Religion, the Sacred and Hospitality

Romanian Philosophical Studies, X

Edited by
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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
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Hospitality is one of the primordial values of the civilized world. The human community and self-awareness emerged when people first began to receive strangers and/or enemies not as such but as guests. Among the oldest historical signs of the culture of hospitality, found for instance, within the Greco-Roman and the Judeo-Christian culture, are three dimensions of hospitality: material, human and religious. Thus, to be hospitable means to attend to the basic material needs of the guests, to treat them as true human beings, or even as a sort of divine messenger. At its highest level, hospitality was a source of happiness and blessing, as it was commonly believed that the guest could assume an intercessory role between his host and the invisible divinity. Therefore, one of the earliest institutions found among the religions, cultures and philosophies that constitute the foundation of our civilization, was the law or value of hospitality.

The discussion about the limits and values of hospitality is coming up again within the social and religious context of the European world of today, a context marked by the complex challenges of the phenomenon of migration. The various answers formulated by Europeans to the requests for asylum made by the political and economic refugees merit being analyzed not only from the perspective of the founding values of the European Union, solidarity, subsidiarity, human rights, freedom, democracy etc., but also in the light of the history of religions and civilizations where we can find open solutions to social tensions like those with which we are being confronted today. This is the kind of analysis which the Faculty of Roman-Catholic Theology at the University of Bucharest in partnership with The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP), Washington D.C., targeted when they invited scholars from all around the world to discuss the value and place of hospitality within the human and religious consciousness of humankind, mainly by re-visiting funda-
mental texts and traditions belonging to the Greco-Roman, Hebrew, Christian and Muslim civilizations.

The participants at the International Conference organized by the above-mentioned institutions, held on March 3-4, 2016 in Bucharest sought answers to the numerous questions which hospitality poses nowadays. Some of the questions posed were: in the contemporary civilized world which faces complex phenomena such as migration, poverty, violence and terrorism, how should hospitality be seen -- limited or unlimited? What should be the spirit of hospitality, Christian or secular, ecumenical or inter-religious? Which values form the basis of hospitality? How can hospitality be lived in post-secular urban areas? What is the place of hospitality in a European social context marked by aggressive marketing, secularization and technocracy? Do European public services retain anything of the religious spirit of hospitality? Could Christian social values motivate and strengthen attitudes of solidarity among people? The answers cannot be found in just one field of the humanities. Thus, scholars from several countries and from different fields in the Social Sciences have attempted to propose solutions and interpretations of hospitality available in the present European context.

In the following pages, we have collected the papers presented during the Conference which was entitled “Religion, the Sacred and Hospitality.” We have divided the volume into two parts: the first is dedicated to the foundational, historical and theoretical aspects of the relationship between religion, the sacred and hospitality, and the second offers proposals and solutions to the practical challenges of European immigration today. The volume ends with an epilogue which analyses religious and civic norms about how immigrants should be welcomed.

Part I deals with the historical, foundational and theoretical dimensions of hospitality. As such, hospitality is an essential component of the Judeo-Christian tradition. We can also find it in the Muslim tradition, especially in relation to Sufi spirituality. All the authors presenting papers in the first part of the volume show us how hospitality has been emphasized differently and has changed its role throughout the ages.

Thus, in “Philoxenia or the Love of Guests, of Strangers or of Enemies within the Christian Tradition,” Stefan Lupu presents hospitality as a sign of that which goes beyond any difference of
religion, race, origin, political and economic conditions or education. Hospitality is the human way to pass on God’s message regarding his creatures, who were meant to live in peace. If we look at Biblical literature, we can see hospitality as a virtue that takes on multiple forms. In the Old Testament the stranger was loved and welcomed as a guest due to the love Yahweh had for him and for the sake of obeying the commandment to welcome strangers while in the New Testament, the stranger is offered hospitality because Christ himself is the one seen in the person of the stranger.

Etymologically speaking, hospitality denotes a relationship on the one hand, and the name of a quality on the other. For (new) Greek speakers, the relationship is expressed by the term *xenia* (ξενία) and the quality by the term *philoxenia* (φιλοξενία); for Latin speakers (or readers), the corresponding words are *hospitium* and *hospitalitas*.

At the beginning of Christianity, during the Apostolic Age, hospitality was a form of gratitude towards Christ. Later on, during the era of Eastern monasticism, monastic hospitality was characterized by balance, rigor, simplicity and, above all, moderation. When offering hospitality the material and spiritual needs of both the guests and the monks were to be taken into consideration. Within the Benedictine tradition hospitality is Christocentric, i.e. the monks should respect hospitality by keeping the essence of simplicity and obedience, so that not a single guest was to leave the monastery before receiving the care that Christ himself would have given to him. If we come to the context of hospitality today, mainly reduced to close friends and official meetings, we notice that the early Christian hospitality is still relevant in many aspects. First, Christian hospitality is meant for everyone, with no distinction between differences of a social or material nature. For Christians, today -- as well as in the past -- showing hospitality is an essential act of loving God and one’s neighbor. Practicing hospitality remains an efficient instrument of evangelization and a means of strengthening the unity of various communities.

“*The Hospitality of God and the Privilege of the Sanctuary,*” by Ana Petrache, seeks to analyze the practice of hospitality, but in relation to the right to receive asylum, which from a religious point of view is founded on the notion of the sanctuary understood as a sacred location where the divine element protects both the guilty and the innocent. From a theological and political perspective, the hospitality
of the sanctuary entails a space in which both secular and religious laws are suspended. Having roots in both the Greco-Roman culture and the Bible, the right to sanctuary was mainly developed in the Middle Ages. Ana Petrache presents and discusses several manifestations of this right of receiving asylum discovered in various religious writings starting with the 5th century and ending with the 17th century, when the right to asylum was limited and its application became increasingly difficult. In fact, in 1642 this right was completely abolished. The interesting aspect of this right, however, is its very basis, which is not the innocence of the refugee but the sacred character of the sanctuary, where the exemption from all civil and moral laws is granted by God’s divine grace. Indeed, on behalf of this, even divine laws could be suspended. In this case, Christian charity becomes secondary; the main root of this exemption is divine grace which supersedes laws.

From the analysis of Petrache we should keep in mind certain relevant dimensions of hospitality granted to refugees. First, the right of asylum was not a human right, but a right directly linked to a sacred place. How is it interpreted nowadays? Who can suspend laws? Therefore, questioning how the secularized countries of Europe receive and protect refugees begins to make sense. Secondly, because it is not the individual who sanctifies the location, the sanctity of sanctuary requires the state of being a refugee to be temporary. Nobody can be a refugee indefinitely. At a certain moment, when the conflict ends, any refugee can return home. Third, from a Christian perspective, we can speak about divine hospitality. Indeed, all people should be able to benefit from the right of refuge in the eyes of God. Christ’s sacrifice has opened the doors of God’s Kingdom even to the unjust. It is his sacrifice and not the people’s merits that gives every human being the opportunity of entering the Kingdom. Seen from this perspective, there is no longer a distinction between just and unjust, Greek and Israelite, master and slave because divine hospitality extends to them all. Finally, the right to sanctuary is a preview of hospitality in Paradise, where the Church, as Christian sanctuary, assumes responsibility for reflecting divine hospitality, offering not only shelter to those in need but also spiritual food and drink to all seekers of God’s Kingdom.

“The Beginnings of Diplomacy as Reflected in the Homeric Epos,” by Maria-Luiza Dumitru Oancea, distinguishes between pri-
vate and public hospitality while analyzing the institution of *proxenia*, extremely widespread throughout Greece since the Classical Age, which became the basis of all subsequent international relationships in the Ancient world. Studying the Homeric poems, Oancea finds references to private hospitality (*xenia*), while public hospitality (*proxenia*), derived from the private, could scarcely be noticed. So, even though the institutionalized term *proxenia* cannot be found in the Homeric epos, one can sense incipient forms of the classical form of diplomatic mission in short episodes throughout both *The Iliad* and even *The Odyssey*. The method used in this paper is the analysis of relevant episodes from *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey* that foreshadow samples of the Greeks’ first attempts to establish negotiations with strangers, focusing on both their surface and depth structure, both reflected in gesture and language. From *The Iliad* has been chosen Chant IX (lines 197-668): the emissary sent by King Agamemnon to the hero Achilles, with Odysseus leading the way, and from *The Odyssey*, a passage from Chant VI (lines 1-210) about Odysseus’ shipwreck in the land of the Phaeacians, followed by the encounter between Odysseus and Nausicaa.

From the analysis of these two passages, we can understand that in the 6th century B.C. *proxenia* or public hospitality between city-states was ensured by a *proxenos*, an equivalent of the ambassador or consul. Etymologically speaking, *proxenos* is a term composed by *pro-*, “in the place of / in the name of,” and by *xenos*, “guest, foreigner.” Thus, *proxenos* is “the person who acts in the name of strangers, protector, defender, go-between, negotiator, honorable person hired to defend the interests of a city state or of certain citizens.” One conclusion we must mention is that the main aim of the embassy was usually to form an alliance with another city-state. It is also interesting to note the religious aspect of this private hospitality. In fact, after the parties reached an agreement, the ratifying of the pact was enforced by a religious act (ritualistic libations to praise the gods), meant to attract divine support for the mission. Another conclusion is that the emissary was treated according to the rules of private hospitality (*xenia*), as the people entrusted with this task were chosen from the acquaintances, equal in status to the host (part of the warrior aristocracy), not inferior to the host. From the analysis of the political discourse of the embassies, we can note two things: first, that an extrapolation of the custom of private over public hospitality was
meant to finalize peace treaties with states (unknown and/or hostile), with the intention of civilizing or colonizing them; secondly, that *laudatio*, especially in *The Odyssey*, takes on an unprecedented amplitude in the economy of the hospitality discourse, which could have contributed to the subsequent development of diplomatic discourse.

“Papal Teaching on Immigration in a Globalized World,” by Eduard Giurgi, sharpens the relationship between hospitality and compassion, or ethical solidarity. Using the words of Pope Francis about the cultivated incapability of people nowadays to feel “compassion for others and for their problems,” Giurgi is relating migration, and consequently hospitality, to the human dignity of each human being. Thus, from the Christian perspective, as Saint John Paul II stated, the basis of human dignity is related not to sacred places, or things, or special qualities, but to the dignity of each human being as such, because every person is made in the divine image and likeness. To better understand the human rights that are founded on human dignity, as well as values such as hospitality, solidarity, justice, and liberty, Giurgi considers as necessary a brief discussion on natural law. Drawing on Pope Benedict XVI’s Christian social thought on the close relationship between charity and justice, we are invited to treat immigrants with charity considering this as the primary way to justice. In this framework, the inequality between immigrant workers and domestic workers must be avoided as well as any form of exploiting the immigrant workers. Every human person is called to the freedom of safeguarding his human dignity and therefore the duty of State officials is to accept people who are trying to improve their living condition. The host countries, however, have a duty to protect and promote the common good, and they should accept refugees insofar as their own societies permit. Immigrants share the same human dignity with all human beings and consequently they should enjoy the same rights that are rooted in this dignity.

“The Question of Hospitality in Sufism and its Reflections on the Iranian Culture,” by Seyed Javad Miri, presents the question of hospitality as it has been discussed in the Sufi traditions, in general, and in the thought of Abolhassan Kharaqani, in particular. Shifting from Kharaqani, who was a 10th century Sufi in Khorasan, to the contemporary context of Iran, Miri focuses on the culture of hospitality in Iran. One way to understand it is to consider Sufism in
the Iranian context as a form of existential approach to the question of being, which could be employed in engaging with diversity. Obviously, there are different approaches to studying any given culture. Therefore, Miri chose to make a link between the spirit of Sufism and Iranian popular culture. Thus, in the light of the honorable code of Jawanmardi, which is the Sufi code for nobility, hospitality is a practical dimension of it. Any Sufi who aspires to become a friend of God must put hospitality into practice. The Iranian culture is a hospitable culture, but in particular, in the light of modern changes, we have to distinguish between two dimensions of hospitality, the spiritual and the material. In Sufi traditions, hospitality is based on spiritual grounds, but in Iran nowadays we can note a decline of hospitality. How can this be explained? Miri focuses on the role of modernization and makes a distinction between two concepts of the guest: in the first sense, it means someone from your society who comes and visits you and stays in your house, and in the second it means a guest who comes from another country and visits your land. The first sense of hospitality in Iran is in decline, but the second is still appreciated by Iranians in general. The refugee does not belong to either and therefore the State of Iran seems to have an ambivalent approach towards refugees as ‘others’. In conclusion, the contemporary Iranian society manifests anomic signs which are very distant from the spirit of classical Sufism, in general and Kharaqani’s approach. Among the many reasons for this, as Miri reminds us, is that modern states are built upon national solidarity, which does not recognize the other as part of its own being, whilst Sufi solidarity is based on existential solidarity.

“The Acorporality and Eschatological Experience for a Noetic Hospitality,” by Valentin Cioveie, introduces a new dimension of hospitality, which is the noetic one. This epistemological openness to the other presupposes putting aside your own deep convictions which do not spring directly from the spiritual experience of God. To reach this level of friendly relationship to the other, Cioveie explains the term ‘acorporality’ in the sense of the Eastern Christian tradition, i.e. as a condition for the Grunderfahrung (fundamental experience). In this framework, the influence of Martin Heidegger’s thought is superficial, because to the term Grunderfahrung has been given a theological meaning. Discussing different practitioners of the ultimate experience, there is only one conclusion, that it does not necessarily follow that
from the highest experience of the Living Absolute that there will be an openness to other religious paths. To practice the ultimate experience, someone must get through acorporality, that is transfiguration, in the same sense given to the term by the Orthodox tradition. There is a difference between the profane and the sacred Grundervahrung, that is the shift from the experience of ‘Angst’ or of ‘Gelassenheit’ to the experience of someone personal. This shift totally changes the fundamental experience of Dasein into an ultimate experience of the liturgical person. Following this way to the eschatological experience, passing through the experience of acorporality, it becomes possible to note the extension of kenois beyond the realm of sensibility to that of noetic ideas. In conclusion, an hesychast, someone practicing the apophatic attitude of the ultimate experience, could embrace the other without passing over the real differences.

Part II focuses on the European Issues of Hospitality. The six authors presenting papers in this second part of our volume invite their reader to reflect on the different tensions manifested by the European people who have reacted in diverse ways to the recent huge influx of immigrants.

Thus, in “Hospitality and the Common Good,” Martin de la Croix Melin, CSJ, argues the idea that the question of hospitality has been put before our consideration in a context of crisis, that of migration and of the decline of political thinking. Based on Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Edith Stein and John Paul II, Melin invites us to look at the phenomenon of mass immigration from the point of view of political philosophy and with respect to the common good, and to Christian charity. Hospitality must be revisited because of the multiple dimensions of the present crisis. The main aspect of the crisis that we are facing is the corruption of political thinking. For instance, what is termed “politically correct” favors the omission of the principle which should govern politics: the common good. In the framework of the migration crisis, it is politically correct to practice humanitarianism which replaces charity and political wisdom or promotes the practice of charity without discernment. In fact, taking the form of immediate and generous aid in a crisis, humanitarianism is in contrast with politics which searches for the common good by tackling the causes. In these cases, the State must consider the common good in its material dimension as well as in its spiritual and cultural dimension because its role in determining the nation’s identity is fundamental.
The nation is the ‘end’ of other communities and it is natural because it allows man not only to live but to live well. It is for this entity to exercise discernment in welcoming new members. This cannot mean calling on an exterior authority: that would be to deny the liberty and sovereignty of a people and the principle of subsidiarity.

Another important aspect of this crisis is cultural. For Melin, the culture of the newcomer tends to place itself on an equal footing with the native culture or even to dominate it. If we look at Islam, we can easily see that it does not recognize the distinctions between religion, civil society and state, and this cultural distinctiveness of Islam constitutes a difficult problem for dialogue with European cultures. To really understand what is at stake, one must discern the key role culture plays in connecting the human person with the nation. Based on the work of Aristotle, Edith Stein and John Paul II, we find in this paper a new perspective to better understand what culture is. Culture is not about “having.” It “is always in an essential and necessary relationship to what man is,” said John Paul II. There is a difference between the works of material culture, that show a spiritualization of matter, a submission of the material element to man’s spiritual forces, and the works of spiritual culture, which manifest a materialization of the spirit, an incarnation of what is spiritual. Today, because cultures are really under threat and the human being as such is whole, we must maintain the above distinction. As we know, this threat is yet more emphasized by the hypertrophy of the mass media. Obviously, culture just disintegrates qualitatively, therefore we are facing an egalitarian and consumerist spirit, the lack of a hierarchy of values, an emphasis on individualism, the rejection of the notion of intellectual, moral and religious authority, and the rejection of all traditions for the transmission of wisdom. But, as John Paul II said, man lives a real human life thanks to culture. Therefore, we must reaffirm the anthropological and even metaphysical basis for the right to culture for the human person. If it is considered in the light of natural law, this fundamental right of the human person could become the basis of a hospitable organization of societies and of the common good.

“To what Extent Can One Rely on Religious Ideals when Solving the Problems of Mass Migration in Europe today?,” by Anatoliy Kosichenko, presents several concepts related to the crisis generated by the huge influx of immigrants, including Christian hospitality. As far as this virtue is concerned -- a virtue that is still highly appreciated
by Christians, and by Muslims -- the real problem is how to put it into practice correctly. Some factors could explain what exactly hinders it. Firstly, in Europe there are few truly practicing Christians. Secondly, nowadays migrants do not go to Europe to pray at the holy places, for business, or for lost relatives, as in the past; usually they go to escape poverty and danger. Thirdly, today there are millions of immigrants moving to Europe, and it is impossible to offer hospitable homes to all of them. For Kosichenko, hospitality is an excellent quality in human beings, but the term “guest” implies a temporary nature of this status. A guest cannot be a guest for months and years. What do we see now? Migrants are not integrated into the social and political life of host countries. Partly, of course, the host society is guilty, partly the migrants themselves. If we look at this situation from a religious point of view, the de-Christianization of Europe is a real and very disturbing process, because all spheres of individual and social life are closely linked to the ideology of these communities. Indeed, the economic activity, the social and political systems, the cultural, educational, ideological foundations are all profoundly correlated with the spiritual and religious values. If Europe loses its religious roots its existence will be jeopardized.

Contemporary European humanism cannot replace religious values and their role in modeling human society, because this is humanism without God, and this kind of humanism is fruitless. The same conclusion would be reached if Christian hospitality were to be transformed into a humanitarian solidarity, i.e. charity without discernment. Due, however, to the cultural challenges and religious threats that are becoming ever more complex, the European leaders are beginning to understand the important role of the Christian dimension of solidarity. At least one question remains topical: how can religion offer some real rules to reduce the level of present challenges and threats? Of course, religion can make such proposals, but how long will the European political communities remain reluctant?

“Hospitality: A Vulnerable Characteristic of European Homo Oeconomicus?,” by Petru-Ciprian Bradu and Iustin Emanuel Alexandru, attempts to present, in a very attractive way, two important things about hospitality: first, that human beings should learn hospitality from nature, and secondly, that human hospitality must have some rules and limits. If we pollute nature too much, then it will no longer be hospitable to us. Developing this starting point, the paper
is an invitation to reflect on the various aspects of hospitality, especially on the vulnerability that must be assumed by *homo oeconomicus* if he intends to become hospitable. Here there is a problem because it might seem that assuming hospitality would contravene his fundamental running principle, i.e. selfishness. Bradu and Alexandru are determined to promote the Christian perspective and ideals through which man becomes more human, therefore they argue that selfishness is what has brought *homo oeconomicus* to situations of crisis. As an approach to these crises they invite us to accept the solution based on the concept of hospitality that makes “economic man” more human by the fact that it opens him to the horizon of communion. If “European economic man” accepted hospitality, then he would become vulnerable.

Based on Luigino Bruni’s theory about the vulnerability in the economic and business environment, the paper considers that one of the risks taken to establish communion is the fact that hospitality does not exclude fratricide. In this case, for the European *homo oeconomicus* to accept the Economy of Communion and to become vulnerable by receiving waves of immigrants is a challenging perspective. To be hospitable for *homo economicus* means to assume the vulnerability or the risk of fratricide. There are two kinds of vulnerability, one is positive (thought of as good) and another one negative (thought of as bad). Its ambivalence has not been accepted in the public sphere because here vulnerability has always been regarded under its negative aspect. Positive vulnerability is accepted only in the private sphere. By analogy, we can say the same about hospitality, accepted at the private level, but at the social level hardly accepted due to the need to assume some responsibilities and take some risks at a community level.

Looking at the roots of social life in Western civilization, the Greek and Judeo-Christian cultures, one can note two tendencies: on the one hand, the reluctance to be vulnerable, and on the other hand, the openness to (and accepting of) vulnerability. Both tendencies are based on the ambivalence of social life as such. Within the Greek culture, especially in Aristotle, the good life of man is fragile because the happy man needs friends, and within the Judeo-Christian culture from the beginning of the Bible fraternal life is ambivalent. Community life, however, cannot exclude the risk of suffering and of death because of the vulnerability which is exposed. When a society is open
to hospitality, it also has to be open to suffering. The same thing happens in business as well. European *homo oeconomicus* should become aware and accept his own vulnerability; he must also be ready to be a good host, even when running the risk of being wounded.

“Europe and the Refugee Crisis: Hospitality and Fear,” by Cristina Barbu, underlines the context of the immigrants’ crisis that opened the discussion about European hospitality. The aim of this paper is to outline Christian rules and values for hospitality, the work in progress of present day European society. The starting point is a historical and political one, because it presents the roots of the conflict that broke out in the spring of 2011 in the Southern part of Syria, Dar’a city, where several groups of students led anti-government protests. Another factor that favored the conflict was the existence in the region of a weak al ‘Qaeda which started to split up into smaller Islamic groups. To these causes we must add the economic differences that the “asabiyyah” around the Assad regime have encouraged and which have determined a series of abuses on the rights and liberties of the person. Due mainly to these causes, Syrians have tried to escape the atrocities by finding refuge in bordering countries, or in Europe.

Regarding the European countries, Barbu claims that they have all the prerequisites to become honorable hosts. European hospitality is practiced as an essential rule of social interaction, a way of living together in harmony, marked by a set of rules, rituals and laws. But the practice of hospitality must assume the host-guest structured relationship. The host must show to the guest that his visit is no bother at all, and the guest must assure the host that his sojourn causes no disturbance. Based on these practices of hospitality and on good Christian moral practices that precede international conventions, Europeans are more able to understand the necessity of hosting asylum seekers and refugees. Obviously, biblical and Christian thoughts are not enough to cope with the waves of refugees coming into Europe. It is necessary to have good and clear-cut laws.

Speaking about human rights, the paper insists firstly on the principle of family unity: the unity of the family is an essential right of the refugee. Secondly, it identifies three types of rights, namely: civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; solidarity rights. For the construction of good relations between host and guest, Barbu insists on the common cultural roots. At the end the question about hospitality is resumed: what is hospitality towards the
refugees? Is it a characteristic of the Christian culture in a secularized Europe or an obligation stipulated by international law? The conclusion is the following: without Christian values, civil hospitality is not effective. If we left hospitality just to the law, the practice of it would not be complete and cultural differences could create problems and fear.

