Philosophy and Spirituality across Cultures and Civilizations

Russian Philosophical Studies, VII

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The present development of a global outlook presents both challenges and opportunities. A new sense of individual identity cannot only enrich the sense of personal dignity, but endanger the social foundations upon which the values and virtues of the particular cultures rest. In turn, this can lead to a period of confusion, anomie and even lawlessness. This is especially true for the young who lack a mature experience of the values of their own tradition while exploring the unfamiliar and as yet unassimilated values of others.

These questions were discussed at the conference “Philosophy and Spirituality across Cultures and Religious Traditions” (April 19-21, 2012, Moscow) organized by the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of History of Philosophy and Centre of Comparative Studies for Education in Humanities) in collaboration with The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) and the Confédération Mondiale des Institutions Universitaires Catholique de Philosophie.

The participants tried to explore the deeper spiritual roots of cultures East and West. In particular they searched for ways of understanding what it means to be human, or a philosophical anthropology; how human life can be lived with justice, dignity and responsibility, or a philosophical ethics; and the spiritual foundations of values and virtues, or a metaphysics for our global times. A point of special interest was the modes of relating the emerging sense of individual identity to the rich commitments to community and social life which mark the many traditions, and of sharing such insights with the younger generation in their formative years.

In the first part of the book devoted to philosophical diversity in unity, the Russian approach, as well as the European, Asian and Middle East Traditions are analyzed.

In her article “Contemporary Challenges to Traditional Values and Virtues: A Russian Case” Marietta Stepanyants analyzes the future role of Russia in the world. Many Russians cherish hope for the return of their motherland to the status of a superpower which the Soviet Union, along with the United States, had in the past century. Others, on the contrary, are convinced that globalization poses a real threat to what they call “the Russian civilization”. Finally, there are those who expect Russia to become one of the poles in a multi-polar world. The author tries to consider which of the above scenarios is real and desirable.

Michail Maslin in “Eurasianism as a Post-revolutionary Variant of the Russian Idea” examines the classical Eurasianism of Russian emigrants that arose in the early 1920s in Europe and spread in places where emigrants took up residence. In order to grasp and to investigate national psychology Eurasianists created a special legal philosophy based on specific concepts.
“Russian destiny” was not meant as a nationalist doctrine like national-socialism but as a “project for the future” oriented on keeping in wholeness all existing civilizations in their “flowering complexity”. This problem is of great importance for the modern world and therefore one can evaluate Eurasianism and its version of the Russian idea as a positive variety of non-aggressive anti-Westernism and anti-globalism standing for the dialogue of civilizations.

In “Vladimir Solovyev: Justification for Philosophy” Vladimir Serbinenko examines the attitude of several Russian philosophers to the famous Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyev. He points out that almost every one of the greatest Russian metaphysicians, recognizing the importance of Solovyev’s ideas for their own works, challenged and criticized certain aspects of his teaching. This is true even of representatives of the metaphysics of unity, of which Solovyev is considered the founder. They argued, criticized and tried to understand. They found, of course, not only contradictions, but also something that could be and became a reference point for further philosophical movement. The author of the article poses the question: whether this corresponds to the position of Solovyev himself?

Vasily Vanchugov in his work “Synthesis of Theology and Science in the Philosophy of History by Lev Karsavin” makes an attempt at combining science and the theology of the famous Russian philosopher Lev Karsavin in his book Philosophy of History. This attempt is interesting from the historical and historical-philosophic prospectives. Karsavin as a professional historian attempted to bring a metaphysical view to history as a science, which resulted in changes in methodology. His attempt at philosophizing on the basis of history left a certain trace in the history of philosophy as continuing the tradition of the philosophy of all-unity, he created the concept of a ‘symphonic personality’, which manifests itself in the historical process.

The paper of Irina Tsvyk “V.D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s Theological and Philosophical System” is devoted to analyses of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s philosophical teaching and his creative activities, which reworked in the Orthodox spirit contemporary West European philosophy. He included the most interesting and suitable ideas from the structure of religious consciousness and used them to expound religious ideas and in brief to lend an ecclesial character to European philosophy. In the author’s opinion, Kudryavtsev-Platonov successfully fulfilled the task that confronted ecclesiastical-academic thought in general, namely, to develop a system in the spirit of the Orthodox tradition and include in his system the Cartesian idea of the transcendental origin of innate ideas, as well as Kant’s teaching on categories and a priori forms of sensuality and reason, and Jacobi’s ideas of faith as direct knowledge and religious-sensual origin of philosophy.

Elena S. Grevtsova in her paper “The Basic Issues of Human Life in N.I. Pirogov’s Philosophy” attempts to provide evidence that Nikolay Pirogov belongs to the existential tradition of the Russian philosophy of the nineteenth century – from the idealism of “philosophic revival” of the 1830-
40s to the materialism and positivism of the 1860s, and the “metaphysical turn” of the 1870-80s intended to resolve problems of world outlook. In one way or another all the above eras of the Russian thought were reflected in his philosophical work answering to questions of his own and the entire Russian life. Pirogov was one of the pioneers of original religious and philosophical thought of the second half of the nineteenth century whose ideas echoed subsequent theories of V.S. Solovyev, L.M. Lopatin, N.O. Lossky, P.A. Florensky and S.L. Frank.

In his article “Aristotelian Reading of Hegel and Hegelian Readings of Aristotle in Formulation of ‘Work of Art’” Ahmadreza Motamedi points out that dialectical negation and affirmation (Hegel) is the actualization of an objects’ capability and potentiality (Aristotle), which is realized in artistic creation. Comprehensive unity of object and subject, mind and matter, and Hegelian essential becoming of the “mind” is the same as Aristotelian “potentiality”. The artist’s talent and genius are his ability to intuit capabilities of the world and the phenomena he sees. When Hegel tells us that when we are standing before a work of art it is as if we are standing before a level of the “Mind”, in Aristotle’s terminology he is stating, that we are standing before an aspect of “potentiality”, which has been previously perceived, actualized and determined by the artist’s genius.

The paper of Wilhelm Dancă “Faith and Reason according to Antonio Rosmini” is devoted to an Italian philosopher and theologian, Antonio Rosmini (1797-1855) and to the interpretation of his understanding of the relation between faith and reason. In a mutually helpful manner this relation can be realized on the basis of a creationist metaphysics where the person’s dynamism represents the ultimate principle of history and society. For Rosmini, ‘human reason’ is assimilated to the lumen mentis spoken about in the Introduction to the Gospel of John. With the help of this natural light, man perceives the two aspects of the concept of participation, namely that of the gift ex parte participants and that of spiritual and intellectual energy ex parte fruentis. These two aspects must be kept together under the law of synthesis lest we run the risk of losing sight of the participant’s divine character or the intellectual excellence and spiritual dignity of the human person.

Jeanna Kamat in “Relationship as an Essential Aspect of Human Nature in the Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand” writes on the legacy of the catholic thinker Dietrich von Hildebrand (XX century) and his understanding of love. Although the absolute intensity of love would seem to be the domain of the saints, nevertheless the insights into the various forms of love which von Hildebrand presents clarify what love is and especially point out love’s personal nature and the joy that comes of being seen and affirmed in one’s uniqueness. Also of great value is his insistence on reciprocity or at least its hope in order for there to be any foundation for the reality of love. Above all is the singular value of love of neighbor because it has the power to touch and uplift persons through the eradication
of indifference, the recognition of preciousness, and the creation of a quiet spirit of solidarity and trust in the world.

Michail Khorkov’s “Metaphysics and Spirituality in the History of Philosophical Anthropology and Contemporary Phenomenology of the Human Person” elaborates the idea of person, which resides in the image of other human beings as the mental object of “he/she”-represented like “I” in every perception of “You.” The more man thinks of his person on the model of something like metaphysics, the less he will be able to accept his knowledge of himself as being genuinely knowledge of his person which is not of that kind of knowledge. Every attempt to explain knowledge of the person as knowledge that has itself as object of knowledge fades because every human individual, given the way he thinks of knowledge of himself, can no longer make sense of his personality. In other words, even if someone thinks metaphysically of an indefinite and not fixed human personality, he will concurrently imagine a human being of definite quality. This means that it is impossible to think of a human person without thinking of this person as a human being.

Andrey Smirnov in “Happiness as Self-realization: Two Islamic Approaches” treats the theme of the quest for sa’āda or “happiness”, which was a general concern of Islamic culture in its classical period. One of the very important questions for this quest was the way that leads to happiness or in other words, the question about the technology of the transition from the state of being captured in this world of suffering to the world of bliss. The author analyzes the two basically different answers to that question: the first emphasizes the need for perfecting the soul, while the other answer is both similar and strikingly different. It is similar in its stress on the need of self-subsistence. The difference is that the quest for self-subsistence is not backed by the theory of human soul as a perfect substance. Rather, the way to happiness, eternal bliss and self-subsistence is self-disclosure. To disclose the self, we do not need to add anything to what we have but to do something different, namely, to make appear what is darkened and veiled. If we manage to get rid of those obstacles that blur and dim our self, we reach the goal of self-disclosure. This understanding of the way to happiness is proposed by the greatest Şūfī philosopher, Ibn ‘Arabī, and by the founder of the Ishrāqiyya school, al-Suhrawardī.

In his article “Nationalism and Islam Opposition in the Formation of Muslim Political Ideology in Arabian Countries” Alexander Rodrigez assesses the question of Nationalism in the Arabian countries, which developed in two directions: mainly on an Arab Islamic and on a secular basis. Looking for the national identity regional and secular forms of nationalism are compelled to address the Arab Muslim heritage, whence they take necessary symbols, banners and names.

The paper of Pavel Basharin “Relations between Human and Divine Natures in Iranian Sufi Tradition” deals with the famous Sufi thinker al-Husein b. al-Mansour al-Hallaj (858-922) and his most famous sentence “I am the True” (“ana’l-haqq”). This sentence caused many interpretations and
was the basis for numerous charges. Historians and fuqahā’ who mentioned this expression criticized it. They asserted that al-Ḥallāj adhered to the doctrine of the incarnation of the divine nature in human nature and unity with God. In the author’s opinion, al-Ḥallāj’s recognition could not draw charges of disbelief and godlessness because all confusion of divine and human natures had been removed. Henceforth in the Eastern Muslim world anāʾl-Haqq ceased to be a claim of divinity.

Ruzana Pskhu in “Integration of Philosophy and Spirituality in Medieval India (based on the ‘Vedarthasamgraha’ of Ramanuja)” offers an analysis of a basic text of the Vedanta tradition and tries to show the specific features of the ideological struggle accompanying the formation of one of the major philosophical trends of Indian Philosophy. The best example of a wedding of philosophy and spirituality is to be found in the Middle Age India, or more precisely in the Vishishta-advaita-vedanta, philosophical system of the great Vaishnava thinker Ramanuja (XI-XII). This was a religious and philosophical reaction against the Advaita-vedanta of Shankara (VIII-IX). But though the Advaita system is mainly a philosophical system without any religious pretensions (in spite of the fact that Shankara was a Shaiva philosopher), the Vishishta-advaita is considered as a religious turn or ‘religious revolution’ in the history of Vedanta philosophy. This historical event can throw light on the attitude between a philosophy and a spirituality (which in this case is synonymous with the realization of certain religious values).

The second part of the book contains philosophical analyses of contemporary challenges in civil society through attempts to overcome existing stereotypes, to explain philosophy and spirituality across ethical values, as well as to search for an aesthetic context for spirituality

In “Civil Society: Overcoming Stereotypes” Nur Kirabaev points out that philosophical understanding of contemporary problems of civil society in the context of globalization requires an answer to the following important question: how to relate a globalization that focuses on the value of a general unity and expresses a single world economic and political system with the supremacy of the nation-state forms of management and the domination of differentiation on cultural ground, as well as pluralism in society? The article is devoted to an analysis of three postulates of globalization theories which seem to be the most questionable: the crisis of the traditional model of the state and the reduction of its role, modernization as Westernization – the natural result of globalization; and “democratic unipolarity” as the preferred method of social self-organization.

Yury Pochta’s article “Civilization Foundation of Civil Society in the Muslim World: The Russian Experience” is devoted to finding an answer to the question of the possibility of creating civil society’s liberal democratic model in non-Western societies. The author pays attention to the need to take into account the coexistence in the modern world of societies at different stages of social development, in particular, the coexistence of several pre-secular cultures (Islamic, Confucian) and liberal democracy as a
post-secular phenomenon of Western culture. In his view, not the modern, but a postmodern view of the history of society and culture can help to overcome the stereotypes in the opposition of an authoritarian East to the democratic West, faith to reason, and traditionalism to modernism. It is possible to assume that democratic development may take many forms, since each culture is able to create its own model of democracy. Taking international experience into account, Russia has still to seek its own forms of democracy, overcoming a mechanical borrowing from foreign values and institutions, which in practice turn into a simulacrum of the liberal-democratic socio-political system.

Pyotr Grechko in “Civic Dignity and the Ethnic Umbilical Cord of History” deals with the analysis of the basic distinction between homo ethnikos and homo civicus. It is important to distinguish between ethnos and ethnicity. Sometimes they are equated or used interchangeably, but it is more productive to differentiate them. Ethnos is Gemeinschaft (≈ community), i.e., a historically established association of people having a common (real or mythical) origin, sharing a common culture (values, beliefs, traditions, customs, etc.) and perceiving themselves as a distinct unity with a dignity of its own. In some cases “a shared feeling of peoplehood” (Milton M. Gordon) is decisive. In this connection the author disagrees with those authors who define ethnos in natural or biological terms. There is nothing, he says, we can or should do about ethnicity, except let it quietly evolve to its historical end. But it is necessary to work constantly over citizenry, civic virtues, and national structures erected on their basis, developing, deepening and increasing their transformative potential. Along this way we have the best chances to enter into a stable and safe social development towards a common and pluralistically universal future.

In her article “Civil Society from the Perspective of Historical and Conceptual Changes” Elizaveta Zolotareva underlines that the increased interest and attention of researchers, politicians and the public in civil society at the present time could be explained by the logic of updating institutional forms and cognitive schemes through reflexive rethinking there-upon. The variety of conceptual interpretations of civil society developed “to the East and West of the Elbe”, and the differences in the articulation of its most important characteristics – individual freedom and communitarian solidarity – to which. A. Seligman directed attention in his “Civil Society as idea and ideal” create the space for continuing critical public and professional, political and theoretical discourses aimed at identifying points of “intersections between civilizations” and at the formation of effective public policy for mobilizing civil society.

The article of Vladimir Ivanov “The Natural Rate of Education as a Factor of Political Stability as an Emerging Global Challenge” contains hypotheses about the increasing level of influence of the system of tertiary education on the stability of political regimes in many modern countries. In order to reveal the mechanism of such influence the author proposes the concept “natural rate of education” which reflects optimal balance between
the labor market and the educational system from the perspective of avoiding social protests and instability. The author supposes that the stabilizing function of the system of tertiary education is caused by its role as the specific regulator of labor market and its ability to involve millions of young males by providing them long-term occupation. Under the state policy this stabilizing function may be enormously exaggerated and even reach the point of becoming counterproductive.

João J. Vila-Chã devoted his article “The Meaning of Love: Explorations on the Role of Philosophy in Spirituality” to an analysis of Love from the aspect of the correlation between philosophy and spirituality. The author believes that to think of Philosophy in relation to Spirituality is, ultimately, to delve into the question of a metaphysics centered upon the hermeneutics of the human condition understood in terms of radical being-with, Mit-sein (so richly analyzed in Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit). The role that Philosophy as such can play in the discernment of new ways for achieving Spirituality, both East and West, cannot be dissociated from a project that gains understanding of the correlation between what we might call an anatomy of love and the proper sense of an anatomy of being. The author is convinced that the achievement of a Philosophical Spirituality and of a Spiritual Philosophy does not find a better form of proceeding than just trying to shed light upon that meaningful dichotomy we find in the terms of both love and being, including being-in-love.

Ozanan Vicente Carrara intends to show in “Ethical Responsibility in Jonas and Levinas” how ethical responsibility is thought within the philosophical projects of Jonas and Levinas. Departing from the way both thinkers elaborate their ethics, he exposes their different conceptions of Ethics, Ontology and Metaphysics and the way they relate to each other. These conceptions make them go in different directions in their reflections in spite of some convergences. Both give to responsibility a fundamental place in their ethics, which allowed for some parallels in the way they conceived the structure of ethical responsibility. After treating some fundamental aspects of the foundation of their ethics, the author also relates responsibility and nature, in search of a new posture towards nature.

Vladimir Tsvyk in “Professional Morals in Modern Society” treats modern conceptions of professional morals its nature and essence, as well as its genesis, specificity and role in modern society. The dynamics of the social processes in modern society and the increase in their complexity requires of the employee, not only such qualities as honesty, integrity, responsibility, and self-control, but also “moral security”, that is, the ability to quickly respond to unusual situations. In addition, specialists must also continuously improve their operations by expanding horizons; enhancing general and professional culture and competence; they must be willing not only to acquire new experience, but also to transmit it to others. All of these are requirements of labor ethics, along with facing specific professional challenges are included in the system of modern professional morals. Professionalism today requires not only adherence to professional moral stan-
standards but becomes also the basis of moral respect of the employee for the profession.

The paper of Tatiana Alexina “The Value of Time and Eternity in Traditional, Modern and Postmodern Cultures” is devoted to an analysis of different concepts of time (in relation to eternity and to the present moment), which in their turn produce different types of spirituality with their own ideas of happiness and the meaning of life. In fact, every culture creates its own specific set of values and meanings by which it seeks to overcome the passage of time. For example, modern time has lost the spiritual character of traditional cultures and forgotten all about eternity. In postmodern culture, there is the prospect of mastering multi-dimensional virtual time, and of combining many forms of spirituality, including a mythological eternity. The author considers in detail the major concepts of time and eternity in traditional, modern and postmodern cultures.

In his article “Symbolism of Cultures and the Spiritual Archetype of Humankind” Sergey Nizhnikov analyzes general principles which unite all human cultures and all people, but without losing the specific peculiarities of each. Indeed, owing to the variety of cultures the spiritual archetype of humankind is more fundamental and colorful.

Jack Harte in “Unravelling the Spiral, Embracing the Serpent” deals with the spiral symbol, which was a favourite motif of Fred Conlon (died in 2004). His sense of awe at the mystery of life and at the beauty of nature can best be understood if related to the inspiration of our ancestors to create the Newgrange monument. In his stone sculptures of the spiral, he strives to capture that mystical centre, that turning point where anti-clockwise movement gracefully rotates into a clockwise movement, the negative into the positive, and decay into growth. As a devout Pagan/Christian he suggests the majestic power of nature/God manifested in this mystical rotation.
PART I

PHILOSOPHY: DIVERSITY IN UNITY
1.1 Russian Approach
CHAPTER I

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO TRADITIONAL VALUES AND VIRTUES: A RUSSIAN CASE

MARIETTA STEPANYANTS

The future of the global world order is certainly unclear. There are possibilities of different scenarios. What role or place in the future is destined for Russia? Many Russians cherish hope for the return of their motherland to the status of a superpower which the Soviet Union, along with the United States, had in the past century. Others, on the contrary, are convinced that globalization poses a real threat to what they call “the Russian civilization”. Finally, there are those who expect Russia to become one of the poles in a multi-polar world.

Which of the above scenarios is real and desirable? Let’s start with the first one. It should be recognized that the existence of superpowers does not always go along with the life of humanity. It definitely is closely connected with particular circumstances. Among the superpowers in the past there were Ancient Egypt, the Empire of Alexander the Great, and the Roman Empire. History proves that, once having lost the role of a superpower, none could ever get it back.

However, Russians often hold another view deeply rooted in a belief that Russia is predestined to a particular mission. After the fall of Constantinople the Russian church strongly promoted the idea of being the God-chosen guardian of Christian teaching in its purity. The Russian monarchy called Moscow the “Third Rome” and stated that it would not ever be replaced by a “Fourth Rome” since the Russian Kingdom would stand until the end of the world.

Later, after the revolution of 1917, the Soviet authorities actively promoted the messianic role of the USSR in the liberation of humanity from exploitation and inequality: the old world will be destroyed down to the ground, and then, we shall build a new world.

Some of those who are well aware that, in the near future, the leading role of Russia as a military and economically strong power is unreal still are hoping that it could play the role of a spiritual guide.

Equally ominous, in this sense, is the position of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). For many years it has been engaged in formulating a common value basis for “Russian civilization”, which refers to the “Russian world” in a wide sense – the world of all those who share common values. Some of these values have already been claimed: “religious belief and inter-religious peace, freedom and morality, self-sacrifice for the sake of others,
strong family ties, respect for elders, creativity, hard work, fairness, Patriotism, caring about the environment”. (Kirill, 2011:8)

The Russian Orthodox Church believes that, just as the United States formulated its mission as a community of freedom, “the overriding mission of Russia could be defined as upholding Truth in the world”. It provides an enhanced understanding of the word “Truth”, which includes the notions of truth, justice, righteousness.

The above mentioned values are unquestionable; however, there are at least two questions. First, are not these very values universal? And secondly, to what extent are we following the declared values?

Let us take the most concrete and understandable values like “strong family”, “equity” and “caring about the environment”. According to publicly available statistics and daily news events none of these values is in fact characteristic of modern Russian life. On the contrary, the departure from them is accelerating on a large scale. In order to carry the mission in relation to others, one must first follow ideals by oneself and demonstrate progress in their implementation.

It should be remembered that the real status of the superpower the Soviet Union and the United States obtained during the cold war time was due to the splitting up into two camps in which those two countries held dominant military supremacy. Consequently, the USSR stayed as a superpower from 1945 until 1990. Forty-five years in comparison with a thousand-year period of Russian history is such a small period that it would be justified to admit: “There has not been any long aged tradition of being a superpower. There is only a habit of thinking like that and there is the memory shared by two generations which was passed to their children, grandchildren, and grand-grandchildren.” (Spasskiy, 2011:29)

The return to the status of a superpower would not mean a return to a tradition, but rather a restoration of “the cold war”, in which the position of the USSR as a superpower became possible. To reverse history is impossible, and efforts to implement that are disastrous.

The second scenario which involves the loss by Russia of its identity is equally dubious. We are sheltered from it by the vastness of the territory, the geopolitical location between the East and the West, virtually inexhaustible natural resources, a large number of highly educated people, and a truly rich cultural heritage.

Indeed, more realistic and more desirable is the third scenario: to become a country serving the welfare of its citizens, a State which would be taken into consideration by others in determining world politics. The preference for selecting this scenario is manifested by recent sociological research.

The question posed in 2010 by the Levada Center: “Do you support the view that Russia must regain its status as a great empire?” The answer “Definitely yes” and “Yes” was given by 78 percent; “ Likely” and “Definitely no” by 17 percent of those who were questioned. However, in reply to the question: “What do you prefer: a good life in a normal country or the
life in a military super-power?” The Russians choose the first. Alexei Levinson – the head of socio-cultural research division of the Levada Center believes that the current inhabitants of the Russian Federation and their leaders seriously do not believe in the restoration of the former empire, and wish just to live well. Yet a symbolic compensation for the loss of the former status is desired by many (Levinson, 2011:48).

To become a State for the wellbeing of its citizens and at the same a State which would be considered in determining the course of world affairs is not an easily achievable task. However, some, like F.W. Shelov-Kovedâev – Professor of the State University-higher school of Economics, former first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, delude themselves by believing that Russia is able to become the locomotive of world developments, a leading intellectual and creative power. It can take a position in the forefront of building a global information, transport and energy networks, and thereby restore the status of world power.” (Shelov-Kovedyaev, 2006:32)

But this optimism is unlikely to be warranted. Do not rely on the forecasts of international or national sectors of other countries. Our fellow citizens may find their subjective opinions, deliberately degrading to the role of Russia. Turn to the forecast of domestic professionals, worthy of respect and trust. In early 2011, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences presented “Strategic Global Forecast-2030.” (Dynkin, 2011:153-170)

Commenting on the above mentioned Forecast, the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin, claims that in the near future world leadership will increasingly depend on the ability to produce a variety of public goods, not just on the ability to destroy, as was the case with the “greatness” of powers over the previous two centuries. The most important indicator will become the scientific and technical capacity of countries, the openness and the viability of their cultures, the dynamism and attractiveness of their way of life. Only the countries which are able to demonstrate to others a model or inspiration will rise up. The future of Russia then looks alarmingly grim since Russian modernization remains mainly the modernization of political language and style (Trenin, 2011).

To avoid marginalization of Russia, first of all, it is necessary to change radically its economics, to raise the standard of living of the citizens. This is possible only with a high level of modernization. The question, however, is what model should be chosen?

This question is not new for Russia. In the 19th century, Russian society was divided so that some, like Peter Chaadaev, were convinced that “you cannot be civilized without following the European model”, (Chaadaev, 89:28) while the others insisted: the main task for Russia is not to become dependent on the West, but to safeguard its particularity (Konstantin Leontiev).

While the controversy continues in the same spirit today, we cannot fail to recognize that at the official level the choice has already been made:
Russia seeks to follow the Western model. One should remember that Russia has made a choice in favor of westernization a number of times. But each time it failed to bring the process to a conclusion. Two examples are particularly relevant. In the 10th century under the rule of Prince Vladimir (980-1015) adoption of Christianity as the state religion allowed Kiev Rus to join the Western community. However, this opportunity was not fully utilized for a variety of reasons both of external and internal order. In the end, the chance was lost: Mongol invasion and Mongol Golden Horde rule for nearly three centuries virtually isolated Russia from the West.

The second example is “the opening of a window to Europe” by Peter the Great (1689-1725). Despite the significant achievements of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great (1726-96), and Alexander II (1855-81) in reforming social, economic and political systems, Russia did not become completely westernized. Further progress was blocked by the October revolution. A preference was given to the Soviet socialist model of development. As a result, for almost seven decades Russia was virtually isolated from the West by the iron curtain.

“Perestroika” which was started by Gorbachev led to the disintegration of the Socialist system and to the fall of the iron curtain. However Gorbachev and his supporters did not have a clear vision of the future path of development: the idea of building “socialism with a human face” was unrealistic.

The euphoria from the changes that brought democratization did not last long. The deterioration of the economic situation and the lack of prospects for radical improvement changed the mood of the people. Momentary outbreaks of new expectations arose in connection with the 1991 events. But subsequent privatization and market reforms have badly hit the population as a whole. Although in general, the Russians live better than in the Soviet Union, income inequality is increasing rapidly. If, in 1992, income of 10 percent of the population – the poorest Russians – was 8 times less than the income of the richest citizens (the other 10 percent of the population), by 2008, the difference increased 16.9 times.

Corruption has surpassed all limits. According to the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation in 2000, its level was 35-37 billion US dollars. For six years, i.e. by the year 2006, the level of corruption had increased to 240-260 billion dollars, i.e. seven times! Each Russian family had to “pay” the corrupt system five thousand dollars.

The sociologists note that society, as a result of what is happening, has turned into a situation that can be evaluated as a “moral wilderness” which is manifested in cynicism, in the crisis of collectivism, in loss of family values (increase in the divorce rate, orphanages, etc), in large scale violence and crime, in distrust of the State and its institutions. (Yasin, 2008)

You cannot expect successful economic development and prosperity a “moral wilderness”. In addition, rapid and effective modernization implies a collective motivation. A group of leading experts has shown that there is a set of values that stand in the way of economic, political and social develop-
ment, generating a collective lack of motivation to such kind of development.

In 2005, Russian researchers were requested to build up a cultur-specific methodology of the study and interpretation of the structural values of the Russian culture, as well as to identify the dynamics of the structure of the underlying values of Russians (1999-2005), its influence on economic and social behavior of the Russian citizens.

The values shared by two generations of the Russians (students and their parents) in various regions of Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Penza, a town Dalashov in the Saratov region) were measured. The measurements have shown that the value structure shared by Russians during the period from 1999 to 2005 was stable in maintaining the seven most important factors that determine the value of motivation.

1. **Security** (national and family safety, world peace, law and order, courtesy, respect for elders, health, social justice, respect for traditions, well-being). This same block primarily motivates the desire for stability of the social system.

2. **Self-realization** (successfulness, responsibility, autonomy in the choice of targets, independence, breadth of vision, ambition, curiosity). This block reflects the need for personal achievements in the development of their own intelligence and skills, independence, and exciting work to realize personal life choices and ambitions.

3. **Simplicity** (modesty, satisfaction with one's own place in life, commitment, ability to forgive, moderation, mutual assistance, honesty). Those factors indicate group harmony and collective coherence through self-restraint. It is believed that here we have the impact of traditional Orthodox values—"humility".

4. **Spirituality** (unity with nature, love of beauty, spiritual life, environmental protection, courage, creativity, loyalty).

5. **Hedonism**.

6. **Domination** (willingness to move forward using all means, even on the heads of others).

7. **Harmony** (internal harmony with oneself, self-respect, right to privacy, along with a sense of social identity).

Sociological survey conducted in 1999 and 2005, showed some changes in value orientations. Security became the top priority due to the rise of threats to human life like terrorism, social and economic instability.

Self-realization from the fifth place has moved up to the second. It is a good indication that the motivation for achievements, professionalism and personal welfare of Russians has become almost as important as security.

Simplicity has lost its previous significance by moving from the first place to the third. Spirituality fell one step below. Hedonism and Domination have moved from second place respectively to the fifth and the sixth. Harmony continued to remain in the system of values on the seventh place.
There is no doubt that the above values are important for successful economic development. However, it is equally obvious that they are less significant than those values from which they derive. They are derivative, belonging to what may be called “thin culture”. “Thin culture” has its roots in the past. But this does not preclude its dynamic, constructive nature. The values of “the thin culture” are empirical; they occur in response to socio-economic changes. (Mishler, Pollack)

Culture is a multilayered phenomenon. Its main attributes are conventionally called “thick”. Moving from the nucleus to the periphery they will gradually get thin. Thick is the fundamental nature of culture: cultural meanings are rooted in history, deeply embedded in social institutions and practices. (Geertz, 1963) Thick culture is given. It precedes and produces both institutions and practices.

The efforts to identify the core of Russian culture, hence of the national character, were taken many times. One could make the full list of examples that confirm the difficulty of determining what constitutes the nucleus of Russian nature and its culture. It is no accident that our people often quote the Great Russian poet Fyodor Tyutchev: “Russia cannot be understood by reason, one can only believe in it”. This formula was elaborated in the report entitled “Russian national character” by B. Visheslavtsev (1877-1954) which he made at one of the philosophy conferences in Rome in 1923. It says: “We [the Russians] are interesting, but incomprehensible for the West and perhaps, therefore, are especially interesting. Even we do not fully understand ourselves, and perhaps incomprehensibility, the irrationality of actions represents the feature of our nature.” (Visheslavtsev, 1995:113) B. Visheslavtsev claimed that the character of the people reflects an unconscious level in the subconscious. In his view, it is particularly characteristic for the Russians, since in their hearts the area of the subconscious holds an exclusive place.

As is well known, the area of the subconscious is almost incomprehensible. Much easier to understand the values related to peripheral sectors, i.e., the thin or to “fine culture.” Though these values are often constructed from above, by those who hold power, they have a huge (if not critical) impact on the development of the society as a whole.

Such a “construct” was the triad: “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Narodnost (Patriotism)”, which under Nicholas I (1825-1855) became the ideological doctrine of the Russian Empire. Paradoxically, the October revolution of 1917 which radically changed all the sides of the social life and destroyed its ideological pillars, however, failed to “uproot” them completely. Hence the previous “pillars” were replaced by the “new” which grew up from the rhizome of the old roots. Christian orthodoxy was replaced by the dogmas of Marxist-Leninist ideology; Autocracy – by Communist dictatorship; Narodnost – by Soviet patriotism.

At the beginning of Perestroika its proponents tried to advance as a national idea the building of “socialism with a human face”. A few years later, at the official level, it was stated that the ideology (and thus a common
national idea) was redundant, in fact, harmful. Soon, however, the “search for the national idea” started once again.

From time to time the claims are made that the national idea was found. Thus, Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov optimistically declared that “Russia has completed the arduous task, ongoing since the early 1990’s, the formation of a new system of values that define the intellectual society for the coming millennium. For the first time since the proclamation of the new Russia, we have been able to articulate a clear answer that is key for all the people and the State: Who are we? Where should we go? In what society we want to live?” (Ivanov, 2006:4) The response to the above questions make the triad of national values: “Sovereign democracy, strong economy and military power”.

Of course, the word “value” is polysemous. It can, for example, mean market value – the price of the goods, or a pragmatic value – pragmatic relevance of one or another political action. But it is not this kind of values that is taken into consideration when it comes to the “national idea”.

It is true that Russians are concerned about the political status of their state, they wish to live in an economically prosperous country without fear for safety. But, as evidenced by the results of opinion polls, Russians are most concerned about “loss of moral values, immorality”.¹

Pragmatic calculation, whether material or political, is able to bring together groups of people interested in practical benefits. Yet it is unable to serve the cause of national reunification around inspirational ideas, principals, and ideals. That requires ethical motivation, which may be formulated only on the basis of the national cultural heritage, taking into account the requirements of the new times.

Equally striking is the claim that this triad constitutes a “special ideological project, competing for the right to determine the global agenda and further prospects of the entire humanity”. Actually that is a claim for the Russian “Imperial project” of globalization, which affirms the hegemony of the strong.

The ability to determine the prospects of the development of human-kind depends only partly on economic and military power. Russia is in a position to engage positively in the processes that shape the world, maintaining its own “face” with values that enable it, through a dialogue of cultures to contribute to building a civilization (or civilizations) of the future.

¹ According to the poll, conducted right before the G8 summit by the international agency “Eurasia Monitor” and the Global Market Insight Company, the Russians are mostly concerned of the following threats: 1) Spreading of terrorism – 54 percent; 2) The loss of national identity and tradition – 39 percent; 3) Mass unemployment and poverty – 44 percent; 4) The loss of moral values – 59 percent.
While efforts to find a common national idea should be continued, still it must be realized that a society is able to break through to a higher level of development not only through collective efforts. Consolidation and solidarity were particularly needed for response to aggression, for protection against threats from the outside. This was the case during the war. But in the context of globalization, we rather need to assert Russia’s authority by proposing adequate vision and options for shared answers to real-world challenges. (Shelov-Kovedyaev, 2006:28)

We have to adapt ourselves in such a way that, without losing our soul, to become capable of effective, successful participation in contemporary social processes. In addition, it cannot be forgotten that “cohesion” around common ideas brings a risk of “averaging”. Using the metaphor of modern Russian writer Vladimir Makanin, “averaging” can lead both to “the sunny and to the shadow sides of the mountains”.

Our recent tragic past should serve as a warning to everyone and to recall the importance of individual choice, personal efforts to perfection. Salvation from the “moral wilderness” described above, depends only on us. A huge role in this case belongs to literature, art, philosophy, i.e., to all the humanitarian spheres of public life. The principal resource of the future will be creativity, education and culture. But they are undervalued and economically disadvantage today. Policies in education, focusing on marginalization of Humanities that form the human creative and morally responsible person rather than merely a competitive individual will have devastating consequences.

Humanitarian components of social life are to be understood in the broad sense of culture. Culture brings together individuals in society and at the same time makes them individuals. By maintaining and developing culture we promote diversity of opportunity and that precisely means the progress.

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CHAPTER II

EURASIANISM AS A POST-REVOLUTIONARY VARIANT OF THE RUSSIAN IDEA

MICHAEL MASLIN

The “Russian idea” is a philosophical term, religious philosopher, conceptually described by V.S. Solovyov in 1887-1888. Before Solovyov the expression “Russian idea” was first used by F.M. Dostoyevsky in 1856 in a letter to A.N. Maikov, and in 1861 in subscribing to Time magazine. Philosophemes of the Russian idea were widely used by Russian thinkers in the late nineteenth and twentieth century, including Eurasians, for the interpretation of Russian identity. Culture, the national and global fate of Russia (for the Eurasians – Russia-Eurasia) and its Christian heritage and future, were all connected in the phrase.

A case in point here is a classical Eurasianism of the 20 and 30s of the twentieth century (N.S. Trubetsky, P.N. Savitsky, L.P. Karsavin, P.P. Suvchinsky, G.V. Vernadsky, N.N. Alekseev, etc). This article is devoted to classical Eurasianism of Russian emigrants that arose in the early 1920s in Europe and spread to places of emigrants’ residence – Sofia, Belgrade, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Prague, etc.

This kind of Eurasianism must be separated from different variants of post-Soviet neo-Eurasianisms which arose in the Russian Federation and in various parts of former Soviet Union. Contemporary comments often see no mental, cultural or political differences between classical and modern versions of Eurasianism. This erroneous position leads to essential distortions in understanding the émigré intellectual trend. Besides ignoring essential philosophical differences between varieties of Eurasianisms one can see the attempts to consider the theme in terms of political ideology. The famous French author Marlene Laruelle in her serial study on Eurasianism put forth a thesis about the central role of the notions “empire” and “Eurasianist imperialism” as the true essence of Eurasianism.

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1 See about the term “Russian idea” and it is modifications in the history of Russian thought: M.A. Maslin, The Russian Idea/Russian Philosophy. Encyclopedia (Moscow: 2007), pp. 474-476. Titles given in English translation.

Probably and actually some ideas of Eurasianism in perverted form are used nowadays in Russia and elsewhere by modern Russian or Turkic nationalists but these ideas have nothing in common with the classical post-revolutionary Eurasianism. Eurasianists critically evaluated both Roman-Germanic and Russian varieties of Empire, though this criticism did not spread to the cultural achievements of Empire in literature, art, science etc.

For classical Eurasianists the idea of Empire is Western and not Eurasian in origin, is borne by a “false nationalism” and must be totally rejected. Hence the Eurasianist – Byzantine idea since the eighteenth century was forcefully denied in the course of the European modernization of Russia. As a result the Russian Empire become the ally of its former enemy, Europe. That is why Nicholas Trubetskoy argued that the founder of the Russian Empire, Peter the Great, put “imperialism and national exclusiveness connected with the downing of the national and religious feelings”.

Agreeing with the slavophiles, Dostoevsky and Soloviev, that Russian culture and Russian fate are inextricably linked to Orthodoxy, Eurasianists were against the slavophile notions about the “Slavic-Russian world as a cultural unity.” Hence the Eurasianists replaced the concept of “Slavic-Russian cultural world” with the concept of “Eurasian-Russian cultural world,” because this last title is ethnically diverse and, includes the Slavic, and Turkic, Finno-Ugric, and Turanian elements. Russian identity is understood here not ethnically, but spatially.

The Russian idea after the 1917 revolution formed in new directions determined by rethinking the revolution as such by émigré thinkers. Former accents on Christian universalism of the Russian idea (Vladimir Soloviev) in terms of West-East Christian unity turned into arguing a proper Russian-Eurasian national, historic and metaphysical destiny and interests. Russian émigré philosophers such as Simon Frank, Ivan Iljin, Nicholas Berdyaev together with Eurasianist thinkers – Nicholas Trubetskoy, Peter Savitsky, George Florovsky, Leo Karsavin and others added some new developments to pre-revolutionary anti-Western moods.

The point is that the character of anti-Westernism had been based on various philosophical positions. Speaking summarily one can see two major paradigms which unified the multiplicity of émigré positions and produced two leading and irreconcilable types of consciousness i.e. pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary. Eurasianists decisively denied the very opportunity of the restoration of the Russian monarchy in any modernized form (as in Ivan Iljin’s project of so called an “organic monarchy”). Iljin argued that Empire and monarchy are historically approved Russian state and political forms which inevitably (in “organic way”) would be restored in the future. Therefore the 1917 Revolution must be evaluated as an occasional catastro-

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phic lap on the Russian historical road. Instead, Eurasianists offered views on Russia in terms of wholeness. Revolution according to Eurasianists is not an accident on the Russian road but a modern part of the whole Russian history. So Eurasianists were against expiration of the post-revolutionary period from the general course of Russian history.

Pre-Eurasianist and proto-Eurasianist moods existed long before its classical post-revolutionary form which arose in 1920s and 1930s. Proto-Eurasianism already existed in the writings of A.S. Khomyakov, N.Y. Danilevsky, K.N. Leontiev, V.I. Lamansky and others. Pre-Eurasianists stressed differences between Russia and Europe within the whole of Christian civilization (Khomyakov). Another view stressed differences between Russia and the Slavic parts of Europe against Roman-German Europe (Danilevsky). Eurasianists (Nicholas Trubetskoy and others) consider Russia as not part of Europe at all. Russia is Eurasia, not Europe nor Asia (Peter Savitsky).

The proof of the Eurasian essence of Russian civilization was seen in the very phenomenon of the 1917 Revolution which had been considered the end of Westernization and the return back to Russian-Eurasian historical standards. Communism and Marxism had been criticized by Eurasianists as a product of Westernization which turned Russia out from its native Eurasian historical road. The October revolution had been evaluated in that sense as an historically determined event but not as a coup d’etat and/or complot of anti-Russian foreign forces (“mirovaya zakulisa” in Iilin’s term) aimed to destroy the Russian Empire.

Classical Eurasianism brought some new accents which enlarged the content of the Russian idea as a specific philosopheme. Eurasianist metaphysical reasoning on the matter of the 1917 Revolution leads to a reconsideration of Soloviev’s version of the Russian idea based on East-West Christian unification. The enlargement meant creation of a new multi-disciplinary synthesis of philosophical, cultural, economic, theological, and other ideas in the humanities. Eurasianist movements became probably the most influential intellectual trend in post-revolutionary Russian emigration which caused much sympathy by outstanding persons: historians, artists, philosophers, musicians etc.4

Many intellectuals published articles in Eurasianist journals – S. Frank, G. Fedotov, V. Iljin, S. Timasev, R. Yakobson among them – though they were not proper members of Eurasian movement. George Florovsky even invented a special term to define the magnetic influence of Eurasianist ideas. He called it “evraziiskii soblazn” (Eurasian sin). It means a kind of appeal which is hard to resist. Vladimir Varshavsky the author of brilliant

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memos on the intellectual life in the Russian emigration movement remarked especially on the attractiveness of Eurasianists ideas. He explained it in encyclopedic Eurasianist writings embracing many subjects: history, culture, philosophy, religion etc. Therefore Varshavsky defined Eurasianism as a new encyclopedia of Russian life created in exile.5

Eurasianism stressed the determining role of geographic factors in the forming of the essential characteristics of Russia. Russia had been formed historically as purely continental, not maritime or coastal geographical and cultural unity. So the Russian mentality had been formed under its influence as a geographic place which determined the historical development of the Russian-Eurasian type of civilization (“continent-ocean” according Eurasianist term). Therefore to define Russian self-identification one must see the concepts “place” and “development” in organic unity (using the Russian term “mestorazvitie” which means “place” and “development” together, simultaneously). (The English translation of the term as “place-development” is a mere approximation).

As a result some members of the Eurasianist movement created a new class of humanitarian disciplines with the prefix “geo”: “geoeconomics,” “geopolitics”, and “geosophy”. The latter means special kind of metaphysical-spatial thought which aims to reveal the close correlation between the place of ethnic being and the mentality of the Eurasian and not only Eurasian people. So classical Eurasianism of 1920s and 1930s developed further the philosopheme of the Russian idea by broadening its former metaphysical content. The original Eurasianist synthesis made a new version of the old philosopheme i.e., a synthesis of various ideas in the humanities.

Analyzing the intellectual life of post-revolutionary Russian emigration one must see the constant struggle for leadership between various persons and groups. Ivan Bunin commented on this struggle for existence as follows: “Emigrants need no food. They eat one another”. So in order “to say their own word” representatives of different intellectual and ideological groups must make various shocking and extravagant statements in order to attract attention in the émigré “market of ideas”. Eurasianists did this like other intellectuals in emigration. From the very beginning of its appearing as a collective intellectual trend (“Exodus to the East”. Sofia, 1921) Eurasianists (N. Trubetskoy, P. Savitsky, G. Florovsky, P. Suvchinsky) attracted common attention.

Instead of a universally known thesis (from the works of N.M. Karamzin) on the extremely negative influence of the Mongol invasion on the Kievan Rus, Eurasianists made declarations about the Mongols positive role in the course of Russian history. Peter Savitsky even said that the very existence of Russia without “tatarschina” (i.e., the Tatar invasion) would be

impossible. Nicholas Trubetskoy, commonly called the founder of Eurasianism, said this in private letters and contradicted his public statements made in newspapers and magazines and his own scholarly “treatises”. The public side of Eurasianism later often looked very “naïve” in his own words. Eurasianists belonged to younger generations of Russian emigration which consider representatives of the older generation (Nicholas Berdyaev, Ivan Iljin, Peter Struve, Paul Milukov and others) to be outmoded prerevolutionary thinkers. Unlike the representatives of “pre-revolutionary point of view” Eurasianists consciously presented “post-revolutionary point of view”.

Eurasianists pretended not without reason to be leading representatives of post-revolutionary consciousness in Russian émigré circles. Eurasianism attracted first class thinkers such as philologist count Nicholas Trubetstskoy, historian George Vernadsky, philosopher Leo Karsavin, theologian George Florovsky. Needless to say, Eurasianism like other Russian intellectual trends such as slavophilism and populism had never been monolithic – in political, ideological or metaphysical senses. In a strict sense integral Eurasianism did not occur at all because of its multipartite intellectual structure and because of the independent characters of its leaders. So one can speak about an Eurasianism of Trubetkskoy, a Eurasianism of Savitsky, an Eurasianism of Karsavin so on. Eurasianists struggled over outer opponents rather successfully by using various means (seminars, journals, collective statements etc.). But there was no integrity in their own intellectual organization.

Contradictions in the Eurasianist movement had been softened only partly by publishing collective manifestos that presented Eurasianism as a whole intellectual trend. After the publication of the collective works “Eurasianism (an Attempt of Systematic consideration), 1926” and “Eurasianism (Formulation of 1927)” seeming Eurasianist unity had been destroyed by the so-called “Clamart concision” (1928-1929) that was provoked by leftist group of Peter Suvchinsky. (Clamart is a place near Paris commonly known as the centre of Eurasianist activities in printing and distribution of Eurasianist books, leaflets, journals etc.). Actually the “Clamart concision” did not mean the end of the Eurasianist movement because besides Paris there were other places of Eurasianist activities in different parts of Europe. The most active until the beginnings of World War II was the Prague group held by Peter Savitsky. But despite many contradictions, all Eurasianists expressed solidarity in stressing the non-ethnic and anti-nationalist interpretation of the Russian idea. They followed Konstantin Leontiev in denial of “abstract and romantic panslavism” as a false version of the Russian idea. The core of Eurasianist critics on panslavism was demonstrated by the European (former protestant)

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origin of panslavist ideology which arose in Austria from Western Slavs and not in Russia. Eurasianists argued that the Russian idea in the Slavic dimension first declared in seventeenth century by Yuri Krizhanich had lost its unifying sense. The reason primarily is that there is no confessional harmony between Slavs. Slavs are not only members of the Orthodox Church, like Russians and Serbs, but also believers in Catholicism (Croats) and Islam (Bosnians).

According to Eurasianists, it is religion that forms and create culture, not vice versa. One can only speak about “small islands of Slavic culture in the vast sea of European culture”. So Russian identity is a product of native Russian-Eurasian “place-development” which formed specific mental features of the Russian people on Eurasian territory. Periods of a flowering Moscow Russia was, according to Eurasianists, the most productive in Russian history because of forming an integral culture. Leading ideology at that time was the idea of “Moscow the third Rome” perceived by common people, clergy and the tsar’s elite as religiously proved and therefore truthful. It was the “holistic and universally recognized worldview formed under conditions “when the ruling elite did not destroy its ties with the masses”.

This cultural harmony between upper and lower strata had been eliminated in the Petersburg’s period of Russian history and reached its apogee in forming alternative culture of intelligentsia alien to the traditional culture of the Russian people.

Eurasianists consider Orthodox Christianity to be the background and real basis of Russian culture but they believed that the historically formed Orthodox Church with its clergy, hierarchy and church dogmats is far from the truly Christian ideals. They based slavophile’s teaching on sobornost as the ideal Christian Church. Leo Karsavin transformed Khomyakov’s idea of sobornost into a theological-philosophical conception where Church became “symphonic personality” in closely contact with other symphonic personalities such as ethnos, people, nation, and humankind. In that context the Church receives its special being and spiritual-body structure.

So the Russian idea in the Erasianist version become somewhat like a religious ideology. It came to mean: “We understand Eurasia like special symphonic-personal individuation of the Orthodox Church and culture.”

The religious philosopheme of the Russian idea here received new “instrumental content”. It is expressed in the principal Eurasianistic notion that the “true idea is a truthful expression of being itself.” That is why “we must move from real life to the idea and from the idea to real life.” In order to express that movement Eurasianists elaborated specific concepts such as:

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9 Eurasianism (an attempt of Systematic Consideration), p. 28.
“the Russian-Eurasian idea,” “ideocracy” (ideokratiya, i.e., “power of idea”), “idea-ruling,” and others.

Peter Savitsky was a consistent defender of the principle “from life to idea.” He understood the Russian-Eurasian idea as a depository of not only religious and metaphysical values but also the values arising from the “living reality as such.” That is why “We (Eurasianists, – M.M.) are metaphysically and at the same time ethnographically and geographically oriented.” Savitsky interpreted the Russian idea through the prism of “idea-ruling” (ideya-pravitelnitsa) oriented to conservation of the most sacral – religious and ethnic values. For him the European-oriented mind of the intelligentsia as the central result of Peter’s reforms must change radically. The Intelligentsia must convert into Eurasian-oriented intelligentsia the fate of which is to eliminate radical differences of the elite’s and people’s cultures. Its “spiritual consciousness” must give true national direction to cultural values. So it is very important for Eurasianists to reveal the peculiarities of national psychology in order to keep ties of patriotism and solidarity with Russian people.

In order to grasp and to investigate the national psychology Eurasianists created a special legal philosophy based on specific concepts. Eurasianist M. Shakhmatov described Russian national psychology in terms of a special imagination of legal ideals deeply rooted in Russian life. Characteristic features of this psychology are idealized “iconographic” images of Russian great rulers – counts and other historical personalities. The people’s memory is to conserve and translate ideal legends and images of the most outstanding doings of such personalities. The power of the Russian state according to Eurasianists had been based traditionally on such people’s imaginations of true rulers. The most important historical person-ality of that sort was for Eurasianists the Holy count Alexander of Neva. Alexander Nevsky (named “brave”) was praised by Eurasianists as a great war commander and diplomat who allied Ancient Rus with the Mongols to defeat the German invasion. According to Eurasianists, every state ruler uses idealized images of legal ideals but Russian rulers did so especially.

The conception of legal ideals (“idealopravstvo”) is closely connected with an organic Eurasianist system of ideas. Essentially its foundation had been based on the “place-development” organic worldview which played a methodological role for Eurasianism as a whole. It must be added that positive legal ideals according to Eurasianists are opposed to negative borrowed legal ideals of non-organic origin. The latter was named as “zlopravstvo” (immoral legal ideals). Who is to blame for the appearance of that sort of ideals? Certainly the intelligentsia is blamed for alienation from native Eurasian-Russian culture and the reception of Western values without limits. Eurasianist criticism of the intelligentsia was a mere continuation of “Vekhi” commonly known as one of the best achievements of the “Golden

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Age” of Russian philosophy at the beginning of twentieth century. “Vekhi” is a Russian philosophical bestseller printed in 1909 (written by Berdyaev, Frank, Gershenzon, Struve, Bulgakov, Izgoev and Kistyakovsky).

As an example of negative national ideals, Eurasianists consider communist ideology which they defined as “based on the exalted but unverified and mistaken faith of the communists.”

11 (Critical conception of communism as a variety of false religiosity was first expressed by Berdyaev in “Vekhi”). As very productive both in theoretical and practical senses one must recognize another notion of Eurasianists expressed many times and in various attitudes. It concludes with the necessity of forming a special “science about Russia” – a science which would be the synthesis or broad spectrum of “Russian-Eurasian ideas” from different branches of knowledge: philosophy, history, theology, geography, philology and linguistics, musicology etc. Eurasianists began by making a new interdisciplinary and polydisciplinary teaching in Russian studies named as “rossievedeniye.”

12 The teaching should consolidate knowledge in various disciplines in order to help the formulation of expert decision-making by politicians. Needless to say this pursuit of scholarly oriented politics in Soviet Russia was mere utopia. Berdyaev called it “utopian etatism” of the Eurasianist’s post-revolutionary consciousness. This utopia, though never realized, remains material for future useful meditations.

The necessity for forming Russian studies had been explained by common émigré ignorance about everything existing in modern Russia. Therefore Eurasianist publications regularly gave news in which Russia was perceived as the motherland, though seriously ill. Russia as a unique civilization must be understandable in a process of special study without bias against its political regime and without exceptions for any period of its history. This methodology of wholeness in Russian studies had been espoused by Eurasianists from its very beginning. The first collective manifesto of Eurasianism stressed the notion of Russia’s original character as a civilization to be known. Eurasianists considered that living Russian culture represents a special type which cannot be included in any other group of cultures or any other cultural zone.

13 Not every member of the Eurasianist movement agreed with the pathos of revealing the content of the Russian idea in real living Russian life. Another position was presented by George Florovsky who pretended to be the leading Eurasianist theologian but later sharply criticized the movement. This long contradiction inside Eurasianism had been unknown and only became available later from archival sources. In his letter to Peter Suvchinsky dated Dec.20, 1923 Nicholas Trubetskoy, the founder of Eur-

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11 Eurasianism (An Attempt of Systematic Consideration), p. 5.
13 Exodus to East (Sofia: 1921), p. 96.
Eurasianism as a Post-Revolutionary Variant of the Russian Idea

Florovsky was the author of two Eurasianist collective manifestos ("Exodus to East" and "On the Roads") but was expelled from the authors of the third manifesto ("Evraziiskii vremen-nik"). The reason was that Florovsky as theologian could not agree with free religious-philosophical interpretation of the Russian idea given by Trubetskoy which denied Church dogmatism. As for Florovsky he stressed the leading importance of proper dogmatic questions instead of conclusions about the findings of the Russian Idea in the living processes of Russian life.

Florovsky pointed out that Eurasianist criticism of Western culture must be done only on the basis of true Christianity i.e. Orthodoxy and cannot be based on secular ideas. Florovsky, as a theologian, could not agree with the Eurasianist admiration of unorthodox religious thinkers like Nicholas Fedorov. He offered a programme of Eurasianism based on Orthodox Church Christianity but also was eager to be the leading theologian of the Russian emigration through his participation in the Eurasian movement. Florovsky understood his own mission in reforming Orthodox Theology and in rejecting of "heretical distortions" of Orthodoxy.

Nevertheless most of the Eurasianists stand on the position of free religious thinking which denied the Church conservatism of Florovsky. Therefore Fedor Stepun defined Eurasianists as "slavophiles from the epoch of futurism." In contrast with the orthodox interpretation of the Russian idea, Nicholas Trubetskoy stressed the utility of the modern market economy (he called it "economic Westernism"). At the same time he depicted internationalism and cosmopolitism as false versions of an all-human culture which do not exist at all. False stereotypes about the total anti-Westernism of Eurasianism deeply rooted in various studies must be reconsidered. According to it, the essence of the Russian idea in its Eurasianist version, is the conclusion of "hate Europe" and "love Asia." The stereotypes can be easily reapproved by the Eurasianist’s own statements. Nicholas Trubetskoy stressed that it is mere ignorance to assert any kind of antagonism between European cultures and the "culture of Asia." The latter as a whole do not exist at all and Eurasianists were never told about it by Trubetskoy. A leading theorist of Eurasianist legal philosophy Nicholas Alexeev agrees with that position. He asserted his position in the following words: "The problem is not to remake Russia and the whole World in Asia but to make a new synthesis of East and West." The Eurasianist point of view rejected primitive anti-Westernism. Alexeev wrote that the Eurasianist agenda is "to overcome the West from within" by "using the spirit of the

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14 N. Trubetskoy, *Letters to P. Suvchinsky*, p. 351
West” not by denying it because “men of Eurasia” must understand that the “spirit of the West” is his “own spirit.”

The Eastern-Western mentality of Russia was written not only by Eurasianists but also by Berdyaev, Fedotov, Stepun and others. A.S. Panarin defined the Estern-Western mode of the Russian soul as the “absence of Russia” in the spectrum of World civilization because Russia was usually perceived as West in the East and as East in the West. So the argument for the Eurasianist worldview is to define Russia-Eurasia per se and not by European-Asiatic stereotypes. The testimony is the creation of an original legal philosophy in the frame of Eurasianism by N. Alexeev which used Husserl’s phenomenology. The main defect of Western thinking in the legal philosophy of the Russian intelligentsia according to Alexeev is a total misunderstanding of the legal ideals of the Russian people. Following Dostoevsky he argued that in the centre of the Russian legal consciousness is the people’s “sense of right” which fell in contradictions created by the intelligentsia’s Western-oriented theories of right. That deep contradiction was the cause (among others) of the 1917 Revolution in Russia.

It is necessary to add that manifestations of post-revolutionary consciousness in Eurasianism had been different. “Clamart concision” approved the existence of “left” and “right” orientations in Eurasianism. But both the “lefts” and the “rights” were relatively united in the opinion that the Russian revolution had been prepared by the Reforms of Peter the Great. At the same time the Revolution is a proof of “divided destinies of Russia and Europe” as pointed out in the second collective manifesto of Eurasianism.

“Russian destiny” thought by Eurasianist not as a nationalist doctrine like national-socialism but as a “project for a future” oriented in the keeping in wholeness all existing civilizations in their “flowering complexity”. This problem of course is of great importance for the modern world and therefore one can evaluate Eurasianism and its version of the Russian idea as a positive variety of nonaggressive anti-Westernism and anti-globalism standing for a dialogue of civilizations.

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17 On the roads (Na putyakh) (Moscow and Berlin: 1922), p. 18.
CHAPTER III

VLADIMIR SOLOVYEV: JUSTIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHY

VLADIMIR SERBINENKO

We can see a certain historical truth in the fact that the undisputable existence of Solovyev’s influence on Russian philosophical culture of the twentieth century has nothing in common with the idola theatri. Almost every one of the best Russian metaphysicians, recognizing the importance of Solovyev’s critical ideas for their own works, challenged and criticized certain aspects of his teaching. And this belongs to the representatives of the metaphysics of unity, of which Solovyev is considered to be the founder. They argued, criticized (fortunately mostly in a philosophical way), and tried to understand and found, of course, not only contradictions, but also something that could be and became a reference point for further philosophical development.

And does it not correspond to the position of Solovyev himself, which he really wanted as a true philosopher? “Philosophy is the work of the philosopher, it is, in fact, philosophizing,” “complete,” absolute “systems outlived their time,” “the dignity of philosophy in its infinity...” — these are the later theses of Solovyev, the principle abstracts, and as it turned out, the final ones. In general, it is not quite justified to consider the “theoretical philosophy” only as a work in progress and the experience of building his own epistemological theory. To a much greater extent Solovyev’s text is his personal response to the question “What is philosophy.”

And we know that such “answers” are an important element of the historical and philosophical tradition. Philosophers of different eras and cultures have felt the need (often at the end of life), to ground the entire experience of philosophical works, to determine the source of understanding the principles of philosophy, its goals and objectives, and cultural uniqueness. In fact, the problem of “justifying philosophy” (in various forms and in various philosophical ways) was solved. First of all, for themselves, and then for the world. In any case, Solovyov in his later works pursued this goal and, as always, very consistently. Concerning the “historical meaning” of philosophy, he thought (and wrote) throughout life. The incompleteness of his “theoretical” thinking in general is very relative. “Theoretical philosophy” is not only a “philosophical testament,” but also a philosophical project.

