preconditions for their existence and ontic status.

\(^3\) To J. Nehru, violence and terrorism within the society are also manifested in the practice of moulding the mentality of citizens in accordance with the interests of the ruling group, e.g. through controlling the information media, prohibiting objective presentation of facts, deceitful propaganda,
manifestations of spontaneous kindness and willingness to help other people in situations of collective threat.

As expected, daily situations illustrating these two trends provoke a number of questions, not only pertaining to the very essence of human solidarity, but also qualities underlying it and possible causes of weakening of solidarity-based bonds.

This discussion is an attempt at highlighting some of the problems hinted at above which, in their essence, seek the foundations or sources of human solidarity. An inspiration for my explorations is drawn from works by M. K. Gandhi, J. Nehru, K. Wojtyla and John Paul II.

HUMAN SOLIDARITY AND GANDHI’S IDEA OF NON-VIOLENCE

Jawaharlal Nehru, writing about Gandhi, repeatedly indicates that the message taught by the spiritual leader was not addressed to any particular country or society. Each truth contained in Gandhi’s teachings can be universally applied to any country and the entire humanity.

In Nehru’s view, Gandhi not only has credit for India’s liberation, but also – a fact of equal importance – is responsible for having taught people how to stamp out fear and hate from their lives. In his actions, Gandhi not only emphasised the need of unity, equality and fraternity, but also argued that the oppressed must rise up, and that all people have an inalienable right to dignified and honest work. He claimed the supremacy of spiritual values and, of particular importance, practised what he preached, claiming that philosophy divorced from life is like a dead body without life.


5 In Gandhi’s view there should not be any difference between programme and practice: “Those who believe in the simple truths I have laid down can propagate them only by living them”. Compare J.Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 371.
In analysing Gandhi’s biography, as well as extensive literature devoted to Gandhi’s life and teachings,\(^6\) one unanimously held opinion emerges that Gandhi was one of very few people who succeeded in spurring hundreds of thousands of people and in shaking them out of their everyday passivity and indifference. What Gandhi did was to transform the general unconcern for social, public and state-related matters into political activity focused on actions taken for the common benefit. Attaining the common good thus became a central goal, and human solidarity a necessary precondition.

For Gandhi, actions carried out for the common good stem from the pursuit of justice\(^7\) and truth\(^8\) in everyday life, they are an ultimate consequence of justice. On the other hand, actions taken to attain the common good, which is possible thanks to universal human solidarity, appear as a consequence of social injustice which has always inspired civil disobedience, opposition or outright resistance. As a result, while searching for the roots of solidarity in Gandhi’s teachings, attention should be paid to two seemingly separate levels: one metaphysical, the other economic or social, concerning the struggle for independence and encompassing social reforms. Even though the two levels tend to be analysed separately, it is quite evident that one has its roots in the other. To put it more simply, the latter would not have occurred if the former had not contributed to shaping Gandhi’s personality, endowing him with extraordinary sensitivity e.g. to social injustice. Looking for sources of human solidarity in Gandhi’s works, regardless of the two main levels listed above, one invariably encounters the principle of _ahimsa_, i.e. the doctrine of non-violence.


\(^7\) Although for Gandhi the concept of justice undoubtedly embraced three classic interpretations, i.e. _iustitia socialis_ (social justice), _iustitia distributiva_ (distributive justice) concerning the distribution of wealth, labour, etc. and its constituent _iustitia vindicativa_ (vindictive justice) for violation of the moral order, he drew attention to the role of justice to improve the will to do good. For a discussion on justice, see e.g. J. Rawls, _A Theory of Justice_, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971; Z. Ziemiński, _O pojmowaniu sprawiedliwości_, [About Justice] Lublin, Daimonion, 1992.

\(^8\) Although authors discussing the problem of Gandhi’s understanding of truth typically refer to the well-known sentence, also quoted by Nehru (ibidem, 287) “God is Truth and Truth is God”, the interpretation of truth in Gandhi’s system is much more complex and at the same time fundamental for Gandhi’s actions. The problem will be dealt with in greater detail in the subsequent sections of this article.
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN GANDHI’S TEACHINGS

Gandhi is commonly regarded as the most significant theoretician and practitioner of social struggle expressed with non-violent means. The fight that Gandhi inspired was an active form of resisting evil, which was mainly manifest in different forms of violence employed against people. Evil grew out of social injustice which naturally gave rise to internal opposition and civil disobedience. Gandhi taught how to oppose evil without using evil, i.e. through non-violence. Gandhi’s method, which Nehru described as a positive and dynamic method of action, excluded violence not because of mental passivity or inherent weakness, but as a result of morally enhanced fighting energy which comes out from a higher level of consciousness. To oppose evil by renouncing violence called for considerable spiritual power, on the one hand, and on the other keen awareness of how that violence is manifested and what it concerns.

According to Gandhi, conscious repudiation of any means of aggression, i.e. active resistance without using violence, was supposed to affect the opposition as well. The ultimate goal was to show what is morally superior from what constitutes its everyday experience within the current system. Another goal was not to lose the elementary human connection with the opponent, in keeping with Gandhi’s principle that “the means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree. We reap exactly as we sow.”

Gandhi opposed evil, which was evident in social injustice and human suffering, by proposing a doctrine of ahimsa (meaning kindness, charity, non-aggression) and social equality (egalitarian justice). He saw the main motive for such action in the readiness to live in Truth.

There are many definitions of violence. Subtle forms of violence are accounted for e.g. in the definition proposed by B. Wolff and cited by I. Lazari-Pawłowska: “the illegitimate or unauthorised use of force to effect decisions against the will or desires of others”. See I. Lazari-Pawłowska, O obywatelskim sprzeciwie, [About Civic Disobedience] in: I.Lazari-Pawłowska, Etyka, Pisma wybrane, (Warszawa, Zakład im. Ossolińskich, 1992) p. 64.

To Gandhi, forms of violence also included methods typically accompanying political struggle, such as ruse, lie, defamation of opponents, vindictiveness, envy, hostility, hatred – the most subtle form of violence – revengefulness, etc.

See Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, p. 39. More information on cruelty and violence in Gandhi’s teachings is to be found in I.Lazari-Pawłowska, ibidem, p. 72-76.

There is a multitude of such statements by Gandhi. I want to live according to Truth; seeking Truth I have discovered many ideas and learnt many new things – and the like. An analysis of the notion of Truth invoked by
ahimsa and Truth (i.e. satya) became the two essential foundations on which Gandhi built human solidarity in a struggle to overcome social inequalities and in the campaign for India’s independence from Britain. In these struggles, Gandhi wanted to prove that the government is supposed to serve the people, not vice versa.13

Gandhi seems much more meaningful when looking for the foundations of human solidarity in Gandhi’s views. One can argue that truth, i.e. satya, both in the Hindu tradition and in Gandhi’s ideological system, is an important element with a social integration function. Another significant aspect concerns the virtue of the first jhana (minor degree) of Raja Yoga required by Patanjali’s Yoga Sutras (II 30 and 31) which applies to all the degrees of the mahavrata (great vow), which plays a vital role in the life of every Hindu. Satya understood as truth, honesty, integrity, loyalty is the second most important virtue (yama) after ahimsa, i.e. non-violence, kindness towards all creatures. The third key virtue is asteya, i.e. non-stealing. The remaining ones are brahmacarya (abstinence) and aparigraha (non-possessiveness or renouncement). The yamas (cf. Y.S. II 31 ibidem) and niyamas (rules and orders sometimes compared to the Christian Ten Commandments) were collectively regarded as a precondition on the path of yoga, regardless of time, place and other circumstances.

In his activity, Gandhi sometimes referred to satyagraha (“cling to truth”). For Gandhi, it signified opposition against injustice and misdeeds which renounces violent means – on one plane. On another plane, satyagraha was also an element of moral and ethical exercises prescribed by tradition and concerned with thoughts, words and deeds. They were fundamental for the spiritual path of each and every human being. One must not forget that Gandhi functioned in a tradition that pursued the goal of uniting with God or the suprapersonal Absolute. It was the main element of sanatana dharma, i.e. eternal law and order governing all Hindus. In the pursuit of this goal it was essential to become liberated from samsara, i.e. the cycle of rebirth. It seems that the ideal of satyagraha in Gandhi’s views is rooted very strongly in tradition – hence references to the yamas, niyamas, sanatana dharma, moksha (liberation), samsara (cyclic existence), etc. In his reflection, Gandhi attaches primary importance to social life. Consequently, the ideal of satyagraha applies, e.g. to truthfulness in the area of politics. One must not lie, Gandhi used to say (here, I pass over the interesting problem of dilemmas faced by Gandhi himself in his political activity), even if lying is employed to achieve some important immediate effects. Gandhi viewed truth as an autonomous good and argued that the pursuit of Truth is the pursuit of God, while to live in truth means to follow moral orders.

13 When the political activity and other endeavours initiated by Gandhi are assessed, claims are sometimes made that even though Gandhi’s movement was religious and stemmed directly from the ethical guidance that has been present in the Indian tradition for a very long time, its actual objective was to overthrow the government. See e.g. E. J. Homer, The Ghandi Reader, (Indiana University Press, 1956), p. 188 and LLazari-Pawłowska, Etyka Gandhiego, [Gandhi’s Ethics] in: Etyka. Pisma wybrane, ibidem p. 301.
Ahimsa – The Principle of Universal Loving Kindness between People

The principle of ahimsa adopted by Gandhi is seen as one of the basic moral virtues not only in Hinduism, but also Buddhism and Jainism. Gandhi placed ahimsa in opposition to himsa, defining the latter as evil, injury, harm and social violence. Gandhi’s ahimsa, derived from the Hindu tradition (see ref. 12), and encompassed the entire world of nature, animals and humans. Its deepest sense was expressed in the statement that no living creature should ever be killed, injured, tortured or oppressed. In consequence, people should always show loving kindness towards the whole natural world, particularly one’s fellow people. Gandhi stressed that ahimsa was very close in meaning to the Christian concept of caritas.

He also pointed out that there was affinity between ahimsa as and charity and love for one’s fellowman. The postulate of universal loving kindness taught by Gandhi was to be revealed in acts of human solidarity and assistance offered to those in need. It is interesting to note that the obligation to help applied not only to one’s family and friends, but also foes. In line with the ahimsa principle, Gandhi wanted to defend his country against the adverse effects of bondage and, at the same time, to protect from suffering those with whom he fought. Guided by ahimsa, Ghandi recognised that no one has the right to remain socially uncommitted in the face of evil. Everyone has an obligation to solidally oppose vice, at the same time remaining kind towards their opponents and not resorting to violence. Ahimsa, coupled with human solidarity which ahimsa inspired, employed in the social commitment against evil, carried an opportunity to achieve harmony and lasting peace in the society, state and all around the world.

Satyagraha: A Necessary Constituent of Solidarity and Universal Human Kindness

Ahimsa was a principle stemming directly from Hindu philosophy and tradition. Gandhi complemented ahimsa with the principle of satyagraha, i.e. insistence and adherence to truth. The two essential principles of Hindu tradition and philosophy became major driving forces of social activity. To Gandhi, satyagraha undoubtedly incorporated certain metaphysical features, though many definitions of the concept stressed

14 Compare I.Lazari-Pawłowska, ibidem, p. 295.
15 Analysing ahimsa, Gandhi asserted “If I am a follower of ahimsa, I must love my enemy. One must never do wrong to a person whose conduct outrages us. One should not even desire for God to punish them.” Compare I.Lazari-Pawłowska, ibidem, p. 297.
exclusively its social and political dimension, namely that the notion basically means the incorporation of truth and *ahimsa* in political life.\(^1^{6}\)

On account of the principle of *satyagraha*, Gandhi in his autobiography\(^1^{8}\) emphasised the solidarity-based motives of his actions in the obligation to help people who are threatened. The aim of those solidarity-based endeavours was to ensure harmonious coexistence and peace within the society and around the world. In Gandhi’s view, if harmonious social coexistence is to be established, one’s own actions may not be dependent on the behaviour of others. Violence should not be reciprocated with violence. Hatred can only be defeated by love; violence can only be conquered with kindliness. Nehru took up the thought, arguing that the ultimate aim of *ahimsa* and *satyagraha* is to elevate humanity to such a level of mutual existence that would be ruled by goodness and would accommodate no hate, cruelty and selfishness. Violence is destructive both for those who oppress and those who are oppressed, while renouncement of violence lifts both sides.\(^1^{9}\)

**METAPHYSICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN GANDHI’S TEACHINGS**

Nehru thought it rather incongruous that Gandhi justified his social, political and moral actions with metaphysics. However, the Hindu tradition leads me to the conclusion that metaphysics was a key element referring to the old customs and beliefs of the people whom Gandhi strove to unite in solidarity-based social and political actions. The overriding social and political objective, namely to eliminate the harm inflicted on the Indian nation, was, at the same time, a moral goal to wipe out suffering and humiliation, and transcendental goal which was ultimately to become free from *samsara*, i.e. the eternal cycle of life.

As a consequence, Gandhi combined – both in his teachings and in his own life – two attitudes: one of an activist, politician and reformer; and the other one of a man whose sole aspiration was saintliness and liberation. In this way, Gandhi demonstrated not only that morality is above politics,

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\(^{16}\) In Gandhi’s view, *satyagraha* called for fearlessness. Those who practised *satyagraha*, whom Gandhi also called patriots, must always be prepared to withstand imprisonment, death and other grave measures. They must not be afraid about their wealth, honour or family. They must abandon all fear of persecution by the government, disability and death. Compare I.Lazari-Pawłowska, ibidem, p. 312.

\(^{17}\) A more detailed discussion is presented in I. Lazari-Pawłowska, ibidem, p. 311.


but also that the latter must be subordinate to the former, because social and political life is merely one element of a person’s life whose central goal, in keeping with sanathana dharma, is complete self-realisation.

Analysing Ghandi’s doctrines, A. Naess tried to capture the main elements of his moral teachings in an attempt to systematise them. To this end, Naess placed an emphasis on the central assumption of Gandhi’s philosophy and its main hypotheses, namely: one should strive for complete self-realisation, and basic hypotheses: 1. Self-realisation presupposes a search for truth, 2. In the last analysis, all living beings are one, 3. Himsa (violence) against oneself makes complete self-realisation impossible. From these hypotheses, Naess derives others, e.g. 4. Himsa against a living being is himsa against oneself, and 5. Himsa against a living being makes complete self-realisation impossible. Hypothesis 4 is derived from hypothesis 2, while hypothesis – from hypotheses 3 and 4. In effect, Naess’s discussion can be linked to the problem of metaphysical elements of Gandhi’s teachings also with regard to the sources or foundations of human solidarity. The foundations can be deduced from the answers to questions concerning e.g. Gandhi’s attitude towards adversaries and methods of struggle using violence, and the problem of the essence of Truth.

The justification of the first question is rooted deeply in the Hindu tradition, as is the question of the sources or foundations of solidarity. It is easy to answer that question, for it pertains to the concept of reality dominated by karma, though in the sense of a chain of causes and effects in the moral world, Gandhi always spoke of fighting with evil, not with people. Opponents cease to be seen as opponents when they give up values imbued with evil. Crime is a manifestation of a sick mind.

In the metaphysical justification of Gandhi’s actions, an essential element is the problem of what precisely is Truth, since the pursuit of truth involves not only social and political goals affecting human solidarity, but also a goal transcendent to empirical life, i.e. ultimate liberation from all earthly attachments (moksha). A question about Gandhi’s truth is at the

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20 *Karma* literally means “deed” or “act”; the concept may apply to both spiritual and physical deeds; it also signifies a consequence of deeds. *Karma* arises from *samskara*, i.e. a notion encompassing impressions, propensities and capacities present in people’s consciousness, resulting from previous actions and thoughts – cf. Bhagavad Gita (any edition, 18.23). It follows that on account of the doctrine of *karma*, Gandhi was perfectly aware that human action creates a potential which guides people’s conduct and motives in the future. Hence if wrong is resisted with wrong, wrong will ultimately prevail in the future.

21 The aim is to escape from one’s karma (moral effects of deeds either in the form of joy or suffering in subsequent existences) and the eternal cycle of birth and death to become united with God or explore the Ultimate Reality. *Moksha* is the highest and the only goal of existence for all the Hindu people.
same time a question about the position of God and religion in Gandhi’s thought, about which Gandhi himself gives the following answer: “To me God is Truth and Love; God is ethics and morality; God is fearlessness. God is the source of Light and Life and yet He is above and beyond all these. God is conscience. He is even the atheism of the atheist. […] He is the searcher of hearts. He transcends speech and reason…. “22 At this point, Gandhi combined religion with morality, arguing that morality was the very essence of religion: “True religion is to do good to others”, “The highest moral law is that we should unremittingly work for the good of humankind” and “Serving others with sacrifice is the best religion”.23 Such ideas of religion and Truth taught by Ghandi spring on the one hand from Bhagavad Gita24 and on the other refer to the virtue of aparigraha, i.e. non-possession and non-attachment. Gandhi tried to show that the latter should be revealed not in escaping from the world, but in sacrificing for the benefit of others (karma – marga).25

SOLIDARITY IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

Analysing selected aspects of Christian thought concerning solidarity, attention should be paid to two basic developments. One shows that solidarity is a quality of creation. The other analyses human solidarity and the causes underlying its deterioration.

Christian thought recognises that solidarity exists between all creatures. This belief is rooted in the fact that all creatures have the same maker and praise his glory. This belief regarding solidarity between all creatures is derived from the Truth revealed by God, which asserts that “Nothing exists that does not owe its existence to God the Creator”.26 With regard to the act of creation, however, questions arise as to the primary and current status of solidarity. The Bible illumines, pointing to the primary solidarity of creation, at the same time stresses the deepest nature of creation, its value and destination. All these issues can, consequently, be

22 Quoted after I.Lazari-Pawłowska, ibidem, p. 362.
23 Compare ibidem, p. 362. After reflecting on various religions, Gandhi came to the conclusion that each religion accommodates truth and each has its mistakes. However, generally speaking, Gandhi held all religions in high esteem similarly to his own Hinduism.
24 Bhagavad Gita means literally “Lord’s Song”. For the Hindu, it performs a role similar to that of gospels to Christians. It forms a part of the Indian national epic (Book 6) entitled Mahabharata.
explored for the idea of original solidarity (which can also be referred to as the original quality of creation) and, possibly, causes of its decline.

For the nature, value and fate\(^{27}\) of all creation, as well as its original solidarity, the structure of created reality is significant, with regards to contemporary times and the problem of the foundations or conditions of human solidarity. Investigating solidarity as a primary quality of creation, a striking feature, namely the hierarchy of creatures and their mutual interdependence. The Bible shows that the solidarity of creatures does not exclude their hierarchy which is manifested through the order of creation, encompassing all levels of perfection (compare Genesis 1:1 – 2:4). Many fragments in the Bible illustrate this claim, for example, Psalm 145:9 “The Lord is good to everyone and has compassion for everything that he has made” (compare Luke 12:7, Matthew 12:12).

Christian thought contends that the variety and diversity of God’s creatures should not adversely affect their original solidarity. Indeed, mutual relations linking different creations and mutual interdependence give rise to a certain harmony. In Biblical statements related to the discussion of solidarity as a primary quality of creation, it is essential to note that humans, said to be made in the image of God, are regarded as the culmination of God’s act of creation (Genesis 1:26). Even though in this way human beings are markedly separated from other creatures, they are also inextricably linked with them by the primary solidarity of creation and the dominant goal of creation, i.e. glory of the Creator (compare Genesis 1:1 – 2:4).

Returning to the problem of solidarity as a quality of creation, all creatures, including humans, note that the derivation of creatures from the act of creation and the Creator, is manifested in the mutual interdependence of different creatures. A number of questions may arise at this point. For example, what is the essence of the principle of solidarity described in the Bible and what guiding principle should be adopted by each and every person in their actions towards the entire world of beings? A claim can be made that solidarity basically concerns respect for every single creature to avoid unordered use of things which disregards God the Maker.\(^{28}\) This causes disastrous consequences for humans and the environment.

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\(^{27}\) I do not offer a comprehensive analysis of concepts functioning in Christian thought. Nature in the sense of the entire reality, a total of all beings created; value: in the sense of properties inherent in a given reality (creation); fate in the sense of events that are beyond the control of human will, considered as an inevitable course of a previously established plan or as a set of facts. Fate also concerns God’s intentions towards people.

\(^{28}\) If one were to refer to the Book of Wisdom (11:20), a conclusion could be drawn that creation embraces God’s wisdom and order, as well as image of the invisible God (compare e.g. Colossians 1:15 and Genesis 1:4, 10:12). Creation springs from God’s goodness and participates in it; hence solidarity is a natural feature of all creation.
Other questions regard human solidarity *per se.* Referring to the Bible, human solidarity must be recognised as pertaining to harmony which is an effect of the interdependence of creatures. The latter offers a possibility of mutual enrichment, Saint Catherine of Siena notes. The enrichment is possible due to God’s design concerning inherent differences between people, and results from the fact that humans were endowed with different talents. Therefore, the solidarity of creation could be expressed in human relations, in mutual enrichment obligating people to practise generosity, kindness or the ability to share, and – ultimately – in reciprocal love.

**HUMAN SOLIDARITY**

In Christian thought, reflection on human solidarity is derived from the belief that solidarity is a primary quality of creation. In this way, the source of solidarity, the one Creator is related to its aim, namely salvation and God glory. All the while, one must note that human solidarity is accommodated in the social domain. This highlights the issues of development and progress, and presents God’s actions as taken with regard to these throughout the history of humankind.

Reflections on human solidarity in Christian thought are to be found in the papal encyclicals published by Pope Pius XII (*Summi pontificatus*), Paul VI (*Populorum progressio*) and John Paul II. Among John Paul II’s encyclicals dealing with the problem of solidarity, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* deserves particular mention. Published December 30, 1987, this is a development and extension of the encyclical *Laborem Exercens* (issued on September 14 1981). Solidarity between people was also taken

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29 A quote from St. Catherine of Siena (from the *Dialogue* of Saint Catherine of Siena, c. 7, ed. G. Cavallini, Roma, 1968, pp. 8-19) may suggest that primary solidarity of all creation is revealed in reciprocal love: “These are the virtues, with innumerable others, that are brought to birth in love of neighbor. But why have I established such differences? Why do I give this person one virtue and that person another, rather than giving them all to one person? It is true that all the virtues are bound together, and it is impossible to have one without having them all. But I give them in different ways so that one virtue might be, as it were, the source of all the others. So to one person I give charity as the primary virtue, to another justice, to another humility, to another a lively faith (…). The same is true of many of my gifts and graces, virtues and other spiritual gifts, and those things necessary for the body and human life. I have distributed them all in such a way that no one has all of them. Thus have I given you reason – necessity, in fact – to practice mutual charity (i.e. to act with solidarity, author’s note). For I could well have supplied each of you with all your needs, both spiritual and material. But I wanted to make you dependent on one another so that each of you would be my minister, dispensing the graces and gifts you have received from me.
up in *Redemptor hominis* (of 4 March 1979), *Dives in Misericordia* (30 November 1980) and *Dominum et Vivificantem* (of 18 May 1986).\(^{30}\)

The discussion of the problem of human solidarity presented in subsequent encyclicals is so extensive and valuable as to deserve a separate study. For purposes of this discussion, I shall select several salient aspects which concern mostly causes for the decline of primary human solidarity and means to address the problem.

The papal encyclicals listed above contain the Pope’s definition of the virtue of solidarity closely connected to the virtue of social justice and ethical responsibility (see *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* 38, 39 and 40). The principle of solidarity, also called friendship or social love, is a direct obligation of the human and Christian fraternity (see also Matthew 6:33 and John 13:35). It is important to note that this belief not only assumes the assurance of rights, fulfillment of duties or the completion of agreements. The interpretation is much broader, underscoring the natural kindness and the natural dignity of people caring for justice and fraternity.

Obviously, these are not the only elements of human solidarity. Other significant fundamentals proposed by Christian teaching and featured in the papal encyclicals include solidarity as a principle that should manifest itself mainly in the distribution of material goods and remuneration for work. Solidarity can also be a form of overcoming injustice or social inequality, as well as negative aspects of human personality, such as jealousy, mistrust or pride.\(^{31}\) All of these are a threat to peace and provoke wars. According to Christian thought, they have their source in sin which not only hurts human nature, but also adversely affects human solidarity.

Investigating solidarity as a form of fighting injustice, one could speak of solidarity of the poor and exploited, but also solidarity of the rich, employers, professional groups, etc. However, Christian thought, expounded in the encyclicals, goes beyond such understanding of solidarity. This is because of the value of the ultimate goal of human solidarity. Whereas all the other aspects, though important because they point to unjust social structures which, are only one fact in the pursuit of the ultimate goal of human life, i.e. to receive life in God’s Kingdom.\(^{32}\)

In effect, human solidarity leads eventually to the realisation of spiritual rather than material goals.

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32 Compare e.g. Matthew 6:33; *Epistle to the Romans* 10:1, *Epistle to the Ephesians* 1: 16-23, *Epistle to the Philippians* 1: 9-11.
Although different aspects discussed above are focused on the problem of human solidarity and analyse it from a variety of viewpoints, the most important point concern the decline of solidarity as a basic value of creation. Let me, therefore, return to one of the thoughts formulated in one of the earlier sections of this paper.

FOUNDATIONS OR CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF PRIMARY HUMAN SOLIDARITY

A fundamental problem which arises when attempts are made to explain the causes of the weakening of primary human solidarity is the issue of the development of human beings and society as a whole.\(^{33}\) Basically, the definition of the development of humans and the society can be regarded as dependent on the interpretation of the world. Although there are essentially two answers to the problem, they have a variety of interpretations. One of them is found in \textit{Sollicitudo rei socialis}\(^{34}\) which calls attention to the genuine development of people and the society (Sr\$ 1), lists the reasons why there is a collapse of primary human solidarity. Both issues are taken up in the context of the Panorama of contemporary world (Sr\$ 11-26)\(^{35}\) and the problem of unequal distribution of wealth (Sr\$ 9), thereby providing, a moral assessment of modern reality and the ensuing moral obligation to exercise solidarity.\(^{36}\)

How should one, therefore, understand progress and its relation to human solidarity in the light of Christian encyclicals? In its discussion of progress, \textit{Sollicitudo rei socialis} notes that progress may not be equated simply with the accumulation of wealth and expansion of possibilities to use various goods and services, especially if these goals are achieved at the expense of the underdevelopment of great multitudes of people and without due account of the social, cultural and spiritual needs of a human being (compare Sr\$ 9). Progress, thus understood, relative to human solidarity, should be targeted at the pursuit of more perfect solidarity between people.

\(^{33}\) The basic cause of the downfall of solidarity is sin. According to Christian teaching, it is possible to understand sin that has marked the entire history of human kind, though on the condition that the bond between God and man is duly understood. In this sense, sin is not an inborn quality of people but an abuse of power that God bestowed on all His creatures for them to love Him and love one another. Compare \textit{Katechizm Kościoła Katolickiego}, [The Catholic Catechism] 386-409.


\(^{35}\) The problem was previously taken up by Pope Paul VI in his encyclical \textit{Populorum Progressio} published in 1967.

\(^{36}\) Reference must be made here to the encyclical written by Paul VI, 48: l.c., p. 281. Compare Sr\$ 9.
(SrS 10), progress within the society and spiritual values cherished by all, instead of search for individual benefits (SrS 10). See *The Letter of James*, concerning sources or causes of individual advantage in social life, is still valid today.

Progress limited to the economic sphere increases the division of the world, and ruins human kind and its primary solidarity. One important effect of the economic division is social regression revealed in illiteracy, deficient access to higher education, inability to build an independent nation or diverse forms of economic, social and political exploitation and oppression (SrS 15-25). These give rise to poverty, unemployment, growing national debts, and – in effect – lack of respect for life. On the other hand, overdevelopment triggers a transformation of people into slaves obsessed, by their desire to possess and achieve immediate satisfaction and, triggers radical insatiability (SrS 28).

This image of the world is confronted in John Paul II’s encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis* with an attitude of human solidarity which rests on the deepest foundations and presents an absolute value for the human being (SrS 38). This response to the contemporary world takes into consideration its theological concern (SrS 38-40) and points to the fact that solidarity requires that all its members mutually recognise one another as legitimate persons (SrS 39). Solidarity calls us to acknowledge others, be it individuals or nations, not merely as tools whose capacity to work or physical strength can easily be taken advantage of and, when no longer needed, simply discarded.

John Paul II’s thoughts presented in *Sollicitudo rei socialis* show that the fruit of solidarity is peace (*Opus solidarietatis pax*, SrS 38). Peace is derived from social and international justice, as well as the practice of virtues which facilitate coexistence and teach how to be united in order to give and receive in harmony and thus build a good society of the new and

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37 Compare James 4: 1-2. “What is causing the quarrels and fights among you? Isn’t it the whole army of evil desires at war within you? You want what you don’t have (…)”,

38 Within the same world, there exist the First World, Second World, Third World, Fourth World…, see SrS 14.

39 In the encyclical, solidarity is presented as a virtue, or social and moral attitude, appropriate for the interdependence perceived as a system determining relations in today’s world. Solidarity, in this context, is not, therefore, an undetermined feeling of compassion or superficial sentiment arising in reaction to evil. Quite the opposite, solidarity signifies a strong and lasting will to be committed for the common good. The will is based on the conviction that hampering the fully-fledged process of development is caused by greed and lust for power. Both, treated as foundations and structures of sin, can be overcome with the help of God’s grace and thanks to commitment exercised for the common good. Instead of exploitation, people should be served (Compare SrS 38 and, for example, Matthew 10:40-42, 20, 25; Mark 10:42-45; Luke 22: 25-27.)
better world. It thus follows that the encyclical distinguishes certain common points between solidarity and Christian love, recognising the former as a Christian virtue and demonstrating that it aims at transgressing itself to turn into absolute selflessness, forgiveness and reconciliation (compare SrS 40).

SOME CONCLUSIONS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOLIDARITY BASED ON THE TEACHINGS OF GANDHI AND JOHN PAUL II

The main objective of my discussion was not to impose any value judgements on any of the two main frameworks discussed, since both the ideas proposed by Gandhi and John Paul II, as well as their lives and personalities, clearly demonstrate the great significance of the two thinkers and moral authorities. Selected portions of their output related to human solidarity not only pertain to people’s social and political life, but also the ultimate goal of their spiritual existence. Both Gandhi and John Paul II unanimously claim human solidarity to be a vital constituent not only of social life, but also of the spiritual sphere of each and every person. What is of consequence both in Gandhi’s and John Paul II’s teachings is that both thinkers stress that human solidarity should find its ultimate expression in selfless readiness to commit oneself for the benefit of others.