“Christian Hospitality as a Valid Response to the European Refugee Crisis: Insights from the Caribbean and Disability Theology,” by Adanna James, proposes Christian hospitality as one possible response to the current situation of the immigrants’ crisis in Europe. Authentic Christian hospitality can help resolve the present difficulties because the care of vulnerable strangers is central to Christian hospitality. Aided by insights from disability theology, James seeks to highlight the relationship between a general lack of solidarity and compassion, and the fear of the other and vulnerability. The lack of solidarity has been shown to Syrian refugees, and if we understand the virtue of compassion as a prerequisite for the ability to develop solidarity (see Christian Vogt), then a lack of solidarity can be related to a lack of compassion. Based on Thomas Reynolds’ theology of disability, James opts for a disability perspective to support her argument that we do not want to admit our fundamental vulnerability as human beings. To have compassion means to undergo, feel or suffer with another (see Thomas Reynolds), but when the other is perceived as foreign, people become unsure of who they are and refuse to be connected to the other. Christian hospitality is grounded in this integration of both the difference and vulnerability of the other.

Helped by Christine Pohl’s excursus into the tradition of Christian hospitality which admits a shift from a pre-modern understanding of the stranger and vulnerability that was restricted to the Christian community to a modern/postmodern perspective, James turns to the post-colonial author, Édouard Glissant and proposes alternative conceptions to difference and vulnerability, conceptions divorced from fear. According to Glissant, differences must be conceived in terms of processes and active forces which interact and relate in multiple entities of “the really livable world.” His theory about the understanding of differential repetition which highlights the infinitesimal differences occurring in reiterations within phenomena that appear inconsequential is very helpful. The infinitesimal differences constitute identity and allow identity to be conceived in
terms of relationship. To further explain Glissant’s ideas about identity, James speak about the opacité/opacity of identity, which offers non-exclusionary strategies for relating with the difference that forms our identities. Opacity is the core of identity, therefore mutual “opacities can coexist and converge by weaving.”

Speaking about how practices of Christian hospitality can be developed from Glissant’s thought, James highlights his proposals for the deliberate stirring of collective memories, convinced that in so doing all will find common ground, because our beginnings were all rooted in stories of suffering. The second insight of Glissant’s thought is his notion of opacity, which is what he uses to ground his idea of identity and to offer ways of interacting with the difference of the other.

To concretize these theories with proposals for practices of hospitality, the paper highlights some hospitality practices already at work in the European context, focusing first on different experiences of hosting refugees in parish communities and secondly, in disability communities. Finally, there must be a strengthening of efforts at ecumenism at the level of leadership in the different Christian communities in Europe to encourage a Christian hospitality that would lead to an openness to immigrants.

“Host for a Day or Host for a Lifetime: To Ion de la Raion from Şinca Nouă,” by Gabriela Blebea Nicolae, argues that in all equations of hospitality, the gratuity and willingness of the host are necessary conditions. Otherwise, hospitality becomes a commercial relationship. The willingness of the host implies the freedom to choose between at least two alternatives. More importantly, these human choices must relate to the attainment of a goal -- a well-articulated and correctly understood goal. In the absence of free will, we are unable to speak in terms of responsibility. In this text, Blebea intends to examine all these elements of hospitality within the context of the hosting of a child -- more specifically, the hosting of an abandoned child.

Regarding hospitality per se, we have some relevant conclusions. First, the equations of hospitality differ from one culture to the next. Second, hosting implies gratuity and willingness. Third, hospitality implies, in theory at least, the following three elements: the host, the guest and the reason for his or her stay. Fourth, hospitality presupposes the freedom to host, i.e. everybody can make a choice. Because this paper is concerned with the way in which we can host
abandoned children, the relation between hospitality and the host’s freedom needs a clarification. The reference to Thomas Aquinas’ analysis of freedom can be applied in this case, because it will help us understand that the basis of a good choice is knowing the goal. Finally, this article poses this question: “In what way do we define ourselves as people through the act of hosting?”

Epilogue, “How Should Immigrants Be Received? Some Christian Social Proposals” by Wilhelm Dancă, focuses on different forms of hospitality shown nowadays to immigrants and on the religious roots, social limits and conditions of hospitality. Because hospitality and hostility both derive from one and the same etymon, the difference being made by the extent of hospitality, the question is how to harmonize identity and otherness? The encounter between a guest and a host may become a failure either because of the social vulnerability in which the guest finds himself, or because of the host’s tendency towards excess. Unfortunately, nowadays, a certain model of hospitality is taking shape, especially in Europe, one which could be labelled as “the hospitality of the lonely.” The guests of today are called immigrants and they are offered hospitality with a sense of regret, since they have been imposed as guests. The phrase “compulsory refugee quotas” used today in political discourses is relevant for this discussion. Unchecked hospitality affects not only the relation with the other, but also the relation with oneself.

To find a balanced form of hospitality, Dancă moves back to the religious roots of hospitality. There we can find hospitality as a fundamental virtue of social life. It is to be found in all world cultures. Christian hospitality has its roots in Hebrew culture. The Bible, however, lacks a coherent and uniform discourse on the attitude towards foreigners. From a theological point of view, the foreigner is par excellence the place where God reveals Godself. From a historical point of view, the foreigner is a human being protected by God. The first name to appear in the Bible about hospitality is Abraham, the man whom God commanded to leave his own land. The second name is a collective one, referring to the descendants of Abraham, i.e. the Israelite people, who will remember that they themselves had been foreigners during their exodus from Egypt. However, what the Bible says about Israel is also valid for any human being. All people and all nations are the guests of God, guests expected to offer other people hospitality in a responsible way. Finally, the third name is Jesus, the
Incarnate Word, who was a stranger in the world into which he came. The hospitable space opened by Jesus by means of his self-estrangement should be promoted first at the level of the ego, offering hospitality to the foreigner living in ourselves, then, at an intersubjective level to transcend hostility towards foreigners.

Hospitality should be equally beautiful and generous at a social and at a religious level. Unfortunately, this is not the case, because there is no tradition of inter-religious hospitality, at least not in the Christian world. There are certain exceptions. During recent centuries, the Abrahamic religions have attempted to develop the notion of tolerance, but tolerance means to bear an error, and in this respect tolerance has nothing to do with hospitality. In the 13th century, St. Thomas Aquinas established the limits of hospitality towards foreigners. With Aquinas, the general principle is this: “no nation is excluded from the law which refers to the cult one owes to God and from the redemption of one’s soul.” In practice, the stranger should be received as if he were a brother, and yet we should not forget that he is not a real brother. Excessive generosity could lead to a distorted relationship between the guest and his host. Hospitality is a two-way road: to be just, hospitality expects the two partners to make equal efforts. Then, to be a good host or guest, we should make a difference between the active and the passive sense of hospitality. These two senses are complementary. Active hospitality, which is offered to someone, is generous and only slightly marked by a sense of obligation; passive hospitality, which is received by someone, is humiliating and unexpected. Active hospitality is the foundation of morality. Received hospitality is a memorable experience that deeply marks human life. For rich individuals and nations, hospitality offered to those strangers who seek safety and vital resources is a moral obligation. From a religious point of view, active or passive hospitality is the result of ecumenical or inter-religious dialogue. If the immigrants are Christians, hospitality is not a question of doctrine, but of practical ecumenism. When the immigrants are not Christians, hospitality means dialogue and concrete help to preserve the transcendental dimension of their lives.

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Part I
Historical, Foundational and Theoretical Dimensions of Hospitality
1.

Philoxenia or the Love of Guests, Strangers or Enemies within the Christian Tradition

ȘTEFAN LUPU

Introduction

Hospitality is a virtue that takes many forms and is found in every nation. Prototypes such as Abraham, Lot, the woman of Shunem, the widow of Zarephath and Job can help us to discover a deeply hospitable spirit in the Bible, monasticism and the writings of the Church Fathers.¹ Ever since the period of antiquity, hospitality has been considered as a divine responsibility. The patriarchs of the Old Testament are given as models (Gen. 19:2; 24:17-33; 43:24). In a special way the visit paid by Yahweh to Abraham (Gen. 18:2-8) put a religious mark on Jewish hospitality, as is shown in the Book of Deuteronomy (Deut. 10:18-19).

In the New Testament, hospitality is about the Christian’s pilgrim condition (Heb. 11:13). It a charism from heaven (1 Pet. 4:9) which makes people able to meet the angels (Heb. 13:2) and it was recommended by Christ himself (Luke 11:5-8; 14:12-15), who gave it as an example (Mark 6:41-45; 8:6-9; Luke 22:27; John 13:1-17) and he offered himself for his guests (Mark 14:22).

As hospitality is a function of charity (Luke 10:33-37), its practice becomes imperative for acquiring eternal life at the second coming of the Son of God (Matt 27:35-42). In an exhortation of the New Testament, the guest is identified with Christ himself (Matt 10:42; 25:35-44), this being the reason for its frequent mention (Acts 10:6.23; 18:1-2; 21:16; 28:23; Rom 16:23; 1 Cor 16:19; Gal 4:14; 3 John 5:9-10). But hospitality has limits, since Christ himself drew up rules about accepting it for the apostles (Matt 10:9-14; Mark 6:10-11) and for his


**Etymology\(^3\)**

Hospitality is the name of a relationship, on the one hand, and the name of a quality, on the other. In Greek, the relationship is expressed by the term *xenia* (ξενία) and the quality by the term *philoxenia*\(^4\) (φιλοξενία); in Latin, the corresponding words are *hospitium* and *hospitalitas*.\(^5\) In both Greek and Latin cultures “relationship” was established between the members of different states and it was used more between families or between families and the state than for creating relations between individuals. In this way, a difference between public and private hospitality is made. Within the Greek culture, “the relationship” between the individuals, the private ones, was named *xenos* (ξένος), while the relationship with the state was named *proxenos* (πρόξενος). In Latin, the word *hospes* refers both to the public and private hospitality. Bearing in mind the fact that the relationship of hospitality was mutual, the host became in his turn a guest. In this way, both the Greeks and the Romans established a word (*xenos*, *hospes*) to designate both sides of the relationship (for example, in Romanian, the words “verișor” or “frate” designate the mutual relationship between two people). Therefore, we can see that both the word “guest” and “host” have the same root (ξένος, hospes). But when the Greeks really wanted to differentiate between “host” and “guest,” they used the term *xenodokos* (ξενοδόκος) for the “host,” i.e., the person who welcomes the “xenos,” the latter being the “guest.” The root of the word *xenos/hospes* also designated a “stranger” or a “pilgrim” or even an “enemy,” but the researchers agreed on the term *hospit-*, the stem of the word *hospes*, and they attributed the following

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significance: “the one who gives food to the guests and the strangers,” “the head of the house visited by the guests and entertained by the host.”

Having found a common root for the following words “host,” “guest” and “stranger,” it is easier to understand this natural attitude of protecting every stranger, developing in this way the concept of hospitality (φιλοξενία — the love of the strangers).

Hospitality within the Old Testament

The hospitality shown by the Semitic and by the Eastern nations in general is one of the most appreciated virtues grounded in the religious aspect. For these people, being inhospitable was not only blameworthy, but also it was a proof of their ungodliness. Hospitality was a holy duty and an important virtue. Disobedience to this holy duty was a terrible sin which involved a severe punishment (Jud 20:12-13; Wis 19:13-15).

The people of the Old Testament made a difference between the strangers that were enjoying their hospitality. Firstly, there were the nokhrs, the strangers, those who were only crossing through their territory, and then ger, the strangers that had acquired a stable place and they were living on their land, having therefore some civil and religious rights. This category of strangers, ger, was described as an ethnic group which managed to adapt to the social structure of the place, but without the benefits of full rights meant for the Israelites.

Abraham could be an example of someone who practices both unconditional faith in Yahweh and the virtue of hospitality. The story from Genesis illustrates the hospitality offered by Abraham to his three guests (Gen 18:1-8). He welcomed his guests with joy and keenness, without any kind of hesitation. This behavior brought him

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7See H. James, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 804.
the blessing of having a son who will be his heir. The same promise was given to the woman of Shunem by the prophet Elisha (2 King 4:8-17). Saint Ambrose used as an example the hospitality of Abraham when he persuaded the Christians to practice this virtue, as “the one to whom God reveals sees the Holy Trinity.” Ambrose said that Abraham was practicing the virtue of hospitality without knowing he was serving God, who blessed him.

The Jews, having a Semitic origin, show the same spirit of hospitality as the other Semitic peoples. The only difference is the reason for practicing this virtue, i.e. the special relationship they have with Yahweh. The awareness of having been chosen by Yahweh, who had established an alliance with them, made the Jews keep to themselves. In this way, other nations became for Israel an object of hate and revenge (Deut 23:3-4; 25:17-19; 1 Sam 15:2-3).

During this time, Yahweh taught the Jews how to love the stranger. Mercy towards the other was lived for the sake of God and to accomplish the will of Yahweh, who asked them not to torture or send away strangers, but to love them as they love themselves. By doing so, they were showing their gratitude towards Yahweh, who gave them the freedom to have the same attitude towards strangers in Egypt (Deut 10:19; Lev 19:33; Ps 39:13). As Yahweh protected them when they were strangers in the desert, they must, in their turn, show hospitality towards others.

There was another reason why the Israelites had to practice hospitality, i.e. the love of God which they knew for themselves when they left Egypt and crossed over the desert into the Promised Land. The Ark of the Covenant was the sign of Yahweh’s presence among them. This presence was an assurance that Yahweh was always ready to show them hospitality whenever needed (Ps 27:4; Prov 9:1-5). The main reason, however, for Jewish hospitality was their belief in Yahweh.

In the Old Testament, the stranger was protected, as having been once welcomed, he had the right to be protected against any kind of evil, even at the risk of the family members’ life. This duty of protecting a stranger is well described in the story of Lot (Gen 19:1-24), who did not hesitate to sacrifice his own daughters to protect the guest from the human desire of the predators. Lot showed hospitality

11See Ibid., p. 73.
Philoxenia or the Love of Guests in the Christian Tradition

and in this way he was saved from the destruction of Sodom (Gen 19:1-24).

For the prophets, the exhortation to practice hospitality became explicit, hospitality being one of the good deeds of mercy (Is 58:6). This period is characterized by a more profound understanding of the universality of the call to salvation. All the people, being redeemed, will come to Mount Zion to praise God (Ps 87). This understanding of the universality of redemption will attract more and more strangers and they will integrate with the chosen people by their belief in Yahweh (Is 56:6).

The attention paid to the guests was shown in different ways: first the introduction to the guest, to offer him water for washing his feet, the invitation to rest and stay overnight, the preparation of the food and the drinks, and eating together with the members of the family. When the guest came with animals, feeding them was also part of the hospitable reception by the host (Gen 18; Jud 19; 1 Sam 28:2; 2 Sam 12:4; 1 King 17:8). Later, within the Jewish period, the kiss as a sign of welcoming a guest was introduced. Initially, the kiss was only offered to one’s own family, married couples and close friends. When the guest left he was accompanied by the host for a short distance. Abraham, for instance, accompanied his guests for quite a long distance, so they could have talked about the destruction and the salvation of Sodom (Gen 18:16). If the guest came with a precise purpose, then he would bring gifts for the host. For example, the servant of Abraham brought to Rebecca several gifts (Gen 24:11). Hospitality was very appreciated and practiced amongst the Israelites, as it had the purpose of building up both the host and the guest.

Therefore, Israelite hospitality was based on religious grounds. Faith in Yahweh who loves the stranger urged the Israelites to do the same. Their experience of living as slaves in a foreign land helped them to understand the need to be hospitable towards strangers.
Hospitality in the New Testament\textsuperscript{12}

In the New Testament, we can find the same hospitality as in the Old Testament. Jesus himself was dependent on the hospitality offered, especially during his public activity. We know that Jesus ate in the house of Simon’s mother-in-law and in that of the publican (Mark 1:29; 2:15; 14:3). Jesus even declared that He has no house here, on earth (Matt 8:20). As Jesus was dependent on hospitality while He was accomplishing his mission on earth, He taught his disciples to do the same. He sent out his followers and told them what to take with them for their journeys. The food and the shelter were from those who were receiving the disciples, and the hosts had to take care of other matters (Mark 6:7-13). Insisting on the great importance of hospitality, Jesus told his people that at the Last Judgment he will ask if they received him when He was a stranger. For those who had shown hospitality, He would say: “I was a stranger and you took me in” (Matt 25:35).

This teaching was taken seriously by the apostles, who with great force urged the Christians to manifest hospitality. For St. Paul, hospitality is the expression of love -- \textit{agape} -- and of brotherly affection -- \textit{philadelphia} (Rom 12:9-13; 1 Pet 4:8-9; Heb 13:12). Although St. Paul insists on the fact that all should show hospitality, he sees this virtue as a quality relevant only to bishops and widows (…). Peter, the Apostle, goes further, saying that hospitality truly shown, without hesitation, covers a lot of sins (1 Pet 4:8).

Being pilgrims here, on Earth, is another reason for Christian hospitality.\textsuperscript{13} Christians do not have a stable earthly house (2 Cor 5:1). They are strangers on Earth, not just because the earth belongs only to God, but also because they are citizens of Heaven. Bearing this in mind, everyone will see that all they have should be shared with others. In this way, Christians accept the virtue of hospitality unconditionally.

On their missionary journeys, the apostles and their followers depended on the hospitality shown by their Christian brothers. The


Christians could travel from one community to another, from one part of the world to the other without having to worry about accommodation. Those who were supporting the missionaries were considered “supporters of faith.”

The New Testament improved what had already started in the Old Testament, as Jesus came not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it (Matt 5:17). If in the Old Testament the stranger was loved and welcomed as a guest due to the love Yahweh had for him and to the demand of receiving the stranger, in the New Testament, the stranger is offered hospitality because Christ himself is seen in the person of the stranger. If people take him in and love him, the stranger, they receive and love Christ himself (Matt 25:35).

**Hospitality within the Apostolic Age**

In the Apostolic Age, the first Epistle of Clement (1,2-3) praises the Corinthians for their hospitality. Aristides also praises all the Christians with similar virtues (Apol. 15,7). Missionaries, bishops and the priests who were visiting the Christian communities, the deacons who were working as missionaries and even the simple Christians that were working in somewhere other than their home, all were received with hospitality (Didache 11:1-10; 13:1-4; Hermas 8:10).

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15 “Which of those who has visited you has not praised your virtue and strong will? Who has not admired your worship for Christ, that one wise and full of goodness? Who has not preached the icon of appositeness of your love for the strangers? Who has not blessed your complete and absolute conscience? You were doing everything without looking at the man’s face: you were following God’s will, obeying your leaders and praising properly your priests,” D. Fecioru, *Scriserile părinților apostolici* (Bucharest: Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, 1979), p. 46.
17 “Each apostle who comes to you should be received as the Lord; but he shouldn’t stay more than one day; but if it is necessary he could stay another day; but if he stays three days he is a false prophet. The apostle, when he leaves shouldn’t take anything but bread, until he finds another shelter; but
Ignatius of Antioch\textsuperscript{18} insisted on the presence of Christ in those that are welcomed as guests (\textit{Ad Eph. 6.1}) and praised hospitality as a form of gratitude for Christ. Origen dedicated two homilies to hospitality (\textit{Gen. 4:5}) and Saint Cyprian appointed a priest to take care of the poor in his absence (\textit{Epist. 7}). Saint John Chrysostom wrote that those from the community of Antioch took care every day of 3,000 widows, wanderers and sick people (\textit{Hom. Matt. 66.3}). From the 4\textsuperscript{th} century, special buildings were established, named \textit{xenodochia} (\textit{ξενοδοχια/hospitia}), for sheltering pilgrims, strangers, orphans, the elderly and the sick.

\textbf{Hospitality within Eastern monasticism}

\textit{Basil the Great}

The \textit{Rule} of Basil the Great shows us the hospitable spirit of this great hermit. In his paper \textit{Moralia}, Basil shows us the necessity of offering hospitality to those who follow the teaching of God, explaining how guests should be welcomed.

Guests must be received with all the care and honor reserved for the great praise of God. Those who do not act like this are blameworthy (Matt 10:40; John 13:20; Phil 2:25.29). In rule no.37 he speaks of simplicity and lack of gratuitousness specifically for hospitality\textsuperscript{19} which must be practiced by Christians (John 6:8-11; Luke 10:38-42). Basil saw and understood that his brothers might be ashamed of the poverty where they lived and, trying to hide it, they would offer more than was enough to the guest they received. He says that the guests should be well treated, but not in an exaggerated way, so that their stay might be for edification. Saint Basil teaches about the necessity of if he asks for money he is a false prophet,” D. Fecioru, \textit{Scierile p\u{a}rin\u{t}ilor apostolici}, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{18}“The more he sees the bishop being silent, the more he should respect him; as we have to receive the person sent by the Lord of the house to administrate his house as we would receive the one who had sent him,” D. Fecioru, \textit{Scierile p\u{a}rin\u{t}ilor apostolici}, p. 159.

offering willingly hospitality to everyone, and moderation being more important than deeds.

*John Cassian*

John Cassian talks about hospitality in his books *Institutes*. He teaches about the importance and the significance of hospitality in relation to fasting. His monks had some doubts regarding the way they should be hospitable whilst keeping the vow of fasting at the same time. He says that the guest should be received and offered food in a normal manner and the monks should take the meal with the guests for the sake of courtesy. The monks must take care to offer only as much as is needed, nothing more.

It should also be noticed that John Cassian points out that the virtue of hospitality is one of the necessary qualities for entering monastic life. Therefore, the novice will live in the guest house, where he will help the monk who has responsibility for taking care of the guests. The superiors will notice how he serves, if he is endowed with love and kindness or not. If he proves to have loving kindness for the guests, then he can be admitted to the community of the monks. Monastic hospitality should be characterized by balance, rigor, simplicity and, above all, moderation. When offering hospitality, the material and spiritual needs of the guests and of the monks should be considered.

*The Rule of Saint Benedict*

There are 73 chapters in the *Rule of Saint Benedict*, and hospitality is approached in chapters 53 and 61. Chapter 53 is about the hospitality of the monks for everyone, in general, while chapter 61 speaks about hospitality that should be given to the visiting brethren.

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21 See S. Benedetto, *La Regola*, tr. from Italian, Maria di Rosano (Siena: Cantagalli, 1975), pp. 91-311.

The experts divided chapter 53 -- which has over 24 verses -- into two main parts. In the first part (vv 1-15) welcome which is kind and warm is described. In the second part (vv 16-23) the practical directions that should be considered are presented.

In chapter 53, Benedict says that hospitality should be given to everyone who comes to the monastery of the monks: the rich, the poor, the kings, the bishops, priests, pilgrims etc. “All the guests that come to the monastery should be treated as Christ, as he himself will say one day: «I was a stranger and you took me in»” (no. 53,1).

Benedict wants each person to be welcome, regardless of his/her social standing, his/her hierarchical position or the fortune he/she has. Moreover, he does not classify the guests according to the moral qualities he does or does not have, but he urges that everyone be treated with honor, humility and favor. This way, he continues the tradition of the Church Fathers, who did not consider the merits of the guests and did not ask for anything from them.

In the second verse of the 53rd chapter, Benedict talks about the greater honor that should be offered to those of the same faith, pilgrims and the poor. The reason for this greater honor is not of a human nature, but it follows Christian beliefs. Saint Thomas Aquinas, when he speaks about who should be loved more, will explain this fact, making a distinction between the intensity of the charity and the ways of loving. God is the object of charity; therefore, the diversity of charity will depend on the relationship of a person with God. It follows that Christians will love their Christian brothers more than they love pagans. This practice is in line with the exhortation of Saint Paul in his Epistle to the Galatians: “As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith” (Gal 6:10).

Therefore, for Saint Benedict, hospitality is extended to everyone. Those who share the same belief benefit from a greater level of honor, not only because of their religion but also because Jesus is more visible in them and God protects them. Since the monastery is the house of God, the poor have a special right to be protected.