The philosopher, as in “Three Conversations”, looked into the future, We can say, into the future of philosophy. It is necessary to consider his clearly marked position: specifically “philosophical doing” as opposed to artistic and scientific, consists in fundamental incompleteness (“not in
something, that is accomplished, but in the intention and decision to know the truth”). So incompleteness of epistemological works of the thinker (there is nothing to be done – it is fate) does not destroy the internal integrity of his philosophical intention, expressed consistently, and in sufficient detail.

The experience of justifying philosophy had for the author of “theoretical philosophy” a deeply personal, I would venture to say, an existential sense. Perhaps no less than the philosophical eschatology of “Three Conversations”. In the “theoretical philosophy” there is no indifferent and cold rationality. The philosopher is clearly not too concerned about the “newness” of his own epistemological investigations, or the formal sophistication of analytical findings. The paper contains a lot of genuine novelty, a kind of intellectual aesthetics, but off by itself, even in spite of the author’s intentions. Solovyov insists in his essay on the necessity of philosophical sincerity, and it is not surprising, since in this case he, perhaps above all, raises the question about the meaning of a life given to philosophy and about whether, in the end, the philosophy itself is worthy of it.

Retaining, as in youth, assurance in the usefulness and necessity of the “philosophical cause”, the thinker finds it necessary to expose his philosophical beliefs to the most serious test, the test of philosophical doubt, which has no boundaries and no limits.

It would be a rather naive reading of “theoretical philosophy” to get offended by Descartes and Leibniz, Lopatin, and the European and Russian spiritualists, whom, to some extent, the author criticizes. The matter is not only that without philosophical criticism it is not possible to follow any consistent philosophical way. More significantly in this case, Solovyov, considers it necessary once again to raise the question about the very foundations of philosophical knowledge. To put it in very real philosophical terms, he simply could not ignore the possibility of a critical review of the positions of those thinkers (above all, Descartes), who worked on this matter. He had no need to argue with Chernyshevsky about the “incontestability of thinking substance”?

It seems quite logical that he thought critically about the position of Descartes and argued with his friend Lopatin, and when he saw that the misunderstanding, aroused in the dispute, was difficult to overcome, he ironically (but with all sincerity) noted that “he does not know phenomenism” and ended the dispute.

We can assume that Solovyov thought it a clear misunderstanding accusations of the antipersonal nature of his position. Solving the problem of justifying philosophy he was thinking not only about its historical merit, but also about a possible future. And the philosopher comes to the conclusion (recognizing serious changes in his own philosophical outlook), that a classic personalist metaphysics is no longer capable of implementing the “historic” – the philosophical goal of the “liberation of the personality from
external violence”. This was all the more true in a situation where impersonal trends in society take on fundamentally new shape and dimensions.

In particular, his attention to the problem of social psychosis, variants of the delusional mind of schizophrenia (Parisian milliner in “theoretical philosophy”), to the mass consciousness in a global civilization, and, consequently, to the new universal features of propaganda (“Three talk”) are related to this.

In such circumstances, the last metaphysical declaration of “soul-substance” seemed to him to be a kind of philosophical archaicism. But in the possibility of a philosophical “protection” of the personality in “imminent” modernity, the thinker believed, and in his last works, also sought these possibilities.

As we know, Solovyov in the “theoretical philosophy” gives proof of the conclusion that only in the pursuit of philosophical truth, philosophy finds itself, its own identity. This actually is philosophy’s justified point. Solovyev’s project in principle does not limit the possible variety of philosophical ways, but it certainly allows their likely “dead end” if the meaning and purpose of “doing philosophy” is lost. As in “Three Conversations”, the philosopher draws attention to the danger of “fakes” that can distort the very essence of the “historic meaning of philosophy.”

The world without philosophy is a serious historical loss of the human. The author of “theoretical philosophy” clearly did not consider this defeat to be fatal. In turn, I believe that it can be recognized – with complete sincerity – that the ideas of Solovyov, in our days, help to avoid a similar ending, provoking and encouraging interest to genuine philosophical creativity.

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CHAPTER IV

SYNTHESIS OF THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY BY LEV KARSAVIN

VASILY VANCHUGOV

Speaking about the specifics of Russian thought, Vasily Zenkovsky pointed out that it was “historiosophical throughout”. It constantly addresses the meaning and end of history, and even gives excessive attention to the philosophy of history. It “stems from those spiritual beliefs that come from the Russian past, from the nation-wide characteristics of the ‘Russian soul’ (History of Russian Philosophy). The creative biography of Lev Karsavin confirms Zenkovsky’s statement.

It should be noted primarily that he continues the academic tradition in which ‘philosophy of history’ long ago became a definitive genre, a direction of research, the object of which is both (a) methodology of science, and (b) method to studying, reading and teaching history. Among experts closest to him in time, Vladimir Guerrier deserves a special mention. He started considering the problems of the history of philosophy in Essays on History Development (1865) which found their completion in 1915 with publication of Philosophy of History from Augustine to Hegel (Moscow). Karsavin follows the tradition of “philosopizing with history” not only as a formal member of the academic community but as an independent, original thinker.

The ability “to philosophize on the historic material” Karsavin sees in the fact that philosophy organically uses not only historical categories but also higher categories extraneous to historical perception. Philosophy of History by Karsavin is interesting today as an apologia of an all-embracing unity undertaken by Russian thinkers with the use of ‘historical material’ – a totality of problems from the historian’s arsenal.

At the heart of the genesis of Karsavin’s book is the dialectic movement of the author’s thought, namely: (1) basic ideas drawn by him directly from historic works in their development brought him to certain metaphysical stipulations; and, (2) metaphysical research necessarily brought him back to specific reality, i.e. the sphere of history. From history he necessarily went back to philosophy, and philosophy inevitably brought him back to history. This goal required both philosophical culture and professional training in history. Karsavin wrote: “My background is in history. I have studied history for a long time, with diligence and, as it appears, with some success” (see Philosophy of History). There are just some episodes from his biography illustrating Krasavin’s development as a professional historian.
In 1901 Karsavin enrolled at the History and Philology Department of Saint Petersburg University. Under the influence of historian Ivan Grevs he became interested in the religious history of Western Medievalism, primarily the Franciscan movement and the heretical sects of the Waldenses and the Cathars. In 1906 he was awarded the first degree upon graduation and stayed at school to be trained for a professorship and teaching. With this goal in mind, he was sent to Italy to do research in libraries and archives. Upon return in 1908, he started lecturing in General History at the Higher Women’s Courses and at the same time at a college and a grammar school. In 1909 he gave the same course at the Imperial History and Philology University. In 1910 Karsavin again left for Europe where he spent two years. Upon his return, he was approved as privat-docent of the University and started teaching at the History and Philology Institute and Rayev’s Higher History Courses. At the same time, Karsavin wrote 49 articles for the *Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary* (in which Grevs was responsible for the history section). In May 1923 at the History and Philology Department, he presented the master’s thesis entitled “Essays on the Religious Life in Italy in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries” which was published a year earlier. In 1914 Karsavin became a full professor of General History at the History and Philology Institute while also lecturing in philosophical propaedeutics at the grammar school of the Institute. In 1915 he published a book titled *Foundations of Medieval Spirituality in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Mainly in Italy*, which a year later he presented as his PhD thesis.

After 1922 when Karsavin was deported from Soviet Russia, he was forced to live abroad. From 1922 to 1926 he lived in Germany, then in France and Lithuania. In 1923, in Berlin the Obelisk Publishing House (of which Karsavin was a co-founder along with Kotlyarevsky) published his book *Philosophy of History* which was written in Russia. In 1922 in Russia he managed to publish another book, *East, West and Russian Thought*, which is critical for the understanding of this “philosophizing historian”.

In the book, he continues the prior initiative of trying to comprehend the essence of Russia’s historical development started in Chaadayev’s “philosophizing letter”. Now, however, the answer to the question of the historical distinctiveness of the Russian way and the national calling of the Russian people is given based on the understanding of the experience of the Russian Revolution and the First World War. An earlier work by Krasavin also needs to be mentioned. It is entitled *Introduction to History (Theory of History)* and was published in St. Petersburg in 1920 as a part of the Introduction to Science series, which thus had a propaedeutic nature. Karsavin describes the major directions in the theory and methodology of history and gives an annotated list of major works, later used in *Philosophy of History*.

The Introduction created in 1920 was intended for those starting out in their pursuit of history studies who were primarily looking for answers to such questions as what history was, what objects it pursued and what methods were used for studying historic materials and what were the peculiari-
ties and therefore the meaning of historical thinking. Even a professional historian finds answers to all those questions only as a result of long-term specialized work, and such answers satisfy very few, and philosophers, least of all. In Introduction to History, one can notice the critical assessment by the author of scientific achievements and his desire to go beyond the limits of the historic discipline, to the understanding of the necessity of the philosophic approach to studying what is happening and what happened, which finds a systematic representations in Philosophy of History.


All the above topics reflect, so to speak, Karsavin’s ‘architecture of the All-Unity metaphysics’ which announced his adherence to this long-term tradition. This tradition dates back to the ancient world, to Platonic philosophy. It was developed and substantiated by Neoplatonism and the fathers of the Greek Church, by Eriugena and Kuzansky. With a different degree of clarity it is presented in the systems of Leibniz, Shelling and Hegel.

He particularly points out that this tradition is a distinctive feature of ‘national Russian philosophical thought’ and that after the works by Lossky, Frank and Vysheslavtsev, fundamental problems of ontology and gnoseology can be considered so established that it allows the author to consider many of his arguments already proven. Hence, he specifically mentions only certain distinctive features reflecting his personal views on the All-Unity metaphysics. This intellectual tradition is characterized by consistency and religious orientation due to the inherent connection with Orthodox religious metaphysics, and thus the ‘theory of the Absolute’ acquires the utmost importance.

In such metaphysical context of the historical, the problem of interrelation between the Absolute and the relative becomes more essential for philosophy of history. The Absolute is presented in the historical process as the ‘total All-Unity’. Karsavin specifically points out that such an understanding of the All-Unity in his philosophy of history cannot be interpreted as pantheism or theism since he, as a thinker, is above these concepts. The metaphysics of the All-Unity gives the foundation for defining and formulating the process of humankind’s development, which in the end allows claiming the knowledge of the development law. Historical development as a theanthropic process is characterized by freedom and creativity in two aspects. On the one hand, it ‘enriches’ the Deity by its involvement with human creatures, and on the other hand, creativity of humans is in their associating themselves with the Deity. The human becomes sacramental to God and recognizes God in itself. Man does not create anything, none of his ‘qualities’, except for himself, his personality. This self-actualization by the
human is the same as his creation by God and his integration with God in perfect duality.

Philosophy of History is defined by three major objectives: 1) it researches the origin of historical existence which at the same time is the origin of historical knowledge and history as a science; 2) it considers this origin as a unity of existence and knowledge, i.e. it indicates the meaning and place of ‘the historical’ in the entirety of the world and in relation to absolute Being; 3) its goal is to know and present a specific historical process in its entirety, in presenting the essence of this process.

Finding sequential solutions to these objectives presents the philosophy of history in three possible modes: it is (1) a ‘theory of history’, i.e. theory of historical being and theory of historical knowledge; (2) ‘philosophy of history’ in a narrow and specialized meaning of the term ‘philosophy’; (3) ‘metaphysics of history’ (where the term ‘metaphysics’ means not a deviation from specific empirical science but, on the contrary, specific perception of the historical process in the light of highest metaphysical ideas).

As a professional historian who, as distinct from his colleagues, tried to discover the essence of the historical through metaphysical knowledge, Karsavin believed that he first needed to find the ‘origins’ to comprehend the historical process with their help. Thus, metaphysics of history is a ‘supplement and specification of philosophy of history’. The metaphysical view of what happened to humankind in the past allowed Karsavin to dialectically solve a number of problems facing history as a science. Since ‘development’ is one of the fundamental historical notions, Karsavin started his research with the analysis of this notion leading to vital metaphysical stipulations.

Having reviewed the reasons for erroneous identification of ‘change’ and ‘progress’ with development, Karsavin comes to the key problem of history – reason. A sign of the scientific nature of history; assessment of history as a science is based on the causal explanation of facts. However, Karsavin, as he himself acknowledged, least of all as a professional historian, paid attention to ‘facts’, ‘causes’ and ‘effects’. According to him, attempts at causal explanation in history were rarely successful. A historian feels, according to Karsavin, absolutely helpless when asked about the reasons, for instance, of the last world war, the Russian Revolution, events that are seemingly available for study. A historian is similarly helpless when asked about the reasons of the Great French Revolution or the Crusades. If causal connection of historical facts was easy to establish, would historians-idealists and historians-materialists have argued for such a long time and with so little success?

Against the background of this intellectual barrenness of the two schools of thought, Karsavin considers it necessary to point out the undoubted merit of ‘historical materialism’. At times forgets about ‘causal explanation’ and starts talking about ‘dialectics’, though not understanding its true essence. For Karsavin as dialectics in its essence is founded on the
metaphysics of the All-Unity, development is a ‘formation of the (indivisual) all-unity soul in the empirical world, its representation in the temporal coexistence and the sequence of all its moments’. Development is just one ‘side’ of the All-Unity soul, just one of its aspects or modes, while development implies completeness.

The human soul is a moment of the Absolute. It evolves in itself, develops the Absolute as itself. The paramount goal of historical thought is to study the entire cosmos, all creatures in the All-Unity as a single developing subject. In this sense, ‘the world in its entirety’ is the subject of historical research. However, ‘the world in its entirety’ is studied by philosophy which in its methods should be primarily ‘historical’ both in comprehending continuous development and in explaining the ‘disjointed reality’ studied by other sciences.

The method of history is inseparable from historical existence, from what is called the ‘material’ of history, and historical cognition is nothing else but one of the moments of historical being. History in the narrow and precise sense of the word sees and studies development in areas where it is most revealed, which is in the material and spatial existence. It is revealed by philosophy not immediately, but with the help of certain metaphysical stipulations, consciously and distinctively, systematically and reasonably. The content of history is the development of humankind as a subject united in its substance, space and time. Humankind in the metaphysical context is interpreted as all-united, and in particular, as a developing subject all-united in time and space.

Anything external for Karsavin as a historian and a philosopher is just a sign of the internal, a symbol. In researching social or economic conditions, accurate statistical data and figures can be helpful but they are only ‘signs of the reality hiding behind them’ and do not have the same meaning as in the sciences about material nature. The subject of history is always ‘social-mental’, and historical synthesis is possible only on the basis of the mental. Limiting itself by development of humanity, history views humankind in its spiritual activities, and spirituality becomes the main element of history.

The subject of history can be most closely defined as a ‘social and psychic development of the all-united humankind’. History leaves beyond its scope the entire ‘material’ part of the human life, though using it as a means to reach its goal. Occurrences related to ‘collective individualities’ are typical for historical science. (Further, developing philosophy within Eurasianism, Karsavin prefers to speak about a ‘symphonic personality’.)

The supreme being is the unity of all individual lower beings. The supreme being and all beings within it have a form of being due to the act of the Absolute which is Absolute Being. In this regard, all lower beings individualizing the supreme being are not constituted by it, but by the Absolute. Each of them, in theological language, is created by God but creation of a lower being by God is at the same time the replication of the
supreme being. In a certain sense a lower being is the supreme being as it participates in the act of its creation by God.

Each individuality (individual, people, culture, religious culture) cognizes itself by cognizing itself (a) as a moment of the supreme being, and (b) as a moment of the all-unity of other individuals in itself. If anyone perceives oneself as a ‘member’ or ‘moment’ of a certain social group, it implies that the social group as a whole perceives itself and its other moments. Thus, an individual knows that the other members of the political party to which he belongs would act in the same way as he would or, at least, would want to act in the same way. He knows and ‘understands’ their specific activities, ideology and mentality. Knowledge does not stop at the ‘second’ higher individuality. It stretches further and higher – to the entire humankind and its utmost exemplarity. As a result, there is no disconnect between ‘my’ knowledge and the knowledge of any supreme individualities as there is no disconnect between their knowledge; and there is no knowledge of supreme individuality without its specification in the knowledge of an individual. This is the principle of the All-Unity manifested in the historical.

It is not sufficient in historical knowledge to discover the quality of the supreme historical individuality – all-united humankind. It is not sufficient to recognize its exemplarity. Beyond all this, there remains the ‘inordinate’ reality of the Absolute. There is only one way out of ‘representationalism’ and illusionism – recognition of all ‘qualities’, not only ‘those of the humankind’ but of the Absolute itself. This leads to the necessity for an impartial historian to recognize the metaphysical theory, the metaphysics of the All-Unity. Philosophy of History was written by Karsavin to accomplish these goals.

The book did not go unnoticed by contemporaries. Among them, we need to mention Pyotr Bitsilli, a medievalist historian, who in 1923 published in Belgrade his Introduction to the World History, and in 1925 in Prague – Essays on the Theory of the Historical Science.

In the latter book, Bitsilli separates the theory of historical knowledge from that of historical process, denying claims of the philosophy of history interpreted as searching for the meaning of the historical process: “The philosophy of history was a way to comprehend the Absolute sub specie of history. In our days Clio became strict and does not allow that”. In an addition to Essays under a characteristic title, New Philosophy of History, Bitsilli criticizes Krasavin’s philosophy of history defining it as an attempt to combine two dogmatisms that are powerless to explain history and that are internally incompatible: Christian church dogmatism and Bergsonov naturalistic dogmatism.

Another of Karsavin’s contemporaries, Ustryalov speaking at the Legal Department in Harbin in a lecture on the Problem of Progress (Philosophy of History) (1931) quoted Karsavin’s work and the work of his opponent Bitsilli, in particular, while discussing progress and the formally equal
quality of the moments of historical progress and at the same time their significant diversity.

*Philosophy of History* by Karsavin was assessed by Lossky in *History of Russian Philosophy* as an ‘exceptionally valuable work’, and Zenkovsky in his *History of Russian Philosophy* wrote that the author of *Philosophy of History* is distinctive due to ‘a certain confessionalism in science’ which is looked upon by him more critically. Having found in Karsavin’s work many valuable remarks regarding historical being as such, Zenkovsky wrote that it was all ‘squeezed in the metaphysics of All-Unity’, for the sake of which the author sacrifices his interesting observations and ideas on the nature of historical being. But that he adds is “the destiny of all those captured by the idea of the All-Unity.” “All efforts to maintain the full value of the living being without letting it drown in the all-absorbing unity – usually fail” (Zenkovsky, V.V., *History of Russian Philosophy*. V.2, P.IV, Ch. V).

Even with the critical assessment of Karsavin’s *Philosophy of History*, all observers from the field of history and philosophy note the undoubted importance of this work both for history and philosophy. As a result, *Philosophy of History* became a landmark of its time and entered the history of Russian philosophy as an example of an interesting synthesis of science and theology attempted on the basis of ‘religious philosophy’.

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CHAPTER V

V.D. KUDRYAVTSEV-PLATONOVA’S
THEOLOGICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

IRINA V. TSVYK

Viktor Dmitriyevich Kudryavtsev-Platonov is a prominent philosopher and theologian and, perhaps, the most brilliant representative of the Russian ecclesiastical-academic philosophy of the XIX century. By ecclesiastical-academic philosophy we mean the philosophical tradition in the Russian ecclesiastical academies in the XIX-XX centuries, i.e. the body of works of the representatives of the ecclesiastical-academic schools of philosophy, the history of philosophy and the philosophy of religion as well as the philosophical courses of lectures they created. Ecclesiastical-academic philosophy sprang up in the XVII-early XVIII centuries in response to the challenge of teaching philosophical disciplines at the Kiev-Mogilev and the Moscow Slavic-Greco-Latin Academy and reached certain theoretical heights in the mid-XIX century. It received a powerful impetus with the creation of the Ministry of People’s Education (1802) and the reform of religious education carried out in the XIX century and associated with the adoption of three orders concerning religious schools: 1809-14, 1869-70 and 1884.

One of the fundamental principles of the reform of religious education was an upgrading of the standards for teaching philosophy at religious academies. Twin tasks were set before the professors and philosophy teachers: first, to create philosophical courses matching the standard of knowledge of the time and drawing on the latest Western philosophical ideas and doctrines; second, to preserve the purity of the Orthodox faith, to keep rationalistic and materialistic ideas out of the theological academies. The ecclesiastical-academic philosophical courses were also called upon to provide a philosophical grounding for the bedrock ideas of Orthodox consciousness.

The ecclesiastical-academic tradition represents an attempt to create such a system in the framework of Russian Orthodoxy in the XIX century. It is the fact that its representatives were close to the Orthodox dogma and that their legacy includes not only philosophical, but strictly theological works that impede an objective historical-philosophical assessment of that phenomenon. At the same time, if one accepts as the criterion of the difference of religious-philosophical systems from systematic theology, the assessment of their structure, the set of categories and methods of treating the central ideas of religious consciousness, then the ecclesiastical-academic tradition can safely be categorized as philosophical theology.
Philosophical theology, as a rule, offers its own solution to ontological, epistemological, cosmological and other classical philosophical problems using philosophical categories for this purpose. Thus philosophical theology is essential to the various attempts at philosophical interpretation and to a theoretical grounding of the central and most common ideas of religious consciousness at the conceptual level. Such interpretations, more often than not, are prompted by certain world-view and cultural-historical causes, and as a rule, provide rational explanation and conceptualization of the main religious tenets. Philosophical theology expresses through a system of concepts what traditional theology believes to belong to the domain of faith, therefore this or that system imparts a greater “reasonable form” to the basic concepts of faith than theology alone.

Looking at the structure of ecclesiastical-academic philosophy of the XIX century one can readily discern the tendency to rationalize or conceptualize the classical Orthodox dogma using the achievements of modern West European philosophy. All the representatives of the ecclesiastical-academic tradition believed that the task of the Orthodox philosophy they labored to create was to form and develop Christian consciousness by harmonizing key dogmatic ideas with various methods of cognizing the Divine Essence. Ecclesiastical-academic philosophers made much less frequent references to Revelation than Orthodox theologians, but they frequently turned to the religious and philosophical analysis of ancient, modern and recent philosophy, the achievements of natural science, psychology and history engaging in polemics with the contemporary scientists and European philosophers. The most complete philosophical system to emerge from the ecclesiastical-academic philosophy was that of Viktor Kudryavtsev-Platonov.

Viktor Dmitriyevich Kudryavtsev was born October 3, 1828, (Novotorzhshky Uyezd, Pskov Gubernia) and died December 3, 1891, in Moscow. He was born into the family of a regimental chaplain in the Pskov Gubernia. He studied at the Volyn, Mogilyov and Chernigov religious seminaries. Completing the Chernigov Religious Seminary in 1848, as an exemplary pupil both in terms of his academic achievements and behavior, he joined the Moscow Theological Academy. From that time until his death Viktor Kudryavtsev’s life and work were intimately connected with the Moscow Theological Academy. His academic success earned him the Metropolitan Platon Grant, which entitled him to add the honorary title “Platonov” to his last name. Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s course paper “On the Unity of the Human Race” was praised by Archbishop Filaret of Gumilev. After finishing the Academy, Kudryavtsev-Platonov stayed on as a teacher at the Academy’s Philosophy Chair. Initially, in 1857, he was appointed extraordinary professor and in 1858 was promoted to ordinary professor teaching metaphysics and the history of ancient and modern philosophy. An important part of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s work was the preparation and development of philosophical programs for other religious schools. In addition to his professorial duties, Kudryavtsev-Platonov fulfilled special
missions for his superiors. It is interesting that in 1860 he taught philosophy to Nikolai Alexandrovich, heir to the Russian throne (died in 1865). At about the same time, in 1860, Kudryavtsev-Platonov was invited to join the Philosophical Department at Moscow University, a proposal he declined. In 1861 he was asked to be the head of the Philosophy Department at St Petersburg’s University by none other than Education Minister Ye.V. Putyatin. However, Metropolitan Filaret personally pleaded with Putyatin “not to weaken the Philosophical Chair at the Moscow Theological Academy by depriving it of Professor Kudryavtsev”, so the professor turned down that offer as well.

The bibliography of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s works contains more than 40 items. Prominent among them is the textbook *Fundamentals of Philosophy* which was reprinted many times, as well as three volumes of *Works* (9 issues) published in Sergiyev-Posad in 1893-94.

The main thrust of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s philosophical teaching and his creative activities was to rework in the Orthodox spirit contemporary Western European philosophy, to include its most interesting and suitable ideas on the structure of religious consciousness and to use them to expound religious ideas, in short, to lend a church character to European philosophy. In our opinion, Kudryavtsev-Platonov successfully fulfilled the task that confronted ecclesiastical-academic thought in general. He developed in the spirit of Orthodox tradition and included in his system the Cartesian idea of the transcendental origin of innate ideas, Kant’s teaching of categories and a priori forms of sensuality and reason, Jacobi’s ideas of faith as direct knowledge and the religious-sensual origin of philosophy. One can trace the influence on Kudryavtsev-Platonov of Hegelian rationalism, of Hegel’s doctrine of the Absolute Idea, even though Kudryavtsev-Platonov was a fierce critic of pantheism and Hegel’s dialectics. Kudryavtsev-Platonov remained a philosophy professor at the Moscow Theological Academy until his death in 1891.

The character of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s philosophical thought was determined by his religious affiliation and the main content of his theoretical constructions was the philosophical grounding of the theistic world view. Thus, the central problem of his philosophical system was the problem of theoretical proof of Divine Being. One can clearly discern in his philosophy an ontology, which considers the rational explanation of God as Absolute being and it’s synthesizing function with regard to spirit and matter, as well as an epistemology in whose framework the problems of cognition of God are analyzed and the teaching of truth is developed. Kudryavtsev-Platonov described his system as “transcendental monism” because it was based on three types of being: material, spiritual and Absolute. This doctrine forms the nucleus of his ontology and purports to offer a new solution to the fundamental question of philosophy, overcoming the one-sidedness of materialism and idealism. This ambitious declaration amounted to an attempt to include Absolute Being, i.e. the philosophical analogue of
the theistic idea of God, in a system of ontology, presenting it as the ontological foundation of the world.

The methodological basis of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s teaching on Absolute Being which is central to his system of philosophical interpretation of religious consciousness was, on the one hand, his critique of Western European idealism and materialism and, on the other hand, the theory of ideas which he developed in line with Christian Platonism. His philosophical reasoning about ideas proceeds from the duality of every object being studied: one can identify the idea of the object and its manifestation. His interpretation of “the idea” is similar to Plato’s theory of ideas. The thinker revered Plato, but believed that the great Greek philosopher’s main mistake was that he separated the essence of things from the things themselves and embodied that essence in the shape of an idea that had an existence of its own. Kudryavtsev-Platonov believed (more along the lines of Aristotle than Plato) that the idea of a thing was inseparable from the thing, that it is contained in the thing as its ideal aspect, as its permanent and immutable essence. The idea of the thing is constant, immutable and consequently constitutes something primal with regard to the changing phenomena. The ideal world, according to him, is a coexistence of various ideas none of which individually, owing to its being relative, can command the absolute truth of being. Crowning the hierarchy of ideas is the Absolute idea which possesses the absolute truth of being. In this way Kudryavtsev-Platonov tried logically to explain the concept of the Absolute, as the original basis and goal of all that exists. “Because of the Absolute idea all other ideas are not disparate and independent elements, but form a single harmonious whole, the ideal world, that ascends up the steps of development and is crowned with the idea of the Absolute which is at once the foundation and the crowning of all things existing, the Absolute beginning and the ultimate goal of being” (Kudryavtsev-Platonov, 1892-94:33). Modern theologians claim that this teaching about the ideal world and the Absolute idea that harmonizes spiritual and material reality was the theoretical basis of Vladimir Solovyov’s philosophy of “all-unity,” notably his analysis of the relationship between the all-uniting idea and its particular manifestations (Ivanov, 1886:146).

Being aware of the importance of the theoretical definition of the idea of the Absolute, Kudryavtsev-Platonov tried to derive it logically from the concept of perfection. He maintained that the idea of perfection contained the feature that was common to the three root ideas – Truth, Goodness and Beauty – in human consciousness. In his opinion, all these ideas are perceived by man as something to be striven for, i.e. as something perfect. But perfection itself lies beyond empirical reality and consequently has an absolute character. Therefore he considered the idea of the Absolute as the embodiment of the idea of perfection, and not an imagined, abstract ideal but absolutely perfect being, absolutely perfect reality or the Absolute Essence.

Obviously, the concept of the Absolute or the Unconditional being as a perfect and omnipotent personality was central to Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s
philosophy. This prompts a more detailed consideration of the issue of the relationship between this concept and the theistic idea of God. He attributed his use of the concept of the “Absolute” and not “God” in his philosophical theories to his wish to broaden the framework of the system by allowing the existence of other points of view along with the theistic one. In our opinion, He needed a philosophical analogue of the theistic concept of God because he sought to present a philosophical interpretation of the main religious ideas, including the idea of God. Seeking to “church” modern European philosophy and to include its ideas in a renewed and rationally explained Orthodox teaching of the world and man, Kudryavtsev-Platonov attempted to prove the necessity of a rational understanding of God. At the same time, in accordance with the Orthodox tradition, excessive “openness” of the Divine or the “watering down” of the Absolute, as was the case with Hegel’s philosophy, in Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s opinion, could not be allowed. In Hegel’s system the Absolute was totally exhausted and cognized, leaving no room for mystery. It thus ceased to be a transcendent essence. Kudryavtsev-Platonov faced a fundamentally different task: leaving God intact as an absolutely perfect, transcendent entity, which is the subject of theology, to present a philosophical vision and rational explanation of the possibility of knowing the Absolute as one of the facets of Divinity.

But the concept of the absolute idea, derived from philosophical reasoning about Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s theory of ideas, was not entirely suitable either, because of its impersonality and the meaning ascribed to it in Hegelian philosophy. It was necessary, on the one hand, to present the absolute as a spiritual-personal reality transcending the world and, on the other hand, to show that because of its transcendence the Absolute becomes knowable, not all the way, but only to the extent that it is within reach of human reason which is limited by comparison with the unlimited Absolute. In Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s philosophy, that function is performed by the concept of “Absolute Being” while the ontological picture presupposes the recognition of Absolute Being as the ultimate criterion and the supreme goal of all that exists transcending the juxtaposition of spirit and matter. Absolute being is by definition outside the world yet at the same time it actively influences the world determining its existence and development.

On the whole Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s teaching of three types of being and the synthesizing function of the Absolute with regard to spiritual and material being cannot be described as entirely logical and consistent. At the end of the day he failed to provide a clear logical grounding for the formula “God is the Absolute”. That proposition, called upon to crown the philosophical grounding of religion, is genetically linked to religious consciousness itself. The close link with religious consciousness, the desire to stay within the framework of traditional Orthodoxy, is one of the key characteristic features of all ecclesiastical-academic philosophical interpretations of religious consciousness. Thus Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s theory of Absolute being as the fundamental element of the world that reconciles the spiritual and material being and is their fundamental reason was a conse-
quence of the philosophical interpretation of the Orthodox-theistic view of the world.

Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s epistemological teaching of the “ideal” cognition of the truth stems directly from the priority of the ontological principle of the transcendental monism in his philosophy. That teaching was a reinterpretation of Platonic ideas under the influence of modern Western European philosophy, especially Kant. The structure of man’s cognitive abilities, in addition to empirical (sensuous) and rational cognition included “ideal”, “rational” knowledge which in effect represents an irrational mystic vision. According to him, cognition includes, along with the empirical knowledge of the material world and rational understanding of the spiritual world, also an extra-sensual perception of the world that is above experience and is “cerebral” and “ideal”. The philosopher interpreted that ideal knowledge as a match between what an object should be and what it is.

The teaching about ideal cognition occupied the key place in Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s philosophical interpretation of religious consciousness. It is not by chance that he had doubts about the choice of a proper term to denote that type of cognition. V. Zenkovsky considered the term “ideal cognition” to be infelicitous, as it did not reflect the essence of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s teaching. Zenkovsky believed that because Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s ideal cognition was based on faith, the concept of “mystic vision” would be more appropriate. (Zenkovsky, 1991:88) In our opinion, the fact that Kudryavtsev-Platonov rejects the term “mystic” is not accidental and has deep meaning. His main task was to prove that it was possible to know God rationally and not on the basis of mystic knowledge proceeding from man’s own cognitive ability. Nevertheless, tailoring his logic to the Orthodox tradition, Kudryavtsev-Platonov could not declare reason to be the only source of knowledge of God. He solves the problem of the relationship between faith and reason in the ecclesiastical-academic style: faith is something basic and original in the human spirit and reason is secondary and derivative. Although his philosophy contained a strong traditional Orthodox motive of glorifying faith over reason, he was among the first academic philosophers to interpret faith as an organic part of the overall process of cognition without opposing it to reason, but uniting the two.

Because Absolute being in Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s religious and philosophical thinking is the basis of all existing things, ideal cognition of it is the highest type of cognition. It is superior to empirical and rational cognition. The main task of ideal cognition is not confined to understanding and explaining the truth of God’s existence. He defines it in the following way: “The main task of ideal cognition must consist not merely in defining and asserting the truth of the concept of God, but in applying that concept to explaining and throwing light on all the concrete phenomena of nature and spirit from a viewpoint that may be described as religious…” (Kudryavtsev-Platonov, 1892-94, 30) Thus the significance of ideal cognition goes beyond epistemology to acquire the character of religious enlightenment.
Two fundamental elements can be singled out in his ideal cognition: first, the immediate character of the knowledge received by the mind; second, in spite of the independent and self-sufficient character of that immediate knowledge, it is linked with rational cognition. The latter proposition is important in the context of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s work: reason is involved in forming the concept of the supra-sensual. A.Fedotov draws an interesting parallel between the ideal and sensuous cognition in Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s work: “Just as in sensual cognition we do not stop at perceptions but bring them to light through concepts, so in ideal cognition we have no logical right to confine ourselves to mere impressions and perceptions of the supra-sensual. In the wake of sensations come diverse kinds of the work of reason which, through rigorous thinking and logical operations, reworks the immediate impressions into various types of perceptions and concepts of ideal objects”. (Fedotov, 1966:18)

Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s concept of the truth, which he himself considered to be “new, more complete and many-sided”, was based on his theory of the dyadic nature of any object in which two different aspects coexisted: the ideal and the phenomenal, which are substantially linked in any object and yet are qualitatively different from each other. He defined truth as harmony of the thing with itself, the unity of its two aspects, the harmony of what must be with what is, of the idea and the phenomenon. This harmony constitutes the true being of a thing, its objective truth. He also identified truth in the subjective sense as true knowledge, i.e. the cognition of the ideal aspect of what exists as it relates to the empirical aspect.

Kudryavtsev-Platonov believed it was reasonable to study both the ideal and phenomenal aspects of reality within concrete sciences, but stressed that such a study was doomed to be one-sided and incomplete: “This knowledge presupposes a new and higher cognition that would encompass the truth more broadly and deeply than the above sciences can attain”. (Kudryavtsev-Platonov, 1892-94:25) That supreme knowledge that is capable of understanding the full depth of the truth is, according to him, philosophy or the science of ideas. However, the thinker’s prime task is to trace the logical link between the truth of science via philosophy to theology, to link the philosophical truth and the truth of Revelation, to demonstrate that the truth of God’s being is the Absolute truth. He tried to solve that task by elaborating the theory of ideas. Recognizing the reality of the phenomenal world, he argued that the idea was something initial and basic with regard to phenomena, the creative element of the thing and its purpose: the thing exists to express or materialize its idea, and thus fulfill its purpose and mission and the measure of that fulfillment constitutes the measure of its truth in the objective sense of the word. Thus the truth of an individual thing depends on the degree to which its idea is realized. This truth is relative because the idea of an individual thing does not possess all its features (reality, constancy and formal conformity to the laws of the world) in their absolute meaning compared with other ideas.
The ideal world which, according to Kudryavtsev-Platonov, forms the objective content of the truth is coexistence of ideas, each possessing only a relative truth. From his point of view, ideas do not contain the entire truth of being, as each idea can serve as a means of implementing other ideas. Therefore his hierarchy of ideas is crowned with the Absolute idea which combines all the properties of ideal being and therefore possesses the Absolute Truth. The cognition of the Absolute idea, approximation to it, is the aim of philosophical reason, but only to the extent that it is within its reach. Consequently the Absolute idea as an object of philosophy is inexhaustible and can never be fully cognized.

However, it was important for Kudryavtsev-Platonov to show and prove through logical argument that the possessor of the Absolute Truth is not an impersonal Absolute idea but the Absolute essence that combines the fullness and truth of being and knowledge, i.e. God. He tried to effect such a logical transition by introducing the concept of perfection. He believed that the diversity of the world of ideas was organized according to three underlying ideas: Truth, Goodness and Beauty. The idea as a concept in his view, must be normal, i.e. must represent a concept indicating the norm. Therefore the ideas of Truth, Goodness and Beauty express “a certain perfection of things. He argued that perfection was absolute because it transcends empirical reality. But, at the same time, it is concrete absolute perfection “is not an imagined but real, existing perfection. In other words, the overriding and basic idea we are concerned with is the idea not only of abstract absolute perfection, but of absolute perfect being, of absolute perfect reality, or, to put it another way, the idea of the Absolute essence.” (Kudryavtsev-Platonov, 1892-94:181) The idea of truth, according to him, is a particular manifestation of the absolute perfection in the sphere of science.

Another important goal for Kudryavtsev-Platonov was to prove that truth is objective. In the spirit of Christian Platonism, he interpreted truth first as the ideas preceding material being and, second, as concepts existing in the human mind, the spiritual sphere. The objective content of truth is in the things themselves as their ideas. But it is man who cognizes and expresses this content and therefore, he does it gradually through understanding the hidden essence of the thing. Thus, the truth has objective content, but is subjective in form.

The novelty of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s approach to the problem of truth consists in his attempt to include the ideas of Western European philosophy and theology in the Orthodox tradition. V.V. Zenkovsky believed that his theory of truth, as a juxtaposition of the thing as it is in empirical reality to what it must be, implies recognition of the need for value judgment in cognition, which he considered to be the distinctive feature of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s approach to the problem of the truth.

Kudryavtsev-Platonov believed that the ultimate goal of all the sciences was to attain the truth. Truth can only be achieved through reason. Only human reason, owing to its divine origin, can approach the Absolute idea. His work sought to prove that a rational way towards the truth and its
rational understanding was possible and necessary. Therefore he criticized Jacobi’s teaching of faith as the basis of all knowledge, and Schelling’s concept of intellectual intuition, writing that according to Schelling the fundamental origin of being and knowledge reveal themselves “suddenly” and “for no apparent reason.”

Summing up his reflections on the truth, Kudryavtsev-Platonov formulated three main truths within his system which may well be considered to be pivotal for the ecclesiastical-academic epistemology in general:

1) the spiritual world, the world of ideas, is the basis and purpose of the existence of things;
2) the physical world exists in reality because it has been created by God;
3) there exists the absolutely perfect essence that combines the fullness and truth of being and knowledge, i.e. God.

The main outcome of his reflections on truth is arguably the proposition that philosophy and concrete sciences can and must understand the truth, but should not claim to understand supreme, divine truth. Truth in the world represents agreement and non-contradiction of things and phenomena, a harmonious combination in each thing of the phenomenon and essence, of what must be and what is. This harmony and agreement of things with themselves is determined by the Supreme Law of Reason. Man cognizes the ontological truth that exists in being thanks to his cognitive ability and by forming non-contradictory judgments of reality. Therefore the logical truth, as a synthetic element of human reason, integrates all the different elements contained in cognition, integrates thinking and being. The main and the sole criterion of truth is the correspondence of human knowledge to God-created reality.

Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s teaching of the truth is also interesting in that it contained a moral aspect, albeit only in an implied form. He saw the cognition of truth as part of the process of “deification”, i.e. moral improvement and transfiguration of man. Man does not merely learn the “revelatory truth” by his reason, but he “enters the truth”, “inhabits the truth”. Thus the individual’s “participation” in divine truth is the starting point for active spiritual work, and the concept of truth becomes not so much epistemological as ontological. Treating the truth as ontological, the identification of a “being” aspect in it, the contention that it adequately reflects something that exists outside human consciousness, was attributable to the idea of the truth as genuinely existing, the idea that traditionally has been part of Russian philosophical thought.

Although Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s prime interest was in recent philosophy and he sought to introduce Western European philosophical ideas into the Orthodox tradition, he managed, up to a point, to avoid eclecticism that is inevitable in such cases. His philosophical reasoning is not the result of mechanical grafting of Western European doctrines onto Orthodox soil.
They are an organic synthesis of European and Russian philosophizing. The theoretical forms borrowed from Western European philosophy were invested with new spiritual content that reflected both the general features of Russian philosophy and the traditional Orthodox principles.

Thus, while his works revealed a preoccupation with epistemological problems characteristic of European rationalism, at the same time his epistemology, in accordance with Orthodox-theistic principles, takes the shape of the theory of knowledge of God, and become ontological and subordinate to the larger task of explaining God’s being. He addresses the problems that were traditional for European philosophy of his time: the relationship between empirical and theoretical knowledge, primary and secondary properties, the authenticity of knowledge and the possibility of obtaining objective knowledge: however, the central idea of his epistemology is the problem of holistic knowledge grounded in man’s spiritual experience and including the spiritual and moral component. In line with the Thomist and Neo-Thomist tradition, Kudryavtsev-Platonov formulates the rational proof of the existence of God and immortality of soul while at the same time advocating the need for a sense of God and of contemplation of the Absolute with the heart. Finally one of his key conclusions is the task, clearly formulated towards the end of the XIX century, of creating an original Russian philosophy, classical in form and Orthodox in spirit, on the basis of the principle of harmonious combination of faith and reason within a special cognitive mechanism of “believing reason” or “reasonable belief”.

Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s aim of creating a confessional, but, at the same time, classically-oriented and professional philosophy accounts for the inherent contradictions of his philosophical ideas which have been extensively discussed in the literature. The use of rational methods to explain the supernatural could not be consistent by definition. His wish to stay within the Orthodox patristic tradition led to numerous logical contradictions in his concept, which is why the system of transcendental monism met with a mixed reception in historical and philosophical studies.

However, because philosophical quests could not be totally free, that did not mean that they were of little value. In spite of a measure of eclecticism and the “derivative nature” of Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s reasoning, some of his ideas have undoubtedly influenced subsequent development of Russian philosophy. They include above all the idea of the need to create systems of philosophical grounding of religious consciousness, “justification of the faith of the Fathers”; next, the interpretation of the world in terms of the principle of transcendental monism or “philosophical synthesis,” some elements of which can be traced in the development of the philosophy of “all-unity”; and finally the doctrine of holistic knowledge as the concentration of man’s spiritual capabilities, including the cognition of irrational elements while not dismissing rationality.

It should be noted that Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s philosophical studies are still regarded as classics by Orthodox theologians. They point out that these studies were prompted by the wish to “justify the faith of the fathers”,...
to philosophically interpret the rich spiritual heritage of the Church and God’s revelation. This speculative path again led to legend, to history, thus enriching theological academic tradition” (Ivanov, 1986).

In modern literature one sometimes comes across the thesis about the “meeting of Orthodoxy and Russian philosophy” that occurred “at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries”. The reference is to the phenomenon of the Russian non-church religious philosophy that traces its origin to the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov. The study of ecclesiastical-academic thought as a whole and the best known philosophical doctrine within its structure, i.e. Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s theological and philosophical system, warrants the conclusion that this encounter, rightly described as “philosophical interpretation of the organic principles of Orthodoxy” occurred as early as the mid-XIX century in the works of the representatives of the ecclesiastical-academic philosophy. The fact that these Orthodox thinkers sought philosophical proof of the religious truths, to create a coherent system of philosophical interpretation of religious consciousness that blends organically into Russian philosophical culture, led to the global task of “justifying the faith of the Fathers” which provided the core of that unique phenomenon of Russian and world culture, the Russian religious philosophy.

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REFERENCES

CHAPTER VI

THE BASIC ISSUES OF HUMAN LIFE IN N.I. PIROGOV’S PHILOSOPHY

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The name of the Russian surgeon Nikolay Ivanovich Pirogov (1810-1881) has worldwide recognition as an inseparable part of the history of medicine, but remained little noticed in the history of philosophy. Meanwhile, he is the author of a number of outstanding philosophical works including Questions of Life¹ (1856) and Diary of an Old Doctor (1879-1881), which are expressive in their form, profound in their content while being extremely sincere and conscientious.

Semyon Frank highly praised these works by Pirogov saying that he was undoubtedly “one of the most outstanding Russian thinkers.” (Frank, 1996:341) As a tribute to Pirogov as a profound religious thinker, Frank, in the article in Pirogov’s memory published in the “Put” journal in 1932, expressed hope that “the forgotten Russian thinker, Pirogov, will resurrect in the consciousness of the Russian community”. (Frank, 1996:350) Unfortunately, Frank’s hope has not come true to the full extent, and Pirogov is still unknown as a thinker.²

Pirogov’s philosophical outlook, his ‘metaphysics of faith’, has a quite worldly origin and results from the understanding of something not brought from outside, from his own unique existential experience of the ‘old doctor’, which with extreme truthfulness and sincerity he described in his work. In this respect, even the name of his main work is indicative: Diary of an Old Doctor Written Only for Himself but not without a Second Thought that Someone Else may Read it One Day. The closest analog and consonance of this philosophy is the existential line of the Russian philosophical thought vividly represented in the work by Alexander Herzen, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Vasily Rozanov, Nikolay Berdyaev and many other Russian philosophers. The goal of the author is to prove that Pirogov is a representative of the existential tradition of Russian philosophical thought which strives to find answers to the ideological questions of the meaning of

¹ Pirogov has two works titled Questions of Life. The first was published as a brochure in Morskoy Sbornik in 1856, and the second was created in 1879-1881 and published post mortem as a monograph under the title Questions of Life. Diary of an Old Doctor....Both these works are created as philosophical confessions.

² The philosophic component of Pirogov’s work is presented in its monograph genre. (Dolya, 2009).
life. This does not put Pirogov among the followers or anticipators of conceptual existentialism that emerged in Europe after the First World War. Methodologically, it is important to distinguish between existentialism as a special direction of philosophy of the twentieth century and ‘existential philosophy’ or philosophy of the ‘existential type’. Defining this type of philosophy, Piama Gaydenko wrote: “Here we rather see an attempt at self-expression with figurative and artistic devices, a desire to express internal personal experience, mood personal emotions”. (Gaydenko, 1993:6) In this case, it implies the ideas of existential orientation (to be more precise, religious-existential) in a confessional form – ideas representing the internal, at times contradictory, spiritual searches of Pirogov as a thinking individual, not attempting to validate or defend any philosophical school. Pirogov did not consider himself a philosopher. His attitude toward modern philosophy, in particular, Cartesian and Hegelian philosophical rationalism was quite critical, but one cannot ignore that he was a true voice of the love of wisdom, a true Russian wise man, as Peter Struve called him. (Struve, 2000:225-230) Vasily Zenkovsky wrote: “Pirogov did not see himself as a philosopher and did not claim to be one, but in reality, in his work we see a comprehensive and well thought-out philosophical outlook”. (Zenkovsky, 2001: 366)

According to Frank, “the greatest originality and significance of Pirogov as a thinker is related to...purely the philosophical aspect of his thinking.” (Frank, 1996:343) At the same time, Frank ranked Pirogov among the creators of “classical Russian literature of the 19th century” and thought that Questions of Life, being a combination of “autobiography and memoirs with philosophical and religious thoughts”, in its spiritual depth could be compared to My Past and Thoughts by Herzen.\(^3\) Frank left out only one aspect of Pirogov’s work, just briefly mentioning it – his teaching ideas, which is quite understandable due to the narrow scope of his article dedicated to the memory of Pirogov as a religious thinker.

Nikolay Ivanovich Pirogov was not only an outstanding doctor but a brilliant teacher and theorist of national education (after retiring from medical practice in 1856-1861 Pirogov was a curator of the Odessa and later Kiev school districts). Pirogov is also the creator of an original existentially-oriented philosophy of education closely connected to his general philosophical views.

The epigraph to Questions of Life is a remarkable illustration of the general nature of Pirogov’s educational philosophy and his mindset in general. “What are you raising your son to be?” I was once asked. “To be a person”, I said. “Don’t you know that we all are not just people – it is just a

\(^3\) See the monograph of the author of the article which gives an overview of existential motives in philosophical work of Alexander Herzen. (Grevtsova, 2002: 24-30) Despite all ideological differences between Herzen and Pirogov, they both can be considered as existential thinkers with similar views.
distraction not necessary to society. We need merchants, soldiers, mechanics, sailors, doctors and lawyers, not people. Is that really so?” (Pirogov, 1887:3).\(^4\) In a certain sense, Pirogov’s philosophical statements attempted to answer the question, “How to be or become a person?” This is, according to Pirogov, the central question of human life asked by everyone who is not an idiot or a hardened dogmatist, someone who “once received a push” and is constantly moving by inertia in a given direction not as a rational being but rather a lifeless heavenly body.

Thus, Pirogov’s theory of education and philosophy addresses, according to him, “people who claim to have intelligence and feelings,” attempting to answer the essential questions of human life: What is the meaning of life? What is our purpose? What is our calling? What are we to look for? (Pirogov, 1887:4) The answers to these questions by any thinking person attempting to somehow sum up his life aspirations are the answers that add up to develop his world outlooks (in the plural and not in the singular, as, according to Pirogov, it is quite unlikely that “any thinking person went through the entire life with the same outlook”. (Pirogov, 1910:12) This continuous work of developing an outlook, emphasizes Pirogov, “uninterruptedly as a common thread goes through the entire life and constantly guides and more or less directs our actions”. (Pirogov, 1910:13)

The distinction of Pirogov’s interpretation of ideological outlook is his approach to its definition not only by rationalistic criteria locking in the status quo of the level of the world understanding that a person has reached. The central ideological concepts can be not only reasoning, but also faith in the case of religious views as well as everyday life experience and common sense. In addition, consideration by Pirogov of the world outlook required a uniquely sincere representation of the evolution of his own views, self actualization and self contemplation which, according to him, is a unique quality of a human being that sets us apart from animals.

The Delphic maxim “Know thyself” here acquires a new, quite instructive characteristic of Pirogov’s philosophic personality, as the subject of the confession in Questions of Life is the unique life of a Russian doctor. This is the life of a modern rather than archaic person, the life of a doctor, scientist and teacher, a graduate of the Moscow University with a degree from Tartu, a veteran of many wars with tremendous life experience and general recognition. Pirogov became a believing Christian and a religious philosopher not in his declining years, as an aging and repenting nobleman,

\(^4\) In this article, all references are to the Pirogov’s lifetime collection of works in two volumes (Saint-Petersburg, 1887) and to the two volume collection published by the Pirogov partnership in Kiev in 1910 dedicated to the centenary of Pirogov’s birth. The works of Pirogov of the Soviet time in eight volumes (Moscow, State Publishing House of Medical Literature, 1957-1962), in a number of cases is not an entirely reliable source as it contains notes and biased comments.
but at the height of his career. Coming from a Russian Orthodox family, Pirogov, in the course of his study, changed his original religious views to an atheistic outlook, primarily not as a result of conscious choice but under the influence of the environment. Pirogov himself wrote with irony, “yesterday at the Shopping Arcade Ivan Ivanovich said that God did not exist”.

Given the scale of Pirogov’s personality, Vasily Zenkovsky, in his History of Russian Philosophy, attempted to prove, using Pirogov as an example, the law of Russian philosophical development which he connected with “overcoming secular beliefs on the Russian soil”. He dedicates a separate chapter (Chapter X) to the views of Pirogov and Leo Tolstoy, which in itself indicates the importance Zenkovsky attributed to analyzing the philosophy of the two mouthpieces of “original religious views”. (Zenkovsky, 2001:365)

Only one aspect of Zenkovsky’s views needs to be corrected. The overcoming of “secular beliefs” resulted for Pirogov not from consistent acquisition of religious beliefs as was the case with another outstanding Russian doctor, founder of the modern-day purulent surgery, Archbishop of Simferopol and of the Crimea, Luka (Voyno-Yasenetsky), author of Spirit, Soul and Body (Moscow, 1997), but developing a position of a free religious thinker who in a number of cases was sceptical of the official synodal church, just as Aleksey Khomyakov, Vladimir Solovyev and other Russian philosophers. Pirogov, for instance, was not opposed to Darwin’s theory of evolution in its application to the animal world as distinct from Nikolay Danilevsky and Nikolay Strakhov. He wrote: “...I’m not aggravated by the fact that humans originated from apes; any creatures that evolved into humans, though possibly accidentally, deserve respect. I, however, believe that humans could transition back to apes, which we are witnessing” (Pirogov, 1910: 171). Pirogov’s rich life experience taught him to see imperfections of human nature where ingratitude, groveling, pretense, cruelty, hypocrisy and other human vices were deeply rooted in all classes. Noticing these vices, Pirogov was far from idealizing the common people, which was popular in the period of reforms of the 1960s. The real truth of life led him to believe in the existence of the Christ, the perfect “theantropic” person. This perfect person, according to Pirogov, is “sympathetic to all human-kind” with its weaknesses and sorrows, and at the same time, a natural similarity of man to God. Otherwise, if that perfection did not exist, “it would mean that we see ourselves as bastards that came from mating that accidentally happened in nature.” (Pirogov, 1910:172) The ideal of belief in the theantropic person and all-perfect Christ is seen by Pirogov so inherent to humans and their perception of the world that the use of Voltaire’s famous aphorism, “If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him” is not seen by him as a sacrilege.

As always, being extremely sincere, Pirogov asked a question: was it a sin before God “if he as a citizen and a person distinguishes the dogmatic representation of Christ’s teachings by the state from the spirit, ideals and the essence of his teachings”. In this case, the church itself “would not want
to force anything on him”, since Pirogov firmly recognized himself as a “son of the church by birth and allegiance, and considered it unfair and unlawful to leave the church.” (Pirogov, 1910:216) Proclaiming as his goal “knowing thyself”, getting into the depth of the soul, coming closer to the ideal of “full self-knowledge”, Pirogov constantly emphasized the difficulty of accomplishing this goal which required mobilization of all human moral forces, in particular, getting rid of the aspiration inherent to humans to see themselves for something different than what they really are. According to Pirogov, only children did not have time to develop this harmful “duplicity”, in which adults often “seek self-forgetfulness”. That is why true self-cognition is defined by him as necessary “expulsion of the double from deep parts of the soul” seen as “arduous work”, “constant spiritual tension” and “struggle with oneself”. (Pirogov, 1887:17) According to Pirogov, the less duplicity there is in ‘internal life’, the more connected are a person’s thoughts, words and actions. An example of such connection is a child’s consciousness, not realizing or not feeling that it thinks as the thought itself exists in children through words and deeds. In such a case, any uttered words and performed actions are perceived as pleasant or unpleasant experiences which are the embryonic form of a distinction between the good and the evil.

Embarking on the difficult journey of self-discovery, says Pirogov, “you are becoming an observer of the immense crater of the soul, waiting for rare moments when the eruption of ever bubbling lava subsides to get a quick look in this scary depth.” (Pirogov, 1887:17) Here is where, according to Pirogov, a struggle between the “internal person” and “external person” takes place – a battle of human feelings, aspirations, passions and various formal obstacles and impediments interfering in one way or another with their implementation. This struggle has two outcomes – to accept it and stop all “distractions”, i.e. in Pirogov’s words, stop torturing yourself with the questions of the meaning of life, and that means “in the book of life understand the letters but not the meaning”, or continue the endless work – “from morning till night researching the depth of the soul, waiting for moments of freedom, making it find answers to the questions of life.” (Pirogov, 1887:15) The above “distractions”, in Pirogov’s understanding, are not merely a result of the generalization of the life experience and logical thinking. They are the result of anticipation, inspiration and prayer rather than logic.

According to Pirogov, self-consciousness is a human ability and quality. For its characterization, it is insufficient to say that the essence of the human existence is exhausted by the Cartesian cogito, i.e. self-consciousness is human existence in pure thought. In reality, the statement “I am” is the product of perception rather than thought, as the words “I feel myself” can be uttered without thought. In a wider context, Pirogov proves that cognition of our own existence “is not the quality of just human nature; we share it with all animals; as an animal could not protect itself, find food, fight for existence if it did not have consciousness.” (Pirogov, 1910:10)
Without humanizing animals, Pirogov, who according to his own words performed “hundreds of vivisections” on dogs, from his personal observations of animals realized that dogs truly have consciousness. Pirogov, for instance, points out that a small dog when encountering a large one usually lies down on its back and put its paws up as a sign of obedience. Many times he noticed that large dogs, despite standard laws of animal behavior, would crawl in front of a small dog which was particularly loved by the owners. Pirogov wonders if that indicates that animals have consciousness.

This is why the fundamental difference between humans and animals is not consciousness but self-consciousness: “we have not only consciousness but the perception of consciousness (self-consciousness) and, possibly, consciousness of consciousness that separates us from animals” (Pirogov, 1887:212) Based on the above, Pirogov suggests critically reviewing the classical rationalism formula by Descartes: cogito, ergo sum, replacing it with sentio, ergo sum (where ‘think’ is replaced with ‘feel’). Regarding the notion of our existence fundamental for the philosophy of self-consciousness according to Pirogov, it is not reduced to pure thought. According to Pirogov, the primary basis of ideology is not knowledge but perception of the world defined as follows: “An ensemble of our perceptions through our own senses (communicating and not communicating with the external world, with our not-me) is our existence.” (Pirogov, 1887:11)

Pirogov’s criticism of Descartes’ rationalism echoes the views of Vladimir Solovyev, initially stated in the first article of the Theoretical Philosophy series under the title, First Beginning of Theoretical Philosophy. This criticism also reflects the characteristic feature of Russian metaphysics in general, defined as ontologism by Zenkovsky. Analyzing the Cartesian epistemological concept based entirely on the assumption of pure consciousness, Solovyev says that it makes no sense to raise the question of existence of thinking, without first finding out “what being or existence is”, as “it makes no sense to pose and solve the question of the existence of anything if no one knows what it is.” (Pirogov, 1990:781) Since Descartes calls his thinking subject a “thinking thing”, “mental,” “thinking or spiritual substance”, these terms, taken without any scrutiny, are the remains of that very scholasticism which Descartes criticized. Descartes’ subject of thinking, according to Solovyev, is an “impostor without a philosophical passport.” (Pirogov, 1990:781)

For the classical rationalism of Descartes’ fundamental type is the assertion that spiritual substance is “so abstract that it is identical to thinking in general.” (Pirogov, 1990:783) Pointing to this primary characteristic of the subject of pure thought in Descartes, Solovyev calls it an artificial entity, a “Cartesian bastard” and in essence, makes the same objection as Pirogov. If Pirogov replaces the dry, rationalistic cogito ergo sum by the existential sentio, ergo sum, Soloviev emphasizes that the real subject of knowing, our “actual self,” is nothing more than a “fact of psychic existence or direct consciousness”.