Even though the views of Gandhi and John Paul II grew out of disparate cultural and religious roots, it seems that both made a very significant contribution to this vital topic. Both argued that the main feature of the development of human kind should be raising people’s consciousness to such a level that they recognise human solidarity as a fundamental quality governing social life.

An analysis of the status of human solidarity and its underpinnings, both in Gandhi’s and John Paul II’s reflections, is presented in Fig. 3 and 4, respectively. An important point in both these frameworks is the pursuit of Truth, which in the Christian religion in addition to the glory of the Creator, may be viewed as the ultimate goal of creation. In Gandhi’s thought, the basic foundation of human solidarity is the principle of ahimsa, coupled with satyagraha. In Christianity, human solidarity is a natural quality of creation which means it originated with the Maker. In both perspectives, social harmony is a result of human solidarity as are justice and lasting peace. In both systems, solidarity offers a possibility of transcendence to the foundation of existence, though differently understood. Furthermore, both frameworks see the main reason for the collapse of human solidarity to greed and desire (of profits, power), even as they are differently analysed either as the basis for sin (understood as abusing freedom bestowed by God) in Christianity, or as the foundation of acquired sensations and inclinations (karma, samskara) in Gandhi. While the position of the human being is seen differently, for Gandhi view focused on the culmination of the
act of creation, the most important point they share is renouncement of violence towards a fellow man, which applies also to resisting injustice.

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PART II

SOLIDARITY:
ITS ETHICAL AND MORAL IMPACT
CHAPTER VI

SOLIDARITY AND THE SHAPE OF MORAL SPACE

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This article is devoted to the notion of solidarity as a moral relationship among persons. It argues that solidarity is always particular; hence, the notion of universal solidarity, just like universal friendship or love, misses the gist of those relations, which is that they are special and somewhat exclusionary. To make them universal makes them nearly empty.

I also show how a moral duty supervenes upon interpersonal relations and is generated by them, and how the structure of moral duties follows the structure of interpersonal ties. People occupy different kinds of places in the web of social relationships, some networks are more dense, stronger, or more egalitarian than others while also the position of some individuals is more central than that of others. Hence, not everybody has the same moral duties though we all have certain minimal moral obligations that are universal. This leads to the structure of moral space, in which morally relevant ties are not homogenous. This falls back on Amartya Sen’s explanation of how such agent-relative structure of moral obligations is consistent and provides the best description of the moral duties we have [Boltuc 2007].

While I have been arguing for non-homogeneity of moral space for the last ten years [Boltuc 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007], I do not claim that the moral partiality resultant from this approach provides a comprehensive moral theory. In the last section I sketch out a broader moral framework which incorporates three levels of moral concern: Universal (not just anthropocentric) concern for anti-entropy in the universe developed by Luciano Floridi [Floridi 2002, 2007]. General, but not universal, concern for all conscious or potentially conscious beings, and, in particular, for those with higher levels of consciousness [Boltuc 1998b; Chalmers; Harman; Nagel]. This is the ethics of concentric moral circles, where general-universal moral duties are supplanted by the stronger agent-relative ones [Cocroft, Cottingham, Scheffler, Blum].

SOLIDARITY AND ITS BOUNDS

The very gist of solidarity is to give priority and special concern to those people with whom we have solidarity. Even thought solidarity may be broadly conceived – like friendship, it is necessarily limited in scope. As Aristotle pointed out, special relationships are non-transitive; we cannot count friends of our friends, among our friends since such friendship would
be unable to bring about its special benefits. We can give special concern, and the kind of assistance one give to friends, only to a limited number of people. As a matter of human psychology it seems that people can be immediately aware of about seven to nine persons, and track relationships with up to 150 people (the former is the maximal number of those in one’s close circle, the latter in one’s close-knit community). Since the gist of solidarity is communitarian, like every kind of communitarianism, it encounters the problem of inclusion and exclusion.

Even a generation ago philosophers viewed this limitedness of moral interest as a major shortcoming of all communitarian views. Dominant moral theories, Hare’s utilitarianism and Kantian deontology, dismissed any attempts at moral partiality as violations of the universalizability condition. J. S. Mill is special moral reasoning are viewed as allowable only instrumentally, e.g. we were allowed to care for our friends and family, but only due to the psychological imperfection of human beings who tend to be more strongly motivated in doing so than of if caring for strangers. The only moral motivation allowed referred to the general of everybody. Yet moral universalism in such a strong form proved to be untenable. One of its counterintuitive consequences is viewing the value of friendship, and other special relationships, as purely instrumental (asking of those relations whether they are helpful within some big picture where morality is the one question too many exposed by Williams).

Today moral theories that recognize the value of special moral duties, and political philosophy based on special morally relevant ties, abound. This turn in analytical moral theory towards recognition of special moral duties [Scheffler, Nagel, Dancy, Parrettter, Cottingham, feminist ethics of care] provides the theoretical breathing space for communitarian and conservative social philosophy [MacIntyre, Sandel, Etzioine, Walzer, as well as the earlier Nisbet and Kirk]. The main objections to this view, launched by Parfit, Regan and others, claim that ethics of special moral duties leads to inconsistent recommendations and, thereby, is logically deficient.

While in a recent article [Boltuc 2007], I defend a moral theory based upon solidarity and moral partiality against the inconsistency charges based on some broadly consequentalist moral theory [Sen, Portsmore], here I shall attempt to define what morally relevant ties are, why they are morally relevant and how they are structured. The present article is a direct follow up on my paper on moral neighborhoods [Boltuc 2001]. There I focus on the thesis that, in the modern world, we do not have substantial barriers (geographic, informational, largely even social) that used to shield our ancestors from the people in other circumstances, different from ours and often major needs. Consequently, in the absence of real barriers of access and knowledge, we are faced with the moral question whether our duties to strangers are, indeed, as strong as those to our family, friends and neighbors. The latter claim, if taken literally, leads to paradoxical consequences, and it makes any meaningful friendship, love and family
relations impossible or morally objectionable. Pargetter seems right that if any human relationships are morally justified those are.

I follow the model based on what I call moral propinquity; namely, proximity in terms of morally relevant ties, as the basis of moral theory. The origin of value in inter-personal ties is what I discuss in the present paper.  

**MORAL SPACE**

I shall define the notion of moral space as the conceptual space created by morally relevant ties among persons (human beings, and also God, angels, extraterrestrials, very intelligent animals and other non-human persons, should such exist). I shall claim that those ties originate from explicitly and implicitly meaningful interactions. Such interactions, which result in the relation of close acquaintance, bring about elements of friendship and camaraderie. I argue below that the relationships of this sort result in moral reasons. Various kinds of reasons that result in morally relevant ties come to mind. Reasons of acquaintanceship provide an example. According to the common sense morality, when I become acquainted with somebody I gain some benefits, but also limited (imperfect) duties to help them in certain situations. The minimal benefit is our ability to initiate a conversation with a person one is acquainted with, and the minimal duty is to respond politely, and somewhat attentively, to such attempts. We do not have such duty towards strangers whose attempts to communicate with us may be viewed as unwelcome impositions and terminated politelly, if at all possible, but swiftly.

As the level of acquaintance increases, so does the level of benefits, and duties. One may be able to phone one’s remote acquaintance at home, but only at certain hours, and the topics of conversation are not supposed to be overly personal, while one may call a friend at almost any time s/he would not be expected to be asleep, and the subjects of conversation may become increasingly personal as the level of friendship increases. Making an acquaintance closer should be viewed as acquiring additional interpersonal ties (or making the existing ties stronger); those ties create reciprocal moral duties. The classical example of acquaintanceship, molding into friendship, and the accompanied intuitive understanding of the moral responsibilities involved can be seen in Staint-Exupery’s *The Little Prince*, when the prince meets a fox, and there is a question of responsibility that would come from domesticating the fox and turning it into a friend.

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1. I discuss the structure of ethics that relies on moral propinquity in [Boltuc 2007 and 2005].
2. Incidentally, the issue whether special moral ties may link humans and non-humans, in particular pet animals, is an interesting issue which we can only mention here.
We may, also, distinguish qualitatively specific sorts of ties, since some relationships may be context and content specific. The best example are ‘sports pals’ or ‘work friends’ who may be very devoted to each other in terms of the shared activity, but not so in other areas of life. As acquaintances become closer usually the lines between various groups of one’s friends tend to blur somewhat, but rarely all the way. A very close work friend may even feel obligated to risk her own career in order to prevent a major work-related injustice done to you as her work friend, while the same person may feel uncomfortable if asked to invite you for Thanksgiving dinner. The workaholic types tend to learn this lesson the hard way, by being able to locate scarcely any personal friends when needed.

Let us view those ties more closely. There is a certain level of personal, physical being that only family, and on rare occasions exceptionally close family-like friends, partake in. This is the kind of thing that helps one in private matters: the medical problems that need the attention of another human being but are short of the need for medically qualified assistance; the need to house somebody between jobs (even if there is no spare room); the help with the chores one has a hard time doing, e.g., for reasons of depression or disability; hospital visits above and beyond the one or two visitations that the closer of one’s not-so-close friends are likely to pay. The ties that give one the right to expect this kind of connection, and the duty to provide such things to others, can be viewed as the most basic human connection by many standards, for instance on the basis of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Most people would add intimate and sexual needs to the mix, and perhaps also the psychological connection that allows people to share the most intimate thoughts, but those two are not always of long-term value. Talk is cheap and the talking heads (or just sexual partners) in your life may be eager to engage with you, but then they turn out unmoved when their partner ends up in real need. The so-called ‘kindred spirits’, ‘sexual partners’ and ‘intellectual friendships’ are highly overrated for the real needs in practical life.

This short phenomenology of inter-personal ties leads to a broader conclusion. It is clear that interpersonal ties, such as friendship, kinship, as well as immediacy of a given uncommon while tragic event, produce moral prima facie reasons to act. Consequently, we can see that moral space is created by the relations a

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3 Such an acquaintance may be very helpful in giving you a ride to the tennis practice, even though she has no direct personal stake in getting you to the game (e.g., she would not be playing on that day with you), but quite put off by your suggestion to give you a ride to work (even though the latter may be less out of her way and more important to you). On the other hand one’s ‘work colleagues’ may be willing to go out of their way to assist you on work, related issues, while they are likely to find suggestions to give you more limited help in pertaining to sports quite an imposition.
person maintains. Moral space can be viewed as the set of all morally relevant interactions among persons.4

The interactions creating moral space consist of actions and states of affairs. Let us consider a few alternative interpretations of this claim within various moral theories. According to deontic intuitions, in order to be morally relevant those actions need to be “weakly intentional”. An action is weakly intentional if its result is either intended or it is an unintended but predictable result. According to the deontological interpretation of Dancy’s particularism, moral space is the complete collective set of the properties of those weakly intentional actions which affect persons in a way relevant for ethics.5 But deontic twists of both of those definitions can be avoided if we add the value of states of affairs (such, as being one’s sibling, which is relevant for many moral issues) to the mix. According to a theory like Sen’s and Portmore’s mixed consequentialism, being in certain relations to some persons is not defined through, or reduced to, a set of actual actions. Indeed, reducing it to the state of potential action would be an unnecessary and tedious move. According to this approach, states of affairs are a little like gravitational fields that define properties of moral space. For instance, if A and B are siblings, certain moral reasons, negative and positive, follow; although, those reasons are cashed in only through actions.6 Hence, Sen’s moderate consequentialism that attaches utility value to all actions and states of affairs (what I call the deontic bricks in the consequentialist wall approach [Boltuc 2001]) seems to be best for describing the structure of moral space. It is sufficient to say, in terms of its function, that moral space describes all potential moral values, and it is shaped by the relations people enter into.

OTHER USES OF THE TERM MORAL SPACE.

The term moral space has been used in other ways in philosophy. For some authors moral space is the part of physical space inhabited by human beings. The fact that a particular spatial location is inhabited by persons gives a potential moral value to states of affairs which take place in

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4 Morally relevant characteristics are characteristics of actions of persons (human beings or groups of human beings).

5 In my doctoral dissertation [Boltuc 1998], I used the following definitions of moral space: Moral space is the complete collective set of properties of those weakly intentional actions which affect persons. This definition is rather complicated due to the fact that, at the time, I attempted to formulate ethics of special moral duties in the framework of Dancy’s moral particularism. My current approach is more intuitive.

6 For instance, A and B have prima facie reasons to take care of each other based upon their relationship, but, on the other hand, if they engage sexually, on the basis of the same relationship between A and B, such engagement would be properly understood as incest and bring in related moral valuations.
it. Moral space which satisfies this definition can be called ethos, in its Heideggerian interpretation as the space where living creatures dwell.\textsuperscript{7} Actually, in its broadest sense Heideggerian ethos is consistent with our intuitive grasp of moral space in this article. For other authors aesthetic space, for instance, a fictitious space in a painting, may be seen as creating a moral space by being “an arena for human action,” which brings about a moral, as well as an aesthetic aspect.\textsuperscript{8} This metaphorical sense of the term moral space conveys valuable intuitions.

Another way of talking about moral space is to take it as a domain within the institutional setup of a society which allows “shared moral deliberation”.\textsuperscript{9} A notion of moral space can also be extended to geographic or architectural locations which are particularly hospitable to moral conversations – for instance the Agora in the architecture of ancient Athens. These last definitions of “moral space” refer to a social or geographical space (room) for ethical deliberation, whereas the conception of moral space I am working with refers to a special “space” created by ethics.

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND VALUES

In this section we elucidate the particulars of the structure of relations creating moral space based on the theory of social capital. The social capital, as well as the social networks approach may help us understand the structure of moral space that includes benefits and duties, brought about by various kinds of acquaintanceship and other interpersonal links.\textsuperscript{10} We may classify inter-personal ties in terms of their strength, durability, thickness, boundingness or bridgingness, horizontal and vertical dimensions and other characteristics. Let us grasp those terms a little more closely.

Strong ties are easy to define: such bounds can survive many obstacles. People connected in that way can count on each other even if this reliance come at high cost to one of them. Those are the ties of close family

\textsuperscript{7}This definition of moral space may be extended to other living creatures if we also understand them as persons.

\textsuperscript{8}Tilghman, B. R. “Picture Space and Moral Space” British Journal of Aesthetics 28/1988 Tilghman claims that Caravaggio’s space is “largely constituted by the human figure as an acting moral force”. Aesthetic characteristics of space in the paintings of Caravaggio can be fully appreciated under condition that we take into account the moral aspect of human beings he represents.


\textsuperscript{10}While the social capital theory, developed by Coleman, R. Putnam and, historically, Toqueville, will not be presented here, I say more about it in [Boltuc 1998c].
relations (as a matter of fact not all families are like that) and (very rarely) friendships. On the other hand, weak ties are those inexpensive to maintain social links that exist only so long as the parties mutually benefit from their existence. The interesting aspect of weak ties is that those are the ties that smooth out social and business relations. For instance, social capital theory demonstrates that it is often easier to get a job on the basis of weak, professional ties that let one get special attention than on the basis of strong ties, which lead to the suspicion of nepotism [Lin, Burt].

Strong ties tend to be durable, but durability and strength are two different factors. Certain ties may be very strong but breakable (the way a divorce breaks marriage ties), whereas some weak ties are, indeed, quite durable. For instance, if two people grew up in the same neighborhood and were in the same class in primary school, the bounds between them may be very durable, although they may be weak enough to be inconsequential in most situations of their lives.

Thick ties are multifarious, they combine, for instance, personal, business, ethnic, religious, cultural and hobby-based relationships. Thin ties rely upon one kind, or very few kinds of connections. Again, as a rule thick ties tend to be stronger than the thin, ones, but sometimes thin ties may, indeed, be very strong (e.g. with one’s business partner), while thick ties may be multifarious but weak nevertheless (e.g. with one’s neighbor who is also involved in a number of neighborhood activities).

Bounding ties are those that bind together people in a certain group, for instance a team, a company or a family. Bridging ties link together people from different groups, thereby providing linkages among those groups. Thick, reliable, safe relationships tend to be bonding, whereas bridging relationships tend to be thinner, though they are often valuable to the group by giving it links to the ‘external’ world.

Horizontal ties are the bounds among peers or equally situated persons (or other units). Vertical ties are those among subordinates and the person(s) in charge. Contemporary theory of social capital (especially Putnam) seems to view horizontal ties as somehow superior to the vertical ones. It is worth noting that each kind of tie may be helpful under certain conditions, and, therefore, their evaluation is context-dependent. Horizontal ties tend to be more compatible with the contemporary free market structure where it is beneficial to have a number of people empowered to make productive choices, whereas vertical structures are better in the environments where the unity of command is of paramount importance (e.g. in emergency situations, especially if the personnel involved is characterized by uneven qualifications and low abilities to coordinate their actions at the low level).

It is not surprising that those kinds of social capital result in similar sorts of social networks. Some social networks are based on thick ties and bounding social capital (families, close-knit neighborhoods), while others on thin links and more bridging ties (many people living in a large city’s business environment). Various ties bring in different reasons to act,
including the morally relevant reasons. Often those are the reasons of reciprocity: you stay after hours for a co-worker, and she is supposed to do the same for you later on. Others rely on social roles and un-chosen ties – one helps one’s siblings, relatives or neighbors. Sometimes one ought to respect certain kinds of ties that emerge independently of their choice (e.g. if one helps out people of his/her ethnicity), whereas on other occasions one’s choice extends to actually creating the bonds (e.g. by joining a voluntary association open to all). The arguments that only ties of the latter kind have any moral value fail since they rely on an absolutist interpretation of the value of individual choice in human life, and in particular in creating the structure of moral reasons.

Clearly the sources of moral reasons are multifarious. Let us give this issue a closer look. Some morally relevant reasons rely on instantaneous, accidental moral ties, such are the reasons of immediacy. Suppose you walk by another pedestrian in a relatively remote area, and she begins choking in what looks like a potentially dangerous way. This very fact gives you the Good Samaritan reasons of immediacy (legally mandated in several states) to go out of your way to help her. Such reasons are defensible, but they are an example of important prima facie moral reasons, independent of one’s choice.

Other moral reasons originate from closeness in the social space: family ties, national and church membership and other ties that may be morally relevant. Only a limited number of moral reasons rely on the ties that originate from explicit choices manifest in contracts and promises. Hence again, not all moral duties are general, and also not all of them are reasons of autonomy based on freely chosen responsibilities. Membership, friendship and family ties are empirical facts which, as a part of their very meaning as to friendship and those other ties) bring about moral responsibilities, as well as moral rights.

**NON-HOMOGENEITY OF MORAL SPACE**

We may note that the rights and duties based on moral ties are generally not the same for different people. Even members of the same network have different moral ties depending on one’s role and position in that network: his/her vertical location (position), bonding social capital, centrality in the network, bridging social capital (ties with others that can, or cannot, be helpful to the network). The strength of those various ties and the other characteristics of the bounds that those duties supervene upon. Not only do various social networks and positions in such networks, create different moral reasons for agents involved, they also produce more of those reasons for some agents (e.g. more centrally located, or placed in positions of responsibility) than for the others.

We can call this feature of the structure of the conceptual space created by such duties by the name of non-homogeneity. As we have seen above, different morally relevant ties create different moral reasons. First,
as we have seen, reasons are heterogeneous in terms of their origins; some of those reasons are acquired by choice, and others are based on unchosen, morally relevant ties. Second, those reasons are not merely epistemic; the view presented above implies some form of moral realism. Not only do different people feel they have different solidarities, but they actually do have different moral reasons of solidarity. This is not just a psychological feeling of obligation, but also, predominantly, an actual moral reason in so far as moral reason, can be counted as not merely psychological inclinations. This means that ethics does not collapse into psychology. As we have seen, those moral reasons supervene on different ties that bind different people into various interpersonal networks. We play different morally relevant roles, and ethics based on solidarity needs to accommodate this fact.

There are widely spread worries among moral philosophers that a theory based on such inter-personally diversified moral reasons would not be consistent. Amartya Sen proposed some ways in which a moral theory may follow such non-homogeneity of moral reasons in his system of consequence based moral evaluation [Sen 1983; 1988; 2000]. Briefly speaking, different agents often have different agent-relative reasons, all things considered, which result in various consequentialist frameworks available to them. This leads to Sen’s acceptance of the idea of moral competition since various moral agents ought to pursue competing moral reasons. I discuss this in more detail elsewhere [Boltuc 2007a]. A somewhat different solution has been presented by Daney within the framework of his moral particularism [Dancy 2003].

Not all inter-personal ties seem to have an identifiable moral value. Some of them may lack the ability to produce moral reasons under the regular circumstances due to their negligible significance or due to some moral defeaters. However, under normal circumstances, although special duties, based on moral ties, enhance the moral reasons we have towards everybody, they do not replace them. But general moral duties we have to

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11 We have barely any special moral reasons to care about the telemarketer who bothers us on the phone, despite his obvious tie to us, since his activity constitutes a defeater of our normal concern and respect for that person, as long as the marketer’s basic goods (especially life) are not at stake. In those cases our moral reasons may be lower, or, at best remain the same, as they are towards all people unknown to us, in fact anybody on the globe. Certain ties result in the defeaters that put moral reasons of beneficence and benevolence that we have towards those persons below the normal level (the level we would have had towards that person if we never met). This tends to be the case with people who committed major, often criminal, offences against us or others. But those people still retain their human rights, though some of those rights may be suspended until they repent and try to make up for their offences. The ethics of punishment relies on such role of defeaters.)
everybody on the globe are very weak, and generally negative (not to kill them and not to inflict major harm on them, especially through unfair dealings), whereas what guides one’s moral conscience most of the time are his/her particular moral reasons, which are also much stronger.

THE VIRTUE OF SOLIDARITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF MORALITY

The shape of moral space allows and requires solidarity as an expression of particular bounds with specific other people, their groups, as well as traditions, values and beliefs that bind them together. An ethical system that does not respect special moral ties is not able to understand the true value of patriotism, friendship and kinship [Pargetter]. The only alternative to moral solidarity is provided by liberal universalism with its reliance on individual choice in the establishment of moral values of any sort. While pragmatic reasons of coordination, and Mill’s harm principle, may provide some basic structural assets of a modern society, the main gist of what is morally relevant goes deeper into the community structures and unchosen duties (such as traditions and the ties of kinship). As Burke emphasized, the society is a community of the living, the dead and those to come. Without the unchosen inter-generational duties of solidarity, we cannot undertake any projects that transcend individual lives, both in terms of duration and their meaning.

Charles Taylor mentioned in his inaugural lecture of The Rockefeller Center for Human Values (but not quite in the published version) that we have the right to recognizable grandchildren. This is not an absolute right since the will of many people, especially of our own children, as parents, is involved. The right to recognizable grandchildren is complemented by the (imperfect) duty of grandchildren to respect the basic axiologies, and general wishes, of their grandparents. Those axiologies, which are culturally inherited in one’s family, may be transformed through a model so as to fit with the new generation, its opportunities, hopes and needs, but should not be just randomly abandoned. Without a certain expectation of social continuity and tradition the only link to something that transcends an individual human life can come from religion. In such society, paradoxically, there is no justified hope for non-believers. In fact, the society collapses into what Legutko called “the society as a department store”, a situation in which all choices are like the choice among various colors of identical tee-shirts. In the society guided solely by individual choice, and coordination principles, the objective basis for choice is lost. What remains are purely instrumental values in service of the individual and individualistic goals that result, at best, in morals by agreement of some sort [Gauthier].

Solidarity is a value of the community. Despite attempts to appropriate this value by people talking about universal solidarity, the terms loses its meaning if it is not limited through some bounds of
friendship or natural ties. What most thinkers fail to acknowledge is that the term *solidarity with everybody* means exactly the same thing as solidarity with nobody. It is an empty term. The only non-empty kind of solidarity follows the model of friendship broadly construed.\(^\text{12}\)

The next step in this project is to incorporate moral solidarity into the broader structure of moral theory. It is important to perceive solidarity as a part of a broader view, which I can only sketch here. The view has three building blocks:

1. The theory of anti-entropy as a universal basis for ascription of the moral status [Floridi].
2. Special value of consciousness as the particular basis for ascription of enhanced moral status.
3. The solidarity framework: special ties as the basis of ascription of even further enhanced moral status to particular human beings that are linked by those special ties to the moral agent (and perhaps even some animals, such as pets).

Those three principles may provide a comprehensive view of ethics. The first idea, that it is the essence of ethical life to resist entropy and promote real anti-entropy is an important basis of ethics that pertains to all beings in the universe, including inanimate objects, rock formations, crystals, computers, simple life forms, as well as human and non-human artifacts. The second idea gives special value to those beings that can be moral patients in the strict sense: those that can perceive the world. It seems that the ability to mirror the world is an important characteristic giving inherent value to conscious beings. The framework of solidarity and special moral ties provides the third level of reason. It lets us identify, in the world of complex conscious beings, those we have special ties with. Moral solidarity accounts for the special morally relevant reasons in our lives.

Together, those three levels seem to provide a comprehensive framework of moral theory. Having devoted much work to the third level [Boltuc 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007] and some to the second level [Boltuc 1989, 2008], I hope to work on the third level now [Boltuc 2008] and on the whole comprehensive framework.

\(^\text{12}\) The value of friendship is based on what Saint-Exupery demonstrates in his example of domesticating a desert fox discussed above, or even more so on another example, of cultivating ‘the only rose’. Once the Little Prince encounters a rose plantation, the value of specialty of the rose is lost. This analogy holds for moral ties: the universal ones are important, but highly insufficient in creating a true moral environment. This is why in the moral space created by exclusive ties of solidarity, various kinds of friendship and family bounds is non-homogenous and there is no universal way for anybody to be special – except for God, maybe (the Biblical notion of *chosenness* seems to run counter to this last claim).
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THE GOLDEN RULE AS AN ETHOS OF
GLOBAL SOLIDARITY:
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
JOSEF BORDAT

THE GOLDEN RULE

The Golden Rule as an ethos of global solidarity holds two propositions. First, it is *global*. Second, it has something to do with *solidarity*. Before going into details, I want to illustrate this relation.

The Golden Rule is a fundamental moral principle a foundation for the ethics of reciprocity or mutuality. Mutuality is not possible without empathy, the ability to understand the needs of others, which, indeed, is a precondition of solidarity. So we are dealing with a moral principle that is deeply connected with the ethos of solidarity. And this Golden Rule, found in all major religions and cultures, is a “global” moral principle. Not only in the Bible but also in other holy scriptures, the Golden Rule can be found, for example in early Buddhist, Hinduist and Jewish scriptures. In the Buddhist Samyutta Nikaya we find the Golden Rule in the phrase: “The Aryan disciple thus reflects, Here am I, fond of my life, not wanting to die, fond of pleasure and averse from pain. Suppose someone should rob me of my life... it would not be a thing pleasing and delightful to me. If I, in my turn, should rob of his life one fond of his life, not wanting to die, one fond of pleasure and averse from pain, it would not be a thing pleasing or delightful to him. For a state that is not pleasant or delightful to me must also be to him also; and a state that is not pleasing or delightful to me, how could I inflict that upon another? As a result of such reflection he himself abstains from taking the life of creatures and he encourages others so to abstain, and speaks in praise of so abstaining” (v. 353.35-354.2). In the Hindu Mahabharata we read: “This is the sum of the Dharma: Do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to you” (5, 15:17), and the Talmud emphasizes: “A certain heathen came to Shammai and said to him, “Make me a proselyte, on condition that you teach me the whole Torah in the time I can stand on one foot.” Thereupon he repulsed him with the rod which was in his hand. When he went to Hillel, Hillel said to him, “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor: that is the whole Torah; all the rest of it is commentary; go and learn” (Shabbat 31a).

The Golden Rule was articulated by Confuze and the Greek philosopher Thales of Milet in the 5th century B. C. In the Analects of Confucius we read: “What you do not wish upon yourself, extend not to others” (15, 23), and Thales said: “Refrain from doing what we blame in
others” (Diog. Laert. I, 39). Many other pre-Christian philosophers mentioned the Golden Rule, including Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

In the Apocryphal Book of Tobit from the 2nd century B. C. the Golden Rule can be found, too: “Take heed to thyself, my child, in all thy works; and be discreet in all thy behavior. And what thou thyself hatest, do to no man” (4, 14-15), before it became popular in Christianity. In the Gospel of Matthew (“Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.” 7, 12) the Golden Rule is mentioned, as well as, in the Epistle to the Galatians: “For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (5, 14).

Islam also knows such a commandment. It is mentioned in the Hadith, “None of you is truly a believer until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself” (40, 13).

It is significant that the Golden Rule developed independently in different regions and in different cultural contexts, for that makes it a principle of universal ethics. Beside its universality, it is an essential aspect of the Golden Rule, that the reciprocity and the moral responsibility make it possible to build up a relationship with empathy and respect. This is an essential precondition of solidarity.

JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE

Further, the Golden Rule covers two basic aspects of every theory in ethics. In the positive form of (“Treat others as you like them to treat you.”) addresses contextual benevolence, in the negative form (“Do not treat others as you don’t like them to treat you.”) the contractually defined limits of intervention into the autonomous sphere of the individual are addressed both guided by the concept of justice. Justice and benevolence come together in the Golden Rule. The two were treated separately in the traditional philosophical debate about deontological or teleological ethics. The claim that an action is right or wrong independent of the consequences (deontological ethics) favors justice as the central term the claim that an action is right or wrong on the basis of the consequences (teleological ethics) does so with benevolence.

In addition to this important fact, the Golden Rule manifests an important step in the progress of civilization, from the lex talionis to a principle of desirability. The talionist principle of the Old Testament, as summed up in the famous verse, „And thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot” (Deuteronomy 19, 21), expressed the knowledge and experience that continuing with the wrong does not heal any wounds. Only with the moral implications drawn by the Golden Rule, can one overcome hate and self-hate, thereby installing a new form of relationship appealing to what is desirable, namely a relationship in tolerance and appreciation. So even in the challenges, which fanaticism and extremism put upon the open society,
The Golden Rule proves to be a suitable principle, because dialogue can be successful only when it strengthens the progressive concept of tolerance and appreciation, which takes into account justice and benevolence.

In spite of all the advantages of the Golden Rule, the academic philosophical ethics indeed almost ignored it. The Golden Rule is not mentioned in the German historical encyclopedia of philosophy. Since the 1960s, the interest has been growing both in continental (for example Hans Reiner and Hans-Ulrich Hoche) and the Anglo-Saxon philosophy (for example Marcus G. Singer and Richard M. Hare). Earlier however, the most important representatives of academic philosophy had criticized the Golden Rule sharply.