In chapter 53 there is nothing about what the guest should do, but only about what the community should do for him. In chapter 61, the monk-guest can stay in the monastery only if he is happy with the life

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he finds within the community,\textsuperscript{24} without making excessive demands which could grieve the community (no. 61, 2).

For Benedict, the monks and the priests who visit the community are models for the community. Such a person, whose behavior is appreciated, is welcome anytime within the community.

\textit{The Reception of the Guests}

Saint Benedict considers it appropriate to name the reception of the guests as a “ritual,” which lasts from the reception until the departure of the guest.

At the reception, the first monk who meets the guest is the doorman. He stays all the time at the entrance of the monastery, ready to answer any knock on the door no. 66). As he hears the knock, he would say: “\textit{Deo gratias!}” or “\textit{Benedicite!}.” Doing so, the monk is thanking God on behalf of the entire community that Jesus Christ has visited them in the person of the guest. In this way, the abbot\textsuperscript{25} comes to meet the guest with every courtesy and kindness. The duty of telling the community about the arrival of the guest goes to the doorman. The other monks must stop their activities and go to meet the guest.

The first thing they all should do is to pray together with the guest, then to kiss him as a sign of peace. The reason the prayer comes before the sign of peace is in case it is an illusion of the devil (no. 53,4). For Saint Benedict, the prayer comes at the beginning of every meeting. The abbot discerns in this way the spirit of the guest who is visiting their monastery. After the initial prayer, the kiss of peace is offered, as a sign of communion between people. This sign was one of the most distinguished elements among the Christian rituals. All brethren in Christ greet each other as brothers with a holy kiss (Rom 16:16; 1 Cor 16:20). This sign was called by the early Christian communities “the seal of peace.”\textsuperscript{26}

The communion between the guest and the monks is further expressed through sharing communal life. Some paragraphs from

\textsuperscript{24}See S. Benedetto, \textit{La Regola}, p. 290.
\textsuperscript{26}See H. James, \textit{Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics}, p. 805.
Scripture are read to the guest, facilitating in this way his entry into prayer for the edification of his soul. Saint Basil the Great says that this mission of talking to the guests goes to the one who has the skill of talking, who can talk and listen wisely seeking the edification of the guest’s soul.

Then comes the washing of the hands and the feet (no. 53,13-14). The abbot pours water on the guest’s hands, and then he also washes the guest’s feet with the entire community. Washing the feet has mainly a practical goal. When someone walks barefoot or with sandals on paved roads during the scorching heat, it is a sign of politeness for the feet of the guests to be washed first. This is a very old practice. We can find in the New Testament Jesus’ reproach to Simon the Pharisee for not giving him water to wash his feet (Luke 7:44). The widows from the first Christian communities used to wash the feet of the “saints” (1 Tim 5:10). This was a regular practice towards the guests. In the course of time, this act acquired a more profound significance, being done by Christ himself for his followers (John 13:5). Christ explained this act as being a sign of unity (John 13:8). Saint Augustine and Saint Basil the Great urged the Christians to make this gesture following the example of the Savior, as a sign of humility. For Saint Benedict, we can say that the act of washing the feet is the expression of the humble service done for the guest and the close unity with him.

After washing the feet, a verse from Ps 48:10 is read. All these point to the fact that some virtues such as receptivity and humility must be expressed for the hospitality to be praiseworthy.

Therefore, we have seen that Benedictine hospitality conforms to that of the first Christian centuries and are Christocentric.27 The guest should be welcome as the person of Christ (no. 53,1-2). They should be treated with humility, reverence, charity and politeness, especially those who are pilgrims or poor. The monks should respect hospitality by keeping the essence of simplicity and obedience, so that not a single guest should leave the monastery without having received the care Christ himself would have given to the guest. Everyone should be enlightened about Benedictine hospitality.

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Conclusion

Today hospitality is shown by polite gestures and conversations that are courteous. For “genuine hospitality,” we might choose one of the luxurious hotels or leave hospitality to the professional activity of restaurants, hotels and cruise ships. While culture has reduced hospitality to an industry or to close friends and official meetings, for early Christians, hospitality was for everyone, without regard for social standing or wealth. Christians and other peoples of antiquity had this awareness of receiving everyone as a guest of honor. Whether they were Greeks, who were afraid of the anger of Zeus, the protector of the homeless and the travelers, or Jews who found their identity in their condition as strangers delivered from Egypt and guided to the Promised Land by Yahweh, the people of those times were aware of the value and the necessity of daily hospitality. For the Christians of the first centuries, showing hospitality was an essential deed for loving God and neighbor. The practice of hospitality was an efficient connection for evangelization and for helping the unity of the communities.

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2. The Hospitality of God and the Right to Sanctuary

ANA PETRACHE

Looking Back: The First Cases of Rights to Asylum

Nowadays, when there is so much public debate about refugees, in a context in which the Holy Father has encouraged Catholic congregations to get directly engaged in finding a solution to this problem, a conference about divine hospitality gives us the perfect opportunity to review the matter of the right to asylum and its religious origins. This detour distracts our attention from the current framework and rhetoric of discussing this issue and redirects it towards the foundations of the right to asylum and its underlying logic. The purpose of my paper is to analyze and discuss the theological foundations of the right to asylum: the sanctuary, the enclosed and sacred location where the divine element protects both the guilty and the innocent.

The right to sanctuary is extremely interesting from a theological-political perspective since it entails a space in which both secular and religious laws are suspended. Here, it is possible to create a space where the law is suspended, not only secular laws, but also the laws established by God Almighty himself. This suspension is not meant to undermine the authority of the law but to create an additional space of freedom, more precisely, an exception from the rule that would allow the salvation of the innocent while also giving a second chance to the unrighteous.

This interpretation emphasizes the eschatological foundations of this right to seek asylum. I argue that the sacrifice of Christ, and not our innocence, gives us the right to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. We all (sinful or less sinful) are invited to take part in the divine feast of the Kingdom if we are willing to ask for the safety of sanctuary, to take refuge in the Church and become part of its life. Participation in the life of the Church (by confessing and having communion) makes the
practicing Christian a refugee in the City of God, a refugee whose faults are suspended thanks to Jesus Christ’s sacrifice.

The right to sanctuary was developed in the Middle Ages and it has become part of the canonical right. However, it is not a Christian innovation since some forms of this right were present in both the Old Testament and the Greco-Roman culture. The Greco-Roman term *Asylum* formed with a privative *a*, denoting ‘what cannot be violated, what is infrangible’, refers to the right to flee from a violent fighting during war. The temple is the place offering protection by its sacred character. One of the main values of the right is concerned with refuge in the case of war. However, adopting a broader perspective, the Greco-Roman literature approach talks about protection of the wrongdoers.

The Bible, in the book of Joshua 20:1-9, identifies some cities of refuge: Hebron, Shechem Kedesh, Golan, Ramoth, Bezer. These cities provided shelter for those who were found guilty of killing another person but whose crime was not premeditated, being the result of an accident. Leviticus says that whoever is found guilty of the death of another must pay with his own life: whoever spills blood is liable to pay with his own blood. To avoid the death of someone who spilled the blood of his brother unintentionally, there is a possibility for him to seek refuge in one of these refuge cities. Six cities are defined and sanctified as refuge city states. They are located on a mountain so as to be visible from afar, easy to identify. The cities were located within 50 km of each other, allowing the refugees to reach them within a day’s walk.

Tell the Israelites to designate the cities of refuge, as I instructed you through Moses, so that anyone who kills a person accidentally and unintentionally may flee there and find protection from the avenger of blood.¹

Next, my study presents and discusses several manifestations of this right to asylum in the religious writings starting with the 5th century. My analysis highlights different ways in which the application of the judicial norms was suspended by the existence of a right to seek asylum in holy places.

¹See Joshua 20:2-3.
Augustine, Defender of the Refugees

Saint Augustine begins his work ‘De civitate Dei’ with a comparison between the right to sanctuary granted in the Greco-Roman culture and the right to sanctuary offered by the Christian basilica. The first chapters of his famous work are dedicated to appeals to the non-observance of the right to sanctuary in Virgil’s writings. He describes how in the ‘Aeneid’ the refuge requested in Juno’s sanctuary was not sufficient to save the refugees from the pursuers. We could wonder why he chose this beginning? ‘De civitate Dei’ is not a history book, nor one of bellettristic analysis. Clearly, the interest manifested by the bishop of Hippo towards the right to sanctuary is not a judicial one. This right had indeed existed in the pagan tradition and took a different form in the Christian one. However, what is most interesting to us is the protection offered by the gods compared to the protection offered by the Christian God.

Troy itself, the mother of the Roman people, was not able, as I have said, to protect its own citizens in the sacred places of their gods from the fire and sword of the Greeks, though the Greeks worshipped the same gods.

This failure of the pagan right to sanctuary is compared to the sanctuary granted by the Christian basilica against the barbarian invasion. Even though barbarians did not respect any laws, they respected the right to sanctuary. Augustine insists that the observance of this right did not result from their mercy but was instead explained by the efficacy of the sanctuary which offers protection because of Christ’s protective power.

Compare now this ‘asylum’ – the asylum not of an ordinary god, not of one of the rank and file gods, but of Jove’s own sister and wife,
the queen of all the gods — with the churches built in memory of the apostles. There liberty was lost; here preserved.4

The Augustinian text emphasizes how the pagan gods were not able to protect the city and its inhabitants and how worshiping these gods brought in fact slavery. Their inability to protect the ones who sought their help proved the inefficacy of the idols. Therefore, the right to sanctuary was interpreted as an effective protection offered by the Christian God. In an era in which the cause of the decline of the Roman empire was believed to be the denial of traditional gods, Augustine addresses the matter of asylum to show that only Christ can grant true protection. The idols cannot bring freedom to the one worshiping them, they only bring slavery.

One of Augustine’s recent interpreters, J. Milbank, depicts the right to asylum as the archetype of the kind of refuge that the Church offers to believers represented by the forgiveness of sins:

[i]t is not like Rome, an asylum constituted by the protection offered by a dominating class to the dominated, in the face of an external enemy. This form of refuge is, in fact, but a dim archetype of the real refuge provided by the Church which is the forgiveness of sins.5

The Church can grant asylum because, ontologically, it has the capacity to suspend guilt through the forgiveness of sins.

In 1983, a set of letters belonging to Augustine was discovered. In these letters, the right to asylum is addressed, a right that Augustine tries to enforce given his position as Bishop of Hippo. In one of the letters, Saint Augustine laments that only a small proportion of the people who seek the protection of the church can be let in. We can help and protect only a small proportion of those who seek refuge in the church, all the rest, many more in number, caught outside, are stripped of their goods or their person, while we cannot do anything.6

4Ibid.
6Augustin, Œuvres de Saint Augustin, 46B, Lettres 1*-29*, (traduction et commentaire par divers auteurs, Etudes Augustiniennes, 1987, Epistola 22), p. 350, my translation from French, the Latin version is: *Ita fit, ut perpaucis qui confugiant ad ecclesiam utcumque solacio uel praesidio esse ualeamus; ceteri uero
In another letter, Augustine describes an actual case of one Victorinus, citizen of Hippo and a spiritual son of Augustine who was a refugee in a church at the time of writing the letter. The recipient is Novatus, asked to intervene in favor of the refugee. It is not the first time that Augustine intervenes in his favor. Another letter addressed to the same Novatus proves this⁷. The reason that led Victorinus to seek refuge in the church is a civil litigation between Victorinus, on one side, and his mother and step-father, on the other. But what worries Augustine in this letter, is that a tribune, Peregrinus, tried to expel Victorinus from the church during Augustine’s absence. The tribune tries to expel the refugee on the basis that he had received precise instructions in this regard from the secular power, namely from a count of Africa, mentioned in the letter. Augustine doubts the validity of the instructions and suspects the tribune of abuse. Given the situation, he firmly opposes the violation of the right to asylum and asks Novatus to fix the problem himself by talking directly to the count, who most probably had lived near Novatus.⁸

In this short letter, we have precise information about the existence and practice of the right to asylum but also about the bishop’s responsibility to safeguard the enforcement of the right and the attempts to deny this right from a secular power. In this case, we are dealing with an issue of economics. Augustine is not clear about whether he believes Victorinus to be guilty of what he is accused. However, we can speculate that the bishop does not want to be the one who judges: in ‘De civitate Dei’, Augustine explains that only at the end of history will we know who had been members of the earthly city and who had been members of the divine city. God is the only true judge of history, thus only He is capable of judging one’s guilt or innocence.

The interesting aspect about this right was that it was not based on the innocence of the one who requested it, being granted to both the righteous and the unrighteous, to the good and the evil, to the

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⁷Ibid., p. 570.
⁸Ibid., Epistola 28, p. 408. The Latin version: Victorinius ille est in ecclesiam, de quo antea scripsersum sanctitati tuae et negotium eius de annonibus agere dignatus es: causam habet cum matre et utinico suo propter quam fugit ad ecclesiam.
guilty or the innocent. Thus, the basis of this right is not the innocence of the refugee but the sacred character of the church leading to the cessation of the secular laws. The exception before the civil and moral law is granted by God’s divine grace. Obviously, the excesses that can be done on the basis of this right are numerous. Thus, the right has never been applied strictly, but its existence exemplifies a unique case of political theology.

In the church, not only human laws are suspended but sometimes even divine laws are abolished in view of divine grace. According to Carl Schmitt, the one who can decide to grant an exception is the king, so God, as a sovereign, can also decide when the law that he, himself, has given can be broken. Christian charity is secondary; the root of the exception is the divine grace which suspends the laws.

As a matter of fact, the right to asylum is approved in the Latin Occident by the laws in 419, 431 and 432, only to be further confirmed by the council of Orange in 441. The right to sanctuary was acknowledged even in the gothic period. It is known that, when Alaric invaded Rome, he clearly indicated that the right to sanctuary was to be respected, churches to be infrangible and the ones who hide in them to be saved.

Who is Afraid of the Right to Sanctuary?

In 541, at the Council of Orleans, the law concerning the right to asylum was amended. If until then, the law had only stipulated the interdiction of forcefully evicting from the church those who were seeking refuge, then in 541, the law forbade the use of deceit to drive out the refugees protected by the sacred places. This detail is important, since the attempts to deceive and drive out refugees represents an implicit acknowledgement of the special power that the sacred place bears. Within the church, fugitives are protected, but once they are outside, the divine protection ceases. Therefore, the persecutors had reasons to try to get the refugees outside the church. One

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does not enter a sanctuary armed nor use force. In church one does not spill blood, not even the blood of a criminal.

If the persecutors, however, managed to get the refugees outside using trickery, then the protection would stop and the refugee would be subject to the usual punishment. The attempt of the asylum violators to cheat highlights to a large degree the authority invested in the right to asylum, preventing them from using force in the space of the sanctuary. From the point of view of the church, both secular and canonical laws are suspended, making the place of asylum an institution *supra legem*. From the point of view of the persecutors, the sacred place offered a special protection which prohibited them from acting within the walls of the church.

The persecutors do not hesitate to use trickery and deception, to lie or to cheat, to get the refugees out of the protected place. Thus, it is not so much morality which prevents them from violating the right of refuge but a form of taboo. Violating sanctuary is a taboo that is more serious than breaking any other law. It is unknown whether respect or fear determines this type of behavior, but the main method of violating the right to sanctuary is the attempt to remove the refugees from the sacred place where divine hospitality reigns. In most known attempts to violate the right to sanctuary, the persecutors physically remove the refugees before executing them. On very rare occasions, one commits murder in the sacred place, becoming exposed to divine retaliation.

From the perspective of the refugee, the sanctuary is a form of salvation from an inextricable situation, and only the divine can allow such “magnificent works.” Consequently, the right to asylum is a remembrance of God’s ability to perform miracles and suspend laws.

By trying to cheat in relation to the supernatural, are the asylum violators not trying somehow to evade the ability of the interceder saints whose relics are in the sanctuary and who allow their magical auras to protect the refugees and more especially punish the persecutors? This is the question posed by Anne Ducloux in the conclusion of her article dedicated to the violations of the right to sanctuary.

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Let us present some examples analyzed by Ducloux from the 6th-century work *Historia Francorum* by Bishop Gregory of Tours (Grégoire de Tours). In 557, following a political affair in which Chram (Chramne) opposes Cholhar I (Clotaire I, his father and the king of Neustria) and Duke Austrapius where the latter is forced to take refuge in the Church St Martin of Tour in order to flee from Chram. The right to asylum is granted to Austrapius but the sanctuary is breached by Chram’s men who chase away anyone who tries to give Austrapius food or water, in the hope that he will come out on his own, driven out by thirst and hunger. The text further explains how a man approaches Austrapius, who is half dead from thirst, and tries to give him water. At that moment, the guard rushes to grab the dish from his hand. That same night the guard dies struck down by a fever. The author of the text, Gregory of Tours, does not hesitate to describe this event as a miracle of Saint Martin who, because of Christian mercy but especially because the right to asylum has been violated, punishes the one who refused to give water to a man dying of thirst, a man who was placed under the protection of the Saint. Following the death of the aggressor, the resistance against Austrapius ends, nobody has the courage to face the Holy Protector and therefore his life is saved and we find out after some time that he has been ordained, later becoming a bishop.\(^{14}\)

The case is interesting since it depicts the story of a punishment for violating divine hospitality. Once hospitality has been granted, nothing can end it, and the host must be prepared to pay the price for this hospitality, even with his own life or with the life of his family members. As in the case of Lot (Genesis 19:8), actions which are normally condemnable are permitted if they are done in order to protect the guest. Presenting the death of the guard as a punishment meted out by Saint Martin is akin to treating the right to sanctuary with the utmost consideration: the one who dares to infringe that right becomes liable to immediate divine punishment.

At Rouen, in 567, Merovech (Mérovéé) marries his uncle’s widow Brunehaut, thereby disobeying divine and canonical laws. Merovech’s father, Chilperic (Chilpéric), is not pleased with the situation and tries to separate the two. They consequently seek refuge in St. Martin’s basilica. Chilperic tries to draw them out by using different stratagems

\(^{14}\)Ibid., pp. 213-214.
but he fails. Hence, he promises the two that he will leave them in peace. The young couple believe him and leave the sanctuary and for some time the situation appears to be settled. Chilperic does not give up easily and after a while sends his married son to a monastery and arranges for him to be ordained. Merovech then flees the monastery and this time seeks refuge in the church of Saint Martin de Tours.¹⁵

This case shows that even an incestuous marriage was not a sufficiently serious offense to place the guilty outside the protection offered by the sanctuary. Another interesting detail is the extremely pious attitude of the father, Chilperic, toward Saint Martin. Gontran Boson, having been accused of killing one of Chilperic’s sons, manages to escape the rage of the king of the Franks by hiding in Saint Martin’s church. Exasperated, the king decides to ask the Saint to withdraw his protection of Gontran. He writes a letter addressed to the Saint and places it on the grave of the Saint together with a blank piece of papyrus for the answer. After waiting three days and receiving no written reply from the saint, the king decides not to chase Gontran under the condition that he remains in the monastery.¹⁶

Another story related to the right to asylum focuses on another young couple who wish to get married. This time no human or divine law stands in their way but the families oppose this union so the two seek refuge in a church. The first attempt to flee fails because the young woman is persuaded by the family to give up. Once she has been separated from her beloved and forced to enter a monastery, she exercises her right not to be thrown out of the monastery against her will, as the bishop, her uncle, asks. Therefore, the family cannot take her away, but her lover can kidnap her, if she gives her consent; then the right of sanctuary is not violated and so the lover comes at her request to save her, and the two get married.¹⁷

Unlike the previous stories, this story draws our attention to a case in which the right of sanctuary is not used to evade the enforcement of the law but to find a space of freedom, to escape the guardianship of the family and to be able to gain independence. The case is even more interesting since the young woman is the niece of the local bishop who manages to prevent her first attempt to flee

¹⁷Ibid., p. 217.
but not the second. Thus, not only the secular power but also the clerical power is not able to impinge on this right to sanctuary which is offered to anyone in need of it. Need can be therefore understood in a wider sense, the need of the guilty who have no other option, of the righteous who cannot defend themselves but also in situations where those involved are in trouble and need additional protection against abuses. I will further continue our research with some more examples of the right to asylum and by observing some differences in the area of Saxony.

From a Religious Right to a Political One

The first reference to the right of asylum is found in a law given by the king of West Saxony (Wessex) (688-725), stating that whoever is guilty of murder and hides in a church can save his life.18 Sometime after, a law passed during the reign of King Alfred the Great (849-899) said that any man followed by his enemies is saved once he sets his foot or his horse’s hoof on the stairs of the monastery and he cannot be forced out of it for at least 7 days. If he survives hunger, or if he does not come out to fight, then his life shall be spared19. In this case, hospitality is limited since the refugee can evade the pursuers but he must face the test of hunger. The text however, leads us to believe that the right to asylum was granted by the king and not by the pope or the bishop, since the king is the one who decides what the laws are, as well as the exemptions from these laws. Also, if someone violates this right to asylum, then this person can be subject to death, except when the king allows this person to be acquitted of guilt by paying a tax.20

The interpretation of the right to asylum as belonging to royalty comes from the extension of this right to the royal court. It is an extension, however, of the right to sanctuary to the royal court and not the other way around, the right having an ecclesiastical foundation.21 According to some authors, the same right is extended to a man’s home, making it infrangible. The sheriff does not have the right to

19Ibid., p. 218.
20Ibid., p. 219.
21Peter Halkerston, A Treatise on the History, Law, and Privileges of the Palace and Sanctuary of Holyrood House; with appendix, list of cases, and index materiarum (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1831), p. 48.
breach a man’s home unless that person is guilty of treason or fraud and must return money that belongs to the king. The infrangibility of the home appears to be an extension of the right of sanctuary but in this case, the infrangibility is only valid for civil laws (as they are called today).

In churches, one can seek refuge for any crime except for treason to the crown and sacrilege, the two crimes which involve on the one hand the authority of the state, which guarantees the law and on the other hand, the church’s authority which underlies it. The wrongdoer can remain in the church for a period of 40 days during which he can confess. If during this time the judge’s court calls him to judgment, the refugee has the option not to attend and to choose the path of exile, hence losing any material goods that he possesses. The person escapes unpunished but he is excluded from the commonwealth and he loses all his belongings. If, however, the person considers himself innocent, then he can appear before the judge and if found not guilty, then he can regain all his goods. This right of sanctuary was extended to all churches in Scotland.

A document signed by King David the First of Scotland (1089-1153) grants the Abbey of Holyrood House a series of judicial and economic rights including the right to grant asylum. This right is founded on the idea that God’s holy places cannot be corrupted by human behavior. The text mentions, however, that the idea behind the right to sanctuary was not that the person can evade the law but that the person is given a favorable framework to an understanding or a fair trial.

All these examples come under the umbrella of what we would call public sanctuaries. There are also, however, private sanctuaries but in this case, the church does not offer sanctuary, but rather whole cities become such places. These correspond to the biblical cities of refuge. We know of at least 22 such cities where the wrongdoer could remain until his death.

In England, the reduction of this right comes in 1519 from a denominational perspective, when King Henry VIII limited the right to asylum in his fight against the Pope. According to King Henry VIII,
the authority that can decide whether a church can become a sanctuary is a political one, not a spiritual one. Furthermore, the acceptance of a privilege set by the Pope on the territory of England would be an offense to sovereignty.25 It seems that the king of England understood very well the Hobbesian lesson by which the right to rule in religious matters belongs entirely to the king. With the passing of time, the right to asylum is limited and its application became increasingly difficult, until 1642 when it was completely abolished. The authority which sets the laws also has the capacity to suspend them and to decide the limits to their application. In modern states, the president has the right to acquit in the same way as the kings before them had the right to pardon. The root of the right to pardon is divine mercy which can forgive sins. To answer the question “who has the right to grant asylum?” means to answer the question “who is king?,” and Henry decides that only he can rise above the law (supra legem).