Of course, neither in *Theoretical Philosophy*, nor in his other writings did Solovyev refer to the philosophical work of Pirogov, and they remained unknown to him. However, this does not change the actual closeness of their beliefs and traditions of Russian ontologism (V.V. Zenkovsky) or ontological epistemology (term coined by S.L. Frank). Pirogov’s legacy, in this case, is an example of the existence of ontognoeological, existentially oriented traditions of Russian philosophical thought – from Khomyakov with his “life-thought” to Frank and his “we – philosophy.” It seems that the high praise by Frank of Pirogov’s religious philosophy is based on the internal closeness of existential attitudes of both thinkers. The main task of Pirogov’s philosophy, i.e. to trace the path of formation of ideologies and beliefs of a person, to establish a relationship of religious faith and philosophical truths, and others, echo the leading statements of Frank’s philosophy, and what he called “the Russian world views”, which in this case is equivalent to the “national Russian philosophy.” Frank wrote: “The saying *primum vivere deinde philosophare* (first live, then philosophize, *E.G*) in external utilitarian and practical meaning is a rather flat banal truth, but the same statement, understood in the inner, metaphysical sense, reveals (as an expression of ontological primacy of life over the fact of thinking), deep thought which just reflects, apparently, the main spiritual quality of the Russian outlook.” (Frank, 1996: 170)

**CONCLUSION**

Thus, Pirogov’s philosophical quest, which resulted in the creation of his own “metaphysics of faith,” was in some ways a concentrated expression of many characteristic manifestations of Russian philosophical thought of the nineteenth century: from the idealism of “philosophical awakening”, to this materialism of the thirties and forties, to the positivism of the sixties, and the “metaphysical turn” of the seventies and eighties. All the above eras of Russian thought, one way or another, found a reflection in his philosophical confessional work, giving answers to questions of his own and Russian life. Pirogov was one of the pioneers of original religious and philosophical thought of the second half of the nineteenth century, whose ideas echo subsequent theories of V.S. Solovyev, L.M. Lopatin, N.O. Lossky, P.A. Florensky and S.L. Frank.

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CHAPTER VII

ARISTOTELIAN READING OF HEGEL AND
HEGELIAN READING OF ARISTOTLE IN THE
FORMULATION OF “WORK OF ART”

AHMADREZA MOTAMEDI

INTRODUCTION I

In the Introduction to his Lectures on Aesthetics, where mention is made of Kant’s explanation of the clarification of the concept of mediation of the arts by the power of judgment, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – phenomenologist-philosopher-identifies nature and necessity on one hand, and thought and freedom on the other. He also emphasizes that Kant regards the power of judgment as thinking in particular put in terms of the universal. He calls this power of judgment “thought” but only when there is a particular and that power of judgment is seeking for a universal. “But he thinks that Kant’s attempts are finally subjective, and his critique of the power of judgment fails to understand lofty and true unity between necessity and freedom, particularity and universality, subjectivity and objectivity”. As Kant emphasized, “though music consists of organized songs, apprehension of unity is not in music, but rather within us, unity is a product of our perceptual qualities”. In his study of the advancing process of the idea of art and tradition in the German classical tradition, however, Hegel concludes that in terms of penetration to the concept of beauty and true cognizance of artistic phenomenon, “Schiller must be credited with the great merit of having broken through the Kantian subjectivity and abstractness of thought, and having dared to attempt to transcend these limits by intellectually grasping the principles of unity and reconciliation as the truth, and realizing them in art”.

To explain Schiller’s discovery and cognizance of the unification between theory and practice, necessity and freedom in the arts, Hegel mentions Schiller’s Letters on Aesthetic Education: “For the aim of aesthetic education is, according to Schiller, to give such form to inclination, sensuousness, impulse, and heart, that they may become rational in themselves, and by the same process reason, freedom, and spirituality may come forward out of their abstraction, and uniting with the natural elements, now rationalized throughout, may be invested with flesh and blood. Beauty is thus pronounced to be the unification of the rational and the sensuous, and this unification to be the genuinely real”. Though Hegel recognizes Kant in his critique of the power of judgment as an artistic intermediate between the concepts of freedom and necessity, theoretical and practical, as well as concepts of free and voluntary, he insists that the Kantian exposition of the
character of aesthetic judgment, the power of imagination and its free play, is not other than the perceivable thing in the form of an "undetermined Unitarian idea". But what Schiller recognizes in the free motive of play against the inner motives causing man to think and act is the imagination of freedom which stems both from the force exercised by everyday free activities. Instead of the abstractness of speculative thought, he reproduces objects by the power of imagination in the form of works of art, and in this way fills the gap between the two senses and theoretical motives. Relying upon the logic of phenomenology of spirit to historically infer the true concept of arts, Hegel thinks that peoples of each and every age belong to a strand of aesthetics, and have woven a form of thought within an objective and plastic framework. In spite of Hegel, the artistic strand is a mentality which is elaborated by the artists of each and every age within the objectivity of their materials. On the one hand, an artistic strand is objective and real, and on the other it is spiritual and ideal. "A mind cannot at first know itself directly. It knows itself by seeing its own reflection in the external world". When the artist gives "spirit" to the art subject, it means that he embodies in his own time idea, thought, and cognizance of truth. "Only after a long journey through the sensory world does the mind purify itself of the sensory and comprehend its intrinsic nature, thought, in the philosophical, conceptual terms appropriate to it".

The link between object and subject in Hegel’s aesthetics comes to the point that he attributes shortage in each level to the other and stemming from the other: “from this point of view, we must remark to begin with, which cannot be proved till later, that the defects of a work of art are not to be regarded simply as always due, for instance, to individual lack of skill. Defectiveness of form arises from defectiveness of content”. And since he recognizes the artistic idea only in a concrete unity, the process of soul, in historical stages, provides the possibility of appearing as unity in art, though at the primitive stage. It seems raw, incommensurate, and languorous: “The mind is insufficiently developed and distanced from nature to master its obtrusive disarray. Unsatisfying as it is to us, symbolic art represents the mind of its producers and contemplators. Abstractive mind, the absence of instantiation in nature, and the realization of concrete identity cause the secret side of symbolic art. “Now, because the Idea is in some fashion a concrete unity, it follows that this unity can enter into art-consciousness only by the expansion and reconciliation of the particularities of the Idea, and it is through this evolution that artistic beauty comes to possess a totality of particular stages and forms”. The historical development of German classical aesthetics as an intermediate between theoretical activity and the practical from Kant to Schiller, Goethe and Hegel, is based on the following:

A. Concepts of theoretical and natural sciences are sensuous and based in intuition. The end of natural things is out of the scope of man’s will. In their theoretical activities, scientist and philosopher do not deal with
the existence of objects; but rather, they make an abstract image of them, and penetrate them in the nature of object.

B. Concepts of practical knowledge are free and super-sensuous. The end of practical knowledge is based on man’s free will. In practical activities, the agent deals with the existence of objects. He considers them (even though they are his own feelings and emotions) as materials and manipulates them.

C. Hegel’s system of aesthetics is philosophically based on intermediacy of artistic activity in the realm of theoretical and practical activities. Artistic activity will not destroy the object, converting it into materials other than the original, nor will it convert it into an abstract concept of the theoretical sciences. But rather it reveals and actualizes what is according to the Idea of beauty, hidden and potential, in its essential possibility.

The distinct point in the Hegelian exposition of artistic creativity is intermediacy between theoretical and practical activities and subtlety of attention paid to potential capabilities of objects. Instead of creating an abstract concept or manipulating its essence, the artist pushes objects, through discovering their potentiality and potential capabilities, toward their ideal capabilities, and reveals the beauty hidden in them. The artist finds something in the world to which neither the mind of the philosopher or scientist, nor those of manufacturer and artisan, are directed. The artist is neither a pure idealist nor a mere pragmatist: “Thus the occasion for production may come entirely from without, and the one important requirement is just that the artist shall lay hold of an essential interest and make the subject-matter become alive in itself. In that event the inspiration of genius arises automatically. And a genuinely living artist finds precisely through this aliveness a thousand occasions for his activity and inspiration, which others pass by without being touched by them”. In his work of art, the artist is going and coming between two negative and positive extremes; and, through his “idealistic thought” he sees something in the world which others fail to see, and finds what is hidden behind the veil of “potentiality” of the object, and pushes through “practical skill” discovered capacities toward ideal thought. He does not negate its essentiality, but rather actualizes its potentiality: “From this point of view, the sort of position that the artist is in is that he enters, with a natural talent, into relation with an available given material; he finds himself solicited by an external incentive, by an event to give form to this material and to express himself in general on that”. Subtlety of artistic inspiration lies in the world’s capacity to deceive and the artist’s capacity to be deceived. The artist’s talent and genius to discover the essential potentiality of objects is the mystery behind the deception which reveals the potential intelligible as the actual sensible for the audience, and attracts them. “Genius is the general ability for the true production of a work of art, as well as the energy to elaborate and complete it. And talent is the ability of different accomplishments of this capacity”.
INTRODUCTION II

Before this, in his *Poetica*, in a comparison made between history and the arts, Aristotle has mentioned the important point that the poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what is “possible” to happen. “The distinction between historian and poet is not that the one writes in prose and the other in verse. It consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and has graver import than history”. In these concise and short passages of Aristotle describing poetry, there are two mysterious and valuable principles: the first is his approach of “contingency” from the fact to contingent thing, and the other is art’s general approach to go from particular to universal. “Hence poetry is something more philosophical and of graver import than history, since its statement is of nature rather of the universal, whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do – which is the aim of poetry”. History is inclined to particulars, considers individual experiences; poetry, though it is an image of reality and placed in mimesis, enjoys a “universal” philosophical approach. But the poet goes from the fact and what has happened to what that may happen. This poetical manner, i.e. attention paid to contingent character of events, phenomena, is, according to Aristotle; the philosophical superiority of poetry to history. A poem is not imitating a particular command. The common proposition is taken according to the causal principles and logical order, which runs along the relation between characters and dramatic positions. “It is true that Aristotle does not make poetry the mimesis of a universal. But even where the objects of mimesis are not universal, they can still bring about a mimesis that presents universals. All that matters is that the mimesis of a person does not, thanks to the causal principles implied by an action”.

Though the final product of the poet is a particular event and description of a particular phenomenon, the superiority of poetry to history is that it processes the particular under universality. The poet does not devote himself to mere reality. Rather, he takes into account contingent and probable aspects. He looks, on the one hand, at the fact and particular experience, and on the other at its universal aspect and potential possibilities hidden in it. According to Aristotle, poetry is the realm of “universality” and “possibility”. Mimesis is not the mere imitation; it is the sphere of “possibility” and the ascending and descending arc of particularity and universality. The poet in his experience of particularity makes production of universality possible. Thus, he may reveal that hidden beauty from behind the veil of particularity. “The poet’s function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, what is possible as being probable or necessary”. The difference between particularity in poetry and history concerns the “contingent” capabilities of the occurred phenome-
non. History’s particular is a “primary particular”, while that of poetry is the “final one”. The philosophical aspect of poetry is the study of all possible forms from the realm of probability to the realm of necessity. The poet searches all particular possible forms under the universality of the phenomenon, and allows a possible and potentially beautiful form to be revealed. What the poet narrates in his own story, though it is particular in form, it is a newly-emerged particular, a particular reconstructed under the universal, which reveals potential and possible capabilities of the phenomenon. It is a primary particular satisfied by the “universal”, and in the arc of descent, it reveals itself as being perfected in the form of the newly-emerged particular.

“The nature of action is thus the ground for a universal statement in the mimesis; and Aristotle’s insistence that mimesis takes action as its object underwrites his conclusion that tragedy communicates authentically philosophical knowledge”. It should be recalled that the philosophical knowledge here means the general realities, which are imitating a particular act in a dramatic plot’s format and rise to the level of general tragedy, because in Aristotle’s opinion the reality of art is different from philosophical or logical reality.

“Aesthetic intuition and philosophy are not the same”. By universal, he means all probable possibilities from the border of impossibility to necessity. “For the purpose of poetry a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility”. In spite of what Aristotle says, requirements of a work of art covers even the improbable, since according to the requirements of the work of art, probable impossibilities are preferred and more legitimate than improbable possibilities. The artistic truth is not other than what is required by poetry and telling tales. The range of possible things goes from necessity to impossibility. “By a universal statement I mean one which such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do – which is the aim of poetry”.

Aristotle’s mimesis is the poet’s exodus from the limited scope of facts and movements in the realm of “possibility” to choose from among the possible, necessary, and (probably) impossible which is followed by the greatest poetic impact. It is a quest for mythos, which engages the audience in details, with characters, and particular events, enjoy a cognizance of human conduct resulting from determination of universality in particularity. Thus it is essentially other than particular historical events and it is constructed on causal principles, which influenced the relation between characters and dramatic positions. “Each event must follow the other either by necessity or probability”. “A well-made plot is consciously arranged around such causal principles”. What causes the audience of the work of art to identify itself with the characters of the story and its dramatic situation is not correspondence between the fact and external form of the event, but rather a sector of the circle of the phenomenon’s possibilities from the limit of necessity to impossibility, which enjoys the greatest level of influence and passions to motivate the audience. “Tragedy, however, is an imitation,
not only of a complete action, but also of incidents arousing pity and fear”. “The emotions that Plato deplored are granted to exist in tragedy, but they benefit ethical action, instead of subverting it. Where Plato gloomily rushed to the conclusion that tragedy’s emotions overpower our capacity to reason, Aristotle presumes us able to reason about our emotions, and to make them more reasonable”.

**ARISTOTELIAN READING OF HEGEL AND HEGELIAN READING OF ARISTOTLE**

Having taken a look at Aristotle and Hegel’s view of recognition of the truth of the work of art, it is time to discuss Hegelian aesthetics in its Aristotelian reading, and in particular Hegel’s cognizance of possible aspects of objects and events. The historical distance between Aristotle and Hegel (one of them at the beginning and the other at the other end of Western metaphysics) cannot be hidden. Developments in concepts and categories, various readings of philosophers’ ideas in the next periods, changes in metaphysics in the Renaissance, domination of the paradigm of subjectivity among thinkers of the modern age, have probably made any comparison between the two ends of the history of philosophical thought meaningless.

Since, more than being produced by the minds of philosophers, the arts are created by the souls of poets, and have revealed their own non-scientific and philosophical truth in the course of history. They have made philosophers, instead of making the work of art correspond to their own methodology, language, and thought, approach the station of the work of art and the aesthetic, so that they may understand some of the mystery of the mysterious world of artistic creation.

Nevertheless, all modern philosophers try to explain what they call art within the frameworks of their own philosophical systems; and for this reason, specification of the world of art has been one the most difficult parts of systematization of a harmonic philosophical structure for them; that is to say, provision of an aesthetic system which is in harmony with epistemology, ontology, philosophy of history, philosophy of law, philosophy of religion and other components of a harmonic and consistent philosophical system.

In his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant tried to make a system of the categories of understanding and a *priori* judgments of “quality”, “quantity”, “modality” and “relation” involved in cognizance of the beautiful; and though he made each one of the above categories, not as it had been cognized, but rather as he wanted them, he attained the realm of arts beyond the necessities of the concepts of theoretical knowledge, natural ends, voluntary freedoms, and human ends of practical and moral knowledge. Nevertheless, the critical system founded by Kant engaged his philosophical system, so that philosophers following him proceeded to criticize his
Aristotelian Reading of Hegel and Hegelian Reading of Aristotle in Art

...critique of the power of judgment, and labeled his aesthetic judgment as “subjectivist” and “inter-essential”.

According to Hegel, Schiller, Goethe, and Zoelger made stable the suspended step taken by Kant concerning intermediacy of arts, and freed aesthetic phenomenon from the exclusivity of subjectivity, and intertwined it with objectivity. Artists such as Schiller and Goethe, though cognizing a work of art as being influenced by mentality and universality, found it as a true reality manifest in objectivity and particularity. Based on his own philosophical system and the logic of phenomenology of spirit, Hegel perfected the final link of the German tradition of aesthetics. He described the philosophical idea in a concrete manner, something which it based on the historical view and in an inductive manner would attain same connection: “the work of art should not present the content in its universality, but rather, it should individualize it to free it from being combined; the universal spiritual aspect and the particular sensuous one should be intertwined both in form and content”. “The idea is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. And in the beautiful work of art this unity is expressed or represented in the union of spiritual content with external or material embodiment. Spirit and matter, subjectivity and objectivity, are fused together in a harmonious unity or synthesis. As Hegel emphasizes, art has the task of presenting the Idea to immediate intuition in sensuous form, and not in the form of thought or pure spirituality”.

According to Hegel’s dialectic, the work of art is a meeting point of matter and spirit, and the two are negating and positing each other. In a work of art, the spirit should be presented in the form of sense; it is here where matter stands as a great obstacle to the manifestation of spirit. Now, if the spirit overcomes matter, the form of the work of art will be negated. Then, to become manifest in a work of art, the spirit posits matter inevitably; for, it is in need of a form to show itself; at the same time, it has to negate matter, since the latter is an obstacle to its manifestation. “But this perfect accord and union are not always attained”. Either “Matter (embodiment) predominates over spirit (content). The spiritual content here struggles to find its adequate expression but fails to do so. It fails clearly to shine through. It has not mastered its medium. It is overwhelmed by matter. This gives us the symbolic type of art” or “The perfect balance and union of spirit and matter. This gives us the classical type of art”.

Then, in every work of art, the form assumed by matter signifies a level of spirit which has been materially and corporally determined in becoming of the spirit. When Hegel describes historical periods of arts, at first he speaks of inappropriateness of the Idea and form, and considers encounter between the Idea and objectivity as a negative relation. He mentions an undetermined potential idea, which is so abstract that it does not have the capability of going towards individuality, which is suitable for its own ideal. In the course of periodical developments, this un-universal abstract spirit will go gradually towards a determined individuality, and
provide a possibility to make a true link between universality and particularity as is suitable for its ideal.

Dialectical development of the Idea negates its own infinite universal aspect, and comes to a finitude of the particular; and each position is followed by another negation, till the Idea becomes completely concrete (Classic). Degrees of subjectivity attain an objective perfection and elevation of the work of art; and, as required by Hegel’s logic of negation and position, this development will continue till the negation of material form in the work of art. Here the spirit searches for another station such as religion and philosophy to attain truth (Romantic and the end of art). It may seem that theme and methodical similarities such as dialectical logic and philosophical idealism, made an epistemological cognition and a univalent ontology in Plato and Hegel’s ideology. However, in the presence of the thought and creation of art, Hegel’s time, passing from Aristotelian, to the beginning of renaissance and especially the late German traditional aesthetics, there emerged a special relation between Hegel and Aristotle. The question that should be answered before an Aristotelian reading of Hegel’s view is: “Is the primary content of art, sensuous or spiritual?” Does not the logic of the phenomenology of spirit suggest that artistic products are only the results of the spirit’s productive activities? Hegel replies that art has been certainly produced by the spirit, and will refer to the spirit; even though we know that work of art has been created to be sensuously received so that it may be perceived through sensuous intuition: “The work of art is not only for the sensuous apprehension as sensuous object, but its position is of such a kind that as sensuous it is at the same time essentially addressed to the mind, that the mind is meant to be affected by it, and to find some sort of satisfaction in it”.

But what that calls the mind to artistic creation and produces the mind’s becoming and causes it to be, materially and corporally, is both through sensuous affection and spiritual inspirations. “The artist must not only have looked around at much in the world and made himself acquainted with its outer and inner manifestations, but he must have drawn much, and much that is great, into his own soul; he must done and lived through much before he can develop the true depth of life into concrete manifestation”. Thus, the content or the source inspiriting art is both of a sensuous and spiritual character; it is a product of artist’s both internal and external journey. “Now in the first place this creative activity involves the gift and the sense for grasping reality and its configuration, since, while the medium of philosophy’s production is thought, art’s is actual external configurations”. To look and listen in a good manner, and to approach the external formations are among the first requirements which should be fulfilled by the artist, which are emphasized by Hegel in particular concerning Goethe: “Goethe, e.g., began like this and throughout his life has winded more and more the scope of his observations. This gift of interest in a specific grasp of the actual world in its real shape, together with a firm retention of what has been seen, is thus the first requirement of an artist”. And finally, while
discussing the concept of artistic beauty, Hegel says explicitly concerning the content in art: “The content of art is also in some respects borrowed from the sensuous, from nature; or, in any case, even if the content is of a spiritual kind, it can only be resized and fixed by representing the spiritual fact, such as human relations, in the shape of phenomena with external reality”. According to what is said by Hegel, content of art is in some respects borrowed from the sensuous, from nature; in mimesis, Aristotle too takes imaging of nature and reality as the starting point; “What the ideal work of art properly provides is not only the appearance of the inner spirit in the reality of external forms; on the contrary, it is the absolute truth and rationality of the actual world which should attain external appearance”. In the Chapter 2, Methods of Aesthetic Science, while discussing the Idea as starting point, Hegel says that Platonic metaphysical and abstract thought is not able to fulfill needs in the field of logical idea of beauty: “The Platonic abstraction must not satisfy us, even for the logical idea of beauty. We must understand this idea more profoundly and more in the concrete, for the emptiness of content which characterizes the Platonic idea is no longer satisfactory to the fuller philosophical wants of the mind of today”. Considering Hegel’s opinion, in art creation, soul is not created from a Platonic immaterial system. Soul is perception of the real world and reception of the exterior appearance, and this is the intersect of Hegel and Aristotelian formulated work of art. “In order to achieve the interpenetration of the rational content and the external shape, the artist has to call in aid (i) the watchful circumspection of the intellect, and (ii) the depth of the heart and its animating feelings. It is therefore an absurdity to suppose that poems like the Homeric odes came to the poet in his sleep. Without circumspection, discrimination, and criticism the artist cannot master any subject-matter which he is to configure, and it is silly to believe that the genuine artist does not know what he is doing”.

In Hegel’s understanding of fine art, he explicitly disagrees with Plato’s opinion about poetic inspiration in the “Ion”, “Phaedrus”, “Symposium” and “Republic”. Hegel’s idea about inspiration is not like Plato’s and the relation with the Muse, but he believes inspiration is a mental activity that fulfills the imaginative virtues of the human being. “The activity of imagination and technical execution, considered in itself as the fundamental condition of the artist, is what is generally called, in the third place, ‘inspiration’. However, despite of Hegel’s emphasis on exterior impulse and inspirational sense, he strictly mentions only the relation of natural and sensual command with spiritual and mental reality. “But the heat of the blood achieves nothing by itself; champagne produces no poetry, as Marmontel, e.g., tells how in a cellar in Champagne he had six thousand bottles confronting him and yet nothing poetic flowed out of them for him”.

In Hegel’s opinion, the real inspiration is creative imagination in creating a work of art, and also the objectification of the exterior quality. Inspiration is a necessity for art realization. “If we ask further wherein artistic inspiration consists, it is nothing but being completely filled with the
theme, being entirely present to the theme, and not resting until the theme has been stamped and polished into artistic shape”. According to Hegel, the spiritual content which is the starting point of art is not the universal abstract mind, but rather a universal inclining towards the particular, it is a universal which is capable of becoming concrete. “This condition has the effect that Mind is at once specified as a particular case of mind, as human mind, and not as simply absolute and eternal, inasmuch as mind in this latter sense is incapable of proclaiming and expressing itself otherwise than as intellectual being”. Then, in Aristotelian reading of Hegel, though arts are suggestive of a universal, this universal is not the same as Platonic absolute eternal mind; but rather, it is a universal which, for Hegel, is represented in the shape of objective and external phenomena and is capable to become sensuous and concrete. “The work of art must be a spiritual activity which, nevertheless, at the same time has in itself the element of sensuousness and immediateness”. “The work of art; it must be a spiritual activity which, nevertheless, at the same time has in itself the element of sensuousness and immediateness”. In Plato’s opinion, whenever the artist looks at the natural and particular and imitates it, he perambulates the principle of departure in a formulated work of art. “Image-making, imitation, and every sort of copying resemble perversions” (Sophist: 228c-267bc). The irrationality of poetry for Plato is because of its devotion to particularity in nature or human events and the staying away from the reality of object and abstract knowledge. The imitation of painter from a particular bed, or poet from a king’s behavior, is connected to a concrete theme, which is unable to reach universal reality (Republic, 597b – 598c, 601c – 602a). In spite of this, Aristotle noted that the artist inclination to nature is natural, and knowledge making. “[Mimesis] is natural to people from childhood….mimesis is natural and pleasant because it is a way of learning”.

However Hegel receives the grasping of external reality and its configuration, as the first place of creative activity, and emphasizes different aspect of the intermediary of philosophical production (thought) and art production (sensible intuition). He noted the alteritas of sensual and aesthetic intuition with philosophical intuition, and he admits that: “The sphere of objective spirit leads on to the sphere of absolute spirit”.

Against an Aristotelian reading of Hegel, we may refer to an Hegelian reading of Aristotle: the particular negates itself and elevates to the station of the universal. The universal again negates itself, and comes in the shape of the particular. But the latter particular is other than the former one. It is a universal, which has become particular through negation of itself. As Aristotle says, this is not a historical particular, like Alcibiades did or suffered. But rather, its personality enjoys some kind of human conduct: “…a person of a given character should speak or act in a given way, by the rule either of necessity or of probability”. This is what is emphasized by Hegel in describing tragedy and its characters: “The action in every drama is necessarily a collision. It may be a collision of universal ethical forces embodied in the contending characters of the play”…”In tragic the spiritual
substance of will and accomplishment is the concrete ethical order, then it is the Divine made real in the world”….“A similar excellence belongs to the genuinely tragic characters. Throughout they are what they can be and must be in accordance with their essential nature”.

CONCLUSION

What that brings, after almost two thousand years, Hegel, a teacher of philosophy in line with Aristotle, the first philosopher, is his attention paid to the process of the formation of a work of art. What Hegel calls “spirit”, “Idea”, “mind” and “inter-essence” are aspects in the creation of a work of art is the same as what is called by Aristotle “possibility”, “capability”, and “potentiality”. Hegel’s logic of negation and affirmation follows the spirit through the sequence of historical necessities to the stage of complete concreteness, and pushes it towards unity with body, objectivity, and extra-essence aspects; this is what is emphasized by Aristotle as the general spirit and philosophical superiority of the “artistic particular” to the “historical particular”. What is certain is that a work of art, wherever it is started, is a unique phenomenon. It is a special particular, it enjoys some aspects of the universal (Aristotle) or mind (Hegel); or it has some aspects of particular (Aristotle) or objective (Hegel): “…the constituted truth is merely the resolution of this antithesis, and in reconciliation”. Unity of object and subject and intermediacy of art cannot be achieved unless through relying upon capacities of the world faced by the artist.

Dialectical negation and affirmation (Hegel) is nothing other than actualization of an objects’ capability and potentiality (Aristotle), which is realized, in artistic creation. Comprehensive unity of object and subject, mind and matter, and Hegelian essential becoming of the “mind” is the same as Aristotelian actual determination of “potentiality”. The artist’s talent and genius are not other than his ability to intuit capabilities of the world and phenomena seen by him. When Hegel tells us that when we are standing before a work of art it is as if we are standing before a level of the “Mind”, he tells, in Aristotle's terminology, that we are standing before an aspect of “potentiality”, which has been previously perceived, actualized, and determined by the artist’s genius.

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CHAPTER VIII

FAITH AND REASON ACCORDING TO ANTONIO ROSMINI

WILHELM DANCĂ

An Italian philosopher and theologian, Antonio Rosmini (1797-1855) deserves to be more widely known today. There are three things that prompt me to speak about him.

First, we are dealing with a brilliant Catholic thinker, a true prophet for the age he lived in, and as proof, I mention here that in 1849 he was placed upon the Index, condemned for his daring ideas displayed in his book Of the Five Wounds of the Holy Church; yet, in 2007 Pope Benedict XVI raised him to the honour of the altar and declared him “Blessed”. The misunderstanding, envy and hostility1 he drew upon himself throughout his

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1 Antonio Rosmini was born and lived at a time when modernity was beginning to assert itself, an age marked by profound cultural and political changes. He fully took part in the social and religious revolutions of his time, both as a priest, as well as a philosopher and theologian, seeking to offer guiding lines to those who were trying to emerge out of confusion and reach the light of truth. He thus rejected the mixture between politics and religion within Church, more precisely Josephinism, Gallicanism and the exclusively social and political Christianity on the one hand, and on the other, he fought against the libertarian ideologies, especially the French liberal Catholicism of the XVIIIth century. As a consequence, he had several life-long opponents: the bishop of Trent and the priests subservient to the political and ecclesiastical power, the Austrian ambassador to the Holy See of that time, the cardinals in favour of maintaining the powerful influence of the Austrian emperor over the dioceses of Northern Italy and, above all, cardinal Antonelli, who regarded with disfavour Pope Pius IX’s intention to appoint A. Rosmini state-secretary of the Holy See. But Rosmini had enemies even after his death, several Dominicans being first counted among them (Tommaso Zigliara, Alberto Lepidi), and Jesuits (Domenico and Serafino Sordi, Giuseppe Pecci, P. Perrone, P. Cornoldi, P. Matteo Liberatore and other collaborators of the “Civiltà cattolica” journal) who, out of excessive zeal in applying the norms of Pope Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris encyclical, accused A. Rosmini of worshipping human reasoning, of getting too close to the thinking of modernity, of distancing himself from the scholastic and medieval tradition or of slipping into ontologism, pantheism, idealism, subjectivism and so forth. The accusations lack however any foundation, since the similarities between the Rosminian thinking and the Thomistic one are many and quite extensive. (Cf. Riva, 1985:9-37; Chimirri, 2011:7-9; Ottonello, 2011:87-111)
earthly life continue even to this day. His philosophical and theological works, though under a bushel, are still considered in spite of a whole tradition of rejection. Of his remarkably vast and profound work of over one hundred titles, just forty have been published so far. It will still take some time and determination to fully read and understand him. Secondly, I have chosen Antonio Rosmini because I discovered in him a rigorous method of thinking in which faith does not come into conflict with reason, but is harmonised with it. Indeed, for Rosmini to think means to think Creation. The Rosminian method presupposes “that non-vicious circularity wherein the totality of the multiple is found in the being that penetrates everywhere and enables that multiplicity to be significantly articulated in words and communicable or *predicable*.” Born out of the character of the object it applies to, the method mirrors “in itself the intimate encounter and the common consummation of all beings and of all their operations in the Being from whom any being, whatever its nature may be, draws the actuality of its existence”. (Raschini, 2002:5)

Thirdly, I have chosen Antonio Rosmini because, in his view on education, he pleaded for the formation of the whole man: mind, body and soul. The Rosminian principle, according to which only great people can educate great people, corresponds to another similar epistemological principle, namely that of *pensare in grande*, that is “think big”, thinking within a universal metaphysical horizon, and these two principles may be, in practice, integrated within the following postulate: “perform all your life activities in the spirit of reason”.

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2 The integral character of education is, to a certain extent, linked to the integral character of knowledge, as A. Rosmini stated in his *Introduzione alla Filosofia*, next to his contemporary, John Henry Newman, in his famous work, *The Idea of University*. In terms of education, there are at least four common points between Rosmini and Newman, namely antinaturalism, the tension towards the unity of knowledge, anticipating the role played by the laity, and the idea of historical and gradual growth. Both thinkers are anti-traditionalist, anti-liberal and anti-modernist. They are convinced that the lack of faith and devotion specific to modernity are the fruit of the progressive alienation from the fundamental sources of Christianity, namely the Holy Scripture, Tradition and the Holy Fathers. Due to the chaos of the political and ecclesiastical situation of his time, Rosmini refused, out of caution, to have a meeting with John Henry Newman, who intended to see him in Milan in October 1846. (Cf. Ottinello, 2011)

3 (Cf. Rosmini, 2007:76-94; 290) In this context, the term ‘reason’ is to be understood as *recta ratio*, right, good or healthy judgement. It refers to the universal understanding or philosophy, independent of any age or culture, which contains universal truths about the nature of reality, man and the world. About this *philosophia perennis* Pope Leo XIII spoke, in the modern times, in the *Aeterni Patris* encyclical (1879), with reference to St. Thomas Aquinas and the whole Church philosophical tradition. Leo XIII’s ideas have been successively
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Antonio Rosmini was convinced that most of his contemporaries were not thinking enough and hence, were weak-willed. He had the same conviction regarding the relation between faith and reason in theological studies, which were threatened either by an invasion of faith (fideism), or by the pressure of a hard and strong reason (deism and rationalism). Rosmini’s reflections about this matter are so fresh in Christian or post-Christian European society today, that he can be rightly counted among the modern authors of the third millennium. This aspect of the freshness of Rosmini’s thinking was also emphasised by Pope John XXIII, by Pope Paul VI and by Pope John Paul II, who mentioned Antonio Rosmini in his encyclical devoted to the relation between faith and reason. Thus, speaking about the fruitfulness of this relationship, John Paul II said: “I gladly mention, in a Western context, figures such as John Henry Newman, Antonio Rosmini, Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson and Edith Stein and, in an Eastern context, eminent scholars such as Vladimir S. Soloviev, Pavel A. Florensky, Petr Chaadaev and Vladimir N. Lossky.” (Cf. John Paul II, no 74)

In referring to these, John Paul II intended not to endorse every aspect of their thought, but simply to offer significant examples of a process of philosophical enquiry which was enriched by engaging the data of faith.

ANTONIO ROSMINI’S PHILOSOPHY

Every philosopher is the son of his own time. Antonio Rosmini lived in an age when the tenets of Enlightenment and empiricism were coming to the foreground. In order to reject them, he found his inspiration in the thinking of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, and at times he resorted to Plato. In his search for arguments against gnoseology solely based on the senses, and while trying to discover the ordering function of experience, he reached Kant. But he did not stop there, because he felt that the multitude of inborn categories Kant was speaking about was unconvincing and useless, and that the subjective changes taking place in the act of knowing, as Kant was arguing, result in thinking subject failing to encounter reality. In order to ensure the objective character of knowledge, Rosmini propounded

taken over by other popes, the last of them being John Paul II, who wrote the following in the Fides et Ratio encyclical (1998): “Quotiens ratio percipere valet atque exprimere prima et universalia vitae principia indeque recte consectaria propria deducere ordinis logici et deontologici, totiens appellari potest ratio recta sive, quemadmodum antiqui loquebantur, orthos logos”. (Cf. John Paul II, 1998) Philosophy as philosophia perennis is an integral part of the compulsory university curriculum for those who want to study Catholic theology. (Cf. Codex Iuris Canonici, cann.: 251-252)

4 The Italian philosopher, Gaspare Mura, initiated a book collection at the Città Nuova publishing-house of Rome, under the title: “Autori moderni per il terzo millennio” [Modern authors for the third millennium].
instead an itinerary of ontological search of the truth, an objective principle able to enlighten the intelligence with immediate, universal and immutable evidence. For him, this principle was the concept of ideal Being, which primarily presents itself as an indeterminate content of the mind, which can become determinate when applying itself to the data provided by the senses. It precedes and informs all judgements asserting the existence of a particular thing.

In order to understand how the thinking subject arrives at the idea of being, and in order to answer, to a certain extent, the critiques of ontologism brought against Rosmini, let us briefly take a look at several elements of his ontology.

First of all, Rosmini spoke about three types of being: a) the ideal being, that is, the logical beginning of everything, the light through which beings can be known, the a priori condition of knowledge, being in its potentiality and indeterminacy, being as the mental image of the infinite being; b) the real being, that is, the actual and objective existence of a thing, entity, a substance (material or spiritual, finite or infinite); c) the moral being, that is, being as good, being as fulfilment, the value and perfection of beings and the loving union of the two former types of being (ideal and real).

The existence of these three forms of being is proved by the human mind’s ability to contemplate, because indeed, the mind is able to know the inner structure of being. However, being is something analogous or a thing that can be conceived in different ways; this theory emerges from Aristotle’s Metaphysics and it has been taken over by St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus, though being is at first ‘simple’ and ‘unique’, it multiplies itself in the mind of the thinking subject, either due to the diversity of the forms it takes on, or to the human faculties of abstraction (which give birth to the abstract, inferred and indeterminate being), or again due to the faculties that relate it to certain realities taking part in its own reality (which give rise to the virtual being, to being as an act of any entity). According to this relation with the realities participating in its own reality, we speak about the one being and the threefold being, the infinite being and the finite being, the absolute being and the subsistent being. All these participations in the being are possible due to the common being or the initial being, which is predicated both about God, as well as about creatures (here being is univocal).

Then, although the initial forms of being can be thought each in itself, they exist only together, linked as in a body; it is here that the ontological law of synthetism steps in, according to which each thing has its own existence only because it is conditioned by, and bound to, another thing. The most telling example of ontological synthetism is the human compound, wherein the sensitive principle (the understanding soul) and the felt body are two opposed and different substances, yet connected to each other through an essential relation. In virtue of this law of synthetism, the world is governed by order, reason, relation and cooperation, instead of chaos or contingency. Each thing, be it ideal, real or moral, cannot exist by itself, but
is always open to the relation with other things, so that not one thing can be virtually excluded, because all of them are implicitly included. Nevertheless, we must not forget the fact that synthetism has an ontological character, both at the epistemological level (any anthropological, moral, psychological, political discourse and so on, has always being as something given initially, to which any other thing relates itself) and at the real one, since in any thing we speak of, being is always its foundation, essence or the element without which nothing would exist.

Finally, being has different properties, among which are counted those that cannot be communicated to other beings, such as infinity, universality, necessity, immutability, eternity, absolute simplicity and so on. If the finite being is aseity, identity and participability, the finite being (any created thing) has the opposite properties, that is, it does not exist by itself, but by another; it can influence other beings, but it cannot communicate their being; it is equal to itself and, at the same time, unequal. (Rosmini, 2011, no 148, 288-289, 958; Antonio Rosmini, 2008, no 702-709, 1162-1164; Chimirri, 2011:16-19)

Thus, the concept of Being is the unique content of mind that does not derive from senses, being therefore inborn. Yet, Kant’s question of the inborn ideas re-emerges here. In order to avoid any confusion, Rosmini points out that in the act of knowing, the human mind formulates judgements in which the idea of Being has the role of a predicate, that is, of a category, while perception is the subject or that about which something is predicated. He also stated that in a judgement, the predicate determines itself, whereas perception certifies itself. If such is the specific function of judgement, any concept can subsist only as the predicate of a judgement. This means that even the concept of Being obeys this necessity and therefore, is given only in the activity of judging, as a form of judgement. However, Rosmini rejected this reductionism and excluded the predicate of existence from the function of judgement, attributing an objective, transcendent nature to it. The transcendent being reveals itself to man, enlightens him and helps him think in grande, in a metaphysical horizon. (Fusaro)

Right from his youth, Rosmini sought to lay the foundations of both the order of knowledge and that of society, of an integral and coherent manner. This search was also obvious to his contemporaries, who were saying: “In Milan we heard that one of Rosmini’s proposals was that of laying the foundations of a real positivist philosophy (…). He is of the opinion that our times need a philosophy, since there is none altogether at this very moment.” (Newman, 1963-1974:504-505; Ottonello, 2011:183) The foundation of his theoretical constructions is represented by creationist metaphysics, as this is the one able to justify the ontological dimension of the person and of societies, and the plurality of beings, each of which, by itself or all together, are in relation with the person, just as instruments are related to a purpose, or just as the entire creation, including the human person, situated at the top of the hierarchy of creatures, is related, in the metaphysical order, to the Creator’s glory. By the help of this metaphysical perspec-
tive, the human being can relate itself to that transcendence that is relation and, at the same time, foundation. For Rosmini, as one can see in his *Commentary to the Gospel of John*, the ineffable becomes foundation: “This is what the sacred text wants to say when it states that *In the beginning God created the world*, namely that it excluded any idea of distance between the world and God’s act of creation”. (Rosmini, 2002:45)

So, the metaphysical order determines the objective relations between principles and the terms of their application, between means and purposes, both at a gnoseological (or scientific) level, and at a moral (or practical) and sapiential one. The metaphysical order of being, of all beings, structures itself according to the triad of the forms of being – ideal, real and moral –, and their circular character underlies the integrality of the person and of any form of understanding, feeling, knowing, willing, acting and loving. By his insistence on the metaphysical order, Rosmini was in continuity with the patristic thinking, especially with the Augustinian and Thomistic thinking. Through his critique of the subjectivism dominating the philosophy of Enlightenment and his plea for the unity of the principle in his *Massime di perfezione* (1828) or *Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa* [Of the Five Wounds of the Holy Church] (1832), Rosmini was inviting his contemporaries to recover the link with the cultural and spiritual tradition of the West. (Ottonello, 2011:29-31) Thus, the manner in which Rosmini raised the question of the relation between faith and reason is also situated in the context of a truly encyclopaedic effort of recovering the values of the classical and medieval world.

**THE HARMONY BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON**

In a work dated in 1850, entitled *Introduzione alla Filosofia*, Antonio Rosmini entrusts the philosopher with the following mission:

to solve, before everything else, the question of the agreement between reason and faith, two inseparable elements of civilised nations. (…) Will this mean that philosophy is mixed up with faith, or the other way around? No, because faith is something altogether different from philosophy. Faith is a voluntary assent offered to a revealing God, whatever the way of knowing this authority may be. Philosophy is a science that examines the final grounds of things and out of these final grounds it deduces the consequences, and as such it requires an explicit reasoning, which is unnecessary (…) in faith. Faith contains truths that can be delivered by philosophy too and supported by arguments with the help of natural reasoning, but it also contains other truths that, without contradicting natural reasoning, go beyond its power. Faith has one sole, yet very strong reason it relies on, namely that of the authority of a revealing God, which does neither condemn, nor exclude, but
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gives value to all the other reasons; philosophy draws its reasons solely out of the intimate nature of things and the relations existing between them. Just as nature represents the subject-matter of a primary philosophy, faith also offers the point of departure for a more sublime philosophy that does not destroy, but enlarges and fulfills the former. Thus, faith always stays inde-pendent in relation to philosophy, self-sufficient and sufficient to all people. Yet, it is not, because of this, hostile to philosophy, which is richness for just a few, but it keeps its middle ground between two philosophies, a natural one that precedes it and the supernatural philosophy that follows it, and as a kind of peace-maker between them, but also as a mediator, it unites them both.

That is why, for those “who do not understand how faith presupposes reason (…) and how faith and reason help each other, and who, out of a mad love for faith become enemies of reason, we do not possess two distinct categories, one of those who, fearing the deductions of reason, which might be contrary to faith, are against its development, and could be called the shy ones; another, of those who, losing all trust in reason and believing it unable to accept the truth, may be called distrustful.” A third category may be added to these two, no better than the preceding ones, that of the indifferent, who profess this particular principle: “It is no good to adhere to any philosophical system, because any system is good as long as it does not oppose faith and it is good to use all of them in order to serve faith”. Should one analyse this assertion, “who would not find it strange and absurd? (…) As for myself, I confess (…) I have found the truth so different and soapolitical, that it always seeks to stand alone and it refuses to be halved.” (Rosmini, 1979, no 43-44)

I would like to add another excerpt from Teosofia (1846-1855), the summa of Rosmini’s thinking, unfortunately unfinished, to this all too little political synthesis about the dangers threatening the harmony between faith and reason. It is about two tendencies present in all ages and in all places and found among the radical interpretations of rationalism and supernaturalism (that is, of fideism and irrationalism):

These two tendencies struggle against each other and divide the World between them. The former prevails in some people, meaning rationalism and the refusal to accept any supernatural element; the latter is dominant in others, who either embrace superstitious beliefs or profess religion in its truth. Both tendencies are natural in man; but rationalism is natural in man due to what it is in its nature, while supernaturalism due to what is absent in it. Because of rationalism, man seems to be independent; science in its entirety belongs to him, because the means through which he comes to knowledge,
which also becomes the object of knowledge, is innate in him. At the same time, that means is uni-versal, so that no knowledge, not even the supernatural one, can renounce it. Everything that is added to man by a supernatural authority comes from the outside, but it does not seem to him to be his science; only that man who is supernaturally disposed to such a thing considers it his own. (…) The two tendencies may struggle against each other, yet they cannot destroy each other completely. And even when rationalism prevails, without realising it, man turns many times to the supernatural, and the effort he takes to free himself of the supernatural proves that he fights against an invincible ne-cessity. When the supernatural tendency prevails instead, necessity and the power of reasoning accompany it, without him being able to free himself from them. All systems that turn to only one of these two tendencies are futile, and futile is also their reconciliation if, under that pretext, one of them is crossed out. (Rosmini, 2011, no 858)

When referring to action, Antonio Rosmini distinguished between reason and intellect. The (essential) intellect is that principle that senses the ideal-indeterminate Being, whereas reason is that faculty that applies the ideal-indeterminate being to feelings, or to real and ideal beings. Next to this function of applying principles, reason has a role of integration when man makes use of the principle of the absolute that helps him complete, in a particular way, the knowledge of real beings and reach the knowledge of God’s existence. Finally, the third function of reason is abstracting, by the help of which concepts and the world of beings belonging solely to reason, come into being.

Regarding faith, we have found the following important division in Rosmini’s work, between natural and supernatural faith. The way in which the relations between these two types of faith are articulated may be synthesised as follows: (Ottonello, 2011:42-45)

1. The truths of faith brought before men by external revelation are partly ideal-negative, and partly positive. The understanding of these truths does not overcome the possibilities of natural reason, and the assent to these truths does not overcome the power of natural will. When God intervenes in the natural order, the human will is stimulated by the supernatural elements and thus, man can enter the order of grace.

2. Faith emerges out of the incipient divine perception and the assent of our will. The order of knowledge finds its expression in faith, that of feelings in charity, and the order of operations in action. Faith acts, but through charity. Faith is a practical judgement, not a purely speculative judgement. It is a judgement whereby we assert not only that God exists, that divine things exist, but also that God is known and lived by us, a judgement where-
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by we voluntarily recognise God and through this recognition moral life begins in us.

3. The living and supernatural faith is always accompanied by three elements: good acts, the charity that yields them and practical judgement, which represents the principle of charity.

4. Reason is the guide of faith in God, yet not every kind of reason, but recta ratio. This is not about subjecting revelation to the light of reason, but about subjecting man to reason, which is why we say that man needs to be formed, educated, and corrected in order not to make bad use of the light of his reason.

CONCLUSION

For Rosmini, ‘human reason’ is assimilated to that lumen mentis spoken about in the Introduction to the Gospel of John. With the help of this natural light, man perceives the two aspects of the concept of participation, namely that of ex parte participantis gift and gratuity, and that of ex parte fruentis spiritual and intellectual energy. These two aspects must be kept together against the law of synthetism, or otherwise we run the risk of losing sight of the participant’s divine character (first aspect) or the intellectual excellence and spiritual dignity of the human person (second aspect). (Raschini, 2002:21-22)

While commenting on the sixth principle of Christian perfection, namely that of “…performing all one’s works of life in the spirit of reason”, A. Rosmini was writing: “The Christian must never walk in darkness, but always in light. He must reach this goal, asking for the gift of understanding, from the Holy Spirit, through which he may deepen and understand the sublime truths of faith; for the gift of wisdom, through which he may properly understand the divine things; for the gift of knowledge, through which he may properly understand the human things; and finally, for the gift of counsel, through which he may amend himself by applying the truths known in all his life’s works.” (Rosmini, 2007:313)

As such, lumen mentis must govern the path of the perfection of Christian life, and this path materialises itself in living charity. Though charity is manifold, intellectual, spiritual and temporal, reason teaches the Christian that “God’s will manifests itself, above all and ordinarily, in the external circumstances”. (Rosmini, 2007:316) Nevertheless, the general and unshakable rule is the peace and quiet the Christian experiences in the depth of his conscience. If something does disquiet him, then he is to discover the evil causing this vexation of his conscience, distinguishing between what comes and what does not come from God’s spirit. By the help of natural light, the Christian identifies God’s spirit and, making room for it in his life, he lives in full peace.

Believing and loving God means to listen to what recta ratio, the good reason, tells us. Man follows this principle of reason in all fields of science without an exception. Faith enriches or broadens reason, while
reason protects faith, in the sense that it helps it not slip into irrationality, superstition, ideology etc. By means of faith, reason can encompass larger horizons, while faith, based on reason, becomes stronger.

But the interpretation of the relation between faith and reason in the manner of a mutual help can be advanced again today if the dialogue takes place on the ground of creationist metaphysics and where human’s dynamism represents the ultimate principle of history and society.

Indeed, the true truth is not only the known truth, but also the loved truth, therefore let me end by saying: do not fear to live your life according to your reason, even your religious life!

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CHAPTER IX

RELATIONSHIP AS AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF HUMAN NATURE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND

JEANNA BRENAN KAMAT

When one looks inward and attempts to fathom the mystery of his being, he is compelled to recognize that he does not create himself or sustain himself in existence. In an insightful passage in his book *Who Is Man*, Abraham Heschel addresses this phenomenon of self-understanding. He approaches being from an existential standpoint. He states, “Life is something I am, but what I am is not mine. Life is not my property.”\(^1\) He then expands this metaphysical line of thought, “Life does not belong to me. I am in relation to existence. My existence is not a property but a trust, a gift…Life, will, and freedom I did not create for myself. I am what is not mine…Life is a transcendent loan; I have neither initiated nor conceived its worth and meaning…I am that I am not.”\(^2\)

This understanding of creation sees man in the light of being a recipient. Man then is not primarily a subject but an object. This stance imbues his consciousness and in recognizing it, he knows his basic vulnerability and the necessity to live in accordance with the manner in which he actually exists. He does not orchestrate his own being and yet he has fullness of life. Consequently, his orientation is toward life, in so far as life has been granted to him. In this understanding of his being, one becomes a bearer of life to others; he becomes the subject, the giver.

In his philosophy of love, Dietrich von Hildebrand views this perception of man as foundational. In other words, what has been given to man, man will then give in turn; he will bring about life in some way and take charge that things get done. Von Hildebrand puts it this way, “In willing something, I say, as it were, to a state of affairs that is not yet real but is realizable through me: You should and will become real, and become real through me.”\(^3\) Now, although man cannot force upon the other an active

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3 Dietrich von Hildebrand, *The Nature of Love* (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009), 42, 74.

The reversal of object to subject is addressed by von Hildebrand in one discussion of value-response. He holds that “an entirely new situation is created
response to his recognition of their unique qualities, it will be seen in the
discussion of love of neighbor that when there is recognition of the good-
ness of a person by another, it is always life giving for that person.

Because of such essential and mostly spontaneous response to the
recognition of personal value, von Hildebrand considers the relationship it
engenders as a hallmark of man’s existence. Therefore, what is of supreme
importance is what man does with his being in order to live on earth
according to the manner of a primary orientation to the other. Man has come
into being in a sheer gift of life. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, man, as
image of God, is essentially turned to the good, and as imitator of the model
who discloses Himself in revelation as law-giver and judge, and in incarna-
tion as crucified love, man has been granted a pattern for fullness of life.
Life is about giving and giving brings life. In giving and receiving, relation-
ships are brought about.

In his extensive study of human relationships, von Hildebrand pre-
sents criteria for discerning the subtleties that penetrate all loves. In so
doing he gives the reader a depth of insight for self-examination in one’s
own understanding and forming of relationships as well as cautions in order
to safeguard against what is misleading and false. Since von Hildebrand
holds that relationship is intrinsic to man’s nature, his perceptions about the
nature of love are an invaluable contribution to both philosophy and theo-
logy. I will concentrate on the particular relationship of “love of neighbor”
since that is a most desired practice for the common welfare of all. As a
background for this, I will make reference to Pope John Paul II’s work The
Theology of the Body because there he also describes relationship as inher-
ent in the human being.

Pope John Paul points out that in the Yahwist account of creation in
the Bible, man means the human being as enfleshed and essentially alone
with no comparable companion. So solitude is the first experience of the
human person. Yet, in solitude there is a longing for communion and for
knowledge of what has brought man into his being. In the biblical account,
this longing for communion necessitates a re-formation of the human being
such that man is brought forth anew as male and female, each directed to the
other as proper gift in a communion of persons. Within this “communio
personarum”, which denotes a fullness of the personhood of each, each sees
in the other a complementary being and a source of communication and
companionship. Each is for the other a sacred trust. So long as they are
faithful to the truth of each other, there is blessedness; there is peace. The

by the fact that the content of a value-response can reach its object in quite
another way; that the object here is precisely not an object but a subject who
can in principle understand and receive our value-response. The word spoken in
a value-response can penetrate his mind and heart.
self-giving and the continuous truthful recognition of each other constitute the fullness of their being and the very meaning for which they exist.\(^4\)

Dietrich von Hildebrand recognizes this essential state of man of which the Pope speaks. He sees man as desiring to have what is comparable to himself in whom he can find the joy of companionship. He expresses this as an awareness of one’s capacity for love. He states, “In my yearning for love, I realize I have a great potential for love, am quite capable of loving, and am made for loving…this comes partly from the ordination of man to happiness and from his consciousness of being destined to and ordained to loving.”\(^5\) For von Hildebrand, that all persons participate in a nature oriented to loving and being loved is the most important foundation of any study of the way in which love is experienced. So it is necessary to examine the way in which love, meant to encompass all, is actually understood.

Value-response is the term von Hildebrand has created to describe the reaction to another person where more genuine relationship has the possibility of ensuing. Value-response can be a spontaneous reaction to some quality of the person, that quality being either a physical or a personal characteristic, or value-response can be a more studied response and not be dependent on spontaneity per se. Value-response with respect to love of neighbor or, even more demanding, love of enemy, can require significant soul-searching to find good where there is not much evidence of its presence. Such an extreme situation places one in a different context in the exercise of love. It demands what is termed agape, a willingness to go beyond what is required or beyond that for which one even has a capacity, in order to see goodness where human insight normally fails. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the love of agape is considered a special gift of divine grace.

The following statement by von Hildebrand demonstrates the effectiveness value-response has at least in the initial stages of a possible relationship.

The value that flashes up in another person pierces the heart and engenders love. In being pierced, I experience the value that I have grasped as radiating throughout the other person as a whole. He stands before me not only as adorned with certain values, but he has become through and through beautiful and precious as a whole – as this individual. But love turns to the other in such a way as to, as it were, draw out this line of perfection into all the corners of the being of the other and to do this without necessarily falling into illusion.\(^6\)

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\(^4\) For further discussion of this initial state of man see: Pope John Paul II, *The Theology of the Body* (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1997), 43-44.


Here it can be seen that the values one perceives in another are relevant to what is of value to oneself. Therefore, each particular case of value-response has its own range of intensity; there is no objective standard. Some significant quality becomes evident in the other and it captures the focus of attention of the onlooker because it resonates with what he holds as important. That the value “flashes up” indicates the drawing power of personal qualities to one who is attentive. In value-response, which has as its object a recognition of the good of the other, the good qualities perceived become the lens through which the other characteristics of the person are seen. Negative characteristics that would undermine these values are considered “non-truths” of the real nature of the person. These are areas which can be worked on and corrected when one is willing to sacrifice self in commitment to enhancing the other. The perfection of the other is always at stake. Von Hildebrand makes this comment about the desire to perfect the other in love, “In loving I am much less inclined to overlook faults because I am much more concerned with the growth of the other for his own sake and with his perfection than when I do not love him.”

There is a beautiful humility in this facet of love because it requires both admitting imperfection and submitting to amendment. Yet, in such a relationship, the beauty of the beloved becomes ever more luminous. In such a “super value-response” the other is looked upon as a source of happiness, and relationship moves onto a higher realm.

This whole concept of finding and adhering to the good in the other is taken up also by Anders Nygren. He considers the orientation of our human nature toward relationship as man’s quest for the good for himself. He explains, “To love is to seek one’s good in the beloved object. It is, however, not enough that it should simply be a “bonum” in general, but it must be, or be conceived as a “bonum” for me who am the lover. Since love means that I seek the satisfaction of my own need, it follows that I can only love “my bonum.” In other words, the good must become my own and not remain extrinsic. This philosophical interpretation stresses the truth that love is not generic but is very specific in its object and the object becomes intrinsic in some way. Furthermore, only this quality of love gives delight and fulfills the unique personhood of the individual.

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7 Love, which focuses on the positive aspects of personhood, gently assists in overcoming these imposing encumbrances thus provides for a more genuine and positive evaluation of the other. Negative qualities demonstrate a certain infidelity of the person to the truth of his being. They diminish personhood by their distortion of the reality with which the person must interact. They occasion grief.


Thus, the happiness that the other is for the lover is based in the goodness of the qualities that have been perceived. As relationship intensifies, the beloved becomes more and more an objective good that then draws more and more powerfully to itself; the more the good increases, the more irresistible it becomes. Thus, to be as one is a necessary quality of love. Von Hildebrand expresses this in his description of what he calls super value-response. He states, “Love is a super value-response because of its ‘intentio unionis’, the interest in the beloved person that surpasses all other value responses.”

The one whose value-response affects the increase of goodness and thus the perfection of the other does not remain untouched by this phenomenon. On the contrary, the giver himself becomes incorporated into his own gift. The good that has initially attracted holds the giver in the embrace of the recipient such that to give becomes a way of life. The giver comes to this good so that the good may come to him. This is the transformational quality of giving and receiving. Other manners of interaction prove empty and ultimately meaningless. Nygren explains, “We are transformed into conformity with that which we love. Love binds us to the beloved object which enters as our bonum into us and sets its stamp upon our self. We become like the object we love.”

Because man is so oriented to the good by his nature, deep discretion must be taken in associations and in what one has adjudicated as a good. There are transformational qualities in the objects of our choices but objects can transform for the worse. Evil is subtle; it attracts as a good and deceives into wrongdoing. The concept of the “bonum” is of significant importance because man is always choosing good. As Nygren puts it, “Even in evil man loves nothing other than his ‘bonum.’ Evil as such, in its capacity as malum, can never be an object of love. It is not the evil in evil that man loves, but the good which is never entirely absent even in evil.”

Von Hildebrand also distinguishes many deficiencies in love because of improper evaluations of the good. While it is not within the scope of this paper to address such short-comings of value-response, a comment about ego may be appropriate. In a genuine relationship the beloved is seen as an

10 Von Hildebrand, Nature of Love, 145.
11 Nygren, Agape, 484.
12 Ibid., 479.
13 Because the beloved is seen as a good and as pleasurable, it becomes very possible to overlook faults instead of addressing them in the truth of their being defects and then working at their elimination. Not to recognize moral defects is a grave danger and can easily lead to serious repercussions. In the present society, self gratification abounds and very frequently without moral judgment or regard to consequences. Evaluations based on such are opposed to the good of the beloved and are not the lens through which the whole person should be viewed. Von Hildebrand treats these matters in particular in his chapter on “Love and Morality” in The Nature of Love, 274-326.
integral person possessive of those qualities that make him/her radiant in
goodness. The beloved is not just an object of casual desire to satisfy the
ego. Even in the situation of love of neighbor where the good to be done is
more objective or of a moral nature and there is no specific intentio unionis,
it is not the ego that is involved in the assistance given to the other. The
following comment serves to put in perspective the place of the ego in a
relationship. “My participation in the other in love is not based on my
taking the other as an extended ego; it is just the other way around: since I
love him he becomes an alter ego, but not an extension of my ego. My parti-
cipation in his life is a consequence of love, of seeing value, and is not the
basis of love.”14 Ego uses the other for satisfaction and consequently asso-
ciation with the other is a form of pride. The attractive qualities of the other
are subordinated to ulterior motives which can never serve as a basis for
anything authentic. The affective character of love always affirms and
elevates the other and in doing so incorporates the giver more deeply into
those qualities so admired and yearned for. Ego is inconstant and operates
on the satisfaction of what is immediate to it.

In the light of this discussion I will turn now to von Hildebrand’s
understanding of love of neighbor in which the affective character of love
especially shines. As has been said, all correct relationships bring a certain
delight that affirms both persons and moves their lives in a positive way.
Delight by its nature diffuses, fills the atmosphere, and touches others. Even
without knowing the source, delight raises the spirit. So persons involved in
loving relationships not only affect their own circumstances, but indirectly
have an influence on the world around them. The realization of how much
affirmation touches the being of others and opens them in positive channels
of influence, should cause one to make a concerted effort to be attentive in
all social contacts. Even when there is no specific need, the sensitive
awareness of the presence of the other moves life toward greater happiness
and joy, and relieves some of the critical tension and subtle poor self-image
that roams with abandon among us all.