Kant, for instance took the Golden Rule for „trivial” and held that a criminal could argue against his judge, because he himself would not like to be sent to prison, therefore he (the judge) may not sent him (the criminal) into prison (Kant 1997, p. 68). But in this case Kant ignores two aspects. First, he fails to take into consideration all the relevant social circumstances under which the case takes place. The judge must not see only the criminal, but also the victim, the relatives of the victim, the society, that is entitled to live in security and the state, that has to guarantee this security. His point of view has to be based on a multilateral consideration, not on a bilateral one. Second, and more important, he should not apply the Golden Rule in a factual case, but in an hypothetical case. The question is not: “How would you like to be treat in this real case if you were he?” but “How would you like to be treat in a hypothetical case in which you are in his place?”

The second criticism comes from the Swiss Brülisauer (1980, p. 325), who blamed the Golden Rule for being against competition, because a competition with winner and losing (for example in sports) would not be according to the Golden Rule, therefore, it would be immoral. Morally, how can I make someone lose by winning the competition, if I do not like to lose myself? To solve this problem it is indispensable to distinguish between the act itself and the result of the act by means of linguistic analysis. In that way Ryle differentiates between terms of act and terms of result (1949, p. 55). Here clearly comes out that “to win” is a term of result and not of act. Hence it is not possible to act “wrong” in a moral sense by winning a competition, if one gave its best as the others did. “To give one’s best” and “to try to win” are expressions of acting and therefore relevant to ethics. The Golden Rule is only applicable on terms of act. So one has to give its best in every competition in which one takes part, in order to obey the Golden Rule, whatever the result will be.

The third problem of applying the Golden Rule appears in a bilateral situation of acting beings with different prerequisites and conditions. One example can be found in the famous fable, The Fox and the Stork by La Fontaine (p. 29). The fox invites the stork to dinner. He had prepared a soup and serves it on flat plates, so that only he is able to eat, meanwhile the stork due to his long bill, does not at all. Here it is possible to see an objection to the Golden Rule, because the fox treats the stork as is
desirable for him (the fox). The argument to remember what it means to you if the other treats you in the same way as you treat him is not effective in this case, for that is not at all meant so by the Golden Rule. The empathy demanded must ensure, finally, that one act in a right way for the other, taking into consideration hereby all the other’s prerequisites and conditions.

So the question is not: “How would I like to be treated in his place with my prerequisites and conditions?” but “How would I like to be treated in his place with his prerequisites and conditions?” Accordingly, it is important to imagine what it would mean to have special qualities of the other or to miss special qualities of oneself and what to do then. The fox has to think about having a bill and how he would like to be served his soup then.

The same goes for preferences and interests, that are not distributed equally, so as to be recognized reciprocal by the question must always be: „How would I like to be treated in his place with his likely preferences and interests?” Hence, a masochist has to use the Golden Rule not in a strict by reciprocative, but in an empathical way, but he be charged with harming all others, since he enjoys having pain inflicted on him.

Used reciprocatory, homogeneity of the participants is not required in applying the Golden Rule to initiate for example an interreligious dialogue, because then the theological differences would be accepted out of empathy. Cultural pluralism is no impediment for the application of the Golden Rule, if every participant of the dialogue is willing to apply it with full empathy as a sign of respect for the other.

A last objection makes clear the limits of the Golden Rule in the ethical discourse. Hare describes his “Golden Rule Test” as an instrument of checking ethical arguments. It shows the limits of the applicability of the Golden Rule in cases when one participant applies fanatic notions, Hare (1963) uses the example of the Nazi-sympathizer who is so doctrinaire that he would be willing to consign himself to a concentration camp if he learned that he had Jewish ancestry. But, however, his attitude can not be regarded as a sensible and reasonable moral principle. So, Hare emphasized the importance of generalization and, therefore, finally come in conclusion to his universal consequentialism.

APPLICATIONS

Following will go more deeply into practical considerations by applying the characteristic concepts of the Golden Rule, tolerance and appreciation, benevolence and justice to the recently discussed problems concerning the protection of human rights, in order to emphasise the political options of international solidarity. I want to characterize two point. First: Tolerance is not all about benevolence, but also about justice. Second: Appreciation is not all about justice, but also about benevolence.

Tolerance is not all about benevolence, but also about justice, what makes necessary intolerance towards the intolerant. The fairness of the dialogue, carried on in the ethos of the Golden Rule for the worldwide
establishment of human rights, must not be abused. This would be the case, if the cooperative attitude is used to violate human rights under the “protection” of tolerance. This is the point where solidarity with a dialogue-partner ends and where solidarity with the potential victims begins.

At the level of the public international law this arises in reaction to the question of whether the protection of human rights should be carried out also by military interventions, despite the principle of state sovereignty which is guaranteed to every state in the UN-Charter. How far may the protection of human rights go? Is there a “moral right” to intervene in cases of serious harm to human rights as claimed both by US politicians and such German philosophers as, for example, Jurgen Habermas?

As I emphasized in an earlier approach to the topic (Bordat 2005), if there is evidence that human beings are likely to be harmed, or are already being harmed then there is a duty to act to end this unacceptable situation if the concerned state is not able (“a failed state”) or an willing (“rogue state”). Military action has to be carried out, even against reservations roused by the UN-Charter’s principles of sovereignty (art. 2, 1), non-violence (art. 2, 4) and non-intervention (art. 2, 7). As Solidarity is more important than sovereignty, the international community has to take action. “The principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.” (IDRC 2001, p. XI), as pointed out by the report, The Responsibility to Protect, by the Canadian government, worked on by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and edited by the International Development Research Center (IDRC). Humanitarian intervention in such cases is not only a possibility to be taken into consideration, but a responsibility, from which follows a duty, provided the international community is willing to take seriously its role in the globalized world. Of course, the questions of bellum iustum (“just war”) have to be answered, the ius ad bellum, that means the just reason to start a war, and the ius in bello concerning the methods of warfare and the question of proportionality. The ICISS delivers an interesting approach to a contemporary answer to this old question: “The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned” (IDRC 2001, p. XII). Only in the case of “serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur” with “large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent...” is military intervention justified (IDRC 2001, p. XII). To make sure, that the military intervention does not cause cruelties worse than those that made the intervention necessary, the ICISS insists on proportionality, namely in the use of “proportional means”. (“The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.”, IDRC 2001, p. XII) and “reasonable prospects” (“There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the
intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.”, IDRC 2001, p. XII). To give such intervention not only clear regulations but also an unquestionable authority, the ICISS calls for the UN as the only place to decide, plan and execute humanitarian interventions: “The UN, whatever arguments may persist about the meaning and scope of various Charter provisions, is unquestionably the principal institution for building, consolidating and using the authority of the international community” (IDRC 2001, p. 48). That means: “There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes” (IDRC 2001, p. XII).

Even under a mandate of the UN Security Council humanitarian interventions may be tackled only as ultima ratio (“last resort”): “Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded” (IDRC 2001, p. XII).

Thus the most important aspect of human rights is prevention. Conflicts with the potential to turn into violence primarily should be prevented by an operating civilian society, before there is a need to stop them by military measures. The responsibility to prevent means “to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk” (IDRC 2001, p. XI). The ICISS does not leave any doubt concerning the importance of that task: “Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it” (IDRC 2001, p. XI). One good example is human rights formation and education. In this context the importance of the announcement of the Decade for Human Rights Education and the World Programme for Education in Human Rights becomes clear.

Appreciation is not all about justice, but also about benevolence. This increases the urge to connect the demand for the autonomy and liberty of the subject with the cultural integrity of the communities which must be taken seriously in their special ways of living.

The social problems of the so-called “Third World” must move to the center of the human rights debate. The rights of life, and liberty and the social rights belong together. A solidarity that covers only one aspect will not lead to peace and progress. Therefore, there is a need for the economic and social foundation on which the human rights can be constructed in the so-called “Third World”. This is particularly task of the rich industrialized nations, especially the G8, and has to be a concrete objective within the current negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
CONCLUSION

Only if the Golden Rule is understood as a fundament of tolerance and appreciation can it be considered as a suitable ethical principle for the global intercultural dialogue. And only if it could be made, that the insisted tolerance and the demanded appreciation of the Golden Rule’s ethos is interpreted in this wider understanding (justice and benevolence), could it be applied as a suitable global ethos to ensure that from the universality of human rights once will arise the universalisation in practice through the path of solidarity.

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CHAPTER VIII

GLOBALIZATION AND RECOGNITION

JAREMA JAKUBOWSKI

INTRODUCTION

The first section of the article, proposes a conceptualization of the transition to the information age and globalization as a current stage of modernization processes. Typical features of the development of the West are identified, and basic differences between the West and other civilizations are pinpointed. The Western world, from ancient Greece until today, has witnessed the development of the ideas of individualism, subjectivity, citizenship, respect for equal dignity of each and every person and, on the other hand, different ways of life. When discussing the issue of recognition, references are made to the interpretation of Hegel’s early works by Axel Honneth.

In the second section, a basic structure of recognition is presented and three levels, psychological, institutional and cultural, are identified. Also, basic relations between the three levels are discussed.

Finally, in the third section, two minimum preconditions of global recognition are formulated, i.e. mutuality and respect for basic human rights, as they were laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Moreover, it is indicated that the correct method of regulation of the global world is not to promote formal procedures of Western democracy but rather to make it possible to develop the existing potential and mobilize resources, e.g. through education, research, removal of barriers to investment and trade.

Although globalization is a radical and rapid process, it cannot be said to have appeared out of nothing. Similarly, it is not a result of any conspiracy or ill will, neither is a catastrophe nor an apocalypse. On the contrary, it is a natural consequence of systemic phenomena lasting for centuries and, like the majority of similarly all-embracing changes, it faces opposition, fear, suspicion and, not infrequently, a violent resistance. Many theoretical discussions on globalization, including a number of works by prominent intellectuals, fail to separate description from evaluation and facts from norms, which is accompanied by a blurring of all significant baselines and reference points and a good dose of contempt for their own heritage and achievements; deliberations of this type testify, in the main, to the spiritual and intellectual confusion of their authors. This confusion often goes together with emotional aggression taking the place of a reliable analysis.
This paper explores the issue of a global contact of civilizations and cultures, sometimes as taking the form of an encounter and cooperation and, at other times, giving rise to a clash and conflict. In the first section, it is proposed that globalization be understood as yet another stage of the ‘natural’ internal development of the West. It is pointed out that it is in Western civilization, and so far, chiefly there that the ideas of individualism, human dignity and respect for diversity have developed. In the second section, it is argued that the functional requirement of the global world is mutual recognition of individuals, groups and cultures. A structure of such recognition is also presented, including three basic levels: psychological, institutional and cultural. In the third section, preliminary preconditions of recognition in the contemporary historical and social reality are identified, since recognition cannot be purely abstract and formal, i.e. it cannot be the recognition of everything, regardless of the content of what is recognized. It is believed that at the outset of the third millennium, the basic preconditions for recognition should include, firstly, its bilateralism (mutuality) and, secondly, respect for human rights, as they were laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

GLOBALIZATION AS EXTERIORIZATION OF THE WEST

Western civilization became fully shaped with the emergence and expansion of Christianity. However, since its earliest beginnings in ancient Greece and Rome, the West has demonstrated its basic systemic feature – exteriorization, understood as going beyond itself and covering new areas. This explains clearly how Rome kept expanding to the outside, with its universal institutions embraced in successive provinces. The world of that time adopted Roman patterns, thus shedding barbarity, lawlessness and the domination of natural instincts.

In the empirical sense, this trend historically occurred in the West with varying degrees of strength, depending on a period. It seems that three great exteriorization waves can be distinguished following the decline of the Middle Ages set off by Christianity, civilization and globalization. All of them go beyond the territory of the Western world proper, encompassing, also, other cultures and civilizations. This generally does not result in a full universalization and adoption of new patterns, usually producing hybridization, or a creating a new mixed quality. A good example of this phenomenon is African ‘Christianity’.

In the metaphorical sense, the West can be said to be symbolically represented by an ocean, as boundless space or, an area into which one must bravely venture, a beckoning unknown. For the Western soul, the ocean is inviting. It is not seen as an obstruction, but rather facilitation. It is not only a physical geographical entity but also a spiritual challenge and a desire to spread truth and justice. The metaphor of the ocean also involves being open to influences, which means that the West is a civilization that transforms itself constantly and is able to change elements of secondary
importance without renouncing the very core of its identity. At the opposite pole are the “wall – civilizations” which, sometimes literally, shut themselves off from the outside world and withdraw into themselves. They are usually cultures closed to influences and changes, in which individual elements cannot be changed without affecting the whole.

The first modern form of Western exteriorization was mainly related to the spread of Christianity by the Spanish and Portuguese into areas often dominated by animistic religions. This form of exteriorization brought about, among other elements, a decline of civilizations in which communities routinely practised human sacrifice, which even today provokes questions how it was technically possible to commit genocide on such a scale, murdering dozens of thousands people on the sacrificial table within just a couple of days.

Another modern form of Western exteriorization was, in turn, connected with the spreading of European civilization predominantly by the British and French (mission civilisatrice). In addition to a range of other aspects, it put an end or restricted such community practices as cannibalism or murdering women after the death of their husbands (suttee).

At the same time, the Western realm saw the development of the processes of modernization and rationalization related to the separation of the Sacred from the Profane, independence of everyday activities from religious control and regulation, breakdown of traditional Gemeinschaft-type communities and radical increase in efficiency. During the last two centuries, modernization had the form of the industrial age, a world organized chiefly around heavy industry. This age was dominated by large social groups (social classes), which led to the emergence of electoral democracy (with equal participation of all adult citizens) and welfare state which considerably separated personal well-being from free-market success.

In the second half of the 20th century, this model of modernization not only began to exhaust its possibilities, but also became a serious barrier for further development. Owing to new technologies, the Internet and social transformations, heavy industry and welfare state can now be viewed as relics of the past. They may have made the past age powerful, however in new reality they have become ballast that must be thrown overboard. The Western world has faced the urgent need of remodernization, i.e. transformation from the industrial to the information age, whose basic determinants are high technologies, computerization of the whole economy and society and focus on education as enabling the transformations of information into knowledge. A systemic requirement of remodernization as to exteriorize the industrial world, to put it outside. This form of exteriorization is taking the shape of globalization. Globalization, understood in this way, is secondary to the internal modernization of the West, and a derivative of remodernization.

The transfer of industry beyond the geographical boundaries of the West is not a conspiracy and does not result from plots by any “dark
forces”, but merely testifies to systemic transformations and the succession of different ages. The Western world is now abandoning industry as it once abandoned agriculture, which provokes fear and suspicion, as it did then, in those people who are anxious about changes and unable to welcome new developments with joy and hope for new possibilities, but tend to view everything new as a threat.

Parallel to the transformations of the Western civilization outlined above, yet another process occurred in the West. Where there emerged the consciousness of equality, freedom and value of each single individual. First, it was the Greeks who left the enclosed palace walls and went out into the open to their agoras where citizens, who had no recourse to incantations and magic, using rational persuasion, practised public discourse. With the spread of Christianity, this principle developed and was consolidated in ancient Rome to eventually cover, along with the spreading Christianity, not only all citizens, but people at large. Christianity brought about essential elements of today’s world, including the concept of salvation of individual souls (and not the church as a whole), a principle effectively defended in the Middle Ages by Albert the Great (De unitate intellectus contra Averoistas parisiensis), for which his memory is honoured today. In modern times, this theological doctrine became secularized mainly in the form of liberalism which accepts subjectification, i.e. the granting of basic rights to each individual, as the fundamental principle. The Cartesian statement ‘I think therefore I am’, made individual consciousness a source of validation of knowledge, and moved the centre of gravity of the concepts of reason and rationality from transcendence into human subjectivity.

The emergence of the modern world is also marked by a replacement of the central idea of honour with the idea of dignity, i.e. a shift from the evaluation of individuals on the basis of their (unequal) standing in the social hierarchy to the principle of equality regardless of social origin. Honour involves indication, distinction, a clear preference; some are entitled to honour, others are deprived of it, usually through no fault of their own and due to the mere fact of having been born in a given family. Dignity, in contrast, is an ontological element that each individual is entitled to, irrespective of social differences (Taylor Ch., 1994, 26-27). Kant, one of the first philosophers to study this breakthrough theoretically, claimed that equal dignity of each human being results from one’s status of a rational agent, able to be autonomously guided by moral right (Taylor Ch., 1994, 41).

The disintegration of the pre-modern world and departure from the idea of hierarchical honour was also accompanied by the emergence of the problem of identity. Until then, identity was defined by traditional kinship ties and the position in the social structure. As such, it was never an object of debate or uncertainty. Following the breakdown of the Gemeinschaft, an attempt is made to redefine identity in modern categories. These endeavors are among the basic determinants of the social dynamics of recent centuries.
The most valuable philosophical attempt to represent the process of recognition and shaping of identity is Hegel’s dialectic of lordship and bondage proposed in his ‘Phenomenology of Mind’. Two self-consciousness entities begin a life-and-death struggle, striving not to gain material goods, but to be recognized as autonomous entities. Recognition can only be gained from the other entity and, therefore, from the very outset it is social, dialogue-based and outward-oriented. This is one of the ideas referred to contemporarily by F. Fukuyama, who presents the struggle for recognition as one of the chief mechanisms that drive the dynamics of history, producing contradictions and conflicts until the moment when everyone was recognized as an entity equal to other entities, and consequently the development potential of common history declined.

However, Hegel’s works preceding his ‘Phenomenology of Mind’ also include another, more developed concept of recognition, reconstructed and further developed by Axel Honneth, using tools offered by modern social theory (Honneth A., 1995 and Honneth A., 2001). In this framework, three levels of recognition are distinguished. Firstly, there is the recognition of concrete needs of an individual on a plane of emotional bonds of love, in which the model is family relations and, in particular, the basic of such relations close between the mother and the child. It is here that self-confidence develops as an ability to express desires in an emotionally open and safe manner, with a justified expectation of acceptance and with no fear of rejection.

Secondly, there is the recognition of the formal autonomy of a person on a plane of law within the civil society. It is here that the basic social dynamics of the modern era is to be found. An individual, ‘leaving the family’ (the Gemeinschaft) enters into relations with other people and with strangers, and thereby forges a conventional (or contractual) bond, not a natural one, as was the case in the family. The modern era is a constant struggle for recognition on this very level. On the one hand, it is a struggle to gain equal legal status regardless of social origin, denomination, gender, race, sexual preferences, etc., by a growing number of people. On the other hand, it is a struggle to extend the scope of rights of an individual, from basic liberties and political rights to welfare rights. Through the status of a legal person, legal recognition leads to the development of self-respect.

Thirdly, there is the recognition of the individual particularity of a subject on the level of state, one of the forms of such recognition being social solidarity. On this level, the focus is not on the recognition of my equality with other people regardless of any (social, denominational, racial) differences, but quite the reverse, on the recognition of difference, of just what makes me distinct from the rest, i.e. recognition of my minority nationality as full-value and worth esteem, appreciation of aspects related to my gender, race or denomination. On this level, different ways of life, conceptions of the good and various community practices acquire mutual acceptance. Thanks to this, no one’s individual achievements are belittled or degraded because of the mere fact that someone is a member of one
group, not another. Solidarity is an “interactive relationship in which subjects mutually sympathize with their various different ways of life because, among themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically (...) To the extent to which every member of a society is in a position to esteem himself or herself, one can speak of a state of societal solidarity (...) In modern societies, social relations of symmetrical esteem between individualized (and autonomous) subjects represent a prerequisite of solidarity (...) ‘symmetrical’ must mean that every subject is free from being collectively denigrated, so that one is given the chance to experience oneself to be recognized, in the light of one’s own accomplishments and abilities, as valuable of society” (Honneth A., 1995, 128-130).

Looking historically on the struggle for recognition, Fukuyama seems to be right in claiming that this development mechanism has lost its dynamics within the West, as equal dignity of each and every person was guaranteed in the liberal democratic system. However, he seems to be only partial right, because the process of struggle for recognition has not exhausted its development potential but merely relocated its potential to another level, namely to the domain of culture, into the area of struggle for recognition for various ways of life as equal to one another. This aspect of the problem became particularly prominent in the last decades of the 20th century and superior to the issues of economic redistribution and political representation. The causes are not altogether clear; some theorists point out that the development of world economy prejudices the issue of redistribution to the benefit of free-market capitalism (Fraser N, 2000, 107-108). Others regard as superior the internal mechanism of the struggle for recognition and the emergence of another level of needs, the needs to recognize differences, not equality, as it was before (Honneth A., 2001, 44; Taylor Ch., 1994, 26). Whatever the causes, one fact must be strongly emphasized, namely that contemporary social conflict and current social divisions take place mainly in the domain of culture and are axiological in nature.

Although the considerations presented above strongly support this thesis, let us again state clearly that the ideas of equal dignity, autonomy, recognition of different conceptions of the good, various ways of life or different beliefs all result from the internal development of the West. They are perfectly ‘natural’ here, developing for hundreds or even thousands of years. All these concepts have, so far, remained the ideas of the West and, as such, they are spread in the hope that they will be understood and accepted with kindness and reciprocity. This hope is, however, completely vain.

**STRUCTURE OF RECOGNITION**

Honneth’s reconstruction of the concept of recognition in Hegel’s early works accurately represents the structure of the phenomenon. Honneth himself, drawing attention to the fact that similar expressions of the idea
can be found not only in the works of Hegel, but also later, formulated by G. H. Mead, M. Scheler or H. Plessner, points out that “it is evidently quite natural to distinguish forms of social integration according to whether they occur via emotional bonds, the granting of rights, or a shared orientation to values” (Honneth A., 1995, 94). Let us follow this thread and introduce the basic structure of recognition (parallel to the one presented above) and discuss the relations between different levels.

Firstly, we shall mention the psychological level, i.e. the level of subjective emotions, habits and attitudes, i.e., speaking in very informal terms, whether I like or dislike someone, whether I feel solidarity towards him or rather aversion, whether I like someone’s way of life or find it disgusting.

Then, there is the institutional level, understood not only as a narrow legal aspect (equality before the law and in terms of the subject’s rights), but also as more broadly formalized patterns of behaviour and standards concerning behaviours expected of different social statues.

Finally, there is the cultural level, encompassing common values shared by the majority of the society, conceptions of the desirable (valuable) ways of life and social practices. On the level of societies organized as nation-states and even, in more general terms, on the level of civilization as a whole, this common cultural pattern of values is relatively homogenous. The main problem today is that the global world is transcending the internal framework of each individual civilization, which results in a contact of various, sometimes foreign and antagonistic cultures. The contact sometimes takes the form of cooperation, at other times that of clash.

The three structural levels listed above are not isolated. Together they form a social whole, defining and determining one another. Culture becomes institutionalized, e.g. in the form of rights, and becomes an element of personality of individuals, thus creating a relatively cohesive and long-lasting whole. Obviously, these interactions are multidirectional with emotional attitudes affecting institutions and influencing patterns of social values. Also, social changes may begin at different points. For example, the institutionalization of homosexual ‘marriages’ may in the long run trigger a change in the cultural vision of different sexual preferences and moderation, or even reversal of hostile emotional attitudes.

In the context of the information age and globalization, it seems necessary to distinguish two types of recognition. Firstly, there is the recognition within the Atlantic civilization and secondly, mutual recognition of various cultures on a global scale. In recent decades, the problem of recognition and the policy of difference has been raised more and more frequently, and social actions accompanying it have become more widespread. The issue of recognition may be treated as a part of the contemporary notion of justice or as a problem that surfaced following the defeat of the left in the fight for redistribution, or as a phenomenon inspired
by Soviet secret services. In any case, it must be admitted as a fact of life in Western societies, and to deny it would be to deny reality.

The policy of difference and the policy of multiculturalism consist in the recognition of group identity: national, ethnic, religious, racial, gender-related or connected with sexual preferences which treat people not as equal individuals, but rather individuals distinguished by the fact of belonging to one of the groups enumerated above. The policy of multiculturalism (namely reviving, supporting and often artificially sustaining cultural group identity) has, in turn, led on the one hand to what Nancy Fraser terms the problem of reification (Fraser N., 2000, 108, 112-113). In other words, it led to nationalism, chauvinism, racism. But just as well, it led to what Jürgen Habermas describes as treating cultures like endangered species and thus depriving them vitality and denying individuals an opportunity of assimilation to the dominant pattern (Habermas J., 1994, 128 ff). For members of a minority culture, assimilation is often a real opportunity, in contrast to having the tradition of their ancestors forced upon them and, thereby, being deprived of development possibilities. Institutional protection of minorities is, by contrast, necessary when they really wish to preserve their identity, while the majority attempts to prevent this from happening.

This cultural recognition is also transferred to the level of institutional regulation, for example, when homosexual ‘marriages’ are legalized or when bureaucratically affirmative actions regulate access to university education or certain professions on account of racial origin or gender. It follows that elements substantially distinguishing people are transferred to the institutional level, not only aspects ensuring formal equality, as in the traditional system. On the other hand, the aim of this transfer is not a protection of group identity, but rather the “status of individual group members as full partners in social interaction” (Fraser N., 2000, 113). Although policies of this type are, often, regarded as unfair because they negate universalist models of the West, they brought about desirable effects to a certain groups of people. Some individuals used the possibilities created institutionally to their advantage and in an honest manner.

PREREQUISITES OF GLOBAL RECOGNITION

The other aspect of the discussed problem in a globalizing reality puts the Western world, along with its ideas of equality, subjectivity, tolerance and recognition, in confrontation with cultures regarding these ideals as totally alien and even approaching them with marked hostility. When a part of the intellectual ‘elites’ went as far as developing and propagating the recognizing of everything regardless of its content, based on the mere fact that it differs or even because it is hostile, the world ceased concealing its attitudes of dislike and now manifests these attitudes openly and violently.
Globalization and Recognition

Formal and abstract recognition of everything, regardless of its content, is a road to nowhere. The requirements of global justice, elementary moral principles, of the universal achievements of the civilizations and the need to regulate globalization processes all demand a formulation of at least minimum conditions of global recognition for global recognition. Without prejudice to their final form, let us attempt to indicate two directions in which search for such preconditions should follow, without intending to work out anything totally new and unknown.

The first prerequisite shall be Hegel’s principle of dialogue as a determinant of recognition. We tend to recognize the cultures that recognize us. If monologue is accepted in addition to a negative moral balance, chauvinism, racism and intolerance develop.

The second prerequisite shall be the respect of human rights, as they were laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This precondition is perfectly legitimate also for purely practical reasons: each member state of the United Nations Organization undertakes to comply with the Declaration. The globalizing world has departed from the principle of sovereignty of nation-states and non-interference in internal affairs of independent countries, a principle established by virtue of the Peace of Westphalia. In the present day, the international community believes it is just and fair to infringe upon the internal sovereignty of a state that allows human rights violations within its territory. An example of such intervention was the military operation against Serbia in the 1990s. The world has now entered the post-Westphalian era.

A distinguishing property of the global world will be an increasing importance of international law and institutions; at least in the initial phase, the main foundation of global regulations should be human rights in their minimum version. What hundreds of millions of people need nowadays are not sophisticated rights achieved through thousands of years, but protection against genocide, tortures and mass rapes. One of the basic requirements of the global world is ensuring elementary religious freedom. Imposing the death penalty on people who depart from their religion is irreconcilable with this principle, as is denying women access to education. Such practices ought to be uprooted from the global community, even with the use of reasonable force.

The conditions proposed above are minimum requirements. For example, this is not a claim that liberal parliamentary democracy should be established in all countries. Democracy is an outcome of a particular civilization and may not be able to be artificially transplanted to another region. The political system of any given state forms a whole, together with its tradition, religion, level of spiritual development and type of social integration. The introduction of liberal democratic procedures in tribal communities or communities integrated by means of religion would reflect their deep tribal or denominational divisions. A political system of this sort might have formal democratic procedures, but the most functional system
might be enlightened authoritarism, with its ‘enlightenment’ consisting of respect for human rights.

It seems that in the information age and in the global world, a new functional vision of authority is necessary, different from previous visions. The focal point should be shifted from the notion of authority, understood as rule and control, to the concept of authority as an ability to mobilize a certain potential and use of resources. A number of e.g. post-communist states, use what is actually systemic violence, rendering it impossible to fully develop and use human capital, intellectual abilities and creativity. This impedes developments by artificially sustaining the world belonging to the past, with its heavy industry, agriculture, etc. Rather than being invested in research and development, reserves are allocated for social benefits and subsidies for bankrupt factories.

With the global world in mind, we should rather take into consideration this approach, instead of promoting formal democracy. Developing states do not need an imported political system relocated from the developed states, but rather an opportunity to use their real potential, including the production of food, extraction of raw materials or production of simple industrial products. In this, it is necessary not only to force political and social stability, but also to remove a number of development barriers, e.g. ensuring free investments and free trade.

Contrary to some commonly-held beliefs, the global world will not gradually become simpler and simpler. The opposite is likely to occur, with the world becoming more complex in a number of aspects. The global world will require procedures and institutions regulating and stabilizing it on three levels: culture, politics and economy.

The discussion above is an attempt to identify some of such mechanisms. It must also be borne in mind that in stabilizing the global world, realistic principles must be followed rather than ideological fantasies.

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PART III

SOLIDARITY:
SOCIO-POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Each concept in a language can be subjected to analysis – for example, by defining or describing its function in the language. The process and the results of such analyses are typically referred to as understanding or explicating. Each language, however, possesses concepts which are empty (devoid of content), unclear, ambiguous or difficult to define. The understanding of such concepts hinges on intuition rather than on discourse-analytical processes. The analyst strives to define an unclear notion with examples derived from his own experience or that of other people. Relying on intuition, insight and imagination, we endeavour to identify facts to which the puzzling concept is related; identify a conceptual context which could serve as a point of reference for our attempts at understanding the concept in question; or, whenever possible, simply associate the problematic concept with something visible or audible.