Some Conclusions

The analysis of these cases reveals something very interesting for a political-theological framework. The right of asylum is not a human right, a right inherent to a person, but a right directly linked to a place. The emphasis is not on the individual, and his rights due to his nature, but rather on the divine, and the grace with which God grants forgiveness, mercy and refuge. God is a refuge for the ones in trouble: “For you have been my refuge, a strong tower against the foe.”26

Ethical reasons are always secondary. The salvation of the innocent does not justify the existence of these places even though they serve this purpose. The sacred nature of a location borrowed from divinity, is that which allows churches to serve as a place of refuge. Being sacred, secluded and left aside transforms the location into a refuge. The whole idea of a refuge assumes a temporary state. One is not a refugee indefinitely. At a certain moment, when the conflict ends, one can return home.

It is not the individual who sanctifies the location but exactly the opposite where the sanctity of the place has power over him. The idea can seem strange at first, but following further investigation we can

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25Ibid., p. 226.
26Ps 61:3.
integrate it within a wider perspective which assumes the sanctity of places. If we think, for example, about Rome or Jerusalem, these places seem to have something inherent which makes them sacred and different from any other places. The logic behind pilgrimages is the acceptance of the sanctity of places. As a matter of fact, during the year of Mercy, 2016, we have had the chance to observe the associations made between mercy and pilgrimage. The Roman Pontiff encourages pilgrimages as spiritual experiences meant to gain forgiveness, meaning that the location ends up facilitating metaanoia.

In a wider perspective, all Christians benefit from the right of refuge before God. Christ’s sacrifice opens the door to God’s Kingdom even for the unjust. His sacrifice, not our innocence, gives us the opportunity to enter the Kingdom. Divine grace grants refuge to sinners and this grace is not for the just but for the unjust. It is not our merits that justify us before God. Christ himself sacrifices his body as a sign of atonement and the Eucharist opens for us the path towards the Kingdom. For this reason, the existence of cities of refuge must be interpreted from an eschatological and Christological point of view. Divine hospitality belongs to the Kingdom to come, prepared for us despite our sins. It is not the fact that we are innocent that gives us the right to hope for salvation in Paradise, but it is the belief in Christ’s efficacious sacrifice. For this purpose, the church is open to anyone who comes to confess. As a matter of fact, the practice of offering asylum in the medieval period required a time of repentance for the one who was being offered shelter.

Finally, we have a paradox which was emphasized by Agamen27 and Robert Jacob.28 It is an ambivalence of the sacred, of what is separate, which represents both those above the law, God, the king, as well as those who are outside the law, the outcasts. The outlaw and the chosen one are defined with the same name: they are sacer. The usage of the term sacer before Christianity emphasized the one who voluntarily puts himself outside the law, the one who knowingly disobeys the laws and therefore brings upon himself the exclusion from the political community of citizens who obey the law. The

Roman right describes the *sacer* as the one who does not benefit from any kind of judicial protection. He can be killed by anyone and his belongings can be taken away. The same situation, however, that of being outside the laws, is to be found in Thomas Hobbes’ sovereign: for a contract to be protected, the king must be beyond the contract, meaning above the law. Thus, beyond the law there are only two categories: those above the law, namely the king, and the ones outside the law, namely the outcasts. Even though this framework I am presenting is not Christian, the image can serve as a metaphor for the unifying and peace-making function of the church, where there is no longer a distinction between master and slave because the divine hospitality extends over all.

The church, the Christian sanctuary, is already in a certain sense God’s Kingdom through the power of its liturgy. Hence, it can already grant the kind of hospitality that is expected in the Kingdom to come. The right of sanctuary is thus a preview of Paradise’s hospitality. Obviously, inasmuch as the church is not yet the Kingdom in its accomplished form, so, too, the protection that it can offer is far from being complete. The responsibility that the church has is that of reflecting divine hospitality which is not limited to offering shelter to those in need but it extends to the liturgical aspect which offers the believer his real home, a privileged “place” where the Kingdom is already being lived here on Earth. During the liturgy, we are already living in the Father’s home despite our sins, hence the Kingdom is the absolute fulfillment of a right of sanctuary that can only be partial on Earth.

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3.
The Beginnings of Diplomacy as Reflected in the Homeric Epos

MARIA-LUIZA DUMITRU OANCEA

Introduction

Homeric epic poems explore the issue of *proxenia* in a sketchy manner and this is because we are now discussing the early stages of the Greek colonizing process of Western territories (8th century B.C.).

The road leading westwards was opened by the Greeks, and *The Odyssey* is, in fact, the only “existing testimony about the exploration journeys westwards.”

Throughout his journey, Odysseus encounters hostile populations as well as benevolent ones and at times civilized ones, having a lifestyle very similar to that of the Greeks (i.e. the Phaeacians). There is even a thesis according to which the Greeks were not successful in their colonizing endeavor in regions populated by hostile inhabitants (cyclops, lestrigones, Circe etc.), while they were successful in regions such as West Sicily, Ustica (North of Sicily), Malta, Tunis, where the Greeks were neck and neck with the Phoenicians, helped by the fact that they had control over Carthage (Northern Africa) and Motya (West of Sicily).

We come to understand the fact that, before colonization per se isolated journeys took place in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea, for exploration and commercial purposes, and testimonies of such remote pre-colonial journeys can be intuited in the Odysseic text.

In order to understand the early forms of what was to become *proxenia* in the 6th century B.C. (the public hospitality between city states and ensured by a proxenos, an equivalent of the ambassador or consul: *pro-*, “in the place of/ in the name of,” *xenos*, “guest, foreigner,” *proxenos* (Sparta) “the person who acts in the name of strangers,

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protector, defender, go-between, negotiator, honorable person hired to defend the interests of a city-state or of certain citizens”; in Magna Graecia this was the person who appointed the witness or who guaranteed an intention or a treatise in the name of foreigners or in the name of a city-state, we will take into consideration a few relevant passages from both *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*. As far as *The Iliad* is concerned, I have chosen canto IX (lines 197-668): the emissary sent by King Agamemnon to the hero Achilles, with Odysseus leading the way. As for *The Odyssey*, I have chosen a passage from canto VI (lines 1-210) about Odysseus’ shipwreck in the land of the Phaeacians, followed by the encounter between Odysseus and Nausicaa.

**The Development of the Proxenia Scenario in the Classical Period of Ancient Greece**

In Classical Greece, the emissary or embassy comprised two or three people called emissaries (*présbeis*), heralds (*kérykes*), messengers (*ángeloi*). These were generally selected from the elderly, more experienced, honorable and wise people.

The emissaries would utter their discourse in turn, before an assembly (i.e. people, a small circle made up of the magistrate’s representatives exercising their function). Each emissary would prove his negotiating skills, and then he would leave, waiting for the results of his intervention.

The aim of the embassy was usually that of forming alliances with another city-state.

The members of the embassy were empowered by the people’s Assembly and by the Council (*Boulé*). After the parties reached an agreement, ratifying the pact was enforced by a religious act (ritualistic libations of wine in praise of the gods), meant to attract divine support in order to ensure the success of the mission.

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How the Scenario of the Emissary Unfolded in the Homeric Period
(in Time of War and Peace)

The emissary in time of war was sent to former allies in order to persuade them to rejoin the warrior group they had left.

The Iliad, IX, 197-668: the embassy/emissary (presbeia) is an intercessor between the two sides in a conflict seen as a failed negotiation.

Following Nestor’s advice, Agamemnon sent an embassy headed by Odysseus, the wise warrior, which was also comprised of two other courageous warriors of the Greek army, Phoenix and Ajax, as well as the heralds Odios and Eurybates, who arrived at Achilles’ tents to intercede between him and the hero.

The meeting scenario:

- presenting the message is done in front of an extremely small circle made up of the demi-god Achilles (assimilated to a basileus, he himself being one of the aristocratic warriors) and his good friend, Patroclus;
- the members of the embassy act in virtue of their empowerment from Agamemnon and from the council headed by Nestor;
- the emissaries (présbeis) were chosen from the people known by both parties; they were respectable people, courageous, wise, endowed with the gift of speaking eloquently; and
- the embassy had a clear aim to ally against Troy.

N.B. One can notice that the embassy was treated according to the rules of private hospitality (xenia), as the people entrusted with this task were chosen from the acquaintances, equal in status to the host (part of the warrior aristocracy), not inferior to the host;

- the host warmly welcomes them, treats them well, preparing a plentiful meal in their honor; and
- satiated, the emissaries begin to utter their discourses in turn, specifying the reason for their unexpected visit, thus trying to develop an entire argumentative strategy typical of the Archaic period.
Instead of Libations …

In the economy of the classical *proxenia* scenario, the next step was to perform libations in praise of the gods. In our chosen passage, Odysseus is the first to speak, toasting a glass of wine in honor of Achilles, as if he were performing libations in front of a god. However, the meal offered to the guest-emissaries by the hero Achilles is not followed by sacrifices in praise of the gods, as it takes place just like a dinner between old friends, and the deal between the parties had not yet taken place so that it should be sealed by a libation or a sacrifice-contract.

We are thus confronted with the emissaries’ recognition of the semi-divine status of Achilles, this being the first gesture of appeasing Achilles’ own deity.

The Constitutive Parts of Odysseus’ Peroration:

1. *Laudatio*: Odysseus admires Achilles’ wealth, which he compares to that of Atreidai *basileis*.
2. Unfolding the aim of the visit:
   - formulating the status quo of the petitioner (the guest): Odysseus tells Achilles that it is impossible for the Greeks to withstand the Zeus-backed Trojans;
   - the evolution of the main planks of the status quo:
     - In Odysseus’ opinion, Hector seems crazy due to such supernatural protection;
     - Odysseus reveals to the hero the growing threat coming from the Trojans;
     - mentioning Odysseus’ personal fear that the Greeks will perish in Troy;
   - the direct formulation of the plea for help addressed to Achilles, requesting him to aid the young Greeks;

3. Appeal to *argumentum auctoritatis* on the principle of *anamnesis*: Odysseus reminds the hero that even Peleus, the hero’s father, urged him, on his leaving, to be moderate (v. 256).
4. A direct urge to calm the wrath
Instead of Exchanging Hospitality Gifts ...

The passage adapts specific episodes of the private hospitality scenario (xenía) to that of incipient proxenia, i.e. transforms the episode of gift exchange into an unimpressive enumeration of the gifts promised by Agamemnon (264-294), followed by an innovation that consists in the formulation of the conditions of bestowing the gifts linked to renouncing anger (229) as well as Hector's demise (304).

The Sequences of Phoenix's Discourse (432-605)

1. Noticing the tense state of the addressé (the host), namely the wrath that overwhelms Achilles.

2. Appeal to argumentum auctoritatis on the anamnesis principle: Phoenix reminds the hero how Peleus, his father, had entrusted him from his birth to teach him the art of war, but also to become an eloquent speaker and an accomplished warrior.

3. Second appeal to argumentum, this time anecdoticum: he himself had been confronted with the raging feeling of anger, when he almost wanted to kill his father, after he had cursed him because of a woman. Thus, he had been received at Peleus' court with benevolence. He therefore reminded the hero that they were bound by ancient ties of hospitality, through the elder Peleus (reminiscence of the xenia scenario).

4. Again, he recalls Achilles' childhood, when he reminds the hero how much he had suffered for his sake.

5. He urges him to appease the anger, using argumentum auctoritatis yet again: the gods too can be relenting in their decisions, through sacrifices and prayers (497-501).

6. The gnomic character is strengthened by argumentum auctoritatis (502-512): Phoenix personifies the prayers, making them daughters of Zeus: "Lame are their feet, and wrinkled is their face;/ With humble mien, and with dejected eyes, /Constant they follow, where injustice flies./ Injustice swift, erect, and unconfined, /Sweeps the wide earth, and tramples o'er mankind, /While Prayers, to heal her wrongs, move slow behind./ Who hears these daughters of almighty Jove,/ For him they mediate to the throne above / When man rejects the humble suit they make, / The sire revenges for the daughters' sake;"
7. Again, there is a direct appeal to tempering anger (513-514), this time based on the renunciation of anger by Agamemnon, who regretted the words and gestures made in front of Achilles, and is ready to bring him countless, expensive gifts and, furthermore, to send as emissaries the worthiest and dearest warriors from the Greek army.

8. Phoenix strengthens the appeal to renounce anger by means of another *argumentum auctoritatis* about the great heroes who knew how to receive gifts and, thus, to relent; furthermore, by means of an anecdotal digression that underlines the whole process of evil thought through a refusal to renounce pride, Phoenix brings to the forefront the story of the hero Meleager who, on being asked by the most prominent Aetolians to fight and defend them from the Curetes, promising him great gifts and honors, refuses, and the citadel is burnt to the ground; very late, seeing that the citadel is being destroyed, he decides to jump into battle, but, despite the fact that he had helped the Aetolians escape the wrath, they did not offer him the gifts they had promised him (525-559).

9. Phoenix utters a somber final warning when he elucidates the meaning of the story to Achilles; he warns the hero not to be overcome with anger, taking Meleager’s example, by coming to the Greeks’ aid too late, namely in the moment of the burning of the ships, as he would not rejoice in either gifts or honors.

*The Sequences of Ajax’s Discourse (622-642)*

1. The warrior begins his discourse through a direct formulation of the final conclusions that define a failed negotiation.

2. Proposes that the companions return to the ships, where they were waited for eagerly.

3. Ajax blames Achilles for obstinacy, calling him “stern” (σχέτλιος: *Od*. 9. 630, an identical epithet to that attributed by Polyphemos to Odysseus: σχέτλιε: *Od*. 9. 351) and “unpitying” (νηλής: 632, an identical epithet to that attributed to Polyphemos: νηλέι θυμῷ: *Od*. 9. 272), sketching a short negative portrait based on two dominant features: selfishness: “does not care for the soul of the wedded” (630) and ingratitude: “nor the esteem they had for him on the ships” (631), if he takes nothing into account when it comes to a girl.
4. He utters a blunt appeal to temper anger, but also a hidden advertisement through the appeal to shyness that the host owes the guests / emissaries under his roof: “beware (σὺ δέ (...)/ αἰδέοσσαι), as a host inside the house.” The appeal bears a striking resemblance to that uttered by Oddyseus in front of the cyclop Polyphemos (αἰδεῖο: 269).

5. Finally, Ajax assures Achilles that the members of the embassy wish to be on his side, despite his stubbornness.

Consequently, one can notice that the emissaries act as one, formulating their speeches in turn, but respecting the sequences of a unique, coherent and dense discourse: the first speaker launches the central ideas of the discourse (voicing, for the organic structure of the embassy, the introductory part of any discourse named prooimion/ lat. exordium), the second speaker develops the ideal expressed by the first (uttering the middle part of a discourse called diègesis/ lat. narratio), while the last speaker formulates the conclusions of the meeting (succinctly formulating the text of the last part of any discourse, called epílogos/ lat. peroratio).

The elements that characterize the epopeic (as opposed to political) discourse, have an abundance of those argumenta auctoritatis or even anecdotica that in fact trigger the epopeic digressions, but also present those familiar expostulations and warnings.

The example above speaks about the beginnings of the political discourse of the embassy, but the mediation also has in its scope groups that are known among them, rivals belonging to the same social sphere (i.e. military), extrapolating the customs of private hospitality over that of the public one, meant to mediate between groups that have become hostile for the purpose of solving an aim external to them (see the ancient hospitality relationship that tied Phoenix to Achilles).

One can notice, that, in general, all the moments of the scenario that in the Classical Age will become proxenia are respected, with the exception that in this situation everything develops around the hospitable dinner, in a quasi-official setting.

Also, as in the case of the particular xenieis, the discourses are uttered at the end of the dinner; instead of libations for the gods, Odysseus toasts to the honor of his guest – Achilles, thus recognizing his semi-divine status, and, instead of gift exchanges, the emissary
enumerates the gifts Agamemnon was to offer in the event of agreeing to re-enter the battle on the side of the Greeks.

In addition, the discourse of the first emissary (Odysseus) starts with a *laudatio*, a rhetorical element absent from the discourse of Classical period ambassadors, but greatly appreciated by epic texts or *agorá* orators. The frequent recourse to tradition through those anamnetical arguments (*i.e.* authority, anecdotic) is, again, related to the epic genre, as well as the expostulations, friendly advice or warnings, all these belonging to the epic tradition.

To put it briefly, the fragment tackles the issue of traversing particular *xenia* and reaching public *proxenia* by means of combining specific elements from one or other form of hospitality, but also by means of adapting one scenario to another.

*The peaceful emissary goes* in his own name on an ethnical exploration with the aim of establishing commercial and peaceful relations.

*The Odyssey* (VI. 1-210): *Asylum Application Form from Foreign Peoples, as Part of the Exploration Journey of Some Unknown Lands: A Successful Negotiation*

The speech of the guest-suppliant (149-185), summing up 37 lines, develops a fully-fledged rhetoric of the asylum application, touching upon all the three key moments of the oratorical discourse: *prooimion*/*exordium*, *diégesis*/narratio and *epílogos*/peroratio; the message is given in front of a small circle of representatives of the local king (Nausicaa and her followers):

- **PROOIMION/ EXORDIUM**
  - Odysseus declares himself a supplicant (*i.e.* person praying), thus defining his status: “in front of thee I fall on my knees”: disclosing the motive behind the visit (*see* Odysseus and the embassy for Achilles);
  - recognizes in the guest someone superior to him, when he calls her “mistress” — ἄνασσα (here, the *laudatio* is indirect): *laudatio*;
  - formulating a direct question to the host with respect to her status (including, indirectly, a *laudatio* addressed to the host -- 149): θεός νῦ τις, ἢ βροτός ἰσσι; (“art thou a goddess or a mortal?”).

- **DIEGESIS/ NARRATIO**
Develops the first premise (θεός νύ τις “a goddess art thou?” 150-152):

**Laudatio** (2 lines): 151: Ἀρτέμιδι σε ἐγώ γε, Διὸς κούρη μεγάλω(“Artemis, the daughter of great Zeus, do I liken thee”); 152: εἰδός τε μέγεθός τε φυήν τ’ ἀγχιστα ἐισκὼ “most nearly in comeliness and in stature and in form.”

Artemis is the virgin warrior goddess, fearless, beautiful, a direct descendant of Zeus.

Develops the second premise more extensively (153-169) – (“art thou mortal?,” βροτός ἐσσι).

1. **Laudatio** (17 lines)

- the people are pleased to have her (155-157);
- the future fiancé will also be happy, winning her heart with beautiful gifts (158-159);
- Nausicaa’s beauty seems to Odysseus unrivaled among people;
- the hero compares her unrivaled beauty to an element borrowed from the plant regnum: a palm tree admired by him near the altar in Delos (162-163): her fragile personality, her freshness and uprightness sums up, in fact, the Homeric ideal of beauty, devoid of any form of sensuality, of any carnality through the sublimation of beauty;
- Odysseus even allows the short digression in order to insert strategically information about himself as a man of strategy (army commander): 164-165: “or thither too, I went, and many people followed with me . . . ,” an anecdotal argument (self-reference, appealing to the experience of the speaker);
- the hero continues the comparison to the palm tree branch in order to motivate his state of amazement (164) on seeing the beautiful face of his host.

Odysseus ends his long *laudatio* using the same simile: he bows to the virgin as if he were bowing in front of that palm tree (ὡς σέ, γύναι, ἀγαμαί τε τέθηπά τε, 168), motivating his inhibition about clasping her by the knees, as was the custom in his country when one would ask to be hosted (δείδια δ’ αἰνῶς/ γούνων ἀψασθαι, “Oddysseus pondered whether he should clasp the knees of the fair-faced maid,” 168-169), immediately making the connection with his
mood: χαλεπόν δὲ μὲ πένθος ἴκάνει “and am amazed, and fear greatly.”
This laudatio is composed of a total of 19 lines.

2. Explaining the reason for his presence in a foreign land (170-174: 4 lines):
   ✓ Odysseus briefly recounts his perils at sea, mentioning the twenty companions who had perished in the deep sea, swallowed by waves (170-171: 1 line);
   ✓ the hero mentions the place from which he set sail: the island of Ogygia (172)
   ✓ he blames the gods for his failure on the land of the host (172-174), but also for his endless mishaps, presenting himself as a puppet in the hands of the gods.

   ➢ EPILOGOS/ PERORATIO (begging for mercy: 175; formulating the hospitality plea: 178; final blessings: 180-185) the partial discourse of Ajax in the Iliad -- the appeal to tempering anger encountered in the discourses of the emissaries Odysseus and Phoenix = begging for mercy; (however, without taking from the Iliadic soil the expostulation, while the uttering of good wishes reinterprets the host’s assurance by the good thoughts of the emissaries proclaimed by Ajax in the Iliad.)

We can notice that the exordium is very abrupt, (149); laudatio represents the most generous part of the discourse (19 lines); the blessings are within the expected limits (5 lines).

On the other hand, Nausicaa, in her answer, does not enlarge upon the series of legitimate investigations, as Odysseus had already pre-empted this moment by answering them in advance.

She thought it necessary to underline her ignorance with respect to the guest’s status, but, at the same time, she intuits the aristocratic status of her guest.

The example above again brings to the forefront the extrapolation of private over public hospitality (proxenia) now aiming to finalize peace treaties with unknown and/or hostile even savage states with the intention of civilized or colonizing them.
Instead of Conclusions …

The two analyzed fragments illustrate the transition from xenia to proxenia rather differently, from defending and negotiating particular interests in small circles of equals to extending these negotiations between city states of similar military power and political influence (transposed to an epic context through the absolute divine protection of the Phaeacians). If in The Iliad, the negotiation takes place between people of the same social circle, (and the discourse is perfectly adapted to this type of particular negotiation), then in The Odyssey one passes to a new type of negotiation between two different, yet similar worlds due to the level of civilization that unites, thus making them comparable. In addition, the discourse also seems to be adapted to the new requirements. In The Iliad, the discourse is marked by specific elements of tradition -- that of familiar oratory and propaedeutic return, while in The Odyssey, the discourse already has the aspect of official formalism marked, not as much by the parts of oratorical discourse (which, one can also find in The Iliad), but especially by the innovation of developing the premises launched in the prooimion/exordium. If the discourses in The Iliad end abruptly (in expostulations, warnings, expressing discontent by sketching negative portraits etc.), without the overt possibility of resuming negotiations or solving a crisis situation skillfully, in The Odyssey the perspective changes drastically, especially due to the fact that laudatio now takes an unprecedented amplitude in the economy of the hospitality discourse, which could have contributed, we believe, to the subsequent development of diplomatic discourse, which is extremely attentive to the feelings and reactions of the host-country. It could give us a hint of the consequences resulting from the clash with the unknown or surprising factor primarily due to cultural codes etc.