As we look at all created things we see that they have their own
value. The value of the person is priceless. Finding and expressing value is
sacred because the divine is inherent in the things of the earth and prompts
such a response. To acknowledge a person for his perceived value is the
greatest service one can give. It allows a moment of realization of what
one’s life is about, and that it is seen and appreciated in some way. It is a
moment of rest in so far as there is recognition that what one is and does is
not in vain. It is a moment to take delight in one’s own goodness and be
renewed to continue in deeper hope and greater conviction. It is a moment

of gratitude and perhaps of fleeting togetherness that remains in the recesses of memory. Actually to see a person is what love of neighbor is all about.15

Having described this basis of relationship, it is necessary to recognize that there is a restlessness that permeates all togetherness. There is no substantial rest within the movements of time. However, there are genuine moments of rest. There are moments that break through the restlessness and prefigure another dimension of time when violence will be quelled in deference to seeing the gift to self in the other. In the light of this, I would suggest that the practice of love of neighbor is an occasion of this positive perception of time. In other words, persons are intermediary resting places for one another, and life is a movement from rest to rest because of the solidarity in love of neighbor.

In further consideration of love of neighbor, two main differences that distinguish it from other loves. In love of neighbor, the other is (1) not a source of happiness and (2) not the subject of 'intentio unionis'. Neither is necessary in the circumstances of this manner of love. One’s personal subjectivity16 is not primarily involved as the neighbor is not necessarily known nor is he chosen for appealing qualities. It is one’s basic goodness that allows one to interact with a neighbor, to be of assistance, or to affirm something of his life circumstances. Von Hildebrand describes these circumstances in this way, “In loving a neighbor I share in his life in an ultimate way. A neighbor does not reach into my subjectivity, for my neighbor is not a source of happiness for me. I step out of my subjectivity, out of all the particular concerns that have some relation to my personal happiness, when I share in my neighbor’s well-being.”17 There is a certain objectivity in this kind of value-response that results in a simple benefit to another without need for further communication. Objectively, this is a form of transcendence that permits the other to be the other, remain in his own circumstances, and experience an enlargement of life.

In the Christian understanding of love of neighbor the intentio unionis is present in the yearning to be united in the kingdom of God and in the love of Christ. As the Christian more intently loves God, he becomes more aware of that love as expressed in love of neighbor. The following description of Christian love is given by von Hildebrand, “As soon as someone really loves God, the aspect of “for his sake” becomes important in

15 Von Hildebrand attests to the value of even the simplest recognition of the other. He states, “There is an element of love in every positive friendly attention given to another person that takes him seriously as a person.” Ibid., 52.

16 Subjectivity is an important concept as it so intimately denotes the person. It encompasses all the things that characterize the person and are of concern to him as an unrepeatable individual and have meaning to him in the realm of happiness. This orientation to happiness through his particular nature is a gift of God and is of the nature of his being.

17 Von Hildebrand, Nature of Love, 209.
relation to every human being; it flows organically from the love for God and is a decisive factor in the love of neighbor that is grounded in the love of God…It belongs essentially to love that I am completely filled by the point of view of the other’s beneficial good.”

In loving one’s neighbor one is not loving an ideal or loving God in the neighbor. One is loving a person in his concrete situation and condition because of the love of God.

A final word about subjectivity and the capacity to love may be mentioned here. Because subjectivity is an essential foundation of personhood and love of neighbor is enacted without interference to this, a great act of love is the offering back to God of one’s subjectivity for it to be transformed into the desire for the will of God for His Kingdom. In this way whatever is done is not tainted by subjective values or imperfect intentions. Love of neighbor is brought to a greater height in such an offering to God. In such an offering, agape, God’s own love, is shared with the person. Nygren describes this love as “unmotivated and spontaneous, not dependent on the recognition of a valuable quality in its object but creative of value…boundless and unconditional.”

The more one recognizes the nature of this love the greater the responsibility to conform one’s love and forgiveness to this divine outpouring. This love bestowed on the neighbor is a creative power that builds true community. Nygren affirms that “neighborly love springs from the same root as the love of God. It comes from God’s agape and has creative power to establish a new fellowship between men.”

The realization that devotion to the love of God is the ultimate way to live a life of love is also expressed by von Hildebrand. He emphasizes that one’s subjectivity is purified and transfigured in being handed over to God and that “in this gesture the absolute primacy of God over self is acknowledged and there is a real dying to self to rise anew in Christ.”

Although such intensity of love as just described would seem to be the domain of the saints, nevertheless, the insights into the various forms of love von Hildebrand presents clarify what love is. Especially they point out love’s personal nature and the joy that comes of being seen and affirmed in one’s uniqueness. Also of great value is his insistence on reciprocity, or at least its hope, for there to be any foundation for a reality of love. But above

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18 Ibid., 166.
19 The prayer of Saint Ignatius Loyola, the Suscipe, is an example of such a self-offering. Here one makes an offering to God of all the aspects of one’s being: one’s liberty, memory, understanding and all one’s will for the exchange of divine grace and love.
20 Edith Stein asserts that dedication to the cross is the only way to be able to offer oneself to God in this way. See Science of the Cross (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2002), xxvi.
21 Nygren, Agape, 77-78
22 Ibid., 96.
23 Von Hildebrand, Nature of Love, 220.
all is the singular value of love of neighbor because it has the power to touch and uplift persons through the eradication of indifference, the recognition of preciousness, and the creation of a quiet spirit of solidarity and trust in the world.

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At first sight it seems nonsense to speak about revival of Aristotle’s anthropological ideas in contemporary discussion about the human person, especially with the intellectual challenge of human embryo research and the sophisticated methods of molecular genetics. What may the “surpassed Aristotelian science” have in common with modern trends in bio-technology? Are there only doubtful parallels?

Meanwhile, the programmatic reference to Aristotle in the book Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur by Jürgen Habermas seems to be a symptom of the contemporary crisis in the philosophical understanding of the human person: “Unsere Lebenswelt ist in gewissem Sinne ‘aristotelisch’ verfasst.” (Habermas, 2001:80) Habermas here rejects the purely naturalistic interpretation of the human nature by supporters of liberal eugenics, just as Aristotle rejected the physical understanding of man in pre-Socratic philosophy, while forming his position on the theory of the unity of human soul and body, based on the distinction between “human nature” and the “essence of man.”

In Aristotle as well as in Habermas it leads to the notion of society-dependent phenomena which arise from dynamic/communicative processes in human nature. Defining human nature as zoon politikon (Nic. Eth. 1097 b 8-10; Pol. 1253 a 7) Aristotle distinguished between “human nature” and the “essence of man”. The first is complicated and mobile, in actual life the human psyche is full of desire, passion, feeling, sense, aspiration, weakness, imperfectness, etc. (Nic. Eth. 1152 b 34 et al.). The second one is “man himself” (Nic. Eth. 1178 a 1-8) which differs from life according to its mortal physical nature and empirical reality (Nic. Eth. 1177 b 31 – 1178 a 1) and means life according the best, the highest, the perfect, the supreme and the ruling identity of man (kyrion, kyrivotaton: Nic. Eth. 1168 b 30, 1178 a 3; kratiston: Nic. Eth. 1177 b 34) that corresponds to the intellectual virtue, or the virtue of Mind (Nic. Eth. 1177 a 18-22; Met. 1205 b 21-27). Within the framework of such an approach the person can be defined as a normative concept, which makes imperfect human nature perfect, reminding us, in this function, of an assimilating substantial formation.

It is fairly certain that this notion of the human person has not only an analytical but also an ethical significance. Apart from the evident value it has for social ethics – the moment, which is emphasized in contemporary
discussions on bioethics – Aristotle by insisting on the unity of a complicated human nature under the kyrion takes a guess at the possibility of analytical “scientific” psychology having a sense for the understanding of man as a body-soul identity; that is not merely as an object of nature, but also as a subject of ethics. Thus, he solves the problem of latent immorality of scientific naturalism and makes a significant step towards understanding that the empirical sciences may possess the values of the ethics of humanism.

It means that the concept of person is only a theoretical model of the knowledge of nature, including human nature, but not of the man as a phenomenon. For every human being to be a person means to know oneself and to be known as a unique qualitative and quantitative identity. In the post-metaphysical era we find this classical concept of the person in crisis. That all human beings are persons, is not considered as something doubtless and obvious, it is rather a concern of the practical sphere of common sense. Within the framework of analyzed models of thinking the key to the solution of this problem is sought in the exact definition of the qualities forming a human person. But such a method makes every question about natural or artificial origin of these qualities even more insoluble.

For the proper ordering of the questions according to modes of relationship between the “human person” and “human nature” the phenomenological method of investigation could be especially helpful. In this sense a notion of the contemporary American Catholic phenomenological philosopher Robert Sokolowski seems to be very symptomatic. He argues that both Aristotle and Husserl could give “major inspirations” for the philosophical understanding of the human person. (Sokolowski, 2008:1) And yet in contrast to the theory of this philosopher I do not think that a phenomenological investigation of the human person could be isolated from the term “human nature” with all the problems it involves.

First of all there is no sense in understanding “human person” in his essence as a synonym for rational “human nature” as Sokolowski does. The term “human nature”, taken on its wider meaning, refers to the most basic life-principles of homo sapiens as one of the biological species. Every living being – not only the human one – lives according to its nature as an inner-self-being. But at the animal level it exists in its most primitive manifestation, which makes an animal capable of simple intelligent behaviour. (Köhler, 1925) According to the evolutionist-naturalistic view, man is qualitatively and quantitatively superior in his intelligence. (Portmann, 1956:62-63) Is then the difference between human person and human nature only a difference of degree of animal specialization? If it is so, then “person” becomes a technical term for the pragmatic view of man which never transcends the level of practical intelligence and the competence of biology.

From this point of view, person unifies logically inconsistent diversities of human existence: vital functions of human body, psychic experiences and spiritual mentality, which requires an actual opposition to the situational complex of environment. To define a person means to establish a
relation between “inner being” and “outer space”. This relation is necessarily for the level that is distinctively human. Person is a unity in controversial diversity, while living beings – as described by Helmuth Plessner in *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch* (Plessner, 2003:303-355) – tend to be homogeneous unities demarcating themselves by drawing a clear dividing line between their centered organization of life and all other forms of being. Person involves a progression from the natural to the ideal by means of the process which was called by Max Scheler the act of “ideation” (*Ideierung*; Scheler, 1954:124) and by which man is freed from his environment. Living body as psycho-somatic entity is in immediate and permanent contact with the environment.

The term “person” gathers individualized data of human life in a common identity as homogenous, stable and unchanging. The borders of the “person” cannot therefore accommodate the rights of impersonal human forms to live according their own nature for they undermine unity with sense of their own. Yet, situated at the margin of the personality, varying human nature constantly disturbs the myth of the “person”.

How does experience of one’s own person and of others differ from the experience of living human being? Is it phenomenologically correct to say that it is our own personality that is first given in our experience of the living body? Once we put the question in this way, it soon becomes clear that the answer cannot be a simple affirmative. Max Scheler’s analysis of two presuppositions which arise from two alternative solutions by perceiving others: a) one’s own “I” is the primary datum of experience, b) the body of the other is the first datum in our experience of others, (Scheler, 1948:263) is very remotely connected with the cases such as embryo, clinical dead, amnesia and mental disease states for which the ground identification of one’s own “I” and “my experience” lacks. These entities are quite alive, but they cannot have and personally express their own experience of themselves and of the others. There is no question here of an analogical reference. In this case I can fully agree with the position of Dan Zahavi that “pre-reflective self-awareness and a minimal sense of self are integral parts of our experiential life.” (Zahavi, 2008:146)

An image of one’s own body is not something we experience as personalized individuals. It is something we experience prima facie as living beings, since it does not already involve a determination of who we are and what our world is. The distinction between the experience of environment demarcated living human being, and of the experience in the communication between “I” and “You” forming one’s own personality is not so tremendous in respect to the emerging experience of homo sapiens that is perceived by us whether a particular experience belongs to my body or to an alien body, but is perceived in reference to intentional acts at two levels. The first level is one of corporeal acts of bodily separation. The second level is one of acts which at first help us to identify ourselves as individuals.
The “person” remains outside this division, but it is closely connected to these two levels of experience. On the ground of experience of one’s own corporeal existence (as opposed to objectified bodily experience) one persons are not personified in their personhood. However, while my person stands in the sphere of intersubjectivity outside of the functions of my corporeal “I”, it is precisely this or “my” person that is dynamically connected to my own body. By means of the intermediation of my person I can identify my body as a representation of my individuality connected to my “I” in my relation to others. Mental process of identification of a human being as human being seeks for likeness and determines similarity between the somatic existence of an observant “I” and an opposite body. Intentionally this kind of likeness means none other than the fact that every human being tends to be transparent for the others in the process of communication.

What is immediately given in the experience of a human living being is a stream of experiences differentiated between unifying corporeal experience of my living body and the experiences of others. They are undifferentiated between my person and other persons. For example, children originally perceive all things to be “my” things; only subsequently do they distinguish “my” things from “other” things. But as living beings they can quite effectively assimilate “other” things since they have these things in their experience as corporeally absent. First of all and mainly, it occurs at the stage of the embryo.

In many cases the appeal to personified human existence seems to be unnecessary. The peripatetic-scholastic concept of *vivum perfectum* (Köhler, 2000:257-258, 296-297; Dietrich von Freiberg, 1977:140) demonstrates how the argument of impossibility of improvement of the living human being lays the foundations of personal immunity and does not require any appeal to the concept of the person. The experience of human body as such is individual too and closely associated with the mediation of personal-bounded structures, but it is not immediately related to the experience which forms the experience of a living human being as independent from the experience of personhood.

Imagining other human beings requires a perceptible form for every one of these human beings, who are individuals, since the objects of perception are individual. So perception and thinking of the others requires an idea of individuality. But an ability to perceive a human being as a perceptible object is not sufficient to produce the idea of person, since this object brought, for example, into direct contact with the eye and visual image cannot be seen as a person, nor can a visible object be seen in the absence of the perceptive body. Hence, seeing personhood in a human being requires a transparent medium of reciprocal relations between “I” and “You” in addition to a visible he/she-form and a natural ability of perceptive “I” to see.

This transparency requires further explanation. Since such realities as human body (from the biological point of view) and human soul (from the
psychological point of view) are not transparent in themselves, they require a transparent form of their individual existence. In the simplest sense it is representation of the sensible, but it differs from them in that sensibles require the presence of an external object, while person does not. And while the sensing of a living being can only be of something immediately present which as an external object can be represented only by means of a medium, imagining the person can only be of something from the immediate past which we have medium-like in our memory. Thus, like an immediate cause it forms the patterns of the present imagination of the person.

Obviously, body-perception is the condition under which the perception of ourself takes place, but neither my body nor the other’s perceived body actually controls the total content of the experience of my personhood. For example, defining man as a person, we do not use for this substantial definition the fact that it is of definite growth. But someone who thinks of a human being thinks of an object of definite growth, yet, in thinking it, he will pay no attention to the fact that it is of definite growth. If I accept my experience in its totality, two points should be kept in mind. As a living body I have an experience of my corporeality that must not be reduced to the purely sensibly perceived elements and an awareness of my body as living among others without having an awareness of the center of consciousness. Secondly, there is a sphere of the communicative “I”, of the “I” and the “You” in their unity, the sphere of intersubjectivity.

The idea of person resides in the image of another human being that is the mental object representing “he/she” – imaging the “I” – entity in every “You”-perception. For the more man thinks of his person on the model of something like metaphysics, the less he will be able to accept his knowledge of himself as genuinely being knowledge of his person. His person is not the required kind of knowledge. Every attempt to explain knowledge of the person as an knowledge that has itself as object of knowledge fades because every human individual, given the way he thinks of knowledge of himself, can no longer even make sense of his personality. In other words, even if someone thinks metaphysically of an indefinite and not fixed human personality, he will concurrently imagine a human being of definite quality. This means that it is impossible to think of a human person without thinking of this person as a human being. Summing up my reflections I could say that thinking of a person intentionally requires the presence of a perceptible human image not only as a medium in the process of perception, but also as an object of thought of the human personality.

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Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that the quest for sa'āda “happiness” was a general concern of Islamic culture in its classical period. With the advent of Islam, when human aspirations were universally shaped and posited in a religious perspective, the word sa'āda started to signify the ultimate goal to be attained by a human being, the absolute bliss which humanity might hope to gain.

This very general meaning presupposed a plurality of interpretations. Let me mention some dividing lines which differentiated the understanding of happiness and the ways leading to it.

The first of them is drawn by an answer to the question whether happiness can be attained only in the hereafter (âkhîra), or is attainable in this worldly life (dunyā) as well. Generally, there was no doubt that life in the hereafter will be a life of happiness and bliss, provided we follow the right path; the disagreement concerned the question whether sa'āda may be attained exclusively in the hereafter, or the worldly life can be happy too. Once again, there was no doubt that the worldly happiness and happiness of the other life are incomparable. Yet the question was not about their being “equated” in any way, as this was out of the question; the question was whether worldly life may be happy at all, in principle.

Generally speaking, Islamic doctrine ('aqîda), Mu'tazila and (at least some of) the Shi'ī thinkers answered positively. The reasoning behind that positive answer was very different in the three cases, but what is important for the moment is the point of agreement, and not disagreement.

Falāsifa and Ismā'īlī thinkers answered negatively, and the founder of Išrāqī school Şihâb al-Dîn Yâbiyâ al-Suhrawardî should be classified as the same type. Here as well the explanation of why the answer was negative differs substantially for the three groups of thinkers, but this does not affect the basic commonality of the answer.

It is true that al-Suhrawardî and some of the falāsifâ recognized the possibility of happiness during life and before death, but they understood it as “death before death,” that is, as the soul leaving this material world, so it was happiness outside this world anyway.

The positive and the negative answers may be expressed metaphorically as horizontal and vertical orientations, or orientations of balance and hierarchy. In the first case, the thinkers tend to find a sort of coordination between the two lives and the two types of happiness, while in the second all the hopes are placed exclusively above the worldly horizon.
The second question is the following: does the human being possess all the prerequisites for attaining happiness? To put it in ontological language: is human nature basically sufficient for gaining happiness, or, on the contrary, is it basically deficient and, therefore, needs to be completed before one can hope to catch a glimpse of happiness? This is the question of whether perfection (*kamāl, tamām*) is crucial for happiness.

The dividing line that runs through the domain of Islamic thinking as the result of answering the second question more or less coincides with the first one. This is interesting enough, for it suggests that the two questions may be interconnected. Whether this is the case and there is a sort of affinity between the two answers, remains to be explored. But it seems to me rather obvious that Islamic doctrine and Muʿtazilite ethics do not presuppose the necessity of any, so to say, additional ontological perfection to be added to initial human nature (*fīṭra*). An ethical effort is needed; this is true, and the Muʿtazila require perhaps an ultimate ethical energy from the human being raising those requirements to the highest possible degree, where they almost cease to be feasible for the mass of believers. But this does not deny the fact that human nature is initially sufficient for attaining happiness, both in this life and in the hereafter, and does not need to be ontologically perfected. Nothing needs to be added to it, and no additional completeness is required. The Ṣūfī thinkers, with their theories of the “Perfect man” (*insān kāmil*) and the “Way” (*ṭarīqa*) to God, are generally regarded as advocates of the need for perfecting human nature. I will argue that though this may be true in some cases, in others it is not, and as long as the Akbarian view of happiness is considered, “perfection” (*kamāl*) as a process of developing human nature is not a condition for happiness.

As for the falāsifa who followed Neoplatonic models of understanding happiness, perfection is unconditionally needed to transform human nature and make it fit for eternal bliss. The Ismāʿīlī philosophy, which culminated in Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī’s *Rāḥat al-aql*, also stresses the need for perfection and, despite some very important points of difference with falāsifa, understands happiness as eternal bliss of the soul freed from the body.

As for al-Suhrawardī, with whom we are concerned in this paper, his answer is not so easy to classify. On the one hand, happiness, according to al-Suhrawardī, is unattainable unless the human being breaks free from the shackles of material world. Happiness is impossible as long as we remain inside this world, and only by transcending its bounds do we attain it. This seems to be very much alike what Neoplatonic thinkers hold. However, the way leading to it can hardly be called “perfection” of the soul in the Neoplatonic sense, because for al-Suhrawardī the human soul is not a substance. And this is more than just a scholastic argument over philosophical terms, as we will see.

Finally, the third question needs to be asked. Those who posit happiness exclusively outside this world – how do they understand the way that...
leads to happiness? What is, so to say, the technology of transition from the state of being captured in this world of suffering to the world of bliss?

I think that the two basically different answers to that question are the following. The first emphasizes the need for perfecting the soul. This understanding relies upon Greek legacy and interprets the soul as a substance which needs to be completed and perfected in order to become self-subsistent and independent of the body. The soul of an ordinary human being is bodily dependant because it is deficient and imperfect. Perfection as completeness of all the soul’s attributes brings the soul independence and, finally, eternal bliss. This reasoning is apparent in the writings of falsifa when they follow the Neoplatonic line, as well as in al-Kirmānī’s Ismāʿīlī reading of Qur’ānic eschatology.

The other answer to that question is both similar and strikingly different. It is similar in its stress of the need of self-subsistence. The difference is that the quest for self-subsistence is not backed by the theory of human soul as a perfect substance. Rather, the way to happiness, eternal bliss and self-subsistence is self-disclosure. To disclose the self, we do not need to add anything to what we have (by adding I mean ontological gain and augmentation). We have to do something different. We have to make appear what is darkened and veiled. If we manage to get rid of those obstacles that blur and dim our self, we reach the goal of self-disclosure.

This understanding of the way to happiness is proposed by the greatest Sūfī philosopher Ibn ʿArabī, and by the founder of the Ishrāqiyya school al-Suhrawardī. To my mind, those two thinkers provide a very clear-cut understanding of happiness as disclosure of human self.1 But they differ much in their understanding of what the human self is, and in what follows I will outline al-Suhrawardī’s understanding of the way to happiness and compare it to Ibn ʿArabī’s treatment of the same topic. Though the two great thinkers follow basically the same line of self-disclosure, their theories explaining the self and how it can be disclosed differ drastically.

In the very beginning of his Ḥikmat al-ishmentrāq al-Suhrawardī speaks about “ranks” (marāʿī) of the universal hierarchy of human beings. This is, firstly, the hierarchy of “sage” (ḥakīm) and “seeker” (ṭālib); those who do not belong to those two groups, are not mentioned by al-Suhrawardī at all. Perhaps it is not unjustified to say that al-Suhrawardī is concerned here with khāṣṣa “special” people, and not with ‘āmma “ordinary” people. Secondly, each of those two layers is further classified through combination of two

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1 To some extent we can trace this view in Ibn Sīnā’s Ishrāq and Ibn Ṭūfayl’s Hayy ibn Yaqẓān too, though it is not always expressed consistently and is followed by understanding of the soul as a substance which needs perfection to become self-subsistent.

2 Or “philosopher” and “student,” according to J. Walbridge and H. Ziai’s translation.
features. Those are *ta’lūh* “divineness” and *baḥth* “investigation.” The first is a sort of intuition that grasps the truth without a mediator, that is to say, immediately. The second is the logical way of cognition, which is a well-known path of *falāsīfa*.

When al-Suhrawardī starts constructing his hierarchy, it may seem that he seeks a sort of balance between *ta’lūh* and *baḥth*. He first marks the extreme opposites as he says that the first two ranks are occupied by

- divine sage proficient in divineness and devoid of investigation; sage active in investigation and devoid of divineness.\(^5\)

After that he mentions the most perfect rank:

- divine sage proficient both in divineness and investigation,\(^6\)

and this means that *ta’lūh* alone, though it leads to ultimate truth, is not the highest rank; more perfect is the one who combines *ta’lūh* and *baḥth*.

Another example. When al-Suhrawardī introduces his book to the reader, he says that

\[ \text{[it] is for those who seek both divineness and investigation.} \]

Among the “seekers” the first to be mentioned is the seeker of “both divineness and investigation,” to be followed by the seeker of divineness alone, and at last – the seeker of investigation.\(^8\)

And, finally, he says about the “leader” of humankind and God’s viceroy (*khalīfā*) on earth:

\[ \text{If it happens some day that there exists someone proficient both in divineness and investigation, then to him belongs leadership (*ri’āsa*), and he is God’s viceroy.} \]

However, this first impression of al-Suhrawardī’s balancing the opposites and following classification based on two poles and two scales,

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\(^3\) J. Walbridge and H. Ziai render *ta’lūh* as “intuitive philosophy” saying that “mysticism” might also do and that the word literally means “deification.”

\(^4\) “Discursive philosophy,” according to J. Walbridge and H. Ziai.

\(^5\) حكَمِ الْهُدَى مَتَوَّلٌ فِي التَّأْلُهَ عَدِيمُ البَحْثِ؛ حكَمِ بحَاثٌ عَدِيمُ التَّأْلُهَ – *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*.

\(^6\) حكَمِ الْهُدَى مَتَوَّلٌ فِي التَّأْلُهَ عَدِيمُ البَحْثِ.

\(^7\) كَانَ اَلْتَأْلُهُ عَدِيمُ البَحْثِ – *Ibid.*.

\(^8\) *Ibid.*.

\(^9\) فَأَنَّ أَفَقَ فِي الْرِّئَاسَةَ مَتَوَّلٌ فِي التَّأْلُهَ وَالْبَحْثِ فَهَلْ الَّذِي الرَّئَاسَةُ – *Ibid.*.
very quickly gives way to strict hierarchy with *ta’alluh* as its only pole. Yes, it is fine to have ability of investigation added to *ta’alluh*; and yet it is *ta’alluh*, and not *baḥth*, which is crucial for *ri’āsa* and condition *sine qua non* for it. The essence of *ri’āsa*, i.e., universal leadership of humankind, is the ability of *ta’alluh*, and it cannot do without it. *Baḥth*, on the contrary, is something inessential, though praiseworthy:

The earth does not ever remain without one who is proficient in divineness, and the leadership of God’s earth does not belong to investigator proficient in investigation but devoid of divineness.10

Why is it so? I think the answer can be found in a short phrase of al-Suhrawardi:

Receiving (*talaqqi*) is indispensable for being [God’s] viceroy.11

This means that *ri’āsa* can be handed down to man from God and received by him only directly, without a mediator. As Şahrāzūrī explains, in the same way and without mediator the monarch handles down to his wazir authority needed to execute the wazir’s duties. As for logical knowledge, it is always mediated by premises, figures of syllogisms, etc. In other words, it cannot be immediate by its very nature, as Islamic philosophers always noted.

Though *Hikmat al-ishrāq* was written for seekers of both *ta’alluh* and *baḥth*, it is *ta’alluh*, and not *baḥth*, which is crucial for reading the book and grasping its content:

The Illuminationists cannot set things going without luminous inspiration.12

Now, what is *ta’alluh*? The most evident and simple answer would be that *ta’alluh* is ability of the human self to get access to the world of divinity. This access is granted to a trained soul (al-Suhrawardi uses *nafs* “soul” and *dhāt* “self” as interchangeable in this context) even during its life and before death; moreover, this training is necessary for the soul to remain in the celestial world after death and not be dragged down to the material world through its attraction to the material “fortresses” (*ṣayāṣī*). Thus the training diminishes the soul’s dependence on the material “barriers”

10 ي البحث ولا تخلو الأرض من متوغل في التأله ابدا ولا رئاسة في ارض الله للباحث المتوغل في البحث – Ibid.
11 لا بد للخلافة من التلقين – Ibid.
12 الاشراقيون لا ينتظم امرهم دون سوانح نورانية – Ibid., {6}.
(barāzikh). This dependence, however, is not essential; it is not caused by any deficiency of the human soul which in such a case would need a remedy and a sort of substantial perfection. No, the only cause of being “tied” to dark substances is the soul’s “weakness” (duf): it only needs to gain “intensity” (shidda) in order to escape from the material world to the world of divinity.

Intensifying the soul as the result of its training is not the same as gaining perfection (kamāl). Intensity (shidda) and weakness (duf) are characteristics of something absolutely simple, while perfection in its initial sense presupposes fullness of attributes. The human soul is light, weakened and therefore captured by material fortress which has become its abode. However, it is still a light, and nothing but light; and, regarded as light, it does not differ from the Light of lights in any respect except intensity. Since happiness is closeness to the Light of lights, it is, so to say, guaranteed to human being ontologically, for there is no ontological deficiency that hinders the human soul’s access to happiness. Al-Suhrawardī’s view of the topic is very optimistic: there is a basic affinity between human soul and the Light of lights, as well as other celestial lights, which guarantees its ascent to the world of light provided it breaks free from the ties of material “fortresses.”

Now, let us remember that the material (barzakh “barrier,” sīšiya “fortress,” etc.) has no, so to say, ontological power: it is only “darkness” (zulma), that is to say, absence of light, which takes its beginning in the notion of a “shadow” (zill). This is a very important point in al-Suhrawardī’s system of thought, since at this step he tries to reduce the apparent duality of light and darkness to the actual unity of light, where darkness is nothing but absence of light. So, initially shadow is the result of a “need” (faqr) which the Proximate Light (al-nūr al-aqrab) notices in itself when it contemplates the Light of lights: this realization of its need is the shadow itself. Eventually it becomes darkness and is found in the material world as fortresses for light and barriers hindering its movement and expansion. Now, what is this realization of need and dependence? – It is nothing but a result of relative weakness of the Proximate Light in comparison with the Light of lights.

This means that in the final analysis the “barriers” which block the soul’s ascent towards its ultimate goal, to the abode of closeness to the Light of lights, are nothing substantial: they are just the soul’s own weakness, and nothing else. To overcome those barriers means to intensify the soul. After acquiring intensity enough to do without its “fortress,” the soul immediately finds itself witnessing the world of lights. This self-strengthening of an absolutely simple light which is the human soul is what can be called self-realization in the case of al-Suhrawardī.

Let me cast a glance at Ibn ‘Arabi’s view of happiness. He says in *Fuṣūṣ* that

the Creation is drawn towards happiness in all its variety.¹⁴

The Greatest Shaykh holds that no one is unhappy; moreover, no one *can* be unhappy. It means that there is *no* ontological ground for unhappiness; on the contrary, Ibn ‘Arabī’s ontology presupposes absolute and unlimited happiness of each and every creature.

There is one important reservation, though. If happiness is universal ontologically, it does not mean that it is universal psychologically. On the contrary, most people *are* unhappy – because they do *not* realize that they are in fact happy. Ibn ‘Arabī says about the “ascent” (*taraqqī*) of any human being to God:

One of the most amazing things is that he is in constant ascent and does not feel it.¹⁵

It means that most of the people are ignorant about the basic truth of the “new creation” (*khālah jadīd*): each and every moment of time the world loses its existence to dive into the Divinity and at the same instant reemerges anew as existent. This back-and-forth movement between Divinity and the world is repeated incessantly. This is why the human being is incessantly close to God. For al-Suhrawardī, ascent towards the Light of lights is something to be gained, something which a human being does not possess; for Ibn ‘Arabī, man has only to realize, that is, to disclose in his own self (*dhāt*), this basic truth of his constant closeness to God. Such *taḥaqquq* “(self-)realization” is not granted to everyone, but those who have it, i.e., *muḥaqqiqūn* “those-who-realized” their own selves as the basic truth of the universe, are ultimately happy not only ontologically, but psychologically as well, already in this life, and not only in the hereafter.

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Nationalism in the Arabian countries developed in two directions; mainly on an Arabic-Islamic and secular basis. Those looking for the national identity in regional and secular forms of the nationalism are compelled to address the Arabo-Muslim heritage, whence they took and take necessary symbols, banners and names.

The first attempts to prove the compatibility of Islam with Nationalism are usually connected with the name of Jamal-al-din al-Afghani. “By their nature people, – he said, – “are in the constant conflict among themselves because of daily bread”. To protect themselves and their family people united into groups on the basis of parentage. This eventually led to the formation of nations and to the appearance of feelings of solidarity – national asabiyya. National asabiyya will disappear, when the reasons which have caused it disappear. And then there will be Islam which has generated the highest form of solidarity (asabiyya – A.R.), which is above national solidarity. And for a while in some cases al-Afghani remarks, that nationalism happens to be more effective than “an Islamic solidarity”. (Al-Mahzumi, 1954)

The attitude of the majority of Islamic ideologues to nationalism is dual. On the one hand, they support nationalism as it serves the interests of practicing Islamic nations’ liberation from infidel domination. In the consciousness of the Muslim people, the West appears not only as the exploiter and the oppressor, but also as the aggressive “Christian world” which is unacceptable for Muslim moral criteria, social norms, and cultural and spiritual values. Even some zealous Pan-Islamists, who envisage the future world as a Muslim religious-political community, justify the support of nationalism by the universal nature of Islam, which includes nationalism. (Davaa al-hakk, 1974) On the other hand (and this line prevails), Islamic leaders subject to sharp criticism nationalistic ideologies that, in their opinion, promote the breaking up of the Muslim community. Often conflicting groups weaken Islam because their nationalism is focused on the building of secular instead of religious society.

Being a secular ideology based on the notion that the nation, as a social group, whose religious identification is not defining, nationalism basically rejects the Pan-Islamistic concept of umma as the supranational community of coreligionists saved by divine rescue. However the important
feature of the nationalistic concepts of the majority in Arabian countries is in the fact that they bring together the seemingly incompatible national and Islamic aims.

Aspiring to subordinate to itself all displays of national culture whose organic part was mainly Islamic traditions, nationalism has appeared to be connected with Islam in these essential moments:

- Islamic ethics are so closely bound with ethnonational tradition that Islamic values are already difficult to distinguish from the primary values of actual Arabian ethnonational culture.

- Supporters of Islamism (as the doctrine of absolute Islamic priority in all spheres of the Muslim’s life) and nationalists need each other: feeling spiritual superiority over other people, they are certain that salvation of humanity is their mission. However they are compelled to rely on the support of the national governments, and in turn nationalists, Pan-Arabists appeal to Islam which possesses powerful integration and mobilisation forces. Ideologues of nationalism pay much attention to Islam as an important element of national identity; Islam is an ideological weapon in the struggle for the consolidation of national sovereignty, and even, for the construction of modern society. Islamism, which is objectively denying both regional and Arabian nationalism, is placed in service to nationalism.

The emphasis on Islamic values has increased after gaining political independence by Arabian countries. That case has several reasons. First of all, the conditions for national statehood building and the aspiration for national self-affirmation. Moreover, one of the reasons was the rising mistrust to the West and disappointment in Western models of the development, as well as searching for own national ways and methods of the achievement of economic and cultural independence.

The turn of Nationalism to Islam was shown particularly well in the fact that the nationalist youth of Arabian countries quite often advertise their belonging to Islam. The young intellectual who had internally broken with religion now starts to keep the fast, adheres to traditional rituals in home life, and tries to apply Islamic norms. He felt that religion connects him with the people. This was during the colonial period and it is still so nowadays. The call to the westernized avant-garde of Arabian nationalism to rally with the Islamized masses was heard. The author of the brochure “Islam and Arab liberation” Munah as-Solh sees the weakness of modern Arabian nationalism in the fact, that the part of the Arabian intelligentsia acting under the banners of Arabian nationalism rejects the positive value of Islam for Arabs’ business. In his opinion, the adherence of the broad masses to Islam, which is combined particularly with anti-Western sentiment, and their feeling of belonging to the umma are more essential to Arabian nationalism, than the position of such intelligentsia. The author supports the consolidation of the Arabian self-consciousness of the intelligentsia with the Islamic self-consciousness of the masses. (Solh Moons, 1973)

So, there was a quantum leap: during the period of the origin of the national self-consciousness Islamism was the form, containing the national
idea. Now, on the contrary, nationalism, in its Arabian or regional embodiment, easily incorporates with Islam which not only provides mass support to regional nationalism, but also strengthens the immunity of national culture from the influence of other cultures.

For the majority of Arabian nationalists and the adherents of the particular orientations in Pan-Arabic Islam and Arabic-Muslim culture who make an organic part of the nationalistic doctrine, its moral-ethical basis, cultural heritage, that are meaningfully included in the national being. But not for all. For example, mainly practical ideas of the necessity of maximal possible fruitful contacts with masses for the interests of patriotic education, national integration, successful realization of plans for the development, achievement of the political goals are in the limelight for the baasists and the followers of the president of Tunis H. Bourguiba.

But thus the Arabian nationalists try to sanctify national ideals by the Koran and to give national character to Islam. They underline the superiority of Arabs over other Muslim peoples, though Islam does not mark out Arabs in principle and does not give them privileges in comparison with other ethnoses. Such a position is proved first of all by the fact, that Prophet Mohammed was an Arab and the Koran was in the Arabian language and Arabian soil. This makes them a subject of special pride.

Interdependence ascertaining between the Arabian nation and Islam with the emphasis on the role of Islam in the history of Arabs or on the role of Arabs in the history of Islam – the general phenomenon among the Arabian nationalists. “Uruba” and “Islam” are perceived as notions related among themselves.

A known figure of the Libyan group of Beshir Havada confirmed in 1972: “Uruba is a body, Islam is its living soul which moves it”. (Kedourie, 1980:61) Such notable ideologues of Arabian nationalism as the Lebanese Nabih Farce, Palestinian Faiz Saeg, and Jordanian Hazem Nusejbe, consider Pan-Arabism as an inseparable part of Islamic doctrine. Even for a secular party Baath core of whose ideology is Arabian nationalism, “Islam is inseparable from Uruba, the Arabian nation, its problems and purposes» (as is noted in documents of Syrian Baas) (Al-Ishiraka, 10.15.1973), and “there is no difference between the spirit of Islam and Baasism” (Iraq Baas). (Al-Dzhumhurija, 10.15.1973)

In Arabian nationalism two interconnected tendencies are found. Pan-Islamic motive prevails in one and the revival of Arab glories relates to with the revival of the glory of Islam. Rather than supporters of Arabian unity, who are not numerous among Muslim ideologues, they try to prove that this unity is an essential part of the concept of Umma.

Many people share the opinion that the Arabian nation became great because of Islam and for Islam. The Lebanese historian Mikula Zijade and the Egyptian literary critic Umar ad-Dasuki advance an idea that the formation of the Arabian nation is connected with occurrence of Islam which has rallied Arabs and opened for them the way out of the limits of Arabian Peninsula for the creation of a great empire. (Nationalism in Asia and
Africa, 1970) Hence, there is frequent mention that for the revival of the greatness of Arabs it is necessary to revive the greatness of Islam.

Great value was given to Islam in the official ideology and the policy of national-democratic leaders of revolutionary Egypt who acted as enthusiasts of Arabian nationalism in 1950s and 1960s. They were trying to achieve secular purposes though many of them were connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and were under the influence of Islamic fundamentalism. There is no mention concerning Islam in the program document of the Charter of national action (1962). But Islamic goals became a reference point for Egyptian legislation in 1960s. Muslim theologians became the tools for carrying out an official political line, brain washing the population for the purpose of legalisation of governmental actions and the socialist choice. The theological university al-Azhar was transformed into the centre for the distribution of ideas of the compatibility of modern progress with the Koran. The committee of fatwa prya al-Azhare regularly published fetvas on burning questions, and leading theologian wrote articles and books about Islamic socialism.

Nasser and his colleagues constantly underlined that their policy corresponds to spirit of the Koran. Such “Islamic values” as solidarity in Umma, equality, brotherhood and justice, were the basis of the Egyptian form of “Arabian” socialism.

Since the 1970s years the Islamic factor has become more effective in the Arabian political arena than Arabian nationalism. After the death of Abdel Nasser not the Arabian league, but the Organization Islamic Conference where the conservative countries led by Saudi Arabia are in the lead, headed the struggle for the liberation of Jerusalem. The movements for Arabian unity and even for unity of actions of the Arabian states were becoming considerably weaker; movement of Islamic solidarity did last for almost 40 years: a number of the Islamic interstate non-governmental organisations whose actions were coordinated were formed; cooperation plans between Muslim countries are carried out with the active propaganda of Islam. With the decreasing of the integrating potential of Arabian nationalism and the potential of Islamic solidarity, the idea of unity of the Muslim community, underlying the movement with the same name, increases. As the facts show, Islamic countries are not capable of uniting for an active struggle “for belief”. However, some attempts at joint actions, mainly propaganda in character, are pursued in protection of the “holy sites”. Moreover everyone is ready to enter the alliance of Islamic states to protect their own interests.

In their opinion, only cooperation on the basis of Islam is capable saving the Muslim world from crisis. Some Arabian leaders used the idea of Islamic solidarity in the interests of the struggle against imperialism and Zionism and for rallying the block of developing countries resisting political and economic pressure from the industrially developed countries of the capitalist world. Along with Islamic and monarchic forces, they were achieving consolidation of Muslim solidarity and Islamic positions. They
constantly kindled religious feelings under the pretext of the need to give an Arabian character to the confrontation with Israel in order to distract the attention of the people from other, no less prominent aspects of struggle against imperialism. The greatest activity in this direction is shown by Saudi Arabia and its partners in the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States. Its governors are convinced that the present instability in the Arabian world has caused distribution of the regional nationalism and led to the disintegration of umma. This is caused by the spiritual and social crisis as a result of the division of Islam and the policy of promotion of “atheistic doctrines”, borrowed from the West and from the communists. In their opinion, only cooperation on the basis of Islam and the policy of promotion of “atheistic doctrines”, borrowed from the West and from the communists. In their opinion, only cooperation on the basis of Islam is capable of leading the Islamic world out of crisis.

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The most well-known expression of al-Ḥusayn b. Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj (244/858–309/922) was “I am the True (anā ‘l-Ḥaqq)”. This sentence caused many interpretations and was the basis for numerous charges. Historians and fiqhā’ who mentioned this expression criticized it. They asserted that al-Ḥallāj adhered to the doctrine of the incarnation (ḥulūl) of the divine nature (lāḥūt) in the human nature (nāsūt) and unity with God (ittḥād). (Ibn al-Naḍîm, 1398/1978:269; al-Baḍāḍī, 1977:249; Ibn al-Aṯīr, 1415/1996:4; Ibn Taymiyya [s.a]:311; Ibn Taymiyya, 1406/1986:379–380; Ibn Taymiyya, 1414/1993:304)

Nestorian Christians used two terms “incarnation” (ḥulūl from the Arabian verb halā – ‘to settle’, ‘to move in’) and “unity” (ittiḥād) for translation of the Greek terms, enoiķēsis ‘settling’, ‘moving in’ and henōsis ‘joining’. These terms were taken by the early Muslim doxographers. (Erdmann, 1938:112; Ernst, 1985:101; Ritter, 1955:449) Muslims have analyzed Christian argumentation about the incarnation of one substance in another, unity and mixture. It looks absurd from the point of view of Muslim theology and was criticized by them. This view began from Mutakallim’s who denied the possibility of mixture Divine (eternal) and human (creaturely) natures as illogical and absurd.1

It seems the change in adherence to the doctrine of incarnation proves some of verses by al-Ḥallāj. He often mentioned the incarnation there:

\\begin{align*}
\text{انا من اهوى ومن اهوى انا} \\
\text{فاذأ ابصرته ابصرته} \\
\text{ولتران ام تفرق بيننا} \\
\text{روحه روحي وروحي رروحه} \\
\text{من رأى روحين حلّت بدننا}
\\end{align*}

I am one who loves passionately, and one whom I love passionately is myself!

We are two spirits incarnated in one body…
And when you have seen me, you have seen Him,
And when you have seen Him, you have seen us.
Ah you who ask us about our story,
Can’t you see that there is no distinction between us?

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His spirit is my spirit and my spirit is His spirit.
Who saw two spirits incarnated in one body.
(al-Ḥallāj, 1404/1984:77–78)

The term “mixture” (imtīzāj) also is found in al-Ḥallāj’s verses:

مزجت روحك في روحي
كما تمزخت الخمر بالماء الزلال
ذا فاذا مسك سيء مسني
ذا اذا انت أنا في كل حال
My spirit mixed with Your spirit, just as
Wine mixes with spring water.
And when something touches You, it touches me,
In all the spiritual states You are always myself! (Ibid, 73)

On the other hand, the conclusion of Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn (the basic remained treatise by al-Ḥallāj) is a phrase: “The True is the True, a creation is a creation”, in another place: “The True is a true, and a creature is a creature.” (al-Ḥallāj, 1913:78, 23) On the ground of this phrase Rūzbihān Baqli argued against all who considered al-Ḥallāj an adherent of the doctrine of incarnation.

In spite of the statement about incarnation and mixture in al-Ḥallāj’s verses, there is no evidence of a mixture between two different natures. But two essences in one nature mix.

L. Massignon believed that it was not a substantial mixing when qualities of the mystical are dissolved in God. But it was an intentional mixing, when intelligence and will of the subject operates by divine grace, and qualities of the mystic are not dissolved in God, but cleared in Him. The leading role in this unity belongs to a universal activity, the divine command expressed in the word “Be! (kun)” which created the world. (Massignon, 1922, 2:520–521) According to A. Afifi, Massignon’s interpretation of anā ‘l-Ḥaq formula was “I am God, the Creator” (anā ‘l-Ḥaq al-Ḫāliq) (‘Afīfī, 1963:333), i.e. it contains the fact of creation. Whole body is “penetrated and updated through manifestation (tajallī).” It is involved in the process of transformation of human qualities. “Al-Ḥallāj asserts that there is no radical opposition between the created person and the Creator. There is even a virtual similarity between body, human spirit and the divinity, and there is no contradiction between the carnal pettiness of the person (bašariyya) and Divine impartiality (ṣamadiyya).” Massignon made up a conclusion: “the higher step of the presence of God in His creations is realized and comes to the end in person.” (Massignon, 1922, 2:527, 529)

According to A. Afifi, human nature is an external aspect of the divinity (Afifi, 1963:191) Al-Ḥallāj believed that “the divine form is

2 Thus the Arabic variant of the second maxim have a lapsus: “Now for true: the true is the creature.” (Baqli, 1374:385, 477) This error may be not a simple accident in the Arabic variant.
strengthened on the earth and that the person personifies one aspect of this divine form that it is impossible to consider.” He explains the formula of anā 'l-Haqq as “I am a Divine image (anā šūrat al-Haqq)”. “I” is an external aspect in which the True is shown. The True was cognized through it and He showed His power and beauty through it.” (‘Affī, 1963:191, 333)

Thus scholars tried to resolve a riddle of Hallājīan unity by means of divinisation for human nature. According to Massignon, it is a manifestation of the divine order, i.e. a tool of the creation process. According to ‘Affī, it is an external aspect as a manifestation of the divine nature. Human nature appears as identical with the divine in both cases. But this identity has a latent state. Thus the problem of distinction between two natures is solved.

We really see a comparison between two natures in texts of al-Ḥallāj. Human nature is comprehended only in the correlation with divine. On the other hand, divine nature is comprehended in correlation with the human:

Your revival is by me (bi-ḥaqqī-Ī), and my revival is by You (bi-ḥaqqi-ka)....My revival by You is a human nature (nāṣūtiyya), and Your revival by me is a divine nature (lāhūtiyya). Just as my human nature perishes in Your divine nature without mixing, so Your divine nature takes hold of my human nature without contact with it. (Akhbar al-Ḥallaj, 1957:8)

However this comparison does not mean similarity between two natures but, their underlined contrast. Human nature is destroyed during unity with God. Thus it cannot possess the divine status: “I have destroyed human nature in Your divine nature, after all in practice my human nature [exists only] concerning Your divine nature.” (Rāzī, 1377:337)

All human qualities are lost. The body is destroyed.

He does not disappear from me for an instant. I am at rest while my human nature (nāṣūt) is perished (istahlaka) in His divine nature (lāhūt). My body is destroyed in the lights of His essence. I have not essence, trace, or aspect (wajh). (Akhbar al-Ḥallaj, 1957:26)

Divine nature is an incarnation of the eternal principle. Human nature is an incarnation of temporal being. Thus the eternity of divine nature is shown only concerning the temporariness of human nature: “The eternity is over my occurrence, and my occurrence is under the dress of eternity as of Your right.” (Ibid, 8)

Al-Ḥallāj illustrated the process of destruction for the human ego. For the first time in Sufi literature he used the well-known image of the moth who perishes from the flame of candle. (al-Ḥallāj, 1913:16–18)

In all passages where al-Ḥallāj speaks about mixture and incarnation, he does not mention human nature but spirit. He means two spirits (divine and human). According to the Koran, the spirit was blown (nafaḥa) into the
person (Kor. 5:29; 32:8; 38:72), i.e. he is not a part of creaturely human nature. Secondly, the spirit is identified with the divine order (Kor. 16:2; 17:87; 40:15; 42:52), with angelic essence (Kor. 70:4; 78:38; 97:4), including the story about revelation of the Koran (Kor. 16:104; 26:193). At last a number of passages narrate about the Holy Spirit (al-rūḥ al-qudus). God helped Jesus by the spirit (Kor. 2:81, 254; 5:109). Once even Jesus is named by spirit (Kor. 4:169). (Calverley, Netton, 1999:880a)

Sufism has been interested the problem of the nature of the human spirit from the moment of occurrence. ‘Abd Allāh Sa’īd al-Nibājī was robably one of the first to put forward the developed doctrine of spirit. According to him, two spirits exist. The first is the human spirit (al-rūḥ al-hašāriyya) based in the heart of the mystic, created and unstable. The second is the divine spirit who has not been created and the invariable, eternal spirit (al-rūḥ al-qadīma). (Massignon, 1922, 2:662; 1954:222)

This doctrine could follow only from a Koranic exegesis. In the Koran the spirit differs in these two aspects (blown spirit and spirit as angelic essence).

Al-Ḥallāj also distinguishes two spirits (divine and human). Two spirits differ from each other only that one of them sits in the person. They are absolutely identical by their nature and can merge under their unified nature. Thus, on the one hand, a person has human nature. On the other hand, his spirit belongs to the divine nature: “You are by me as my spirit.” (al-Ḥallāj, 1404/1984:30)

The human spirit is the “speaking spirit” (al-rūḥ al-nāṭiqa) because it has speech as the fundamental characteristic of life. Speaking spirit is a basis of the divine image in the person. Therefore his attributes are divine: knowledge, evidence (bayān), power (qudra), and argument (burhān). (al-Ḥallāj, 1404/1984:30)

Divine spirit is the form (ṣūra) formed creaturely matter and gives it a goal. He is shown in the person as in the act of desire: “You are shown just as you wish. For example, You are shown in the desire (mašī‘a) as the best form. And that form is speaking spirit.” (al-Ḥallāj, 1404/1984:30)

The spirit with divine nature is not localized particularly in any organ, but occupies all the internal space of the person directly and figuratively:

“My spirit placed You between my skin and bones”; “You sit…in my heart, spirit, idea (damīr) and thought (ḥāṭir)”; “For eye You are eye, for heart You are heart.” (al-Ḥallāj, 1404/1984:63, 84)

Note the meaning of spirit in the following verse:

إنت بين الشغاف والقلب تجري مثل جري الدموع من اجفاني
كحلول الأرواح في الأبدان وتحل الضمير جوف فوادي

You run between the pericardium and heart
As tears run from the eyelids.
You incarnate in thoughts, in the depth of my heart (fu‘ād),
As spirits incarnate in bodies.
This understanding confirms a parallel from the Mi’rāj al-sālikīn by al-Ḡazālī:

As spirit it runs in arteries. (al-Ḡazālī, 1421/2000:52)

It is wrong to compare spirit with soul, because creaturely substance cannot compare with divine. The soul is only a veil on a way to God. (Baqli, 1374/1995:408.) It proves to be true in the testimonies asserting that al-Hallāj implied that divine spirit (= divine nature) was incarnated in him. (Bīrūnī, 1876–1878:211)

Thus speaking spirit belongs to the divine nature. Through love to God (‘išq), as the catalyst, both essences mix. Human spirit is incarnated in divine spirit. Speaking spirit is given for each person initially as a guard over his soul owing to the preeternal contract with God. Some assertion about any substantive mixture is impossible: “The True formed it [the form of the person] by its own hand and has blown into it His spirit, has established it as testimony of revival, has explained it, having submitted to knowledge of it (ta’līm).” (al-Sulamī ms, f° 328a (Kor. 64:3))

The spirit must testify to the Creator in itself, because human creaturely nature is incapable of it. (Akhbar al-Halalj, 1957:11)

The True God testifies Himself in the spirit. This is a unique true way of testimony: “You should look at things through the testifying True, instead of through testifying yourself. After all one who looked at things through testifying himself was lost.” (Sulamī, ibid, f° 333a (Kor. 68:4)
Your unity of God is my unity of God,
Disobedience to God is disobedience to me,
Your indignation is my indignation,
Your forgiveness is my forgiveness,
Oh my Lord, the cold stuck through me,
When it said: “He is unrighteous”. (al-Ḥallāj, 1404/1984:81-82)

Traditionally it is considered, that anā ’l-Haqq phrase came into existence in the period of early Sufism before al-Ḥallāj, approximately after Abū Sa‘īd al-Ḫarrāz (d. 286/899). However in Ibn Taymiyya’s writing we find reference to Ibn al-Mubārak (d. 181/797) who transferred words of one Mu’tazila: “I am God, indeed. There is no god but me”. (Ibn Taymiyya, 1415/1994:88–89)

Certainly it is the first testimony. Thus occurrence of the given phrase can be ascribe to Mu’tazila’s groups. Of course, we cannot argue about some reconstruction of this Mu’tazila’s range of problems in this fragment. This phrase could not arise from a vacuum. The material is taken from the hadīths. According Mu’tazila tradition, each original idea must interpret the Koran and exegesis (naql). Already in early Muslim exegesis God names Himself the True. Therefore a phrase: “I am True” obtains more than once there (al-Ṭabarī, 1405/1984, 17:196; 23:187–188; Ibn Kaṯīr, 1401/1981:45)

In the Sufi tradition a problem of “ego” and correlation between the human ego and the divine “Ego” have been put for the first time by Abū Yazīd al-Bīstāmī (d. 874) and al-Ḥallāj have seen this problem. They have started talking about the divine “Me” and divine “He”. They divided them. The divine “Me” provides direct contact of the mystic with God. The divine “He” is a condition of God in solitude (huwa huwa).

It is not difficult to show that many well-known al-Ḥallāj’s formulas are borrowed from al-Bīstāmī’s speeches: “(Human) <me> is not <Me>. I am <Me>”; “I have seen that I am ‘Me’ and [divine] ‘Me’ is me”; “There is no god but Me!” (al-Sahlajī, 1949:111, 128, 138.) Here we are concerned with the well-known al-Bīstāmī’s šaṭḥ: “Glory be to me! How great is my majesty! (subḥā-nī, subḥā-nī mā a’zama ša’nī)” (al-Sarraj, 1914:390)

Massignon wrote: “Al-Ḥallāj’s doctrine of the mystical unity it seems to us is a version of al-Bīstāmī’s formulas.” (Massignon, 1922, 2:526)

But the phrase “I am True” obtains in al-Bīstāmī texts only in connection with God: “He [God] asked me: ‘Who are you?’. I asked Him: ‘Who are you?’ He told: ‘I am the True!’.” (al-Sahlajī, ibid:139)
However al-Ḥallāj supported his phrases by reasoning. The human ego of seeker perishes and he understands, that his “me” is the divine “Me”. According to al-Ḥallāj, al-Bīstāmī has not understood the true value of Sufi doctrine about the merge with God (the subject and object (‘ayn al-jam’): “Poor Abū Yazīd! He was only in the beginning of speaking, but he has been hidden from the True. Abū Yazīd believed that one who knows listens to the True. Abū Yazīd did not see and did not deny that did not see any more” (Baqli, 1374/1995:405)

In all these cases al-Ḥallāj uses the terms anniyat-ī, ann-ī as an analogue of the term anāniyya (that it is possible to translate as “myself”). Because this term is derivative from the term anniyya (‘essence’, in the literal sense is ‘something’), Massignon assumed that this term could be understood as “my essence”. (Massignon, 1913:162).

According to al-Ḥallāj, “Myself” is not a createurety ego but a divine Ego, a particle of the divine spirit: “…do not correlate your ego with ‘Me’ (anni) now, neither in the future, nor in the past”; “I am like myself, I am like Himself, or He is like Myself. He would not inspire in me fear if I was ‘my ego’,” (al-Ḥallāj, 1913:18) “Yes, He is me and I am Him, and the division (jarq) between my ego (aniyyat-ī) and Your Himself (huwiyya-ka) is [division] between casual and eternal…that you see is [no other than] my Lord has placed the eternity in my occurrence, while He uses my occurrence in His eternity.” “I have not an attribute except eternal attribute, and my speech (mutq) is in this attribute. All creations speak about arisen, whereas I speak about the eternal. And they deny me, testifying about my disbelief and aspiring to destroy me.” (Akhbar al-Ḥallaj, 1957:21)

It is possible to identify divine Ego directly with the speaking spirit only by means of possibility of divine Ego’s being in the person. Human ego should be lost, because it is a unique obstacle for comprehension of identity of the two ego’s. Otherwise one comes to a dualism because one takes divine spirit and our own spirit for two gods:

آنت ام انا هذا في الهين
هوية لك في لائيتي ابدا
Is this Yourself or myself, or there are two gods?
Inside Yourself is that inside Yourself. It is an acknowledgement, that [we are] two.
Your “yourself” is forever in destruction of my ego.
My totality above [material] totality is a confusion (talbīs) in the face of two. (al-Ḥallāj, 1404/1984:83)

As a result of this process, three-private division subject-certificate-object (mālik, mulk, mamlūk; nāẓir, naẓr, manzūr; ǧākir, ǧikr, madkūr; ārif, ‘irfān, maʾrīf, muṣār, išāra, muḥāṣid, tawḥīd, muwaḥḥad) is deconstructed; “As long as you point [to something], you do not yet profess One God. While the True seizes an object of your pointing, and annihilates,
and so does not remain neither a pointing out, nor an object indicated.” (al-Bīrūnī, 1377/1958:66)

Al-Hallāj called this status of lost relation between subject and objective “the contemplation of the merger [with God]” (‘ayn al-jam’). This reasoning caused a reaction from many thinkers. Many Sufi masters who did not understand al-Hallāj’s ideas expressed neither for, nor against it (for example, Abū Ḥafṣ al-Suhrawardī (d. 632/1234)) (al-Suhrawardī, 1358/1939:58)

In post-Hallājian ecstatic Sufi tradition the doctrine of divine ego, as a part of human nature, has become larger. It sometimes led to taboo for uses of the pronoun of the first person singular in relation to oneself. This precedent is known in the Khurasan mystical tradition. Abū Sa’īd Mayhanī (357/967–440/1049) used for himself the neutral isān (3rd pers. plur.) (Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar, 1332/1958:15).