The common type of association in our cultural heritage is that which comes from the tradition of Greek culture. Jaeger calls it a culture of seeing. It is most evident in the arts, not only in those that are, by their very nature, intended for visual appreciation, but also in music, because the composer “sees” his masterpiece while he is composing it – while the listener experiences specific images and visual associations which accompany the process of auditory perception. In science, which is similar to the arts in this cultural interpretation, the “objective” reality is perceived as something visual. Even if sight is incapable of embracing (or reaching) the object of study, we tend to build models and develop diagrams where we present in visual form that which is borne by a given concept or framed in a formula of nature. In this way, science takes account of the common idea of cognition, in which “to see” is equivalent to “to understand”. In the applied sciences, as opposed to theoretical disciplines, the development of a visual diagram, model or law seems to be more difficult (if at all feasible), because the standards of conduct in the domain of positive values are immeasurable. Consequently, in the sphere of human behaviour it is much simpler to forbid something than to order it. Therefore, if one reflects on the phenomenon of solidarity denoted by the corresponding concept, he is sure to come up with copious examples of the phenomenon. However, justifications of solidarity-based attitudes are required to substantiate solidarity – no matter how far-fetched the justifications might be. Mere occurrence of attitudes and behaviours which may be defined as solidary, based exclusively on observation, might ensue from the use of intentional
evaluation criteria. But it might also result from a social game – that is, from a set of behaviours underpinned by economic or political factors. Consequently, in the field of the arts and the humanities, all too often we do not know precisely whether or not a concept we use refers to actual reality; whether it is descriptive or it is prescriptive. This happens even if the concept in question is of key significance in our reflections. Eventually, we are effectively interested in the underlying “causes” of the reality we are considering; and in discussing solidarity we may reflect on whether it is inherent in human nature or developed in the course of civil life.

HUMAN NATURE

The issue of what is inherent in human nature involves the obvious difficulty of establishing precisely what human nature is – what its scope is; from what viewpoint and perspective it should be examined and accounted for. Generally speaking, what we would like to perceive as human nature is such a highly polarised way of life (which has been called existence not without a reason) that it is not possible to identify a single interpretation and a single criterion with which to approach it. Already in Plato’s and Aristotle’s systems, the different parts of soul, (or, rather, their names) reflected different states of existence. The tendency to define the quality of existence in such a way that its interpretation would be based fundamentally on the so-called spiritual life has been widespread until today. But, the form and the content have been substantially modified because of the development of the humanities, which grew out of philosophy. Despite the major achievements recorded by the academic disciplines – also despite the fact that these disciplines have a relatively good understanding of the problems inherent in human spiritual life – the problem still remains intricate where knowledge comes mainly from analytical psychology. Different fields in the humanities take a position on what changes might occur to human consciousness; what foundations these changes might hinge upon; how the changes are to be assessed, etc.

One of the trends rooted in transcendental philosophy is distinguished for its inclination to globalise the problem of consciousness; this no longer regards consciousness as a trait specific to each individual in a unique fashion and a distinctive perspective. The tendency comes down rather to an obvious equalisation of different academic fields with regard to one of the requirements and criteria of what is scientific. This is the criterion of universality for a law (expressed in the form of a proposition) should refer to the most extensive range of phenomena possible and should make it possible to describe lasting and repeatable phenomena. The phenomenon-oriented side of consciousness, its manifestations, and consciousness itself seem to be different things. However, the commonness of the phenomenon-focused aspects, which form part of the scope of human issues of the condition, also offers a means for analysing the very core and essence of consciousness. This is readily used by phenomenology. Where
human nature (or humanity) is accounted for in a fundamental means provides reasons for the claim that human nature is focused on the transcendental subject engaged in the “transcendental community” [Husserl, 1982]. But, consciousness gives only an opportunity to provide answers stemming from the habitual nature of consciousnesses, whereas the answers here derive from components of existential phenomena.

These phenomena are existential and proffer the ultimate interpretation (almost like Kierkegaard's knight of faith, cf. 1972, p. 37) of each state of existence. Adopting a non reducible status of a phenomenon – that is, adopting an *eidos* as an intuitive basis for all scientific disciplines – makes sense only if science is understood as pursuit of cognition. This pursuit is tantamount to developing effective judgements on the analysed object. The illusiveness of the human phenomenon called consciousness makes us either account for it objectively, or, on the contrary, analyse it subjectively. Objective analysis makes us use an ontology of some kind: here, the “object” acquires a static character; it is treated as a fixed and unchanging “reality”. In subjective analysis, the ontic (subjective) consciousness remains an illusory phenomenon where can be discussed in a variety of ways and can be equated with the essence of human nature. Making this equation has prolific consequences, yielding both historic and evolutionary research perspectives. From the dilemma of whether animals have consciousness to the issue of consciousness of consciousness, the problem of cosmic consciousness understood as a mystic unity with nature [cf. Wilber 1997(b), p. 59]) and superconsciousness [ibidem]), In each context, the ontic and subjective meaning of consciousness as the very essence of human nature remains valid. Put differently, as a phenomenon related to the essence of life in general (i.e. in the biological, natural and existential senses), consciousness retains its ontic and subjective meaning.

CONSCIOUSNESS

The ontic view does not make it possible to define consciousness unambiguously. However, this lack of definition does not mean that there is no intuition into the existence of consciousness. And if intuitiveness is established as a premise for rational and discursive discussion, it becomes part of any deductive system. The term “system” does not necessarily refer only to a philosophical system, for it can also be used to define a coherent set of judgements that are made within any individual academic discipline. To put it differently, consciousness analysed in its ontic or intuitive and subjective aspects may become a subject of deductive reasoning; or, it can accompany such reasoning, without occupying the central position. One example here is that of discussions undertaken in the context of physics, quantum mechanics and cosmology by R. Penrose [cf. Penrose 1996]. The postulate of the ontic (or ontically understood) is also valuable in that it need not entail any concrete manifestations of the existence of consciousness or, if we wish to discuss any of such, their perspective will
be defined by the expansion in the evolutionary, not historic, time. Consciousness does not preclude historic time, but it can become an element of its theoretical foundations, noted in each historiographic interpretation of history. In historic time, consciousness becomes a different phenomenon, it functions as an ego.

Therefore, if one wants to embark on a discussion of the phenomenon of solidarity), in line with the arguably best methodological proposals, phenomenology, which makes it possible to frame the discussion in the perspective of fundamental ontology – makes the task considerably easier. From the ontic point of view, phenomenology allows for an exploration of the very core of consciousness in such a way as to identify (in the purest and nonreducible form of eidos) solidarity and, furthermore, historically to analyse indications and signs of solidarity fulfilling themselves as eidos in various social, economic and political situations. The two paths of analysis should be intertwined to complement each other because, one way or another, we must account for the existence of ego and all the consequences resulting from this fact. By applying a specific classification of historical ages in accordance with criteria imposed by a selected historiographic system, it will become obligatory to determine whether, at any given stage and at any given time in history, the phenomenon of solidarity – eidetically understood – could have existed. Accordingly, by applying the criterion of the degree of freedom achieved at a given time in history, generally in line with the tenets of Hegel’s historiographic method, one may inquire into whether or not human solidarity existed in the period of the so-called “Eastern despotism”. If this putative phenomenon had properties of an existential, its presence in the above-mentioned period in history would have been determined by another existential, i.e. by freedom or, historically speaking, from the “amount” of freedom that was available to be had. This is understood in the social sense, namely, from the extent of freedom enjoyed by individuals. In the line of thought proposed by Hegel, it is assumed that only the despot had true freedom because he held all the power. If this is so, then, only the despot could practise solidarity – a proposition, which is clear nonsense; or it seems to make no sense at all. Solidarity must, by its very definition, be practised with someone, towards someone or something. Could the despotic ruler be fundamentally solidary towards himself, as an embodiment of religious authority, legislative and executive power? He would be engaged in solidarity towards a phantom which would be an adjunct to specific functions. This option is quite conceivable and by no means transgresses the adaptive mechanisms of human nature. Taking into account the flexibility of human nature and the best developed adaptive strategies known among all living creatures, if we are capable of imagining a situation of solidarity towards one’s own phantom, we will not rule it out as impossible. However, if solidarity and freedom are to go together, is solidarity covered by the critical distinction proposed by E. Fromm between “freedom from” and “freedom for” If it is used analogously, based on the
observation that metaphysics is a discipline which rests on analogous thinking, solidarity could be analysed independently of empiricism – even as it belongs to metaphysics). Continuing this line of reasoning, one may ask if solidarity is not transcendental in nature? The underlying premise is that it is independent of empirical considerations – the so-called external experience associated with sensations – but, at the same time it is linked to the sphere of consciousness.

Employing the testing method invented by Kant – spelled out in the claim that each correctly formulated philosophical question ultimately comes down to cosmology – let me phrase the question as follows: “Is solidarity a cosmological notion?” ; “ Does the phenomenon of solidarity exist in the universe or can this notion be regarded (and used) as an ontological category which applies to the universe?” or is this. Yet another absurd conclusion? For the monist (pantheist), who identifies Being with God, most certainly, it is not. Quite the opposite: the notion of solidarity as an attribute of God is a sufficient justification for the possibility of relating each discourse dealing with the topic of solidarity to an ontic and subjective premise, which, at the same time, is intuitive. Intuitiveness itself is a key premise of historical studies into beliefs, opinions and practices behind statements postulating the divinity of human beings, the quest for God, divine thinking, as exemplified by contemplation, according to Aristotle. From this kind of “understanding” (or rather intuition) of solidarity, it is quite easy to switch into individual interpretations of this phenomenon as a personal trait that is unique to a particular human being. The personalistic context is obvious and it emerges as one would expect it to.

PERSONAL FORMATION AND SOLIDARITY

However, let me just briefly acknowledge then ignore for now, the problem that effectively calls for an extensive separate study. Personalist philosophy also includes an anthropological view, which may actually be treated as the leading view in the “new existentialism”. This, in turn, brings us to the question of what kind of human being we refer to when we discuss the phenomenon of solidarity. For example, a person is defined as something (or, rather, somebody) qualitatively different from an individual. Thus, it requires a different kind of discourse to adequately account for their internal constitution, as well as for their resultant relation to the world and the place they occupy in it.

Current premises defining the concept of a person are rather weak, and we should rely on intuition rather than on convictions when we discuss them – bearing in mind that our intuition should be grounded more in phenomenology than in psychology. While a person is undoubtedly a human being active in the psychological, social and political spheres, the premises defining that concept are of an eidetic character. If we were to find some eidetic character in the propositions pertaining to inter-human solidarity, those propositions would exhibit the same eidetic character.
Thus, in the case of a person, they would refer to self-solidarity: solidarity first and foremost towards the self, like the solidarity of the ancient Eastern despotic ruler or divine solidarity. The difference becomes clear not only when we refer to the criterion of (psychological) egoism claiming that neither God nor a person is an egoist. A similar case pertains to the difference between love of self and selfless self-love as, when we point to the identification of an individual (not a person) with the function he/she fulfills, his/her occupation and the work he/she performs.

Any reflection pertaining to the relations or behaviours of an individual perfectly correlates with any psychology or anthropology because both focus on the human being and on human problems from birth to death. Sometimes the reflection reaches even further into the past or future, with civilisations or their superiority at the background. In the context of self-knowledge, human life is spread against the horizon of infinity where the subject is transcendental in nature. We thus set the perspective of our thinking to infinity (as a result of the nature of the transcendental subject), while our exploratory drive urges us to fill that perspective with the shape and meaning of a worldview. The tendency to place our ego there is widespread. Many result from a feeling of satisfaction derived from participating in the activity of shaping the worldview, or from a feeling of anxiety about noticing an almost objective dependence of the ego in that activity. Subsequently, we rationalise this activity according to the principles of sufficient reason and contradiction. The rationalisation provides us with a feeling of stability, balance and security. Seldom do we realise that we are able to rationalise almost anything.

It seems that when we rationalise scientific research on the environment or nature, – i.e. the so-called actual existing reality – this has no direct bearing on our existence. The impact of rationalisation in the humanities is usually noticeable and perceptible, while the effect of rationalisation in our everyday lives may even take a tragic turn when ideologies, opinions, convictions and beliefs (held without relation to existence) come into play. We also become susceptible to “solidarity” towards or against something, and thereby testify to our greatness or baseness. In every case, every behaviour and motivation to rationalize our actions, we still preserve the ability to transcend this a rare ability (or possibility) to preserve our self-objectivity (in terms of the transcendental subject), namely, to preserve the person in the existential dimension, which is the social dimension of everyday life. “Even if people are base creatures for they have realised the nature of death, they may go one step further, and, by transcending the I, transcend death as well” [Wilber 1997(a), p. 274].

The activity of transcending does not necessarily have to be conceived in positive terms, for in the act of transcending death we may also find an objectivised tool that may be used against another tool or even against ourselves (and also, by ourselves). Transcendence does not automatically entail that we have rationality, thinking and consciousness at
our immediate disposal – they all exist for the ego., Rather it entails that rationality, thinking and consciousness exist as subjects or as their component parts, and comprise a whole array of emotions, thoughts and beliefs. If, based on that array we attempt any kind of transcendence, the remaining component parts of that whole will remain ontically intact, which gives us a reason to reflect on the nature of timeless existence. In other words, the transcendental experience constitutes a piece of information which, when compared with everyday “external” experiences (sensations), seems to be eternal and constitutes a kind of presence of the transcendental. That feeling of “presence” is not unfamiliar to mathematicians conducting individual research. According to R. Penrose “a mathematical discovery is about broadening the horizon. Since mathematical truths are sufficient, the scientist, strictly speaking, never receives new information. That information has always been available. It is, then, all about reassembling different elements and “noticing” the answer!” [1996, p. 470]. Most probably, “discoveries” in the humanities follow a similar path. But what are they all about?

A humanist, like a mathematician, also has access to “existing” information; however, according to R. Penrose, it does not constitute Plato’s world of mathematics. The said information may still refer to Plato’s “World of Ideas and Principles”, though. Seen in modern terms, it is an explanation of our ability for formal and logical thinking – to the extent it was possible in Plato’s time. Therefore, if “a conversation between two mathematicians is possible, since both have direct access to the truth […], and each has direct contact with the same external Platonian world” [ibidem, p. 469], we could likewise apply Plato’s line of reasoning to substantiate the possibility of conversation among the humanists.

The difference in the object of study or, in Kant’s terms, “the use of reason” (be it theoretical or practical) becomes a matter of lesser importance. In both cases, the mechanism generating ideas awaiting the moment of inspiration is similar. While the mechanism itself may be claimed to be “unconscious”, it is important to “assess it consciously” [ibidem, p. 463] with regard to suitability. The process of generating ideas unconsciously and nondiscursively or nonalgorithmically (as in the case of mathematics according to Penrose after Gödel) takes place in the “global” sphere (“… globality is a generally accepted feature of conscious thinking” [ibidem, p. 464]), and as such, it requires some conscious stimulation (“… true mathematical thinking requires a very high level of consciousness” [ibidem, p. 466]), conscious exploration, a rational or rationalising reflection.

This activity of the mind searching for “perceivable” elements in the infinity of self-knowledge (i.e. mathematical symbols, exploring the possibility of formal-logical relations, or “archetypes and symbols”) might have led Descartes to claim that it is possible to learn to control the mind. Of course, it is not the conscious mind that controls the thinking process, but rather we who focus on a matter we want the mind to consider or
recover from the sphere of the “unconscious” (understood not in Freudian terms). Therefore, if we focus our attention on some matter we have consciously selected for consideration and we discover some mathematical information which in some way is accessible to us (or has been accessible), or we discover some information in the humanities in a similar way, we subsequently assign symbolical forms in order for them to be generally understandable and possibly acceptable (i.e. “burdening”).

There exist no formal fundamentals or definitions. Since people may decide to reach the information contained in self-knowledge and experience, the “timeless” duration they might subsequently experience facing eternity, infinity and some supernatural – that is, an almost divine kind of knowledge. It is to be observed that the outcome of looking into self-knowledge depends on the individual’s mental abilities, character and personality traits, and education. Also, accessing information entails time. Consequently, since the kind of “knowledge” from which information is retrieved cannot be derived from perception, the existence of the divine self or consciousness, the I comes into consideration (C. G. Jung opposes this idea). “Every person intuitively knows [he is] God but [he/she] erroneously attributes this feeling to the I [here referring to the ego – R.L.] and consequently attempts everything in [his] power to reinforce that intuition. Through substitute gratifications (Eros) and substitute victims (Tanatos) [people] create a rift between themselves and other people, while the violent friction resulting from the overlap between individual Atmans creates the nightmare called history. Men and women are enslaved – and by enslaved I do not refer to the original enslavement caused by horrifying greed or repressive institutions, but by all transcendence. They will continue to need light and they will fail to realise that, in fact, they are light and they will desire immortality” [Wilber, 1997(a), p. 274-275].

FROM CONSCIOUSNESS TO CULTURE

The history of humankind looks different from the point of view of the development of consciousness, where it forms part of anthropology which we may call the history of humanity. It is different from the point of view of the ego when examined as the ego’s sphere of activity, which used to be called the history of rulers and wars. The Hegelian “end of history” may thus be understood as an end to the activity of strong and leading individuals; an end to the politics of interest groups; an end to the fight for gaining and preserving power. The beginning of “the end” will be marked by the implementation of human subjectivity in the socio-political sphere. If that happens, will there still be a place for solidarity in societies that are based on pure subjectivity? Or, will it be replaced by the feelings of tolerance, understanding, acceptance, empathy, etc. in the absence of incentives to form groups or societies based on common interests, where individuals apply the principle of solidarity towards or against somebody or something? Or, maybe the notion of inter - human solidarity form a
substitute, or, heralds the advent of other features characteristic of a transcendental community. Further, might the possibility of such a community taking shape in the future – however distant it might be – be inevitable enough for us to practice solidarity towards a given phenomenon today?

It is usually difficult to predict the flow of future events; we are, at most, able to perceive future directions of changes on the basis of perceivable facts at present. The error margin is so large that, without the slightest embarrassment, we succumb to our intentions and hopes behind which we conceal the benefits we hope to achieve. Even when subjected to the total view (as in the Hegelian system), divagations about the future shape, character and face of humanity emerge rather as a consequence of having adopted the kind of criteria used to assess the present state of affairs, current facts and events. However, we (or at least the majority) might wish to live in a world devoid of violence, wars, lies, hypocrisy, hatred; without having to fight to defend any particular material or ideological interest with no duplicity or vengeful hatred, envy or base intrigues, no deceit or sheer stupidity, in our every single vision of “a better world” we tend to build on existing assumptions.

Thus, in predicting the future, it is not necessary to understand the present (understanding crashes against the so-called nonsensical relations) or the future (for “predicting” brings in new criteria into the future in terms of quality). According to M. Weber, predicting is not even possible in the social sphere. Therefore, when talking about “the future” we should bear in mind that it is not about forecasting or projecting (as demonstrated by J. P. Sartre) but about a “presence” (its enactment) and “the present”. If the reason why we complain about a given day is dissatisfaction with our living conditions or the current world situation in general, then we must conclude that it is our specific individual ego that feels dissatisfied. Seldom has man felt such deep discomfort for his dignity or humanity. It may depend on us whether our individual humanity suffers any damage it is the ego that feels the surrounding world or that things around us are not in order. Driven by the criteria of individual comfort, attractiveness and vanity, the ego makes this world seem a bad place. We may also find arguments in support of our convictions and go so far as to refer to the necessity of species activity propagating the slogan “demonstrate solidarity towards (with) me”.

According to G. Deleuze, “Man is reactive in nature; there exists, nevertheless, man’s species activity, though often it is deformed, inevitably missing its target, and leading to the emergence of the tamed man. That activity should be continued but in another sphere, where it would result in creation but of something different than man…” [1993, p. 147].

Let us ask the following question: what does that activity create? It creates culture and the man of culture “tamed” by the ego. “The activity of culture aims to tame man, i.e. make reactive forces able to serve and become susceptible to influences. However, during the taming process, that ability to serve becomes deeply ambiguous, for it also allows reactive
forces to serve other reactive forces, gives them a semblance of activity, a pretense of justice, and turns them into fiction that defeats active forces” [ibidem]. In other words, by enabling him to “behave”, the taming process prevents man from existing. That is, it prevents man from being an individual self; it reduces him to an entity, a culturally functional and existentially finite ego. Out of resentment, some reactive forces make other reactive forces susceptible to influence” [ibidem], which “creates” a condition of blissful conformism and a fictitious feeling of contentment. Next, “to achieve similar results, impure conscience uses almost diametrically different measures: in impure conscience, reactive forces use their ability to become susceptible to influences in order to give other reactive forces a semblance of activity”, the procedure itself being as fictitious as the procedure of resentment. In this way, to benefit species activity, combinations of reactive forces are formed. They subsequently feed on species activity and inevitably derail its direction. Reactive forces find a perfect opportunity for taming: a chance to unite and form a combined reaction, usurping the status of species activity” [ibidem]. The ego identifies with the species and is solidary with the species in a fictitious reality thus created. The true and observable reasons, however, stem from the real motive aiming to renounce fiction, and so revenge becomes the leading motive, a revenge of “the seduced” (by culture or by fiction). “The other side of the coin” comes into play; “with the level of ego we have attained an evolutionary stage where the separated “I” is so strong and complex that, having broken off its previous unconscious relationship with the cosmos, with its nature and body, it has turned vengeful against its previous evolutionary stages that form an integral part of its complex structure. Halfway through the subconscious and unconscious stages, the ego felt it could deny the fact that it depended on those two. The ego has not only transformed itself from the typhonic structure and group membership, but has also violently denied those two, it has become aggressive and arrogant”. Exalted to the heavens (in Atman’s design), the ego “in a foolhardy attempt decided to cut off its roots and prove its absolute independence” [Wilber, 1997(a), p. 149].

EGO FORMATION

The process of ego formation (or separation), which is investigated by transcendental psychology, takes place at the base of the permanent (transcendental) self and in its surroundings. It is undertaken to gain independence, thereby constituting a senseless fight, as that independence is imaginary, fictitious and destructive (for the real, transcendental I). Paradoxically then, man intuitively feels that he is God himself and wants the ego to become God. Paying tribute to his “complex nature”, man enters that paradox and reinforces it by believing that he “objectively recognises the objectively existing reality”, despite the fact that he already knows that reality by virtue of his being an existing entity. Treating his own being then
as an objective entity despite its subjectivity; he embraces his intuition and objectifies the ego. We may label this process nicely as transcendence and add that we do so by virtue of its possibilities. However, it is actually reminiscent of a saying that people start to act rationally only when all other possibilities have been exhausted. The path of rationality, despite all appearances to the contrary, is actually not very well-trodden. However, the fact that some individuals had walked this path sufficed to create a philosophy. It emerged in the process of mental work done by individuals mature enough to reflect on the issues already present in the form of myth.

To repeat after Hegel, philosophy could have also emerged as a result of mature conceptual thinking (using concepts) in contrast to the immature thinking that is present in myths and mythological thinking. Disciples consciously gathered around their masters to learn from their teachings while myths were readily available to all. For some time, at least still during Plato’s time, these two strains of thinking were linked by esotericism. However esoteric the mathematics of Plato may have been, it still fulfilled its role from the point of view of a teacher-philosopher. It was a barrier to those who were not motivated enough to pursue the path of self-education and self-development. This prevented science from becoming popular, and, even consequently, unfavourable to humans when it was used for improper or unsuitable purposes. Sophistry was an example, for Plato, of what the ego can do to learning.

Therefore, neither a philosophy nor philosophy in its entirety is fully protected from the “aggressive and arrogant” ego that supposedly blazed a trail to wisdom through commonness. In reality, it sent the “separated I” on a wild goose chase after “freedom”, knowledge and power. After antiquity, the historical stages of increasing domination of the ego (or rather the superego in Freudian terms) over consciousness, personality, and especially “others”, might be classified according to the same criteria as those used to characterise different eras according to culture or important social developments. There would be obvious differences between the man of Renaissance, Baroque, Enlightenment and modern times. In philosophy, it is rather the permanent characteristics of man that are needed in order to identify the possibilities of conducting research on man to benefit science, rather than philosophy itself. The culturally variable facet of man may undoubtedly constitute a meaningful and worthwhile object of study in the historical sciences (including the history of art), the anthropological sciences (although in them there is a tacit agreement that there is some permanent point of reference), or the psychological sciences (clearly, whatever definition we adopt, the soul is cognitively constant as an “object” of cognition). But whenever we make mention of philosophical sciences (their cognitive independence being frequently contested rather than affirmed), the absolute point of reference is the transcendental subject.

Historically, the ego has always been set against some background, which in itself constitutes a good point of departure for research, since a background usually provides a kind of ontology or onticity (in philosophy).
In other words, the ego always emerges from some kind of background. According to Wilber, mythology is the primordial background where “…the «I» must have broken free of Great Mother’s embrace and proclaimed itself as an independent and rational centre of consciousness guided by its own will” [1997(a), p. 150]. As a result “…old cosmologies and mythologies of the goddess mother had been radically transformed […] and pushed aside to make place for more masculine and patriarchal mythologies about gods throwing thunderbolts from the clouds. After a century (i.e. around 1500 BC) they became gods in the Middle East” [Wilber, 1997(a), p. 151, after J. Campbell, *Occidental Mythology*, 1964]. The same tendency had penetrated Greek mythology: “According to Campbell, it was the reason why the literature of Aryan Greeks and Romans, and the neighbouring Semitic peoples of the Levant of the Early Iron Age, abounds in variations on the theme of victories of radiant heroes over some dark and repulsive creature involving freeing a treasure: a beautiful land, a damsel or heaps of gold, or simply setting oneself free from its captivity” [ibidem].

Before the second century B.C, humanity did not possess the ego in any form (Wilber, after Julian Jaynes, *The Origin of Consciousness*); therefore, despite the fact that the process of ego formation was rather long, it has, nevertheless, left an indelible mark on mythology. “According to researchers, we may assume the following fact: sometime between the second and [the] first century B.C, there emerged what we nowadays call ego-based consciousness. The heroic appearance of an ego-based structure of consciousness was truly remarkable!” [ibidem, s. 153]. Group membership was based on a kind of morality exemplified in myths and can be treated relatively unproblematically as an expression of a solidary relationship of a slightly atavistic nature. The process of ego formation was accompanied not only by the creation of an “ego-based structure of consciousness” but also by “directed thinking”. “While mythological (or paleological) thinking was a representational and symbolic projection of images, directed thinking entailed a different way of thinking, i.e. thinking directed at an object (the Object) and an objective world” [Jean Gebser, *ibidem*, p. 150]. This is different from Hegel’s vision, although it is only natural that both used different words to describe the transition from myth to philosophy, a process which – luckily – has been well-documented.

Questions arise regarding the origin of that transition; however, given the fact that it took place over a large time-span, it should rather be treated as part of a “natural” evolution of the species. The evolution was marked by a clear and objective hormonal difference between man and woman. Obviously, writes Weber, “both hormones – testosterone and oxytocin – are products of biological evolution” [1997(b), p. 23]. Thus, evolution is responsible for the “solidarity” of the sexes. However, according to Weber, evolution is about transgressing, so it should rather make us transgress the accepted norms of behaviour as determined by hormones: “Men are learning to live in a relationship, while women are
learning independence. In so doing, to each party the opposite sex seems to be a monster. I believe this requires a certain degree of kindness on the part of both sides” [ibidem, s. 24].

Since most people are interested in their own future and also in the future of humanity, the shape or expression of solidarity should also be of interest to us. Transcendental philosophy researches the development of consciousness. It provides answers, although these should be treated as outcomes of speculation on the basis of data forwarded by its research methods. Presumably, the predictions about the future made by transcendental philosophy share some features inherent in all futurological speculations, i.e. they abound in contradictions and inconsistencies. We must also make allowances for intentional attitudes on the part of researchers who live in certain times and conditions and who perceive them on the individual basis, of those who intentionally perceive the present. When Ken Wilber points to the great role of hormonally determined behaviour of the sexes, and, at the same time, asserts that biologically (or evolutionally) desirable features were formed in the course of evolution, three possible future scenarios emerge: hormonally determined behaviour may remain at its current level, it may be reinforced or it may wane.

Wilber adopts a philosophical perspective with humanity as his main focus of interest and, in so doing, he transgresses the “solidarity of the sexes”. According to his works, the future will not require such a “transgression”. For the time being, “We, the people of the present, are facing a new dragon [to] fight and we need a new heroic myth. The dragon we must slay is an ego-based structure; while a centauric, i.e., mental[sic] kind of consciousness, is the new treasure we must strive to win. In order to reach our goal, we need a hero who in a couple of centuries’ time we shall praise in the same way we had praised “the solar ego”. Today we must develop our intuition and a vigilant but passive kind of consciousness in the same way we had to develop logic and active mentality some time ago” [Wilber, 1997(a), p. 210]. “Passivity” would not only signify a departure from the expansive ego and a form of openness and sensitivity towards others, but also any ecological sensitivity within the altered consciousness. This see the universe as a whole (with us being a part of that whole) rather than as an arena of war (conquest of the cosmos). Why should we need a hero representing an extreme form of advanced individualism? Despite the hero being a mythological and symbolical figure, which leaves one in no doubt regarding the role of a future hero, Wilber is examining the future hero to find some features that will be similar to our new features of developing humanity in a world that we keep on changing. “A new hero will be centauric (i.e. an integrated body and mind); with a single holistic mental-androgenic body; psychological, intuitive and rational, male and female. Women may well take the leadership, since our society is already balanced on the male side” [ibidem].

In fact, maybe everyone agrees with this analysis of the social lives of people in the present world, because is balanced “on the male side”,
especially in the so-called male occupations. However, domination – the main feature of the isolated ego – is definitely not solely a male feature, while the comparison of “typical” features and roles is actually a matter of convention. Therefore, in order to construe a model for the development of consciousness in the context of humanity, we need a point of departure other than the empirical-comparative, especially given the fact that the said model is always based on a male or a female point of view – or, on an interpretation of facts. Indeed, Wilber provides such a theoretical model for the development of human consciousness [ibidem, p. 211] as “a localisation of mythical figures”, to which we can always refer some real characters even though we may only know them from literature or some other medium. Like all living beings, real characters possess their own history of the relationship between the psyche (consciousness) and myth (or mythology, even in the base form of a rumour or legend about somebody). This is a relationship which constitutes an attitude toward the hero, whereby we may praise or condemn him, identify ourselves with him or reject him, admire him or deny his existence. In fact, the hero is a character from our internal world, a phantom that justifies (thereby providing, at least, a semblance of mythological reality) our phenomenological side (or form) of existence; while the jealous ego lurks in its shadows and emotionality; or, while our emotions are tossed and turned by the tides of hormonal activity.

All the above notwithstanding, the world, of man and woman are two different worlds that may well be doomed to coexistence and dialectic co-dependence on the road to the future and humanity. For the time being, Wilber critically assesses the present and warns us in his diagnoses: “Until men stop killing each other and women stop emulating their actions, and until women in their feminist anger refrain from reactivating the chthonic Mother and matriarchal obsessions and try to break themselves free of the despised patriarchy, the following questions shall remain unanswered: “What does it mean to be a real woman?” and “how to attain a level that would be neither male nor female but entirely human?”. Patriarchy, the mental ego, has fulfilled its indirect but necessary function. However, if the circumstances do not soon change diametrically, it will literally mean the death of us all” [ibidem, p. 211]. Humanity, or the humanity within, or “the human being”, all refer to a “multilayered individual.” Being alive, one can improve at various layers, but one can die at various layers, too. It would be almost an exaggeration to add that one can likewise be solidary at various layers.