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Bibliography


Papal Teaching on Immigration in a Globalized World

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Introduction

One of the main questions that I was asked a couple of months ago by my parishioners, when I visited them at their homes for the house blessing, was related to the topic of my essay; namely, Father, what do you think about the people who these days leave countries, like Syria and Iraq, seeking safer conditions and a better life in Europe or in other parts of the world? Their question taught me that they are not indifferent to their suffering sisters and brothers, since indifference affects many people today and it is shown in different ways, as Pope Francis says:

Some people are well-informed; they listen to the radio, read the newspapers or watch television, but they do so mechanically and without engagement. They are vaguely aware of the tragedies afflicting humanity, but they have no sense of involvement or compassion. Theirs is the attitude of those who know, but keep their gaze, their thoughts and their actions focused on themselves. Sadly, it must be said that today’s information explosion does not of itself lead to an increased concern for other people’s problems, which demands openness and a sense of solidarity. Indeed, the information glut can numb people’s sensibilities and to some degree downplay the gravity of the problems. In other cases, indifference shows itself in lack of concern for what is happening around us, especially if it does not touch us directly. Some people prefer not to ask questions or seek

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1In Romania, there is this custom that during the month of January, the parish priest and curate go to bless the houses of all the parishioners and thus they get to know better each other and share their joys and troubles.
answers; they lead lives of comfort, deaf to the cry of those who suffer. Almost imperceptibly, we grow incapable of feeling compassion for others and for their problems; we have no interest in caring for them, as if their troubles were their own responsibility, and none of our business.²

That said, I was truly glad to see that my parishioners were concerned about the tragedies of these people. Yet, at the back of my mind I knew that what my parishioners were seeking was not my own opinion on this very touching issue, but rather what the Church has to say in this regard. Their question led me to reflect more deeply on this issue and to write the present essay.

**Certain Aspects concerning Immigration**

First, there are factual data that need to be considered when talking about immigrants and refugees.

Throughout history people have left their families, nations, and cultures and moved to foreign countries. The same thing is happening in our time.

Migration of individuals and families occurs for multiple reasons. A variety of factors push people toward the decision to emigrate from their homes. These include lack of economic opportunity in the home region due to unemployment or underemployment; governmental instability or oppression; lack of educational opportunities; regional hostility toward one’s religion, cultural, ethnic, or political identity; absence of family ties; famine; civil war; and, in a few cases, just plain adventure:

Similarly, a variety of factors pull people toward certain immigration destinations. Family ties; political stability; economic and educational opportunity; cost and standard of living; absence of language barriers; religious, cultural, and ethnic tolerance; and the cost of reaching the desired

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destination weigh against the resources available to effectuate the move.³

Secondly, the reasons for emigration just mentioned underline the fact that they are related to human dignity. Regarding human dignity, as Saint John Paul II stated in his apostolic exhortation, *Ecclesia in America*, it is important to underline that it is at the root of all human rights. The pope states:

It is appropriate to recall that the foundation on which all human rights rest is the dignity of the person. “God’s masterpiece, man, is made in the divine image and likeness. Jesus took on our human nature, except for sin; he advanced and defended the dignity of every human person, without exception; he died that all might be free. The Gospel shows us how Christ insisted on the centrality of the human person in the natural order (cf. Lk 12:22-29) and in the social and religious orders, even against the claims of the Law (cf. Mk 2:27): defending men, women (cf. John 8:11) and even children (cf. Mt 19:13-15), who in his time and culture occupied an inferior place in society. The human being’s dignity as a child of God is the source of human rights and of corresponding duties.” For this reason, “every offense against the dignity of man is an offense against God himself, in whose image man is made.” This dignity is common to all, without exception, since all have been created in the image of God (cf. Gen 1:26). Jesus’ answer to the question “Who is my neighbor?” (Lk 10:29) demands of everyone an attitude of respect for the dignity of others and of real concern for them, even if they are strangers or enemies (cf. Lk 10:30-37).⁴


It appears clear that for us Christians, justice in immigration requires a sense of solidarity since we share a common status as children of God.5

Thirdly, closely linked to human dignity is the necessity for freedom of everyone since “Freedom is the measure of man’s dignity and greatness.”6 Again, Saint John Paul II explains how we should understand freedom:

Freedom is not simply the absence of tyranny or oppression. Nor is freedom a license to do whatever we like. Freedom has an inner “logic” which distinguishes it and ennobles it: freedom is ordered to the truth, and is fulfilled in man’s quest for truth and in man’s living in the truth. Detached from the truth about the human person, freedom deteriorates into license in the lives of individuals, and, in political life, it becomes the caprice of the most powerful and the arrogance of power. Far from being a limitation upon freedom or a threat to it, reference to the truth about the human person -- a truth universally knowable through the moral law written on the hearts of all -- is, in fact, the guarantor of freedom’s future.7

It follows from here that the logic of utilitarianism “which defines morality not in terms of what is good but of what is advantageous, threatens the freedom of individuals and nations and obstructs the building of a true culture of freedom.”8 Instead of such an approach, John Paul II invites us to an “ethic of solidarity”9 reminding:

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8 Ibid., n. 13.
9 Ibid., n. 13.
ourselves that no one has a right to exploit another for his own advantage, but also and above all we must recommit ourselves to that solidarity which enables others to live out, in the actual circumstances of their economic and political lives, the creativity which is a distinguishing mark of the human person and the true source of the wealth of nations in today’s world.\textsuperscript{10}

Fourthly, fear, that affects many people in dealing with the immigrants, is not the proper answer to this challenge. Again, John Paul II teaches that the proper answer is this:

The “answer” to that fear is neither coercion nor repression, nor the imposition of one social “model” on the entire world. The answer to the fear is the common effort to build the civilization of love, founded on the universal values of peace, solidarity, justice, and liberty. And the “soul” of the civilization of love is the culture of freedom: the freedom of individuals and the freedom of nations, lived in self-giving solidarity and responsibility.\textsuperscript{11}

Finally, from what was said so far, it follows that for a better understanding of the human rights that are founded on human dignity, as well as values such as peace, solidarity, justice, and liberty, a short discussion on natural law is required because these rights and values can be explained and understood in this light. With that in view, the essay will move to the second part to provide this discussion.

A Brief Presentation on Natural Law

One of the first jurists who examined natural law in more detail was Gratian, who taught canon law in Bologna in the twelfth century and who wrote concerning natural law in his \textit{Tractatus de legibus}:\textsuperscript{12}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{10} Ibid., n.13.
\bibitem{11} Ibid., n.18.
\bibitem{12} See Kenneth Pennington, \textit{“Lex Naturalis and Ius Naturale,”} in \textit{The Jurist} 68 (2008), 569-570.
\end{thebibliography}
The human race is ruled by two things: namely, natural ius and mos. The ius of nature is what is contained in the lex and the Gospel. By it, each person is commanded to do to others what he wants done to himself and is prohibited from inflicting on others what he does not want done to himself.13

As can be easily seen, Gratian based his definition of ius naturae on what Jesus says in the Gospel: “whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.” (Matt 7:12). “Ius commands each person to render unto others what each person would want others to render unto him/her -- the Golden Rule.”14 Yet, it is worthy of note that Gratian’s thought on natural law was influenced by Justinian’s Digest, in which the ancient jurist Gaius states:

All peoples who are ruled by lex and mos partly use their own ius and partly the ius that is common to all men. The ius that each nation has constituted for itself for each city is called the ius civile; almost as if it were a ius proprium of that city. What, however, the natural reason of men establishes and is used by all men equally, is called the ius gentium, almost as if all human beings use that ius.15


14Kenneth Pennington, “Lex Naturalis and Ius Naturale,” 570.

15Justinian’s Digest, ed. Alan Watson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985) 1.1.9 “Gaius 1 inst. Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur. Nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium ipsius civitatis: quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peraeeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes
For the jurist Gaius, *ius gentium* has two characteristics, namely, it is common to all people and is established by human reason.

In addition to Gaius, Isidore of Seville also helped Gratian in shaping his thought on natural law as can be seen in his *Decretum*, where he uses Isidore’s work *ius naturale* to “illustrate his assertion that natural law was based on the Golden Rule.”

Natural law is common to all nations. It has its origins in nature, not in any constitution. Examples of natural law are the union of men and women, the procreation and raising of children, the common possession of all persons, the equal liberty of all persons, the acquisition of things that are taken from the heavens, earth, or the sea, the return of property or money that has been deposited or entrusted. This also includes the right to repel violence with force. These and similar things are never unjust but are natural and equitable.

Here, another characteristic of natural law comes into play, namely, it has its origin in nature, where it is written and not in any constitution. For Isidore, all laws are either divine and are based on nature or they are human and are based on customs. St. Thomas Aquinas also states that natural law is based on nature and reason even though in his approach to natural law, in addition to the prevailing legal tradition, there can be found a synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy.

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16 Kenneth Pennington, “*Lex Naturalis* and *Ius Naturale*,” 570-571.
17 Gratian, *Decretum*, D.1. c.7: “Ius naturale est commune omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctu nature, non constitutione aliquae habetur, ut viri et femine conjunctio, liberorum successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae cello, terra marique capiuntur; item deposite rei vel commendate pecuniae restituitio, violentie per vim repulsio. Nam hoc, aut si quid huic simile est, nunquam injustum, sed naturale equumque habetur.” English translation taken from Kenneth Pennington, “*Lex Naturalis* and *Ius Naturale*,” 581.
telian philosophy and Christian theology. Thus, in his work *Summa theologiae*, he points out:

The order of precepts of the natural law exists per the order of natural inclinations. Because in man there is first an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: because every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, per its nature: and because of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specifically, per that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, per the nature of reason, which nature is proper to him: thus, man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one must live, and other things regarding the above inclination.

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21Thomas of Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a 2ae q. 94, a. 2: “Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est, quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit un bona, et per consequens ut opera prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda. Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum naturalium, est ordo praecessorum legis naturae. Inest enim primo inclinatio homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat cum omnibus substantiis: prout sicut quaelibet substantia apparet conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et secundum hanc inclinationem pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur. -- Secundo inest homini inclinatione ad aliquam magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua communicat cum ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur ea esse de
It appears clear here that St. Thomas of Aquinas goes beyond the Golden Rule and gets more specific about the precepts of natural law: for instance, when he presents what human nature has in common with all substances, “he is echoing the Aristotelian notion that natural beings -- even rocks and water-lilies -- ’have an appetite’ for existing and preserving themselves in existence.”

Then, he also presents what human nature has in common with the animals, namely, to have offspring and to educate them, but also what is specific to human being, namely, rationality. Here again Thomas is “consonant with Aristotelian philosophical anthropology.”

It is also worth drawing attention to what Pope Benedict the XVI pointed out concerning natural law in his address to the participants of the International Congress on Natural Moral Law on February 12, 2007. He stressed:

the necessity to reflect upon the theme of natural law and to rediscover its truth common to all men ... The said law, to which the Apostle Paul refers (cf. Rom 2: 14-15), is written on the heart of man and is consequently, even today, accessible. This law has as its first and general principle, “to do good and to avoid evil.” This is a truth which by its very evidence immediately imposes itself on everyone. From it flows the other more particular principles that regulate ethical justice on the rights and duties of everyone. So does the principle of respect for human life from its conception to its natural end, because this gift of life is not man’s property but the gift of God. Besides, this is the duty to seek the truth.

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23Ibid., 21.
as the necessary presupposition of every authentic personal maturation. Another fundamental application of the subject is freedom. Yet considering the fact that human freedom is always a freedom shared with others, it is clear that the harmony of freedom can be found only in what is common to all: the truth of the human being, the fundamental message of being itself, to be precise the lex naturalis. And how can we not mention, on the one hand, the demand of justice that manifests itself in giving unicuique suum and, on the other, the expectation of solidarity that nourishes in everyone, especially if they are poor, the hope of the help of the more fortunate? In these values are expressed unbreakable and contingent norms that do not depend on the will of the legislator and not even on the consensus that the State can and must give. They are, in fact, norms that precede any human law: as such, they are not subject to modification by anyone. The natural law, together with fundamental rights, is the source from which ethical imperatives also flow, which it is only right to honor.24

Natural law, as states Pope Benedict, being written in the hearts of all human beings is unbreakable, is not subject to the will of the legislator, it cannot be modified, precedes any human law, is the source of the principles that regulate ethical justice, such as respect for human life, the duty to seek the truth, freedom, solidarity.

Moreover, in his encyclical Caritas in veritate, Pope Benedict XVI highlights with regard to justice:

Charity goes beyond justice, because to love is to give, to offer what is “mine” to the other; but it never lacks justice, which prompts us to give the other what is “his,” what is due to him because of his being or his acting. I cannot “give” what is mine to the other, without first giving him what pertains to him in justice. If we love others with charity, then first we

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are just towards them. Not only is justice not extraneous to charity, not only is it not an alternative or parallel path to charity: justice is inseparable from charity, and intrinsic to it. Justice is the primary sign of charity or, in Paul VI’s words, “the minimum measure” of it, an integral part of the love “in deed and in truth” (1 John 3:18), to which Saint John exhorts us. On the one hand, charity demands justice: recognition and respect for the legitimate rights of individuals and peoples. It strives to build the earthly city through law and justice. On the other hand, charity transcends justice and completes it in the logic of giving and forgiving. The earthly city is promoted not merely by relationships of rights and duties, but to an even greater and more fundamental extent by relationships of gratuitousness, mercy and communion. Charity always manifests God’s love in human relationships as well, it gives theological and salvific value to all commitment for justice in the world.25

In this encyclical, Pope Benedict XVI highlights the close relationship between charity and justice since to love means to give to the other what is mine although this is not done without giving to the other what pertains to him/her in justice. Charity is the primary path to justice, but it also transcends and completes it in the logic of giving and forgiving.

To sum up, this essay has emphasized so far, beginning with the Golden Rule, “ius commends each person to render unto others what each person would want others to render unto him/her — the Golden Rule,”26 that natural law is written in human nature, is based on reason, is the source of the principles that regulate ethical justice such as respect for human life, the duty to seek the truth, freedom, solidarity. “Natural law manifests as a duty the natural demands of man’s being, which are summed up, in short, in obtaining his natural ends.”27

Having presented this discussion on natural law, the essay will move to the third part that will present the papal teaching on immigration which is based on natural law and on the ethical justice that has as its source natural law.

Papal Teaching on Immigration

In papal social teaching, it appears clear, first, that persons have the right to residence and to find opportunities for life, development and fulfillment in their own homelands. Pope John XXIII speaks even of “the right to freedom and of residence within the confines of his own country.”28 Moreover, Pope Leo XIII points out that “men would cling to the country in which they were born, for no one would exchange his country for a foreign land if his own afforded him the means of living a decent and happy life.”29 To live a decent and happy

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26Kenneth Pennington, “Lex Naturalis and Ius Naturale,” 570.
27Javier Hervada, Critical Introduction to Natural Law, 129.
29Leo XIII, Encyclical Rerum Novarum, n. 47: “neque enim patriam cum externa regione commutarent, si vitae degendae tolerabilem daret patria
life, in the words of Pope Leo XIII, means to have respected and safeguarded the right to private property, which is sacred, inviolable and “is derived from nature, not from man.” He insists that:

For, every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation, for the brute has no power of self direction, but is governed by two main instincts, which keep his powers on the alert, impel him to develop them in a fitting manner, and stimulate and determine him to action without any power of choice. One of these instincts is self-preservation, the other the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which lie within range; beyond their verge the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by their senses only, and in the special direction which these suggest. But with man it is wholly different. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of the animal being, and hence enjoys at least as much as the rest of the animal kind, the fruition of things material. But animal nature, however perfect, is far from representing the human being in its completeness, and is in truth but humanity’s humble handmaid, made to serve and to obey. It is the mind, or reason, which is the predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially from the brute. And on this very account – that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason – it must be within his right to possess things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living things do, but to have and to hold them in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things that perish in the use, but those also which, though they have


30See Ibid., n. 46.

been reduced into use, continue for further use in after time.\textsuperscript{32}

Also, regarding this right to property, Pope Leo XIII emphasizes that the state has the right to control the use of private property “in the interests of the public good alone, but by no means to absorb it altogether.”\textsuperscript{33} In explaining the right to property, he also underlines the dignity of work:

To labor is to exert oneself for the sake of procuring what is necessary for the various purposes of life, and chief of all for self-preservation. "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread." Hence, a man’s labor necessarily bears two notes or characters. First, it is personal, because the force which acts

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., n. 6: quia possidere res privatim ut suas, \textit{ius est homini a natura datum.} - Revera hac etiam ir maxime inter hominem et genus interest animantium ceterarum. Non enim se ipsae regunt belluae, sed reguntur gubernanturque duplici naturae instinctu: qui tum custodiunt experrectam in eis facultatem agendi, viresque opportune evolvunt, tum etiam singulos earum motus exsuscitant idem et determinant. Altero instinctu ad se vitamque tuendam, altero ad conservationem generis ducuntur sui. Utremque vero commodo assequuntur earum rerum usu quae adsunt, quaeque praesentes sunt: nec sane proredi longius possent, quia solo sensu moventur rebusque singularibus sensu perceptis. – \textit{Longe alia hominis natura.} Inest in eo tota simul ac perfecta vis naturae animantis, ideoque tributum ex hac parte homini est, certe non minus quam generi animantium omni, ut rerum corporearum fruatur bonis. Sed natura animans quantumvis cumulate possessa, tantum abest ut naturam circumscribat humanam, ut multo sit humana natura inferior, et adarendum huic obediendumque nata. Quod eminet atque excellit in nobis, quod homini tribuit ut homo sit, et a belluis differat genere toto, mens seu ratio est. Et ob hanc causam quod solum hoc animal est rationis particeps, bona homini tribuere necesse est non utenda solum, quod est omnium animantium commune, sed stabili perpetuoque jure possidenda, neque ea dumtaxat quae usu consumuntur, sed etiam quae, nobis utentibus, permanent.” English translation available at: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., n. 47: “non ipsum abolere, sed tantummodo ipsius usum temperare et cum communi bono.” English translation available at: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html.
is bound up with the personality and is the exclusive property of him who acts, and, further, was given to him for his advantage. Secondly, man’s labor is necessary; for without the result of labor a man cannot live, and self-preservation is a law of nature, which it is wrong to disobey.\textsuperscript{34}

In addition to the right to private property, the dignity of work through which persons acquire this property, the papal teaching stresses the principles that regulate ethical justice, such as, respect for human life, and the duty to seek truth, freedom, solidarity, charity, which have their foundation in the natural law.\textsuperscript{35} These principles must also be protected and promoted by the State.

A second right, after the first one stating that persons have the right to residence and to find opportunities for life in their homelands, appears in the papal teaching and it regards the right to emigrate. In this regard, Pope John XXIII states:

When there are just reasons in favor of it, he [human being] must be permitted to emigrate to other countries and take up residence there. The fact that he is a citizen of a State does not deprive him of membership in the human family, nor of citizenship in that universal society, the common, worldwide fellowship of men.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., n. 44: “Hoc est enim operari, exercere se rerum comparandarum caussa, quae sint ad varios vitae usus, potissimumque ad tuitionem sui necessariae. In sudore cultus tui vesceris pane. Itaque duas velut notas habet in homine labor natura insitas, nimirum ut personalis sit, quia vis agens adhaeret personae, atque eius omnino est prorsus, ut quo exercetur, et cuius est utilitati nata: deinde ut sit necessarius, ob hanc caussam, quod fructus laborum est homini opus ad vitam tuendam: vitam autem tueri ipsa rerum, cui maxime parendum, natura iubet.” English translation available at: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html.

\textsuperscript{35}See John XXIII, Encyclical Pacem in Terris, n.11-36.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., n.25: “quin etiam, si iustae id suadeant causae, eidem liceat necesse est, alias civitates petere in iisque domicilium suum collocare. Neque ex eo quod quis certae cuiusdam reipublicae est civis, is ullo modo vetatur esse membrum humanae familiae, neque civis universalis illius societatis etconiunctionis omnium hominum communis.” English translation available
Sharing their membership in the human family, people can leave their countries and go to another country, for example, for reasons of work, to support themselves and their families. In this case, Pope John Paul II teaches:

The most important thing is that the person working away from his native land, whether as a permanent emigrant or as a seasonal worker, should not be placed at a disadvantage in comparison with the other workers in that society in the matter of working rights. Emigration in search of work must in no way become an opportunity for financial or social exploitation. About the work relationship, the same criteria should be applied to immigrant workers as to all other workers in the society concerned. The value of work should be measured by the same standard and not per the difference in nationality, religion or race. For even greater reason the situation of constraint in which the emigrant may find himself should not be exploited. All these circumstances should categorically give way, after special qualifications have of course been taken into consideration, to the fundamental value of work, which is bound up with the dignity of the human person. Once more the fundamental principle must be repeated: the hierarchy of values and the profound meaning of work itself require that capital should be at the service of labor and not labor at the service of capital.37


37 John Paul II, Encyclical Laborem exercens, n. 23: “Summopere igitur refert ut homo, qui extra natalem suam regionem opus facit vel ut migrator perpetuus vel ut opifex temporarius, nihil patiatur detrimenti sui in laboris iuribus respectu aliorum operariorum alicuius societatis. Migrationem ergo operis causa nullo modo fieri licet occasionem quaestus, cui in re summaria aut sociali homines habeantur. Quod spectat vero ad nuxum laboris cum operario, qui immigravit, caedem valeant regulae oportet, quae pro ceteris omnibus illius societatis opificibus vigent. Pretium namque operis eadem metiendum est regula, diversae originis, religionis, stirpis nulla habita ratione. Tanto igitur magis nefas est perverse uti condicione coactus, in qua versatur homo, qui emigravit. Debent enim haec omnia adiuncta sine condicione cedere principali bono laboris, quod cum personae humanae dignitati cohaeret, consideratis quid em opificum peculiaribus proprieta-
The pope insists that the inequality between immigrant workers and domestic workers must be avoided as well as any exploitation of the immigrant workers since work is bound up with the dignity of the human person.

A third right that appears in the papal teaching on immigration concerns the refugees. In this regard, Pope Pius XII, in his Apostolic Constitution *Exsul Familia* states:

The émigré Holy Family of Nazareth, fleeing into Egypt, is the archetype of every refugee family. Jesus, Mary and Joseph, living in exile in Egypt to escape the fury of an evil king, are, for all times and all places, the models and protectors of every migrant, alien and refugee of whatever kind who, whether compelled by fear of persecution or by want, is forced to leave his native land, his beloved parents and relatives, his close friends, and to seek a foreign soil.38

Addressing this touching issue, Pope John XXIII also states:

Here surely is our proof that, in defining the scope of a just freedom within which individual citizens may live lives worthy of their human dignity, the rulers of some nations have been far too restrictive. Sometimes in States of this kind the very right to freedom is called in question, and even flatly denied. We have here a complete reversal of the right order of society for the whole *raison d’être* of public authority

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is to safeguard the interests of the community. Its sovereign
duty is to recognize the noble realm of freedom and protect
its rights. For this reason, it is not irrelevant to draw the
attention of the world to the fact that these refugees are
persons and all their rights as persons must be recognized.
Refugees cannot lose these rights simply because they are
deprived of citizenship of their own States.39

Freedom of the refugee as freedom of any human being worthy
of human dignity is a principle of justice rooted in the natural law.
That said, even though they are deprived of citizenship of their
homeland, they are not deprived of their natural rights. In this light,
it is to be the “right to enter a country in which he hopes to be able to
provide more fittingly for himself and his dependents.”40

A fourth issue, found in the papal teaching on immigration,
regards the countries where immigrants or refugees seek to find a
better life or freedom, worthy of their human dignity. In this respect,
Pope John XXIII teaches:

It is therefore the duty of State officials to accept such
immigrants and -- so far as the good of their own com-

39John XXIII, Encyclical Pacem in Terris, n.104-105: “Id profecto ostendit,
quarundam nationum principes plus nimio circumscribere iustae libertatis
fines, intra quos singulis civibus liceat vitam agere homine dignam; immo in
huius exempli civitatis quandoque vel ipsum libertatis ius aut in dubium
vocatur, aut etiam plane tollitur. Quod cum accidit, rectus civilis societatis
ordo penitus evertitur; nam potestas publica suapte natura ad tutandum
communitatis bonum spectat, cuius princeps officium est agnoscre honestos
libertatis fines eiusque iura sarta tecta servare. Quae iura profugi amittere
non potuerunt, propterea quod nationis suae civitate sint
destituti.” English translation available at: http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-

40Ibid., n. 106: “licere cuique se in eam nationem conferre, ubi aptius se posse
speret sibi atque suis necessariis prospicere.” English translation available at:
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_
enc_11041963_pacem.html.
munity, rightly understood, permits -- to further the aims of those who may wish to become members of a new society.\textsuperscript{41}

Consequently, the receiving countries have the duty to protect and promote the common good, and they should accept immigrants and refugees inasmuch as their own communities permit. Thus, there must be a control of the borders, but it must be done with justice, mercy and a sincere commitment to all the people involved.\textsuperscript{42}

Conclusion

In summary, living in a globalized world, the papal teaching on immigration gives the necessary guidance for the way in which immigrants and refugees are to be seen and treated. They share the same human dignity with all human beings and enjoy the same rights that are rooted in this dignity. While it is true that “the Church does not have technical solutions to offer and does not claim to interfere in any way in the politics of States,”\textsuperscript{43} it is also true that the Church has “a mission of truth to accomplish, in every time and circumstance, for a society that is attuned to man, to his dignity, to his vocation.”\textsuperscript{44} “Fidelity to the human requires fidelity to the truth, which alone is the
guarantee of freedom and of the possibility of integral human development."\textsuperscript{45}

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The Question of Hospitality in Sufism and Its Reflections on the Iranian Culture

SEYED JAVAD MIRI

Introduction

The concept of Hospitality is of great significance in all world religions and most of the philosophical as well as the mystical traditions. The question of hospitality has been widely discussed in the Sufi traditions, in general, and in the thought of Abolhassan Kharaqani, in particular. Kharaqani was a 10th century Sufi in Khorasan who spoke of the vital importance of "Hospitality" as a spiritual means to reach God. As a matter of fact, it is said that at the entrance of his monastery was written:

Whoever enters this convent; give him bread and do not ask about his faith; if he is worthy of being endowed or given life by God, surely, he is worthy of having a piece of bread (Bolhassan Norbakhsh, 2006).