The special point of view was developed by al-Ġazālī (450/1058–505/1111). He described experience of another ecstatic Sufi Abū ʿl-Ḥusayn al-Nūrī (probably 2226/840–295/907): “Perfection consists in full self-disappearance and renunciation of ones own state….This is a stage of those who entered a chasm of trues and overcame the states and actions, united with the clearest unity of the True with all fidelity. Thus nothing remains in him from the former statement, all the human has left him, his attention to the human has totally disappeared. “His disappearance” does not mean disappearance of body for me, but disappearance of heart. “Heart” does not mean flesh and blood for me, but the secret of divinity that has the latent place in his tangible heart. There is a secret of the spirit that [arises] from the command of God behind [that place]…” (al-Ġazālī, 1357/1939:288)

However al-Ġazālī has negative estimates for such formulas as anā ʿl-Ḥaqq. In al-Maqṣad al-asnā he divided in the concept ḥulūl three aspects:

1) Carrying over of divine attributes to the person (intiqāl), by al-Ġazālī is absurd;

2) Combination of two opposite substances in one (ittiḥād), Sufi masters call this approach (taqrīb);

3) Verbal poetic hyperbola used by some mystics. These are such formulas as anā ʿl-Ḥaqq. In this error mystics are similar to Christians who speak about an incarnation of divine nature in Jesus. (al-Ġazālī, 1407/1987:151–155; Massignon, 1969, 2:532–534)

The true is similar to glass which accepts a colour to its contents, but it has no image. “This is an appreciable error of those who judge by mirror according to the concept of “redness” because, when he looked in it, he has

3 See the list of Muslim writings where it is made comments of al-Hallāj’s anā-l-Ḥaqq in: Basharin, 2008:56.
Ahmad al-Gazalli (d. 520/1126) in Savāniḫ analyzed the major Hallājian verses. He saw the process, where loving creates in a soul an image of the beloved and feeds him by the food of knowledge (qūt-i āgāhī). The connection of loving with a beloved appears by means of this food of knowledge. This process has an irrational character. The image of the beauty (husn) of the beloved is reflected at the perfect mirror. This mirror is spirit or heart, which is identified by Ahmad al-Gazalli. He repeats al-Hallāj’s idea that only the heart of a person is capable to behold God. However the main difference of his scheme from al-Hallāj’s position is that Ahmad al-Gazalli replaces a mixture of two spirits by a third intermediary. This is the mirror of spirit (heart). The beloved always remains the only reflexion incarnated at the mirror of loving. As a result of this process, there does not occur direct unity. (al-Gazzālī, 1381/2002; Pourjavadi, 1998:263–274)

Thus Ahmad al-Gazalli actually has given another sense to anā ‘l-Haqq formula. We show not a trace remains from the early explanation, that is not clear for most people. The new explanation did not give occasion to charges and was accepted by many Sufi masters.

Meanwhile for many ecstatic Sufi masters the mention of mirror (anā ‘l-Haqq) became only a mere formality. For example, Sulṭān Valad (623/1226–712/1312), son of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, explained anā ‘l-Haqq too. He anticipated all reasoning with the mention of image at mirror: “Actually He is One but not two, because He is loving and reflexion of the beloved. He is shown in the mirror of the beloved. And it is enough. After that, the two are not present, though, proceeding on the form and verbal expression, reflexion and the beloved are two, but in a sense they are one essence because the same form of the beloved is included in the mirror. Just as, if water streams from a source in a stream, the reasonable sees these two waters as one because the same water is in the stream.” (Sulṭān Valad, 1377:109)

On the basis of these conclusions Sulṭān Valad develops the original concept. Unity status is proved by the divine game. God loves in person Himself only. He appears loving and the mystic appears beloved. (Sulṭān Valad, 1377; Ritter, 1955:557)

On the borders of Iranian mysticism, the idea of divine Ego was further developed in the light of the concept of unity of contemplation (waḥdat al-šuhūd) by ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Sīmānī (659/1261–736/1336). According to his ideas, the divine “Myself” is realized in human life. However the great error is to believe, that creaturely ego can come nearer to the divine. Thus al-Ḥallāj had a wrong conclusion. He stopped in the middle of the way of knowing God. A maximum of the mystical way to approach to God is assimilation of himself with the mirror at which will be reflected divine life. Thus he should realize an accurate difference between his ego
and divine Ego. In this connection all ecstatic explications are rejected. (Landolt, 1973:29–81)

‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simmānī allocated four stages for manifestation in subtle vital centers of the human body (latā‘if). (Corbin, 1973:275–352) The first step (the claim of Pharaoh) is existence (hasīt) shown in a carnal soul (nafs) as the absolute attachment to life for the creaturely ego and a sight through a prism of the ego of the divine Ego. In this stage we attribute our natures to Him. The second step is the comprehension of divine Ego as own ego. These are the words of al-Ḥallāj: “I am the True.” This is the non-existence (nīstī) shown in heart (dil). This phenomenon does not exist actually. The next stage is the super knowledge consisting in the distinction from the divine Ego on the epistemological level shown as secret (sirr): “I am an ignoramus and You are knowledgeable, I am a fool, and you are wise. Glory be to You! If you had not taught me, I would have no knowledge. You are knowledgeable and wise!” After this appears the highest step on which the mystic realizes the break between this divine Ego and the creaturely ego shown in the spirit:

This “Myself” is not mine, but Yours (Simmānī, 1977:316; Landolt, 1977:297–303)

Such interpretation for divine “Myself” was peculiar to Iranian mysticism as a whole. For example, Maḥmūd Šabistarī (687/1288–720/1320–1321) wrote:

“Myself” is a quality of the True.

Because He is hidden, [being] hidden is an illusion (wahm) and a guess (Šabistārī, 1377/1958:374)

Such explanations were apprehended by many practical Sufis masters. Especially, this interpretation became popular among šayḫs in Nakšbandiya brotherhoods. For example, Ḥwāja ’Ubayd Allāh Aḥrār (d. 869/1490) said, that al-Ḥallāj’s words became a certificate of the imperfection of his self-renunciation. Pronouncing the words “I am the True” is a simple claim on divine status. The mystic, who say these words, is still very far from a full loss of his ego. Nakšbandi šayḫ Mīrzā Jān Jānān Maẓhar (1111/1700–1195/1781) explained, that a similar error results when a Sufi is capable of beholding an original being in the form of manifestations of the Creator in the world, such as rays coming from the sun. He will say: “I am the sun.” It is a traditional error of novices. (al-Kurdī, 2000:245, 260)

According to Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 604/1207–672/1273), the real status has only the divine Ego in contrast to the human ego. One who does not agree with it as an infidel confirming existence of two realities. The human ego becomes transformed into the divine only after his destruction, being dissolved in divine love through which he has created the world. The mystic falls into a state of ecstatic intoxication and madness. (Chittick, 1995:214–216)

“There are no places for two ‘Me’ with God. You are speaking ‘me’ and He is speaking ‘Me’. Or you die before Him, or allow Him to die before you” (Chittick, 1995:214–215); “It was so and with Maṣūr [al-Ḥallāj].
When the love to the True has reached a limit, he became enemy for himself and has turned himself into anything, having told: ‘I am the True’, i.e. I was lost. The True has remained and that is all. It is a limit of modesty and extreme degree of service. It means: ‘He exists and that is all’. The following speaker is claim and arrogance: ‘You are God and I am a servant’. At the statement of oneself, there is a need for two. In exactly the same way when you say: ‘He is the True’. It is a dualism because before ‘me’, ‘Him’. Therefore, impossible God says: ‘I am the True’ because nothing, except Him, exists. Mansur was lost, [therefore] that there were words from the True.” (Rûmî, 1381/2002:193.)

Thus al-Ḥallâj’s recognition could not draw any charges in disbelief and godlessness because all crossing of the divine and human natures has been removed. Henceforth, in the east of the Muslim world, anā ‘l-Ḥaqq has ceased to be a testimony or claim for divinity.

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CHAPTER XIV

INTEGRATION OF PHILOSOPHY AND SPIRITUALITY IN MEDIEVAL INDIA
(BASED ON THE “VEDARTHASAMGRAHA” OF RAMANUJA)

RUZANA PSKHU

First of all we should define the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘spirituality’. We can agree on the following meaning of philosophy which says that philosophy is the systematic study of fundamental problems, which are connected with human existence, knowledge, morality and so on.

Spirituality is not a system of ideas. Spirituality is connected with an energy, power or will to take the road, on which we realize the highest values. In this sense we can say that spirituality is a “way” we create by ourselves, by our deeds, words, thoughts etc. and it is based on the spiritual power of the soul, or in other words, on faith.

Then we should ask ourselves: how these two absolutely different areas can interweave with each other? We consider philosophy a mental activity and spirituality a practical activity (or activity of the soul which accepts a dare to take action which has only spiritual values), we know that philosophy often views the world from the point of pure reason (in other words impersonally) and spirituality, in fact, creates a personal attitude towards everything which is on its road. It is a personal self-devotion and resoluteness (or firmness) to act according the highest values. It is obvious that this problem of the correlation of philosophy and spirituality is a very difficult problem first of all for the person who has very strong logical power of thinking and at the same time has very deep religious faith.

The best example of such a cross between philosophy and spirituality can be found in Medieval India. More precisely in the Vishishta-advaita-vedanta, philosophical system of the great Vaishnava thinker Ramanuja (XI-XII). It is known that this system was a religious and philosophical reaction against Advaita-vedanta of Shankara (VIII-IX). But if the Advaita system is in fact, mainly, and first of all, a philosophical system without any religious pretensions (in spite of the fact that Shankara was a Shaiva philosopher), the Vishishta-advaita is considered as a religious turn or ‘religious revolution’ in the history of Vedanta philosophy. And this historical event can throw light on the attitude between a philosophy and a spirituality (which in this case is synonymous with the realization of certain religious values).

In general terms we can say that the Vishishta-advaita system consists of two basic philosophical elements: a Vaisnava element and a Vedanta philosophy element. The first element, Vaisnavism, has passed through
several stages of development before it was expounded in Ramanuja’s works. The most important phase of its development is the period of the Alvars or the twelve Vaishnava Saints from the South India. The poetry of the Alvars is based on three main ideas:

1) Devotion of the God (devotion of Vishnu in the image of Krishna).
2) The world is understood as a manifestation of the God (each object in the world seems as a reflection of the God).
3) Deliverance of the soul is reached by personal devotion to God (bhakti), by the love towards Him; while the ascetic life and sacrifices have no significance.

The most outstanding mystic saint, Nammalvar, created the huge composition of the devotional hymns, which contain rich theological ideas related to the three fundamental doctrines of the Vishishtha-advaita-vedanta: the Ultimate Reality; the means of its attainment; and the supreme goal of life. According to Nammalvar, the Ultimate Reality is the Supreme Personal Being, which possesses infinite unsurpassable bliss and the nature of spiritual knowledge. This Reality is the Supreme Being and Personal God, Vishnu-Narayana, who possesses not only infinite auspicious attributes, but also a spiritual body, which is decorated by weapons and ornaments. The main question which may arise in process of the study of Vedanta System of Ramanuja is how this Personal god of Vaishnava religion can be integrated into the very philosophical system of Vedanta? Or how we can understand that God can be understood as “a town and village, knowledge and ignorance…the merit and sin, fire, water, earth…father, mother, children…luminous moon, sun, stars and darkness and so on.” (Chari, 1997:47) In other words, if God is equated with qualities which are of a contradictory nature, and if God also is spoken of in physical terms, then how can we equate God with universe? Their natures are so different and further how we can argue the identification of God with the universe from the philosophical point of view (as was in fact done by Ramanuja)?

To answer these questions we should outline the history of Vedanta.

We can understand from the word Vedanta, this philosophical system expounds and develops the main ideas of the Upanishads, the final part of Vedic texts. Upanishads were the basic source of the Vedanta system (shruti-prasthan) and along with the “Bhagavadgita” (smriti-prasthan) and “Brahma-sutras” (nyaya-prasthan) constitute the triple canon of Vedanta (prasthan-trayi). We can talk about the becoming of the Vedanta tradition, beginning with second century B.C. till second century A.D., when “Brahma-sutra” was created. It is known that the “Brahma-sutras” were the

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1 Veda+anta=Vedanta means the end of Veda.
first systematization of the Upanishads, which contains the many very
different and sometimes very contradictory sentences.

Such systematization of Upanishads meant establishment of the
borders of the problem areas of each of the schools of Vedanta, which
appeared later. The aphoristic style of the “Brahma-sutras” was a cause of
the appearance of different points of view, various interpretations of the
main content and meaning of Upanishads. The founders of the main schools
of Vedanta were first of all commentators of the text of the “Brahma-
sutras”. But despite this variety of views of the Vedanta systems there was a
cornerstone idea, which was partaken of by all systems of this tradition as a
conditio sine qua non. And this idea considered Brahman as the Highest
True and Reality, which should be the main goal for every human being.
Certainly when the different schools of Vedanta started to develop this idea,
there occurred some differences. The main problems which were actual for
every Vedanta school were two common questions:

1. A question about relationship between Absolute Reality and the
   world.
2. A question about the way, which leads from this world to this
   Reality.

We can see that the first question concerns the metaphysics of a
Vedanta school (in other words, its philosophical part), meanwhile the
second question concerns its practice or Ethics. It is evident that both
questions are interrelated: the human knowledge of the relationship between
Brahman and the world is a necessary condition of man’s deeds for his own
‘salvation’. Each school of the Vedanta tried to create a non-contradictory
idea system, which would explain the nature of Brahman, His relation with
the world, and the way to ‘freedom’ from samsara.

The founder of the first and the most famous school of Vedanta was
the above mentioned Shankara (his school was named Advaita-vedanta).² He
decided very simply and let’s say genially the question about the cor-
relation between the ‘perfect’ Brahman and the ‘imperfect’ world: he kept
the ‘absolute’ purity of Brahman by rejecting the non-absolute world. In
other words, if we take Brahman as the only real and true reality we should
not assume the reality of another essence, i.e. the manifold world. The
evidence of this world is convincing only for the ‘ordinary’ people and is
caused by the mystifying power of the great Illusion or Maya. Moreover,
Shankara says, the question of the correlation of Brahman and the world is
itself a trick of Maya, which is not real nor unreal. The presentation of the
world as a product of the Great Illusion causes the idea that the human soul
in its individual aspect has also an illusory nature. Every personal and

² This school was so famous that during a time it was considered as the
only school of Vedanta.
secular feature of the soul is caused, according Shankara, by illusory limita-
tions or upadhti. All that can individualize the soul is illusory by nature. The
soul is real only in its identity with Brahman. But this Brahman, the Highest
Principle is Nirguna-Brahman; 3 He is without definition, without expression
and without description. 4

This system of thought plays a very important role in the history of
Indian Philosophy. Advaita-vedanta was the first system of Vedanta and the
following systems of Vedanta criticized it from various aspects. The main
object of the critics was the idea about the illusory status of the world. The
first opponent of Advaita-vedanta was Bheda-abheda-vada (doctrine of
identity and difference [between God and the world]), which can be divided
into two types (Yadavaprapasha’s and Bhaskara’s). Then the second
opponent of Advaita-vedanta was Vishishta-advaita-vedanta. The common
feature of all opponents of Advaita-vedanta of Shankara, who belonged to
Shaiva religion, was the Vishnu religion.

Bhaskara (VIII-IX) was a commentator of “Brahmasutra” and in his
“Bhaskarabhashya” he put forth the first critical ideas against Advaita-
vedanta. This text is devoted to the destruction of Maya, the main doctrine
of Advaita-vedanta. The basic critical thesis of Bhaskara says that all argu-
mentation of Maya-vadin 5 against the reality of the world can be reversed
against himself. If the world has an unreal nature then, Bhaskara says, we
can presuppose that Maya also has an unreal character (because it functions
in this unreal world). Moreover the Highest Brahman himself can be consi-
dered as unreal, because we know about him from the sacred texts, which
circulate in this world. And at last the rejection of Advaita to describe Maya
has many contradictory consequences. Ramanuja repeats the arguments of
Bhaskara but he goes further and after destroying Maya-vada of Shankara he
destroy Bhaskara’s system of thought.

Bhaskara, who accused Shankara of sympathy to Buddhism, created
a new trend of Vedanta, Bheda-abheda-vada. The world is a modification of
Brahman and it is real as Brahman is real. Being the cause of the world and
individual souls, Brahman has an indivisible and unchangeable nature. He is
infinite, unlimited and transcendental by nature. But this modification of
Brahman into the real world does not mean that his own nature is modified
and changed, because that would be contradictory to the Vedanta thesis
about his perfect nature. Brahman is modified into the world and does not
lose his pureness and perfectness. Bhaskara compares Brahman’s modifica-
tion into the world with the image of a sea and its waves: like the sea (or
fire), which differs from the waves (or the sparkles), Brahman differs from
the souls and the world; and like a sea (or fire), which is identical with the

3 Nirguna – without qualities.
4 This system of thought was investigated in many works. The most
popular is Indian Philosophy by S. Radhakrishnan (vol. II).
5 Partisan of the doctrine of Maya.
waves (the sparkles), Brahman is identical with the souls and the world. We know a sea (a fire) through its waves (sparkles) or its essential features and we know Brahman through the souls and the world. The individual soul is a part of Brahman, which is influenced by ignorance, desires etc. the soul is atomic in size, but its essential nature is identical with Brahman. Bhaskara considers illusory limitations (upadhi) of Advaita-vedanta as real, which means that the individual soul is Brahman, characterized by accidental limitations. In other words, samsara can be considered as a ‘mixture’ of Brahman and upadhi.

Yadavaprakasha (IX) was another representative of Bheda-abheda-vada. Unfortunately we have not any information about his life, personality, works etc. (except the very little information about his thoughts, given by Ramanuja in the text of ‘Vedarthasamgraha’). The main ideas of his philosophical system are the following: Brahman has the nature of a pure universal being, he possesses three powers – consciousness (cit), matter (acit) and divinity – and based on them he changes himself into the world. The world, soul and Brahman are different in their consequences, but they are identical in the aspect of cause, i.e. of pure Brahman, when these differentiations are eliminated. Bhaskara considers differentiations as caused by real upadhi, which only restrict Brahman and make appear the individual souls, wandering in samsara. But Yadavaprakasha considers differentiations as real modifications of Brahman. ‘Brahman of Bhaskara’, as individual soul suffers in samsaric life, ‘Brahman of Yadavaprakasha’, suffers partially as individual soul, and the world suffers in samsaric life, but only partially, as Ishvara\(^6\) does not suffer. In any way both variants of Bheda-abheda-vada were rejected by Ramanuja as faulty understanding of the relationship between Brahman and the world/soul. According to Ramanuja, Brahman cannot suffer or experience samsaric life.

Bheda-abheda-vada system was the first attempt to save the world as having absolute reality: Bhaskara stressed the importance of Brahman as spiritual principle, meanwhile Yadavaprakasha tried to save the world and that’s why he put attention on the reality of the world as a modification of Brahman. If we consider Vishishta-advaita-vedanta we will see that the status of the world is more stable. The religious life of a thinker can influence his philosophical system. For example we can see the correlation of features of God on the character of the philosophical system: it is known that Shankara was a Shiva, and that Shiva is a mythical destroyer of the world and we can see that Advaita-vedanta destroys the reality of the world. Ramanuja was a Vaishnava and Vishnu is mythical savior of the world and we can see how Vishishta-advaita saves the reality of the world, keeping its divinity.

As we could see Vishishta-advaita-vedanta was an inheritor of Bheda-abheda-vada’s system in its critical part, but in some sense in its con-

\(^6\) Personal God.
As was said above, to talk about this tradition we should begin from Vaishnava religion. Vaishnava religion as a Hindu sect originated from the Epic period. In sixth century BC we can see that this religious movement, as a reaction against Buddhism, was spreading throughout India, and the central part of this development was South India, where Ramanuja was born. The poetic heritage of Alvars was interpreted by acharya (or spiritual teachers), one of whom was Ramanuja. The first acharya was Nathamuni (X), who can be considered the first preceptor of Vishishta-advaita-vedanta. He collected the hymns of Alvars and composed three treaties, which were read by his grandson and the second acharya, Yamuna (918-1033). Yamunacharya was ‘a spiritual grandfather’ of Ramanuja or the teacher of Ramanuja’s teacher. He was also a mediator between Ramanuja and Alvars. Yamunacharya tried to harmonize Vaishnava theology with the basic principles of Vedanta. He wrote nine works, among which the most important is “Siddhitraya” (philosophical trilogy), commentary to “Bhagavadgita” (it was a base for Ramanuja’s commentary on the same text), a collection of devotional hymns and “Chatuhshloki”. In his philosophical trilogy Yamunacarya also raised some critical arguments against the Advaita-vedanta of Shankara and Bheda-abheda-vada of Bhaskara. For Yamunacharya Brahman is the Highest Person, on whom all individual souls and the world depend and the sole way to salvation is a way of love of this Person (bhakti-yoga), prepared by knowledge (jnana-yoga) and deeds (karma-yoga). In fact Yamunacharya was a real creator of the philosophical system of Vishishta-advaita-vedanta, because he inspired the main works of Ramanuja.

This brief outline of Vedanta history shows that the Advaita-vedanta of Shankara proposed a very simple solution of this problem – the difficulty of how to identify the Perfect Absolute with the imperfect universe: this system affirms that the universe has no reality – it is an illusory manifestation of what is real. And it means that we have only one Real Being – the Pure and Perfect Absolute. The Vishishta-advaita-vedanta considers these two entities as absolutely real and distinct but they are one in the sense of a substance as qualified by the attributes. There is an organic relationship between the two entities, as in the case of the body and soul. In the case of Brahman and universe, Brahman as organically related to the universe is one. In other words, we can see the Vishishta-advaita-vedanta integrated the Alvars’ religious description of the Personal God into its philosophical system in fact without any corruption.

The central doctrine of the Vishishta-advaita Vedanta philosophy is that Brahman as ‘sharirin’ or the universal soul is organically related to the university of ‘cit’ (sentient souls) and ‘acit’ (not-sentient entities) in the same way as the soul is related to the physical body. In other words, the significant feature of the philosophical theory of Reality is the concept of the organic relationship of body and soul. The Supreme Being which is equated with the universe is conceived as the Universal Soul and all that
exists in the universe as its body ('sharira'). But another question arises: what can I do with this conception of God or what should I do? And here we see how this main value of Vaishnava spirituality (I mean Vishnu-Narayana) was integrated into the philosophical system of Ramanuja by means of the establishment of a special way of salvation, the way, which one names as intellectual love or 'bhakti'. In fact if the Ultimate Being is identified with the real and very different universe and at the same time it is identified with Vishnu-Narayana, then the only way which may bring the salvation and which is only possible for the sentient soul is love towards Vishnu. And this love can express itself through service before the face of God, through the unselfish performance of daily duties ('karma') and depends on the true knowledge of God ('jnana'). In other words, if a person meditates on the essence of God, performing his daily duties and trying to please God, then as result of these efforts he will gain the uninterrupted vision of God.

Ramanuja entered in the history of Indian philosophy not only as a founder of Vishishta-advaita-vedanta school, but also as a severe critic of Shankara's philosophy. He criticized very intensively the Maya-vada and this intensity was misunderstood for originality. Many historians of Indian philosophy considered him only as a critic of Shankara’s system. And really his criticism of Maya-vada plays a very important role in his system: he composed seven arguments against Maya (ontological, epistemological, etc.), but all of them are in addition to his main ideas. He had to propose firstly, the critical arguments against his opponents and then after this critical destruction he easily can elaborate his own views. Moreover, the critical consideration of the ideas of his Vedanta opponents meant that his own system of ideas is also a part of the Vedanta tradition.

Of course, it would be incorrect if we try to reduce all activity of Ramanuja to his critical 'redaction' of Advaita-vedanta. If we take his first tractate “Vedarthasamgraha” (“Summary of meaning of the Veda”), which functions as a condensed commentary on the Upanishads, we will see that this text represents a new era in Vedanta philosophy, because Ramanuja described the Absolute in new religious and devotional terms. The tractate consists of three sections: 1) introduction, which contains the contents of the whole text, 2) critical exposition of views of Vedanta and other opponents (Advaita, Bheda-abheda-vada etc.), 3) development of his own ideas. The introduction is a condensed reflection of the text and its explanation can throw light on the whole system of Ramanuja. We can divide the text in two parts, one of which contains the critical arguments of Ramanuja, and the other – his own ideas. The text shows us that the results of the philosophical integration of the spiritual values of Vaishnava, which were made on the base of Vedanta philosophy (according to Ramanuja’s work “Vedarthasamgraha”) are: 1) the affirmation of one Brahman, the sole cause of all existence, who is differentiated by the all perfect attributes; 2) the idea that all sentient and non-sentient matter constitutes the body of Brahman, and stands in the relationship of attributes; 3) the idea that salvation of the
individual soul is not identification with Brahman but devotion to Brahman throughout intellectual love for Him (bhakti). (Pskhu, 2007:302) The integration of philosophy and spirituality in medieval India was possible on the basis of Vedanta philosophy and Vaishnava religion, but it needed the religious genius of Ramanuja, who was able to harmonize these very different areas of human creativity.

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PART II

PHILOSOPHY: CONTEMPORARY
CHALLENGES IN CIVIL SOCIETY
2.1 Civil Society: Overcoming Stereotypes
Philosophical understanding of contemporary problems of civil society in the context of globalization requires an answer to the following important question: how to relate globalization which focuses on the value of general and complete unity and expresses the integration of world needs into a single economic and political sphere of life, with the supremacy of the nation-state forms of management and domination differentiated on cultural grounds, with the pluralism in society? In this regard, three postulates of globalization theories seem to be the most questionable:

1. the crisis of the traditional model of the state and reducing the role of the state;
2. modernization as Westernization – the natural result of globalization;
3. “democratic unipolarity” as the preferred method of social self-organization.

If we consider the development of the countries of Western Europe and the USA over the past two centuries in the framework of modernization theory as a universal model of human development, it is now obvious that globalization as a new form of modernization theory did not become the only true way of world development. It is no mere chance that the current systemic crisis of global liberal world order showed that it has not lived up to its expectations. Globalization is “not working” as expected, and contrary to the expectations in even the most developed countries of Western Europe and the USA the quality of life of entire segments of the population falls, and the triumph of democracy is absent. The modern world is increasingly losing its stability. It is no mere chance that, for example, heated discussion was aroused after the publication of the book Germany – self-destruction by the former Bundesbank board member, Thilo Sarrazin. What conclusions can be drawn after the scandal surrounding the publication of Germany Abolishes Itself: How we are Putting Our Country at Risk (Sarrazin, 2010) and after the statement of the leaders of France, Germany and the UK about the failure of the multiculturalism policy in their countries, and perhaps most importantly, after the act of terrorism by Anders Breivik in Norway?

As it is known, the policy of multiculturalism, which provides good-neighborly co-existence of people of different cultures and religions, is not simply a sphere of public policy, but is also an indicator of the sustainability
of civil society. The evidence of this fact is that in the speeches of the leaders of these states had different emphases, and their statements were emotional rather than scientifically based. However, they had one thing in common – the civil societies of Great Britain, Germany and France were at the stage where they are not just “different”, but irreconcilably “different”. We should note that the question of what “European identity” represents today, is already on the agenda, because this process in one form or another, was going on and happening in Switzerland and Holland. We do not set ourselve the task of analyzing the theory and practice of civil society, we need only note that, on the one hand, by the remark of Yale University professor B. Kapustin: “The dictionary of modern social science has a bit of the concepts that would resemble the “Cheshire Cat smile”, as “civil society” (Kapustin, 2009) and on the other hand, “we will proceed from the fact that, if civil society is anywhere, it is likely that we will find it in countries of stable liberal democracies” (Kapustin, 2009). In addition, after the collapse of the Soviet Union it is clear that Western countries have the inspiration to establish a “liberal democratic unipolarity”, even by force of arms, for example the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO forces and the requirements for Yugoslavia to join the EU, as well as the compulsion by force of arms to democracize in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

Indeed, European countries started to say, quite often, that the relationship between so-called indigenous Europeans and immigrants from various countries of Asia and Africa did not turn out well, and even began to threaten national identity. Multiculturalism, which until recent times was considered one of the most important achievements of the European community, in the framework of its policy of tolerance, is still quite high relative to other nations and cultures. However, this is so against the backdrop of a systemic crisis reflected in the growing popularity of right-wing slogans: “France for the French”, “Austria for Austrians”, etc.

Of course, migration flows in Europe today greatly complicated the lives of indigenous people and showed that this problem is important not only for Europe but, in particular, for Russia as well. “It is a serious challenge that both Europe and many other regions of the world will have to face” (Putin, 2012).

Analysis and search for solutions of the problem of rather serious growing confessional and ethnic tensions in the modern world has become the main topic of numerous conferences on dialogue among civilizations and cultures, cross-cultural interaction between civilizations, as well as numerous studies on the problems of nationalism, the role of religion in the modern world, national identity, and the theory and practice of multiculturalism in the context of social policies of different countries, etc.

The problem of the crisis of multiculturalism in contemporary Europe is, in fact, the problem of the crisis in integration models, where people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds must live not only together, but in accordance with their own rules, and whether the matter about common rules can be solved on the basis of equality before the law.
and fundamental freedoms (of expression, religion, etc.). The main problem arises because of the traditions that every nation has, and which should not in any way infringe the rights of others. In other words, the problem relates to the fact that the current political structures of the paternalistic nature are formed for nation-states, and therefore cannot cope with multinational system and multiculturalism in the framework of democratic institutional development.

This is why, in one of his speeches David Cameron under “we are – different”, means the alienation between the citizens of Great Britain – Anglo-Saxons and Muslims. People are divided on different sides of “barriers,” on the one hand, by ethnicity, but on the other by religion. This is not surprising, since the question of European nationalism turns out again to be the subject of serious discussion (Craig, 1997). Angela Merkel by “we are – different”, means that the problems of integration into German society are the responsibility of immigrants, in other words the German version of multiculturalism seems to mean assimilation. It looks like “we are different” destroys the idea of the integrity of civil society, because “we are different” not only takes on a social, but also a religious and in a sense ethnic tinge. In Germany this confrontation is on a religious and ethnic basis, as Thilo Sarrazin described, noting that the continuation of current policies on immigrants will lead to the Islamization of the country and the collapse of its economic system (Sarrazin, 2010). In the UK this is the problem of deeper cultural integration of British Muslims for the sake of preventing the growth of extremism. Thus, it is not only about the European version of the theory and the politics of multiculturalism, but primarily about practice, that is, about the crisis of the traditional concept of civil society. After the fact that many German politicians accused Thilo Sarrazin of xenophobia, it became clear that his view is shared by most citizens. It is no mere chance that the Chancellor of Germany noted that it is necessary to encourage newcomers more actively to a full-fledged entry into society. That is not about multiculturalism, but about assimilation. At the same time questions of theory and practice of multiculturalism in the development of civil society and the understanding of European identity are important for us. I would like to draw attention to several important aspects and issues raised in the speeches of leaders of major countries in Europe. Firstly, the problem of cultural integration under the circumstances of cultural atomization of the ethnic communities that are in the European countries. For example, apparently only in that way can ethnic Turks live in Germany while retaining their religion, culture and language. It is no coincidence that several years ago, Prime Minister Erdogan, R., speaking to the Turks in Cologne, said that the Turkish language – “It is your natural right to teach your children their mother language. I understand that you are sensitive about the issue of assimilation. Assimilation is a crime against humanity” (Ferda, 2011). It seems that the problem is not only in assimilation, but in the fact that it is necessary to integrate into German society. The matter is not that there are good and bad nations, but that they are different. It is no coincidence, that
Angela Merkel, as indeed, N. Sarkozy raised the issue of language, that the new citizens of their countries should have a good command of the language of the country. Speaking about France, Sarkozy stressed that his country is a strictly secular state, where it is incorrect to show their traditional religious values, and even by peaceful means to implant them in the society in which Islam is not a traditional religion. In general, it should be noted that the issue of the crisis of multiculturalism does not mean the end of integration or the end of immigration. Apparently it means the end of illusions of political correctness, their own geopolitical ambitions and arrogance, a victim of which has become Europe. The problems of integration and the relationship to a civilization cannot be solved simply by a ban on the construction of mosques, on wearing headscarves, or by deportations of immigrants to their historical homeland.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the overwhelming majority of PACE adopted a resolution “Combating Extremism: achievements, shortcomings and failures” on October 5, 2010. The main idea of this document is that Muslim extremism is a reaction to Islamophobia. This political recognition by the Parliamentary Assembly, needs theoretical explanation. Also the events of the so-called “Arab spring” have important meaning for understanding the contemporary models of civil society.

The systemic crisis, which peaked in 2008-2009 according to some researchers, is considered as already a “crisis of modernity” with all the ensuing consequences for existing models of social development claiming to be universal, and for the practice of modern life. In 2003 Immanuel Wallerstein in his book The End of the World as We Know It was speaking about the “the world of capitalism” and “the world of knowledge”. These “framed our reality and the world we have known in the sense of acquiring understanding of it” (Wallerstein, 2003). He noted the crisis of social science methodology, “I believe we are in the midst of wandering through dark woods and have insufficient clarity about where we should be heading. I believe we need urgently to discuss this together...” (Wallerstein, 2003).

At the basis of Western models of civil society is usually found an exaggeration of the role of secularism in the development of civil society and as the basis for the modernization of Western countries. It is considered that, under the circumstances of industrial and postindustrial society the influence of religion on society and citizens is being reduced. However, as Francis Fukuyama noted in the March 13, 2005 New York Times article “The Calvinist Manifesto”: “it goes without saying that religion and religious passion are not dead, and not only because of Islamic militancy but also because of the global Protestant-evangelical upsurge that, in terms of sheer numbers, rivals fundamentalist Islam as a source of authentic religiosity (and) suggests that secularization and rationalism are hardly the inevitable handmaidens of modernization” (Fukuyama, 2005).

In recent years it has become apparent that the role of religion did not decreased but has increased significantly. Moreover, the religious factor is becoming increasingly important. This statement is true for Islam. Over the
past centuries, the influence of Islam in the Muslim East countries did not
decrease but increased, and not in favor of secularism.

The history of Arab and other Muslim countries shows that over the
last hundred years, a reaction to secularism has been the emergence and
spread of various Islamic movements, including some that are radical. At
the basis of the ideology of these movements is placed the idea of opposi-
tion to the intellectual and political manifestations of colonial order, which,
from their point of view, have been directed against Islam and Muslims and
are designed for “Westernization” and depriving them of their cultural
identity.

Obviously it should be stated that many philosophical theories and
methodologies that pretend to be universal, have shown their ineffectiveness.
Re-evaluation of Western models of democracy as the champions of
civil society should also be noted from the point of view of a universal
model. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama in his
famous article announced “The End of History” and the approval of the
liberal unilateralism as the only way of social self-organization. In 1993 an
article by Samuel Huntington about the clash of civilizations, in which this
liberal unipolarity has already been considered as universal and “mis-
siory”, and according to which were determined forms of interaction of
Western civilization with other civilizations. Today we can say that some
eamples of contemporary history show some countries developing accord-
ing to Western models. It is no mere chance that there are even discussions
about the need to save capitalism from the dominant ideology of neoliberal-
ism, which considered its values as having global significance. As noted by
Professor G. Derluguyan of North-West University, when speaking today
about the crisis, we must answer whether it is a “creative destruction” of
obsolete monopolies? Does it signal the end of American hegemony itself,
which lasted nearly a century? Does it mean maybe even more the offset of
world civilizational centers and geo-political power that for 500 years have
centralized the world system around the Western nucleus? “It may be all the
above and at the same time” (Derlugian, 2008).

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Is There a Universal History That Leads toward Liberal Democracy?

After the Cold War the communist global project disappeared together with the Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Russia is creating a new statehood, choosing a project of social organization for itself. At the present time the Western liberal democratic model is the dominant global project of social order. This model is proposed for Russia and non-Western societies as inevitable. Analyzing this situation, Francis Fukuyama, repeating the dreams of Hegel and Karl Marx, wrote about the “old age of humankind”, the end of history as such. He argues that in the world there is a Western liberal democratic model as the ultimate form of human government. Non-Western societies will have to go this route because “one can hardly speak of real alternatives to liberal democracy and market capitalism as the fundamental principles of the organization of contemporary society.” (Fukuyama, 2004:22)

He believes that in the cultural foundations of society liberalism contributes to the creation of a new liberal universalist civic identity, not related to ethnic or religious affiliation. The threat to this universalist cultural identity, he sees in the “fundamental belief” in multiculturalism and moral relativism. (Fukuyama, 2004:382-383) Fukuyama vigorously denies any hope of successful development of societies based on different principles than universalistic cultural identity. He argues that “a political order based on the Serbian ethnic or Shiit identity could never outgrow the boundaries of some pitiful corner of the Balkans or the Middle East and, of course, can never become a fundamental principle of the large, diverse, dynamic and complex modern societies – as for example, components of the Group of Seven. Not only would they be faced with intractable political controversy associated with religious or ethnic minorities, but their hostility to innovation would close them off from the possibility of free economic exchange and, therefore, participation in contemporary economic life.” (Fukuyama, 2004:381) If one agrees with these arguments, it is necessary to recognize the inevitability of the Western liberal democratic model of development for Russian society.

These views reflect the existing concepts of progressive and linear development of the political-economic world, and universal or global civilization. It seems that in this civilization the West represents the highest
form of development, and non-Western societies look barbarous, or at best, followers. As Fukuyama states, “there is a universal history that leads toward liberal democracy”. (Fukuyama, 2007:95)

Analyzing world politics in the period after the “cold war” Samuel Huntington came to different conclusions. He challenges the dominant view of the existence of a universal world civilization and recognizes the pluralism of human civilizations (as did Nikolay Y. Danilevsky, Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee and Marshal Hodgson). He argues that for the first time in human history, politics has become multipolar and polycivilizational: “In the years after the “cold war”, we have witnessed the beginning of huge changes in peoples’ identity and the character of this identification. Global politics has to line up along the new cultural lines” (Huntington, 2003:13). In this regard, he is not talking about the inevitability of the victory of the Western model. His idea is that the “survival of the West depends on willingness of Americans to re-confirm their Western identity and that Westerners take their civilization as unique not universal, as well as their associations to preserve their civilization against the challenges of non-Western societies. It is possible to avoid a global war of civilizations only when world leaders recognize the polycivilizational nature of global politics and work to maintain it”. (Huntington, 2003:16) Keeping faith in the success of the Western model, Samuel Huntington nevertheless warns that it may interfere with the cultural and civilizational identity in some regions of the world (especially the Muslim world and China) to the extent that in order to overcome them it will be necessary for the U.S. and their allies to use military force.

However, the faith of Western politicians and political scientists in the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy and civil society institutions in non-Western societies, including Islamic, remains unchanged.

Democratization of Humanity

To achieve this goal, active programs for the democratization of humanity are being carried out. In the early 1980s U.S. President Ronald Reagan called for a “crusade for freedom” and a “campaign to promote democracy” around the world, including the creation of the infrastructure of democracy, and among them civil society institutions. But the upsurge in this activity began after the end of the Cold War.

The current U.S. political elite believes that globalization is an American project and considers it spreading an important goal of U.S. foreign policy. Globalization involves the promotion of democratic regimes. Or, as argued by T. Friedman and M. Mandelbaum, after the Cold War the world is created by the American project on the basis of democracy and the free market. (Friedman and Mandelbaum, 2011) All societies not included in the trans-Atlantic civilization, are urged to carry out the modernization leap to global integration.
But while trying to analyze the actual social and political processes of a civil society’s construction, scientists and politicians are faced with several challenges.

One of them consists in the fact that the exercise of democracy involves the formation of modern civil society to limit the dominance of state over society. Democracy as the power of the people can be declared, specifying it in the constitution and electoral laws. Civil society is more difficult than simply declaring its existence. It needs to describe itself as the ability of a particular society to organize itself under a number of freedoms and ethical values, first of all, the notion of justice.

For this reason, civil society cannot be transferred from a different social environment, it must be based primarily on a society’s own culture. Research and practical implementation of this process in non-Western societies is strongly complicated by the identification of democracy and civil society with Western post-Christian civilization, with a liberal political culture. In relation to other civilizations, some authors claim the complete absence of civil society, or of its immaturity.

Muslim World versus Western Liberal Democratic Model as a Universal Civilizational Form of Social and Political Development

The onset of the post-communist era does not mean that the way the world declared the triumph of Western liberal democratic model as a universal civilizational form of social and political development will not call forth new enemies instead of defeated communism. And one of their possible opponents is not new, and as such was seen by European religious and scientific thought even before the emergence of Marxism. This is the Muslim world, which represents a different model – the eastern form of civilization. Many contemporary defenders of the Western values of “open society” identify the Muslim world with the world of Islamic fundamentalism and consider Islam as the embodiment of the foundations of a “closed society”.

Thus, considering the likely possibility of ideological and political opponents of democracy, Fukuyama calls Islam among those which, in his opinion, defeated liberal democracy in many Muslim countries, creating a serious threat to liberal practice, even in countries where Islam has not achieved direct political power. Describing Muslim society, he uses such generalized ideological stereotypes as “Islamic fundamentalism”, “fundamentalist state”, “totalitarian Islam”. (Fukuyama, 2007:89-90, 329)

Such an approach cannot help to find an answer to a question about the possibility of democracy and civil society in the societies belonging to other civilizations. Or its proponents can make practical conclusion about the need to democratize non-Western societies through the intervention of the West with a “soft” and “hard” power. Theoretical and practical technology of such intervention had already been worked out in world politics in the concepts of “new interventionism”, “failed states”, “forced democrati-
zation”, democratization of “the Greater Middle East”, notions of “global civil society” and “democratic empire”.

Russia as well as China, defending their state sovereignty and territorial integrity, do not support this tendency toward “forced democratization” of the world and never signed any international agreements on such issues. That is why Russia “does not participate in “the Great Modernization Project” proposed by the United States for a democratization of Muslim society or a creation of “another image of Islam”. This project is considered senseless and even dangerous”. (Malashenko, 2007:8) The same applies to the dramatic events of the “Arab Spring” of 2011. As Pyotr Stegniy writes, “even at the current – and apparently initial – stage of the Arab Spring the events in the region do not only reflect the free choice of the Arab nations in favor of democracy. They are also a byproduct of Western nations’ efforts to create instruments for global democratic transformation”. But this democratic transformation is being achieved at the expense of security. “On the whole, the impression is that the West is developing an inclination in the wake of the Arab Spring to link the notions of democracy and security and give democracy a priority in building a new, safer world, if not to place democracy above security. (Stegniy, 2012)

In other words, democracy can be considered theoretically and methodologically, examining objective conditions for the democratization of a society, by analyzing its basic characteristics, and on this basis predicting the progress of society to the desired condition. A different approach – pragmatic and constructivist – is most often used by statesmen and their spin doctors. For them, democratization is an urgent political task that requires urgent construction and institutionalization in a particular society or region. Almost the same as in the Middle Ages, the West was engaged in active work to transform the “wrong” Eastern societies by Christian missionary activities, colonialism, military and political, economic and cultural imperialism, the practice of the world proletarian revolution, and democratization.

The main properties of the civil society, taken without regard to their social nature, and expressing only its outward signs, cannot produce a real civic life activity in any model of institutionalization. However, in some countries, we observe a tendency to realize this pragmatic, constructivist approach to civil society, ignoring the importance of the first theoretical and methodological approach. Such a course of action most likely will lead to creation of a simulacrum of civil society and to discredit the very idea of this important institution of Western liberal-democratic society.

Three Main Areas of Research for Problems of Democracy and Civil Society Development in Russia

Discussion of specific civilizational forms of social development, and democracy in particular, attracts much attention from scholars. In Russia and in many non-Western countries, the development of civil society
is seen as an important element in strengthening the democratic principles of the functioning of society. With regard to Russia we can discern three main areas of research of problems of democracy and civil society development.

*The first area* focuses on the liberal-democratic model in which religion relates to the private lives of citizens as an important aspect of their individual civic consciousness. Study and practical implementation of this process in non-Western societies is strongly influenced by the identification of the institution of civil society with Western post-Christian civilization, with liberal political culture. In relation to the societies of other civilizations, some authors give an opinion on the complete absence of a civil society there or its underdevelopment (S. Huntington, E. Gellner).

Followers of this approach believe that liberal democracy is possible only in a secular society, excluding in this way (because of the archaic social development) Russia and Muslim societies from societies having a democratic perspective. S. Huntington recognizes that attempts to transfer patterns of development from one civilization to another are futile: modernization was separated from Westernization, and Westernization of non-Western societies does not happen. He recognizes the fallacy of belief in the universality of Western culture. “The main differences of political and economic development of different civilizations have their roots in the different cultures, S. Huntington writes, the reasons for the failure of democracy in most of the Muslim world is largely rooted in Islamic culture. Prospects for… economic and political development in the Orthodox countries are vague, the prospects of the Muslim countries are all bleak”. (Huntington, 2003: 26) This means the end of an era when the conflicts within the dominant Western ideology defined the situation in world politics, and the onset of a period of interaction with each other of different civilizations, which revived the religious doctrine and ideology.

Such Western ideas as individualism, liberalism, human rights, equality, freedom, rule of law, democracy, free markets, and secularism are not rooted in non-Western societies. There, instead of individualism, collectivism is cultivated, rather than liberal democracy – the rule of various forms of authoritarianism or limited forms of democracy. Traditional values are in practice (Confucian, Islamic, etc.). Islamization or Islamic revival, according to Huntington, is a product of the modernization process and demonstrates a real opportunity to use their own forms of peoples’ rule and of legal regulation of social relations. He cites the examples of Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, where Islamization led to the creation of Islamic social organizations. “In fact – he writes about Egypt of 1990s, – Islamist groups have created an Islamic “civil society” which is duplicated, and often exceeded, replaced an activity of often weak institutions of the secular civil society”. (Huntington, 2003: 166-167)
Representatives of the second attitude doubt the applicability of the model of Western democracy (as foreign, alien and dangerous) in Russia and insist on the need for the organization of society based on traditional values. Religion is thus often treated as a natural basis for civilian life.

The basic contradiction between the representatives of this trend is precisely the definition of what value can be regarded as traditional for Russian society: Christian; Christian and Islamic; Eurasian or secular traditions of democratic governance.

Determination of values depends on the preliminary decision concerning the specifics of Russian civilization in post-Soviet history. Islamic values are not recognized as traditional in the Russian society, nor are Christian values. Rarely is attention drawn to the long history of coexistence between Christianity and Islam in Russia and to the historical forms of the combination of Christian and Islamic elements of civil society. Recognition of this historical coexistence can be realized through the concept of a new form of Islam, suitable for the formation of civil society in a democratic Russia.

Such a proposal was made by S. Gradirovski, who suggested the idea of a Russian or “Russian culture Islam” as a phenomenon belonging to Russian, and Islamic cultures, including political culture. Perhaps the idea of S. Gradirovski, our Russian “anti-Huntington” has merit. He searches for the answer to the existence of a real problem – the lack of a common cultural space because of the “religious and cultural borderland” within Russia. He gives a positive outlook on the interaction of Christian and Muslim cultures in Russian society in the direction of the interpenetration of cultures, creating a space of mutual complementarity “between Russian culture, which has traditionally Orthodox roots, and Islamic culture – in a multi-Russia.” In a rather harsh manner, but quite rightly S. Gradirovski criticizes Russian society and government for shortcomings in this area: “The alienation of Muslims from many meanings of Russian statehood is easy to read, impassable incompetence and suspicion on the part of non-Muslims against Muslims is evident. But it is only by respecting the other side, and opening one’s own values, that it is possible to hold sufficiently hard and coherent dialogue.” (Gradirovsky, 2003)

In our opinion, we can and must deepen this critical approach. Yes, Russia’s history has had the experience of coexistence between Christians and Muslims during the ages, but the Muslim problem in the Imperial pre-revolutionary, Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia was not resolved and is still not resolved satisfactorily. (Pochta, 2010:171-188)

Of course, it is not resolved in the West, where the ideology of the Muslim countries is often identified with the world of Islamic fundamentalism. However, there is no society in the West, with a significant indigenous Muslim population. Thus, Russia’s decision about the integration of its own Muslim population is connected with the question of its survival as an integrated state, as well as the possibility of forming a democratic political system. Since 1991 this has taken place in the ongoing context of the
collapse of Soviet society and the formation of a new post-Soviet Russia, partially oriented on the Western economic and political values. At the same time, there is a revival of some social life characteristic of the pre-revolutionary Russian society. However, this society (Russian Empire) was in a serious crisis, which has been temporarily interrupted (for 74 years) or significantly modified by the construction of socialism in the USSR. Thus reviving the old Russia will reanimate its diseases.

Perhaps, as a whole in Russia, the processes of decay still dominates over the creative process. In these circumstances the Muslim problem tests the process of building a new Russia and accelerates the decay of the old, imperial Russia which is trying to revive. The Muslim perspective is not able to find a solution as long as Russia fails to make:

- a new civilizational self identification (is it Orthodox-Slavic, Eurasian or Western);
- an ethnic or national identification (is it Slavic or multiethnic society);
- a religious identification (is it an Orthodox or secular poly-confessional state with religions having equal rights and separated from the state);
- a state construction identification (is it a unitary state consisting of the provinces or a quasi federation consisting of national entities aspiring to sovereignty).

Analyzing the Islamic influence on Russia’s foreign policy Alexei Malashenko considers it to be based on the “premise that Russia is a multi-confessional (mainly Christian/Moslem) country, which predetermines its right to simultaneously exist in two different civilizations” (Malashenko, 2007)

But even when the traditional Islamic values are recognized in Russia, the Muslim civil society in Russia is mechanically equated with the existing Islamic regional, national and international organizations: religious organizations (spiritual offices, coordinating councils, Muslim ulema councils); educational institutions; youth and women’s organizations; Islamic funds.

Perhaps it is a Russian constructivist ideological response to the West, the desire to show that Islam too has democracy and civil society. Alexei Malashenko critically evaluates an existing idea that at the beginning of the 21 century the Muslim society in Tatarstan had worked out such a model of civil society which perspectives till now have not been realized in the Islamic countries. Nevertheless he agrees that Islamic society in Tatarstan as part of the Russian Empire has really gained experience in applying to religion ways of civil society construction. (Malashenko, 2007:42)

The third trend, in general, rejects the applicability of the liberal-democratic conception of civil society in the Russian society. In mild form it presents M. Shevchenko, believing that Russia could create its own model
of civil society. In this case, it will be able to avoid the social and political destabilization of society resulting from the introduction of an inappropriate classical liberal model. A Russian model will be based on the principle of a broad “social contract” that takes into account poly-ethnicity and religious pluralism in Russia. The achievement of the social contract is possible, in his opinion, at the level of religious communities. A state may be the guarantor of such agreements. (Shevchenko, 2002)

But the most prominent representative of this trend is A. Dugin. He believes that the Western mode of civil society is not and cannot be created theoretically and practically in Russia, because that society is not European, but Eurasian. Civil society was a product of the historical development “of Western European Roman-Germanic civilization, with a completely different logic.” This path formed the concept of individual responsibility of a citizen as an atomic individual, devoid of ethnic, religious, communal identity, and endowed with the highest legal status. This is the opposite of communitarian, the religious and collective identity of all the Russian peoples. Repeated attempts of the Russian reformers to impose on Russia civil society (from Peter the Great, through the Bolsheviks, to Yeltsin), or Westernization, led to disastrous consequences. However, the “collective identity – believes A. Dugin – continued during the whole of Russian statehood, transformed at different stages of historical development, but never disappeared.” At the present stage of history the forced creation of civil society would mean a loss of identity, dehistorization and denationalization of Russia and the subsequent disintegration of the federal state.

A. Dugin suggests that supporters of the construction of “civil society” might provoke the collapse of Russia. The complete opposite of “civil society” is a Eurasian Federalism, uniting politically and legally the “subjectivity of ethnic groups, nationalities, cultural and religious groups as “collective elements” of federalism, but at the same time, placing all the issues of the direction of territories under the jurisdiction of the “strategic center.” (Dugin, 2005; Dugin, 2001)

**Pragmatic Approach to Participation of the Muslim Population in Russia’s Democratic Development**

Leonid Syukiyanen does not share the first approach, but is close though not limited by the scope of the second and third approaches. He is more pragmatic and less categorical on the possibility of Russia’s democratic development.

In the opinion of Syukiyanen, Islam is not a foreign element in Russian history and culture. It is a religion and way of life for millions of Russians for centuries. The Islamic civilization has accumulated a vast legacy of forms of social regulation, including political and legal. Among them are those that can be used by the modern Russian state and society in a democratic society, including the desire for stability and moderation, for
loyalty to the government, for deliberation to reach a compromise in the conflict and to avoid harm to the consolidation of society and state.

Syukiyaynen not only offers the use of moral and political positive potential of Islam in the development of the Russian secular state and civil society institutions, but also Islamic law in the legislation of a number of subjects of the Russian Federation to regulate some relationship between the Muslims. Thus, he refuses the popular notion, that the politicization of religion is not typical for traditional Islam in Russia and it should be limited, as other denominations, by the sphere of charity and spiritual and moral education of the population. Islamic law is capable of creating a legal framework and serving as a criterion for the justice of the political activity of Muslims.

Syukiyaynen believes that with regard to Islam, the State must have long-term policies emanating from the clear principles and recognizing 1) the Islamic revival factor for stable development of the country, and 2) Islamic culture (including political and legal) as an important part of Russian society and state. Islamic values do not threaten the national interests and security of Russia, and represents an amount of its potential wealth. (Syukiyaynen, 2003)

Such a problem is of course difficult for Russia, as well as for any other non-Western state. It suggests a spread of democracy in the social groups that do not have the experience of liberal politics, interpreting politics with terms of religious culture and perceiving any Western ideas on politics and culture as a form of Westernization.

Perhaps only a counter-process of introducing the community of democratic values and institutions of civil society, including the specifically Islamic, can bring tangible results in the near future. We need maximum utilization of the political culture of democracy and forms characteristic of civilizations specific for non-Western societies.

Role of State and the Middle Class

For Russia in this respect, as in most Muslim societies, statism is a very important tradition. In modern Russia, the success of the democratization of society is directly linked with the degree of state involvement in this process. If Western experts measure the progress in the development of civil structures by the quantity of emerging non-governmental organizations, we have to note the extent to which the state is immersed in the process. (Solonin, 2005:419-420) And the state itself considers bearing the main responsibility for this task. Put aside is an individual who knows his/her rights, fighting for them, coming into civic associations to protect his/her rights, including protection from the state. Often we ignore the complex path taken by Western society in the development of relations between the state and citizens, including development of ideas about private property as one of the foundations of Western civilization. Thus, the perception of the nature of civil society is greatly influenced by the peculiarities of
national identity. Individuals are accustomed to be dependent and to require assistance from the state, rather than to develop, at their own risk a system of interdependencies of civil and social relations.

Lack of development of modern institutions of civil society in Russia, in addition to the reluctance of the state to create a strong competitor, has another reason. Every social structure must have some support in the face of particular social groups or strata. In the liberal model the foundation of civil society should be legally free and economically independent citizens – the middle class. In modern Russia, the basis of the existing social order is a narrow segment of the population connected to public administration, financial activities (usually speculative) and raw materials industries. Therefore, only the change of the current economic paradigm and the emergence of the middle class could lead to full-fledged civil society institutions. An even more complicated situation is found in the Muslim regions of Russia, where society is still largely traditional. We can take as an example the situation in the North Caucasus, where, in the opinion of Alexei Malashenko, civil society is most successfully represented by traditional institutions due to lack of effectiveness of state institutions and non-compliance with laws. This situation exacerbates the conflict between supporters of the secular state and the advocates of the Islamization of society and state. Unfortunately, the position of defenders of the secular state is vulnerable due to its inefficiency and corruption, and its failure to address key economic problems, including unemployment. (Malashenko, 2009)

On the process of a Russian civil society’s construction since the early 1990s there has been a big impact from the weakening of “federation” relations and the rise of regional elites, especially in the national republics. On the example of the republic of Dagestan we can conclude that in some regions there arose a model of civil society on the basis of regional political subcultures, including ethnic and religious political culture related to a pre-modern structure. In the 2000s, the main effect (inhibitory) on the civil society construction had the regional peculiarities of the mechanism of an initial accumulation of capital, the dominance of paternalistic relations in the social and economic spheres and insecurity of civil rights. There was also the influence of such peculiarities of political culture as the dominance of “parochial-subject elements” with elements of participation, because of the tribal social structure, jamaat (Islamic group) thinking, limited access of small ethnic groups to the real levers of power in the regions, the tough political and economic dependence of the subsidized regions of the central bodies authorities. In such difficult conditions, an independent political role of Islam is only possible in the future. Russian researchers do not rule out the possibility of civil society’s construction in Muslim regions on the basis of the principles of Islam and Muslim communities, taking into account traditionally established intra communal structures. However, the creation of civil society in these regions must be a compromise between finding a region in the legal space of the secular federal state, and between the orientation of the traditionally established intra-communal structures, including
religious ones. A huge disappointment for supporters of the Western liberal democratic model is that in the process of this complex interaction new democratic values do not connect with existing pre-modern values but are superimposed on them. As a result we witness deformation of both traditional and liberal-democratic value sets. (Emirov, 2006:7, 18-19)

The state will continue to play an important role in the creation of civil society in Russia. We can expect that the state at a certain stage of modernization of society will offer a unified model of civil society. But is it possible for Russia as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, polycivilizational society to have a single model of civil society? Perhaps because of this desire for unification a unified model of Soviet society suffered a setback in the long run. In this process, conflict will be inevitable between Unitarianist and Federalist trends in the development of post-Soviet Russia. Perhaps the democratic political system of our federal government can play a role in the development of civil society in contemporary Russia, where the will of the population of different regions will contribute to the creation of a number of models of civil society, taking into account the civic values in pre-secular, secular and post secular forms, the tradition of democracy, and the level of civic engagement and economic development.

Necessity of Transition from Modern to Postmodern Thinking in Order to Overcome Eurocentrism in Studies of Non-Western Societies

History shows that democracy and civil society cannot be transferred from a different social environment, they should grow based on their own culture. The Western oriented universalist approach is not conducive to finding the answer to the question of the possibility of democratic development in non-Western societies.

Overcoming Eurocentrism in studies of non-Western societies is not achievable within modernist thinking. Therefore, some of the ideas of postmodern philosophy, including the narrative methodology may be useful for this purpose. Postmodern discourse supposes civilizational multiplicity of the political modernity and political modernization process. (Kaya, 2004:35-57; Spohn, 2010:49-66)

What we call Eurocentrism, Peter O’Brien criticizes as “technocratic liberalism”. He points out that the European liberal tradition has rested on an idea of conversion to a common set of secular rationalist values. When it runs into a population that just won’t convert (such as Muslims), it reacts with hostility. Peter O’Brien proposes abandoning traditional liberalism which reject Islam as a system, and replacing it with a post-modern liberalism which accepts Islam coexisting with it and not considering it through a prism of arrogance. It presumes as insurmountable a narrative diversity where no single metaphysical world view can be dominant. (Evans, 2004)

One possible way out of this epistemological impasse may be the revision of Western oriented perception of non-Western societies through their deconstruction and searching for alternative positive stories, recog-
nizing the identity of both the Western and other civilizations. Postmodern thinking can facilitate the return of respect for the ideas about the uniqueness of different peoples and cultures and their religious traditions. Chris Hann wrote about this in relation to the issue of the universality of the Western concept of civil society: “We can, in some cases refer to the basic definition of civil society and use it for comparative analysis. But instead of looking all over the world for one embodiment of a Western model, we must be ready to leave this universal standard, and to understand that civil society is a moral community, a problem of responsibility, trust and cooperation, faced by all. In that sense, all human societies tend to make their version of a civil society or a civilization.” (Quoted from: Howard, 2009:74).

Conclusion

We can assume that from the two approaches to the development of humanity that we have shown it is Fukuyama’s approach and not Huntington’s that is correctly being implemented. World politics goes on in the context of the progressive character and the linearity of the political-economic development of world civilization, in which the West represents the highest form of development. The Western community exercises in non-Western countries, including Russia, the “crusade for freedom” and “campaign for democracy”, including the creation of the infrastructure of democracy, which are part of civil society institutions. The civilizational identity of all societies not included in the trans-Atlantic civilization is ignored. These societies are characterized as transient and are encouraged to carry out the leap of modernization to global integration.