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CHAPTER X

CULTURAL AND CONCEPTUAL MEANING OF SPIRITUAL IDENTITY:
A PRECONDITION FOR HUMAN SOLIDARITY

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Instead of limiting the Eternal Spirit
to the image and likeness of your culture and language,
try to use this image and likeness
to experience yourself
in the image and likeness of the Eternal Spirit.

INTERNAL GOODS AND THEIR EXPRESSIONS

Human civilisation has two main facets: external, related to technological development of material goods; and internal, including the growth of inner qualities, due to the progress of culture and education. The evolution of civilisation connected with the human interior is also linked to religious progress through the refinement of skills for using spiritual goods. Both types of civilisational achievements form a human heritage that must be protected and cherished for ourselves and for future generations. Proper balance should be maintained between the two types of attainment in civilisation, because emphasis on only one aspect of human existence will eventually produce an imbalance in people’s lives.

People function both in visible and in invisible realities. Through their physical bodies, humans participate in the external world. A psychophysical unity, a human being, wants to be happy. By constantly developing human civilisation together with other people, humans hope. People accumulate certain goods, because using them gives them satisfaction. To a considerable degree, all of us perceive ourselves as specific individual entities on the basis of what we possess. Consequently, we strive to acquire goods, for example: heading a company, playing a prestigious social role (e.g. to become a well-known actor), having good health or a happy family. Our individual identity is clear and unambiguous to ourselves and to other people. We can be called president of a large company, a celebrity actor, a handsome man, a happy parent, etc. Such attributes as these, which bring us joy also distinguish us from other peoples we are the exclusive bearers of these attributes. Moreover, the qualities that make us feel we are valuable beings are inherently conditioned, i.e. existing only in one particular place and time, which makes them intrinsically fleeting. Since they are transient, they bring
pleasure or problems. Accordingly, we cannot feel entirely comfortable and safe.

On the other hand, religions offer humans a very different type of good – a spiritual realm which is our shared property. Each of us can claim to be a legitimate king and owner of this shared property. This invisible good is hidden at the very base of our human interior. It can provide utmost satisfaction, and a fully comfortable or secure identity. A spiritual good is not conditioned; it exists in any place and time and it is not transitory. Once we acquire it, it enables us to attain a spiritual identity in which we become united with other people and with the whole world.

In order to be fully happy each person must have access to both kinds of goods because people want to experience both transitory and eternal satisfaction. There is no conflict between the two “realms” discussed above. They are simply different, and complementary to each other, in constitute they make up the human kingdom. I subscribe to a vision of human identity incorporates social identity (property, social standing, nationality, address, etc.), physical identity (age, gender, appearance, health, etc.), mental identity (character, views, emotionality, memories, desires, aspirations, etc.), as well as spiritual identity. Hence different religions, treated as our shared wealth, allow us to acquire a human spiritual identity. People who have forfeited their spiritual entity, do not feel fulfilled and might seek lasting happiness in transient situations. Religions – which can be described as fruit of the cultivation of the human interior – have an undisputed value, giving meaning to human life and to the entire world by providing the hope and strength to wrestle with obstacles encountered in life.

One thing is even more important: Those who have faith – or experience their spiritual identity – are able to see themselves in other people. In this way, they have an opportunity to experience genuine love, which breaks through individual and collective barriers. They also have an opportunity to adopt an attitude of kindness to the whole world and to all people. Shared human identity enables people to view those of a different race, gender or material status as brothers and sisters. It determines general human brotherhood and equality – general human solidarity – within the same, shared human spiritual identity. As one great family, we must do everything in our power not to squander this common worldwide achievement which has been the focus of the great religions of the world.

However, as we well know, this shared human identity is differently defined by particular religions. For some, we are a human family in Christ, for others in Brahman, for yet others in the nature of Buddha, in the God of Abraham or Allah. These conceptual differences give rise to conflicts which prevent religion from properly fulfilling its role, particularly today, in an age of globalisation, as all humanity intermingles and unites, a religion which claims that full Truth revealed itself only through the person of its founder – in confrontation with another religion – fails to perceive the other religion as offering people an opportunity to regain the same eternal
human good. In an age of globalisation humans face the inevitable tasks of developing new general principles of co-existence in all spheres of life common economic and market rules, for example, and of defining how education and science are to function. This suggest, a concrete vision of general religious principles to safeguard and enable the continuing development of the “civilisation of the interior” in its religious aspect. Such theology of peaceful coexistence might be considered a common appendix, or even foundation to each existing religion. Following its adoption. All religions could develop in a harmonious manner, even as they preserve the specific features of their unique doctrine of spiritual identity with its distinctive ritual and its own hierarchy of celestial gods who are not entities of flesh and blood, but spiritual identities.¹

This is to regard the human spiritual entity as general and meta-religious that is, as a shared human supra-cultural and extra-conceptual goal of each religion. This good embraces the whole of humankind, and can be obtained by each by opening to any of the great religions of the world.

These religious forms of expression reflect the context of a religious tradition founder, the customs peculiar to a given culture, the type of language used for communication, the level of intellectual development of the followers, the extent of tolerance to newly developed ideas and the duration of religious teachings among other factors,. Spiritual visions taught by religious founders were also affected by the personal attributes which they had, e.g. the extent of their knowledge, their character, emotionality, social status and the like. Because of these and many other reasons, while the precise forms of religious technologies differ from one another they are united by a common feature, namely they aim to enable their followers to experience personal spiritual unity with other people.

This spiritual unity consists of shared human spiritual wealth which has always existed beyond any particular symbols or circumstances. The principle applies not only to the theology and liturgy of each religion, but also to the form of deities seen “through the mind’s eye” in celestial visions by religious believers. This also means that the precise appearance and qualities of what – depending on our particular religion – we call Angels (Christianity), Genii (Judaism), Houris and Jins (Islam), Yidams (Tibetan Buddhism) on Devas (Hinduism) – depend on specific circumstances pervading a given culture.

¹ Primary religions and expressions form “religious technology” and, may be easily associated with a mechanistic and unemotional process (which may, indeed, seem inappropriate in relation to religion), the term has a major advantage. It emphasises the instrumental and contractual nature of the forms of religious life. Another benefit of the term is that its conceptual field includes the notion that reaching a supra-cultural religious foundation is possible only as a consequence of personally experiencing a specific process of spiritual self-fulfilment – and that this religious foundation is not an effect of dreams or philosophical speculations.
Consequently, any conflicts arising between different types of heavenly armies which may take place in the mental sphere of a particular religious follower must be regarded as a result of his ignorance of the common supra-cultural foundation of existence of these disparate forms of deities. For example, the religious vision of mercy to a typical Catholic will be realised – in line with St. Faustina’s vision – in a symbolic form of the Master Jesus as God of Divine Mercy. In turn, for a Buddhist the same truth will assume the form of a four-armed white god called Avalokitesvara. Even though the symbolic representation of mercy of both these celestial forms is expressed in a culturally disparate iconographic canon (with the disparity reflecting differences between Christianity and Buddhism on the level of their religious technologies), these various forms refer to one universal truth. While discussing the spiritual category of mercy, it seems pertinent to note that it is precisely this attraction of the highest truth, an attribute of the spiritual foundation of the existence of the universe, which has triggered the development of different religions, by different authors, throughout human history. Therefore, the emergence of different paths which enable human beings to regain their spiritual identity is an expression of the overriding concern about the pathological state of dissociation of human identity. For that reason, to us humans as entities separated from their absolute roots – divine mercy is the most precious godly quality; the only help we can count on in seeking out a common human spiritual identity.

As long as different religious methods are not recognised as various tools that can be used to attain the same spiritual existence that functions beyond any linguistic or cultural meaning, it will not be possible to experience a spiritual bond embracing humankind in different continents and cultures. Hence, it will not be possible to achieve any general human spiritual solidarity, free from regarding a selected nation, material status, language, skin colour, age or gender as superior to others. As long as religions fail to acknowledge that their religious technologies play but an ancillary role to the overall supra-cultural “religious fruit”, they will erect religious walls that separate, rather than unite, people. Consequently, if the cultural as the relatively conditioned name and form becomes more important in a religion than the Absolute Spirit of the entire humankind, it becomes much more difficult to realise the Spirit in a personal religious experience. If the situation continues, the Spirit will finally have to vanish under the load of dogmatic formulas that become the only “rightful and legitimate” object of religious cult, instead of Him.

SECTARIANISM

Analysing religious life in the context outlined above, has implications for what is commonly referred to as religious sectarianism and for the criterion for determining which spiritual paths should be recognised as leading to the recovery of spiritual identity and which should not. All
religious movements which strive to elevate their own religious technology above all other technologies and, consequently, above their shared fruit, are essentially sects, markedly contributing to religious “confusion” and adding their own bricks to the religious Tower of Babel. The essence of sectarianism lies neither in the time of emergence of a particular denomination, nor in the number of followers; it lies, rather, in the capability to beguile [or enchant] and control human minds. The quintessence of sectarianism as religious evil is to restrict the life activity enjoyed by believers, rather than to give them even more freedom and enable them to live their lives to the full. Consequently, all acts of intolerance by a denomination towards religious forms that are culturally different from its own forms of religious life must unequivocally be recognised as symptoms of a dangerous religious xenophobia and clear manifestations of a sectarian attitude. The syndrome of the “chosen form of religious life” which, pervaded by emotional inflexibility, seeks ruthlessly to exterminate all foreign and culturally disparate forms is a major threat to healthy spiritual co-existence within humanity.

Exploring the topic in greater detail, one can list five major types of religious sectarianism. (1) When the overriding goal of spiritual practice is the well-being and comfort of the founder of a given religious movement, not the good of his followers. If the founder places himself above the rest, he fails to convey the spiritual experience in which all believers are equal to him. This path is not able to transcend transient external “religious” experience. (2) When the particular religious proposed is not built upon the foundation of the spiritual self-fulfilment of the founder. The form of expression might be free from any cultural and spiritual entanglements, but is nothing more than a logically constructed effect of the founder’s original concept. (3) When religious leaders promote the idea that it is not necessary to employ any religious technology to fulfil one’s spiritual existence, for different rituals, descriptions and forms of gods are seen as “merely” cultural tools or means – and not ends – of a given religion. (4) A religious attitude which does not respect its own religious method – even as it uses it according to its proposed principles. This type of sectarianism considers “mere” method not to be a goal of religious life. Yet an excessive instrumentalism towards the method used makes it impossible for religious believers to be genuinely open to it and to become ardently involved in religious practice. This attitude stems from the failure to understand that it is impossible to attain a religious goal without a religious method. Method is not qualitatively inferior to the spiritual goal itself. Furthermore, after leading us to religious practice, the religious technology that assisted us in our pursuit may also help others to attain what we achieved—the sectarian attitude in question fails to recognize moreover, that religious form can be used also to refresh our experience. (5) The last type of religious sectarianism states that if different religious tools help achieve the same spiritual goal, they can be used freely; we can combine them as
we please without regard for the religious tradition that draws on specific principles of action.

**RELIGIONS MYSTICISM**

No discussion of the proposed religious appendix in the context of spiritual solidarity embracing humankind would be complete without an exploration of the phenomenon of religious mysticism. This is because each of the five great religions has its own living mystical tradition. The essence of mysticism is to revive the type of experience – free from any linguistic and cultural implications – and bring it back to spiritual life. It is true that, with their attitude of rational and empirical treatment of their theologies, religious rituals and forms of celestial gods, mystics of all the major religions call to mind the religious meaning of life.

The way mystics practise religious life is usually fresh and authentic, and they go usually beyond just the pure letter. Regardless of their specific spiritual tradition, religious poems composed by mystics always focus on themes of internal solitary and difficult paths that ultimately lead to universal and selfless love. All the mystics emphasise that the road is marked by pain and humility, for the process of spiritual abandonment of false separation from the world and other people must be excruciating. Furthermore, all religious mystics, with their own lives, proved that they could notice the spiritual fruit of their religious practice in each fellow person. None of them feared to transgress the tight boundaries of religious truth imposed by their language and culture. Quite often, it must be noted, they excessively disregarded any such limits, walking a thin line between devotion and heresy. As a result, they rarely went outside the tall walls of their monasteries. Even though true mystics exist today as well, they are rather unwelcome by the so-called mass spirituality, since those who care about ostentation and relish their institutional superstructures, prefer to focus on the external setting and concepts, wary of looking into their spiritual inner selves. By contrast, mystics – with their keen, yet inconspicuous religious presence – always emphasise the superiority of the loving heart over the dead letter of intellectual tradition. Therefore, the more “unmystical” various official traditions are and the more they concentrate on the outward setting of their religious technologies, the more distrustful and jealous they are of other religions. At the same time, mystics in all the great religions of the world, paying no attention to what “great theologians” and “eminent offices” might say, invariably converse in the quiet of their hearts in the same language of love with each person sunset and each man they come across.

**PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN PEOPLE**

Considering the above, I believe the theology of peaceful co-existence to be a common appendix to universal mysticism, i.e. the need to
undergo an internal revolution and revaluation within the dead letter of one’s religious tradition. An adoption of this theology of peaceful co-existence should indicate the invigorating criterion of deep spiritual realisation, “attainment” in the selection of members of the hierarchy, instead of academic education only, or, political or economic considerations.

If a religion believes that only its own technology is capable of achieving full spiritual bonds between people, then it ceases to be a life-giving criterion of the growth of mutual love between people. If this attitude is maintained, it would eventually lead to something that can be likened to a spiritual arms race. In addition to everyday problems and “natural enemies”, religious practice would then bring to people other opponents, namely believers of “foreign” religions. If the living water of the Spirit of Truth and Love – the pure water of spiritualised mental life – is to freely flow through all the people, then it may not tolerate artificial barriers in the form of an unreasonable clinging to concepts, rituals and forms of celestial gods. Spiritual truth requires worship in judicious silence, not in animated reviews of differences. Practising a religion that is not able to see its own Spirit of Truth in other religions – albeit expressed in a different way because of different cultural settings – cannot unite humanity; it will only continue dividing it. If other religions are treated as competitors, possessing only fragmentary knowledge of the highest Truth, then people might not really believe in spiritual existence that functions independently of a specific culture – and independently of the concepts that are communicated, no matter how smartly formulated it might have been. This, in turn, would mean that the cultural message that is communicated by the existence of the spiritual truth about each human has been stuck in its own tools. In other words, what was supposed to be only a tool became a goal, then, original and principal goal then became heresy. Therefore, as long as religions fail to acknowledge that their theologies, rituals and symbolic representations of heavenly gods are only instrumental, they will never be able to perform the spiritual role entrusted to them. They will not be able to offer their believers any consolation in love that goes beyond blood relationships, skin colour, social status, age, gender and language.

We have now reached the time when our human world in its old and divided formulae is inevitably coming to an end. The shape of the new undivided world will only be determined by us; the future form of the human social order will depend on our combined courage and responsibility or – alternatively – on our collective cowardice and selfishness.

The precise position and role of various forms of religious life in the future public order hinges exclusively on decisions being made now on that issue. The problem of coexistence of different religions cannot be resolved in the public sphere by legal pacification, for such a solution would be a crime to history. Any attempt at legal pacification would merely demonstrate collective irresponsibility which deprives future generations of the opportunity to freely decide on the direction of further development.
Therefore, as globalisation takes shape, we all have the responsibility to develop a feasible formula for a peaceful co-existence of different religions in the public sphere. We can renounce this responsibility and let the issue deteriorate due to lack of control. If we agree on this option, we automatically consent to the “dark forces” that are taking over the control of this process. The “dark forces” are nothing else than the resulting energy of our collective stupidity, laziness, selfishness, ill-wishing and shortsightedness. In the end these human features always lead to evil and suffering. Fortunately, however, we can assume conscious and rational control over the creation of a new social order that would incorporate the spiritual heritage of all humankind. If we do this, we will allow the forces of light to score a victory in this apocalyptic moment of human history.

As we already know, analysing the history of religion and excessive attachment to words may increasingly separate us from the real world and make us lose touch with our own inner self, which was originally an extra-linguistic and extra-cultural pure mental energy. Therefore, caution should be exercised with regard to the linguistic assimilation of new religious notions. On the other hand, if the category of human spiritual identity is not introduced into the doctrinal linguistic base of each religion, there would be no common religious foundation for inter-religious communication about such a vital topic as the position and sense of spiritual life in a post-globalist human society. For this reason, one should always be prepared to create a new language that would enable all people to express clearly a new, long-awaited, vision of the world. This new language would be significant to all. Enriching the vocabulary of each religion with the category of “shared supra-cultural spiritual identity” and bringing to the fore the same mental reality that is in the entire collective consciousness and in each individual process of thinking. The reality may function as something shared by the people, with the semantic interpretation being clarified in the text. Therefore, universal and serious attention devoted to the religious vision proposed here can foster rational and public communication within a context impacting everyone. This, in turn, naturally translates into a possibility to undertake concrete actions, i.e. a controlled reshaping of the surrounding reality.

Without first agreeing that all religions of the world pursue common goals, peaceful emergence of religious pluralism in the social arena is impossible. This is because spiritual anarchy would arise, or one religious option would try to dominate others. That each religion consents to a general understanding of its religious essence as an aspiration to restore to all the people their spiritual identity, reflects the unity of the religious goal, with a simultaneous respect for the existence of a great variety of representations and methods, even in the institutional dimension. All spiritual temples, variously called and different in architectural form, might then be regarded as equally important places of worship. Churches, mosques, gompas, synagogues or ashrams become simply venues where people – using different means – learn to discover the same spiritual
identity which they share with others. We have no right to deprive future generations of an opportunity to be taught a spiritual lesson of life in these diverse public spiritual schools. Therefore, as we jointly build our new social house-spanning the whole world, we should – from the very outset – design a spiritual story in it. However, this can only be made possible provided that a total religious reform be carried out, which focuses on the attitude to cultural differences between religions.

If we achieve this, we will no longer have to run away from the problem of the existence of different forms of religious life in the so-called secular democracy. What is more, we will be able to go even further in our pursuits and consistently extend democratically conducted political interaction in a religious dimension. Were the outlook to be accepted by major religious “governors”, religions might compete for followers through a democratically conducted political process. Civil spiritual identity as a dimension officially existing in each social situation would emerge from the cover of collective social unconsciousness and become a legitimate base for social interactions. It would have opportunity to be represented and shaped in accordance with the will of the electorate, without anyone fearing that the form of that identity would be dominated by any single religious option.

Different religions, willing to legitimately co-create the human world, will then function as different proposals for taking care of the common spiritual social base. In such a political climate, the kind and loving attitude displayed by one citizen towards another will be interpreted in the social forum as a general human good and will be covered by legal protection. I think that a political system that fails to protect this type of social good by legal means or fails to notice the emerging need for this social good may not be politically mature. A social system, which enables further democratisation in an existing democracy and continued evolution of civilisational attainments, is not a system of extreme (i.e. either exclusively secular or exclusively religious) democracy, because social law in the system would publicly protect the civic spirit and the civic psyche, the civic physical body and material property. In a system of complete democracy, the public sphere of social life should be free from any form of indoctrination in the sense of being axiologically neutral and offer equal opportunities for promoting all dimensions of human existence. People living in this political system could be happy, also, for reasons other than possession of material wealth. The public law would protect all means of expressing one’s individual happiness, unless the expression is accompanied by propaganda or intolerance. In contrast, our currently promoted system of secular democracy is inherently undemocratic because it undermines the basic principles of democratic justice. Democratically understood, justice should mean flexibly respecting the will of the social majority which is expressed every four years in a referendum in which all members of the society should be eligible to vote. The referendum should also deal with all the major spheres of life – spheres that are important to
the citizens. Issues involved in the citizens’ spiritual life should not be considered as unimportant to collective social life.

This is confirmed by a look back into history. One should first analyse communism as a proposed global political system. History has unequivocally demonstrated that communism does not accommodate religious life at all.

Ultimately history has judged it anti-human and opposed to the well-being of human beings themselves. With its slogan stating that “religion is the opium of the people” communism effectively eradicated respect for religious life in society and provided its own “opium. While capitalism tolerates religious life in public, this tolerance is merely for commercial and mercantile reasons, i.e. in the shadow of money worship. In fact, capitalism as an ideological system has a deeply ironic attitude to all forms of spiritual life, which it regards as pathetic and pitiable. Capitalism – just like communism – makes it effectively impossible to uphold the appropriate sense and reasons for the existence of various types of spiritual life.

By contrast, this study proposes an unrestrained development of full human potential. It offers a legal balance between the secular and spiritual life in the social domain. In the context of legislative and executive powers, it takes into account the development of all social bonds – including those that exist exclusively in the sphere of the invisible spirit. All these goals can be achieved with the full majesty of democratically changing law and, in the process, which not deprive citizens of the opportunity to choose the direction of their individual development. It includes no ideological foundations for totalitarian aspirations and is, thereby, able statutorily to protect each type of civic desire of public development, be it exclusively on the consumerist and materialistic level or solely on the spiritual plane. A common social house, thus constructed, markedly increases the freedom of individuals and elective room for determining the shape of the state. This requires further serious study.

Poznań, Poland
CHAPTER XI

THE PROBLEM OF MORAL DECLINE IN POST-SOVIET UKRAINE

YAROSLAV PASKO

In the past few years there has been a remarkable interest in morality and human dignity. This field, which was thought to have been all but exhausted two decades ago in the European tradition, has become the focus of great intellectual ferment in view of the post-Soviet decline in moral standards. This moral crisis is closely connected with the collapse of the Soviet ideological system and the decline of traditional pre-conventional morality. In conditions of chaotic change, one can observe the rise of inequality, a limitation of human freedom, a lack of access to goods and resources, and the formation of corporate ownership that serve as an important factor of alienation. In contrast to East European countries, in the Ukraine the preconditions for the emergence of civil society were not created. The legitimization of civil society serves as the prerequisite of the formation of post-conventional principles of morality is the basis of modern pragmatism. Ukrainian reality does not correspond to such fundamental values as morals and law, equity and freedom, differentiation between public and the private, solidarity and confidence, inclusion and human rights.

CONDITIONS OF TRUST

In the early part of the 20th century, the social theorist, Viacheslav Lypinsky, wrote about the intelligentsia’s role in nation building and in shaping the moral pivot of the Ukrainian nation. Lypinsky saw the intelligentsia’s natural role as exercising moral authority and mediating among social classes. He considered the intelligentsia of that time in both Western and Eastern Ukraine as a prototype of the European middle class. According to his view it stimulates the processes of self-government, the enlargement of human rights, and the creation and mobilization of civil society [1].

In contrast to the West – where the middle class has been the main support of democratic, horizontal ties of self-government– the intelligentsia in the Soviet Ukraine was shaped quite different by within a system of total obedience. While the Ukrainian underground intelligentsia was oriented to Europe and existed that way, in Donbass and Galicia it was destroyed by the colonial state. The resulting shock it made an imprint on the contemporary Ukrainian intelligentsia, as is evident in the essential alienation of intellectuals from the problems of culture, morals, education,
and spirituality, and their inability to hold independent opinions different from those in power.

In Galicia the state of affairs was a little bit better. But even here there was widespread subjugation. Many were obedient and oriented to the bureaucratic forms of social life and of servilism.

In all regions of Ukraine, the clientele type of power was created and the intelligentsia became the mechanical perpetrators of the nomenclatural version of the welfare state. Many were completely dependent on those in power and incapable of creating a foundation for social capital as a system of independent horizontal practice that would foster mutual trust in a broader society. During the total repressions of the 1940s-50s, the moral foundations of Ukrainian society, inherited from the national tradition, were destroyed by the Communist regime. Stalinist repressions and the total destruction of Ukrainian culture as a whole historically entailed the destruction of the moral basis of the Ukrainian nation. This repression also formed a system of mistrust and a hierarchical model of clientelism that distorted the social and moral dimensions of life.

Evidently moral decline in Ukraine is connected with the heritage of mistrust in the Soviet-Union and the Russian empire. The system of old Russia did little to cultivate trust and social capital in society, and the Soviet system brought this system of social mistrust to an unprecedented level. Today, this heritage of mistrust is the greatest impediment to a normal moral climate; and a serious obstacle to the development of civil society in the Ukraine. This can be studied on both the institutional and the interpersonal levels, both of which are interrelated in the Ukrainian reality, where institutional mistrust often generates interpersonal mistrust.

The authoritarian state has not been changed in its main structures, institutional dimensions, and political practices. The Soviet type of political culture exists in the Ukraine. Also, during the transformation period following Ukrainian independence, a weird symbiosis of the state with the criminal world was shaped. In the mid-1990s, the weak elements of an independent society were oppressed and marginalized; and a corporate model of the welfare state was formed.

**UKRAINIAN LEBENSWELT IN DANGER**

This moral crisis is becoming dire on account of the rising vector of neo-corporativism, which degrades the family and the legal institutions. Also degraded is the Lebenswelt constituted of culture, persons, and society. The result is a reduction of the public and private spheres of civil society and a reduction of civil, political, and social rights. In the Ukraine we can observe the shaping of a neo-corporativist state that is contributing to social exclusion, an anthropological and spiritual crisis and to an infringement of universal citizenship rights. At the root of the injustice and the lack of trust and solidarity are economic inequality and a continual exclusion of people from political, civil, and social membership in the
community. This neo-corporative state is based on feudal remnants that pose a serious obstacle to the full implementation of citizenship, and hinder the formation of close ties and organic solidarity. The corporate, group-based terms of the feudal political culture preclude the full institutionalization of a civil society in the Ukraine, and thereby preclude the autonomy of the subjects of the political process.

In this context, I would like to cite Habermas’ position where he makes good use of Kohlberg’s concept of moral consciousness. He draws attention to links between principles of universal ethics and systems of social relationship as a whole [2]. But the ideas of Habermas confront the real practice of post-communist societies, including the Ukraine. We can observe serious obstacles to transcendental communication which is based on authentic and democratic solidarity, and obstacles to the practice of partnership and mutual recognition. Instead of solidarity and mutual recognition, there are morally distorted forms of communication. These forms are determined by the dismantling of horizontal ties in civil society, by the primary of hierarchical forms of power and violence upon persons, and, by the prevalence of a corporative ethos over the common good, moral virtues and justice. This is a total annihilation of European forms of the private and the public, a transformation of the citizen into a subservient client of the state, and primitivization of the forms of publicity in the mass media: advertisements, which were presented in Marcuse’s works [3]. Reality of this sort leads to a restriction of the right of citizenship in the Ukrainian corporate state, and a leveling of the Lebenswelt.

In this country, none of the complex rights of citizenship is protected, and different forms of rights conflict with one another. The distinction between the organs of state rule and the representation of functional interests in society – as in Western democracies – is critical to the understanding of the difference between those polities and the post-Soviet countries. In the latter case, the historical legacy of a relatively un-modernized and corporate state never accepted the principle of individual autonomy and equality as the basis of the polity upon which the organization of corporate interest (and more centrally, the autonomy of the democratic state) rests.

In contrast to the 19th century when the prominent excluded group was the working class, now, in the 21st century, the problem of citizenship in the Ukraine is connected with moral, ethnic, economic, religious and gender problems. One can talk of the burning problems of inequality and injustice in society where relationships of submission became those of factor of alienation and non-freedom. The state became the embodiment of irresponsible private interests, incompatible with the public good. Unfortunately, the absence of civil society institutes inhibited the integration of various social groups into the political, civil, and social life. More than fifty years ago, one of the authors of the concept of citizenship, T. Marshall, characterized the interrelationships between political, civil, and social aspects of citizenship this way: “The civil element is composed of the
rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of persons, freedom of
speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid
contracts, and the right to justice... The political element comprises the
right to participate in the exercise of political power... And the social
element includes the right to a modicum of economic welfare and
security..." [4]

One may assert that in the Ukraine none of the above aspects is
realized in full. We have typical patron-client relationships, a hierarchical
system which leads to socio-cultural and political alienation. Ukrainian
clientelism clashes with Putnam’s treatment of this phenomenon. The latter
sees the source of a clientelist hierarchy in agrarian ties of obedience,
whereas in the Ukraine the hierarchical model of power was incorporated
from the eastern, highly industrialized region. This region never had
traditions of social and citizen inclusion, the Magdeburg law, civil
contracts, natural law, civil society, or the freedom of horizontal ties typical
of European tradition. This non-freedom and clientelism still dominates,
making any form of solidarity and social trust impossible. That is why we
can observe: 1) the invasion of the state into the private and intimate realm;
2) the transformation of state property into a corporate one; and 3) finally,
most important, mental alienation from any form of political participation,
with social indifference as a result of the domination of distorted forms of
pragmatism and immorality. In Ukrainian society, social exclusion is
particularly strong, manifesting itself in the lack of high quality medical
service, and education, as well as widespread poverty. To change the
situation, it is necessary to secure civil, political, and social rights. The
absence of any of these components makes the development of civil society
impossible.

PROSPECT FOR SOLIDARITY

The development of solidarity in Ukrainian society is possible, not
so much on the basis of a distorted form of liberalism concerned with
economic determinism, as through a unification of the traditional culture
and the principles of post-conventional ethics – that is, an ethics of
responsibility not only for one’s own fate but also for the destiny of the
whole of humankind. It is also important to combine private interests with
the public good, traditions of republicanism, communitarianism, and social
democracy.

Ukrainian society inherited the twin legacy of communism and
colonialism – which is not easy to overcome. Despite promising
declarations voiced by politicians, bureaucrats, and higher intellectuals
about an orientation towards Western values, such as freedom, democracy,
civil rights, and human dignity, it is evident that this society is far from
seriously progressing in the economic, social, political, and humanitarian
spheres. Post-Soviet Ukraine remains a typical neo-corporativist state with
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patron-client relationships which are based on shadow economy, servility, and a criminal (illegal) type of sociality.

Ukraine’s corporate state destroys the symbolic network of a Lebenswelt. Symbolic codes in Ukrainian cities play a dominant role in spiritual adaptations to the pragmatic world. But, in the present historical context of globalization, in Ukraine there is a clash between two traditions: increased symbolic traditions in different spheres of culture and politics on the one hand, and city life, as a whole, on the other. In cities, people are less likely to adhere to traditional symbolic codes. As a result, they live by the code of an ill-defined mass culture in the midst of social and cultural disintegration. Specifically, the more established symbols and rituals of public life and religion during periods of cultural and social changes seem to fail – or they lose their persuasive power. The diminishing participation in religious rituals in some churches reflects a disaffection with what is ritualized, failure of the ritual to persuade, or failure of the parent community to hold the people’s allegiance. Civil rituals connected with the tradition of Magdeburg decrease; those of Cossack self-government and corporative rituals also decline in importance. For example, many do not think it of great importance to vote in elections.