In other words, within the Sufi tradition it seems there is an "awareness" of the other beyond accidental markers such as religion, denomination, color, race, ethnicity, class, party, ideology, clan, confession and so on and so forth.

However, I would like to contextualize my problematic by referring to the contemporary context of Iran. In other words, instead of talking about the theoretical significance of Kharaqani’s distinction between bread and life – I will focus on the culture of hospitality in Iran. Of course, it would be difficult to ignore the theoretical dimensions of the Sufi approach to the other as it is impossible to understand the being of the human self without realizing the relational dimensions of self which appear through various modes and concepts such as stranger, foe, friend, wayfarer, enemy and hospitality. (Zarrinkob, 2008)
Human societies and communities are erected upon the concept of distinction which itself is a reflection of the act of distinguishing between my-self and thy-self. This distinctive modality is an existential form of being which focuses upon differences which may exist between human beings based on tribal, ethnic, racial, national, denominational and religious markers. This could be conceptualized as a formal approach to being where the substantial markers have not been fully considered in the heart of the human person. This is to argue that we need to problematize being as an emancipative marker in the context of social life and distance from forms which take being -- which is shared by all humanity -- for granted as this negligence may lead us to existential forms of imprisonment, political segregations and suppressive forms of life.

Sufism as a Form of Existentialistic Approach

I think it is appropriate to distinguish between ‘Existentialism’ as a European form of philosophical deliberation which took shape within the parameters of Continental Philosophy and existentialistic ideas which are part and parcel of all intellectual tradition in various civilizations. (Zarrinkob, 2009). When we talk about Sufism it should be remembered that we do not consider Sufism as part of the tradition of existentialism in its disciplinary sense but it reflects existentialist aspirations of the human self in non-Eurocentric forms of cognitions. Sufism in the Iranian context has nourished a form of existentialist approach to the question of being which could be employed in engaging with diversity and paradoxes of human societies which are moving in a dominant manner towards “accidental markers” in the contemporary context. There are different approaches in studying any given culture and here I am not going to review all these theoretical paradigms. On the contrary, I would like to make a link between the spirit of Sufism and Iranian popular culture which may be detected through various forms of proverbs.
Jawanmardi as a Form of Hospitality

Sufism has always emphasized the honorable code of *jawanmardi* which is the Sufi code for nobility and the practical dimension of this code is demonstrated by the act of hospitality and generosity towards the other. (Pakatchi, 2013) Within the framework of this code, hospitality is not merely a theoretical nicety but actually a practical issue which should be practiced by any Sufi who aspires to be a friend of God. Sufis celebrate Abraham not only because he is called a Fata in the Quran and was loyal to God and prepared to sacrifice his son, but also because of his exemplary hospitality. Another model found in the Quran, Hadith and Sira was Muhammad, who encouraged the believers to be loyal to God and to show mercy and generosity to the needy, orphans, the poor and the destitute. In the Iranian and the Shiite context, the most important figure is Ali, whose actions mirror those of Abraham and Muhammad. In effect, the various champions of futuwwat, from Abraham and Muhammad to Ali, offered the adherents of futuwwat a wider range of stories and anecdotes to illustrate the same fundamental message, i.e. mercy to strangers. One of the key proverbs among Iranians on guest and the importance of hospitality is the following proverb, i.e. *the guest is God’s beloved*. The word which is used in the proverb for illustrating the importance of hospitality is *Habib*. *Habib* is an Arabic term and derived from the word *Hubb*, i.e. Love. In other words, the way to reach God is not only through rituals but through selfless acts of service to others. The Iranian culture is a hospitable culture and this phenomenon has been observed by many visitors and scholars who have studied Iranian cultural behavior. However, this needs to be problematized in the light of modern changes as hospitality consists of two different but interrelated dimensions of the spiritual and the material. In Sufi traditions, hospitality is advocated purely on spiritual grounds, but this should not blind us to the fact that hospitality could be seen as a means to ensure a greater degree of social security. In other words, the decline of hospitality in present Iran may have economic justifications along with other reasons too. But here I am not going to explore them in detail as this may fall outside the primary concerns of this article.
Could we talk about the modernization of Ethos in Iran? What does modernization of Iranian ethos mean? In other words, when we talk about the relation between tradition and modernity (Enayat, 1982) how does this debate play a role in the constitution of the human self? To put it differently, how should we conceptualize the modes of hospitality in regard to modernization of cultures, in general, and in the Iranian context, in particular? Here I shall focus slightly on the role of modernization and the notion of ‘guest’ in the context of contemporary Iran as it seems few in academia have reflected upon this ‘relation’ in a systematic fashion. This is to argue that modern ethics or the monetarization of Iranian culture seems to have had an impact upon the Iranian character as far as the question of guest is concerned. But we need to distinguish between two concepts of guest in the sense of someone who comes and visits you and stays in your house and a guest who is other and comes from another society or country and visits your land.

State and Hospitality

The primary forms of hospitality in Iran are in decline as far as large cities and metropoles are concerned but the secondary forms of hospitality are still preserved and cherished by Iranians in general. Of course, if we take the question of hospitality in reference to a stranger who is not a guest in terms of the first or second meaning but in terms of a refugee then we need to have a more elaborate approach. In other words, refugees come to Iran mainly through Afghanistan, Iraq or recently from Syria. Here we can discern different forms of responses from the general public in Iran; close to the borders between Iran and Afghanistan we can see more hospitable relationships between the hosts and the guests but when refugees come further … to the cities of Tabriz, Isfahan or Kerman we see less hospitality from Iranians towards refugees. The state seems to have an ambivalent approach towards refugees as others. According to international conventions Iran is open to refugees but the media is sometimes critical towards refugees from Afghanistan but the economic sectors seem to benefit from cheap labor from Afghanistan. This is a paradox which has a very interesting and arduous story, i.e. the dialectic of labor and capital.
other words, this governmental ambivalence seems to serve the purpose of capital rather than laborers who do not have any social security such as insurance in case of sickness or disability.

Existential Solidarity

Contemporary Iranian society, like many societies around the globe, demonstrates anomic signs which are very distant from the spirit of classical Sufism, in general and Kharaqani’s approach, in particular. Why is this so? Well, this is a long story but we should not forget that modern states are built upon national solidarity and by definition this form of solidarity does not recognize the other as part of its own being -- while Sufi solidarity is based on existential solidarity, i.e. Jan or the common soul which God has breathed into the body of humanity. In the spiritual tradition, of which Sufism is one expression, humanity is the kin of God -- but in the nationalistic traditions the highest form of communality is nation or race and God seems to have been left out of the scene so that there is a correlation between the sufferings of the stranger and the abdication of God. Maybe?

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Acorporality and Eschatological Experience for a Noetic Hospitality

VALENTIN CIOVEIE

Introduction

When we consider the variety of human actions, preoccupations, professional activities, the diversity of hobbies, and ways of entertaining oneself ... but also the large number of spiritual practices and beliefs we are faced with -- a well-known fact of contemporary life -- taking all this into account, we perceive that our existence is seen as lacking an absolute quality; and, more importantly, lacking the main axis and direction of this existence. Postmodern thought and culture have tried hard to rid us totally of the idea that there could be such a thing as a common human nature and of a universal view or “meta-story” comprising an ultimate aim of life which could provide a focus for each person’s own plans and wishes.

This is good: diversity belongs to Creation’s original intention. Uniformity pertains more to the realm of artificial objects and mass-production than to created things, and is far-removed from real human persons. Given the obvious fact of diversity and variety, the quest for the Absolute is still worthwhile. It is still worthwhile because there are doctrines (such as the 7th century Saint Maximus the Confessor and others) which do allow for the co-existence of innumerable different created things and of the Absolute -- in the strongest sense of the word, the transcendence of God. And if I take relativism as given, I also assume that postmodernism is not the last word on the universe, nor the deepest perspective on it. So we should learn again to ask seriously old questions. Consequently, let’s seriously address the following question: Is there any fundamental goal or ultimate experience toward which human life in its entirety could be with determinateness oriented and which would provide some priorities among our multiple wishes?

I reject postmodernism’s perspective as the most profound reading of the human story; nevertheless, I have taken on board the
lesson of multiple perspectives, so for present purposes I’ll limit myself to presenting a traditional religious proposal for this *ultimate experience* and will not try to claim that there should, or even could, be an absolute value for everyone. Therefore, I will speak as an Eastern Christian. When I say a traditional proposal I do not at all mean a view of the past, but a view from the past which is also incarnated even today. I have something more to add to the sheer fact of clearly enormous relativism. Although I will limit myself to a single perspective on ultimate experience, that of the Orthodox Christian tradition, those who have studied the history of religions with this subject in mind will know that I will be talking about an invariant of more traditions than one or two.¹

**Acorporality**

Firstly, I will reflect on the conditions for an ultimate experience in the Orthodox Christian tradition -- in fact I will choose a historical moment and a name before the great schism of the Christian Church - - and allow me, please, to do this before I even explain what the phrase “ultimate experience” might mean and where it comes from.

Even though the first systematizations of Christian spirituality started with Origen (ca. 185-ca. 254 AD) and Evagrios of Pontus (345-399 AD), the *summa* of the ascetical and mystical life was not written until the 7th century by Saint John Climacus, a saint revered by the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Christian churches alike. This ascetical and mystical treatise is called *The Ladder of Divine Ascent* and has 30 steps which describe the subtlest existential-ontological psychology in our battle against vices and demons and in acquiring virtues which are not just behavior according to moral rules, but are human efforts and angelic energies.

According to step 15 §3 of the book, chastity is a generic name for all virtues. Why virginity should explain all divine energies in us is not obvious: there are many other virtues like gentleness and mercy, humility and courage, and so on. Let’s try an explanation using the guidelines of this treatise. First, virginity is not just abstaining from

¹Though important, arguing why postmodernism is not the last word about human (cultural) reality is not the focus of this paper and could be justified only in relation to one or other specific audience.
sexual relations. In its extended significance lies the key to understanding. At the summit of the spiritual ascent to God, that is in the abyss of humility, the monk as hesychast practices holding the incorporeal in a finite body. The practice of the embodiment of incorporeality is exactly the extended sense of virginity: it pertains to a generic chastity towards our (negative) passions, our own (neutral) body and the bodies of others as finite organic forms. It is about an attitude towards the objects of the material world and even towards non-spiritual and non-Christian ideas. The main point is the interplay between the possible and desirable experience of the infinite ocean of Love of Christ and the finite forms of sensibility or of thoughts and states. It is not matter in itself which represents the cause of the loss of chastity. Matter is blessed by God, but it is rather the investment of matter or of finite forms with absolute character (most of the time unconsciously) which is the mark of the idolatrous attitude as opposed to the iconic one. Because we are concerned here with an antinomy between ascending toward an incorporeal and immaterial God and at the same time we can only have this experience in a concrete body, that is, because we try to live on the thin line between a concrete and historical corporeal existence and the unseen realities, we should call this generic chastity not non-corporeality, but with the help of α - privative from the Greek language, a-corporeality or with the Greek prefix hyper-, super-corporeality (This is a joke, in fact it means exactly beyond corporeality, or putting corporeality into brackets).

Let’s try now to investigate and exemplify what this a-corporeality means. I will take some examples from the relationships between man and woman, from other relationships, and then from an extreme area of religious practice.

When you look at some old movies like those with Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall, *Casablanca*, *To Have and Have Not*, *Key Largo* you see a romantic love, full of ideals but not puritanical between man and woman. You see renunciation, directness, longing in separation, great gestures of altruism, but you also see some sarcasm, irony, depression. Love unfolds in a blend of non-idealistic, yet romantic, less corporal, but not ascetic, encounters. This kind of love contrasts in many respects with what we have seen for a period of some decades in this global culture which is spreading. I am speaking here of some trends, not of every possible relation. The latest kind of love is very
sexual and cultivates corporality as strong habits of the soul. I will give you some examples that struck me many years ago, and they are the most innocent. Transformation of the kiss: kissing between lovers was an intimate act in which both of them were held in a very personal, mysterious. You can observe the total transformation today of this realist symbolic art of union: the disappearance of the subtle energy needs a compensation which is gained by adding an exacer-bated tone to this special connection of man and woman, through loud repetitions, public demonstration of the sports like activity of kissing, and an insatiable yet unsatisfied appetite.

Another short example comes from the sphere of the supermarket: the same tendency to swallow the other greedily seen at some recent street-shows of kissing, can be seen also in the tendency of many kids and adults at supermarket shelves. This tendency is more prominent when a parent has to struggle with a child having a tantrum and stop him /her buying sweets. These two are the most innocent examples of porno love, which is unsatisfied, obsessive-compulsive ‘eternal’ in its search for the same, a never-ending loss of reality.

What could a-corporality be for these all-pervading dimensions of our society?

Not something very metaphysical: going amongst urban people with your sight and other senses having retreated inwardly, in search of a deeper experience; taking seriously different kinds of fast and practicing them regularly. (I must confess that, in my view, the Catholic and Protestant traditions in the West witness to the great decline in fasting which has been happening over the last 50 years). In fasting, corporality is not abolished, sometimes it comes more to the fore, but it is in time transfigured. A-corporality also means transfiguration and I use this word with the strong connotation given to it by the Orthodox tradition. I remember also from the life of Djalal Ed-din Rumi that he used to pray and prostrate himself with the disciples in the morning or in the evening and sometimes his heels would be bleeding. This is a further step into a-corporality. After a long hour of praying during the night, when you have offered all your un-virginal thoughts towards the world to God, touching the other or kissing the beloved good-night may bring some subtle energy which reverberates in a personal mood in the two souls for hours. Or, it may not! Let’s not fool ourselves that we have a recipe here.
I have just touched very quickly upon these phenomena. A lot of aspects, even important ones like this of the translucent, iconic character of a-corporality were omitted from our considerations, even though they pertain to the fundamental structure of being human. Instead I want to speak now of a hyperbolic degree of a-corporality.\(^2\)

This is the a-corporality of some of the most ascetic Christians and I will mention here the radical spiritual type of the fools-in-Christ. You know probably that this family of spiritual practices are rooted in the Byzantine world beginning with the IVth century, but they existed in the Western medieval world, in a modified form, too. The fundamental biblical dictum of this way of hyperbolic life is that the Wisdom of God is madness for the social world. Consequently, the fools-in-Christ enter an existential rationality that pertains to quite a different logic from the mundane one. The philosophical fundamentals of the mundane logic of being human were brilliantly described by Martin Heidegger in his *Being and Time* (1927) in which the human being is considered as intimately connected with the world, even more as being fundamentally *ein Seiendes* (a being) conceived as *in-der-Welt-sein* (being-in-the-world), that means that the being of humans is deeply structured by and intricately connected to the world. Now, in the Christian tradition but also in the other Abrahamic traditions there is a radical distance between God and the world. If some person embodies the Wisdom of God, he/she will leave the mundane existential structures and will be characterized in a non-Heideggerian way by the death-to-the-world as the fundamental insistential. (Existentials are the transcendental structures of human being in *Being and time*). I do not want to go deeper into philosophical considerations here, except when it is necessary for my general considerations. It is important to notice the lack of corporality in Heidegger’s treatise and its importance for the death-to-the-world. Because death-to-the-world is instantiated mainly as death-to-corporality of the body (mine or others) and of the world, a-corporality is the topic that should be investigated first in order to understand the hyperbolic logic of ‘death-to-the-world’.

Let’s come to the more concrete experiences of our corporality and to the practices of going beyond them. Our body is strongly connected by needs and desires to the objects of the world, so in order to conquer them one should martyr one’s desires. Sometimes this appetitive part of our soul and body is described in the ascetical literature as a hydra with many heads: oriented towards the different objects of the present, or towards past memories, or towards future plans. The space we inhabit -- no matter where we are -- is intimately connected with our being. But how do we live in space and, of course, in time? Very concretely: we have to eat and drink, and we have then to defecate which is linked with public shame. We avoid the cold and the heat, even though the temperature which can be tolerated varies from person to person. We all have strong limits in these respects, we are not just beings of desire but of sexual desire long before any sexual life begins. Our body gets tired and we have to rest and sleep. Last but not least, we are strongly connected to the world by the opinions of others: this is a chain that we hardly ever break. Imagine now that a fool-in-Christ turns all this existentiality upside-down in a very practical way (they are far from being theoretical persons). In fact, you don’t have to imagine because there are a series of lives of these saints published in different languages.

I will not give examples for every point above, but let me take just one. You have surely noticed at least once in your life how important it is to have a clean and ordered space around us and how we sometimes put things in order around us. The stronger the chaos in our thoughts, the harder we work. The stronger the impure thoughts, the harder we want to clean the outside. We have some culturally inherited attitudes: we like green plants and birds around, but we do not like cockroaches and bugs. Now imagine that someone deliberately fills his room with dirt and cockroaches. Please do not let your mind ask at first what this could be good for but just record the aversion. I happen to have had, not imagined, this experience. One night I made a hole for fresh air in the wall of my bathroom to fix a ventilator. Human beings stink sometimes. I left the hole open during the night because it was too late to finish the job. There are no insects usually in the apartment so I did not expect any visitors. At 2 o’clock in the night I woke up suddenly and immediately I had the impression that something had fallen on me. I got up, turned on the light in the apartment and everywhere there were big, black, unpleasant cock-
roaches. You know, I do not harm spiders in my room, I put bugs back into nature without killing them, but I could not bear the negative feeling deep in my body that night and I reacted with huge aversion and aggression.

Being in the world is being-in-space and more concretely it is being in a clean space. What if someone would fill his/her place on purpose with dirt, excrement, and insects? I know this is an extreme form of putting the spatial dimension of our being into brackets, which is not necessary for spiritual evolution, but some Christians do not want to be lukewarm in a number of different respects. They do not want, for example, just to keep control of sexual desires, but to annihilate them in God. They do not just want to avoid being praised and to accept criticism, but they expose themselves to harsh aggression. This is a different form of a-corporality from that of transfiguring your body into a beautiful, translucent a-corporality, if by the help of God one is led to this. In this radical modality of life of the fool-in-Christ, especially of those from Russia in the XVIIth to XIXth centuries, their extreme practices combined with a theological ethic of ugliness, seem to me to go towards some kind of dualism between corporality (of the body or of the world) and God.

You can talk for two hours or more just about the different practices of a-corporality, but in my presentation, it is important to offer you only an idea of what this word means. I also said above that a-corporality is an existential condition for the ultimate experience. I want now to talk about the meaning of ultimate experience.

**Grunderfahrung -- Ultimate Experience**

The phrase *ultimate experience* is a translation of Heidegger’s word *Grunderfahrung* which appears in paragraph 45 of *Being and Time*. Heidegger’s problem is to find a specific experience which can reveal the human being to our understanding such that our perspective gained through this experience will reveal not only some secondary dimension or even some primary dimension of humans but our whole being. His idea put into plain words is to go to the ‘root of the root of ourselves’ (this is a verse from Djalal Rumi) where all the different layers and phenomena of man are organically connected in an ultimate unity. For this ultimate level, Heidegger uses the word *ursprünglich* (original), which means at the existential foundation of
our being, in the root of the root of ourselves. The *Grundierfahrung* is an experience that we can have such that the most original layer of our being is involved in contrast to experiences that touch just parts of our being. Now, in *Being and Time* this ultimate experience is anxiety (Angst) which is distinguished from fear which is something specific. Anxiety is an experience of man facing the nothingness of existence, the lack of ultimate sense. Following this fundamental state of *Dasein* is an overview of the whole structure of being.

Now we have to remember that the main question of this contribution concerns the unity of this experience. And this unity of *Grundierfahrung* from *Being and Time* is diminished in the later work of Heidegger where he speaks of another fundamental experience of *der Sterbliche* that is *Gelassenheit* which can be translated with *serenity* or *release* in the sense of letting things be without forcing them. These two experiences are not just distinct but also in some sense opposed. The diversity of ‘ultimate’ experience is reduced even more in the work of a contemporary French philosopher and Catholic theologian, Jean-Yves Lacoste, a well-known name in phenomenology. This is done in his recent book *Être en danger* where he speaks of *plus qu’existence et être-en-danger* (more than existence and being in danger) and I think that here he has lost the original level of thematization when he claims there are many different fundamental experiences. In fact, there could be just one experience which is fundamental or none. We cannot speak of two, or three or more experiences as being *fundamental*. I will omit the demonstration of this obvious thesis.

If we go beyond a *mundane*, atheist thematization of the human being, and also beyond the understanding of being human in the sense of a receptacle of the *sacred* experience, the only perspective left on human being is that of *liturgical being* with its phenomenological structures. This has been brilliantly done in the work of the same author, Jean-Yves Lacoste, namely *Expérience et Absolu* with some peculiarities, which are Catholic, but the phenomenological perspective makes his results valid beyond this tradition. Even though I see some differences in his thematization of the liturgical person from my view, I can accept his results for the most part. The most obvious lack in his philosophical and theological reflections is the question about

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the original point of view of the whole enterprise which is the question regarding ultimate experience. Here I want to put this question again for you and my answer will be given from the confines of the Eastern Christian tradition: Is there any fundamental goal or ultimate experience toward which human life in its entirety could be with determinateness oriented and which would provide some priorities among our multiple wishes?

I look for the answer at one paradigmatic moment of the Eastern tradition: Saint Symeon the New Theologian (949-1022), but one can find testimonies for this ultimate experience first of all in the Bible, then from the Desert Fathers to Archimandrite Sophrony Sakharov (1896-1993) in our times.