Western oriented universalist approach is not conducive to finding a convincing answer to the question of the existence of civil society in non-Western societies. We need to use the civilizational approach, a historical analysis of the cultural contexts of the processes of modernization, the formation of a market economy, democratic political systems and civil society. It is also necessary to take into account the coexistence in the modern world of societies at different stages of social development. In particular, it is necessary to consider the possibility of the coexistence of several pre secular cultures (Islamic, Confucian) and of liberal democracy as a post secular phenomenon. The dialogue of cultures is possible primarily through the recognition of their significant specificity. Such a (postmodern) view of the history of society and culture can help to overcome the stereotypes (antithesis), expressible in opposition to the authoritarian democracy of the East to the West, faith and reason, traditionalism and modernism. In these circumstances it is possible to assume that democratic development takes many forms, since each culture is able to create its own model of democracy. Taking into account international experience, Russia still has to seek its own form of democracy, overcoming mechanically borrowed foreign
forms which are a simulacrum of the liberal-democratic political system of society.

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CHAPTER XVII

CIVIC DIGNITY AND THE ETHNIC UMBILICAL CORD OF HISTORY

PYOTR K. GRECHKO

An old truth says: to know means to distinguish or to discern. Let us follow this truth. As is seen from the very title of this paper, the basic distinction of my analysis is between homo ethnikos and homo civicus. But to reach it as a conclusion it is necessary to go through many other distinctions with which I will deal.

The Terms: Ethnos and Ethnicity: It is important to distinguish between ethnos and ethnicity. Sometimes they are equated or used interchangeably, but it is more productive to differentiate them. Ethnos is Gemeinschaft (= community), i.e., a historically established association of people having a common (real or mythical) origin, sharing a common culture (values, beliefs, traditions, customs, etc.) and perceiving themselves as a distinct unity with a dignity of its own. In some cases “a shared feeling of peoplehood” (Milton M. Gordon) is decisive. In this connection I disagree with those authors who define ethnos in natural or biological terms. According to Valery Solovey, for example, “ethnos is an essentially biological group of social beings” (Solovey, 2005:52). In particular, “Russianness (Russkost’) is not culture, not religion, not language, not identity (self-consciousness). Rather, Russianness is in the blood as a carrier of social instincts, perception and action.” (Solovey, 2005:306)

Evidently, ethnos is supposed to have some physical dimensions. It is internally associated with geography and territory (hence such a concept as motherland or historic land), its members are living individuals as well. However, the physical and biological traits of ethnos are superficial. Moreover, there are special concepts for expressing such traits in human history—geographical environment, population, race, masculinity/femininity, and so on. Moreover, the socio-cultural and physical characteristics have been intertwined. The most profound roots of ethnos are social-cultural rather than natural-biological. The latter is considered to be a substratum of the former. As an entity ethnos is historia datum, it has been given, it simply exists. There is nothing to argue with in this respect.

A different situation is with ethnicity, its historical existence is not so univocal. Ethnicity is not the sum total of characteristic features of ethnos, as is usually represented, but some primordial definiteness of the given ethnic community that becomes established as a basis for its way of life, private and public behavior. The main conceptual nerve of the offered definition is primordiality. What is it? From general dictionaries (such as
Oxford, Webster’s) we learn that “primordial” means existing from the very beginning, primitive, primary, rudimentary. In the majority of ethnoses known to me all these characteristics are fixed with full definiteness. But what to do when ethnos is socially constructed, i.e., begins with a purely mythological or ideological narrative? Indeed, there is no history as such without a socially constructivist element. Constructivism of various kinds is a creative investment into any human activity. For this reason, however, the quality of historical (social) reality, i.e., its ontological solidness and elasticity, does not suffer at all.

It is appropriate in this respect to distinguish between “physically natural” and “humanely natural”. According to F. Engels’ fair remark, a normal (read: natural) existence or state of man “is one appropriate to his consciousness, one that has to be created by himself” (Engels, 1987:476). The naturalness of human establishments tends to increase in the process of their historical habitualization. This tendency was perfectly depicted by Jill Freedman and Gene Combs in their example of imaginary society: “For the children of the founding generation, ‘This is how we decided…’ will be more like ‘This is how our elders do it’, and by the third generation it will be ‘This is how it is done’ […] By the fourth generation of our imaginary society, ‘This is how it is done’ will have become ‘This is the way the world is; this is reality.’” (Freedman, 1996:23). We face a tradition that is constructed intentionally.

Primordiality in our case can be interpreted widely, diachronously as well as synchronously. It is not only the past, something linked to a former time, it is also the present. All depends on the quality of one’s value orientation. It is possible to live chronologically in the present and socio-historically in the past. Today’s situation is not like the one described by William Shakespeare in his Hamlet: The time is out of joint. Rather we face a heap of times laid upon one another and interrelated in a very complicated dialectics. In other words, contemporaneity is a temporally multilayered world. This allows for the existence side by side of very different socio-historical times – archaic, premodern, modern, postmodern (contemporary). Homo ethnikos is the person, male or female, who is looking back. His/her value orientations can be defined as traditionalist and absolutist. There is no need to prove that all traditionalist entities are now out of date; the same is true of absolutist traits which are obsolete today. For homo ethnikos people are divided into Us (“my people”) and Them (“not of our people”, aliens). Of course, we are more highly weighted than are Them, my people acquires a plus sign while aliens come with a minus sign. Homo civicus is capable of discerning Aliens and even Foes, but he/she is more inclined to see around himself simply Others, people, and not nationals. Belonging to an ethnic group maintains the archaic, premodern condition, essentially restricting the freedom and individuality of a person. It gravitates towards homogeneity and like-mindedness. There is no room for individual choice, as the ethnic membership depends on the origin and primary socialization. It is important to note that today individualization becomes a more and more a representa-
tive trend. As such, individualization turns out to be a reverse side of the “struggle for recognition” to which I will turn below.

Thus the ethnic sources of human life cannot be very old, but in any way, the attitude towards them is always already traditional, even traditionalist, that is, uncritical, spontaneous, having a form of a peculiar social instinct. This case may be generalized into some non-critical confidence in history (in the past) and its crucial importance for developing the present. Ethnicity interpreted in such a way coincides with ethnicism.

As for civic dignity, its socio-historical horizons are much wider than those of ethnicity. It demonstrates something generic or of universal worth to any modern and contemporary individual. Here we need another distinction, a distinction between citizenship and citizenry. Citizenship expresses some officially juridical relation of a person to a state, a state of belonging to a state: residing there, having an allegiance to a state, legal rights, naturalization, etc. Such a belonging is identified rather simply – by a passport or other identity documents. Whereas citizenry includes citizenship in its meaning but goes farther and, what is more important, deeper than that and requires something else. Threads of belonging in this case lead not to a state but to a consciousness in the widest sense of the word. So in contrast with citizenship denoting the condition of being a citizen of a particular State, citizenry and its ideological expression – civicism – stand for a normative value system with which the individual identifies himself/herself. Citizenry deals with those factors and circumstances that convert citizens into co-citizens (or fellow citizens). Co-citizens form a wide community which may be called a nation. In the long run, a nation stands on common or shared value orientations. As demonstrated by Max Weber, value determinism is the most profound and effective in society’s development. In other words, all the orders and disorders of our life are eventually rooted in our mentality.

In the developed historical cases a nation and a state constitute one interconnected civic-political complex, known as a nation-state. In the underdeveloped or developing cases, on the contrary, a state can exist without a nation. In this case the national is not distinguished from the state-operated or the governmental, to be more precise the bureaucratic. Thus, for example, in Russia we speak of national interests and national security, but in reality, since there is no nation as a political community of people, we speak of statist interests and statist security. The statist approach here presupposes that sovereignty is vested not in the nation or the people but in the state.

From the national point of view all the persons are first of all humans and only then representatives of various ethnic groups, religions, social classes, etc. Civic dignity tells us that “all men are created equal”; it requires seeing in each person an image and likeness of humanity or a Person with a capital letter. In the case of homo civicus an attitude towards norma-

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1 For further consideration of this idea see (Nam-In, 2002:165-183).
tive-evaluative foundations of life is reflexive and consensually relativistic. In other words, values and norms here rest on the power of their being shared at least by the majority of people. The causal potentiality of such a power can be qualified as intersubjective. Here the inter-prefix stands for mutual understanding between participants in the communication. Without being objective, the intersubjective definiteness of communicative understanding is nevertheless sufficient for a productive and successful human life. The intersubjective (factually sharing) nature of values definitely corresponds to the ontological status of the human being proper. Consider, for example, the phenomenon of love. There is no place for it in nature; love is exclusively a property of human beings. And how does it exist? As one popular singer sings, “Love is just what it seems”. As is accurately pointed out: love, like many other truly human products, ontologically has a seeming nature. For this reason, however, love for us is no less real and convincing. Without it there would not be a person as such. It is seemingness that transforms love into a human phenomenon.

Ethnic and Civil Values. As a rule, the ethnic is supported by the religious; these phenomena usually work in tandem. The ethnic value orientations become thereby more convincing and imperative, indeed sacred. Civil values are by definition secular formations. In this regard they stand in opposition to religion. But an in-depth analysis shows that civil values are not without a sense of sacredness, too. Civil sacredness is very specific, anthropocentric and not theocentric. By human definiteness of civil sacredness I understand a selfless devotion of ordinary people to the ideal of Person, publicly divided today into human rights and freedoms. Such a devotion may be so deep and sincere that people are ready to die for the corresponding attitudes, for those values and commitments which are simultaneously elevated and basic, or better yet, basic precisely because they are elevated.

The comparison between ethnic and civil values raises a question of the validity of this procedure itself. Values by definition are original, inimitable, unique, and in this sense self-sufficient. They cannot be proven or refuted, but are simply chosen and preferred or, as in case of ethnicity, accepted through tradition, imbibed with one’s mother’s milk. They look like some inherent life givens, axioms or postulates of our being. So, indeed, values in themselves cannot be compared. But in reality this “in themselves” does not exist because everything exists in the system and each unit of being is contextually immersed and influenced at least dispositionally². Moreover, we are now witnessing the blurring or permeability of all boundaries, limits, lines, etc. The outside essentially disappears; the internal and the external interpenetrate each other. The contextual immersion of values shows how they work, what they really improve in the human

² On dispositional determinism see (Grechko, 2012:99-111).
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situations, in what measure they are productive, in Francis Bacon’s words, fructifera, not only lucifera. It is also appropriate to recall here the Biblical saying: “Ye shall know them by their fruits” (Matthew 7:16). Generally, we are talking about inadmissibility of a separation of culture from its technological implementation – namely, civilization. It is difficult, if not impossible, to compare, let’s say, values that guide the residents of North and South Korea, but on the whole we can compare these two countries. The results of such a comparison will undoubtedly be relevant in the world of values. Taken in their civilizational contexts, ethnic and civil cultures exhibit different historical productivities: the former wanders along the closed circles of being, while the latter rapidly gallops ahead paving a road to the future with its successes and achievements. Here we have outstanding accomplishments, brilliant discoveries, a comfortable infrastructure of life, and the present transition to “postmaterialist values” (Ronald F. Inglehart).

The value uniqueness implies one more interesting question – that concerning the equality of all cultural values. We usually select and estimate as good or bad the material values, commodities and services. It is believed we have no right and should not treat cultural values in a similar way. Doing so, we allegedly unify and thereby annihilate them. This does not seem to be correct. Values can and should be placed within the process frame of evaluation with its distinctive beginning and end. At the start all values are really equal, they may be offered or exposed without any restrictions with their claims and ambitions. But then they are condemned to engage in an open competition with other values for their place. This is quite tough, but very effective. Competition in the social world is a civilized form of the survival struggle. Without this competition mechanism society’s development would be impossible, radical changes would be complicated, the social life itself would be swamped with nonviable things. The interaction between values and especially their systems must be freed not from competition but in competition from racialism, chauvinism, xenophobia, religious fanaticism and extremism, and other unfree and unfair struggles. Under conditions of competition someone manages to do more and better and, as a result, is sure to win. It means that at the end of our evaluating process there is not equality, but instead the inequality of human freedom and its creative products prevails. The most successful actors become winners or leaders showing a possible future for all the rest. Thus, the end situation may be qualified in terms of agonistic justice – to use the Greek word – or even agonistic egalitarianism.

Homo Civicus and Homo Ethnikos: A Comparison. Returning to our basic distinction, I would like to stress that homo civicus is historically more advanced than homo ethnikos. First of all, this is due to the growth of what Francis Fukuyama, following G.W.F. Hegel and A. Kojève, calls the “struggle for recognition” arising out of some “innate sense of justice”. As Fukuyama points out, the individual “wants not only to be recognized by other men, but to be recognized as a man” (Fukuyama, 1992:147). Taking
into account this historical tendency, we can specify civic dignity as human dignity. Human dignity includes not only his/her sense of self-worth and dignity, but all the spheres of human qualities proper. Human dignity is a kind of “the care of the self”; to insist upon being treated with proper respect is to develop the human in a human being, overcoming or reducing the animal in him/her. The tendency towards enhancing human dignity is constituted by the process of transition from the “state of Gemeinschaft”, on which ethnics and ethnicity ultimately are based, and to the “state of Gesellschaft”, or in more general terms, from evolution to history.

Factual, or from the standpoint of a single individual, this transition is reasonably treated in communicative terms. In this framing context human dignity appears to grow out of communication between people. As Karl Marx has put it, “…man first sees and recognizes himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he stands in his Pauline personality, becomes to Peter the type of the genus homo” (Marx, 1956:54). It is very important to stress here the generic, or human relation, between Peter and Paul. Peter sees in Paul namely a man in the guise of an individual, that is, a representative of Homo. Phenomenally, a mirror of the Other may look like a direct face-to-face encounter, but essentially or ultimately it is a man-to-man relationship. Dignity is at root a generic definiteness of man, where humanity and citizenry coincide. For a long time people developed in specific forms (“species”) of their own. This ultimately was determined by immaturity of material and other conditions of their life. Ethnicity, along with estateness, classness, etc., is related to such narrow historical forms. Being a generic phenomenon, human or civil dignity is a post-ethnic reality. Of course, we can speak of ethnic dignity, but with one reservation – that it is an embryonic form of human dignity. At some stage the ethnic and human/civil dignities practically coincided with each other. But the farther they emerge from their common origin the more they become divergent. Today they are opposites, their struggle in many cases undermines the public peace. Homo civicus looks like a person awaken from his/her ethnic slumber.

Ethnicity and ethnocentricism in our days are a condition of dependence and historical maturing of any person. They stand in the way of development and progress, preferring to walk along cyclic life circles. Perhaps this way of life is safe, but lacks any drive. In contrast, citizenry and civitism are the embodiments of historical dynamic and life productivity. As distinct from homo ethnikes exposed to the inertia of the past, homo civicus rushes forward, storms the future, reasonably believing to find there (most probably to construct) the meaning of life. Of course, he/she takes risks, but as is said, nothing ventured, nothing gained. Luck as both materially active and ideally cognitive is not something foreign to history. At any rate, opportunities emerge from a vita activa.

Both ethnocentricism and civicism imply a “social glue”, i.e., uniting people into some whole – powerful, centralized and hierarchical in the case
of ethnicism and soft, subsidiary and pluralistic in the case of civitism. The
ethic community literally fastens the individual to its integral interests,
whereas the civic community opens for him/her a perspective of self-realiza-
tion and personal growth. The coherent context for such a perspective is a
reflexive way of life. It provides us with the most important – intellectual,
mental – resources, and first of all such competences as a culture of question-
ing, analytically evaluating criticism, imagination, flexibility, and commu-
nicativeness.

Conclusion. From what I have said above one can easily conclude
that my interpretation of ethnicity is obviously negative. But that does not
mean that I call for its forced overcoming, cancellation, or abolition. I
simply urge not ‘to play the ethnic card’, not to artificially enhance ethnic
sensibilities, and what is most important, not to dress ethnicity in political
clothes, that is, not to design it in a statist way, not to demand coincidence
of the political frontiers with ethnogeographical dotted lines. A cultural-
political autonomy is the real alternative to all these encroachments. Once
again, ethnicity pulls us towards the past and consequently is at odds with
social progress which is always directed to the future and looking there for
the solution of today’s problems. A distinctive dimension of a contemporary
person should be not “What is your race-tribe?”, but “What really are you
able to do?” Otherwise ethnicity threatens to degenerate into “ethnocra-
tism”, that is a political dominance of the so-called titular nation. This is a
well-known racism, only in its softer, politically correct form.

Like church and churchism in a secular society, ethnicity and ethno-
centricism should be separated from the state. When applied to contem-
poraneity they should be seen as something folkloristic and infrastructural,
an ornament and not an essential, much less political, determinant of life.
Ethnicity is good as a supplement rather than a replacement of public con-
sensus on basic values of coexistence. Such is a challenge of our time, a
requirement of the course of global changes. Today it is very important to
learn to live together without confrontational divisions and oppositions.

In sum, there is nothing we can or should do about ethnicity, except
let it quietly evolve…to its historical end. But it is necessary to work con-
stantly over citizenry, civic virtues, and national structures erected on their
basis, developing, deepening and increasing their transformative potential.
Along this way we have full opportunities enter into a stable and safe social
development towards a common and pluralistically universal future.

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The modern period of profound transformations that covers all areas and structural levels of modern society at the global level and that is defined as turbulent time or post-modern ("second modernity" in another version) is comparable to a civilizational shift experienced by Europe in seventeenth century – the period of the birth of modernity.

The increased interest and attention of researchers, politicians and the public in a civil society at the present time can be explained by the logic of updating institutional forms and cognitive schemes through reflexively rethinking it. According to N. Luhman, “The question of what happens to the historically proven, but now obsolete forms returns us to the usual, for us, debate about postmodernism. These forms are used as material. You could even say, as an environment for the construction of new forms, which are obtained by recombination.” (Luman, 2009) Throughout the history of modern social science morphological structure and functional characteristics of civil society were in various ways articulated in the scientific and political discourse: in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries civil society was seen as the foundation of the liberal project for reformation of society and as a social substratum of the liberal constitutional state, that generates the civic identity of modernizing Europe. In the twentieth century, civil society is more often considered as a synonym for a democratic society and as a critical opponent of the state, legitimizing protests and movements (both conservative and reformist). At the end of the twentieth century there appear the concepts which consider civil society as a hypothetical basis, and an agent for creating an international community, organized on the principle of co-operation on the basis of horizontal legal relationships.

The novelty of civil society studies in the philosophical and legal doctrines of modern times (as compared with antiquity and the Middle Ages) consisted in the analytical distinction between the state and the social stratum. The term “civil society” since the seventeenth century is applied to institutions operating independently from the state. At the same time, civil society (as the nation-state) was seen as a social artifact – it was the result of spontaneous activity of individuals who have signed an agreement with each other in order to establish a new institutional order based on the principles of freedom, justice and equality for maintaining civil peace and the achieving economic prosperity.

The narrative of the “social contract” and “natural law”, that is present in all the philosophical and legal doctrines of civil society in
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was a generalized expression of shifts in the regulatory paradigm, legitimizing a new institutional order and new principles of structuring civilized space, firstly in Western Europe, and later in North America.

The metaphor of “social contract” which philosophers of modern times used explaining the emergence of nation-states, reflected the realities of the European history of the seventeenth century – the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia, that laid the legal and regulatory framework for new forms and principles of governance – national sovereignty, separation of powers, popular representation, constitutionalism, the institution of citizenship. Desacralization of political power and the widespread adoption of the principles of “natural law” promoted the emergence of new forms of community life – separation of the public sphere, the autonomy of economic activity, the emergence of new social groups – classes and new social communities-nations, based on civic solidarity.

Simultaneously, the emergence of civil society in the Post-Medieval Europe legitimated the process of political centralization and concentration of power resources in the hands of the supreme power. By civility was understood not only legal order of social community forms, but the compulsion by force to execution of that.

Semantic proximity of Greek terms politeia, koinonia politike (as polity, politics – italics) and Latin civil, civility (as citizenship, civil, civilian) is not accidental.

Refferent of civil society in the works of early-contemporary philosophers generally was the society of the Enlightenment, but the fact of inserting civil society into national and state boundaries in the conditions of multi-vector and multivariate nature of nation-state construction contributed to the emergence of different interpretations of the phenomenon of civil society and the multiplicity of interpretations of the nature of the evolution of the relationship between civil society and the state.

Some authors have drawn attention to the existence of causal relations and genetic continuity between civil society and the state: political power is constituted by civil society, but then the government takes the dominant position with respect to civil society, (T. Gobbs, J. Locke). In the works of others – civil society was considered as a relatively autonomous structural unit (A. Smith, T. Peyn), as a special “non-state sphere” of society (A. de Tocqueville) or the social context of the existence of the state (C.de S. Montesquieu, J-J. Rousseau, A.N. Condorse). In G.V.F. Hegel’s works, it occupied an intermediate position between family and state, then in his later works – was absorbed by the universal state. K. Marx saw civil society as synonymous to the bourgeois, and therefore, in historically transient form of development.

Later in the Western neo-Marxist and left-radical ideology there remained a negative-critical attitude towards civil society as the epiphenomenon of the bourgeois, to “a false totality” of capitalist society opposed to “the true totality” of the communist society. However according to the
liberal-oriented doctrines civil society was seen as an unquestionable achievement of civilization and the basis of economic and political modernization of society.

Despite the existing differences in the ways of civil society considerations, and in the assessments of its historical perspective, the end of the nineteenth century in social theory emerged a sustainable notion of civil society, as desacralized space of social activity of individuals and voluntary associations and organizations, protected from direct intervention and arbitrary regulation by public authorities, with the condition of giving the monopoly on the use of violence in domestic and foreign policy to the state as an institution of supreme power.

In the twentieth century the theory of civil society has evolved; in addition to civil rights to the institution of citizenship was included a body of political and social rights. If civil rights were based on the abolition of privileges and observance of the natural human rights, ensuring the equality of all citizens before the law irrespective of their status, then the political rights presented to all citizens the opportunity to participate in the formation of government and were provided a democratic electoral system. Social rights should have compensated the least successful, or the least provided groups of citizens the costs associated with inequality in income distribution and access to material goods, administrative, cultural and symbolic resources. In accordance with the principle of basic fairness, formulated by J. Rawls, inequality was allowed only on condition that it was beneficial to all, and also that all the positions and social status to which it relates are available to all (Rawls, 2010).

The realization of rights of each complex was based on different regulatory mechanisms – from free market mechanisms and economic coercion to the methods of state regulation and administrative non-economic impacts. The difference between national models of reconciliation and to maintenance of balance of mutually pointed working mechanisms was conditioned by national characteristics of institutional development, history and cultural traditions, triggering the emergence of a variety of forms of citizenship and the development of relations between the state and civil society, that still exists.

In some cases, as in Britain and the United States, civil rights are in priority and the society itself produces rules of social life in the competitive struggle of various social forces, but the state acts as a “night watchdog”. In other cases – as in France or Germany, political and social rights are more significant, and the state is perceived as authority, that is placed over society and performs the paternalistic functions of “head-state”.

By the mid-twentieth century with the increasing complexity of international relations (the entry into the era of the bipolar world), the relationship between state and civil society are undergoing significant changes. In countries that have adopted the model of liberal development, virtually everywhere there is a tendency for the evolution of the liberal state into one that is social actively involved in the regulation of the economy. This
ensures not only the protection of civilians, but also their political and social rights. At the same time there is a threat of absorption of some of the main functions of civil society by government structures (the process of “etatization”) and the substitution of civil structures by corporate ones (the phenomenon of “tripartism”).

During this period the focus of philosophical and political discourse has shifted from the problems of civil society to the issues of democracy (direct democracy, representative democracy, economic democracy) and to the development of democratic systems. In political and sociological theories of the twentieth century philosophical, anthropological and institutional approaches are gradually replaced by system-structural and systemic-functional approaches (T. Parsons, D. Iston, N. Luman). (Parsons, 1997; Luman, 2006)

Semantically equivalent to the term “civil society” is the term “societal community” that is free of the normative-value connotations of liberal ideology. Modern society is seen as an organically growing, complex and differentiated system in which the integrating role belongs to the “societal subsystem.” “Societal community” as an interpenetrating network of collective identities: family units, churches, non-governmental agencies, associations. This forms a societal subsystem and is found in complex interaction with structural elements of the economic and political subsystems. In the political analysis societal community is correlated not only with the state as an autonomous agent of political relations, but with the political system, that is represented by relatively distinct structures of the administrative, legislative and judicial branches. As a result, the study of civil society turned out to be fragmented to specific subject areas, such as political participation, electoral behavior, party systems, social movements, public opinion, etc.

Civic associations, which organize social life and political participation – representation of interests – base their activities on democratic principles of liberty, equality, justice and meritocratic principles of selection between leaders that provides them an advantage in comparison with the state authorities, based on the principles of the bureaucratic hierarchy while keeping the hierarchical order of relationships with an increase of complexity caused by the specialization and differentiation of modern society, democratic political systems through the aggregation of interests ensure a balanced distribution of power between government, economic organizations and professional associations. Ideally, in a modern democracy, political power is in a dispersed way distributed among all individuals, thus eliminating the polarization of the individuals between those who have full power and those who have been eliminated from it.

The term democratic society, whose main features are the existence of a multiparty parliamentary system, freedom of personality and diversity of ownership, the rule of law is more often considered synonymous with the term civil society. Democracy as a civilizing structure provides real deter-
The interest in civil society goes back to the protest movements of the late 70s-80s. Student riots in 1968 in Western Europe, anti-war and environmental movement, and later gender and ethno-confessional movements, that were named new social movements were formed within civil society and focused on the perception of the constitution as an open project of a just society and the normative content of its rights required public discussion and interpretation. The activism and the radical character of the strategy of new social movements was appearing in addressing the problems important for all society, in the ability of handling new information and presenting a new interpretation of deep-rooted values and offering innovative solutions to existing problems. By advancing new proposals, initiatives and requirements, they pressed for a shift of public opinion, while influencing the formation of the public will by exerting pressure on parliaments, courts and the administration.

The return to the term civil society and to the philosophical and sociological analysis of modernity was contributed by the works of Jurgen Habermas, as he attempted to reconstruct the concept of civil society (Habermas, 1996; 2000) occupying the mediating position between the economy and the state. At the same time civil society was seen as the sphere of social interaction which includes the closest contacts (family), formal and informal associations (voluntary organizations), social movements and various forms of public communication.

In the structuring of civil society an important role belongs to public discourse as unfolding in the public sphere. Since, according to the dominant legal paradigm, modern institutional order is legitimized by civil self-determination, the citizens must have the ability to perceive themselves as both the authors of the law, and their subjects. The institutionalization of both the public sphere and public discourse are seen as essential aspects of the structuring of civil society.

Through public discourse controversial issues of public life are specified. The arguments and claims made by the participants of communication, become the subject of debate and criticism, in order after an exchange of arguments to be accepted or rejected. Rational argumentation, elaborated after an open confrontation of different opinions, free from the pressure of the state institutions or authorities, tests the powers of existing rules, specifies social problems and promotes achieving harmony on the basis of mutual understanding. Thus the discourse participants have the opportunity to make a conscious “correction” of norms and values in order to bring social institutions into accord with the changing requirements of the era but without resorting to violence.

The public sphere – culturally – is the symbolic space, in which is public discourse. It is characterized by Habermas as an “intersubjectively shared space of speech situation”, that is represented by the clubs, arenas of public debates and forums. Modern civil society with the help of discursive
forms of self-construction and self-mobilization of the public is able to stabilize the intensity of social differentiation and to transform dissatisfaction and protests in a constructive direction of reflexive deliberative politics.

Assuming that the concept of civil society, properly differentiated from economic and political structures can form the core of the critical political and social theory, Habermas and his followers (Arato, Cohen, 2003; Gutmann, Thompson, 1996; Dryzek, 2000; Thompson, 2008:497–520) set for themselves the task of creating a social theory of the average level, which would allow them to test the degree of real autonomy and the integrity of civil society.

According to the index of determining the quality of discourse – Discourse Quality Index (DQI) – public discourse can be distinguished from other forms of communication by the following criteria: the level of participation, forms of participation in the discourse (whether participants are limited to only putting forward claims or they justify their positions with arguments and how serious this study is); attitudes of participants and content of claims, grade of service (whether the requirements are focused on the implementation of the principles of the common good or the principles of coordination of group interests); degree of respect shown to the groups participating in the discourse (from the recognition of equality to a neutral or discriminatory attitude); degree of attention to the demands put forward by the opposing teams (from the recognition of the importance to a neutral or ignoring attitude) the degree of willingness to consider counter-arguments put forward (whether participants insist on the approval of their position as set out in the extended requirement, or they are willing to consider alternative or intermediate proposals). During the practical use of this index were noted both positive aspects of evaluation the quality of discussion and the difficulty of measuring such variables as “respect of the opponent,” or in the definition of “rationality” of the demands made. (Mansbridge, 2010:64–100; Steenbergen, Bachtiger, Sporndli and Steiner, 2003:21-48)

Leftist-minded critics (Mouffe, Wittgenstein, 2003; Young, 2002), however, noted that the terms of discourse are hard to implement in practice. Firstly, because the design – as well as reproduction of collective (especially civil) identities always contains political power component that gives with inevitability an asymmetrical and confrontational nature of communication unfolding in the public space. Secondly, because the discourse is never emotionally neutral and more often we are faced with many discourses, terminated by means of a hegemonic articulation, i.e., by excluding unwanted discourses: some participants define the rules of the game, while others accept these rules, and some are excluded from that. In order to avoid totalitarian establishment of a democratic identity between rulers and ruled, Sh. Muff, for example, offers a model of agonistic democracy. Under the agonistic democracy she understands the creation of conditions for the institutionalization of conflict discourses, given the
multiplicity of destinations of possible development of democratic rules. Since the existence of a single best more “rational” way to follow these rules is impossible, agonistic democracy in the first place is oriented to the inevitable conflict of interpretations of fundamental principles – freedom, equality and justice. The conflict of interpretations that is expressed in the form of a debate should be the norm in a democratic society, seeking to avoid a head-on collision of opposing forces. For example, the disputed interpretation of citizenship in liberal, social democratic, neo-conservative ideologies. (Mouffe, 2010)

The era of global transformations, which the modern world entered at the end of the twentieth century has contributed to the increase of the interest of scientists and politicians’ in civil society as a social phenomenon and as a theoretical concept. To a large extent the increased activity of international economic and political organizations, including non-governmental associations contributed to this. Transnational networks which dominated almost in all spheres of human activity, had a major impact on the change of configuration of domestic and international space, drawing attention to the problem of effective global control exercised by a network of international organizations operating at different levels and the problem of perspectives of “global civil society” constitution. (Habermas, 2008; Smith, 1998)

Global civil society was considered (1) as a special form of social interaction, which is institutionalized by law and subjective rights and (2) as a special form of the structuring of social space in its aim of establishing “cosmopolitan democracy” and the transformation of the world system of nation-states into the international community organized by the principle of cooperation on the basis of horizontal legal relationships.

It was assumed that the structure of global civil society, based on transnational and regional international organizations will contribute to greater transparency of governmental activities at national, regional and global levels, and will serve as a deterrent of the negative trends of globalization (de-politicization and super control) helping to create a “legal order of international citizenship.” It was believed that non-governmental organizations, which control the movement of significant information and financial resources, are able to influence the political decision-making processes at the global level and to lay the foundation for the global institutionalization of a public, that is more and more aware of their planetary solidarity and responsibility.

However, in the beginning of the third millennium – “age of 2000” (inspired by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the economic crisis in 2008, etc.) in studies of the negative aspects of globalization, more and more attention is being given to the analysis of risks and threats associated with the weakening of the role of the national state, “depoliticization of Polity”, “bad” civil society. (Chambers, Kopstein, 2001:285) Here “bad” civil society means a society in which illiberal and antidemocratic tendencies not only dominate, but play a leading role as groups that preach hatred and fanaticism, whose notions, declarations, ideology or platform exclude
the possibility of tolerance and critical attitude to the issues that need moral and legal assessment, despite the existence of alternative points of view in society. Apathy and self-isolation of civil associations, the destruction of communicative space, the unwillingness to consider political opponents as equal political partners, are seen as warning signs of potentially destructive to civil society and civic culture.

Since the late 1990’s the concept of “corporate citizenship” as the development of the doctrine of social responsibility of business and a search for ways to reduce social tensions are spreading. Corporate citizenship is based on the development of constructive relations with the so-called stakeholders (stakeholders) – citizens, communities and organizations, which in one way or another are involved in the activities of corporations. Along with the staff of companies stakeholders also include local communities, non-profit organizations and authorities whom the corporation is facing in the course of solving its industrial, commercial and political objectives, guided by a strategy of integration into civil society. According to S. Peregudov (Peregudov, 2006) in Western countries and on the global level anti-corporate public relations and power pressure from the non-profit organizations stimulated a search for compromise solutions by corporations that demonstrate their civic responsibility, and contributed to the adoption of “reformist” strategy by the non-profit organizations.

The crisis of 2008, initiating the restructuring of relations in the world and in its parts (macro regions) again drew attention to the importance of national markets, national economies and government regulation. There is a tendency to reject the idea of post-state or global civil society, at least, as an urgent task of the moment. Especially as the processes accompanying globalization, in particular, the aspiration of some countries to extend their economic and military influence on other countries, not taking into account the factors of civilization, has shown itself in the emergence of new centers of power and in intensifying the struggle to create the most attractive appearance of the state–society relation, which should become the standard of the international community. In this struggle, the normative image of the civil society plays the role of one of the elements of the PR Company at the level of international relations. As a result, the normative ideological image of the civil society, inspired “velvet” and “colored” revolutions in Eastern Europe and the republics of post-Soviet satelites and the Middle East, were cut to the patterns of the European liberal-democratic model of the mid-twentieth century and not always effective solutions for internal problems of social reformation.

The variety of conceptual interpretations of civil society developed “to the East and West of the Elbe”, and differences in the articulation of its most important characteristics – individual freedom and communitarian solidarity – drew attention. A. Seligman in the publication “Civil society as idea and ideal” (Chamber, Kymlicka, 2002:13) created space for continuing critical public, and professional, political and theoretical discourses. He
aimed at identifying points of “intersections between civilizations” and at the formation of effective public policy, and a mobilizing of civil society.

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CHAPTER XIX

“THE NATURAL RATE OF EDUCATION”
AS A FACTOR OF POLITICAL STABILITY
AND AN EMERGING GLOBAL CHALLENGE

VLADIMIR IVANOV

This article will want to stress the multidimensional character of the influence of the system of tertiary education on the political and economic processes. Some of these effects could be disguised and subdued to their less evident logic.

We saw that the protestors from Arab countries (as well as current Russian protest movements) mostly consist of relatively young and educated individuals. This explains the relatively bloodless character of modern revolutions that can be classified as revolutions of possibilities and revolutions of expectations.

This study will present the hypothesis about the increasing level of influence of the system of tertiary education on the stability of political regimes in many modern countries. To reveal the mechanism of such influence the concept “the natural rate of education” reflects an optimal balance between the labor market and the educational system from the perspective of avoidance of social protests and instability. The author supposes that the stabilizing function of the system of tertiary education is caused by its role as the specific regulator of labor market and its capacity to involve millions of young males, providing long-term occupation. Under the state policy this stabilizing function may be enormously exaggerated and even reach extremes and become counterproductive.

In the modern world the system of tertiary education influences the level of employment and thus becomes one of the key factors of political destabilization “from below”. This role of the educational system is so high because of its economic function as the specific regulator of the labor market.

By what economic mechanisms the educational system can influence protest activity both positively or negatively? We are talking about the tertiary education that includes higher and professional education. Nowadays the global tendency of increasing domination of higher over professional education is evident, which is why the main attention is paid to higher education.

This political function of the educational system appeared relatively recently, chronologically simultaneous to formation of the modern system of mass tertiary education. In many countries this function of education can be exaggerated. This could be one of the reasons for many revolutions at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In many countries the system of
education in different historical periods can become either the cornerstone of stability of a political regime or a catalyst of social and even political perturbation.

Nowadays the popular question of political scientists is: “Why social protests and revolutions happened in many Arab countries but not in Latin America and Eastern European countries?” Maybe the key is the numbers of students and graduates and their correspondence with the conditions of national economies. Latin America countries cannot boast high literacy rates, long academic traditions and quantitative indices. They do not have as many students and graduates as many Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries do. For instance the first University in Brazil was founded only in 1920. But can this backwardness become an unexpected political advantage?

The role of educational system in contemporary Russia is also very special and very substantial – Russian tertiary education system plays a unique and significant political role. Modern Russia presents a unique example of configuration of employment and educational levels that permits one drawing a conclusion about the exceptional role and efficiency of educational system in sustaining stability in the country.

To understand this phenomenon we propose the concept: “the natural rate of education”.

As a definition of political stability I use “the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism”. (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2008)

To begin the explanation of the proposed concept we should answer the following question: “What demographic group represents the most notable threat to political stability?”

According to the recent data, there are four main factors:

- The high rate of unemployment could affect people orientations, civil societies, their protest activities and thus political stability.
- The numerous revolutions at the beginning of the twenty-first century prove that in the modern world the most explosive demographic group is young people and first of all single young males aged from 15 to 24 in the Asian nations and 16-30 in Europe.
- People with higher educational levels are more inclined to have more substantial and complex needs and demands and higher levels of citizen activity. It is easier for them to comprehend the political messages and use information technologies. They more easily establish social and civil networks more easily. This means that in general they are more critical about dictatorship, cleptocracy, oligarchy, “wild” capitalism and other forms of restrictive and repressive authoritarianism. Their level of political culture and participation is above average.
- And finally the modern young generation is considered the most educated in world history but the rate of unemployment among youth surpasses all other population groups.

So youth is the important and active part of the national civil society and possible protest movements. Youngsters are often feared by governments, as they should be. This is especially true for developing countries with autocratic or anocratic political regimes. As J. Goldstone wrote, the growth of the weight of youth could undermine the existing political coalitions and stability. Big cohorts of youngsters often attract new ideas and heterodox religions that challenge old forms of power. Since the majority of young people has less family and career obligations they can be mobilized to take part in social and political conflicts relatively easily. “The role of youth in political violence during known history is indisputable”. (Goldstone, 2002:12)

According to the UN special report, the current generation of youth is the most educated in world history but the unemployment rate in this cohort is unparalleled and is still worsening. 45 percent of young people in the world live on 2 dollars per day or less.

So, on the national level “the natural level of education” means the optimal balance of the educational system output and the number of the new jobs and private entrepreneurship possibilities created (see fig. 1). If the balance is absent, this could lead to instability.

Also the state universities and colleges could purposely overproduce graduates to unload the labor market and win some time for the economy to grow and create new occupations for more people. Sometimes national governments do not have many public and economic goods to offer to youth except wide access to higher education. Populism or idealism of political leaders could be other factors of politically motivated unbalancing of supply and demand of educated specialists.

This strategy could wither demographic pressure on the labor market and boost stability in short- or mid-term periods. But in long-term periods this could become counterproductive, often provoking accumulation of the “overeducated” and underemployed young males and their frustration and radicalization.

Figure 1. The approximate effect of the increasing deviation from the “natural rate of education”. The growth of tensions in the country is determined by the broadening gap between \( A \) – the number of graduates (supply of the specialists), \( B \) – the number of qualified jobs, created by economy with an effect of possible fluctuations (the demand).
Investments in the sphere of tertiary education can have very substantial multiplicative effect, providing not only the training of needed specialists, economic growth, employment and modernization but also substantial political outcomes and “probe effects”.

However it would be a mistake automatically to associate the investments in the sphere of education with the investments in the reproduction and development of the human capital.

To illustrate the thesis that these investments are not always aimed at development and their quantitative growth could demonstrate an absence of correlation with the level of the human capital, in some cases (including modern Russia) the increase of the state educational investments dictated by the need of sustaining of political stability sometimes leads to the formation and accumulation of the so called negative human capital.

Russia spends just 2 percent of GDP on its tertiary education system. The return, both economic and political is enormous. The system of education contributes greatly to sustaining the stability of the political regime. This is a very effective but not a very generous investment. This proves that in modern Russia the government’s attitude towards education policy is mostly instrumental. The output is also questionable because at least 1/3 of the graduates of the universities find jobs that are not connected with their competencies. So there is a huge gap between professional training and job placement.

The unbalance of “the natural rate of education” is especially evident if the unemployment significantly deviates from its “natural rate”.

As we know, there are three main types of unemployment:

*Cyclical unemployment*, also known as deficient-demand unemployment, which occurs when there is not enough aggregate demand in the economy to provide jobs for everyone who wants to work.

*Frictional unemployment* is the time period between jobs when a worker is searching for, or transitioning from one job to another. It is sometimes called search unemployment and can be voluntary based on the circumstances of the unemployed individual.
Structural unemployment occurs when a labor market is unable to provide jobs for everyone who wants one because there is a mismatch between the skills of the unemployed workers and the skills needed for the available jobs.

All three types can contribute to the protest activities of the relatively young and educated specialists but only 1 and 3 can be described as inevitable “social evils”. So here we shall attend mostly to cyclical unemployment.

Human resources could be distinguished into 3 main parts:

* **Employed (E)** – most stable.
* **Unemployed (U)** – most unstable, often the “fuel” of violent protests.
* **Non-labour force** (NL) – more stable, they do not work but have temporal or permanent occupation.

In some situations, if the labor market is not developing fast enough to absorb young people, the state can afford to convert the potentially unemployed (U) to Non-labour force (NL) providing them long term occupation.

For this distinction we propose the term: stabilized by education non-labour force (SNL). Many young people who cannot adequately realize themselves in the economy receive the possibility of postponing their entrance into the labor market. If the educational system mostly belongs to the state it can increase investments, open new universities, programs, propose loans etc. Another tool is the “market signals” – the increase of educational demands to the workforce.

This strategy works well while the economy is growing and developing, but during recessions an adequate numbers of new jobs are not created (for instance in the Egypt before the revolution there were annually 700,000 of new graduates from universities and colleges and only 250,000 of new jobs).

In such conditions the spending on SNL becomes a burden and a waste (according to Okun’s law). This function is becoming counterproductive (see fig. 2).

Quantitative investments in the sphere of education (the sheer number of students at the expense of quality of tuition) are often a valid indicator of the process of churning out SNL just to soften economic and social tensions.

Despite the fact that authoritative political regimes in Tunisia and Egypt were unprepared for revolutions and the majority of political scientists did not express any warnings, the possible negative effect of deviation from “the natural level of education” could be predicted rather easily. For instance the use of dynamic modeling could be very helpful for prognosis of possible political tensions. On fig. 3 we can see the model of economic and social situation in Egypt before and after the revolution. This is a simple “stock-flow” model prepared in iThink 9.02 analytical software by isee systems, inc. The base variable here is the number of educated
unemployed (first of all former graduates). The larger this number the greater the social tension. The accumulation of critical mass of this group leads to social radicalization, especially among single and relatively young males. The demographic “fuel” of Arab spring mainly consisted of such individuals.

Figure 2. The impact of the economic conjuncture on the growth of SNL (− ,+ – the degree of intensity of recession/growth). During the stable and substantial growth the cyclical unemployment is decreasing according to the need for SNL and vice versa.

Figure 3. The dynamic model of deviation from the natural rate of education in contemporary Egypt.

Figure 4 depicts the “equation layer” of the model which helps to understand its logic. As we can see extra state driven measures, such as additional education (overproduction of SNL) or limited injection of additional jobs cannot save the situation if the number of educated unemployed approaches a million mark.

As the results of modeling shows, the possible critical point of accumulation of young and educated unemployed in Egypt was reached in
2011. This was the result of the state driven educational “boom” of 1990-2000th in the country. But this tectonic social shift was not sufficiently backed up by the national economy. According to the model it is possible to predict the preservation of instability in Egypt in the near future because of the “youth bulge”.

From this perspective it is possible to consider “brain drain” as a “good” possibility for many political regimes to add relieve the labor markets and decrease possible instability. This explains why many governments in the developing countries complain about “brain drain”, but at the same time do little to prevent it. We can call this process “the channeling of the excessive human capital”.

It would be fruitful to apply some of the notable concepts of the theory of human capital to the analysis of the phenomenon of “the natural rate of education”.

According to the prevalent definition, human capital is the stock of competencies, knowledge and personality attributes embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to produce economic value. K. Marx was the first to prove economic and political effectiveness of investments in human capital (workers).

So, employees with higher levels of human capital are prone to expect and demand more. The nations with a high level of human capital are more competitive, developed and stable.

Human capital investments are educational, training and other spending: public, private or personal. If they are not efficient we can witness accumulation of the negative human capital.

Figure 4. The equation of the dynamic model of deviation from the natural rate of education in contemporary Egypt.
Negative human capital can be defined as human capital with little to no effective output. So it cannot provide economic modernization and sufficient return on investments. Graduates with insufficient or outdated skills, knowledge and ethics cannot satisfy modern requirements. Negative human capital cannot be easily canalized. Above all, negative human capital if accumulating produces mass frustration and protest activities.

The system of education can form negative human capital in 2 ways (quantitative and qualitative):

- Disproportionate overproduction of particular types of specialists leading to unbalanced labor markets (“educational bubbles”)
- Low quality of educational standards and “pseudo-education” (outdated or locally limited knowledge).

The next important question here is the rate of efficiency of tertiary education. This concept was proposed by Polish-American economist J. Mincer. The rate of efficiency of tertiary education measures the economic gain of an educated specialist. It is high if the difference in lifelong earnings of the groups with different educational levels is substantial.

The rate of efficiency of education illustrates the percentage of increase of earnings for each additional year of tertiary education.

According to recent data in OECD countries the rate of efficiency is rather high – 7-10 percent of extra earnings for 1 additional year of training.

But in some countries (like Georgia) the difference is only 3 percent. So we can imagine the frustration of the young graduates – their gain is next to nothing.

Russia witnesses an interesting exception – overproduction of educated specialists was accompanied with a rather high rate of economic efficiency of tertiary education (see fig. 5).
Russia has one of the most educated labor forces from the formal criterion. More than two-thirds of our labor force have full tertiary education. Only the US and Japan can compare. But the hi-tech sector of the economy is less than three percent of GDP. That seems very untypical. Since the beginning of the 1990s the number of students and universities has tripled, but the economy and applied science fields are still in poor condition.

To explain this phenomenon we propose the term “Educational Pyramid” (see fig. 6).

Fig. 6. The dynamics of change in the rate of efficiency of education and the effect of “educational pyramid”.

A – the situation of economic recession,
B – the situation of sustainable development,
C – “educational pyramid”. The number of educated labor force is permanently increasing – this means that the rate of efficiency of tertiary education is going down.
D – the “swine cycle” gives the most exact presentation of the dynamics of fluctuations of the rate of efficiency of education affected by the economic conjuncture.

The effect of the “educational pyramid” is rather simple. Overproduction of the educated workforce leads to the increase of educational demands on the workforce even if they do not correspond with condition and level of development of economy. This policy is carried out by the state and at the expense of less educated social groups. This strategy creates some kind of artificial situation but can boost stability and postpone the negative effects of economic and social imbalances. Such situations can be found in several Middle East and postcommunist countries including Russia.

But why are these pyramids formed only in certain countries? Which factors contribute to formation of “educational pyramids”?

- The presence of the “resource” economy based on natural rent that helps to smooth out market contradictions at the expense of extra rent income (like “oil money” in Jordan and Russia);
- Formation and swelling of the “educational bubbles”;
- The moderate level of demographical pressure;
- Sociocultural factor – the status of higher education is very high in the society;
- Successful combination of low alternative (“opportunity”) costs and non-monetary benefits;
- The presence of the disguised and possibly not recognized state policy directed at tackling of social and political processes undesirable for political elites.

Let’s take a look at the Russian case.
In contemporary Russia we can witness many economic and social paradoxes connected with education:

- the huge growth of number of educated specialists and at the same time the decrease of productivity of labor;
- the expansion of the system of higher education and the decrease of the hi-tech sector of economy;
- rapid development of post-graduate education and the decrease of inventions and patents;
- very high percent of youngsters entering universities and colleges and high percent of graduates, applying for low-qualification vacancies;
- rapid decrease of the number of researchers and increase of the number of lecturers.

I suppose that these paradoxes could be effectively understood by applying the proposed hypothesis of “the natural rate of education”.

From many perspectives the parameters of the educational system in Russia are very specific. We can clearly see the great scale of tertiary education system and its important role in supporting political stability in 1990-2000th.

The unique parameters of tertiary education in contemporary Russia are as follows:

1. The highest coverage of education.
2. Preparation of specialists costs very little to the state.
3. Russian system of education involves students for a very long time.
4. The stabilizing function of the system is that it became a huge and very important employer. Then again the salaries of professors are below the average level.

So in contemporary Russia the return on investments in production of SNL is very high (long time for studying, one of the widest level coverage in the world, huge supply of relatively affordable or free places in colleges and universities, big numbers of relatively cheap professors and personnel
and also high motivation of the youth to receive tertiary (especially higher) education). These investments are not so costly for the state (the “share” of GDP of one student is much lower than of an employed person, as are his temporal economic demands). As in several countries it is much easier for elites to open wide the doors of universities for young people than to carry out effective modernization of the economy and an improvement of vertical mobility.

But sound quantitative parameters of higher education in Russia are compensated by not so bright qualitative parameters. So the process of accumulation of negative human capital is underway. Often the problem is not only lowering educational standards and disciplinary demands of many institutes. For many students diplomas but not knowledge became the main aim. This is especially true because of the formation of the educational pyramid which leads to increase of formal educational requirements to work force even if a given vacancy is not connected with received specialty and competencies of a candidate.

In the 1990s the period of recession of the economy and weak political regime, the role of the education system in supporting stability was very high though it was hidden and not obvious. The number of universities as well as students more than doubled in a decade. But quantity preceded quality (also because of socio-political aims). Also in the 1990s the universities helped overcome structural unemployment provoked by market reforms, “information revolution” and transformation of the society.

In the 2000s the political regime became stronger and the economy began to grow, but the educational system preserved its role and even amplified it because of the formation of the educational pyramid. But now this process has reached its limits. Since the financial crisis of 2008 forced continuation of overproduction of specialists most of whom are not effective is becoming bad for the economy and its stability. If educated people do not see opportunities this could lead to mass frustration and the development of protest movements.

At the end of 2011 and in 2012 we were witnessing some of these trends and processes coming true. But these processes are not likely to lead to mass and serious transformations, because of objective reasons. The first obstacle is the “demographic pit” that Russia began to face in 2009. The demographical decrease of the youth is a dangerous trend for the nation, especially from a long-term perspective, but it could be a relief for a political regime that desperately wants to keep power.

This means that the system of higher education has accomplished its “hidden” socio-political function of helping the political regime withstand the wave of the baby boom of the late 1980s without large-scale social turmoil.

CONCLUSION

1) The era of mass tertiary education: the political implications. Pre-
viously in human history political regimes used to restrict the access of the masses to higher education. The important factor was concerns about political stability and the integrity of highly polarized social structure.

Now the regimes that want to stay at power have to open doors of educational institutes as widely as possible. To restrict the access to education could be a very unpopular move nowadays, because it is perceived as a very high value by the young people.

Previously there used to be many governmental programs to deal with jobless youngsters (like labor camps described in “Grapes of Wrath” by J. Steinbeck) but nowadays physical labor for food is not so attractive. These camps have been replaced by colleges.

2) *Education is not a guarantee of the modernization and development of the society.*

3) *The quality run.* Previously, including a big portion of twentieth century, there was a widespread perception among the elites that the quality of education should not be “too high”. Now such strategy could lead to social conflicts and revolutions. The quality of education becomes an important component of political stability.

4) *The civil society challenge.* In the past the different access to education separated young males preventing them from creating network structures and articulating common interests. Now white and blue collars can communicate via Internet and their differences often do not prevent them from joint civil activity.

5) *The exhaustion of “enlightened autocracies”.* In his classic works J. Schumpeter wrote about the overproduction of “intellectuals” as the “undertakers” of capitalism. (Schumpeter, 1990) I think this thesis is true for many “enlightened autocracies” for instance of the Arab World. They produce too much “intellectuals” and often do not know what to do next. They are doing many things right (developing human capital, tackling radical Islamism etc.) but the mistake is to exclude young and educated people from politics and limit their vertical mobility. Revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia were “revolutions of possibilities.” Anyway, even replacement of authoritarian regimes in these countries with democracies won’t eradicate the preconditions of political instability.

6) *The invincibility of “educational pyramids” and the rise of “structural violence”.* Structural violence is a term first used in the 1960s commonly ascribed to Johan Galtung. It refers to a form of violence where some social structure or social institution purportedly but nonviolently harms people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs.

As far as we can see, the “educational pyramid” seems almost invincible (not in the long-term perspective) before the face of protest activities “from below” if accompanied by “smartly” applied structural violence. Institutionalized birth-control, elitism, manipulations and massive SNL overproduction can be effective in tackling potential protests. We see that in Russia stability of the regime was bought at the price of depopulation and demographic pit.
7) The decline of religious fundamentalism and the possible “renaissance” of ideologies? If the output of the educational system in the Middle East keeps its dynamics (which is probable and the results of modeling prove that) we can see the growth of modern and rational demands and interests in the region, the development of civil society and further global unification. If in the future more than two-thirds of the young population has tertiary education will they still be so interested in religious values and not consumerism? That’s a question but the probable fact is the growth of political activity, disapproval of dictatorships and emergence of new political parties and social institutions. Maybe in the future, taking into consideration the ambivalent position of the global youth and the recession of the global economy, social (ideological) but not civilizational factor will dominate politics again.

The spread of education usually leads to rationalization of politics; the deepening of economic recession and global polarization leads to ideological conflicts and the increase of protest activities. What would emerge at the point of intersection of these two global trends?

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2.2 Philosophy, Spirituality and Ethical Values
CHAPTER XX

THE MEANING OF LOVE:
EXPLORATIONS ON THE ROLE OF
PHILOSOPHY IN SPIRITUALITY

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To think of Philosophy in relation to Spirituality is, ultimately, to delve into the question of a metaphysics centered upon the hermeneutics of the human condition understood in terms of a radical being-with, of that Mit-sein so richly analyzed in Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. The role that Philosophy as such can play in the discernment of new ways for achieving Spirituality, both East and West, cannot be dissociated, I believe, from a project that gains the best of forms whenever there is some understanding of the correlation between what we might call an anatomy of love and the proper sense of an anatomy of being. I am indeed convinced that the achievement of a Philosophical Spirituality and of a Spiritual Philosophy does not find a better form of proceeding than just trying to project light upon that meaningful dichotomy we find in the terms of both love and being, including the one of being-in-love.

In order to understand the Idea of Love, one we consider as being at the very center of the European philosophical process, we must first recognize how the idea of Eros was slowly transformed into a transcendental term. This process can be seen at work, for example, in texts such as Plato’s Symposium (198b-212c) and the Phaedrus, (246a-257b), the Book XII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (in particular 1072b) as well as in Origen’s Commentary on the Song of Songs (prologue), and Plotinus’ Enneads (1.6 on beauty), Ennead 3.5 on love, and, even if only to a less extent, Ennead 6. But we also recognize that the European intellectual approach to love is inseparable from the contribution of thinkers like Proclus and his Commentary on the First Alcibiades, as well as the Pseudo-Dionysius, who, with his major work on The Divine Names (particularly 4, 10-17) gives us what truly amounts to the magna carta of the Christian understanding of Eros, at least inasmuch as his theologico-philosophical concept expresses the reality of love as something that not only belongs to the contingent order of things but intrinsically refers to the pure and simple transcendentality of being.

The role played by the Pseudo-Dionysius is of particular importance granted the huge influence he had during the Middle Ages, as becomes evident once we look at the special role played by Saint Thomas Aquinas in terms of what we want to call the transcendentalization of Eros in texts such as Summa Theologicae (Ia, q. 20), or the Commentary on the Divine Names, particularly in Book 4, lectures 9-12. In the Middle Ages, moreover, the process took a very special turn in Dante Alghieri’s Divina Comedia, parti-
cally in Canto xxxiii of *Paradiso*, and the second book of his *Convivio* (2.2).

But in order to come to an analysis of the transcendentality of love in the Renaissance one would have to take into account texts like Marsilio Ficino’s *Commentary on Plato’s Symposium (De amore)* (Ficino, 1544), his *Commentary on the Phaedrus* (Allen, Michael J. (ed.), 1981), or Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s *Commentary on the Canzone of Benivieni* (Mirandola, 1942: 443-581). As for the Renaissance, however, our choice will be just to refer, even if very briefly, to the role played by a distinguished son of Portugal, a respected member of the Jewish community, an adopted son of Italy and, above all, a prince among the philosophers of the Cinquecento, i.e., Judah Abravanel or Leone Ebreo. In his famous *Dialoghi d’amore*, which were first published in Rome in 1535, what we find is a conversation of and about love between a man and a woman, i.e., between two dialogical figures, Filone (Philo) and Sofia (Sophy). Needless to say that such a dialogue is intended to form a composite name, one namely that we shall not fail in recognizing as what it is, a *parable* of the true nature and meaning of Philo-Sophy. We believe, indeed, that the *Dialoghi d’amore* of Judah Abravanel constitute a *dramatic* representation not only of a particular *philosophy of love* but also, and no less importantly, of how *philosophy* itself constitutes a form of *love*. In other words, to reflect on the proper meaning of Philosophy and Spirituality always implies a serious consideration of what might be considered as the ultimate meaning of Love. Indeed, the *Dialoghi d’amore* constitute a monument to human resilience and the ability to overcome by the power of intellect and will the pains and the horrors of history. The very fact that we have this work is in and of itself a most true and beautiful *triompho d’amore*. With Leone Ebreo and his philosophy of love, *Eros-amore* takes center stage on the theater of philosophy as it becomes understood as the single and most important driving force not only of everything that is, but also of each and every aspect of the human attempt to understand the multifarious aspects of being (Vila-Chã, 2006).

On this occasion, however, and in order to reach an understanding of the issue at hand, we shall rather explore some important moments in the history of the theoretical discussion regarding the *nature of love* in the context of Western culture. For the most part in the 20th century, however, this discussion has been influenced by the contribution of Anders Nygren (1890-1978), a Swedish theologian who in the 1930s published a highly remarkable and controversial book precisely about the distinction between

1 I understand that he is called “The Hebrew” but I think it might be better to refer to the people as the “Jewish community”.

2 The present paper is for the most part based on the research done when preparing this work.
Eros and Agape (Nygren, 1930-37). Thus, we now intend to precisely follow Nygren in order to understand the nature of love and so, in the first place, make ourselves aware of the opposition that has been so profoundly established between what he calls the system of Eros and the system of Agape.

The first term of the opposition is, obviously, Eros. As such, it is at the center of what Nygren calls the Hellenistic theory of salvation, whereby it means an egocentric form of love, one that is at the center of an understanding of being determined by the centrality of the human position. Man, therefore, articulates in a most privileged way both the starting point and the goal of the ontological process (Nygren, 1969: 235). The starting point in this process is need while the goal is satisfaction. Accordingly, in the system of Eros the human soul is regarded as being essentially divine, so much so that once it comes to reflect on its true nature it will cease to seek satisfaction among the changing and transient things of the world. The implication is, moreover, that in order to achieve true wisdom the human being will have to turn away from the temporal things and, by the same token, rise on the wings of the soul “that higher realm from where the soul comes into the body. This, in other words, means that Eros represents the inmost aspect of the human soul, i.e., its homesickness and longing for that sphere of being that alone can give it true satisfaction.

One common representation, furthermore, is the one that makes the human soul’s destiny appear as determined by the need to embark on a journey toward heaven, a journey which invariably finds its term in the ultimate experience of a spasmodic aspiration or, to put it differently, in the experience of an ecstatic vision and rapturous enjoyment (Nygren, 1969: 336). Hence Nygren’s comparison of the power of Eros to the power of the heaven-storming Titans, or, in other words, the assertion that the inmost nature of Eros is characteristically egocentric.