At the same time, in spite of the oppression by the corporate state, new kinds of ritual activity of a more open and fluid character are emerging in Ukrainian cities. Various forms of Pentecostalism arise in both western and eastern cities – the latter very seriously affected by clientelism. A symbolic code, with rituals playing a key part in the life of different social groups, is a complex of significant things, gestures, sounds, images and words that invite participation in the reality that is represented and expressed. In other words, the symbolic universe itself – or the symbolic code as it may be called – is quite complex. But it is not to be seen “in itself”, but rather as the language given to a speaking subject, inherited and transmitted across time. We are attentive to what is done through it by the subject. From this perspective, it becomes apparent that as the common language of any human grouping, symbolic codes are constantly changing, both in their functioning and in the intuitive meanings assigned to them.

Historically, the symbolic code of Ukrainian traditions represents the clash of discourses. On the one hand is the discourse of freedom, with the Christian narratives of tolerance and recognition, and horizontal civil ties; on the other hand is the, postcolonial tradition and soviet narratives which clash not only with the narratives of Slavonic Christian culture but also with Christian culture as a whole. The break of symbolic and historical ties in the modern city – in the age of globalization - degrades civil relationships, annihilates the institution of civil society and reinforces the clientele system in the Ukraine, for clientelism is incompatible with the space of freedom and solidarity[5].

The development of democracy and civil-society relationships take place not so much by a mass-consumption culture concerned with economic determinism, but by traditions of civil society, that is, by horizontal national
practices, and by positive symbolic narratives and symbols which reveal new possibilities of cultural interaction in an age of globalization which emphasizes communitarian traditions.

For Ukrainian society, it is very important to maintain, the balance between dimensions of a consumer civilization and those of a high culture with moral standards, and to ensure a differentiation between the private and public, between the normative and the factual. In the Ukraine in both the soviet period and the present, there is no moral pivot of practical life – a situation that is typical of a country with delayed modernization. That is why the Orange Revolution could not bring global changes in economic, political, and social spheres.

The Ukraine is marked by ethnic and regional solidarity based on corporative relationships rather than on horizontal ties that contribute to the formation of social capital (social trust). The corporationism in post-Soviet countries is different from that of the West. Especially when the Russian orthodox Church is concerned, corporationism is quite similar to the original corporate ideology originating from within the Russian Orthodox Church, with its claims to social hegemony. In the Ukraine, this represents not only a different interest, but a different metaphysical universe.

A civilized future in the Ukraine is feasible under the following conditions: a separation between the public and the private spheres; enhancement of human rights; and development of pragmatism based on moral foundations. These are what can contribute to the development of civil society in the Ukraine, by shaping a society of justice with high moral and legal standards.

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The goal of this article is to analyse the main lines of the political programme developed by the “Fighting Solidarity” organisation, centred on the three concepts given in the title, i.e. freedom, independence and solidarity. Since “Fighting Solidarity” is not prominently featured in books about Poland’s contemporary history, the first section of the article contains a brief description of the organisation’s history, while subsequent sections provide a description of the political thought developed by “Fighting Solidarity”. Section three contains an overview of the organisation’s attitude towards totalitarian communism; and section four, a synopsis of the idea of a “Solidary Republic”, which is in the political programme promoted by the organisation. The final section features a description of expectations of “Fighting Solidarity” members concerning the fall of communism and the consequential critical attitude of the negotiations conducted by representatives of “Solidarity” and the political opposition at the Round Table. Finally, the summary presents a concise evaluation of the organisation’s political thought.

“FIGHTING SOLIDARITY” – A HISTORICAL OUTLINE

“Fighting Solidarity” was established by Kornel Morawiecki in Wrocław in June 1982. The organisation was set up in response to growing disagreement between Władysław Frasyniuk and Kornel Morawiecki. The two activists were at variance as they promoted different methods of struggle with the communist system. In general, Frasyniuk claimed that social resistance should be a tool employed to force the authorities of the day to conclude another agreement with the society. Morawiecki contended that it should be a tool to oust the communists from power. When, in 1982 the communist party and government authorities turned down moderate

theses formulated by the Primate’s Social Council, more radical underground activists were spurred to seek more dynamic forms of fighting the system, such as street demonstrations, broadcasts of the independent radio “S”, spectacular leaflet campaigns and the like. Those who favoured more active methods of struggle with the communist power grew increasingly estranged with the passive attitude adopted by the management of the Regional Strike Committee of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity of the Lower Silesia Region, and they embarked on setting up their own organisation (Myc, 1998, p. 19-20).

In their programme, the circle of “Fighting Solidarity” activists described their position as follows: “We regard ourselves as continuators of the radical current within the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity” – a current that was marked at the First National Convention in the “Message to the working people of Eastern Europe” (Ideology and Programme Principles of “Fighting Solidarity”, p. 4). Kornel Morawiecki, the founder and leader of Fighting Solidarity, embarked on his opposition activities in 1968 by participating in student strikes and rallies held in Wroclaw. In August 1968, he copied opposition leaflets in a protest against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In June 1979, Morawiecki joined the Social Self-Government Club, a Lower Silesia splinter of the Committee for Social Self-Defence (KSS KOR). In January 1980, together with Romuald Lazarowicz, Jan Waszkiewicz and Michal Wodziński, Morawiecki started publishing the “Lower Silesia Bulletin”. Morawiecki was a delegate to the First National Convention of Delegates of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union, Solidarity. At the second round of the Convention, Morawiecki called upon Trade Union authorities to prepare a set of instructions in case martial law was declared and foreign invasion was imminent. After the publication of the “Appeal to Soviet Soldiers Stationed in Poland” and “Message of Free Trade Unions in Moscow to Solidarity” in the “Lower Silesia Bulletin”, Morawiecki was arrested in September 1981. Under pressure from “Solidarity” and following surety granted by the highest authorities of Wroclaw University of Technology, Morawiecki was released after 48 hours. Formal proceedings were carried out against Morawiecki in November and December 1981, but they were discontinued after the imposition of the martial law.

After 13 December 1981, Morawiecki was one of the members of the underground Regional Executive Committee of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity, where he edited and printed the Union’s newsletter called “Z dnia na dzień” (“Day to Day”). Alienated by the passive attitude of the regional management of the Trade Union, Morawiecki resigned from the function he had in the regional structures of the Union and set up his own organisation at the beginning of June 1982. The initial name of the new group was “Fighting Solidarity” Alliance, however it was soon (November 1982) transformed into “Fighting Solidarity” Organisation which declared itself as a social and political
association which, at the same time, allowed its members to belong to other political factions and social organisations.

The basic unit of “Fighting Solidarity” was one group, while several groups functioned in a given area formed as Branch. The first management body of the organisation was the Council of the “Fighting Solidarity” Alliance, made up of a dozen members or so, appointed in August 1982. On 11 November 1982, the Council was transformed into the Fighting Solidarity Council, headed by a chairman elected by Council members. The first chairmanship was given to Kornel Morawiecki, the founder of “Fighting Solidarity”. Similar councils were also set up outside Wrocław, in such major centres of the organisation as Katowice, Lublin, Poznań and Gdańsk: however their scope of competence and authority was never established precisely. Since the Council failed to function efficiently, another body was established on 11 November 1985, called the Executive Committee. Members of the Committee included a number of close associates of Kornel Morawiecki, designated by the Council. In addition to sessions of the Council and the Executive Committee, there were also “city gatherings” of representatives of the largest centres of the organisation, held from 1983 onwards.

Gradually, branches of “Fighting Solidarity” were also created in other Polish cities. In 1987, they functioned in Gdańsk, Jelenia Gora, Katowice, Cracow, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Rzeszow, Szczecin, Torun, Warsaw and Wrocław. Furthermore, “Fighting Solidarity” groups were active in several dozen other Polish towns. According to the 1987 census of the organisation, “Fighting Solidarity” published 20 different magazines and had two printing houses. In Wrocław, for example, the organisation published the “Fighting Solidarity” bi-weekly and “Lower Silesia Bulletin” monthly. Publishing flourished also at a number of regional branches of the organisation. For instance, the Cracow branch published the “Free and Solidary” and “Katowice Underground Brochure”, the Gdańsk centre brought out the “Fighting Solidarity – Gdańsk Branch” newsletter, Poznań – the “Fighting Solidarity” bi-weekly and “Time”, and Rzeszów “Galicia”. According to Mateusz Morawiecki’s estimates, “Fighting Solidarity” in 1984-86 had approximately 1.500 members, although another two for three thousand people supported the organisation at various times, with varying degrees of commitment and sense of identification with the organisation’s programme. The same author asserts that actions initiated by the organisation in Wrocław itself were supported by a group of 400-600 people. Besides Wrocław, major “Fighting Solidarity” centres included Katowice, Poznań and Trojmiasto.

On 7 November 1987, the Secret Police arrested Kornel Morawiecki together with Hanna-Łukowska-Karniej. The position of the organisation’s chairman was then taken up by Andrzej Kołodziej who,

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however, was also apprehended by the Secret Police, 21 January 1988. Poland’s authorities, in an attempt to avoid conducting sham legal proceedings and drumhead trials, tricked both “Fighting Solidarity” leaders (including Kołodziej, who was supposedly ill with cancer) into leaving the country. When it turned out that Kołodziej’s diagnosis of disease was false, Morawiecki returned to Poland, on 4 May 1988. However, at the Okecie airport in Warsaw he was put on a plane by force and sent away to Vienna. In July/August, Morawiecki went to the United States, only to come back to Poland illegally at the end of August 1988.

The developments that occurred in Poland in the first half of 1989 caused a radical change in the formula of the organisation’s actions. In July 1989, Morawiecki appointed public representatives of “Fighting Solidarity”. The group included Marek Czachor (Trójmiasto), Maciej Frankiewicz (Poznań), Antoni Kopaczewski (Rzeszów), Wojciech Myślecki (Wrocław). The autumn of 1989 saw the establishment of the legally functioning “Free and Solidary” Political Club in Wrocław. Later, at the end of 1989 and in early 1990, similar clubs were founded in other cities, such as Gorzów Wielkopolski, Kalisz, Cracow, Łódź, Poznań, Rzeszów and Szczecin. By forging local electoral alliances and coalitions, or by acting on their own, the clubs participated in local government elections. In the first half of 1990, in the wake of internal debates and the changing social and political situation in the country, Morawiecki decided to come out and set up a publicly operating organisation based on the existing “Fighting Solidarity” political clubs and branches. The Founding Convention of the new Freedom Party was held on 7 July 1990. The party’s statutes and programme were officially adopted and Kornel Morawiecki was proposed as a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections. The propaganda effect of Morawiecki’s disclosure was markedly weakened by the so-called “war at the top” which escalated at the end of June and at the beginning of July. Lech Wałęsa, who ran for the presidency under the banner of “acceleration”, took over many of Morawiecki’s potential supporters who were in favour of more radical political transformations. Ultimately, Morawiecki’s candidacy was not registered by the State Election Commission on account of the inadequate number of votes supporting him as a presidential candidate.

This false start in the presidential elections, however, did not arrest the development of party structures. In 1991, the party started to publish a newspaper called “Days” in Wrocław. The paper was published three times a week. The Freedom Party ran independently in the first free parliamentary elections in 1991, registering its candidates in 24 constituencies. The party won 78,000 votes (0.7 percent), and won the majority in Wrocław – 9,500 votes (2.6 percent). In June 1992, the Freedom Party backed the vetting initiative proposed by the government of Jan Olszewski, staging nationwide demonstrations supporting the overthrown government and campaigning for the completion of the vetting process. Since the Freedom Party was not represented in the Parliament, it set out to seek allies for future elections.
The Second Convention of the Freedom Party, held in Wroclaw in 1992, granted the party’s management the authority to enter into talks with the Coalition for the Republic, a political party founded by Jan Olszewski. In the parliamentary elections of 1993, Freedom Party candidates were registered together with the Coalition for the Republic candidates. However, the alliance did not bring them success in the elections. In March 1995, at the Third Convention of the Freedom Party, Kornel Morawiecki announced dissolution of “Fighting Solidarity”. At the same time, the Freedom Party changed its name into the Freedom Party – Fighting Solidarity. In the presidential elections of 1995, Morawiecki, not without some doubt, supported Jan Olszewski. After the elections, the Freedom Party – the “Fighting Solidarity” was collectively (and its members – individually)- incorporated into the emerging Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, which marked the end of independent political activity of the Freedom Party, that is, the “Fighting Solidarity”.

IN THE FACE OF TOTALITARIAN COMMUNISM

The first enunciation of the programme of “Fighting Solidarity” was the policy paper Kim jesteśmy? O co walczymy? [What are we? What are we fighting for?] published in September 1982. The ideological message presented in the paper was further developed in Manifest Solidarności [Solidarity Manifesto] published in December 1982. The main theses of the organisation’s programme were also expounded in Zasady ideowe [Ideology principles] and Program Solidarności Walczącej [“Fighting Solidarity” Programme] published in June 1987. The author of all these documents explaining the policy of “Fighting Solidarity” was Kornel Morawiecki. The programme of the organisation, drawn up in 1987, contained several sections, including the Declaration which spelled out the principal ideological message proposed by the “Fighting Solidarity”, six chapters and the Summary. The chapters had the titles: “Our assessment of the current situation”, “Our vision”, “Organisation”, “Current policy” and “Prospects”. The extensive document would provide a foundation for outlining the political thought promoted by the “Fighting Solidarity”.

The organisation outspokenly opposed totalitarian communism – other terms, it used interchangeably with “communism” in the Programme include “socialism” and “real socialism”. It defined communism in the following fashion:

Communism is an unjust and undemocratic system in which power is held by a limited group of the privileged, and collective opposition is suppressed by the police and the military. It is a system of wielding and centralising power for power’s sake. Bureaucratic pressure restrains all activity and squanders social energy. Extensive areas of public life are subjected to the dictates of one secluded
One of the main theses of the political platform was that communism failed to respect basic human rights and freedoms. This thesis gave rise to passive social attitudes that eventually led to economic collapse. An argument supporting this claim of this inability of the was the comparison of the living standard of the people in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and that in the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD); those in North and in South Korea. For Polish society, Italy and Spain were invoked as examples which aptly illustrated the claimed discrepancies in development. Before WWII, Spain, Italy and Poland were on the same level of economic progress; in the post-war period, the gap between Poland and Spain/Italy grew dramatically.

Another threat posed by communism was the risk of uncontrolled nuclear bomb explosion, because weapons of mass destruction were in the hands of top communist party officials who were totally beyond the control of the society at large. Claims were made that:

Only if communism were transformed into a democratic political system, would the spectre of mass extermination disappear and make genuine disarmament possible to accomplish. Democracies do not pose a military threat either to one another or to other states. In turn, countries dominated by right-wing dictatorships do not have nuclear warheads and transform into democracies much more easily (Ideology and Programme Principles of “Fighting Solidarity”, pp. 10-11).

In their platform, “Fighting Solidarity” activists also abolished the myth of communism as a progressive and humanitarian political system. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia coincided with modernisation processes and the social rise of previously deprived social classes. These objectively occurring social processes were typically presented by the communist ideology as their own successes resulting from the transformation of the political system. Western intellectual circles were tricked by this ideological rhetoric, further substantiated by the participation of the Soviet Union in WWII and Soviet achievements in the early stage of the industrialisation process. However, in the face of the coming information-based civilisation, communism – which had “the monopoly [of] political power, means of production and the mass media” (ibidem, p. 11) – grew increasingly anachronistic, hampering further social development and progress of civilisation. Only a social system which can guarantee freedom of thought and initiatives, and endorse the pursuit of
truth and the good, is able to face emerging challenges and adapt to the progress brought about by civilisation. In this competition, communism was doomed to failure. The question remains, however, what kind of political system should replace it:

Residents of the so-called socialist camp feel that communism represents social evil, however they do not know what should substitute for it and how this should be accomplished. In Western democracies they admire general welfare, though they crave something more than just the pursuit of money. They feel antagonised by selfishness and [an] absence of deeper ideas prevalent in these societies – a feeling that is partially true but also to some extent, exaggerated by the communist propaganda. Not only do Western societies lead more affluent and honest lives, but they also lead a life of free people. And communism must be superseded with a system in which people will be free and solidary (ibidem, p. 11).

An alternative to communism and capitalism was expressed by the idea of the “Solidary Republic”.

**BETWEEN COLLECTIVIST COMMUNISM AND INDIVIDUALIST CAPITALISM: THE IDEA OF A “SOLIDARY REPUBLIC”**

The ideas of social solidarism were developed by Kornel Morawiecki some time before martial law was declared and before Morawiecki founded the “Fighting Solidarity”. The term “Solidary Republic” first appeared in the announcement communicating the establishment of Fighting Solidarity, published in the Fighting Solidarity periodical on 1 August 1982. The original version of the solidarist system was presented in the Solidarity Manifesto issued in December 1982. The document provoked widespread debates in the underground press, and its author was often condemned for lack of political realism, for utopian ideas and a messianic attitude. Furthermore, Morawiecki faced a barrage of criticism for his proposal to “eliminate large ownership” which, incidentally, disappeared from subsequent versions of the organisation’s programme. In its most mature form, the idea of social solidarism was expressed in Ideology. Principles and Fighting Solidarity Programme.

The idea of social solidarism was already manifest in the organisation’s motto, “Free and Solidary”. Members of the organisation were required to swear an oath in which they undertook to fight for a “free and independent Solidary Republic” and “solidarity between people and

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3 The debate is recounted in the chapter “Assumptions of the Programme of “Fighting Solidarity” in M. Morawiecki’s work.
nations”. Solidarism, claimed in the axiological assumptions of the Programme was to be developed in three dimensions: political, economic and international.

The paragraph, “Man and the Society” of the chapter “Our Values” gives an outline of how people depend on their social surroundings:

People create communities, build civilisations and, at the same time, are moulded by them. Human beings are born as children of God, their family and homeland, as residents of a specific region and citizens of their state. People’s personalities grow mature in a tight relationship with the surrounding environment which they gradually shape by entering into various groups and relations. This is precisely how people as members of the community discover and explore truth and beauty, accept and do justice and good (ibidem, p. 6).

In line with the Programme, each individual belonged to a number of communities at the same time:

We all live united and, at the same time, divided into different cultures, religions, races and nations, social strata and classes, states and blocs. These and other communities, both wider and narrower, delineated by clear or blurred boundaries, carry, convey and exchange values and ideas. However, in the long run, only those communities whose members are prepared to take actions and suffer sacrifices for the common good are able to thrive and advance their values (ibidem, p. 6).

In a wide range of human communities, the Programme attached particular importance to the national community: “Nations are extremely significant human communities. Nations pass on to their citizens and to humanity at large treasures of tradition, culture and language scrupulously accumulated by successive generations. All nations have a right to independence” (ibidem, p. 6).

As far as values were concerned, freedom and solidarity received particular mention in the Programme as basic values: “We can and we should be free and solidary. The centuries-long human desire for a better life for oneself and one’s [closest] and dearest [ones] requires concern for others and for communities, which have contributed to shaping each and every individual. The destiny of an individual is always inextricably linked to the fate of the nation and civilisation, to the preceding and following generations” (ibidem, p. 6). Other fundamental values included the right to live, freedom of religion and beliefs, the right to unrestrained work,
production initiatives and creativity, tolerance and respect for diversity, democracy, and the principle of participation in public life and peace.

In terms of political system, the Programme clearly favoured parliamentary democracy and division of authority into judicial, executive and legislative sections. However, certain deficiencies of parliamentary democracy based on political parties were also pointed out indirectly. It was argued that system, which give rise to a vertical relation (democratic) authority over the citizen ultimately lead to the alienation of the state, even if the latter is legal and democratic. In order to avoid this alienation, a fourth branch of authority was proposed – one that would represent self-government on levels of the region, trade union and labour. The fourth authority would take over certain functions of the state machinery, act as counterweight, articulate the needs of its members, represent their interests in disputes with the administration and mediate in conflicts between regions and professional groups. Compromise-seeking would be based on the principle of solidarity and common good. Self-governing authority would protect citizens against potential dictates by the party coming to power after victory in elections and would enhance citizen participation in public life. An institutional culmination of self-government would be a “self-governing parliamentary chamber” or a “self-governing Senate”. In the opinion of the author of the Programme, the proposed “democracy enrichment” was in line with general trends marking the progress of civilisation, including educational improvement, a sense of being a social subject and of independence.

In the social and economic spheres, the author of the Programme endeavoured to combine the principles of market economy with the ideal of social solidarity. In the chapter Our Values, the free market was described as the most economically viable alternative. Well-known arguments were invoked at this point, claiming that the realisation of individual interests had to be associated – via free market exchange – with the fulfillment of the needs of other social groups. At the same time, however, the Programme pointed to the fact that free market invariably results in material stratification and the emergence of dramatic differences in material status between the rich and the poor. As Morawiecki asserted, “It tears apart social relationships and frequently leads to a subjective feeling of injustice or to a state of resignation or defiance in the poorer social strata” (ibidem, p. 7). Consequently, the free market economy had to be enhanced by a system of progressive taxes and social expenditures incurred by the state. These measures, however, should be employed with great caution, for the redress of inequalities inevitably strains free market mechanisms, which typically reward hard work, resourcefulness and perseverance. This is the reason why democratic rule provides the best setting for the free market system. The idea is expounded in detail in the chapter entitled Our Vision. The proposed market economy system incorporated the idea of equal status among diverse forms of ownership: private property, co-operative property, local government property, share property, social property and state ownership,
as well as among various forms of management. At the same time, however, the Programme was opposed to maintaining any monopoly in any form of organisation of production, stating that “there are no universal solutions that would define optimum proportions of any given form of ownership, tax policy or management methods (ibidem, p. 12). The Programme also accounted for the then unknown problem of unemployment by dividing people into three categories: those who want to work, those who want to work but for various reasons, e.g. ill health or disability decline of a given profession or being defeated in the recruitment process are incapable of working, and finally those who do not work because they do not want to. The fundamental rule of social solidarity requires that people representing the second group be provided with daily maintenance and assistance in retraining and finding a job.

A problem arose in the process of defining a social policy that would accommodate a marginal, as it was assumed, group of people who “do not want to study or retrain, who do not want to work” (ibidem, p. 13). All in all, it was recognised that it might be difficult to tell “unemployment resulting from maladjustment, incapacity or mental breakdown from laziness and reluctance to work in general” (ibidem, p. 13). The Programme of “Fighting Solidarity” assumed that since the existence of each and every individual carries an independent value for the society as a whole, each individual should be provided with subsistence allowances as a practical sign of solidarity of the general public with the individual. Although the Programme took notice of the fact that:

such a solution violates the economic laws of the market [...] but the contemporary flexible labour and capital markets, as well as goods and services markets, are sources of such enormous material development that people will not become poor if they support the life of every individual in this way (ibidem, p. 13).

The systemic proposals thus outlined were to form a basis for a new political and social system referred to as “solidarism”. The Programme purposely refrained from spelling out precisely what institutions would implement the main assumptions of solidarism, since:

A general principle of solidarity of free citizens will be more important than these. The idea of solidarity is a transplantation of the Christian commandment to love your neighbour into mutual relationships connecting different social groups, as well as individuals and the community. It is this very idea that we want to use as a foundation for our “Solidary Republic” (ibidem, p. 13).
According to the Programme, the principle of solidarism should also be accommodated in the field of international relations. Manifestations of international solidarity include a sense of natural compassion and aid provided to regions afflicted by famine or natural disasters. This, however, is much too little. The existing United Nations organisation fails adequately to address all issues in its scope, for the majority of the UN member states are not ruled democratically. The UN, it was claimed, should be substituted with the Organisation of Free Democratic Nations. The body would support “resistance movements for independence” in subjugated non-democratic countries by providing humanitarian and material aid, IT [information technology] assistance and – in extreme cases – also military help. The Programme of “Fighting Solidarity” also contained declarations of abandonment of any territorial claims against Poland’s neighbouring countries: Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Such claims, it was asserted, should also be renounced by all nations remaining under direct or indirect authority of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which, after winning independence, should preserve their current boundaries, since otherwise “disputes of secondary importance would obscure the overriding goals of independence and liberation from communism” (ibidem, p. 14).

**DOWNFALL OF COMMUNISM: EXPECTATIONS AND REALISATIONS**

As he set out to found “Fighting Solidarity”, Kornel Morawiecki clearly and unambiguously stated his intention to oust the communists from power: “Appreciating the role of compromise in the accomplishment of political goals, we reject the possibility of any agreements with the communists, for they disregard and violate any arrangements that would restrict their power whenever they have an opportunity. We want to remove these authorities from power and establish a democratic government” (ibidem, p. 16).

In his political platform, Morawiecki distinguished three main stages of abolishing communism. Stage A was to force the authorities to adopt reforms in order to enable a more effective struggle with the social and economic crises. This stage ought to witness a restriction on the state repressive involvement in political activity and an abolition of the state’s information monopoly. In the field of economy, Morawiecki forecast a slowdown in the development of the military industry and a decrease in the scope of state ownership accompanied by an increased scope of authority and responsibility of workers’ self-governments, recognition of peasant ownership and abolition of the state monopoly in the trade sector.

Stage B, Morawiecki contended, should see growing participation of independent social forces in ruling the country. This stage should also feature subjectification processes within the society, including the restoration of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union, “Solidarity”,...
and other trade unions that were outlawed during martial law. Society should also be granted the right of association and the right to create worker self-government structures above the factory level. In addition, this stage should accomplish the removal of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) from workplaces, complete emancipation of enterprises, debureaucratisation of the national economy and privatisation of State Agricultural Enterprises (the so-called PGR farms). It is also in this phase that democratic elections for local governments should be held.

Stage C should be marked by a pursuit of political pluralism in Poland and by the regaining of full independence. New political parties and factions should be founded. Free and democratic elections should be staged. As for international relations, authorities selected in democratic elections should campaign for the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Poland and verify trade and business contracts concluded by Poland with adjacent countries. While recognising that his forecasts were merely hypothetical estimates, Morawiecki prepared a schedule of transformations: “The division into consecutive stages listed above should serve as a means of imposing order. We will be glad if reality surpasses our expectations. Generally, we expect stages A and B to be completed in the first half of the 1990s and stage C by the end of the century” (ibidem, p. 18).

In addition to the option recounted above, measures were also taken to prepare for the revolution-based course of events by working out a concept of active strikes in the production area. In the case of worker crises, a special Workers Council on strikes should be appointed to take over control of this area. The management and administration of an enterprise would report to the Workers Council. Those who refused would be removed from the company together with Polish United Workers’ Party and Secret Police units. Each enterprise and plant would have its own industry guard and workers’ militia. Also, the establishment of councils to deal with inter-factory strikes was postulated. The bodies should pave the way for self-governing worker authorities and supervise production and procurement in their areas.

The negotiated fall of communism which was realised in social reality did not, however, correspond to the predictions made by “Fighting Solidarity” (neither in the evolutionary, nor – even less so – in the revolutionary variant). Criticism of the compromise reached during the Round Table negotiations, “contract-based” elections and the policy of “thick stroke” followed by the government headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki become fully understandable if one notes what the top activists of “Fighting Solidarity” thought of Gorbachev’s perestroika and transformations taking place in Eastern Europe, for the Round Table compromise was just a local variant of a larger-scale trend. In this area, the position of both the top Fighting Solidarity officials and the grassroots corresponded closely to the ideas of A. Besancon whose articles and statements were often reprinted in the Fighting Solidarity periodicals. The French sovietologist compared Gorbachev’s perestroika with the Russian NEP (New Economic Policy).
Perestroika, Besançon argued, came down to temporary and superficial concessions made by communists, to which they agreed only because they had to overcome temporary difficulties and intended to return to the offensive. After perestroika, Besançon maintained, the communist power was to grow even stronger, and repressions against the society even harsher. Holding these beliefs, Morawiecki and the Fighting Solidarity structures remained in the underground because of the anticipated policy turn initiated by the authorities. However, the Autumn of Nations of 1989 and the events occurring in early 1990 proved Besançon’s predictions wrong.

Besançon’s ideas were critically developed by Alfred B. Gruba, a “Fighting Solidarity” activist and publicist. Gruba asserted that perestroika was not merely a tactical compromise but precisely what it claimed to be, i.e. a radical reconstruction of the system. The aim of this was to eradicate the party structure and conduct reprivatisation that would leave the key sectors of the country’s economy in the hands of the nomenklatura. Such selective transformation into a market-oriented economy would then foster the emergence of a class of owners related by their social environment and biographies with the circle of political rulers and the development of state-independent middle class. Thanks to this strategy, the political system would be stable and based on the loyalty of new owners (Gruba, 1990, p. 14-16; 1991, p. 1-4).

It is not surprising, therefore, that the evolution-based transition from communism to democracy, effected in the period 1988-1991 by constructive opposition, faced a barrage of criticism from “Fighting Solidarity”. Kornel Morawiecki condemned the very idea of talks between the communist state and the society, which he regarded as utterly anachronistic. One distinct feature of democratic systems, Morawiecki claimed, is that political authorities are elected by members of the society and thus the communist state could not act as a party to any negotiations. In Morawiecki’s view, reforms carried out by the Polish United Workers’ Party were only superficial and their only goal was to neutralise political opposition. In addition, involvement in a morally dubious agreement with the communists dissipated social energy and time. Before the commencement of the Round Table negotiations, Morawiecki wrote:

Evolution of the system – agreed – but an evolution gradually eradicating the system, not sanctioning and preserving it. The evolution must, therefore, be quick enough for liberation and growth of social subjectivity to precede the inherent degradation and sovietisation of communism. It is inappropriate to delude anyone with a purely evolutionary perspective. Agitation of masses is inevitable. Communism will not recede just like that, on its own. Upheaval will occur regardless of whether the system will close up or open up. In the former case, it will take the form of

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4 Józef Darski and Jerzy Przystawa, popular “Fighting Solidarity” publicists, wrote in the same spirit.
suppressed despair, in the latter – outbursts of aroused hope [Morawiecki, 1989, p. 1].