The theme of Grunderfahrung in the work of Saint Symeon the New Theologian should begin with the subject of repentance, acorporality (for which Saint Symeon represents an important and original source), and the gift of tears.

Alas, limited space sends us directly to the vision of God in his work, which is the theological phrase for Grunderfahrung. Although from the very beginning the Scriptures play down the enthusiasm of the very possibility of this experience there are, nevertheless, numerous passages in which one finds a negation of any vision of God. We find, for example, Exodus 33: 20-3 You cannot see My face, for man cannot see Me and remain alive and John 1:18 No one has seen God at any time, but along with these texts that testify to the absolute transcendence and thus the unknowable and inaccessible character of God, we also find other texts that speak of a direct encounter, for example that of Job with the Creator and the New Testament eschatological scene on Mount Tabor. The tension between these two kinds of texts is solved differently in the patristic literature. Firstly, the solution which comes from Saint Gregory of Nyssa and later on elaborated by Saint Gregory of Palamas, but negated by Barlaam of Calabria: God is invisible by nature, but becomes visible in His works i.e. God’s condescension and not the vision of pure Being itself. [The second solution is: God is invisible in God’s essence, but He reveals Himself in His incarnated Son. Third

4The following four solutions of the tension are listed in Hilarion Alfeyev, St. Symeon the New Theologian and the Orthodox Tradition (2000), p. 223. A very good study of Saint Symeon which includes the vision of God is Alexander Golitzin, On the Mystical Life (St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997). Further back in time the next good study is Basile Krivochéne (Chevetogne, 1980).
The fourth way to solve the contradiction is by appealing to the stage of purification of the center of our being. Those purified through extreme repentance will receive — may the benevolence of God be with us! — the almost eschatological vision of God. Saint Symeon cites Matt. 5:8 *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.* The pure in heart 'see the ineffable beauty of God Himself invisibly, hold (God) without touching; without understanding they understand His image beyond image, His formless form ... in a vision without vision'.

The first remark on this *Grunderfahrung* compared to the 'Angst' or 'Gelassenheit' of Heidegger is that it is relational and of a personal nature. This will change totally the fundamental existential-ontology of *Dasein* into an insistential-existential doctrine of a non-mono-logical type of the liturgical person.

I will not enumerate and analyze the different occurrences where Saint Symeon writes on his repeated experiences of this type. I want to conclude by citing one passage from Saint Symeon:

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Even at night, even in the midst of darkness
I see Christ fearfully opening the heavens for me,
He Who humbles Himself and shows Himself to me,
With the Father and the Spirit, thrice-holy light,
One in three, and three in one single light ...
I found Him, the One Whom I saw from afar,
The One Whom Stephen had seen when the heavens opened
And Whose sight had later blinded Paul,
Completely, like a fire, truly, in the center of my heart ...
(Hymn 11).
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Besides Saint Symeon, the New Theologian in the Eastern tradition, there are a few other paradigmatic examples for this Taboric hyper-experience, the most well-known occurring in the dialogue between Saint Seraphim of Sarov and his disciple, Motovilov. In our times, the different layers of this intimate relationship with God are presented by Father Sophrony Sakharov of Essex in his book *We shall see Him as He is.*

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5 Archimandrite Sophrony (Sakharov), *We shall See Him As He Is* (Stavropegic Monastery of St. John the Baptist, Essex, England, 1985).
Noetic Hospitality

The attitude of noetic hospitality (that means of making space for the other, even by putting to one side your own deep convictions) does not spring directly -- in the concrete lives of Christians considered to be at the peak of spiritual life -- from their relationship with God. The experience of uncreated Light may very well direct one person to the drastic defense of the concrete, cataphatic way in which that person has reached union with God. Maybe at times, when the experience fades away into the deepest layers of the memory, the defense can adopt some idolatrous tenets. We can see along these lines the contemporary Bishop Hierotheos Vlachos of Nafpaktos in Greece, who gifted us with the philocalic beauty of his book *A Night in the Desert of the Holy Mountain*, but nevertheless just sought everywhere for the differences between traditions, beginning with our Christian brothers, the Catholics. Reading his many theological books born from the liturgical and hesychastic life of prayer, you can easily observe that it is not always the case that dogmatic theology separates us and mystic experience unites. On the contrary, considering another person with the same Christian Orthodox and hesychastic background, we see how the extension of *kenosis* beyond the realm of sensibility to that of noetic ideas through an apophatic attitude specific to the Eastern Orthodox tradition, can lead a great hesychast of this tradition. Archimandrite André Scrima (who went to God in 2000) wrote about the attitude of embracing the other without passing over the real differences. (André Scrima was the representative of the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras at the Vatican II Council and spent three years of his life in India and over 20 years in the Lebanon). In this respect, it is worth reading his texts for the very high capacity of keeping together the identity of monastic and hesychastic Eastern Christian tradition and, on the other hand, openness to others. Among the texts which are written in an international language (many of the others being in Romanian) we mention here two: *L’Avènement philocalique dans l’Orthodoxie Române* (Istina 3-4, 1958), *A L’Intérieur du Mystère de L’Unité: Le Moine* (Cahiers de la Pierre-qui-vire).

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*Metropolitan of Nafpaktos Hierotheos Vlachos, *A Night in the Desert of the Holy Mountain: Discussion with a Hermkit on the Jesus Prayer* (Birth of the Theotokos Monastery Greece, 2003).*
I wish to end this paper with some questions: Is Christ our Lord exclusive to anyone, not to mention whole categories of people? Even hypocrites are rejected because of their hypocrisy, not as persons. Can we imagine Christ standing on Mount Tabor and sending people away just for belonging to a specific religious category, even non-Christian, even atheists? I lack such a kind of imagination, and I conceive the Love of Christ who cared for the most despised as having a special concern for the pure in heart and for the purification of heart of those from other traditions.

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Part II
European Issues of Hospitality
7.

Hospitality and the Common Good

MARTIN DE LA CROIX MELIN, CSJ

Introduction

In France, in the early 1970s, there were still very few Muslims. At present, there are about 8 million, at least 10% of the population. Within thirty to forty years\(^1\) they could be in the majority. Their fertility rate is higher than that of native French people.\(^2\) In the town of Béziers, for example, -- and this is not an isolated case -- 64% of the pupils in State schools are Muslim. Other European\(^3\) countries are experiencing similar demographic changes.

The question of hospitality has been put to us in a context of crisis: in the first place, that of migration, both in the countries devastated by war or poverty, which generates this flux, and in the countries where the immigrants settle, calling into question the identity and even the continued survival of these countries.

There is yet another dimension to this crisis: the decline or corruption of political thinking. The trivial manifestation of this is found in what is termed, “politically correct.” It seems to us that the epistemological knot here is the omission of the principle which should govern politics: the common good.

One of the manifestations of this crisis of political thinking in the present trend towards liberalism is an absolute relativism\(^4\) which considers the affirmation of all truth and all identity (natural or cultural) as a danger to liberty.

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3. See note 1.
Ethics and Politics, the Common Good

A brief overview of the facts is necessary here. Essentially happiness resides in the activity of the soul: contemplation of the truth, friendship. It therefore requires the virtues. You cannot have real friendship without virtue. One has only to think about the experience of marriage! Virtues are acquired through education, habits, and the law. These three all belong to the field of politics. Light is now shed on the irreducible link between ethics and politics.

1st Experience: A Common Patrimony Linked to the Search for Happiness

The peoples of the world set out on the pursuit of happiness, each in a different manner and with different means. To attain this goal, they create diverse modes of living and constitutions. It is a question of holding, in common, goods which are for the use of everyone. These goods are the property of the community because it is there that they have been made, acquired or inherited. They can be material (a territory which has been humanized by successive generations and by infrastructure) or spiritual goods (intellectual, artistic, legislative achievements). All these are inherited, are developed (in the best of cases), and are handed on. The members of the present community are only the stewards. The material goods are used for living, whereas the spiritual gifts are used for living well, i.e. for a happy life which is a life based on virtue.

The city [nation] is not only a military or commercial alliance, not only a protection against injustice, but it is also a community who live a happy life, having as their goal a perfect and self-sufficient life … There remains to be discussed the question whether the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state, or different. Here again there can be no doubt -- no one denies that they are the same.

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5 Aristotle, Politics, VII, 8, 1328 b.
6 Aristotle (in Politics VII especially) speaks about the city as a people, a territory, a language and a constitution.
7 Ibid., III, 9, 1280 b 5-30.
8 Ibid., VII, 2, 1324 a 10-15.
2nd Experience: Wanting the Other’s Good

As I desire good for the person whom I love, that good is at the same time his/hers and mine. It is a question of a good which we hold in common and yet remains personal, it remains the final cause. One seeks a friend’s happiness … and in a mutual way which reinforces communion. It is the experience of every family: the couple in daily dialogue seeks the good of each child and of the whole household. This good of all is inseparable from the good of each one.

3rd Aspect: The Same Kind of Happiness?

Aristotle speaks of a life of virtue as a condition for happiness for this kind of life brings about the ‘finality’ of our human nature, which is what we all share. So, per determination in the philosophical sense, happiness is the same for everybody.

But per real, concrete conditions of life, happiness is incarnated in a form in each culture: that is why Aristotle says, “People set out on the pursuit of happiness each in a different manner …”

Today, in our societies, we are witnessing a clash between these “different ways and means of searching for happiness.” According to the testimony of a history teacher, who is in contact with many Muslim pupils in the suburbs of Lyon, France, these children (now third generation on French soil) have closed minds and even contempt for what are elementary and evident notions for European Christians: separation of religion and politics, forgiveness, help for the weakest, merit (being rewarded for effort which is the condition for success) equal dignity of men and women, equal rights for persons belonging to different religions, sense of truth, liberty of conscience …

Is the Common Good of a Country Open to Absolutely Everyone on Earth?

We are going to look at this question from the justice point of view (there could be no community worthy of its name without

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*Jean-François Chemain (Une autre histoire de la laïcité, ed. Via Romana, 2013), p. 205.
justice), of charity and of prudence (the practical wisdom necessary for governing).

Cicero sums up the importance of justice and of the organization of charity in a social community: “The interests of society, however, and its common bonds will be best conserved, if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion to the closeness of his relationship.”

When considering this topic Saint Thomas Aquinas deals not only with the organization of the distribution of charity but even the ranking of different kinds of love such as affection and acts of will.

Some say … that we must love all people equally and that only by our exterior acts of charity should we make a difference between our kin or neighbor and those who are not our kin or neighbor. What an irrational opinion! As to affection, and not simply our outward works of charity we must love some more than others.

Saint Thomas further explains:

The principle of love is God and the one who loves. Our love should therefore be greater for those who are nearest to God (because of their excellence) or for those who are nearest to us (because of natural proximity). Wherever we find a principle, order is measured in relation to that principle.

About beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all: but about benevolence, love ought not to be thus unequal.

In the following article (q.26, a.7) Saint Thomas develops the link between closeness of nature and intensity of love.

If love is specified by its object, then the strength of love comes from the one who loves. Therefore, our love is more intense [naturally] for those who are nearer to us [and divine charity assumes this order] particularly through blood ties which form unchangeable and constitutive connections.

11Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 26, a. 6, resp.
12Ibid.
13Ibid., ad.1.
Accordingly, we must say that friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship.\footnote{Ibid., II-II, q. 26, a. 8, Res.}

Basically, Saint Thomas is only developing what Aristotle stated: friendship is born only from a certain common experience, from a shared life, \textit{koinonia}. Love cannot be abstract. We have seen how belonging to the same culture, to the same country, molds us into a true community. Certainly, one could also speak of a unity of civilization, in the case of Europe, for instance. But it is necessary to define more precisely what is implied by this \textit{koinonia}.

\textit{The Humanitarian Part of Egalitarian Democracy and True Prudence}

Per De Tocqueville, the relativization of natural social bonds which is now observable is a characteristic of egalitarian democracy.

Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to cut himself off from the mass of his fellow-creatures and to draw apart with his family and his friends so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself … Isolated, democratic man becomes indifferent to others, lacks any great devotion, and, paradoxically, his heart is more inclined to have compassion for all mankind.\footnote{Alexis de Tocqueville, \textit{About Democracy in America} (De la démocratie en Amérique II, Paris: éd. Gallimard, 1961), pp. 105;174.}

This accounts for the development in the West of humanitari
tarianism,\footnote{François-Frédéric, “What Can We Hope or Fear about Democracy” (“Ce qu’il faut espérer ou craindre de la démocratie,” in \textit{Aletheia}, Revue de l’Ecole Saint Jean, no. 25, June 2004), p. 80.} something praiseworthy, for that matter. The problem is that when faced with the migration crisis, humanitarianism replaces charity and political wisdom. Humanitarianism takes the form of immediate and generous aid in a crisis situation. Politics is the search for the common good by tackling the causes. The causes of the migration crisis are mainly the following: the fall in the birth rate in
Europe, disorder brought about by wars most of which have been begun by the West (Iraq, Syria, Libya …), and economic poverty in, for example, Africa for which the West bears a huge responsibility. In a just world, everyone would be able to live peacefully on earth, playing a part in making the riches of one’s country bear fruit.17

*Welcoming without any discernment: the summit of charity?*

Firstly, charity can never be summarized in a single word (welcome as opposed to expulsion, peace as opposed to war), in fact charity is not a special act but the form (the soul in other words) of the other virtues.18 Just as the intention (which in human love inhabits every act and has an affective relationship with the outcome), so too charity can lead to a war (a just one) or to closing borders.19

Secondly, charity demands that it be exercised in truth, which means, on a practical level, that there must be discernment through the virtue of prudence (*phronesis*) and a respect for justice (what is due to each person). Prudence (practical wisdom) puts in order of importance the different “goods” and directs them towards their finality, the higher good. Love cut off from the realism of the order of “goods” would only be a vague desire.20

In concrete terms, what charity is there in taking in (without discernment) large numbers of immigrants if we are contributing to the disappearance of Christian communities in the Middle East, the death of liberty in countries under Islamist control, the economic and cultural death of African countries handed over to the prevarication of multinational Companies, and the dying out of our own nation whose population is gradually being replaced by a non-European and often Muslim one?

**Discernment by a Nation: The Criterion of the Common Good**

The guest does not enter a neutral community with no identity.

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20 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q.56, a.5.
A Dominican novice master used to tell the postulants: “We’ll accept you in our community if your customs are acceptable to us and if our customs are acceptable to you!” For a high-quality welcome, there must be discernment about the quantity and the quality. This is what Church documents state:

It is the duty of the public authorities in charge of the common good to determine the number of refugees their country can receive ... considering possibilities of employment and perspectives for development.\footnote{Pontifical Commission “Justice and Peace,” \textit{the Church and Racism}, 1988.}

States have the right to regulate the flow of migrants and to defend their own frontiers ... immigrants have a duty to integrate into the host country, respecting its laws and its national identity.\footnote{Benedict XVI, 27th World day for migrants, 2010.}

Therefore, the State must consider the common good in its material dimension as well as in its spiritual/cultural dimension. It is this which largely determines a nation’s identity. Like Iring Fetscher,\footnote{Quoted by Alain de Benoist in the article «Identité, le grand enjeu du XXI s.» \textit{Eléments} no. 113, 2004. The author states: “My identity is not a blind fortress, an armor behind which I shelter from others ... it is a window that belongs only to me, thanks to which I can know the world.”} we could speak about the right to remain oneself.

\textit{The Nation’s Identity}

The city/nation (people, territory, language, constitution) is a natural community per Aristotle\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Politics} 1, 2, 1252 b 30.} firstly, by reason of its origins as this reality is comprised of other natural communities (families and villages which are family groupings) but above all because a city/nation is the end of other natural communities. The city is the end of other natural communities, and so precedes them as the whole precedes the part “as the body precedes the foot and the hand.”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 1253 a 20.}
Language is yet another sign of this anteriority. In a family one learns language and a lot more -- symbolism, the culture of a nation. The city/nation is the end of other communities and it is natural because it allows man not only to live but to live well, to lead a happy life, according to virtue for it offers education, customs and laws.

It is for this entity, endowed with a genuine identity, rich in patrimony, and responsible for its destiny, to exercise discernment in welcoming new members. This cannot mean calling on an exterior authority: that would be to deny the liberty and sovereignty of a people and the principle of subsidiarity (exactly as the Communist regime did in forcing families to share their flat or house with other families!).

**Edith Stein (An Investigation Concerning the State) Identity and Community Conscience**

Edith Stein explains Aristotle’s statement “Every people sets out on the pursuit of happiness by creating for themselves different ways of living and different institutions.” Per Edith Stein, the state which emanates from the community and which is at its service needs a group of people who form a real community (and not a mass or even a society). Quoting Aristotle per whom “Friendship rather than justice seems to hold states together,” she comments: “Philia (friendship) here, as always, has the basic meaning of communal awareness.” In fact it is hard to see how it could be a question of personal friendship. That is why appropriate discernment for the very identity of the people is vital. “Not every individual can be assimilated into every ethnic community. Every member of the ethnic community must bear the imprint of his or her membership in it.” Community identity is not something outside the human person. It affects his way of thinking, of loving, of being in relationship with others … his pursuit of happiness.

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Each community forms the personal fabric of its members along certain lines and one uniform ethnic character ... from this there should emerge a distinctive culture particularized by the community’s special character.³⁰

Therefore, should we not be wondering whether a massive immigration by a population (which is ethnically and culturally “other” and often unassimilable) is, in a certain sense, just as much an act of violence as colonization?

Colonization puts at risk either the sovereignty or the cultural identity of a people. Is this not always unjust? Contemporary demographical and geopolitical changes invite us to question the place of culture and nation with respect to the human person.

Culture, Nation and the Human Person

It might seem like an exaggeration to compare mass immigration to Europe with colonization. The comparison can only be made in two respects: the huge scale of this immigration and the situation in which a culture (to be more precise, European civilization) finds itself when confronted by cultures of external origin especially those marked by Islam. Colonization can either be for exploitation or settlement. Regarding the latter what is of interest to us is that ‘the population settles down permanently with the concern of ensuring the continuity of this settlement for future generations.’³³

What is important for our argument, is that in this case, the culture of the newcomer tends to place itself on an equal footing with the native culture or even to dominate it. As Islam does not recognize the distinctions between religion, civil society and state, we know that this power struggle between cultures is inevitable in Europe. To really understand what is at stake -- one might say the drama of this situation, which is, we remind you, that of all colonization, -- one must

³⁰Ibid.
³¹Is the ‘caesura’ not whether one belongs or not to the same religion?
³²Currently 8 to 10, 000 entries per day in Europe or 3 million per year. See Centre de réflexion sur la sécurité intérieure (cercle Droit et liberté, Me Thibault de Montbrial).
³³Encyclopédie philosophique universelle, PUF. Les notions philosophiques, dictionnaire, 1. Art. «colonialisme».
discern the key role culture plays in connecting the human person with the nation.

In this regard we see three points for consideration and we will continue to base our arguments on the work of Aristotle and of Edith Stein (An Investigation Concerning The State), whilst having recourse to the reasoning, supported by philosophy, of Jean Paul II’s speech at UNESCO in 1980: culture is linked to the dignity of the human person, it justifies the existence of the nation, it can be classified objectively within a hierarchization of civilizations according to philosophical, anthropological and moral criteria.

Dealing first with the importance of culture and then that of the nation will force us to consider, in addition to the phenomenon of migration, that of economic globalization which both fosters and benefits from an uprooted humanity. But first, let us see how Aristotle situates culture in the City. He approaches this question through art, for example Mimesis in the Poetics.34

Culture per Aristotle and its Unifying Dimension for the City

In Poetics Aristotle shows how much art (in its broad sense and therefore equivalent to culture) contributes to the unity of the city because of the convergence between art and the moral, political and religious goals of a society. Art is useful and even necessary for the city for it is “par excellence” the place of transmission: it imitates good actions and allows itself to be imitated.

Just as with language,35 there is imitation because it is shared with members of the city. The notion of mimésis which signifies art for Aristotle is only understood if we remember that man is a “political animal.”36 To explain clearly this statement of Aristotle which puts the family as base community of the polis, Anne Cauquelin underlines the importance of a common language:

The base unit of politics is the family, and not the individual, for in the family one talks, one exchanges, one acquires not only material riches but also a wealth of symbols. As

35See Cauquelin Aristote, le langage, p. 14, whose analysis we are using here.
36Aristotle, Politics. I, 2, 1253 a 1.
language is learnt by imitating not just words but accents, different intonations … in short an activity, so too the tragic poet, by imitating, gives access to a certain knowledge … the hero, the “spoudaios” does not give rules but reveals himself, accomplishes noble deeds … As the child plays out the relationship to the world with which he is familiar through “mimesis” of his parents’ language, so too tragic actors act out the relationship in memory of the city through mimesis of exemplary actions. We are speaking about a language which imitates phronesis – prudence (because it adapts itself to the action) and of a language which is in harmony with both distant memory (the myth) and the telos or a project which is envisioned globally by a city and its culture.37

What does culture do except link the symbolism of the city, the distant memory and the goal? Can the community, but even more so, each person, discover the goal and the path to it if they do not know who they are?

What Aristotle said about language can be extended to all art and to culture in general: “language serves not only to communicate what is useful but also what is just,”38 which is the search not only for one’s own good but for that of the other. It is in the family that one first learns about ethics and politics and this apprenticeship continues into the amphitheater, for “tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality.”39

The Content of Culture which is Comprehensible and Moral

For Aristotle and for the Greeks in general, the pleasure of the beautiful has a content which cannot be separated from meaning (purpose) nor from its intelligibility. This content which is intelligible and moral is even part of its beauty. What is noble and virtuous is beautiful. Without wishing to moralize art, it shows that culture can be measured per a certain objectivity as we will see. The anthropolo-

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38Aristotle, Politics, I, 2, 1253 a 15.
39Aristotle, Poetics, 6, 50 a 15-20.
gical and moral content which it transmits will be more or less close to, “at the service of “excellence (virtue). If the latter is sought after with a personal aim in view, (contemplation of the Being first and secondly that of friendship) it is the essence of one’s happiness.

Culture and Dignity of the Human Person

For John Paul II, culture is not about “having.” It “is always in an essential and necessary relationship to what man is”40:

And man is so, always, in his totality: in his spiritual and material subjectivity as a complete whole … on the one hand, the works of material culture always show a “spiritualization of matter,” a submission of the material element to man’s spiritual forces, that is, his intelligence and will -- and that, on the other hand the works of spiritual culture manifest, specifically, a “materialization of the spirit, an incarnation of what is spiritual. In fact, whether it is a question of an absolutizing of matter in the structure of the human subject, or, inversely, of an absolutizing of the spirit in this same structure, neither expresses the truth about man … 41

One should note here that globalization, including the movement of persons, even of populations, in a borderless world is thought out and wanted for a very materialistic end, namely the enrichment of certain people.42 In this case, culture is only “having”: customs and local skills are used for economic ends, the only purpose being to be competitive on the world market.

At the same time, it is justified and encouraged, for example, by certain Christians, in the name of feelings of fraternity and goodness which are completely spiritualized, whilst forgetting the physical dimension of humankind, a dimension which is embodied by a culture linked to a people, a territory, a language etc. Someone deprived of a

40Address to UNESCO [7], 2 June 1980.
41Ibid., [8].
history, of roots, of customs, does he not become, even if he stays in his own country, a tramp, a wanderer?

Today cultures are really under threat. This is not only in Western Europe because of mass migration but throughout the whole world because of the global economic reality which impoverishes and standardizes the milieu be it material (sophistication must not be confused with quality), artistic, intellectual, moral, traditional or even ecological.