Like Karl Barth (Reginald, 1991: 95-98), Nygren contrasts the Hellenistic form of love to the Christian form of it, that is, to Agape. Contrary to Eros, he says, Agape has nothing to do with desire and longing since agape “seeketh not its own” and, contrary to Eros, does not ascend in order to secure advantages for itself. On the contrary, agape always consists in sacrifice and the giving of self. Its proper model, after all, is the very love that is in God, or, better, that God Himself is. The agapic form of love, in other words, means not that the human being is raised up to the level of the Divine, but rather that the Divine, moved by compassion, descends to the level in which the human being finds him- or herself. Theologically speaking, thus, agapic love is nothing but the very love of God whose most profound and definitive revelation is found in the Cross of Jesus Christ, i.e., in the offering of self that He makes for us sinners (Nygren, 1969: 336).

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This opposition between *Eros* and *Agape* shows itself in particular when it comes to the consideration of the different *dimensions of love*. Indeed, since the *idea of love* implies a relation between a *subject* who loves and an *object* that is loved, when we take into account the different objects of love, we find ourselves, says Nygren, confronted with *four dimensions of love*. They are the following: (1) The love that God has for man and the world; (2) our human love for God; (3) our human love for one another; and, finally, (4) the love that we have for ourselves, i.e., human *self-love*. (Nygren, 1969: 211) Now, considering the fundamental opposition between *Eros* and *Agape* in terms of each one of these four dimensions of *love* the following characteristics for each one of them can be found.

First, with regard to the idea of *God’s love* for us, the system of *Eros* starts by simply rejecting the idea. Indeed, if we start by describing *Eros* as an *upward tendency* and as a *yearning desire*, it becomes clear that in God there is no *way upward*, i.e., no *Eros*, precisely because it is assumed that in God there is no want or need, and, consequently, no desire nor striving. After all, God cannot ascend higher than Himself. Moreover, *Eros* is also unable, says Nygren, to conceive the possibility of God loving the world or the human being, precisely in the measure that this necessarily implies a descent from His Divine perfection and blessedness into an inferior realm (Nygren, 1969: 212). In terms of *Agape*, on the other hand, the most central idea is precisely the notion that God loves *us* and that each and every love that truly deserves the name is nothing else but an outflow from the love that is in God or, even better, that *God is Agape* means that God is the true source of love and, on the other hand, that *Agape* is in and of itself a love that *descends*, i.e., a form of love that can only be understood in terms of a superabundant gift.

Secondly, this contrast is also evident when we try to think of *love* as a relation that goes from *man toward God*. In terms of the *Eros* motif, the idea of a *love towards God* is perfectly acceptable, particularly inasmuch as in *Eros* everything pertaining to the movement of love appears to be destined to reach up towards God and, in this way, to seek participation in God’s own richness of being. Inasmuch as *Eros* is equally defined as *acquisitive desire* and *appetite*, and inasmuch God ends up being represented as the *Highest Good*, i.e., as the sum of all conceivable good or desirable objects, it becomes perfectly acceptable to think that God is truly at the center of all desire and love. In terms of *Agape*, on the other hand, the notion that in the world there is *love for God* plays an equally central role, as we can see from the Biblical injunction “*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the great and first commandment*” (Matthew, xxii, 37 f). But the problem is, says Nygren, that *Agape* means a spontaneous and unmotivated love, while our love in relation to God can never be spontaneous or unmotivated (Nygren, 1969: 213). Theologically speaking, the truth is indeed that *God’s love* always comes first, in response to which the human love is awakened. According to Nygren’s reading of Saint Paul, the *love that the human being*
has for God is nothing if not a response to the love that God first has for us. Furthermore, connected with this is also the idea that appetitive desire must be interpreted in a metaphorical sense given the fact that God transcends everything that can be made an object of human desire and longing. The implication is, of course, that in terms of Agape God cannot be said to be the Highest Good, since this would necessarily imply that God is only one among other objects of desire. On the contrary, what we must first and foremost understand is that God should in no way be placed among any objects of desire whatsoever. Hence Nygren’s understanding of Agape as a purely theocentric love, i.e., a form of love in which all choice on the part of man appears to be excluded (Nygren, 1969: 213-214). The human love of God, therefore, can never authentically result from the act of comparing God with other things and of finding Him naturally more satisfying than anything else, but simply from the experience of being overwhelmed by God’s unmotivated love and this to the point of being unable to do anything else than love God.

As it pertains to the love of neighbor, the contrast between Eros-love and Agape-love is even more striking. For one thing, says Nygren, Eros does not seek the neighbor as other; it seeks him in so far as it can utilize him as a means for its own ascent. According to his own reading of Plato, Eros is for Nygren in no way concerned with its immediate object; rather, its nature is to always detach itself from its object and to use it as a stepping-stone to higher things. This means that the object of love must here always be left behind, since love is directed only to that which in the object participates in the Idea of the Beautiful. The true object of love, therefore, is here not the other person as such, but the beautiful Idea it incarnates. Even though love can and does indeed always begin with sensible objects, its goal is always one of ascending to the realm of more abstract objects. Since in the process of Eros we must follow the same upward way as when we rise from the particulars to the universals and the world of Ideas, we must also say that in the system of Eros the neighbor is reduced to the condition of being an intermediate object of love, given that the ultimate goal is God Himself. In the system of Eros, therefore, the object of love is not the individual person as such, but simply God in the person. In other words, the system of Eros does not account for the possibility of a true love of the other (Nygren, 1969: 215). In terms of Agape, however, the love of neighbor is something quite different. Agape-love is directed to the neighbor as such, i.e., the other person as such. Since, moreover, in the Christian sense the love of neighbor also implies love for one’s enemies, one fundamental question arises: What is it that can induce a man to simply love his neighbor? When my neighbor also happens to be my enemy, obviously no reason for my loving him can be found in his own character or conduct. The problem is here, therefore, that in this kind of love we can see no demonstrable personal advantage behind it. Indeed, there is no motive for the love in the loved object itself, and no motive can be found outside the object, in some ulterior purpose, or else the love will not be true, – it will
not be Agape. For unless love for one’s neighbor is directed to the neighbor in himself or herself, even to the point of not being concerned with gaining God’s own love, then such love does not have the right to be named neighborly love. Should, however, the question be asked about the motive for agapic love in relation to one’s neighbor, the only possible answer is God Himself. In the agapic sense, therefore, the love of neighbor is ultimately love for God’s sake (Nygren, 1969: 216).

The opposition between Eros and Agape becomes, clear finally, when we take into account the dimension of our own self-love. In Nygren’s terminology, Eros is by definition self-love and all erotic love is nothing but a form of self-love. More importantly, however, is the fact that here even our love for God and our love for neighbor can be reduced to a dimension of the love of self; the true motivation at work in the so called neighborly love would be nothing but the fact of it representing a stage in one’s own ascent to higher things. Similarly, the love for God in this system would be nothing more than a source of satisfaction for all of our needs and desires (Nygren, 1969: 217). On the other hand, however, Agape is said to be exclusive of all forms of self-love. This, after all, is the reason why Nygren makes the extraordinary claim that Christianity does not recognize self-love as a legitimate form of love. To the contrary, he seems to firmly believe that Christian love can only be found in two directions, namely, the one toward God and the one toward the neighbor. Excluded, therefore, is any form of self-love. When confronted with the very reasonable observation that since very early in the history of Christianity self-love has been referred to as a third form of authentic Christian love, and, furthermore, as the true basis for the love of God and the love of neighbor, Nygren simply answers with the suspicion that such an understanding is nothing more than the result of an attempt to achieve a premature compromise between those two opposing systems, i.e., the system of the Eros-love and the system of Agape-love.4

Nygren summarizes these different dimensions of love. In the case of Eros, the center of attention is clearly given to self-love, as much as Eros always demands satisfaction for its own desire and longing. In that sense, it finds ample room for love towards God, precisely in the measure that God constitutes the Highest Good and represents the satisfaction of each and every desire. On the other hand, Eros does not have room for love of neighbor. Indeed, when Eros-love is directed to a fellow-man, it is because he is regarded, not as a “neighbor,” but as an object which participates in the Idea of the Beautiful, or, generally speaking, in the higher world. Here, therefore, the neighbor is simply used as a stepping-stone for one’s own ascent. In the same way, no space seems to be left here for the idea that God Himself is love or, even more importantly, that God can love (Nygren, 1969: 218).

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4 Regarding the theological and philosophical discussion about the nature and the relevance of the question of self-love, see, among others (Brink, 1997: 122; Jean-Hervé, 1956: 5-42; O’Donovan, 1980; Völkl, 1956).
Agape, on the other hand, is said to run counter to all this, precisely in the measure that Agape is God’s love. According to Nygren, the most distinctive feature of this divine love is the freedom of its giving, which means that we have no need to try to make room for neighborly love, nor to find any external motivation for it. It is God’s own Agape which seeks to make its way out into the world through the particular loving subject. In relation to the possibility of our own love toward God, it has a place within the scheme of Agape, but at the same time we must also say that its meaning is quite different from the one present in the context of Eros. Obviously, the most fundamental principle here is the idea that our love toward God must always be understood in responsive terms. After all, God always loves us first and our human love is nothing if not a response to God’s own love for us (Nygren, 1969: 218-219).

Karl Barth, indisputably one of the great theologians of the twentieth century, was also in favor of this strong opposition between Eros and Agape, which for him basically represents two movements going in opposite directions. In other words, like Nygren, he seems to exclude the possibility of us finding harmony instead of conflict between the two. As a matter of fact, he attempts to ground this exclusion between the two types of love in a philological argument, which is precisely based on the fact the verb eran and the substantive eros are carefully avoided in the pages of the New Testament precisely in order to lead the reader into believing that love or agape is not something destined to be grasped, taken, possessed or enjoyed. The emphasis, rather, is on the verb agapan and the substantive agape, which, being mostly unknown in classical Greek, was first found in the Septuagint5.

According to Reginald E. Allen, however, Barth’s philological account of Eros and Agape is rather confused and, it seems, unreliable. In conceptual terms, Allen says, such an account lives in ignorance of the fact that the notion of Agape has an equivalent in classical Greek, namely Philia, which means friendship. Moreover, he also says that, at least in the case of Plato, the notion of Eros also includes a clear concern for others, particularly as Eros is directed toward happiness. Furthermore, when theologians like Barth or Nygren make Eros selfish or self-interested they do so at the expense of ignoring the fundamental fact that happiness also consists in justice and friendship, and, moreover, of the fact that Eros is not only a dimension of the body but also of the soul, whose end is nothing else but the contemplation of the summum bonum. We must indeed think of the situation in which a man like Socrates, precisely on grounds of justice, offers his own life for the sake of the polis and its citizens (The Symposium, 1991: 97).

Philosophically and theologically speaking, moreover, the positions of Barth and Nygren are also problematic in the sense that they ground their

notion of Agape in the conviction of man’s utter sinfulness and nothingness. According to their understanding of justification by faith alone, salvation must result from an act of grace which has nothing to do with human merit. In Calvinistic terms, furthermore, God is the one Who in His absolute sovereignty ordains men in their nothingness, some to salvation and eternal life, others to reprobation and eternal damnation, and for no other reason than that God simply wills it so. We can say, therefore, that Barth’s and Nygren’s account of Agape, i.e., of a form of love that takes no account of the worth of its object, is rooted in the doctrine that men in their nothingness are only worthy of eternal damnation (The Symposium, 1991: 97).

The careful study of the practical implications contained in the stark contrast between Greek Eros and Biblical Agape is well beyond the possibilities of this introductory presentation. It should suffice, however, to mention the famous dictum of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough when he compared the notion of agape separated from eros to only a paper flower (The Symposium, 1991: 98). We shall not forget, furthermore, Paul Tillich’s insistence upon the idea that the very possibility of God’s grace implies in and of itself the existence of a certain similarity between God and the human being. In other words, the very notion of Grace implies the truth of that most basic and fundamental theological assertion according to which the human being constitutes an image of God. Anders Nygren, on the other hand, always reiterates the principle that, in the end, it is only by means of God’s own agape that the human being is ultimately in the position of doing anything whatsoever; indeed, it is only by means of God’s agape that man can be transformed, at least superficially, from being wholly unlike God to some kind of likeness with Him (Rist, 1970: 173). Rist also remarks that there should not be much doubt left regarding the fact that from the time of Plato the Greeks themselves recognized Eros as being not only an appetitive, i.e., self-centered power, but also as being an expansive and generous manifestation of being (Rist, 1964; Rist, 1966: 235-243; Rist, 1970: 156-173).

The transformation of self-love into a problem, particularly in Nygren’s terms, has been the source of many discussions and attempts at correction, many of them oriented towards the goal of demonstrating that self-love must be recognized not only as biblical, but also as a strong demand of modern psychology. It should suffice to mention here Erich Fromm’s opinion according to which the love of self, which he clearly distinguishes from selfishness, and the love of others are not alternatives, but rather complement each other. The truth of the matter is indeed that anyone who finds himself or herself capable of loving others will also be found in the position of loving himself or herself. In his work The Art of Loving, Fromm

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6 The theological implications of the opposition between Eros and Agape can also be seen in the following studies: (Armstrong, 1961: 105-121; Brechten, 1975; D’Arcy, 1947).
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says: “If an individual is able to love productively, he loves himself too” (for he “actualizes and concentrates his power to love”); “if he can love only others, he cannot love at all” (The Symposium, 1991: 98).

Let us now return to the Dialoghi d’amore, a work written in a language that, as such, makes it a good example of what we might call profane philosophy in the Renaissance. Indeed, this is much more than a work of Jewish philosophy; in and of themselves, the Dialoghi d’amore are better described as a book of philosophy written by a Jew.

In the first of the Dialoghi d’amore, Leone Ebreo attempts an understanding of love in the context of the ethical and moral life of man. Hence the importance of the role played here by Aristotle and the Nichomachean Ethics, a source that in this first stage of the work is even more important than Plato’s Symposium.

The second dialogue seems to be a text written as an imitation of the speech of Eryximachus in the Symposium. Here Leone Ebreo enters into a dissertation about the cosmique role of love, whereby he spares no means to emphasize the universal dimension of Eros. As a matter of fact, he seems to be particularly determined to establish a connection with the very last verse of Dante’s Divina Comedia, i.e., l’amor che move il sole e l’altri stelle.7

Then comes the third of the Dialoghi d’amore, by far the longest, in which Leone Ebreo presents the diverse theories about the origin of the Universe, its organization and finality. This constitutes a process which for the most part takes place in terms of a comparison between the opinions of Plato and Aristotle, together with those who commented on them, along with the teachings of the Bible and other sources of the Jewish tradition. It is known that while Aristotle defends the idea of a universe that is eternal Plato was particularly inclined to assert the origin of the universe as deriving from a demiurque which organizes the eternal and chaotic matter in accordance with an intelligible model. Leone Ebreo’s task here, however, is to attempt to bridge the teaching of the philosophers with the Biblical doctrine, which makes it clear that the universe was created by God ex nihilo. In the process, he formalizes his attempt to demonstrate that indeed Plato is much closer to the Truth than Aristotle actually is.8 The complexity of the Dialoghi d’amore cannot be separated from the fact that its author was a believing Jew attempting to assimilate and integrate themes which were very much in circulation in the cultural context of his own time, i.e., early in the sixteenth century, with the many other central questions raised.

7 See Paradiso, Canto XXXIII. For a study of the roots and the development of the idea of love as cosmic force, from Homer to Dante, see (Dronke, 1965: 389-422; Dronke, 1984: 439-475).

8 In order to do just that, Leone Ebreo goes back to an ancient theory, at least as old as Philo of Alexandria himself, according to which Plato came into a personal contact with the Books of Moses while journeying in Egypt (Moreau, 1973: 104-105).
by the contributions of classical antiquity, the texts of the Bible and those pertaining to the Jewish history of interpretation. As a matter of fact, we believe that it was precisely in order to achieve this extraordinary hermeneutical goal that Leone Ebreo so eloquently and vehemently adhered to literary forms typical of the medieval tradition of *courtly literature* and of the *mode littéraire* developed by the many *tratatisti d’amore* in the platonic style which were so much *en vogue* during the early years of the Renaissance. Leone Ebreo’s main intention is, thus, to make a contribution in terms of the *philosophy of love* proper to the Renaissance, but without compromising his own Jewish culture and faith.

Our contention is, as a matter of fact, that what Leone Ebreo did within the context of sixteenth century Renaissance has important similarities with that which thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas, on the Jewish side, and Maurice Blondel, on the Christian one, attempted to do in the twentieth century when developing their many argumentative demonstrations of the harmony that is to be sought between faith and reason, between philosophy and theology. In any case, we consider that the idea of the *chain of love*, which in Leone Ebreo’s *Dialoghi d’amore* culminates in the notion of the *circolo amoroso*, much more than a particular episode in a particular work, is a notion that runs throughout the entire trajectory of Western Civilization and, thus, might be particularly illuminating of our own need to integrate Philosophy and Spirituality as two unavoidable sides of our own search for Meaning.

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CHAPTER XXI

ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY IN JONAS AND LEVINAS

OZANAN VICENTE CARRARA

This article is intended to show how ethical responsibility is conceived within the philosophical projects of Jonas and Levinas. Departing from the way both thinkers elaborate their ethics, I will expose their different conceptions of Ethics, Ontology and Metaphysics and the way they relate to each other conceptions. This will lead to different directions in their reflections in spite of some convergences. Both give to responsibility a fundamental place in their ethics, a fact which allows us to also find some parallels in the structure of ethical responsibility in the way they conceived it. After exposing some fundamental aspects about the foundation of their ethics, I will also relate responsibility and nature, in search of some hints that will provide a new posture towards nature.

JONAS’ PROJECT OF AN ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Jonas proposes an ethics which he believes is capable of responding to the problems of the techno-scientific civilization and that is also capable of reaching a universal acceptance, in the face of the dangers that threaten the existence and essence of humanity, and of nature as well. Even though he searches for inspiration in the judeo-christian model, he looks for a foundation of his ethics in Ontology, developing it from an absolutely rational argumentation. Such an enterprise, even though valid and convincing, is criticized by other philosophical schools like the Philosophy of language, those who defend the end of Metaphysics or the criticism coming from Habermas and Apel’s Theory of discourse and even Pragmatism. Jonas, however, proposes, in his philosophical project, to overcome nihilism as the main mark of contemporary thinking. He is convinced that the Being’s dignity and its permanence do not depend on time and, for that reason imposes itself on him as uncontestably prior.

Jonas considers the question of existence and of humanity’s essence to be inseparable from the techno-sciences. He holds Cartesian dualism responsible for the dissociation between subject and nature, limiting philosophy to what concerns the subject which, in its turn, imposes itself on the object. Bacon, and Descartes as well, doest not escape his criticism in what concerns the modern representation of nature. Thus, our philosopher searches to show the presence of finalism and values in nature, the fundament of which comes from the absolute value of Being as good in itself. The result of this is the supremacy of human being in whom finality
culminates. The responsibility of human being towards nature gets rooted, in the last instance, in an ontological solidarity between the human being and nature which the Cartesian-Baconian model destroyed. Like many contemporary philosophers, Jonas identified the center of the problem in the excessive and absolute valorization of the autonomous subject which began with modern philosophy, rising to its highest point with Kant. Basing himself on Leibniz, Jonas shows how Being affirms itself constantly as a response to non-being, a possibility that threatens it every moment. Affirming himself in Being, the human being creates himself and affirms himself in an identity, as opposed to the natural means from which he comes. The current technique ignores, in Jonas view, the aspect of finalism that so peculiarly characterizes human being.

In his effort to approximate human being and nature, corporeity gains a central place in Jonas’ philosophical project which situates it out of a dualism that places the body as the tomb of the soul, depriving it of all spiritual dimension. Contemporary materialism also conceives a world totally deprived of spirituality. For Jonas, human being is neither pure matter nor pure spirit, but a psychophysical entity which reaches the maximum of ontological completeness. Matter already contains, even though in elementary forms, freedom and finality, characteristics thus far attributed only to human beings. In his way of conceiving and proposing a new Ontology, the question for Being passes inevitably by the body no longer reduced exclusively to the condition of res extensa, a conception that resulted in a nature deprived of value, but we find in this an admission that we share with nature the same modality of being which consists in the incessant activity to maintain us between Being and nothing.

In *The Phenomenon of Life*, Jonas proposes an Ontology which will serve as a foundation for the ethics for which he proposes *The Imperative of Responsibility*. Different from Levinas, Jonas’ ethics is rooted in Ontology. To build a metaphysical foundation for the ethics of responsibility in reason the basis of his ethics should be philosophical? Departing from the Leibnizian question “Why is there something rather than nothing?”, Jonas searches for a basis for his ethics, reintegrating it in Metaphysics. To do so, he reinterprets ethically the metaphysical categories of Leibniz. Metaphysics has the task of thinking the ought-to-be of being and, for Jonas, such a task justifies itself in the face of the need to respond to nihilism. The question of the ought-to-be belongs to philosophy. If the Good and the Evil are related to finality as Jonas proposes, the being in itself of Good or value belongs to the reality of Being. Axiology is, for him, a part of Ontology. Ethics gets rooted in the “yes” said to Being or in the refusal said to non-being. As in Plato, also in Jonas the Good is the world cause. Responsibility is a response to the appeal of the Good through which the human being becomes responsible not only for other human beings, but also for the future humanity and for the whole biosphere as well.

How Jonas then does understand ethical responsibility? Some aspects will help us to comprehend the Theory of Responsibility he proposes. In
Ethical Responsibility in Jonas and Levinas

In traditional ethics, the focus was always the act, the praxis and the proximity as everything was considered within a short term context. The first aspect in Jonas’ reflection is a critique to the notion of responsibility conceived as limited to past acts in which the author becomes responsible for what he has already done. The focus here is in the agent which is the active cause of the moral action. But Jonas wants to raise responsibility towards the future of humanity, that is, for the survival of humanity. The powers that human beings acquired with modern techniques put humanity face to face with the real possibility of its own destruction. If the penal code charges us with what we have already done, how then do we impose on this acquired power the conscience of duty? Responsibility then sees itself before the fragility of individuals and before the threats to the continuity of the world. In other words, it is the object itself that claims my action. The cause of my action from the subject, despite the fact that the object imposes itself on my power, claiming protection or being threatened by it. It is not the idea of responsibility which takes me to an engagement in favor of the object which claims my attention, but here responsibility comes “from the perceived right-plus-need of the object, as it affects the sensibility and puts the selfishness of power to shame”. (Jonas, 1984:92-93) We can see here another structure of the moral act in which, in the first place is the ought-to-be of the object and, in the second place “the ought-to-do of the subject who, in virtue of his power, is called to its care”. Jonas goes on:

the demand of the object in the unassuredness of its existence, on the one hand, and the conscience of power in the guilt of its causality, on the other hand, conjoin in the affirmative feeling of responsibility on the part of a self that anyway and always must actively encroach on the being of things. If love is also present, then responsibility is inspired beyond duty by the devotion of the person who learns to tremble for the fate of that which is both worthy of being loved and beloved. (Jonas, 1984:93)

In this sense, to act in an irresponsible way does not mean “lacking the capacity for responsibility”, but refers mainly to an exercise of power devoid of duty.

For Jonas, a way to overcome the current ecological crisis demands also an attribution of right to nature, giving to it an autonomous ethical significance. Natural things also need to be recognized as “ends in themselves”. He says it is a duty to preserve the conditions which assure the conservation of the essence of human beings. The kantian categorical imperative gains in Jonas the following version:

act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life; or expressed negatively:
act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the
future possibility of such life; or simply: do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth; or again turning positive: In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will. (Jonas, 1984:11)

There is a contradiction, for Jonas, between the attitude of wanting the present good on the part of the current generations and the other attitude of sacrificing the future on behalf of this same current good. This new ethical imperative is not directed, as it is in Kant, to the internal dispositions of a subject, but to the collective act, that is, it has public politics as destination. It does not demand the internal logical compatibility of the will, but the concordance between the effects of the act and its permanence in the future. It does not imply a transference of the subjective maximum to the universal level as in the kantian model, but here the totalization is done from the objectivity of the effects of the collective act which affects the entire of humanity.

Jonas wants then to think a notion of nature which does not exclude the human subject or one which does not understand him only as a reflexive conscience, but one that understands man from his double nature of res cogitans and organism. In searching to overcome the dualism that separates human being and nature, Jonas thinks a responsibility which does not deny our freedom of using our powers the way that seems more adequate to us, but one responsibility that takes us to exert our freedom, taking into consideration all the other forms of life on which our existence depends. The Baconian ideal of knowledge understood as “domination of nature” destroyed in its basis the possibility of another comprehension which would integrate human being and nature, encouraging in excess man’s desire of power over nature instead of entrusting him with guarding and responsibility for nature. It is urgent to change one’s stand before nature!

Despite all the suspicion around Metaphysics, which primarily comes from the anglo-saxon academic environment, and despite the discourse around a post-metaphysical world, Jonas turns to a metaphysical argumentation. He proposes an ethical imperative rooted in life as the continuity of existence and not a principle of rationality. This first principle does not come from ethics as the “doctrine of acting”, but from the Metaphysics as the “doctrine of being”. This way, the affirmation of Being is ontological and ethical as well, as Being is preferable to nothing or to non-being. To destroy humanity would be to prefer the non-being to Being. Existence is then a value which prescinds from a cause and imposes itself on its own. Life is a value which needs care. The struggle for auto-preservation that characterizes the organism gains, in man, the aspect of a free and conscious choice. For Jonas, the end of being is life, which brings with itself the demand of its own reality in the form of an imperative. Jonas also admits a feeling of responsibility to show that it is not only a question of choice by
an autonomous and reflexive will. He talks about a passive responsibility in a first moment which does not originate in the subject.

Ethics has two aspects: the rational foundation of ought (objective aspect) and the psychological foundation of the capacity of influencing the will (subjective aspect). Even though the philosophers have occupied themselves much more with the first one, the second one is no less important and the two complement each other. The ethical appeal supposes a welcome from the part of that one who receives it, that is, it supposes a feeling which influences the will. Jonas says: “the phenomenon of morality rests \textit{a priori} on this correlation, even though one of its members is only \textit{a posteriori} given as a fact of our existence: the subjective presence of our moral interest”. (Jonas, 1984:86) As in Kant, Jonas also makes a concession to the sensitive nature in admitting that morality needs a “feeling of responsibility”, but, in Kant, such a feeling of respect does not refer to a special object, but only to the law. Jonas calls our attention to the claim of the object towards us and not simply to the fact that it is the object of our choice or interest. A mere “emotional recognition of the dignity of the object” is not sufficient, but it demands also a feeling of responsibility “which binds this subject to this object, and will make us act on its behalf”. (Jonas, 1984:90) Only this feeling is able to produce in us a necessary disposition to engage us in favor of the object existence.

Jonas’ ethics does not limit itself to the thinking of a responsibility for the continuity of human nature, but also teaches us that existence is possible only through the coexistence between human nature and extra-human nature. If we understand his criticism of traditional ethics, accusing it of anthropocentrism, we will understand why his ethics could not incur the same mistake. This way, nature gains, in his ethics, its own dignity and claims a limit to the illimitable power that technique gave to man over it. This does not mean that his ethics is a natural ethics, but that it supposes a constant self-improvement of man to the point that he has to reconstruct the idea of humanity.

In all levels in which responsibility is considered, three concepts are present: totality, continuity and future. Between human beings, reciprocity is the main characteristic of responsibility in the measure that I am responsible for others and others are also responsible for me. However, “the possibility of there being responsibility in the world, which is bound to the existence of men, is of all objects of responsibility the first”. (Jonas, 1984:99) Thus, “existence of a mankind’ means simply that there live men on earth; that they live well is the second commandment”. (Jonas, 1984:99) There is then an imperative that demands that humanity has to continue to exist as such, an imperative which is present in all imperatives. This ontological imperative is the fundamental cause “to which a mankind once in existence, even if initially by blind chance, is henceforth committed. It is the prior cause of all causes that can ever become the object of collective and even individual human responsibility”. (Jonas, 1984:100)
The best examples of this non-chosen responsibility are, according to Jonas, parental and political responsibility. Responsibility means that “responsibilities encompass the total being of their objects, that is, all their aspects, from naked existence to the highest interests” (Jonas, 1984:101) (its characteristic of totality). For parental responsibility, “the child as a whole and in all its possibilities, not only in its immediate needs, is its object”.

(Jonas, 1984:101) Jonas next argument compares parental responsibility to that of the public man: but isn’t this precisely what Aristotle said of the raison d’être of the state: that it came into being so that human life would be possible, and continues in being so that the good life is possible? This then is also the object of the true statesman. (Jonas, 1984:101)

The simple birth of a child implicates a responsibility for the continuation of an existence in an indeterminable future as the newborn is incapable of subsisting without the help of another. In the same way, political responsibility has as its aim the development of human beings. Thus, in both cases, we are before a responsibility for the preservation and perpetuation of fragile and vulnerable beings who invoke us in an imperative way. But political responsibility, in contrast to parental responsibility which terminates when the child acquires autonomy, has no term despite the fact that it has to cope with more consequences. Then the moral imperative imposed upon the public man is: “to do nothing that will prevent the further appearance of his life; that is, not to plug up the indispensable, though not calculable, wellspring of spontaneity in the body politic from which future statesmen can arise” […]. (Jonas, 1984:118) That means that we are today in the face of a responsibility with an entirely new content as it is turned to the future in the sphere of political action and in the moral sphere as well.

Jonas, in his search for an ethics of future, uses a “heuristic of fear” (a prevalence of the bad over the good prognosis), that is, a simple prevision of human deformation and the threat to his image create a certain horror which demands the assertiveness of an authentic human existence. In this case, knowledge originates from the need of protecting us from destruction. It is this “heuristic of fear” that encourages us in the search for the Good once that which is feared was not yet experienced neither in the past nor in the present. The author, in this topic, takes distance from Hobbes’ fear (fear of a violent death) and prefers to talk about a kind of spiritual fear which would oblige us to take a new attitude. (Jonas, 1984:31-32) Such a fear would push us towards new human values, driving human action in the direction of its preservation besides the fact that it would awaken the political leaders to the axiological lucidity capable on its own to give birth to a new praxis that would orientate the choices of our society. As Science and technology with its promises of growth and progress and the construction of a strong State were the answer to the threats of a violent death (Hobbes), if that responded to the lack of resources or to the threat of civil war (Locke) or still if the Utopias were also a response to an apocalyptic situation (the utopias of Bacon, More and Campanella), this “heuristic of fear” would have as its aim to awaken a responsibility towards the future.
Foppa evaluates the consequences of an ethics rooted in Ontology such as that of Jonas. Jonas first of all elaborated Ontology and only afterwards occupied himself with Metaphysics because ethics should be rooted in Ontology. This means that, for Jonas, ethics cannot have an autonomous existence, but relies upon a previous ontological foundation. His ethics departs from Being and it is not centered in man as the ontology upon which it is rooted is centered in metabolism. “The act of being is the the metabolism”. This way, Jonas wants to show that Being itself is holder of values and nature is not neutral or indifferent in relation to values, but, on the contrary, it is source of values for human beings. Thus, values do not come from the conventions established by men between themselves, but they are already present in Being. Ontology is for Jonas a means through which man can discover such values as the being of nature speaks through man. We are here, says Foppa, in face of an ethics of ontological nature. (Hottois and Pinsart, 1993:186-189)

Thus, our question here is what is Ontology for Jonas. In The burden and blessing of Mortality, he says what he means by Ontology: namely, an inquiry into the manner of being characteristic of entities of one kind or another – in our case, of the kind called ‘organism’, as this is the sole physical form in which, to our knowledge, life exists. (Jonas, 1996:88)

He refers to Ontology as “speculation that roams beyond proof”. This understanding of what Ontology is all about is very important for our purpose in this study which intends to show two understandings of Ethics and then two ways of comprehending also what Ontology is about.

LEVINAS’ PROJECT OF AN ETHICS OF ALTERITY.

Levinas departs from the understanding that Ontology is insufficient to express the alterity of another person and its transcendence, as he accuses Ontology of reducing the Same and the Other in a system. Since his first writings, Levinas searched for a way out of Ontology and out of the reduction of philosophy to the thought of being. His first writing is De l´évasion, which title clearly shows his intention of building a philosophy which goes beyong Being and its categories. As his philosophy is a philosophy of alterity or otherness, he searches for a way of breaking with totality (one of the main categories of Ontology), responsible, in his view, for totalizing the Same and the Other, and thus erasing the alterity of the other. The Hegelian totality is for Levinas an obstacle, as is Heidegger’s ontology as well, as neither allows the alterity of the other to appear. Levinas rejects the “tout est un” idea at the heart of the spirit of system. Even though Hegel read Plato, putting him at the service of his system, Levinas read Plato as opposing the spirit of system, by discovering in him a new way of thinking transcendence. Transcendence here indicates a “movement of crossing over”, of going beyond, it indicates a relation with what is separated, it is a structure of subjectivity and should not be reduced to the transcendent or to a “dimension of the real that reaches beyond the inner life”. (Hayat, 1999:IX-
X) In Totalité et Infini, Levinas says: “this relation with the other as interlocutor, this relation with an entity – precedes all Ontology”. (Levinas, 1988:18)

We can see here a very different philosophical project for which the essence of philosophy is the search for the “Other than being” and not simply the overcoming of the entity in Being as we see in Heidegger’s philosophy. The way the logos in the Western philosophical tradition terminated by erasing the alterity of the other and its transcendence. Levinas is convinced that only Ethics is able to respect the strangeness of the other, not allowing its reduction to the Same or thought. The terms Levinas uses to characterize Ontology show how he understands its nature: monological reason, philosophy of power, Being thought as expansion and effort of self-preservation. In Le Temps et l’autre, he criticizes Being for this characteristic of being without limits. (Levinas, 1983:29) Behind this understanding is Heraclitus’ Being as war and Hobbes’ perspective of confrontation as the natural conditions of life.

Levinas considered it necessary then to leave that tradition which marked the Western comprehension of Being and to search for another one in which the Other finds a place and is not deprived of its alterity. As a consequence, it is also necessary to break with all forms of naturalism to which Ontology seems to accede. In sum, Ontology is for him a philosophy of power, the logos of which tends always to reduce the Other to the Same, through the denial of its independence. Ontology then is not the primary philosophy. It reduces itself to a movement within the Same and leaves the I intact without touching its his uncontestable sovereignty. Totality is its central aspect and in it the beings find their truth because Being is an unlimited exercise of freedom, it occupies all the space.

Metaphysics, in its turn, is taken by Levinas as the transgression of phenomenality, of the world and its light. The experience of an infinite desire best translates it. It is still a search for adequacy and, for that reason, it also looses the alterity of the other. Metaphysics cannot be synonymous to Ontology as it shows a dimension beyond Being and its discourse. It precedes Ontology. If Ontology is related to Totality, Metaphysics, on the contrary, is related to the infinite desire which breaks totality, opening it to the transcendence of the invisible. Levinas favorite themes all belong to Metaphysics: Face, Desire, Infinity, Separation, etc. It is closer to Ethics, its first approximation. (Calin and Sebbah, 2002:44-45) Thus, the levinas’ comprehension of Metaphysics, Ethics and Ontology takes distance from Jonas’ way of understanding Ontology and Ethics as well. If Ethics is the first philosophy, it does not need a preparation and Ontology, in its turn, is able to be interrupted by Ethics as we will see ahead.

However, we can see also some proximities between the two philosophies. Both talk about the Good with its capacity of attracting us, a Platonic heritage we find in both philosophers. For Levinas, it is not the conscience that creates the Good, but it is the Good that takes the initiative and convokes conscience. Jonas also thought of responsibility as response to
the appeal of the Good, but this Good for Levinas is beyond Being. Thus, transcendence is a “way out of Being and out of the essence that unveils it”. (Levinas, 1988:90) Infinity appears in Levinas’ philosophy as the exteriority which shines in the face of the other and it is the figure he opposes to the totalizing power of Being which absorbs everything in the work of totalization. The Infinity does not give itself whether as a substance or as a Being, but as an infinite feeling never satisfied which he calls desire. It is never integrated into the logic of the cogito for to reduce Infinity to an idea would be to fall again in the ontological totalization. Thus, “the experience, the idea of Infinity sustains itself in relation to the other; it is a social relation”; (Levinas, 1997:210) its logos is “do not kill!” It is then an ethical resistance, a moral command which destroys at its base all power coming from the I. “The way the other presents itself, going beyond the idea of the other in me, we call face”. (Levinas, 1988:37)

“Face” designates man bereft of his qualities, of his social belonging in such a way that his origin, culture and color are put aside so that the human may appear. It is the figure of ones own vulnerability. As the moral law in Kant does not depend on sensibility and its disposition is a universalism without context, the Face is also a moral command. Thus, Levinas defines ethics as:

a relation between terms where one and another are not united by a synthesis of understanding neither by a relation between subject and object and where, however, one imports or is significant for the other, where they are linked by an intrigue that knowledge cannot exhaust or unfold. (Levinas, 1997:275)

Having exposed how Levinas understands ethics, we can now turn our attention to his understanding of responsibility and its structure. We will encounter here also some parallels with Jonas, despite the differences of their philosophical projects.

According to Levinas, responsibility has a fundamental place in the constitution of the I as I discover myself as an I in the response to a responsibility to which I am convoked by the other. This responsibility of which the I is in charge does not deny the identity of I, but makes it solidary with the other. The unicity of I here consists in knowing that nobody will respond in his place. So, it is not reflection that funds the I, but an “election” which puts him in a privileged place from which depends all that is not I. Such a responsibility empties the I of all egoism and of all imperialism, confirming him as center and support of the whole universe. (Levinas, 1994:81) As in Jonas, we here stand before a neither chosen nor wanted responsibility. Levinas also takes distance from the autonomous will of Kant. It is the other who convokes me and does not allow my indifference towards him in his fragility. Jonas also talked about an object that claims my action in favor of it. Levinas also sees in the ethical relation an asymmetry, that is, the other presents itself in a high position and not in a
relation of reciprocity because, for Levinas, the other should be in such a position that it can question the I and his “egoism”. In this aspect, Levinas diverges from Buber in the conception of the ethical relation. For Buber, it is still characterized by reciprocity. Levinas argues that the other, when put in symmetry with the I, would not be able to uninstal the I in his self-enclosed world. Situated above myself in hierarchy, the other is the one who ordains me to obedience. In the face of the other, the I sees itself before a signification of which it is not the origin. This impossibility for the consciousness to assimilate the other is morality itself. Thus, the movement of responsibility is a positive movement and, at the same time, it is a spontaneous and a critical one: the I affirms itself by an impossibility of escaping to the order of the other, but returning to the Same. For that reason, the moral consciousness is primary and it is the source of philosophy. (Levinas, 1994:88)

This movement of the Same that the moral consciousness allows to see in face of the other is prior to freedom. Being is commanded from outside by an infinite responsibility which demands a response to a superiority which imposes itself absolutely. (Levinas, 1994:89) This exteriority – which has no origin in consciousness – provokes reflection. Philosophy begins when the consciousness sees itself before an exteriority of which it is not the author.

Freedom, as it was thought by Liberalism and by Idealism as well, presents itself, in Levinas’ view, as an alienation. Only responsibility is capable of disalienating the I, and opening it to the other. It is then a response to the appeal of the other once the other obliges me to leave indifference. The appealing other is first in relation to the I. The initiative comes not from the I, but from the other. The appeal is prior to the response. The identity of the I is acquired in the response. As in Jonas, there is a passivity in responsibility as it supposes a welcome of the other. The subject is subjectum, that one who suffers action from another; he is hostage of the other. Freedom is not the condition of my humanness. Indeed, Levinas claims that freedom must be justified. What characterizes the subject is not his autonomy of a free being, but his exposure in total vulnerability to the other. In responsibility, the alterity of the other is respected and not erased. The other makes me responsible for him even before the discovery of myself as owner of an autonomous and free will. As the other person cannot be chosen – he/she is the first to be seen – responsibility consists then in an exposure to the other prior to all decision. As it cannot be reduced to an inner call of consciousness, it has to be translated in concrete gestures in favor of the other: clothing the nude, giving food to the one who is hungry, welcoming the orphan and the widow, etc. Here we can see how Levinas goes beyond Heidegger’s Dasein, which rests only on itself, understands itself through anguish in its own power-to-be, that is, in its own freedom. (Levinas, 1997:103-105) The other person is then the only one capable of disengaging the I from the closed comfortableness of his/her own world. In order to satisfy the other’s needs, the subject deprives himself of what
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Ethical responsibility, as Levinas describes it, is a non symmetrical relation between an I and a Thou which, however, has to become a civil and juridical responsibility when, to the dual relation between the two, are added the many others who with him form society. Levinas uses the term “the third” who is already present in the dual relation of face-to-face (the primordial ethical relation) to designate the plurality, responsible for the introduction of a symmetry in a relation now no longer reduced to two, but opened to the plurality. Here we can talk about the passage from the ethical relation to the social relation. With the entry of the “third” or “third ones”, the problem of plurality, absent so far, is put as the ethical relation remains a relation between an I and a Thou. Passing from the ethical relation to the social relation, there is no longer symmetry. From this moment on, we can introduce Justice, as it was always understood in the Western tradition since the Greeks, as measure and equalization of rights and duties. Social life does not accept inequalities. Nevertheless, this new relation with the plurality of individuals cannot loose its link with the dual ethical relation in which it finds its source. Politics begins with the “third ones” and is secondary in relation to Ethics. Here, the question that comes to mind is: how ethics and politics are related? This topic is not very much developed by Levinas himself, but he leaves some hints in some of his “Talmudic lectures” and in the last pages of Totalité et Infini and of Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence. His suggestion is that politics cannot become autonomous as it is secondary in relation to Ethics. In that position, politics will keep being interrupted by Ethics (the primary philosophy) as we can see in the interpretations of Derrida and Bensussan. From this point, we can see another convergence with Jonas: philosophy has a political mission. If with the “third ones”, we are faced with the need of introducing a measure, an equalization of rights and duties, it is also from this moment on that we face the problem of knowledge and objectification of logos resumed by Levinas in the term “the said” (the ethical does not belong to the theoretical knowledge that is Ontology’s reign, but is previous to it and belongs to the reign of “saying”), the other person has to be said in the theme or in the concept, despite the fact that he/she can never be reduced to the theme or to the concept. In other words, “saying” has to become the “said”, as the social relation with its demand of Ontology forces the passage from Ethics to Ontology. Nevertheless, the ontological language of the “said” has its origin in the ethical or in “saying” and cannot loose “saying” from which it comes.
Justice as equalization of rights and duties (the political) has as its source Justice as righteousness of the face-to-face (the ethical) and, for that reason, ethics should continue to inspire politics and to interrupt it each time it, and the institutions that represent it, take distance from the responsibility for the other. The political rationality will tend to self-sufficiency, considered the ambiguity implied in every political action, but it has to be judged by Justice as righteousness of the face-to-face. Ethics and Politics do not get confused with one another. Levinas keeps them separated and distinct against the Hegelianism which, in his reading, dissolves the ethical in the political. The Hegelian State as the complete realization of the moral and the incarnation of Spirit is, for Levinas, the origin of all kinds of totalitarianism. Ethics and politics would be equalized in the State and the distance between the I and the exteriority would be eliminated. This way, nothing would escape totality. The humanness of man would consist in a State without contradiction and without political parties. Such a State would be Reason itself! (Levinas, 1994:148) To avoid this risk, Levinas opts to maintain the ethical exteriority in relation to the political institutions, leaving ethics and politics in a constant tension. For Bensussan, ethics can make a kind of “detotalization”, disarranging or disintegrating the integrative structure of the State when it forgets the parts that compose it and loses itself in the whole. Only ethics is able to do it without, however, erecting itself as a counter-totality. (Bensussan, 1999:95) Ethics would offer to politics an opportunity of a new beginning so that it will not keep turning only around itself, trying to get autonomy out of any contact with ethics as its source. Every State leaves empty spaces which the social movements and the social struggles try to fulfill, shaming the State and, at the same time, resisting its movement of statization. Politics is interrupted and awakened by those social movements and non-governmental organizations which denounce it when it takes distance from Ethics. They interrupt politics from an ethical demand. Thus, from Ethics could come a measure against the excesses of the political apparatus.

The last question I want to address in this article concerns the possibility of applying to nature the ethical way of thinking we found in Levinas, asking about a different approach to nature which could come from the philosophy of alterity. How to conceive nature ethically? An ethical notion of nature certainly would reject any view in which nature is perceived only as object of fruition or as something at the disposal of man’s interests or still something reduced to a source of energy, raw material for industries, available to be explored by technology without any limit. First of all, Levinas rejects any response that would approach nature from the point of view of unity between it and man within a totality as it seems common in the thinkers who talk about the ecological problems. Levinas’ philosophy, as we tried to show above, contains a strong criticism of the notion of totality which dominated the Western thinking. Several reflections done by the thinkers related to the ecological movement talk about the need of recuperating the unity lost between man and nature, seen as one of the
possible causes for nature’s destruction followed by the possibility of man’s
destruction as well. For Levinas, any thinking which tries to synthesize the
differences in a harmonic whole is at the service of the ontological totali-
tarism. It would only favor man’s domination over the universe. In this
sense, Levinas also accuses the dialectics of loosing the difference in the
moment of synthesis. One of the key concepts of the levinasian philosophy
is that of separation which functions as a rupture with that one of totality.
He says in *Totalité et Infini*: “a dimension of psychism opens itself under
the impulse of the resistance which one being opposes to its totalization, it
is the effect of a radical separation”. (Levinas, 1988:42) The human being is
different from nature as he can decide his destiny. Only man is absolute
alterity because he does not belong to nature. It is here that we can find the
most important point in which Levinas takes distance from Jonas and from
his model of thinking about man. The other cannot be abstracted nor be
generalized in an intelligible whole. One of the dimensions of the alterity is
language and nature is deprived of language. It is the concreteness of the
other that resists Ontological totalization and becomes itself the content of
the separation. To quote Levinas on this matter:

> language defines itself maybe as the power of breaking the
> continuity of being and history. [...] Language is a relation
> between separated terms. [...] This way, the formal structure
> of language announces the ethical inviolability of the other
> man and, without any mould of ‘numenous’, his holiness.
> (Levinas, 1988:174)

To think nature ethically would then be to refuse to give it a place in
the totalitarian space of the same in such a way that we could not apply to it
all the ontological totalizing classifications and determinations. This would
open a way to conceive nature ethically. From this ethics, we can find in Le-
vinas elements of criticism of some of the reflections made by the thinkers
of the ecological movement which would still remain in the totalizing tradi-
tion of Western ontology, so criticized.

Despite the fact that I see in Levinas an alternative to Jonas reflect-
ion, I can also find some convergences like the critical reception of the Hei-
deggerian heritage; the central place given to the responsibility by both
thinkers; the attempt to build an ethical rationality; the criticism of the
modern subject and of the tradition Levinas designates ‘egology’ and even
in the hints they left that appoint a new epistemology for the sciences. The
other had only a marginal presence in the philosophical tradition. It is
Levinas who gives to the other the statute of philosophical category on
which we can build another culture. For the Franco-Lituanian philosopher,
alterity has a metaphysical dimension that would enable us to see society,
human beings and history from the point of view of the other.

Levinas also strongly criticizes the modern tradition of contractual-
lism which explicates the origin of society from a natural ego, egoistic, in-
dividualistic and self-sufficient which is the foundation of all the institutions. Jonas is still close to that contractualism as we saw in some aspects of his philosophy. The jusnaturalism originated from this pessimistic vision of the human nature became the foundation of modern societies. The other, according to Levinas, may become the foundation of a new way of being person, society and culture. For Levinas, the I is understood from the other. He unmask the natural autonomy of the modern ego and its rational essence, showing its historicity and its relation to the other person. Alterity appears as the first condition of Being and also the condition of subjectivity’s existence. Alterity even precedes the ego’s existence in a kind of anteriority which is not only temporal, but also metaphysical in the sense that the I finds himself always in state of openness to being. Desire is a constitutive dimension of the levinasian subject, showing its lack of completeness and its openness to welcome the other person, as the desire is the “desire of the absolutely other”. (Levinas, 1988:22) We can see here Levinas’ way of overcoming the Cartesian dualism between subject and object and the overcoming of the old conceptions of the other (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Husserl, etc). The other resists any category in which it could be fitted and is irreducible to knowledge. The other person can only be known in the form of revelation in which he manifests him/herself as a constant epiphany which the I must welcome. To conclude, we quote Levinas:

the proximity of the other man, the proximity of the neighbor, is in Being an ineluctable moment of revelation, of an absolute presence (that is, it frees from all relation) which expresses itself. His own epiphany consists in convoking us by his misery in the Face of a foreigner, of a widow and of an orphan. (Levinas, 1988:64)

Thus, the ethical rationality proposed by Levinas would open ways of thinking nature in a different way, escaping from the totalizing tendencies he sees in contemporary philosophy, above all in Ontology. To think nature ethically would help us to find a way out of all subjugation and domination still so present in the contemporary Science and technology. His philosophy may inspire us to build another way of seeing, thinking and relating to nature.

CONCLUSION

Jonas’ way of thinking the ethics of responsibility teaches us that Being and ought-to-be are never the same thing, but life is within being and the ought-to-be must be fulfilled in the real world as the values have to be realizable. For him, ethics belongs to this world, the only place where value may be realized or manifests itself. Human beings are beings of value as we do not belong exclusively to nature despite the fact that nature is not
deprived of value. In the case of ethical responsibility, Jonas wants to awaken us to the responsibility towards the future of humanity, nature being an inseparable part of this future. There is also a high degree of gratuitousness in the ethical action as we are convoked to act without the expectation of any reciprocity and out of the idea of any right. Transcendence is not absent in Jonas’ ethics as we transcend ourselves by following a moral imperative which does not come from our own will in spite of the fact that man is the place of all normativeness. The idea of man is such that it demands its incarnation in the world.

Levinas, in his turn, proposes another ethics based on the radical transcendence of the other. We stand before an ethics of a much more radical transcendence, the foundations of which contrast radically with the foundations of Jonas’ ethics. Levinas’ ethics is of eschatological nature, that is, it is without world. The ethical man is comprehended out of any naturalism. Despite the fact that this characteristic of his ethics could feed a kind of political quietism, the response to the ethical appeal from the other is a historical one. There is no ethical action without a bodily engagement in favor of the other person and of his/her needs. Levinas does not reject all social totality, but only those which erase in the individuals what they own as most singular and original. By the centrality given to the notion of separation, he wants to preserve the individuality and the alterity of the other as well, disturbing their totalization in a harmonic whole destroyer of the differences. Nature is not excluded at all from the ethics of alterity, but it should thought with any idea of unification or totalization. Responsibility is of a non-chosen kind too. It is infinite and besides cannot expect reciprocity. Finally, both ethics may complement each other, despite their differences, in our search for another world in which are contemplated both nature’s and the other’s demands.

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CHAPTER XXII

PROFESSIONAL MORALS IN MODERN SOCIETY

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Professionalism is closely connected with moral human life. The moral maintenance of a person, his ability to carry out a correct moral choice, development of his representations about honor, his duty and responsibility in many respects define the success of his professional work. The harmonically developed person steadily improving not only his own professional skills, but also a moral consciousness so as to be guided in his professional work by humanistic moral principles, is capable of becoming a qualified professional.

The professional activity of a person, his behavior during his productive performance is regulated by both general moral principles, and the special moral standards with specific characteristics depending on the professional affiliation of a person. Professional moral norms along with the general moral regulations are the integral components of a person’s professional structure. Such professional morals as a code of practice to guide a worker in his activity, emerge in the course of the social division of labor.

The reasons for the occurrence of professional moral requirements have not been sufficiently studied. In his works D.S. Avraamov has studied in detail the development of morality that leads to the formation of special professional norms. He considers the occurrence of professional morals to result from the specificaiton of labor morals under the impact of social division of labor as causing the differentiation of working conditions. (Avraamov, 1999:20)

The moral value of labor was postulated in many social systems, therefore originally professional morals included not so much professional as labor moral standards. However the labor morals themselves, in turn, occurred as a result of the establishment of public moral consciousness. At the very beginning of morals development as a system that regulates social relations in human society it hardly had a specialized character, i.e., in fact labor morals was not focused only on a regulation of labor process. Labor in moral consciousness of people just gradually became one of priority moral values; labor activity did not appear at once as an object of moral regulation.

In this sense it appears to be correct that labor at an initial stage of development of human society and social morals was not allocated as an independent field of activity, and as all undeveloped phenomena, was only one of the aspects of syncretic (connected, united) life process arising in society. And the fact that this aspect appeared and with time evolved to be a
direction of live activity of a society, does not contradict other aspects of social functioning, for example, such as the interaction of generations, reproduction, etc.

Hence it follows that the morals, whose occurrence was really caused in many respects by the necessity to coordinate people’s activity during labor process, nevertheless, as the regulatory social mechanism, should work on preservation and development of the life activity system of a society in general, and not just regulate people’s relations during the activity of labor. This aspect of general morals from an early stage of its development was concretized in labor morals with the lapse of time.

Thus, it is possible to distinguish following stages in historical formation of professional consciousness and professional morals development:

- the period of “before labor” morals while labor relations regulation is not yet allocated a special sphere of moral regulation, and serves the social requirements of life activity as a whole; at this stage norms and values of labor morals are only in the course of formation and have no clear wording. Labor is not a priority moral value. The understanding of labor was characteristic of the earliest times of human society up to early antiquity.

- the period of labor morals while the requirement of conscientious work as a norm of moral human life was accurately defined despite different approaches to the understanding of labor activity as a whole and intellectual and physical labor distinctions. This was the case in mature antiquity and the subsequent Middle Ages where labor morals were one of the important aspects of moral regulation.

- the period of professional morals beginning with the first craft shops and artels in the late Middle Ages; this craft division of labor initiated the professional labor differentiation that marked the beginning of professional morals.

The “before labor” period of professional morals development can be studied only: presumptively as there is not enough original historical evidence. The first philosophical and literary monuments reflecting moral relations in labor sphere describe later times up to the period of origin and development of labor morals. Certain modern writers in their works try to recreate the early period of formation of humankind’s professional morals. To their thinking the initial moral perception of labor activity was the sense of something “good”, “kind”, i.e. benefiting and providing processes for the continuation of life.

Indeed, labor activity as processes of creating a product worthwhile for a society was a vital sense in primitive society. Labor, as manufacturing a product necessary for the human life of society acted in terms of vital necessity; so that everything which promoted this process was estimated as good, everything that hampered and prevented the process as evil.
The major factors influencing the course of the labor process are considered by modern psychologists as internal and external labor conditions, i.e. various circumstances – natural, social, personal – within which actual labor activity is developed. Therefore the aggregate circumstances influencing the labor process (those circumstances which were perceived by undeveloped moral consciousness of the ancient man as kind or evil) were structured as follows:

- external – natural or social – factors which a person could not influence during his activity. It should be mentioned at once that natural and social circumstances were not subjected to any moral regulation (the natural phenomena weren’t estimated as kind or evil);
- internal circumstances expressed in relation of a person as the subject of labor activity and its process – in circumstances where it was a subject of moral regulation in a human society at an early stage of its development.

These internal factors of labor as the person’s attitude towards labor were of three basic types:

a) in relation to a society as a whole or to those of its members to whom the subject’s labor is directed (i.e., consumers of the labor produced by the subject);

b) in relation to other participants in the labor process especially as labor during that period was more often a collective activity;

c) in relation to the process of labor itself.

Note that all three types of relations correspond to the modern understanding of the structure of professional ethics and include the same circle of problems. This confirms that the professional moral consciousness of a person arises “before labor” morals, long before allocation of professional morals as one of the spheres of moral regulation in a society.

Professional morals as a set of moral requirements which determines a person’s relation to his professional activities appears with the differentiation of professions because of the social division of labor. As Engels pointed out every profession has its own morality. (Engels, V. 21:298) Occupation creates not only professional skills but also certain personality traits and attitudes toward the related activity.

With the development of processes of social division of labor, and the emergence and differentiation of professional activity there is need to regulate the relations of people in labor and professional spheres. Society’s approach to the profession determines its value. This is due to two main factors: first, what this profession really provides for social development, and second, what it gives to a person subjectively, what moral influence it exerts on a person. Since every profession performs defined social function, all its members have their own objectives, features and form a specific
medium of communication, which affects the identity of an expert, regardless of his wishes.

In the course of professional activities there raise many difficult issues involving conflicts which are always easily and unambiguously resolvable. As some contradictions appear, ways of solving them are chosen. Removal of contradictions and conflict resolution can occur in a constructive and destructive ways: success can be achieved, as well as losses and costs.

The contradictions in the course of professional activities are realized by people and become the object of their subjective experiences, evaluations, and may be caused by implicit violations of moral standards as well as by the need to determine the question of moral responsibility for professional activities. At the same time situations resulting from the production process may be repeated and typical. Hence, certain forms of both the professional relationships of experts with each other as well as between representatives of the profession and the society in general should be set. Thus appears a professional ethics regulating relations between people in the course of professional activities.

As soon as certain professional relationships acquire high-quality stability, there begin to form specific moral principles consistent with the nature of the work. In other words, there is a professional ethics with its key element-norm, which reflects the feasibility of certain forms of relationships both within the professional group, and in relationships with its society. 

(Kapto, 2006:33)

In contrast to the general requirements of morality, professional moral standards for the most part did not develop spontaneously, but were created under the direct influence of professional units. Simultaneously with the creation of professional codes of ethics, professional morals arise as a rational justification for a set of moral demands, addressed to a particular profession. The object of study of professional morals as a philosophical science becomes professional morals. Professional ethics is a moral code, a set of rules that specify the general rules of morality in relation to the specific circumstances of a particular type of professional activity.

Professional ethics serves as a prism through which the moral requirements for a specialist is refracted by the appropriate specific professional activities maintaining, however, its essence. At the same time professional morals do not claim to be a universal regulator of the behavior of the specialist. The sphere of its influence is limited to professional relationships, and these requirements are local. Professional morals govern the conduct of an employee solely in the performance of production tasks. Motives, goals, methods and results of professional work are understood by ethics in terms of only one, though a very important factor, namely, their value.
Regulations on certain specific and limited areas of professional morals and relationships are shared by many modern scholars of ethics. At the same time it should be noted that professional moral standards learned by an employee become an integral part of his professional consciousness, objectified in the process of activity (and not only professional) and, ultimately, affect the essence of personality. The professionalism of a person assumes its integrity; the moral in the structure of an individual is inextricably linked to the professional. Cases when learned professional moral demands (e.g., sense of responsibility for the results of a professional action) become for a professional a guide not only in professional activities, but also throughout his social life. Being essentially a concretization of the general requirements of morality in relation to the profession, professional moral standards differ from the general moral demands because of a greater degree of institutionalization. Professional and ethical relationships in contrast to the moral relations as a whole, suggest institutionally organized intervention of the professional community in the conduct of its members. Professional ethical codes, as opposed to general moral requirements, are controlled not only by public opinion and the power of tradition, but also by specially created organizations within a particular profession. For example, compliance with the rules of conduct by a journalist is being controlled by an editorial team and organization of the Union of Journalists, and by specially created commission on professional morals. Certain social institutions can apply strong sanctions against violators of professional morals in other professions. Therefore, professional ethics in contrast to the common morality is to some extent institutionalized.