After the start of negotiations, the role of “Fighting Solidarity”, in Morawiecki’s view, was to “raise the bar” of demands:

Although we do not directly participate in this round of the game, we care a lot about the outcome, about winning full and legitimate “Solidarity”. With our whole hearts and minds, we vigorously support the social team. With our organised presence alone we will provide Walesa with trump cards, we will pull up the stake. However, our duty is also to look at the cards held by our players, assess their bids and leads [ibidem, p. 2].

Criticism emerged in response to the methods of the negotiations held between “Solidarity” and the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) – and also to the details of their political deal. Aspects that were criticised included: the permission to legalise Solidarity again; amendments to the statute which deprived the Union of the right to strike. Instead, demands were raised to relegalise Solidarity (the same formula was used in the case of the Independent Students’ Association, NZS). There were calls to boycott contractual elections. Change of the electoral law effected between the first and the second round of elections and Walesa’s support for the national list were publicly condemned. “Fighting Solidarity” staged country-wide demonstrations against the election of Wojciech Jaruzelski to the office of President of the Polish People’s Republic. When Mazowiecki accepted the post of the Prime Minister, criticism was levelled at the participation of communist ministers in his government and the fabian tactics employed by the “Solidarity-based” government.

In the period 1989-1991, Fighting Solidarity campaigned for the acceleration of political changes in Poland. The establishment of the Freedom Party on 7 July 1990 was accompanied by a formulation of a party platform which came down essentially to the problem of how to abolish, as soon as possible, the political arrangement which resulted from the Round Table talks. The party demanded the immediate resignation of Mazowiecki’s administration and the establishment of a temporary government based on an agreement among all forces on the Polish political scene, except for communists and their followers. The next task of the temporary government would be to lead to Jaruzelski’s deposition and self-dissolution of the Seym and Senate. The Freedom Party did not claim that the contract-based Parliament was entirely socially unrepresentative, for its “Solidarity-associated” section was to be incorporated in the National Assembly which would then prepare new electoral regulations to be able to hold fully free parliamentary and presidential elections in 1990. Until the elections, the function of the temporary Head of State would be held by Ryszard Kaczorowski, the official President of the Republic of Poland in
exile. In the same period, the temporary government would give up Balcerowicz’s Plan, adopt complete vetting and decommunisation, publicly disclose the Secret Police files, subordinate the military and the police, withdraw Poland from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact, recognise the independence of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, as well as other former USSR Republics eager to achieve sovereignty and, finally, inform Western creditors that it did not feel responsible for any debts incurred by the communist government before 1989.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the political sphere, the party platform outlined in this paper was an example of radical anticommunist thought, while in business it was a result of searching for “the third way” between capitalism and socialism. Let me discuss the former first.

It was history’s major paradox that the visionary political postulates put forward by Morawiecki, not the cool-headed calculations offered by realists, were put into practice. However, they were in fact realised by those who initially accused Morawiecki of cherishing utopian ideas and political day-dreaming. At present, no one questions the justifiability of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland or Poland’s withdrawal from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), free elections or the right of the former Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union to the status of independent states. If these proposals had not been implemented, Poland would not now be an EU Member State or a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Morawiecki’s critique of the great compromise between the communists and the constructive opposition may be described as somewhat naive and idealistic, ignoring the genuine interests of parties participating in the compromise (including the Solidarity-based and the opposition-based camps), it should be noted that Morawiecki’s vision had a solid rational core. He repeatedly stressed that the society was largely devoid of enthusiasm, apathetic and passive, which is why even the best reforms, planned entirely in good faith, would be impossible to implement (Morawiecki 1990, p. 3). The main reason was – so Morawiecki maintained – the dilly-dally policy of small steps adopted by top “Solidarity” activists and later by Mazowiecki’s government. This is precisely why there was no clear breakthrough date (comparable to 11 November 1918) that is associated with the birth of the new Third Republic of Poland. The coalescence of political changes featured in the political platform of the Freedom Party was to compensate for the lack of breakthrough, giving Poles the feeling of freedom and

5 Attention was drawn to this aspect by A. Łaszcz, another “Fighting Solidarity” publicist (1980).
unleashing much needed social passion. As Zdzisław Krasnodębski noted many years later:

No foundation myth [...] of the renewed Republic, the Third Republic of Poland, was created. The Round Table was definitely unbefitting as a myth. Due to the fact that the value- and emotion-laden conflict ended neither in a revolutionary outbreak nor in outright victory which could bring about emotional catharsis, but was founded on a rational and calculated compromise, there was no place and, it also appeared, no need for symbols and emotions (Krasnodębski, 2003, p. 89).

Problems with establishing the foundation myth of the Third Republic are also noted by Jakub Karpiński: “Attempts were made to turn Round Table negotiations into such a foundation myth, asserting that general Kiszczak was a co-author of Poland’s independence, while the road to independence was mapped in the Ministry of Internal Affairs villa in Magdalenka” (Karpiński, 2001, p. 310). The mythical potential of the Round Table, however, turned out to be rather limited. Note that the participants in the negotiations representing the coalition-government’s negotiating party made a major contribution to the popular demythification of the Round Table legend when, on the tenth anniversary of the compromise, they published previously unreleased photographs and footage showing that the talks were held in Magdalenka in a very festive and social atmosphere.

The situation is slightly different with the evaluation of proposals for a political system based on social solidarism which stemmed from the programme platform developed during the Solidarity revolution. In comparison with the “Self-Governing Republic” platform adopted at the First National Convention of Delegates of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity”, the “Solidarity Republic” blueprint feature, a range of essential new aspects, such as approval of a free-market economy and private property. Consequently, social solidarism was:

[A]n adaptation of democratic capitalism which takes into account the experiences and failures of decades of communism and the social situation shaped in the course of all these years. Shortage of solidarity in classic capitalism is a flaw that communism demagogically brings up and presents as an example of its supposed “systemic superiority”. Solidarism, in our interpretation, accents the importance of solidarity on the level of principles and institutions, while being essentially a variation of capitalism, though one heading in a good direction, towards consolidation of interpersonal bonds, at the same
time without absolutising the state; it claims superiority of sharing over consumption but does not lead to any homogenisation, depreciation of aspirations or needs (Ideology and Programme Principles of “Fighting Solidarity”, pp. 13-14).

Evaluations of the platform are thus closely related to the global assessment of “Solidarity” as a movement. Andrzej Walicki, in his critique of the political foundations of the Polish opposition made a distinction between liberalisation and democratisation of the system. Liberalisation consists of limiting the scope of the ruling authority (e.g. by lack of central regulation of the economy); while democratisation meant participation in power. The basic political error committed by the Polish opposition was, therefore, to ignore the liberalisation of the political system which was manifest – e.g. in the recognition of private ownership in the nation’s economy – and the demand for democratisation of the system. Meanwhile, Walicki argues, dictatorial authority would be more eager to accept a certain limitation of the scope of its power (e.g. by the sphere of the economy) than to offer the society a share in its ruling power. The same mistake, Walicki maintains, was made by “Solidarity” which called for the democratisation of real socialism, not liberalisation. In Walicki’s words:

The idea of solidarity was conceived of as a collective guarantee that no worker will lose [his] usual living standard and no social group will grow rich at the expense of other groups in the process of reforms. It is, indeed, [an] imagined normal free-market competition in such circumstances. In theory, the Union was in favour of the separation between politics and economy; however, in practical terms the Union’s programme called for replacement of the state’s control of the economy with the Union’s control. The Union perceived freedom not only as autonomy, but also – and above all – as unhindered participation. At the same time, it was considered obvious that all spheres of social life, economy included, can be regulated by conscious and democratic decisions. The Union’s platform was thus a programme of maximum democratisation of control of the economy, not a programme assuming a limitation of this control by exposing workers to anonymous and ruthless laws of the market (Walicki, 2000, p. 26-27).

From the liberal point of view advanced by Walicki, social and economic aspects of the political platform of “Fighting Solidarity” can be analysed as another variant of democratisation (or societalisation) of the economy centred on workers’ self-governments instead of trade unions. As
such, the “Fighting Solidarity” programme can be seen as a continuation, in the purest form, of utopian and impracticable elements of the “Solidarity” revolution. The best choice would have been to abandon it outright.

Krasnodębski analyses “Solidarity” from a slightly different perspective. In his view, the practice of the Solidarity trade union was a Polish variant of republicanism combined with the idea of participatory democracy. Republicanism, Krasnodębski argues, is rooted in exactly the same values as liberalism, e.g. liberty of individual citizens. However, the guarantee of liberty is different in the two systems (Krasnodębski 2003, p. 280-285). “In the republican tradition – Krasnodębski notes – liberty is not to be equated with negative freedom, understood as an absence of external interference, but rather independence of foreign authority which enslaves even if it does not interfere with the liberty sphere of the subordinate” (ibidem, p. 281). The freedom of an individual can be guaranteed only by the freedom of all citizens which, in turn, is determined by the independence of the nation to which a given individual belongs. Consequently, the state is not regarded as a structure which poses a threat to individual civic liberties or as a neutralistic framework which makes it possible to accomplish selfish individual preferences, but rather, it is treated as the common good, res publica, “the public thing” of all citizens.

Participatory democracy, advanced by the so-called New Left movement, is considered as an important complement of the model of liberal democracy, capable of overcoming its inherent weaknesses: the alienation of elites, growth of the bureaucracy and the withdrawal of citizens from public life (Krasnodębski 2003, p. 74-76). Freedom in the period 1980-81 was understood as an ability for self-government, independence of arbitrary communist power and joint actions undertaken to achieve collective goals. In this sense, solidarity was a synthesis of the right-wing thought (republicanism) and left-wing thought (participatory democracy). As Krasnodębski summarises:

Solidarity […] was […] a liberation-oriented republican movement with a range of unique features. It shared one central thing with liberalism, namely the idea of freedom of [the] individual […]. however it understood that freedom differently, knowing that one cannot be free as an individual as long as Poles as citizens will be dependent on the communist authority (Krasnodębski 2003, p. 293).

Considering the above, the political platform of “Fighting Solidarity” can be viewed as a specific Sarmatian version of republicanism combined with the idea of participatory democracy and the pursuit of the “third way” in economic issues. It was positioned somewhere between collectivist communism and individualist capitalism. The political system proposed by “Fighting Solidarity”, drawing inspiration from Polish experiences and sources, was never seriously debated, either by “Fighting
Solidarity” or by other, ostensibly more influential organisations (including the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” which, at the First National Convention adopted a programme for a “Self-Governing Republic”, inspired by the ideas of Edward Abramowski and the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church). It seems worthwhile to reflect on why the ideological solidaristic aspects vanished not only from the platforms adopted by major post-Solidarity political forces after 1989 but also from the public debate in general. The reasons can be divided into external and internal.

As regards “Fighting Solidarity”, it is relatively easy to identify internal factors which contributed to the phenomenon. The Freedom Party which grew out of the organisation was dominated by a young generation of activists who treated all solidaristic aspects and associations with “Solidarity” as unnecessary ballast. Accordingly, in the platform accepted at the First Convention of the Freedom Party in 1990, there was no mention of a self-governing parliamentary chamber. Instead, the Party officially endorsed “the republican political system and combined presidential and parliamentary government” (The Freedom Party, Platform and Statute, p. 4) and declared reinstatement of the Constitution of 1935 ensuring continuity of power. In the economy section of the Platform, claims were made that “private ownership was the dominant form”, while “the role of the state in economy should be limited to a minimum” (ibidem, p. 5). In this aspect, the Freedom Party wanted to become a typical right-wing liberal group. On the other hand, it aspired to be different in terms of hardline anti-communism, disapproval of the compromise reached with the communists and an independence-centred programme, including the demand that Soviet troops leave Poland, withdrawal from the, uncil for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact, and support for the national liberation ambitions of the former Soviet Republics. In practice, however, all solidarity-related aspects faded to the background – an event that resulted in a somewhat eclectic format and in a lack of programme homogeneity.

Virtually, the only demonstration of solidaristic ideas was the high degree of interest shown by the press, published by “Fighting Solidarity”, as the idea of an employee benefit scheme called the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). However, social circles favouring this type of ownership were too lacking in influence politically to turn the ESOP into one of methods of the state’s privatisation policy.

There were also a number of external factors independent of ideological solutions approved by members of the organisation that deserve a mention.

“Fighting Solidarity” was a party that opposed compromise with the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) with utmost vehemence. Therefore, the anticommunist and independence-oriented goals of the organisation came, by the natural course of things, to the forefront in the social reception, whereas the solidarity-centred visions of the political
system did not. Criticism of the Round Table talks led to the marginalisation of the entire organisation in the years 1988-1991 and, along with it, solidarist elements of the political platform which were developed only sketchily and incompletely during martial law.

As regards the marginalisation of social solidarism by “serious” constructive opposition stemming from the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” of 1980-1981, it seems that factors determining the course of transformations in Poland and external circumstances were its likely causes. Transformations contributed to the emergence of the so-called political capitalism, i.e. a social system in which the class of owners who were originally representatives of the communist nomenklatura had tight connections with the ruling system. Solidarity-based ideas calling for grassroots-initiated social transition and social participation were dysfunctional in this social system.

In addition, the fall of communism and the transformation of real socialism coincided with the revival of neoliberalism advocated e.g. by the governments of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. It was, therefore, only natural that transformations sweeping through Poland and other countries were interpreted in the categories of the liberal thought which, at the time, achieved a dominant position globally (or at least in the Euro-Atlantic civilisation). In this framework, the transformation of Eastern Europe was regarded as a process whose chief goal was to make up for many centuries of “modernisation backlog” (accumulated not only during the period of real socialism), consisting, for the major part, in the transplantation of established Western institutions into the newly emerged independent Eastern European states. A genuine triumph of the liberal ideology occurred when Francis Fukuyama made his well-known declaration of the “end of history” which would occur along with the (preferably global) establishment of parliamentary democracy and free-market economy. Liberalism, which triumphed (perfectly legitimately) over its ideological opponent (communism-inherent collectivism), at the same time, defined the Polish viewpoint of the society and the economy after 1989 and marginalised (unfairly) all ideological alternatives.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE RHETORIC OF SOLIDARITY AND IDENTITY IN BELARUSIAN LITERARY SOURCES: 16TH-19TH CENTURIES

OLGA SHUTOVA

The period of modernity and nation-state building that brought the concept of solidarity into wide use. Solidarity developed during the French Revolution, and the time of the French Constitution of 1848, the principles «Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité» became well established in European society. In the conditions of today’s society, as (post)modern and globalizing, the discourse of solidarity seems to be in conflict with widely proclaimed multiculturalism, individual experience, cult-like principles of “differencing” and “the Other”.

There is no need to argue for the need to trace the tendencies of development and the co-relations of solidarity and identity in such a society as Belarus – one of the last “bastions” of socialism, the plexus of collective values, traditional mentality, autocratic government, etc. Here we would like to pose the questions: How then and there? Were “we”, “other” and “responsibility” perceived? What was the role of collective values in the Belarusian past?

From the very beginning, I have tried to avoid the “temptation” of merely for works or quotations where some celebrities who can be called “Belarussians” (but also “Litwins”, “Russins” or “Poles”) said something that could be classified today as “solidarity rhetoric”. – for example, where “we” is used on compassion expressed. Moreover, even with such quotations in hand, the picture seems to be a puzzle of fragmented pieces. It is not so much the fragments as interconnections between them that actually define the content of the “puzzle”.

ON SOLIDARITY

Solidarity, understood in the current usage, can be traced to literary sources from very ancient times. Then solidarity had the connotation of collective identity or compassion for the “brothers”, with the main emphasis on religious community: “Be aware and full of fear, avoid human sins… I beg to pray you, fathers, brothers and sons; let us follow God’s testaments… because they are not heavy to carry on….1

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1 Cyril Turovski, Kirila mniha v nedelu mjassoputnju slovo o vtorom prishestvii gospoda nashego Iisusa Christa. Sbornik XVI veka (Dobrohot, Library of the Academy of Science Russia), № 39, list 88.
Note that the path of our research goes through the analysis of the rhetoric of “us” and the “old good times”: “…cherished memory of Sigismund – who didn’t like the Germans or as the Poles with their trickiness, but he charitably bestowed our Lithuania and Rus’. Although we did not have expensive clothes, we lived much better... Allow, my Lord, again that time to return!”2

“This path goes through reflections on geopolitical situation, “us” and “other”:

Meeting the enemy on the forefront or edge, as an outpost,
We are bleeding to death; the swords cover our bodies with wounds.
Our blood, as the rivers flow also slowing down the movement of Enemy hordes; our boards are in holes
From poleaxes ruthless, we are in scars from the sables.
...
Our neighbors are not concerned by the rods of misfortune,
The red cock has not passed on their lancet roofs.
Their cozy comfort meanwhile is broken by nothing
Only because that the edge of our land blazes in fires”.3

As it goes, the understanding has the character of a “buffer” between the West and the East, between the Catholic and the Orthodox churches (Uniatstvo – the Union version of Christianity was created in 1596 in Belarus):

Rome does not really want you,
And the Latin can live without the Rusin.
But come back to your
Eastern Church sacred.4

The famous quotation from F. Skorina’s Introduction to the Judith Book of the Bible sounds like representation of collective identity: “By the very virtue of their birth, animals in deserts know their holes; birds flying in the air know their nests; fish swimming in the sea and rivers feel their places, bees defend their hives – therefore, human beings love the place

4 Afanasij Filipovitch. Pamjatniki polemicheskoj literatury v Zapadnoj Rusi. Kniga I (Saint-Petersburg, 1878), column 49-156.
where they were born and raised…

Elsewhere he says: “Treat the other the way you want to be treated yourself” (chini ti drugim), reflecting the Christian value of solidarity. His Introductions and Afterwords state: “We, the Christians, knowing all sciences which have passed, demand eternal salvation for our soul”; “Written and translated by Doctor Francisk, son of Skorina from the glorious town of Polotck to the Rusian language for God, The Holy Trinity, Verge Marie and for the all people (les gents simples) — to educate”.

Almost 50 years later, Vasilei Tsjapinski’s Introduction to the Evangelie (New Testament) is more secular: “Every god-fearing soul will feel sorrow for God’s punishment, everybody will cry for so numerous and noble men, children and women, for such famous and learned people with their language declined..!” “If only they could, they realize watching how the beauty and goodness of their people is taken over and die…” “God willing, you yourself, respected sirs,...have the pity to help your own Fatherland and simple people who look for you and follow you”.

“In that need of your Fatherland, in that simplicity due to the lack of education among your brothers, you must give the gracious example if only you have fraternal mercy”.

The trajectory of the development of solidarity in society goes through the religious understanding of communality and compassion to help others, as we have seen in Skorina, Tsjapinski, etc. Nevertheless, it is to be continued in the formation of a laic (secular) and moral understanding of solidarity. Should such a transition happen, it could mean also a transition toward the modern nation.

We can find something similar (but not fully developed) in sources in the 17th century – for example we can trace szlachta solidarity in “Rech Ivana Mjaleshki”: “Telling the truth – this is not so much the king’s guilt [responsibility] as of the counselors who are around him… There are many of them here, who are essentially of our bones but with alien flesh grown on

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5 Kniga Judif/ Predislovie. –This is reminiscence from the Evangelie: «Глагола ему Иисус: лиси жавины имуть, и птицы небесныя гнезда: Сынь же Человеческий не имать где главы подклонити» (Матвей 8, 20 Russian Edition 1998).

6 Predislovie doktora Frantsiska Skoriny s Polotska vo vstu Bibliu ruskago iazyka (Prague, 1519).

7 “Vylowheny Doktorom Frantsiskom Skorininym synom iz slavnogo grada Polotska, na ruskij iazyk napred Bogu ds troite edinomu i ego prechistoi materi Marii ko chti i ludem pospolitym k naoucheniu”. / In Kniga tsarstv (10 August 1518, Prague).

it, and who humiliate and eliminate us.” “I know: we are at the edge…, we are afraid and we are afraid to tell the truth…”

Or, we can find in the “Letters of Filon Semenovitch Kmity-Chernobylski” from the frontier city of Orsha: “Where is the szlachta of my region who must (meet the embassy from Moscow – O.Sh.), – but instead demands only its rights and freedom, and does not help me!”

We pay special attention to the understanding of solidarity and patriotism. After the religious Union (1596), the Belarusian orthodox population began to be pushed toward a new religion… and identity. Here is a source where we find discourses of collective identity (we), fatherland, solidarity with victims of lawless discrimination. In 1623, the orthodox szlachta from Grand Duchy of Lithuania sent this message to the Warsaw Seim (congress): “We suffer great lawless and brutal pressure and nobody in our Fatherland expresses a desire to help us. …How can one expect concord (consensus) in our country if we are to give up our church and civil rights and freedom. While there is a certain need in civil union, for the sake of our Fatherland, and the preservation of the rights and freedoms of all peoples, it is necessary to abolish the (church) union… Let us at last come to a consensus – Polish, Lithuania and Rus’…!” Special place is given to such topics as civility, civil rights and solidarity.

Writing his poem “To the Poles and to the Litwins” (Da Palakau i Litwy), Polish-speaking poet, Andrzei Wolan, emphasizes that only fraternal relations must build the foundation of the union between two peoples, with the goal of peace, mutual aid and order.

The theme of equality (among the szlachta) and fraternity was extremely palpitating in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus’ and Samogitia. Theoretically, equality of privileges, heredity, and ability to participate in political life existed. Practically, such ideological “equality” was strengthened by the definition of “fraternity”. A poem by Andrzej Rymsha “Ten years novel about military affairs of Prince Krzysztof Radzivil” (1585), gives the following description of such conceptual “equality”:

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13 Loika, p.67.
“Certain trees are cut for three distances around,  
Others – make the soil for the swampland.  
Also other trees which were built one over another,  
Are to be thrown out, to provide to go through [passage].  
For [people] do not recognize where the (governor) getman is, where the szlachta is is simple.  

Thinking about the beginnings of the rhetoric of solidarity and identity always brings us to the 16th and the 17th centuries – a time known later as the “Golden Age” and the time when dramatic wars brought disasters and death to almost half of the population of Belarus. That period is also colored by the specific symbolism of its latest reflections on Belarusian historiography as nostalgia and even as the “time of missed opportunities”. In this sense, the patriarch of Belarusian “cultural history”, Adam Maldzis, said: “The train of Belarusian history in the 16th century during the Golden Age ran normally and even in advance… If that train would run today the way it ran in the 16th century, everything would be good with us”. Later on, we shall return to this topic in the discourse of contemporary Belarusian historians.

But speaking about solidarity among the people is impossible without understanding the widespread feelings of peasants during that period. The Polish researcher R. Radzik observes a special feeling of “collective intimacy” (“svojkasc”, “tutejshacs”) and of “alien-ness” toward foreigners. On conservatism, the wishing to preserve the traditional peasant culture unchanged – Radzik quotes from the 1930s Jusaf Abremski about the Belarusian population of Palesse: “If the power is Russian, then the people is Russian; under Polish power – the people is Polish; under Tatar power – Tatar”. Radzik, following Stanislaw Asowski, calls this position “nominalism in national affair”.  

There are “mentality” problems that make research on such aspects as historical consciousness, identity and solidarity in Belarus especially difficult – even painful – and hardened by the fact that ethnic studies here were underdeveloped for a long time. One needs to understand the fact that the “proper” Belarusian national movement begins no earlier than the second half of the 19th century and then almost disappears, in part because

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of the USSR’s national policy. This policy was expressed not only in the physical elimination of the so called “natzdems” but it was also framed in the latent “standardization” of Russian history and language. It served as the model and language of power that kept Belarus from “deviating” from that model. In part, this was because of its “similarity” to Russian; and also for historical reasons (the revolution, the Second World War with its terrifying victimization, the battle for socialism, which superficially ignored national dimensions…). This evident failure of nationalism made Belarus “not appropriate” for Western researchers to study for many years; only recently, in the framework of general interest in the so called “Cultural Borders Studies” (W. Mignolo, H. Chang), did this interest arise.

IDENTITY AND THE “OTHER”

Let us consider one of the most palpitating topics for Belarusian historians. It built on a discourse of identity, and solidarity and referenced the relation to Other – to “Europe” (and its derivatives: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Central-Eastern Europe). Besides being transformed into a symbol that referenced or contradicted certain values attributed to “Europe”, it has, at its core, the principle of “centre” and “periphery”.

Central Europe and Eastern Europe are ideological constructions. They do not exist as a geographic whole – their boundaries have moved through the centuries and continue to do so. They do not exist as a political unity – the Grupa Wyszehradzka/Wyssegad Group cannot be regarded as one. Neither have they existed as ethnic unity: Hungarians are not Slavs; the idea of “Mitteleuropa” itself was introduced by F. List who wrote about economic unity under German domination. Furthermore, the idea of Panslavism was coined in the Russian Empire and supported by many leaders of “Central-European” national renaissances.

During the last two decades, practically all studies of the phenomenon of “Europe” or “Central Europe” carried out the idea of the “Other” as lying in its core: the West (civilization) versus the East (barbarism). Afterward Said’s “Orientalism”, studies on “inventing” and “re-inventing” Europe, took an important place in Western historiography. Pioneering this field, Larry Wolff traced the roots of this sort of construction from antiquity. The construction associated “South” with civilization, and “North” with barbarism (which included Russia); and is traceable to the 18th century Enlightenment, which emphasised the conceptual pair West/East accordingly. The remarkable research of Iver

The Rhetoric of Solidarity in Belarusian Literary Sources

B. Neumann, showing the “West” and “Russia” as constituting “Others”, underlined the relativity in the definitions of self and other.19

Paradoxically, “Central Europe” does not necessarily mean “centre”. In a figurative sense, the centre (or, the model, the point-of-departure) is the West. It is Western Europe that is the point of reference. Various understandings of Central, Eastern, East-Central Europe and even “Europe” are based on different “centers” for each construction. While in English-speaking historiography after Oscar Halecki,20 “Western Central Europe” means Germany and Austria, “Eastern Central Europe” refers to the countries between Germany and Russia. For Russian intellectuals “East-Central Europe” includes Russia; or the ideas of Polish researchers for whom “East-Central Europe” has Poland in its centre. In turn, nationally-oriented Belarusian historians are more inclined to call Belarus “Central European” – making reference to the little Belarusian town, Mir, as the geographic centre of Europe. However, this ancient town with a symbolic name – Belarusian “Mir” can be translated as “peace” – cannot be the starting point of argumentation. The main argument implies the great past of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – and not the official pro-Moscow pan-Slavic historiography – as the foundation of Belarusian identity. Belarusian historians found themselves between two poles: the West (represented by the idea of “Belarus is the Europe!”22), and the East (Russia again – with Kievan Rus’ as the cradle of three brotherly nations: Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian).

Interpretations of Belarusian history are built, accordingly, on two contradictory points. “Official” historians criticize even the 16th-century historical sources for the “inability” of the authors to “understand that [the] true interest of the Belarusians was in re-uniting with Russia, not to forget the conception of Kievan Rus’ as “the cradle of three brotherly nations”, not participating on in the Council of Rzeczpospolita”.23 “National”

23 Protasevich V.I. Pamjatniki politicheskoi satiry XVII veka. “Rech Ivana Meleshki” i “Pismo k Obukhovichu” [Political satires of the 17th c. “Ivan Meleshko’s speech” and “Letter to Obukhovich”], in Iz istorii filosofskoj i
historians aimed to prove the European character of Belarusian culture or the fact that Belarusian history always ran in the European stream – interrupted only by losses and deprivations in the 16th and 17th centuries. These insistent appeals represent a bi-polar world: just like the Moscow-Minsk highway which is understood by Belarusian intellectuals as a permanent condition with two-directions (West/East or East/West). This is the point of reference, that defines the “Other” (either Russia or Europe). The construction of “us” and “others” is a continuing process of inclusion/exclusion from the rhetoric of “us” and “solidarity”.

In his famous “Orientalism”, E. Said demonstrated how the East became the mirror in which Europe saw its own reflection, and an analysis of this reflection can give more information about the original. Postcolonial studies show that not only is the Western European civilization built upon the principle of the presence of the “other” (put differently, it is not possible to define “the self”, if there is no “other”), but this civilization also introduces its own model of existence into the “other”. In the period of their expansionism, Westerners spread not only their politico-economical influence but also “introduced” to the “others” their own vision of “others”. As a result, national/patriotic movements in these countries arrogated unto themselves images of their own “otherness”. The external European “other” became their internal “self”! Today’s analytical works show how such pro-Western” models of philosophy, historiography, and literature were constructed in India, China, Latin America, and the Muslim East; and how difficult it was to reassess and overcome the apparently “natural” status quo. New generations of intellectuals, realizing the falsehood of these efforts of constructing identity in accordance with the Western European model, try to return to their roots, traditions and religion. In today’s growing globalization and its underlying “side effect” “Westernization” and even “Americanization” various fundamentalist movements are connected with processes of recovering and reconstructing the identities of former “others”. The dynamics of today’s political and cultural conflicts prove to be closely associated with the circumstances of the modern and the postmodern age.

There is a certain superficiality in the discourse of “orientalism” which says that it is mainly concerned with how the West distorts the East by creating false images, and stereotypes. There is much less attention to


the fact that “Orientalism” is also about how the East distorts itself. Gayatri Spivak’s question, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”26 brought to life a big research field named “Sub-Alternative Studies” which is one of the most fruitful in today’s postcolonial discourse. Can the subordinate, the subaltern subject, speak – and if he can, with whose voice?

IDENTITY: BETWEEN RUSSIA, POLAND AND LITHUANIA

It is useful to consider the other side of postcolonial studies, especially in the Belarusian case: how the people accept the identity that is ascribed to them. The phenomenon of Zapadno-Russism (Western-Russianness) lies in the same dimension as Orientalism. This is important for us because it deals to a great degree with the discourse of solidarity and identity. In the 19th-century, patriotic discourse in Belarus, we can define three main orientations represented as combined and intersecting elements: “Litwinstwo”, “Zapadnorussizm” [Western-Russianness] and the so-called “Eastern-Polishness”. Being socially “between Polish culture and Russian power”,27 these elements lead to the compassion: 19th-century Lithuanian intellectuals will as the Czech experience (separating themselves from the Polish) as their model. Polish thinkers from Jan Długosz’s times distanced themselves from the Lithuanians while the Belarusian “regionalists” of the early 19th and then of the early 20th centuries, tended to adore medieval “Litwins”, competing with modern Lithuanians for the heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In the early 19th century, professors of Wilno University and their compatriots, Ignatij Danilovitch, Michael Bobrowski, Jaroslaw Jaroshevitch, and Teodor Narbutt, tried to develop some models for Belarusian history, although they defined themselves as “Rusiny” (Ruthenus) or “Litwins” (not “Lithuanians”) and they dreamt about a renaissance of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (in terms of its “Golden Age” – the 15th and the 16th centuries). “Lithuania” meant for them a polithonym rather than an ethnronym. Meanwhile, M. Bobrowski insisted on the renaissance of the ancient Belarusian or even the ancient Slavonian language (his European voyage; the Slavophil ideas of the Czech leader, Dobrovský, greatly influenced him).28 There were certain historical

conditions for such ideas as “Lithuanianism”/“Litwinstwo”: “the Lithuanian” legal code was abolished only in 1840, and at the beginning of the 19th century, it was still in effect.29 The Catholic-Union or the Uniate Church (established in 1596 by the Brest Union) was still a major confession in Belarus. The famous Wilno University still existed (it was closed in 1832 by Russian authorities); and the majority of the population, including the gentry (szlachta) and the peasantry, who spoke different dialects of Belarusian, regarded themselves as “Litwins”. Decembrist, A. Bestuzhev, having lived in Belarus (i.e. “Lithuania”) for a few years, could not hide his surprise at the dissimilarity and the “otherness” of this country (which was always regarded as ‘Russian’ in official Russian literature). Returning home, Bestuzhev exclaimed “The other air! I am in the Fatherland! I am in Russia! Russian faces are around, and Russian girls do not avoid us as indulged Uniate girls….”30 Certainly for Bestuzhev, the Russians and the Belarusians were not the same.