The emergence and the development of professional ethics in a society is regarded by many modern scholars as one of the components of social progress since the moral codes reflect the increase in the value of a person, and entail the principles of humanism in interpersonal relations. However, we must also take into account the fact that by proclaiming the high moral standards of professional service to a person and to humanity, professional codes of ethics are considered corporate interests of individual professional groups. In this case the necessary basis for reconciling the interests of society and professional groups are the principles of universal morality. They are the criteria for proper behavior of a specialist supported by public opinion. “In modern society the dignity of any particular type of work and any profession is ultimately approved by the extent to which its representatives consistently embody in their work, unspecialized general principles and norms of social morality....It defines the subordination of the moral codes of professional values and norms of public morality in general. This is clearly revealed in conflict situations where the need to give preference to the requirements of professional morals to the detriment of others requires a creative search for moral decisions.” (Bakshtanovskiy, Sogomonov, 2001:104)

Common and corporate or professional codes of ethics may be in harmony, but they may contradict each other. In each case the level of har-
monization of general moral and of professional business standards depends on the state of morals in society as well as the unity and the consciousness level of professional members of a corporate professional group.

Creation of professional codes of ethics within a particular profession is one of the most important factors in the process of institutionalization of the profession when it acquires a certain social status. The development of a professional consciousness is usually carried out in parallel with the development of the profession, and professional ethical standards are fixed in the relevant documents – codes, rules, appeals, oaths.

The functions of professional morals in modern society is the work of specific entities. A general system of professional morality plays regulatory, cognitive, educational, evaluative, imperative, communication, prognostic, and other roles. Undoubtedly, the main function of professional ethics is a regulatory one: professional morals have arisen as a major regulator of professional relations in society. However, one should not underestimate the role of professional ethics in the education of a person, not only professionally, but also morally. The communicative function of professional ethics is significant as well: setting ethical guidelines for professional activities. Professional ethics promotes professional communication between people and contains valuable attitudes to the professional environment and for society as a whole.

The essence of professional morals is also in the moral development of a person in the world of a profession and professional reality where evaluation and moral commandment blend naturally. In this context professional morals are an evaluative-prescriptive way of human exploration of his professional life carried out by means of simple concrete moral precepts and imperatives in relation to a particular profession. The moral evaluation of professional conduct requires knowledge about the profession and the public demands upon it, that is refracted in values and enables carrying out a reasoned moral choice in the field of professional activity. Therefore, the assessment and imperative features of professional morals are closely related to the cognitive function. At the same time this has the nature of practical actions: it directs the specialist in the world of cultural and moral values that surround him, and allows him to choose those that meet his needs and interests.

It is also necessary to isolate the specific, cultural and traditional role of professional morals, which allows it to play an important role in ensuring the continuity of the moral and cultural development of the society. In changing eras, types of society, or regulatory systems due to the growth of social tensions simply unbending moral precepts weakens, the rules of professional morals with their certainty which contribute to the preservation of a sustainable moral order of life.

In modern society under the influence of scientific and technological progress the conditions and nature of labor as well as the functional role of the person in his work are improving. This affects the moral relations,
because moral and psychological qualities of the specialist are no less important than his professional experience, skills, abilities and knowledge.

The dynamics of social processes in modern society, the increase in their complexity and the speed of their rate of change required the employee, not only have such qualities as honesty, integrity, responsibility, ability of self-control, but also “moral security”, i.e. the ability to quickly respond to unusual situations. In addition, the specialist must also continuously improve his operations by expanding the horizons; enhance general and professional culture, competence, willingness not only to acquire new experience, but also to transmit it to others. All of these requirements for a labor ethics, along with those specific to a particular profession are included in the system of modern professional morals. Professionalism today not only requires adherence to professional standards of morality, but also becomes the basis and prerequisite for moral respect for the employee in a profession.

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CHAPTER XXIII

THE VALUE OF TIME AND ETERNITY
IN TRADITIONAL, MODERN AND
POSTMODERN CULTURES

TATIANA ALEXINA

The idea of time exists in all cultures and determines the mentality and perception of such values as happiness, fate, life meaning and self-mission. O. Spengler was the first to notice this fact. He connected cultural identity with the idea of the “soul” of the culture: “The problem of time is available to us only in connection with the ideas of destiny and fate. Every culture must necessarily have its own idea of fate”. The idea of time (destiny, fate) is present in every culture and forms its temporal identity. Hence, Spengler thought different cultures cannot understand each other due to their unique temporal identity.

Different concepts of time (in its relation to eternity and the present moment) produce different types of spirituality with their own ideas of happiness and life meaning. In fact, every culture creates its own specific set of values and meanings by which it seeks to overcome the pace of time.

But it also follows the fundamental unity of all cultures, allowing us, if not “to understand” but “to explain” and compare them with each other. After all, any particular culture, and Culture in general according to Levi-Strauss, is “the machine to overcome time”.

However, if we compare local cultures on this basis – such as antique, Indian and Western Europe – “Spengler barrier” may seem to be insurmountable: the uniqueness “of individual souls” can make such comparisons flat and trivial. Another thing is the comparison of the main stages in the history of culture: traditional culture, modern culture, postmodern culture. Here, conceptual, “explanatory” models may be more fruitful.

The perspective of the comparison is also important. Thus, it is easy to compare the ontological and cosmological ideas of time, but pretty pointless – such comparison does not explain much. The same Spengler incommensurability prevents us from comparison of deep existential moments, and it is difficult to speak in this sense of “traditional culture” in general – here the differences between local cultures are sometimes stronger than the stadial differences. But it is quite interesting to compare these three cultures according to the value aspects of their attitude to time. Dramatic change of value ascribed to time and eternity, in many ways is the essence of transition from traditional culture to the culture of modern times, and from it to the culture of postmodernity.

There is also an appropriate “language” that allows us to describe cultures at this point. At the time, the founder of the “Russian cosmism” N.
Fedorov introduced the concept of two types of thinking: “horizontal” and “vertical”. “Horizontal” thinking is oriented as if along the time axis, from cause to effect. This is a rational way of thinking. “Vertical” thinking focuses on the meanings, purposes, values that are always in the direction of spontaneous order from lowest to highest. The philosopher linked the moral feelings in particular with the “vertical” thinking. These two types of thinking correspond to two ways of life awareness: – from the standpoint of eternity, and in terms of time. Eternity’s point of view was tested by traditional culture and the point of view of linear time – by European culture in modern times.

Between them there is a long period of Christian Middle Ages, where the symbol of its specific spirituality is a cross, signifying the intersection of time and eternity, and the center is Jesus. This symbol has many meanings. The intersection of time and eternity – “horizontal” and “vertical” lines in inner subjective world shows the structure of the personal mental present. It shows the central location and position of a person in the universe. It also includes the unity of terrestrial and divine; every Christian identifies himself with Jesus and thinks that he is in the center of universe; the idea of personal responsibility for the fate of the world follows.

Modern time has lost the spiritual tension of traditional cultures and forgot all about eternity.

In postmodern culture, there is the prospect of mastering multidimensional virtual time, combining many forms of spirituality including mythological eternity.

THE VALUE OF TIME AND ETERNITY IN TRADITIONAL CULTURES

In the article “The horizontal and vertical position – death and life” (1851) N. Fedorov stated that the original image of the world was “vertical”, i.e., all events were located along the vertical scale of values. “Vertical” thinking was common to all traditional cultures. And indeed, for archaic cultures time has no value, because the “highest” values are eternal. In ancient myth there is a metaphysical contempt of the profane world, with time as a symbol, and also of the sacred and everlasting world, where “past”, “present” and “future” coexist. Mythological events are eternal events which are stored in memory and acquire the value of archetypes. Mythological time is not time at all; it is a type of virtual reality, which connects in the infelt moment present, past, and future...

The axiologically ambivalent image of time was formed already in archaic cultures: the irreversible (death) and reversible (immortality), successful and unsuccessful, “our” and “strange”, the time of living and the time of the death, the good and the dangerous, normal and abnormal (Tolstaya, 1991; Slavic Antiquity, 1995). But they lacked understanding of the difference between the past and the future. Having discovered that primitive people lacked understanding of the past and the future, Levy-
Bruhl even concluded that they had no morality— a conclusion that is quite natural for a modern person, whose morality is associated with the comprehension of temporal experience and “horizontal thinking”.

Primitive man really did not have such complex moral consciousness with its horizons of memories and hopes, which is typical for a man of European culture. It means that primitive man had a different morality, different scale of values, different attitude to time. He did not have the advanced idea of individual time, but he had a very important idea of eternity (the sacred experience and “vertical” thinking).

Archaic people did not separate the inner world from the outer one; their mythological consciousness reflected the inner psychological reality of spiritual experience. Mythological time as well as the time of the soul is reversible, non-uniformed (it can stretch, shrink, stop) and multidimensional. It does not destroy the past but stores it in the form of memory (Alexina, 1994).

The length of subjective time depends on its emotional intensity. It can stretch or shrink depending on the event which fills it (this phenomenon is now described in detail in psychological literature) (Golovakha, 1984). Ancient myths reproduce this phenomenon in the actions of the gods, who are free to manipulate time.

A ritual, more than a myth, expresses the idea of the immutability and stability of cultural grounds. Myth, ritual, tradition, playing with cosmic rhythms were forms of “eternal return” to the timeless values of the first and sacred period when basic values appeared. This “eternal return” was the basic form of archaic eternity.

Thus, the main features of archaic time are the following: a qualitative heterogeneity and axiological ambiguity, as well as a close link with eternity (expressed in myth and ritual).

Ancient civilizations largely preserved archaic attitudes to time and eternity, as well as their archetypal desire to overcome time and its destructive tendencies. This attitude (temporal escapism) was just reflected and refined.

It is possible to allocate different levels, or ideas of eternity, which were present in the texts of ancient civilizations (the list is not the only one possible).

Mythological eternity is the most archaic representation, it can mean the beginning of the world or Nothing (something, unformed being, Chaos). It is also a sacred space of acts of creating the world by Gods. This is also the time, won and reserved in myth as a sacred history.

However, metaphysical eternity is not nothing but something: the world of ideas, God, categories. It is also a transcendental field of goal setting and creative fullness (Plato, Aristotle). In Christianity, Eternity is horizon of metahistory and the set of all times (St. Augustine).

Psychological eternity (Seneca, Augustine) denotes the subjective experience of the soul, dwelling in the eternal and continuous present. As our soul is in a constant and eternal present, it has direct experience (
illusion) of eternity. This illusion is complemented by the lack of visual experience of birth and death (after all, a person “does not see him/herself while in birth and death”). Therefore, the soul feels infinite in time. If we assume that the soul is able to see its birth and death, it would mean that the soul lives longer than the body, which can also serve as an argument for the soul’s immortality.

Existential eternity and transcendent afterlife is based on the experience of death, described by such cultural monuments as the Egyptian Book of the Dead, The Tibetan Book of the Dead (Bardo Thodol). This experience is the basis of archaic morality. The first moral ideas appeared as the fight against the entropy of death; they contributed to the collective survival. The idea of soul’s immortality as a refuge from destructive and meaningless time serves the same purposes. On the other hand, many cultural creations (art, philosophy, music, love) confronting the face of death, acquire value and meaning.

In all of these “manifestations” of eternity it is associated with rich and axiologically full reality of “the Other World” as opposed to the “profane” physical world. This mysterious sphere of otherness is the essential element of all traditional culture and the main source of human creativity.

In antiquity, a new attitude to time and eternity appeared. Ancient Greeks knew about their past (“Iliad” is not “Mahabharata”, its plot is historical), and wished to leave a memory in the future. Ancient philosophers reflected on the problem of time. Parmenides proved (and Zeno in his paradoxes demonstrated) the ontological failure and non-substantiality of the time, Plato showed the insignificance of time. It is obvious that the problem of time and the temporal was experienced as relevant to the culture.

The ancient myths of fate were the first impressive attempt to combine time and eternity, to look at human life from the standpoint of both.

The main thing is the following: the idea of destiny involves the allocation of the individual and emergence of the most “advanced” individuals with their own time.

In ancient culture the attitude to time as a divine gift, a given opportunity first appears positive (albeit cautiously positive). There were the attempts to combine these standpoints – time and eternity – which resulted in attempts to unify chronology. In the place of historical works, covering the life of one or two generations, came world chronicles which operate for thousands of years (Averintsev, 1997).

CHRISTIANITY: THE FULLNESS OF THE PRESENT MOMENT AS THE UNITY OF TIME AND ETERNITY

But the real bridge between the polar values of “time” and “eternity” was made by Christianity.

The question of time arrived in the Old Testament. [We are talking about the ideas of Jewish culture represented in the Old Testament as Christian: it was exactly how they prepared and formed the picture of
Modern time]. New ethos was introduced there for the first time. It considered everything that happened in terms of time. It is permeated with the greatest pessimism, but the position which recognizes the present time as the main or even the single value, was clearly stated.

In “Ecclesiastes” (the source of wisdom of “the world”) the main motive was pessimism about the value of life and all the good things, because “everything takes and destroys time, and no one will be saved from destruction and oblivion”. But this pessimism is not opposed to the point of eternity. As time takes everything with itself, making nonsense of all works, all the accumulated wealth and even wisdom, the main advice to people is to get the joy of life and make good. If there is meaning in life, it is associated with time. It follows that everything has its own time, there is nothing out of time. But man does not know his time – this fact gives rise to universal injustice, moral chaos and confusion when “not the brave gets victory, not the wise wins bread and not the reasonable possess wealth. And the main cause of universal absence of meaning is death: death makes existence in time meaningless.

We can say that the preaching of Ecclesiastes was revolution in attitudes to time and temporality. In contrast to the mythological mentality, which ignored time and was turned to the sacred and eternal past, Ecclesiastes talks about the upcoming final catharsis, which collects all the ups and downs, integrates and comprehends everything that happened. The source of meaning moves from past to future, history turns into an endless field of possibilities.

Based on the ideas of the Old Testament, Christianity developed the concept of a historical time line, filled with eternal values such as meaning and purpose.

The New Testament concept of time differs from the mythological aimed at past, and from the Old Testament which is prophetic, forward-looking, because it brings past, present and future together into one line filled with meaning and sense with the center line in the human soul (Alexina, 1994: 40-41).

The first task to master time as the main gift that is inside man, put Seneca [who was not a Christian, but he had a great influence on Christian thought, so there is every reason to consider him in the context of the Christian tradition]. To master time means to develop a relaxed attitude to past and future and to realize time as inner wealth, which potentially is had by every person. This wealth is updated if there is a time filling, which allows you to experience the present moment as eternity. Seneca described psychological peculiarities of time, allocated the present moment as meaningful center of time. He discovered the psychological stretch of time, depending on the emotional richness of human experience. All his ideas has been proved by modern psychologists (including W. James).

The idea of mastering time, first expressed by Seneca, was the leitmotif of the whole modernization process. A particular attitude to the present was the foundation of the European mentality and the whole
Western civilization. It was the point that radically changed the world. The category of time (and the notion of completeness of the present) does not occupy such a place in other religions, as it does in Christianity. As part of Christianity such problems were put forward as: the aim and meaning of world history; the problem of personal time (its aim and meaning); and the problem of complex dialectics of temporal and eternal.

In Christianity, time was transformed from the strange and aggressive enemy power into the means of educating humanity. Here first historical time as the fate of humankind appears and is conceptualized. A new, positive concept of time became the ideological foundation for the emergence of a new cultural identity.

However, a new view on time emerged in Christianity, but not at once. It required great intellectual efforts. Many early Christians, especially Gnostics and Manicheans, treated time, history and life very negatively. This is the time of sadness, anger, fear, exile, oblivion. This age is winter, while summer is ahead (The Gospel of Philip, 1, 7). Here lies a deep sense of longing, alienation, abandonment. Gnostics thought that time is discrete, torn into unrelated pieces, it makes no pedagogical sense. Most people are doomed, only the few will be saved. These are the pneumatics, but they do not need time to prepare, because they become part of God already at birth, while in death they return to their original divine state. Salvation transports them instantly from time to eternity.

The same view on time as on the “alien” world, disorder and destruction can be found in the patristic period. At the time of Tertullian it was a synonym for death, Origen thought of it as a symbol of degradation and sin....Time and eternity completely exclude one another, nostalgically distant past and near future are not connected with the present and lie outside history in transcendent eternity. Time is an unmanaged space of alienation and lack of freedom.

But gradually a positive image of the time has developed. It is considered as part of the universal plan, where the present serves as a guarantee of the future, as the one who sees all, the existent bad things and the future good ones.

As a result Christianity carried out a gradual extension of the time perspective. The past, which includes not only the history of the Jews, but also the entire history of humankind was expanded; the future was prolonged; the idea of continuous time continuity was created (the links between past and future with present), as the center of time was indicated (such a center is the human soul, as a crossroads of time and eternity).

Christian apologists worked out the idea of “world history”, which was supposed to perform the function of joining different cultures. They considered time as a necessary human resource to achieve perfection and completeness. Gregory Nysskiy imagined time as continuous increase, as necessary dispensation (Desalvo, 1996: 1994). Augustine compared human life with house building and history – with the song to be sung to the end (Augustine, XXII.26).
Christians formed a new type of cultural identity – an eschatological identity, which unites all Christians, not only alive, but dead as well (cultural identity in archaic community covered only “friends” and the quick).

All Christians are united and are close to each other by common past (Christ’s appearance) and common future (expectation of the Second Coming).

Christianity (in the person of Augustine) carried out the unification of horizontal line of historical time with the vertical line of “Eternity” by showing that the vertical line bisects the soul’s present moment (“experience of eternity” is given to each person). “Fullness of times” has already come for each person, who identifies himself with Christ, who is regarded as the center of time, and of history.

As each person chooses between God and sin, then and now, Christianity is focused on the maximum value-content of the present. The lifetime of an individual inscribed in a lasting “whole” of Christian history becomes more complete. All the times (past, present, future) are “connected” and arranged in a single thread, with the center in the present which is related to eternity. When the horizontal line of time and the vertical line of eternity joined in the mental present, there was an impression of the real “fullness” of time. Life in time filled with eternal meaning. Time ceases to be a symbol of absurdity and chaos; it gradually turns into a servant of man and his instrument.

NEW CONCEPTIONS IN MODERN TIME

The culture of modern time is aimed at the value of the person’s existence, considering him/her as a dying being. “Timeless eternity” is not the main thing now, but the ephemeral instant because of its uniqueness. The most rational attitude to time was completely accepted by modern Western civilization, which comes from the idea of finite existence and the possibility of finding the meaning of life during our short life.

Assigned by Modern Time the aim of time includes:

• Giving a definition of the term “time”, considering it as a historical, cultural, philosophical and scientific phenomenon (development of conceptions of historical, physical, biological, psychological time, time of culture).
• Time optimization and rationalization, including time management.
• The most comprehensive fulfillment of a person’s entity by means of acquiring time.
• Acquiring the present moment and the realization of man in the present.

Modernization was grasped under ideas of Seneca, who said that time was the main treasure of the humanity. Now time can also be sold and bought, not only saved. New attitudes towards time made everybody appreciate every single moment, instead of delaying life, hoping for a forth-
coming eternity. Modernism estimates the waste of time as the biggest crime.

The new image of time is the most rational, measurable (both qualitatively and quantitatively) and easy to control. The idea of rationally organized success and the idea of progress as a deliberately modeled possible future replaced the idea of fate (as a view of time, which covers it completely, or from the position of eternity).

Rational thinking of the modern person has overemphasized historical time and identified it with the main value. But this overemphasized position naturally brought humankind to devaluation of human subjectivism as a source of the meaning and center of time and brought humankind to ethical nihilism. Levi-Bruhl denied the morality of primitive peoples, because they did not conceive of past and the future, searching for eternity. But his “characters” also have reason to deny morality to “civilized peoples”, who can conceive only the past and the future (and do not know eternity). The conception of history as permanent progress, which replaced the eternity by historical time, annihilated the meaning of time. But the meaning of life can exist only in the case of the junction of the time and the eternity.

POST MODERNITY: TIME AND ETERNITY OF THE VIRTUAL WORLD

Post modernity is characterized by the opposite, nonlinear attitude towards the time. This time is the time of virtual reality. It is multidimensional and reversible, discrete and irrational, unsteady, multiple path, theoretically endless and faultless (because the game can be replayed with better leads). Virtual reality is a modern form of myth, where all cherished dreams and wishes may come true, but without existential meaning.

Virtual reality as well as myth cannot be in the past or in the future, it can be only in the present, it is in the present forever. This experience of time’s absence is like the psychological experience of eternity. The world is oriented to a person’s space and is geared into it. The virtual world as well as myth has its dream characteristics. Person can re-experience one situation many times. Few or even many deaths are possible in virtual reality. There is no hedge between reality and fantasy, the past and the future in the virtual world as well as in myth or in dream.

The “other world” completely simulates inner reality, but it is not physical reality, it is the situation of the inner world, including complicated mix of objective and subjective time. As a result, person in the virtual world cannot make difference between real and virtual world and he also faces the problem of differentiating the types of reality archaic myth had the same problems. A person gets used to the multiplicity, alternativity of a situation, lack of restrictions, which are only in objective world. Reduction of responsibility, devaluation of surrounding reality, lack of life values, is a natural result of reload.
There are new risks for a human in new conditions: time disappears, the moral subject is dying. The moral position (self-awareness which has been formed over thousands of years of Christian religion and traditional philosophy) disappears and dyes. This disappearance of self-esteem mechanisms leads to “fundamental loss of orientation”, loss of values and meanings of life. The disappearance of time includes the appearance of new forms of eternity. However, the shapes of post modernity are just now coming and we cannot jump to conclusions. From ancient times we have been taught that the future in historical time is an inexhaustible source of possibilities, and these are virtual.

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2.3 Aesthetic Context of Spirituality
CHAPTER XXIV

SYMBOLISM OF CULTURES AND THE SPIRITUAL ARCHETYPE OF HUMANKIND

SERGEY NIZHNIKOV

As a process the spiritual discloses the essence of a person as nothing else but self-cognition. In the act of self-knowledge a person is given to itself, but in a paradoxical way, so, that he is a special essence that is in the dark concerning its own nature. Therefore the first precept applied to a person from God, became a commandment, “know thyself”. In history it arises for the first time as an inscription on the Apollonian temple in Delphi, then it is repeated by Thales, and it becomes the meaning of life for Socrates. It appears as Plato’s theory about knowledge as reminiscence of a complete kind. The same requirement is proclaimed in religion, though in the form specific to it, it becomes also the basic theme of art, especially in Aeschylus’s tragedies in Ancient Greece, in the Indian Bhagavad-Gītā and even in the Epic of Gilgamesh in ancient Mesopotamia.

The ordering of various approaches to the spiritual and to its displays in various cultures already comprises some kind of understanding of the subject. As a result of research a certain invariant of a spiritual phenomenon – which various cultures contain – comes to be known. At the same time, realization of the spiritual in different fields of a person’s activity does not destroy its specificity. So, whether it is the East or the West, religion, philosophy or art, despite all variety of forms, appearance and understanding, the spiritual comprises something essentially uniform that comes out of the position of the person in the world regardless of the culture or spiritual tradition to which one belongs. This intrinsic unity can be defined as a spiritual archetype of humankind.

Research on the spiritual problematic and on the concept of the spiritual through the logic of its development results in an integrated and holistic approach to a spiritual phenomenon. The spiritual archetype of humankind represents by itself the essence of a person in a developed, but formal manner, demanding existential addition by a personal sense in the life of each human being. This spiritual knowledge as self-cognition, remembering or deployment of what has already been initially incorporated, requires definition of essence of the final goal. The spiritual archetype represents such a cell as it were that grows into the plant of spiritual culture.

The process of unfolding of a person’s essence and the display of spiritual archetype of humankind is already determined from the conceptual and abstract side, but when meeting the concrete material, many problems appear. The archetype is uniform, but it develops the material of various cultures and shapes in various languages that are defined by different
concepts and symbols. Subsequently this results in religious wars, philosophical contradictions and, eventually, it results in an imaginary opposition of cultures and civilizations. In order to remove the above-stated contradictions, it is necessary to examine the sources of the various cultures; for only then will their intrinsic unity become clear. The person who has already deeply existentially peered into himself carries within himself such universal knowledge, and reflection on his essence can make clear the codes of the various cultures.

But a person can tell about his spiritual experience only symbolically, using this or that language. A person is created in such a way that he should go through the spiritual only personally. Language and symbols can only give him a hint at this experience, and call for it. The symbol, being condensed and incorporating all the treasures of culture, becomes its archetype, which culture, in its turn, should disclose in the historical process. In order to move closer to the definition of archetype, it is necessary at least briefly to explain, what a symbol is and what is its role in culture.

First of all in the present context a symbol is treated broadly. Any concept except in the view of absolute realism or Hegel’s ontological panlogism, is a symbol containing the logos of reality, but in the specific form due to the mode of human perception and determined by culture.

The well known Russian philosopher of the twentieth century, A.F. Losev (1893–1988), defined a symbol as “a concept saturated by a semantic image”, and as such it “can have an infinite amount of values”. (Losev, 1976:199, 130) That is why a symbol differs from an abstract concept in that it does not lose its contents, volume and existential meaning. Besides within a symbol as the highest aspirations of a human spirit, one’s material and bodily being meet, reflect each other, coexist and interact in a vivid and contradictive harmony. The basic symbols of cultural archetypes reflect this antipathy: in God – in the humanity of Christ, Krishna and Buddha. Matter meets spirit and human being, and culture or symbol comes to exist. A symbol, having no limits in its semantic profoundness, especially as archetype of one or another culture or of the whole humankind, cannot be exhausted. So a symbol plays the role of a cognitive principle. It has a special symbolic logic as an integral part, and releases this inner formal and dialectical logic. This logic cannot be casually exhausted because it is the logic of the semantic and value. It comprehends fundamental problems of a personal being through semantic images that would be easily destroyed if displayed in rational partition. As example, we cannot divide, i.e., disintegrate, the concept of conscience or virtue it is also impossible to restrict them to casual relations. Reason can analyze only in series, but within the symbol there is already ordered all possible horizons of reasonable acts. A single symbol can include endless problematic, – it is possible to pull out kilometers of logical threads, to write thousands of books. A symbol, especially as an archetype of this or that culture regulates the field of cognition with a human being inside it. Besides all mentioned above and contrary to a simple concept a symbol comprises all intrinsic human powers, not only thought
but faith, not only reason but experience and so on. Symbol plays a special role from the point of view of spiritual cognition as deployment of the human essence. In this case it serves as a cell and possibility of cultural development, executing a creative function in respect to the culture and to human consciousness. In conformity with Mircea Eliade’s idea

The symbol makes the world ‘open’…it is through symbols that man…‘opens himself….Symbols awaken individual experience and transmute it into a spiritual act, into metaphysical comprehension of the world…a man of the premodern societies can attain to the highest spirituality, for, by understanding the symbol, he succeeds in living the universal. (Mircea Eliade, 1961:211-212)

Ernst Kassirer, rooted in the Marburg tradition of Neo-Kantianism, devoted a lot of attention to the problem of symbol. Unfortunately the philosopher based on Kantian and nominalism methodology failed to move beyond a dialectical comprehension of the symbol absolutizing its subjective-functional side and eliminating the ontological aspect of any symbolized reality. In his early work he writes: “The truth of cognition ceases to be merely an appearance it transforms into pure function.” (Kassirer, 1912:56)

In this A.F. Losev is partly in agreement with “What is ontology? – There he poses the question. – There is no being outside of the idea”. But as there is no being for a man outside the same idea there is no idea outside being for otherwise there is the danger of flowing into a symbolic functionalisms and relativity that destroy any ontology. That is why Losev treats the ontological basis of the idea and symbol. (Losev, 1993:791) The spiritual archetype of humankind comprises ontological reality but transfers it in a symbolic way. Everything said about a symbol also relates to an archetype that is the symbol of symbols and the eidos of cultures.

In order to express the spiritual archetype of humankind as a concept that comprises a certain contents it is necessary to find out what it means. For this purpose we have to turn to C.G. Jung’s theory about archetypes as mechanisms of culture that organize the psychic and spiritual life of a man. Yet his teacher, S. Freud, in his work Totem and taboo wrote: “...we rely on the supposition of a mass psychy having the same processes that happen in life of an individual person.” And further: “Sensual process...is spreading within new generations,” and in case this constant flow would not happen in culture “then there would not be any progress at all”. His main task the researcher saw as understanding “in what way is created the necessary continuity of the psychic life of constantly changing generations.” (Freud, 1997:166-167)

Here we can see the beginning of the discovery of archetypes that were later have been developed by Jung. In many of his works Freud approaches the problem of archetypes. In his work Mass psychology and analysis of the human I, he cites the words of Le Bon (1841–1931) from the
book *The Psychology of Peoples* (1895) that influenced him greatly: “Our conscious acts originate from unconscious substance created under the influence of strain. This substance comprises countless strains of ancestors, out of which the racial soul is created”. (Freud, 1992:259; Le Bon, 2011: book 1, ch.1) Freud tried himself to construct symbols of the human psyche and cultural interpretations not just cognitive and analytical symbols but structural symbols relating to human cognition, for example such fundamental symbols of this kind as the “Oedipus complex”.

In his research Jung extended a correlation between phenomena of the human psyche and cultural symbols of humankind. He tried to create the language for reading ancient symbolic clues concealed not only within the monuments of culture but also within the sole of each person. Jung practically discovered such a functional character of human consciousness as its ability for the creation of symbols and myths. “Is it possible for people to escape myth?” – He asks and then brings us to the conclusion that all forms of human relations towards the world and forms of self-cognition are symbolic by their intrinsic nature. Not only art and religion are flooded with symbols, but philosophy and science (that from a certain point of view can be considered as the mythology of contemporary man) as well. In the consciousness of the modern person UFOs (unidentified flying objects) have taken the place of the religious visions of the Middle Ages and the miracles of ascetic-saints have been replaced by tricks of persons with “extrasensory perceptions”.

The archetype concept constitutes the core of Jung’s theory. He borrowed the term from ancient Greek language where it represented some initial image. Through an analysis of the introverted character of the human psyche the psychologist fills imbued this concept with the following meaning:

> Introverted intuition cognizes images that comes from the apriory, i.e. as a result of inheriting the existing basis of unconscious spirit. These archetypes have an intrinsic secrecy beyond the access of experience for they represent the psychic residue of the ancestor family i.e., the collection through millions of repetitions and condensed in the experience of generic types of organic being. That is why these archetypes comprise all experience that occurred on this planet since very ancient times. (Jung, 1938:83)

This saying of Jung makes clear that archetypes have as apriory nature which effects the becoming of human spiritual realm and the functioning of the psyche. The archetypes can display themselves only through different kinds of symbolic systems: ideas, concepts and images.

The next intrinsic characteristic discovered by Jung are: their primitive state and collectivity. An archetype shows a collective unconscious “not so much of the individual but mostly of the collective”. (Jung,
Some of us may think that these conclusions are not grounded but then it is necessary to recall that not long ago cybernetics and genetic were considered pseudo-science. But as far as the science that researches coding and transmission of biological information from one generation of the human family to another exists, why can we not assume the same kind of translation through psychic and spiritual sphere of the human family? This hypothesis is confirmed by more and more new scientific facts. This translation can be seen more distinctly in art. The more the genius of works of art, the more information of general values of the human and family they contain, regardless of direct dependence of time, place, epoch or nation.

In his later work *Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* Jung makes use of the archetype theory for understanding some initial symbols of Western civilization’s both Ancient and Christian cultures. The idea of archetype is the “collective basis of individual psychic life being by nature super individual”: (Jung, 1991:98) Thus the archetype obtains a dialectical interpretation as its collectiveness is reflected in individual personal form. The Christian symbols have recognized and reorganized the psychic world of a person in such a fundamental way that they create a new type of culture and spiritual way for a human being to imbue up his life with a new sense. In the beginning of this mentioned work Jung contemplating the history of culture finds there confirmation of his doctrine in the personalities of great ancient symbolists, among whom are: Plato, Philo Judaean (Alexandrian), Augustine and Dionysius the Aereopagite. An increased of activity in creating symbols always coincides with the epochs of transitional periods. The new Christian culture needed fundamental development of its own system of symbolism for affirming the new comprehension of the world and of his personality.

Then Jung continues with the analysis of epoch of the Reformation in Western Europe that was destructive blow to the Christian symbolic and released a person from ceremonials, leaving him alone before God. But a man cannot bear this kind of freedom and virtue turns into crisis. In twentieth century these processes start to achieve a catastrophic magnitude: the former symbols have lost their attracting power for man but he cannot admit the emptiness of consciousness so the empty place may be occupied by all kinds of symbols belonging to other cultures even if distorted in appearance. But Jung says that ideas of other cultures cannot solve the problem of a psychic vacuum in a Western person: “The inheritance of Christian symbolic form belongs to us by right, he writes, unfortunately we have lost it somewhere”. On the other hand he insists that “the increasing shortage of symbols is not that senseless” (Jung, 1991:106) because mere literal returning to the old symbolic and to ritual forms based on it is impossible for it has drained itself in the history. But at the same time a new all-embracing metaphysical comprehension by man of his new position and of the surrounding world has not yet been formed. Man is as if balancing on the edge of an abyss.
But the insignificance of psychic experience of the becoming of culture at the time of Jung does not allow him to move further, to look more profoundly at the object of research. It seems that this is only within the power of philosophy. Nevertheless, an analysis of Jung’s doctrine of archetypes empties the concept of spiritual archetype of humankind to which he came very close. Jung has not derived a uniform formula of archetypes of culture and symbols. Perhaps this is the task of future humanitarian research. But even now, we can make a theoretical approach to the unity of human spirit manifestation regardless of specific nations, religions and cultures. The things that still are difficult to be proven by empirical science may be solved within the power of speculation.

Archetypes find their manifestation not only through the psyche of a person and its unconscious level. In a pure psychic sphere at the level of consciousness it is disclosed through fundamental religious symbols and metaphysical categories, as well as through masterpieces of art. For example Hegel said frankly about the secret sense of the philosophical structures of his work dated 1796 *First program of German idealism:* “Monotheism of reason and heart, polytheism of imagination and art – this is what we need. We should fulfill our duty to ideas and the mythology of the reason”. (Hegel, 1975:212-213) Socrates characterized the highest level of philosophy as symbol-creating ideas. The same level was achieved by Plato, when for the first time, he represented the spiritual archetype of humankind not only in mythological but also in symbolic conceptual form. In this sense an idea is a metaphor born as a result of spiritual archetype of humankind deployed during the process of cognition. H. Bergson, in this connection, wrote that the theory of ideas “contains also concealed principles of philosophy, innate to our intellect”. (Bergson, 1914:286) Out of that it is possible to draw the conclusion that the spiritual archetype of humankind containing the human essence is deployed in *logos, theos* and art. The initial spiritual embryo has three ways for its realization. In the sphere of philosophy thought it is represented by a fundamental kind of thought forms that in different cultures are presented as *Aum – Tao – Logos*. A.E. Lukyanov determines the initial spiritual embryo through the concept of a prime ancestor out of which begin both, philosophical discursiveness and religion. (Lukyanov, 1989:5) The role of prime ancestor may be played either by Zeus or Krishna, who retain the reminiscence as of a human being. As a universal man Prajapati and Purusha in the ancient Indian consciousness also has established a socio-gnosis spiritual archetype. Christ represents for Christian culture the spiritual archetype in absolute form. Having deployed His essence to the utmost perfection and profundness He becomes God and the accumulated man.

The concept of spiritual archetype as the essence of a man that deploys itself during the process of spiritual cognition and which occurs in *theos, logos or creativity*, removes the contradictions of cultures, religion and philosophy, though variety characterizes truth. The spiritual archetype expresses the highest aspiration of human spirit, reflects the position of a
man in the world on a spiritual level, and contains the goal of development of a man and of humankind, their ultimate perfection and ideal. Nicholas of Cusa interprets his understanding of this representing it through revelation about theos:

In case you consider humankind as a form of some absolute being, mixed with nothing and not represented in anything concrete and will consider a man in which this absolute mankind is represented in absolute form and from whom descends the concrete mankind of separate human being, then the absolute mankind will be as likeliness of God and the concrete one as likeliness of the Universe...absolute mankind is present in a man as inborn or primary.... (Nicholas of Cusa, 1979:112)

The Russian philosopher S.N. Bulgakov (1871–1944), referring to the novel of A.P. Chekhov On Official Business, accuses each single man of every possible fault. The main character of the story considered himself guilty in the beginning of the Russia-Japan war and of the Russian catastrophe at Tsushima.

We are forced to admit that besides the personal responsibility of a man for his individual actions there are also conscience patrimonial feelings, not just a fantasy, but real and common to all human consciousness present inside any individual. Its voice may be more or less distinctive, sometimes not heard at all, but it exists, this mysterious secret voice, and it says: everyone is responsible for all, the mankind is a solidary unity and there is no possibility to draw a border within this living unity and to stipulate where is the end of responsibility of this or that man. (Bulgakov, 1993:66-67)

This same phenomenon of guiltiness we can easily understand based on the concept of spiritual archetype of humankind says Dostoevsky through one of his personages – monastic elder Zosima in Brothers Karamazov.

Disclosing, the intrinsic essence of a man intensifies the moral obligations and conscience of a person, makes him realize metaphysical guilt and responsibility not only for him but for anything alive and for the world as a whole. Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965) had such kind of consciousness; he left comfortable life in Europe and went to jungles of Africa to treat people. The same kind of consciousness does not permit Leo Tolstoy to eat his fill at the time when there exists hunger in the world, and when small children suffer from starvation somewhere. When the spiritual archetype appears in a person, he begins to see the essence of each man, and this vision gives birth to love.
Though S.N. Bulgakov notes that in empirical existence humankind is not a unity and that for him “the unity exists just as a problem, norm or ideal, nevertheless a person developed in a spiritual way presents by himself the love and the unity that as an ideal should be achieved in history” (Bulgakov, 1993:68), because the spiritual archetype is effected not only as the historical one, but first of all, existentially within a person, and only then as demonstrated in the history. Besides, Aristotle stated that “the later that is becoming is the first in the essence”. (Metaphysics 1050a 5)

In common consciousness the spiritual archetype may look like the social ideal in the past or in the future, in fact the archetype can show itself only here and now: eternity can be materialized in the present moment of reality. In case a person demonstrates love, goodness and beauty in his common life, then it means that through his acts the archetype is deployed in the history.

The concept of archetype is expressed in the philosophy of culture and language of Wilhelm Humboldt (1767–1835):

There is a known circle of general ideas that exist everywhere just as they are, in thoughts and feelings rather than incoming from outside. Among them the ideas that make up the basis of religion, structure of States, social, family and individual life....These ideas are the essential powers of nations forming....

Then the thinker in his work Philosophy of Culture and Language writes:

Under the whole mentioned here it is necessary to suppose not the mankind that lives now or has been living some other time, but the idea of humankind as a human clan in general. It finds its partial reflection in each nation and in each individual, and due to possible relations among people that live at the same time and within each epoch, but as whole can exist within a never to be achieved totality of all coming steadily into reality as separate phenomenon. It is impossible to imagine that the idea of humankind in its time boundaries would be able to spread and move aside the ancient creation keystones....But it is possible and necessary that the essence of humankind slowly and steadily becomes more clear, as fundamentality within has given limits the spirit in its partial realization of this aspiration for the idea of humankind (just as the idea You is apprehended as I), as the idea of the divinity that is of power and justice in its wholesome purity. (Humboldt, 1985:284-285)

The present perception of the history as spiritual self-revelation was expressed by Hegel at the abstract-cognition level.
At the same time, the empirical analysis of various traditions shows us some principal differences in spiritual cognition in the East and in the West, disclosing specifics of world outlook, of conception and methodology. In conformity with this point of view, the Western religious-philosophy ideology, based on Abrahamic revelation, shows that the truth is of transcendent personalistic origin, when the Eastern one does not separate the transcendent and the immanent, inclining to pantheism. Spiritual cognition in the West perceives the origin of being as a personality, whence comes its personalistic orientation; the East dissolves the egoistic human being in the universal: Atman in Brahman (India), individual in Tao (China). In the West a spiritual way is the salvation of a subject by the Absolute Personality, but in the East it means a liberation and emancipation that a person carries out by himself. The difference between these concepts has as a principle character that determines the selection of the means of spiritual cognition: in the West it is a prayer as devotion to a transcendent source, in the East it is more like a psycho-physical training, meditation. In the first case it is necessary to speak about faith, in the other one about yoga or Taos alchemies.

Faith presents the only means of cognition of the transcendent source that goes beyond intellect. Faith has ability to grant an immediate salvation and in this case there is no need for liberation since salvation comprises it. The denial of faith calls for years of methodical training, working upon one’s own body and consciousness for obtaining the desired goal.

In the West the gnostic ideal is the process of divinizing as approaching the Absolute Personality, in the East gnosis should we use the term divinizing means elimination of the individual egoistic features of a subject. Divinizing (coming from Greek, θεωσία – theosis) is – the goal and explication of religious life that is characterized by an ecstatic experience of uniting with absolute. Through historical analogue and examples of divinizing we find in the very ancient period of shaman-orgiastic cults that were directed toward the ecstatic elimination of the distance between a person and gods (world of spirits). Nevertheless the divinizing in its literal sense appears only when spiritual cognition comes to the concept of a transcendent Personality – personalistic theism. In orthodox systems of theism (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) the absolute is represented by the personality of God and uniting with him (divinizing) is reflected not as fusion, (that is, not by essence) but “by grace”, in Christianity – as “adorption”, uniting not of intrinsically but energetically. This is a result of dialogical relations of personalities (of God and of human being). This conception of divinizing was first time implied in the Old Testament tradition. It appeared as a term in ancient Greek philosophy and was further and fundamentally developed in the spiritual – ascetic theology of Christianity, Sufism, etc.

The difference in comprehension of divinizing in pre-Christian, outer-Christian and Christian cultures is fundamental. It can be expressed as divinizing in Christianity based on the faith concept in its speculative-religious sense. Christian gnosis is the faith as the highest kind of cognition
and knowledge for the incomprehensible, transcendent God, beyond the reach of intellectual cognition, may be disclosed owing exclusively to faith and Revelation. This faith can be revealed through love towards the transcendent source and towards a human being as well.

At the same time we cannot deny the ability to transcend as a method of spiritual cognition in the East. Meditation specific to the East is the same way as faith of going beyond one’s own egoistic limits. The Eurocentrism that is based on an Abraham-centric stresses on the differences between the West and the East based on the contradiction of faith and meditation is a shallow doctrine. Methods of obtaining immediate truth are known not only to the West but also to Chinese Buddhism and Japan and the concept of liberation even literally assumes the presence of a subject to be “liberated”. The unity of Atman with Brahman, Taoist with Tao may be considered not only as or like a process of dissolving the subject in a Higher Universal source that is accompanied by the loss of self-consciousness but also as a process of individual self-consciousness expansion till infinity. (Tao and Taoism in China, 1982)

Access to a similar universalism is retained in the potential of any spiritual tradition owing to the uniformity of spiritual cognition. First of all this is its metaphysic foundaion that consists of the concept of a transcendent being, which cannot be totally disclosed by a single tradition, then the unity of spiritual experience in its practical aspect of achieving the highest gnostics basing characteristics are also universal (abstinence, humility, silence, impassivity, penitence, grace, love etc.). This unity is not in metaphysic, but in the substantial aspect of Sufi and East-Christian gnosis, e.g. the concept of love. Since God is love then divine love is the highest gnosti in its practical aspect. Love takes the concept of gnosti beyond its specific manifestations, vividly expressed by Ibn Arabī: “I follow the religion of love and regardless what way camels of love should choose, that will be my religion, my faith”. (Filshtinsky, 1989:32)

Spiritual traditions of the West and the East, though different in methods of spiritual cognition of the truth, are united by their results. This unity is embodied in the spiritual archetype of humankind and in the essence of a man. These are united, but can be disclosed with the help of different methods. The essence of a man is discloses itself through philosophizing ~ by methods of thought that research the truth; through faith in religion that expresses goodness; through activity in the sphere of art that creates beauty. This distinction is formal because all these spheres are closely interconnected and the archetype exists as a whole or a unity. But each sphere represents its spiritual manifestation as a whole, but uses a specific way and method. Such comprehension of the spiritual archetype of humankind introduces certain clarity that eliminates the contradictions, for all the cultures of humankind reflect the united archetype, concealed by a clothing of different symbols. In an archetype everything is prescribed in a unity that from the very beginning, in terms not of time but of substance, to which spiritual cognition, is directed, tries to acquire its whole appearance.
The spiritual archetype of humankind can disclose itself in history through the realization of each personality, – through a deployment of its essence.

The spiritual attitude to life began to appear where a person started to comprehend life metaphysically from his position in the world. Based on such judgment the representation of Plato’s idea was born; an idea about the ideal relation to life, i.e., the spiritual appeared. The idea as a spiritual vision is expressed most adequately in Plato’s philosophy though not without some problems. In religion the metaphysical comprehension of life is fixed on its central symbol. Through such a symbol or idea for human consciousness there arises the possibility of an entry into the spiritual. This is the realization by a person of his spiritual life. Christ, Buddha, Plato have managed to penetrate into the spiritual essence of a person in the world and to express it in symbols and concepts. Their positions contain speculative truth which is demonstrated on the material of various cultures and through various methods. As the spiritual knowledge concerns neither the abilities of a person, nor what he has but what he is in his essence, the spiritual truth is he himself on the highest level of the sense of his being once the essence of a person is completely developed which results in the appearance of the spiritual archetype of humankind. For this reason Christ said “I am an entrance”, and al-Hallaj, – “I am the Truth”.

Summarizing all the aforementioned we shall repeat the most essential. Behind all the forms and manifestations in the culture of spiritual phenomena hides invariant the spiritual archetype of humankind. A researcher of ancient mythology J.E. Golosovker wrote of the presence of an “imaginative cultural absolute”, in which are condensed all images and senses. The spiritual archetype can be drawn in the shape of an isosceles triangle the apexes of which are Truth, Virtue and Beauty. Making a circle that connects them we get Love. The circle as whole, means Being, All-Unity, Goodness, God, – depending on the tradition and symbol that is used.

![Truth (Philosophy)](attachment:image)

Goodness (Religion) Beauty (Art)

Goodness is mostly represented by religion. Beauty is expressed in and by arts. Truth is represented by philosophy.

This is the spiritual triangle that we can find in each culture under different symbols.
What unites these three points is Love at its highest representation.

Love is the highest level of spiritual cognition. If a person discloses this archetype within him then he will be able to see it in other people, which is the bases of real life.

When we discover it conflicts between cultures disappear. This is the main problems nowadays. But we understand that we all share something that is universal. At the same time this archetype is the essence of each human being. Speaking in terms of ancient Indian philosophy Atman is the essence of each human being and Brahman is universal God. So the moment we get in contact with Atman we get to know Brahman, God.

Self-cognition is characterized by the process of humanizing a person, so it results in his humanization. Such knowledge is the supreme kind of creativity, which is self-mastering. In terms of an ideally achieved spiritual perfection it is possible to think of a person who has developed his essence, has humanized him or herself, and has opened the spiritual archetype of humankind within themselves. This spirit can bloom for the person’s self-consciousness as a first inner revelation if the person searches for it inside him or herself. So this spirit will bloom as a form of contemplation in which all intrinsic forces of a person result in the supreme harmony and perfection when the essence of a person is completely realized in its existence, history and culture.

In the present research we have concentrated upon the analysis of the issues that are general and that unite all human cultures and all people, but this should not degrade the specific peculiarities of each of them. Owing to the variety of cultures the spiritual archetype of humankind becomes more fundamental and colorful.

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REFERENCES

CHAPTER XXV
UNRAVELLING THE SPIRAL,
EMBRACING THE SERPENT

JACK HARTE

When the Irish sculptor, Fred Conlon, died in 2004, his life-long friend, the writer Jack Harte, decided to produce a book that would display the range and richness of Conlon’s work and generate an awareness of it among the public. Conlon drew inspiration from the Neolithic landscape of his native Sligo, but was particularly fascinated by Newgrange. The spiral motif was an on-going subject in his work, both in stone and in bronze. When Harte began to probe this fascination with Newgrange and the spiral, his insights illuminated not only Conlon’s intuitions but the very meaning of the spiral and the significance of the Newgrange monument itself. But it also solved an enigma that Harte had been baffled by heretofore, the demonization of the serpent and the symbolism of Ouroboros, the snake devouring its own tail.

On Monday, 17th May, 2004, the sculptor, Fred Conlon, my cousin, next-door-neighbour, life-long friend, took ill; a brain tumour was diagnosed and he was given nine months to live. He died on 24th February, 2005.

Despite the diagnosis, despite a family history in which seven of his siblings had died young before him, Fred met the challenge to his life with fierce determination and ferocious optimism. But his physical deterioration was rapid and horrific. A man whose hands had been endowed with all the skill, all the facility, the gods could bestow, struggled to light a cigarette.

I visited him frequently at his home in Tully during his illness and was amazed by his philosophic acceptance of his fate, but also his determination and optimism. He talked about adapting to the new reality: he could no longer carve stone, but he could draw and paint. He could also write, I suggested. And I was not joking; he could express himself extremely well, could even turn a poem, when he put pen to paper. But, as I feared the worst and had an intuition that I would be writing a book about him one day, I really wanted him to record his views and ideas on art, especially to provide an insight into the creative process behind each of his sculptures. Recognising that he was not able to sustain the act of writing, I gave him a Dictaphone. But he could not manipulate the machine. However, Kathleen, his wife, and Orla, his daughter, said they would make a point of recording statements and conversations.

When Kathleen afterwards showed me the diary she had kept over those harrowing months, I found it painful to read. The reflections on art were scant; life and death had taken centre stage. It was an account of day-
to-day tribulation, escalating to absolute torture as weeks passed, as his condition worsened, as hope slowly ebbed.

His speculations were more or less what I expected. I knew Fred well enough, after a lifetime of friendship, to be familiar with his thought patterns and his ideas. What I really was expecting now was an indication of his final mindset as he approached death, his final attitude to life and the afterlife. There was one phrase, repeated a few times, which I thought reflected Fred’s way of thinking, in a typically symbolic image: ‘the second dance of the spiral’. Here are two entries from Kathleen’s diary in which he mentions this concept:

5th June... Fred talking...

I am not necessarily religious. I am a spiritual being, I sense spirituality. I feel lucky to have this sense, I feel the second dance of the spiral brings me into ongoing-ness. This symbol belonged to the ancient Celts, which is meaningful to me now because it brings me into contact with a feeling of flow – the flow of goodness, the greatness of God and the goodness of humanity. Since coming back to Sligo I feel this flow strongly – close family, friends, and strangers. My new learning is wisdom so that I can be gracious. It is all about regeneration, energy flowing back into me and strengthening me. All energy must be put into being positive, no halfway house – the will to survive – the will to get better. Outside of us there is a power greater than all of us. It is pointless asking what went wrong. Even if I knew the answer, it would not make me feel better. If there were burdens, they are yesterday’s burdens – All will be well.

12th June...

My work has been in conjunction with the spiral. The centre is everything. There is nothing without a point of energy. There is in nature and man a great centre of force. Where this power comes from is the big question. For me, what matters now is to be part of that continuity, the second dance of the spiral. My energies are going into the positive flow. This will give me courage and sustenance. I think of this energy as God. I need to have a power greater than myself.

At first glance I thought this might be an insight into Fred’s vision of the afterlife. But a second glance, at the date, convinced me that, consciously at least, he was still engaging with life itself. He had returned home after his operation and was still determined to get better, still optimistic.

The spiral was one of Fred’s favourite motifs. He made explicit and implicit use of it in many of his works. Symbolically, it reflected very well his own approach to spiritual exploration and intellectual investigation, with its dual movement, inwards in eternal introspection, outwards in an openness to others, to humanity, to the world. Alternately, the movement could be seen as down into the local, the personal environment, upwards and outwards towards the universe. Either way, going around the spiral twice appears something of a conundrum.
Fred talks of the spiral as being Celtic, but of course it was carved on to ritual stones long before the Celts, or Celtic culture, arrived in Ireland. It was these sacred stones that haunted his imagination, inspired extraordinary feeling for a material that had gestated in the womb of the earth over millions of years, that had emerged to be shaped and decorated by our ancestors thousands of years ago and by him during his own lifetime.

Fred’s use of the spiral was that of the symbolist: the image was symbolic, it represented something more than itself, something deeper, which was not and could not be defined. Yet when the mind meditated on the image it was led on to planes of significance and meaning beyond the grasp of rational thought. And if we follow the path of his exploration, then we will understand a little better the sculptures he based on the spiral, but also gain an insight into the mind and soul of the sculptor. When Fred set down his interpretation of his insight, he related it consciously to God, in the Christian sense, the creative force in the universe, the focal point of his spirituality. But, ironically, if we go further along the path he was following it will bring us back to a pre-Christian concept of God, and to a much better understanding of Fred’s subconscious deep spirituality.

So what are these spirals, so popular with our Neolithic ancestors, that inspired so many of Fred’s pieces, and that his mind turned to now as he struggled with his fatal illness? And what was he talking about, dancing around the spiral a second time? One conceives of the spiral as a continuous movement, going outwards, or inwards, even in both directions simultaneously – but how does one go around a second time? The first thing we must accept is that, for Fred, the spiral was significant or symbolic, not just a decorative motif. Neither Fred nor the ancients used motifs solely for decoration. And this motif was prevalent in the artwork of many early civilizations.

In order to understand the significance of such a motif to the ancients, it is necessary to shed totally our knowledge of science and the whole databank of information our modern mind has accumulated, using our imagination to project ourselves into the mind of prehistoric man. The ancients looked in awe and reverence at natural phenomena, observed the cycles and processes in nature, and did exactly as we do, tried to make sense of them. Above them their sky was filled with a dazzling array of heavenly bodies that baffled them, but on which they imposed a meaning, an explanation, a concept, so that they could relate to them in a significant way. Of course to them the earth they stood on was the centre of the universe with the heavenly bodies moving around them and their earth in strange irregular but predictable paths.

The most significant of these phenomenal bodies was of course the sun. And our ancient ancestors observed the effect of the sun’s heat on the earth and how their very existence depended on it. The sun’s rays touching the earth caused growth, enabled life. So they saw the earth as female being fertilized by the rays of the male sun. They studied the annual circuit of the sun and it appeared to them that it followed the path of a spiral (in mathe-
mathematics a conic helix, because strictly speaking a spiral is two-dimensional, it belongs on a single plane, but we will run with the looser term). To an observer looking south, from the summer solstice to the winter solstice the daily path of the sun, rising and setting, appears to follow that of a spiral moving inwards, from the winter solstice to the summer solstice that of a spiral moving outwards.

When our ancient sculptors put chisel to stone in order to depict this cycle of the sun, they captured it in the spiral image. At first it was a simple single spiral, with loose ends inside and outside, which was of course a depiction of only a half-year’s cycle. They also had to address the very different nature of the two half-year cycles. For the first half of the year, the spiral was uncoiling, was creative, giving more and more heat. Then after the summer solstice the cycle was destructive, less and less heat, with growth turning to decay. So they developed a more satisfactory image, a pair of spirals where the moving point starts at the centre of one and maintaining a clockwise movement rotates to the outer ring of that spiral, then swings on to the outer ring of the other and continues in an anti-clockwise direction to the centre of that one (see Kerbstone 67). These counter-balancing positive and negative spirals, with clockwise and anti-clockwise patterns depict the opposition between the Spring/Summer creative cycle and the Autumn/Winter destructive cycle. And when the highly sophisticated sculptors who created the entrance stone at Newgrange (see illustration) applied themselves to depicting this annual circuit of the sun, they created a single spiral that moves from a perimeter in towards the centre, converging on a centre point, but then turning around through that centre point and moving outwards again along a parallel path. Again, the movement inwards is anti-clockwise, outwards is clockwise, representing the half year of decay leading to the half year of growth. And if we look at the image as a unit, it is a positive spiral counterbalanced by a negative one, very similar to the yang-yin symbol in Chinese art.

Now, like the sculptors, let us focus on the mystical centre point of this Newgrange spiral (mathematically a Fermat’s Spiral). This is the point (which is all the more mysterious and elusive because the movement is continuous) at which the negative changes to positive, anti-clockwise to clockwise. It is the winter solstice. It is the moment when the decay of autumn and winter gives way to the growth of spring and summer.

The Newgrange monument was the basilica of our Neolithic ancestors to this mystical moment in nature. The entrance stone is a sort of marriage stone, festooned with spirals representing the sun superimposed on lozenge shapes, distorted squares, the traditional symbol of earth. At the centre of the monument is a chamber set into a huge mound, and the chamber is accessed through a narrow passage. The chamber is clearly both a tomb and a womb, the tomb of the old negative cycle, the womb of the new positive one. And on the morning of the winter solstice, when the year dies and is reborn, the first shaft of light from the sun makes its way through the passage and fills the inner chamber for seventeen minutes. At its weakest
When you appreciate the absolute awe with which our ancestors observed such a natural phenomenon, and the numinous importance they attached to it, you begin to understand the story of St Patrick and the snakes. The abstract mathematical figure of the spiral had zoomorphosed in the imagination of our ancient ancestors into a gigantic snake or serpent or dragon, recoiling and uncoiling in the course of each year, controlling life, benignly bestowing light and heat for half the year, and for the other half destroying everything it had created. The circular serpent devouring its own tail is a more graphic representation of what the spiral sculptors were representing. But look carefully the next time you see this image, because the serpent is creating itself, emerging from its own mouth, as well as destroying itself.

At face value, Patrick banishing non-existent snakes from Ireland has always appeared a nonsense anecdote, a humorous interlude in the story of the saint’s life – and we have always felt a dubious sense of debt to the man for sparing us the nuisance of such vermin that never did make their way to Ireland in the first place. But the snakes that Patrick wrestled with were not real, they were very powerful symbols, they were the spirals that festooned the holy shrines of Pre-Christian Ireland. The great serpent represented the sun, the life force of the universe, the creative ever self-renewing, ever self-destroying power, more or less God. But Patrick’s message was that God was personal, not an abstract spiral, not an all-powerful life-bestowing life-devouring serpent. And his snake-banishing feat is echoed in the Christian mythology of most countries, where the founding saint in each case banishes snakes or kills the dragon. Of course Patrick never did succeed in banishing the snakes from Ireland. As they did with everything else, our ancestors retained the old symbols but attached them on to the new Christian message; so the spirals and snakes continued to gyrate even through the decoration on chalices and high-crosses, and we can see them run rampant through that sublime edition of the New Testament, the Book of Kells.

The mystical awe for this moment of renewal in the annual cycle of nature was so deeply and powerfully embedded in the mind and soul of the pagan world that the Christians, instead of trying to quash it, superimposed on it the celebration of the birth of Christ.

As I have said, the spiral was a favourite motif of Fred’s, just as the serpent had intrigued me. His sense of awe at the mystery of life and at the beauty of nature can best be understood, I think, if we equate it to that which inspired our ancestors to create the Newgrange monument. In his stone sculptures of the spiral, he strives to capture that mystical centre, that turning point where anti-clockwise movement gracefully rotates into a clockwise movement, negative into positive, decay into growth, and as a
devout Pagan/Christian he tries to suggest the majestic power of nature/God manifested in this mystical rotation.

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Illustrations

‘Eibhhear Alban’ produced in Kildrummy, Scotland, now in the Shekina Sculpture Garden in Glenmalure, Co Wicklow, collection of Catherine McCann. Photo Alan Revell

‘Síochán’ located in the Subhash Bose Park, in the city of Cochin, India, where it was produced when Conlon was an invited artist at an International Sculpture Symposium. Photo Niamh O’Grady
Unravelling the Spiral, Embracing the Serpent

Newgrange Kerbstone 67

Newgrange Entrance Stone

summer solstice to winter solstice  
winter solstice to summer solstice
Fermat's Spiral

Ouroboros
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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

PROJECTS

A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.
2. Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues. This series of 10 week crosscultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

3. Joint-Colloquia with Institutes of Philosophy of the National Academies of Science, university philosophy departments, and societies. Underway since 1976 in Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these concern the person in contemporary society.

4. Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development. A study in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of education and character development. This work has been underway since 1980.

The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Colombia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.

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