Notwithstanding the first efforts of Belarusian literary and historical writings at the beginning and in the first half of the 19th century (Jan Czeczot, A. Kirkor, A. Rypinski, D. Werigo-Darewski, Jan Barszczewski, Pavel Szpilewski), Belarusian history itself remained unwritten. By 1829, Ignatij Danilowitch, having moved from Wilno to Kharkov, married a Ukrainian and joined the Ukrainian movement. “He has become “Kazak”, “Okazachel” – as Bobrowski put it.31 This was no coincidence: by this time, the activities of Ukrainian nationalists were strong in Kharkov University, and the unifying idea had begun to be established among Ukrainian nationalists, namely the myth of the “Kazaks” as inherently freedom-loving Ukrainians. By contrast, Belarusian
intellectuals still dreamt of uniting with the Lithuanians in one common state – the idea of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania being the model.\textsuperscript{32} The Litwinstwo, Zapadno-Russism and pro-Polish orientations were significantly distinct, but all three had in common some referencing whether to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to Russia, or, to Rzeczpospolita. Although all three orientations co-existed for a long time in Belarus and echoed through the 20\textsuperscript{th}–21\textsuperscript{st} centuries, after the revolt of 1863 the Litwinstwo and the pro-Polish orientations were almost totally overwhelmed by Zapadno-Russism.\textsuperscript{33}

The events of 1863 were remarkable: the Belarusian leader of the revolt against the Russian Empire, Kastus’ Kalinousky, turned to the peasants – his publication, \textit{Muzhitskaia Prauda}, was written in Belarusian with Latin characters – and to Europe. Kalinousky appealed to \textit{muzhiks} (peasants) to struggle against the Empire on the side of the \textit{Polish} insurgents: “As soon as you, the People, hear that your brothers from Warsaw fight for the truth and freedom, do not stay behind – take your scythes and hammers, and go to war for your human and national rights, for your lands”.\textsuperscript{34}

Kalinousky involves the Belarusian people in the European space by evoking a sense of continuity: the “People” and the foreign powers as equal to “us”, and by expressing hopes for foreign help and solidarity:

“Two hundred years ago, our fathers…went to fight to save Christianity from Tatar savageness; in our own turn, although we have the right to ask for help, we do not extort it… But when all kings endorse by signatures our slavish subjection to Moscow (Partitions of Rzeczpospolita –

\textsuperscript{32} Even in 1915, on the territory occupied by Germany, the Belarusian Social-Democratic Worker’s Group strove to establish the Confederation of the Great Duchy Lithuanian, and even later on, in 1918-9, such activities were popular; in February-August such a ghost state was created by the Bolsheviks; it ended up in Polish occupation of Belarus.

\textsuperscript{33} The first and almost single-handed researcher on “Western-Russianness”, A. Cwikewicz, (Cwikewicz A. \textit{Zapadno russizm}: Narysy z gistoryi gramadzkaj mysli na Belarusi u XIX i pachatku XX v. [Sketches from the history of social thinking in Belarus, 19\textsuperscript{th}-early 20\textsuperscript{th} c.]. 1\textsuperscript{st} edition – Minsk, 1929; 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition. Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1993) finds the beginnings in 1720 (when the Synod of Zamosc supported a number of changes in the Uniate Church in favor of Latin influence; and traditional Uniate Church priests resisted these by leaning toward Russia. Yet, we cannot talk about “Zapadno-Russism” in the proper sense of this word until the 1863 Rebellion. After the incorporation of Belarusian lands into the Russian Empire, it was Archbishop Joseph Semashko (1798 – 1868) who would be called the first authentic carrier of the idea of unifying the Uniate Church and the Russian Orthodox Church, which was finally eliminated in 1839.

\textsuperscript{34} Kastus’ Kalinouiski. \textit{Listy z-pad shybenitsy} [Letters from the gallows]. In Za nashuju volnascz [For our freedom] (Minsk, MF Belaruski knigazbor, 1999).
O. Sh.) they blemish their honor… You, the People, do not wait, and go to fight, doing whatever you can… And when foreign nations shocked by you will call you “insane”, tell them that it is their conscience that is guilty…”

“The French could help us as they helped the Polish, but the Tsar says that all our peasants are satisfied and they do not want anything else, that they deeply love the Tsar and write him letters, that they willingly pay taxes and labor-rent, that they are recruited to the army with pleasure and they do not want Union confession! The Tsar lies here to let us all perish. And the French will not help us if it is all quiet here”.35

Not surprisingly, after the 1863 revolt was suppressed, these events provoked the massive propaganda of Zapadno-Russism.36 Moreover, Zapadnorussism successfully suppressed the emerging Belarusian movement by substitution. Basically, Zapadnorussism/Western-Russianness characterizes the Russian people with such traits as unity and non-dividedness and understands the Belarusians as part of the Russians. For its definition, let us follow the lines of one of the major representatives of Zapadno-russism in the 19th century – Michail Kojalovitch:

-unity of the historical destiny of all the “Russian peoples” always governed under the authority of Russian princes from Saint Vladimir’s family;

-neglect of “Western-Russian” speech, acknowledgement of the weakness of the differences between Western-Russian and Russian languages and culture;

-one Orthodox faith defined as ‘Russian’;

-“narodnost” (people-orientation) as the main feature of Russian culture in opposition to the “poisonous” influences of Polish szlachta domination;

-understanding all “Polishness” as the “Other”: other civilization, other Polish Latin influence (“latinstvo”), other gentry (always considered

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35 Ibid.

36 The development of Zapadno-Russism in terms of its administrative forms has been analyzed by Cvikewicz A. “Zapadno-russizm”: Narysy z gistoryi gramadzkaj mysli na Belarusi u XIX i pachatku XX v. [Sketches from the history of social thinking in Belarus, 19th-early 20th c.]. 2nd edition. Minsk, 1993; for the periodisation of Belarusian patriotic discourse, see: Nicholas P. Vakar, Belorussia: the Making of a Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956). Until 1863, the ethnic consciousness and provincial patriotism were Belorussian, but “their essence was Polish”. After 1863, when Belarusian peasants did not support the revolt, “the natives were described with sympathy and compassion for their miserable lot; their modesty and humility were praised; their simple manners and deep devotion to the native woods and swamps inspired admiration. Provincial patriotism assumed new significance; though Belorussian in form, it was Russian in essence (p.77).
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as in opposition to the overwhelmingly peasant population with a Belarusian character);
- The Roman-Greek (Catholic-Orthodox) Brest Union (1596) and the Uniate Church were overwhelmingly considered as “most hypocritical and humiliating confessions”;
- The persistent will of the Belarusians to unite with the Russians and, therefore, the “lawful and positive character of merging with Russia” (“Russia always considered western Russia as its proper land, and frequently reminded Poland of this. This issue has never ended, and the famous expression of the Empress Catherine the Great engraved on the medal celebrating the second division of Rzeczpospolita, “Torn off has returned”, is the expression of the centuries-long competition between Russia and Poland for western Russia.”)\(^{37}\)

**RELATION TO THE RUSSIA**

One of the major Zapadno-Russists, M. Kojalovitch, gives us the mirror that reflects how “Litwinstwo” was treated and reversed by Russian ideology: a “small party of Polish people, which came to be known as not Polish, and moreover, that the people of their country are not Polish either. They thought of a restoration in a science (italics – O. Shutova, since this expression returns us to the notion of “inventing” the nation) – of the independence of western Russia. They based it on the following beliefs: they took the old idea of political independence of the Lithuania and believed that western Russia could develop this independence under the same Polish civilization – but freely, naturally, and without any violent suppression of the local national features”. Among the “Litwins” party, I. Danilowitch, T. Narbutt, J. Jaroshevitch, Kojalowitch characterized their ideas as evil-minded, explaining that “political independence for western Russia is impossible in any case and even more impossible under Polish civilization.”\(^{38}\)

The major Zapadno-Russist argument against Litwinstwo and Polishness, was the proclamation of narodnost’ (people-ness, people-solidarity) as a major eternal characteristic of the Russians (and the indissoluble connections among the layers of Russian society (“Russian confession, Russian language, and folk historical legends equally appeal to the Russian soul, in high as well as in low social milieus”\(^{39}\)). This fact itself is a reflection of the process of “constructing” the Russian nation in this period. In the Belarusian context, the idea of narodnost’ was raised in the middle of the 19th century (and the Belarusian peasants who did not participate in the 1863 revolt played a decisive role in this appearance –

\(^{37}\) Kojalovitch M.O. Chtenija po istorii Zapadnoj Rossii [Readings on the History of the Western Russia] (Saint-Petersburg, 1884), pp. 2-17.

\(^{38}\) Ibid, p. 17.

\(^{39}\) Ibid, p. 9.
being represented by the authorities as “confirmation” of narodnost’). Narodnost’ was used overwhelmingly as a counterbalance to the remoteness, separatism and narrowness of the “Polish gentry”, with its character being absolutely alien to the “people” in language, in beliefs, and in historical consciousness. We shall emphasize that the use by the gentry of the opposition in the “alien character / narodnost’” generally continues in Belarusian historical and literary discourse today. Moreover, Belarusian intellectuals in the late 19th century began their nation building by putting on the agenda, proving the authentic character of the gentry. With the establishment of the Soviet Republic in the territory of Belarus, its gentry became automatically strangers to its people, speaking Polish and living in an absolutely alien culture. Again, once the Soviet Union collapsed, Belarusian intellectuals began to revive versions of the “autochthonous” character of the Belarusian gentry40 – often with efforts to prove the “Belarusan-ness” of famous noblemen or noblewomen.

Since 1863, Zapadno-Russism rapidly spread in Belarus, substituting not only Litwinstwo and Polish-orientation, but the very possibility of the Belarusian idea itself. As N. Vakar says about this period, “The archives of the Grand Duchy had been opened to scholars a long time before, but their work had largely been ignored. Now a flood of books, monographs, magazine articles, and pamphlets invaded the literature, as if everybody wanted to know more about this region and its true relation to Russia” (italics – O. Shutova). Linguistic studies established that the local vernaculars were “dialects of Russian”, not of Polish. Ethnographers swarming over the country recorded folklore and found that it was different from the Polish, while very similar to the Russian and the Ukrainian. For the first time, the question arose as to whether religion could be an appropriate standard for classifying various groups of Slavs (Bobrowski).

Hard as it is to believe now, it took one hundred years for the Russians to discover that the lands annexed from Poland and Lithuania “were Russian indeed”.41

While Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalisms were prohibited by all measures, the Belarusian nationalist movement was substituted by Zapadno-Russism. While Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalist awakenings proceeded as resistance, in Belarus there was a different process:


“Belarusian” was not forbidden; the main thing was that it be written in Cyrillic characters and not in Latin (Polish) letters. With Russian graphics, Belarusian texts very closely – too closely – reminded the Russian. As he symbolically describes this situation Timothy Snyder says, “The problem for Dunin-Martsinkevich (who translated Mickiewicz’s poem into Belarusian – O. Shutova), was that his Belarusian title page read Pan Tadeusz, exactly as it would have read in Polish, rather than Пан Тадеуш, which would have looked exactly like the Russian.”

In the same way, transcribed in Latin characters, the Belarusian words of Jan Barszczewski’s Szlachtycz Zavalnia (1844-46), looked Polish to his numerous “Belo-Russian” admirers.

The main aim of Russian imperial policy in Belarus was to exclude it from the Polish movement and Polish identification, to “reunite” it to Russia, to give it a Russian identity. Linguistically, the Belarusian language was regarded like a dialect between “Polish and Russian”, all Belarusian movement proved to be, as T. Snyder called it, “located socially between Polish culture and Russian power”.

While the very name of Lithuania was to be discontinued, all “Belarusian” had to become officially proved and “Russian” by nature, even by reversing history. For example, Vakar shows famous facts: Kovno Province, the center of ethnographic Lithuania, was given a coat of arms that reproduced a monument to the Campaign of 1812, and Grodno province, with a big percentage of ethnic Lithuanians, was given one that reproduced a European bison from the forests of Belovezha (1878); at the same time; the provinces of Vilna and of Vitebsk (mostly Belarusian) were given coats of arms reproducing the historical symbol (pogon’, pahonia) of the Grand Duchy.

Referencing or co-relating was the main distinguishing feature that unified tendencies in Belarusian patriotic discourse. Nevertheless, all three – Polish-orientation, Litwinstwo and Zapadno-Russism – gave birth to voluminous examples of “regional patriotism”, primarily in its ethnographic (“Ethnographic narodolubie” which counted dozens of ethnographic descriptions, collections of songs, customs, tales), historical (archaeological expeditions, archival publications), and literary products (the above mentioned Vincent Dunin-Martsinkevitch was one of the first to write and publish in Belarusian; but we can also name J.Czeczot, J. Barszczewski in this category…). Belarusian in form, but Polish (and then Russian) in essence, the efforts of many activists not only greatly contributed to the understanding of the region, but also created a trajectory for the further development of the Belarusian historical consciousness, identity, and sense of solidarity.

Within this trajectory lies the activity of the Orthodox archpriest, I.Grigorovitch (1792-1852), who was greatly interested in Belarusian

42 Snyder, op.cit., p. 43.
43 Vakar, op.cit., p. 76.
history and prepared the first volume of the collection of documents. Proving the purpose of his work by collecting and publishing church and civil history documents, Grigorovitch advanced referencing as the main argument in two circumstances: (1) Europe (“Europeans, since the time of dissemination of the ideas of the Enlightenment in Europe, have felt the need of gathering general data on the States. Men of science and patriots tried to learn mutual attitudes and duties of people, their laws and rights, all to weigh their force and prosperity…”) and (2) Poland (“Poles, zealous admirers of glory domestic, can be proud of huge collections of their rites and customs of the Fatherland…”).44

Very briefly, we can name here other major representatives of this tendency: Adam Kirkor (famous Wilno’s publisher, founder of Wilno’s museum of antiquities, who nevertheless, dreamt not about Belarus but about the Commonwealth); Michail Bezkornilovitch (romantic admirer of myths in Belarusian history who published them in 1845 as “Istoricheskie svedenia o primechatelnykh mestah v Belorusii s prizvokupleniem drugih svedenij” [Historical notes about most remarkable places in Belarus and other notes], considered all of them as part of Russian history); there was “ethnographic narodolubie [people-loving] spread among Belarusian intellectuals – who lived sometimes and frequently far from Belarus – in Saint-Petersburg and Moscow where they received their education and wrote on themes of Slavic history and philology (Konstantin Kolajdovitch, Pavel Shpilevsky, A. Sementouski, and by the end of the nineteenth century – P. Shejn, E. Romanov, D. Dobrovolski, J.Karsi and many others). There was the activity of Wilno’s archeographic commission which published 39 volumes of “The Acts” in 1865-1915; or the publication of also voluminous archeographic collection of documents concerning the history of north-western Russia (1867-1904)…The “…northwestern edges of Russia, this ancient heritage of the Russian Principality of Polotsk having been the most ancient colony of the Great Novgorod, spread from the river Pripjat’ to the Baltic sea, and from the upper Dnepr to the Neman. All these lands were divided between three tribes:… the Jatwjags, the Litwa, the Latvians or Lëtgols… According to all ancient annals, these tribes lived savage lives among forests and swamps, and knew neither agriculture, nor other métiers … In such a wild country, covered with forests and inhabited by savages, several colonies of Novgorod appeared: Polotsk… and Smolensk….”45

This quotation is taken from the essay of Moscow University professor, I.D. Beljaev (1867). A famous Slavophil, Beljaev wrote about Polotsk and Smolensk which were the ancient centers of western Slavic tribes (the Polochans, or the Kryvichs), as if they were colonies of Novgorod. The Primary Chronicle (Povest’ vremennyh let) gives a different

44 Belorussian Archive. Chast’ 1 (Belorussian Archive. First part (Moscow: Typographie of S. Selivanovski, 1824), p. VII.
description: it depicts the Kryvichs (Polochans) with their tribal centers in Polotsk, Smolensk, Izborsk. But Beljaev’s hypothesis was aimed to emphasize the primordial “Russianness” of these lands with the leading role of Novgorod in their colonization.

With Russian scientific discoveries on Belarus, especially since the 1860s, the questions of Belarusian “Russianness” again and again were coming to the fore, and even the modest efforts of the “Western-Russian” wing of historians to study “Belorussian” peculiarities were severely criticized. In 1867, leading Moscow Slavophil I. S. Aksakov wrote to M. O. Kojalovitch: “Russian lands belong to the Russian people… Russia now saves Belorussia from the dearth threat. What really matters is the elimination of Polonism, but the Belorussians pretend that this problem is already solved; and instead, they are busy with the preservation of local peculiarities! And do those local peculiarities really exist at all?” Curiously, Aksakov’s letters were published officially in 1893 in Saint-Petersburg Vedomosti (News) and reprinted in the Minski Listok (Minsk newspaper), two years after the publication of Frantiszek Baguszewicz’s Belorussian pipe (1891) and the rise of the Belarusian national movement.

RELATION TO POLAND

Similarly, but from a different pole, the Polish patriots described the history of Belarus. Lecturing in Paris, Alexander Rypinski stated that Belorussia was and “will always be Polish, since the language itself is binding the people with Poland, not with Moscow”. He also introduced the term “White Ruthenians” in the foreign press to make more evident the distinction between Belorussians (White Russians) and Russians, but in reality such a “distinction” became the symbol of the eternal duality of the Belarusian situation and the source of permanent confusion: the practice of “translation” as regards “the White Russians” reflected the referential character of its identity, and stirred the development of “Belarus” as a proper name.

Writing on the tragic consequences of the partitions of Poland, Alphonse de Calonne, in 1861, involved the problem of its “edges” (Belarus and Ukraine) as a European affair. Similarly, Paul de Saint-Vincent proved the close ties and the natural character of the union between the Belarusians and the Ukrainians with the Poles:

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46 I use here “Bielorussia” preserving writing style of the 19th century which meant White Russia.
47 Minski Listok, 1893, 19 marta (March 19)
48 Vakar, op.cit., p. 75.
49 Ibid.
50 Alphonse de Calonne, La Pologne devant les conséquences de traités de Vienne in. Revue Contemporaine, mars et avril 1861; Vol 20, pp. 304-327.
L’union s’opéra de la manière la plus absolue depuis les bords de la Dzwina et du Dnieper jusqu’au basin de la Vistule. Elle s’étendit même au dela du Dnieper et de la Dzwina. Cependant les siècles de l’envahissement avaient créé quelques différences, qui ne s’effacèrent que peu à peu sous la supériorité de la législation Polonaise. Les habitudes prises, les coutumes que les temps avait enracinées, furent l’ailleurs respectées, et se sont conservées à l’abri d’un pouvoir qui puisait dans le principe d’autonomie la force nécessaire à la liberté et à la décentralisation.\(^{51}\)

In contrast to Ukraine, Belarus itself did not appear, being replaced with “eastern edges” of Poland. Referring to A. Mickiewicz (Belarusian born Polish poet who wrote about « Litwa »), Saint-Vincent points out the « frontir » character of these territories: …pays de frontières, elle constitue, comme l’a dit Mickiewicz, l’une des principales artères par lesquelles l’Asie se déversa sur l’Europe (civilisation occidentale contra despotisme asiatique).\(^{52}\) Moreover, Saint-Vincent continues, in opposition to the modern Russians who belong actually to “another race”, namely Belarusians and Ukrainians should be considered as “true Russians”.

These voices “pronounced” the then famous (but already discredited on the eve of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century) theory of Slavic ethnography of Polish émigré, Paris professor Franciszek Duchiński (1817 – 1880).\(^{53}\) According to Duchiński’s thought, “Moscovites” did not belong to the Slavs, neither to the Arians, constituting their own Turanian “branch” along with Mongols. They cannot even be called “Russians” because this name properly belongs only to Belarusians and Ukrainians (who are close relatives of the Polish). Duchiński emphasized the artificial construction of the Russian language (borrowed from Church-Slavonian), the autocratic traditions of governing (in contrast to the republicanism and individualism of Arians), the very slow development of urban life among the medieval Russians. In contrast to this, Russian historians in every possible way emphasized the presence of this feature V. O. Kluchevski’s characteristics for the 8\(^{\text{th}}\) to 13\(^{\text{th}}\) centuries as Rus’ Dneprovian, urban and trading). The theory of Duchiński was so popular that it has exceeded its ethnographic boundaries, and has been used in politics. The Polish patriots believed that Europeans should help Poland in its restoration of the ancient borders.

\(^{52}\) Ibid, p. 614.
(including both its “edges”, Belarus and Ukraine as buffers between the Aryan Europe and the “Turanian” Moscovits). On the other hand, the claims, of “Moscovites” for a supervising role among Slavs and the ideology of panslavism appeared insolvent, according to Duchiński.

Such voices, looking absurd today, had weight in European society, and they excited the minds of contemporaries. K. Marx wrote F. Engels in 1865:

Ad vocem Poland, I was most interested to read the work by Elias Regnault (the same who wrote the “histoire des principautés danubiennes”), ‘La Question Européenne, faussement nommée La Question Polonaise’.54 I see from it that Lapinski’s dogma that the Great Russians are not Slavs has been advocated on linguistic, historical and ethnographical grounds in all seriousness by Monsieur Duchiński (from Kiev, Professor in Paris); he maintains that the real Moscovites, i.e., inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Moscow, were for the most part Mongols or Finns, etc., as was the case in the parts of Russia situated further east and in its south-eastern parts. I see from it, at all events, that the affair has seriously worried the St Petersburg cabinet (since it would put an end to Panslavism in no uncertain manner). All Russian scholars were called on to give responses and refutations, and these in the event turned out to be terribly weak.55

Although Duchiński’s views by the end of 19th century had been disappearing, we can find sudden echoes in unexpected places: e.g. in the already familiar “Western-Russianness”. A famous adherent of Zapadno-Russism, A. Sapunov (“On significance of reign of Empress Katherine II for the Western provinces in general and Vitebsk province in particular”, 1896) by the end of his life, regarded the Belarusians as even more Russian than the Russians themselves:

“So, in my opinion, it is possible to answer the question ‘Who are Belarusian?’ this way: Belarus, or the so-called Russia Lithuanian (gathered by the Lithuanian princes), as professor M. K. Lubawsky says, ‘was primordial Russia, which has been set on old root, and has never lost its historical heritage’. Hence, the Belarusians are the primordial Russians without any impurity of another blood. As for Great Russia or “Moscovia” as it was called by foreigners, then Great Russians or “Moscovites” can be

called “Russians”, as far as they have Belarusian blood”.56 Did this invert Duchoński’s version?

Even today, the famous linguist from Belarus, Michael Goldenkov, is very clear in indicating the “true” origins of the “Moscovites” (nowadays, the Russians) as Finno-Tatarian – in contrast to the “true Russians” – nowadays Belarusians.

Further development of the “western-Russianness” was practically unchanged until the early 20th century, when it was spoke of Mikita, protagonist in the symbolic tragicomedy, “Tutejszy”, (Locals) written by the famous Belarusian poet, Janka Kupala (1882–1942) in 1922.57 “Belarusian assessorship, among many other “pluses”, has in itself one more plus: it is that, as I am convinced, even in Belarus, it is possible to pursue the true great principles of unity and indivisibility of the autocratic Russian empire”. This irony reflects the spread of “western-Russianness” among the intellectuals. The same hero says to Janka Zdol’nik (a type of Belarusian national intelligentsia, antagonistic to the type of Mikita’s “western-Russianness”): “Why, for what reason do you somehow not like our pure intelligentsia?” And the answer he receives is: “It is Polish dust, and dirt from Moscow”58. The essence is here: “our pure intelligentsia” has a referential “Polish-Russian, inverted” character.

ZAPADNO-RUSSIA

The ideology of Zapadno-Russism has not come to an end even today. The majority of contemporary Belarusian “court” historians (as R. Lindner calls them59) who share the governmental version of “the national” history, also share the ideas of “western-Russianness” to some extent.60 However, paraphrasing R. Barthes, it is impossible to be “Western-Russian” more or less: the matter that counts is that it is not “Belarusian”.

57 First published in Polymja, #2 (10) (Minsk, 1924).
60 One of the most obvious examples of apology of Zapado-Russism: Valery Cherepitsa, Michail Osipovitch Kojalovitch. Istoria zhizni i tворчества [History of life and activity] (Grodno: Grodno State University Press, 1998).
The popular polemist, Andrei Okara, doing the adverse forecast for the Belarusian nation, expresses some consolation, describing different “Golden Ages” for Belarus and Ukraine: “The Golden Age” for Ukrainian consciousness is an epoch of the religious wars of the orthodox Kazaks of Zaporozhie against Poland, Turkey and Crimea. For Belarusian consciousness such a “Golden Age” is the epoch of the Great Duchy of Lithuania – the epoch of Nicolas Gusowski, Francisk Skorina, the Statute (Law Code) and constant opposition to Orthodox Great Duchy of Moscow.61 And still, because of the absence of a “sacral center” unlike Ukraine with Kiev as the “sacral center”, “Belarussians are not the carriers of a special or unique identity, but carriers of the identity of the other while Moscow or European. For this reason, obviously, the optimum cultural program for Belarus is to consider ‘Neo-Western-Russianness’. This is, in contrast to the Ukraine which has, besides ‘the western direction’ integration into the civilized world community and the ‘pro Moscow direction’ (beginning from ideology of ‘Small Russianness’ to full assimilation of the Ukrainian), the ‘third alternative’ – comprehension of its own metahistorical unicity”.

Belarus, as Okara says, has no alternative to other the “Protestant-Catholic civilization of the West” as “periphery of the Great Europe”, or, “willingly accepting Orthodox eschatology evident, Russian Moscow-centered or, less probable for this moment, Ukrainian Kiev-centered” – and all this under the dominating culture of “western-Russianness”.62 Zapadno-Russism has never endured here totally. Until it lasts, at the centre of Belarusian identity, its history or historiography with all its intriguing plots can be barely interesting for the external world. «Mais les autres sont des « je » aussi : des sujets comme moi, que seul mon point de vue, pour lequel tous sont là-bas et je suis seul ici, sépare et distingue vraiment de moi»63 – Todorov’s words sound for us especially up-to-date. It is in no wise the question that “we are not read” by the West (a circumstance that is a subject of the “pride” for the Belarusian researchers standing in opposition to the West); but what really matters is the reason why the Belarusians are not interesting to Western historiography. When my Belarusian colleague, Alena Lapatnieva, who, for a long time lived in France, suggested this question, it appeared to me as absolutely senseless.. However, years of work in the West show the reality of this situation.

Is it important for Europe to see itself through the eyes of the “Other”? And to continue this question, can Belarus be regarded as the “Other” for Europe (that is, in the eyes of the Europeans)? Probably sounding ambitious, my hypothetical answer is “No”. Belarus is still not an

62 Ibid.
“interesting” case to the West, because it does not represent the “Other”. We can argue that Western historiography is inclined to see Belarus as Polish “kresy wschodnie” (eastern edges) according to the 18th to 19th century’s version of Polish patriotic émigrés – the first who presented “White Russia”/Belarus and “Small Russia”/Ukraine for the European intellectuals; the 20th century has adopted the “Great-Russian” version of Belarusian as history – “Zapadno-Russizm”/ “Western Russianness”. Against the existing contrast of West-East, West-USSR, West-Russia. Belarus looks too much “like Russia” to pretend to be “interesting” as the “Other”, and all Belarusian “specialties” in history, culture or politics, look to the Western eye seen to be as variations of “Russianness”. Paraphrasing R. Corbey and J. Leerssen, we are not “external enough to Western elite culture to become the object of anthropological (O. Shutova: and historical) inquiry”. 64

It could be wrenching to speak about a direct implication of the idea of Russian colonialism in relation to Belarus. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of the transformation of the intellectual from the “Lithuanian kin of Polish nation” to the “younger brother of the Russian” are apparently similar to the colonial and even to the postcolonial mechanisms. The Russification policy, the imposed idea of religious unity, Pan-Slavism, the “western-Russiannes” of our own vintage are all milestones on the pathway of the Belarusian intellectual. Armed with old 18th century dogmas of Russian historiography: about the ancient Kievan Rus’ nation united before the period of the feudal wars, the three brotherly ancestors of the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Belarusians the unifying mission of Moscow rulers, the peasant nature of Belarusian society. Yet the Belarusian intellectual could not borrow, and has not borrowed, the main passionate quest of the “Russian soul” for its “mission”, and it is torn between Europe and Asia. Instead, the tear in the Belarusian soul lies between Europe and Russia.

The Soviet historiographical heritage in Belarus still dominates – mainly on account of the state - supported conserving and reproducing of its clichés, styles and approaches. In this canal of historical consciousness, the school follows neo-Soviet orientations in history and references to Russia. Counterbalanced by history, “nationally-oriented” historians make their choice in favor of Europe: “We have always been in Europe”; “We had our own legal system – the Statute of the Great Duchy of Lithuania – from which even Moscow tsars borrowed”; “We had ancient the Belarusian language as a state language for a centuries”; “Belarus had its own Renaissance and Reformation”… Nevertheless both positions of “state-approved” and “nationally-oriented” Belarusian historiographies represent

the same discourse of referentiality, the same *structure*, although with different poles of attraction.

What, then, is the future of the idea of solidarity and its relation to identity? With further studies on *Zapadno-Russism* and its implications in society, there are still more questions than answers.

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PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Studies in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

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1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.

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The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Columbia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.

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