This threat is yet more emphasized by the hypertrophy of the mass media. A continuous flow of information produces an ephemeral culture and can divert us from depth of personal reflection. Virtual access to the whole world goes hand in hand with this same world breaking into the “milieu” of traditional life. The consequence of this is the relativization of traditional practices and even the destruction of cultures (a process which has been widespread in the West since the 60s.)

Culture just disintegrates qualitatively: the internet creates a huge forum dominated by an egalitarian and consumerist spirit. It does not allow for a hierarchy of values to be presented; side by side we find encyclopedic articles and advertisements for lingerie. This relativization is accompanied by an emphasis on individualism: each person chooses and consumes information without needing to interact in a real way with other people, with a community. The corollary of relativization and of egalitarianism is the definitive rejection of the notion of intellectual, moral and religious authority: there is also the rejection of all traditions for the transmission of wisdom. The result of economic globalization is:

a human subject radically de-centered, cast adrift in a sea of disjointed and unrelated images which in the end de-construct him by preventing him from unifying the past, present and future into a coherent sequence. The universal consumer … without a frontier either in space or in time, is incapable of becoming attached to any particular value … Globali-

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43See how in France the school curriculum in history and French has recently changed (e.g. recent change in spelling).

zation, with neither a past nor a memory, has nothing to recount apart from itself.45

As John Paul II underlines “man lives a really human life thanks to culture”46. Threatening a culture, whether it be regional, national or even that of civilization itself, is to threaten “man in his wholeness, regarding the inalienable rights of the person which is the basis of everything.” There is, therefore, an anthropological and even metaphysical basis for the right to culture for the human person, a right which holds to the relationship between body and spirit in man -- neither “materialization” nor “spiritualization,” therefore -- and which holds to the fact that man is a social animal who only becomes a person (with responsibilities) within the bosom of a family community and of a much broader cultural community. These fundamental rights of the human person, to be considered in the light of natural law, are the basis of a just organization of societies and of the common good.

Consequences: Culture and Nation, a Matrix Connection

If culture is essential for the dignity of the human person, for his whole development, then neither the community which creates and lives out of this culture nor the structure which emanates from it and which protects this community (state) can be abolished without contempt for the human person.

The community of which Edith Stein speaks, let us remember, “forms the personal fabric of its members along certain lines” because it presents:

one uniform ethnic character and gives life to a distinctive culture particularized by the community’s special character

... The people has by its very nature a vocation to be the

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45Cavanaugh, Eucharist-Globalization, pp. 110-111. We note a limited response to the challenge of globalization. The author seems to dismiss «a priori» the sovereign nation and only suggests a theological, even mystical notion of community.

46Address to UNESCO [6], et quotation of Thomas Aquinas: “Gens humana-num arte et ratione vivit.”
creator of a culture but its customs die out with a cessation in creativity.\textsuperscript{47}

In fact, the people are particularized by their cultural autonomy which is reflected in the sovereignty of the State. People, the creators of culture, call the State “an organization that secures for it a life per its own laws.” John Paul had the same vision:

The Nation is, in fact, the great community of men who are united by various ties, but above all, precisely by culture. The Nation exists “through” culture and “for” culture.\textsuperscript{48}

Consequently, John Paul II speaks of experience: “the law of the Nation must be set along the same line: it, too, must be the basis of culture and education.” Following Aristotle, he explains how the city/nation is the real purpose of other communities:

It is this community which possesses a history that goes beyond the history of the individual and the family. It is also in this community, with respect to which every family begins its work of education … I am the son of a Nation which has survived by relying on its culture! … There exists a fundamental sovereignty of society which is manifested in the culture of the Nation. It is a question of sovereignty through which, at the same time, man is supremely sovereign.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47}Stein, An Investigation Concerning the State, pp. 48-51.
\textsuperscript{48}Address to UNESCO [14].
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid. The discourse gives an exhortation: “I am also thinking with admiration of the cultures of new societies, those that are awakening to life in the community of their own Nation -- just as my Nation awakened to life ten centuries ago -- and that are struggling to maintain their own identity and their own values against the influences and pressure of models proposed from outside … I say to you: with all the means at your disposal, watch over the fundamental sovereignty that every Nation possesses by its own culture. Cherish it like the apple of your eye for the future of the great human family. Protect it!” (14-15).
That man cannot flourish as a sovereign person, (i.e. free) except within this framework.

*The Objective Value of Each Culture*

If every culture is to be respected as an inalienable right of the human person, this is not to say that every culture is objectively equal. There can be no relativism in this field because a culture is the carrier of an anthropological and moral ideal. Everyone can make a judgment about what is true in these domains, taking on board his own culture but able to see beyond it. This is required even and maybe especially for the Christian: his faith does not annihilate his ability or his duty to search for the truth which is humanly possible to reach.

It must be stated that a distinctive feature of the Christian faith (especially Catholic) is that human reason is never to be contradicted.50 One can even say that Christian thinking has allowed the development of what specifically describes the West: the sense of the meaning of the human person. Moreover, does the culture which has ensued from this not have more in conformity with the philosophical truth about man than a culture born out of Islam for instance? Let us note here just the ambiguous relationship of this last religion to truth: a doctrine about creation which separates the omnipotence of God from the wisdom of God (the Creator can create a world in which he misleads his creation and can ask of it absurdities); a ban on historical research on the real origins of the Koran; the use of concealment is encouraged in the pursuit of its goals regarding the infidels (*taqiya*). From the ethical point of view one ought to wonder about the place of women in society and about polygamy.

John Paul II recognizes the unique place of Christian cultures. He spoke as the Sovereign Pontiff but his reasoning has a philosophical significance:

There is an organic and constitutive link which exists between *religion* in general and Christianity on the one hand, and *culture*, on the other hand … The whole of Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- bears witness, in the history of each

50We see this in *Summa Contra gentiles* of Thomas Aquinas also John Paul II, encyclical *Fides et Ratio*.
nation as in that of the whole community, to the link between culture and Christianity … To create culture, it is necessary to consider, to its last consequences and as fully as possible, man as an autonomous value, as the subject bearing the transcendence of the person … Love must be claimed for man by reason of the particular dignity he possesses. The totality of the affirmations concerning man belongs to the very substance of Christ’s message and the mission of the Church, in spite of all that critics may have declared about this matter, and all that the different movements opposed to religion in general and to Christianity in particular may have done.51

In conclusion, a European has two reasons to defend his culture: it is his own and his personhood has been forged in it; this culture goes beyond others in its understanding and respect for the human person. Are Western European societies ready to keep alive, to defend, to even rediscover their own cultural identity? It is certainly a matter of their survival when confronted by the demographic and geopolitical changes that are now happening. And what is at stake here are the conditions for each person to flourish. That is only possible if we rediscover that the unity of a society is not just contractual but is created around a common good. The latter is not just material but even more an exercise of justice which recognizes what concerns the person. Therefore, in concrete terms, community identity is part of who the person is. It is for each person to recognize also that this common good is really a “good,” and even a necessary good, for him or her.

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To What Extent Can One Rely on Religious Ideals in Solving the Problems of Mass Migration in Europe Today?

ANATOLIY KOSICHENKO

Introduction

Mass migration to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa, is no doubt a challenge for Europe. It increases and expands the problems already associated with this migration. In this regard, it is appropriate to ask whether it is possible to appeal to some moral traditions in order to solve this problem, e.g. to the traditions of hospitality and solidarity for someone in a difficult life situation. Initially we identify a number of important factors during a crisis such as Christian hospitality toward traveler and pilgrim, and then we argue that hospitality is difficult to practice within a secularized society and religion might help to reduce the threats of mass migration.

In Christianity, hospitality (more accurately strannopriemnichestvo) is a virtue. The person meets the traveler, and according to the word of Christ, receives Christ himself. In showing grace to the traveler he shows the grace of Christ. So, hospitality is highly valued in Christianity, many saints have had this virtue. Hospitality is highly regarded in Islam also. The peoples of the Islamic countries show the traveler respect -- it was included in the traditional culture of the East.

We must keep in mind, however, what journey meant in the Old Testament (and in early Christian times) and who the traveler was. The journey was an event out of the ordinary. The norm was to live where you were born. Even now, the Church prays “for traveling people,” considering them in danger. By providing the traveler with a home, a shelter, “the risks of travelling” are reduced.

This is a religious reading of the merciful attitude towards traveling. Is it possible to extend this attitude to mass migration in Europe today? The ideal of the Christian attitude to the traveler is not
canceled, has not disappeared, and has not left the spiritual world of modern Christians. But the realization of this ideal, is unfortunately hindered by several factors.

Firstly, in Europe there are few true Christians; secularization has done its work. The European of today is only marginally Christian. In real life, he is focused entirely on other values. Therefore, modern Europeans cannot expect a Christian attitude to migrants.

Secondly, a migrant of today bears little resemblance to the traveler of the past. We should be very careful before applying the criteria that are based on the ideals of strannopriemnichestva. These “strangers” are not coming to worship at the holy places, are not travelling on business, and are not looking for lost relatives, as were the ones who evoked the grace of hospitality.

Thirdly, a million immigrants -- it is not tens, nor hundreds or even thousands of “pilgrims.” They cannot be accommodated in a strannopriemnicheskii house. For Europeans grace is not enough for a million immigrants.

**Hospitality of Secularized Europe**

Hospitality -- excellent characteristic. In the term “guest” there is a clear indication of the temporary nature of this status. A guest cannot be a guest for months or years. He has to become an independent subject of society; he has to take his place in society. In other words, he must cease to be a guest. Indeed, this is what happened to the migrants of the ‘first wave’ in Europe. Migrants from the Maghreb (North Western Africa) became assimilated into France and the UK and in other European countries. They took their place in European society; they worked, raised children, and performed civil duties, even becoming active participants in the wars waged by their new homeland.

What do we see now? The latest waves of immigration to Europe are fundamentally different in nature. Migrants are not becoming integrated into the social and political life of host countries. Partly, of course, the receiving party is guilty. It does not create the necessary conditions for the integration of migrants. Yes, immigrants demand more favorable conditions of integration than they often provide. It may seem that they are finicky and require too much. But who instilled in them the idea to “demand a lot”? Those countries, which
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today clearly stipulate the conditions for the adoption of migrants (even if these conditions are quite tough) behave more consistently than those with a “humane” attitude to migrants, yet who tighten immigration policies because of their understanding of the negative aspects of mass migration. In the latter case, there is a “conflict of interest” between the host country and migrants. These contradictions are generated from both sides: some have promised too much, others expect too much. The host country must accept responsibility for its part of the blame.

But in situations where migrants do not integrate into the society and political institutions of the host country, there is a considerable fault on the part of the migrants themselves. You could say they are greatly at fault. Why are they not integrated, thereby creating a variety of everyday problems? Why do migrants not accept the living conditions, traditions, culture, political and social reality of the host country? Why do they live in enclaves, ethnic communities, not only to keep their religion, but marking a sharp contrast with the local religious traditions? Answers to these questions may be different, according to specific aspects of the complex problem of the lack of integration. There are economic and political, religious, and ethical aspects and they all contribute to the problem.

We are only paying attention to one side of this complex situation. What does a Muslim from an Islamic state, who has been affected by armed conflict, see in a European country? He sees a calm, measured life, a high level of material well-being, social security and other benefits of a legal, social state. For him all this is not available. All this must be “earned.” But he does not want all this sometime in the distant future, he wants it now. But now, at best, he depends on hand-outs (good as they are) and his prospects are uncertain. In addition, in this particular circumstance, to which we would like to draw special attention, he sees not only the positive aspects of European prosperity, some strange realities for him. He sees a secular society that has lost faith in God and lives in stark contrast to religious traditions. He sees local poverty. He sees young people denying the values of previous generations, etc. Much of this vision he can tolerate (he is not from another planet) but there is something which he cannot do. He cannot stop being a Muslim. He cannot cease to be a family man. He cannot break the kinship and community ties. From all this, he constructs a message of protest to society and the country.
that accepts him. That is how migrants for the most part begin protests. We are not talking about the infiltration of extremists and terrorists.

One could argue that no one forbids a Muslim from migrating. Yes, it is not prohibited. But the general atmosphere of unbelief puts him in opposition to this unbelief, and he begins to display his faith? This, in turn, encourages radical Islamic preachers. In addition, the immigrant begins to despise the Europeans who have lost faith in God. The circle is closed; the result is we have an extremist. This is what happens to the family, community and ethnic immigrant.

Is it possible to change this situation, by turning to Christianity, and the moral principles of humanism and solidarity? We have already spoken about the loss of Europe’s Christian roots and therefore, the values and ideals of Christianity. With regret, we have to state that modern European society (admitting that the latter is not something homogeneous and there is even doubt about the concept of a European self) is not able to live a Christian life. Migrants cannot count on the love of the gospel from modern Europeans.

Why is the average European today not a Christian? After all, even as recently as a few decades ago, the level of religious practice in Europe was quite high. Europe relies on its Christian roots. However, the enhanced promotion of liberal values, the increased focus on ideals of consumption and individualism have pushed Christianity to the periphery of public life in Europe. As a result of this condition, it should be recognized that implementing Christian ideals in today’s world is difficult, especially in normal, everyday life. Christian ideals come into irreconcilable conflict with the liberal values prevailing in the world today.

Freedom, understood in Christianity as a responsibility to God (and “neighbor”), has today turned into permissiveness, to the right of everyone to live as he wills. Christianity requires a person to live “in good conscience,” to fulfill the Gospel commandments, to love our neighbor. All this is perceived as obsolete by modern man, it has lost importance for modern, abstract ideas. Sociological studies show that modern Europeans do not believe in an afterlife or the reward or punishment of the Last Judgment. At the same time, this same European considers himself quite a believer. As for the level of religious practice, we are referred to the following data of sociological research. According to the Gallup International / WIN (Global
Barometer on Hope and Despair), in France 59% of the respondents never go to church, similarly in the Czech Republic 57%, in the UK -- 54%, in Sweden -- 52% in Germany -- 48%, in Spain -- 48%, in Hungary -- 44%, Estonia -- 42%, in Norway -- 42%, in Denmark -- 33%. Drawing figures from this agency and the national sociological centers of the UK, France, Germany and others, records show an annual decline of faith to an unprecedentedly low level for these countries. The growth of religious practice is only noticeable in some Orthodox countries such as Russia, Serbia, Macedonia, Georgia, Romania and Moldova.

Against this background, can one can speak of a Christian morality? People living in Europe, people living in their own ethic communities, in “religious “ groups and within the family have stopped calling themselves Christian but live simply and humanly. What is the gospel love in this background on which migrants can count? The de-Christianization of Europe -- this is a real and very disturbing process. No need to be a deep analyst to realize that almost all spheres of individual and social life (not only in Europe but in all regions of the world) are closely linked to the ideology of these communities. The nature and content of economic activity; social and political systems; cultural, educational, ideological foundations -- are all profoundly correlated with the spiritual values of the peoples and spiritual values are the sphere of religion. If Europe lost its religious roots, its existence would be jeopardized.

The present “Islamic threat” to Europe makes many wonder, whether Europe has gone too far in its desire to implement the “rights and freedoms” that have led to the loss of Christian values? No doubt, the value of human freedom is very high. But freedom involves responsibility, and we must not forget that it also applies to the ideologues of liberalism. Freedom, understood as the right of people to be irresponsible is dangerous for the individual and for society. Such a man and such a society become vulnerable to any consolidated threat. Let us hope that European leaders are aware of this threat, the more so as the realities of international politics confront these leaders with the hardest problems to be resolved. Solving them on the grounds of ideological and spiritual weakness will not work. The ideological and spiritual priorities will need to be determined. In this context, we emphasize that in respect to the “Islamic threat” the best answer will not be a fight against Islam and the revival of Christian ideals. Christianity, as a religion in Europe, will have its rightful place
in an interreligious dialogue with Islam. It has to be dialogue, not confrontation. If we use religious confrontation, the modern world will not survive.

If Christianity in its true depth cannot become the ideological basis for how we treat migrants, is it possible that this could be on the basis of humanism? Humanism in fact can be considered as a kind of projection of Christianity in real life. The bar set for Christianity is very high for modern Europeans, but is humanism within its ability?

Herein lies all the falsehood of humanism. Humanism, as the love of man, out of touch with Christianity is fruitless. Yes, a person can show compassion to his “neighbor” from time to time, but to make compassion a permanent basis for the relationship to the “other,” and even more so to the mass of workers, is extremely difficult. Not at all impossible, but extremely difficult! Almost unfeasible. Why? Because humanism, as we pointed out is essentially false. Humanism historically occurs in the context of the growth of protest against God. Humanism is an attempt to justify the possibility of man’s love for man on natural and historical grounds. But love, like morality in general, is not generated during the process of the historical development of man and society. Man’s love for man must be based on the love of God. In other words, the basis of true humanism should be based on God’s love, and we are once again forced to appeal to Christianity in an attempt to justify the essence of true humanism. But Christianity has been lost to modern Europeans, as already mentioned. Therefore, there is no true humanism. It is a substitute. But a substitute cannot be the basis of our “humane” treatment of migrants.

An appeal to solidarity also fails. Solidarity cannot be arbitrarily designed. It may not apply to everyone. The bases of solidarity (in its social dimension) are: the general history of the nation, its ideological specificity, ideological preferences, language, religion, and even psychology. Solidarity is possible only in a group which has a long common history. Solidarity cannot be artificially “applied.” Again, it is organic to the communities that have a common “destiny.”

When we try to make solidarity a principle of universal partnership, we are confronted with the consequences of the essence of social life which have been misunderstood. In recent decades we decided that all people are roughly the same, and one can construct an arbitrary community with the desired properties. A bad joke played here on individualism! Once freed from the social community
people have turned into “atomic” individuals i.e. a set of “private” persons, and considered this as progress in human development. And now we want to build a society with solidarity qualities. From where will we get it? Solidarity is the result of a long historical development of joining together, rather than an arbitrary combination of disparate individuals. For all its power, social engineering is not capable of this.

At the same time, solidarity in issues related to modern mass migration to Europe, could be an effective means of removing the “divide” between migrants and nationals of the host “mill.” But this requires a lot of effort on both sides. The migrant has to realize that it was he who came to a foreign country, and at the very least he must reckon with its laws, its demands, and its realities. They are not the same as they would like. They are what they are. He has to show commitment to integrating them. They can keep their core values (religious, family, community), but these values have to be related to the socio-political and spiritual-cultural context of the host State. Moreover, a number of States (United Kingdom, for example) leaving aside the matter of migrancy, have introduced into their legislation some aspects of Sharia law (in the area of family, inheritance, community rights). These moves on the part of migrants will be their contribution to solving problems of mass migration through solidarity.

The receiving party should show real solidarity to migrants, building a relationship with them not as unwanted asylum seekers, but as people who are in difficult life circumstances. These aspirations dominated at first. Then dealing with the growing complexity of the entire process of dealing with migrants arriving in emergencies has radically changed attitudes to them on the part of the States and of ordinary citizens. In addition, European leaders are beginning to realize that their intention of turning migrants into cheap labor was too optimistic. In these circumstances, solidarity could rely on the tradition of the Christian community and catholicity. Solidarity, in theory, it really is. Europe cannot rely today on Christianity, for it has lost its Christian roots. At least on a formal level, some elements of solidarity with migrants prove necessary.

We believe that Europe will cope with the problems of mass migration, which today seem difficult to resolve. The wave of mass migration will stop. Legal and judicial mechanisms are involved. A significant proportion of immigrants is likely to be subject to
expulsion. At the same time, I think, that humanist, moral and religious aspects also find a place in the development of an overall strategy to resolve difficult situations related to this mass migration, which is both a personal tragedy for groups of migrants and for the global geopolitical issue of our time.

Religion could Reduce the Threat of Mass Migration

Finally, we would like to mention a few general ideas that are relevant to the issues under consideration. The problem of mass migration to Europe from the regions in which wars are conducted is clear, but it is not the only threat to the modern world. Challenges and threats are multiplying and becoming more complex. Many of them are global, are generated by the conflict of interests of states, communities, nations, nationalities, ideas, etc. At the heart of many of the threats is opposition and confrontation. But is opposition an obsolete way of “insisting on one’s rights?” Much better today is the saying, “give in to win” -- in the good sense of this maxim. In general, this is little understood by modern people, mired in low desires and intentions. And the essence of this rule is as follows: it is necessary to sacrifice everything so that others may not lack. Simply put, one loses one’s life for the truth, finds it, and will lose everything in order to keep this. This response of religion to the challenges and threats, all growing in the world today, may seem abstract, but it is very concrete, for those who understand. Weakness is created force -- as indicated by the same source; and it is absolutely true.

Today many, implicitly or explicitly, expect an apocalyptic disaster. And it has become even clearer that, to keep the world from such global collapse, we need an initiative based on values entirely different from those on which the world was based in the 19th and 20th centuries. In those centuries, there was a gap between the fundamental importance of human privacy and, on the other hand, policy at national and international levels. Any private person caught up in such a policy has been reduced to nothing. Politics has lost a human face, of course, because of the argument that we need to care for the individual and the harsh realities of the world. The gap has led to the loss of any human sense of politics at national and international levels. There has been a global destruction of the meaning of existence, for it has lost the moral and human dimension of richness, and has
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Religious ideals ceased to be a “house of humanity.” Globalization has given rise to its antipode namely atomicity and scattered human communities.

It may seem strange to many that religion can, in these conditions, consolidate the national and supranational communities today. It is not just that many ideologies in the 20th century have demonstrated their incapacity and lost the right to claim a consolidating role, although this too has some symbolic meaning. A deep sense of religion in human society is that any true progress is possible only if the target is set to something higher. Simply by referring to something perfect, you can progressively develop. Religion, God entering human relationships -- these set high standards of relationship. Therefore, in the modern world there is simply no way out of the almost hopeless situation in which we find ourselves except a return to God. Man, ethnic communities, the state -- all of them have exhausted their possibilities of building a “right future” for its natural, godless basis - - the evidence is the current global crisis of world relations.

Can religion today offer any real measures to reduce the level of challenges and threats? Religion can make such offers, but the international community is not yet ready to accept them. After all, we are accustomed to seeing economic or political reasons and factors behind the threats and challenges of our time, and indeed they are present. The deep roots of the challenges and threats are of a spiritual nature: spiritually corrupt people, a spiritually meager society without a state spirituality generate decisions and actions which become a threat to peace. Religion is seen as not understanding the secular world. We should not forget that religion is a special form of human life, this space of “meeting” between man and God. The inner purpose of religion is not to improve the world, but human improvement, moral and spiritual development, which is indispensable to finding the kingdom of heaven (all three Abrahamic religions -- Judaism, Christianity and Islam -- see their purpose and main content in this). But the appeal to the generality of human history and the unity of humanity, increasing the moral potential of societies and states, the interpretation of human existence -- is also a major contribution to improving the overall international situation, as these forms of religion now offer. The very formulation of the attraction of religion to reduce the level of aggression of contemporary world politics and to build a more just world is very valuable. It is a step of fundamental
importance, allowing the world to be led out of the abyss of contradictions, in which it is located.

The role of religion is exceptional also due to the fact that religious values are the basis of cultures and civilizations. And when we now talk justifiably about a dialogue of cultures and civilizations as the only alternative to the chaos and instability of the modern world, it should be remembered that the dialogue is not about abstract ideas, but these are the core values of religions. Therefore, interreligious dialogue is the core of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations. The active position of religion in the dialogue is another significant contribution to the reduction of potentially hostile ethnic-religious groups in the modern world.

There is, however, one condition for the realization of all these features of religion. It is small, but difficult to execute. In order to reduce the level of challenges and threats in the modern world based on the possibility of religion, it is necessary to reduce the level of the sinfulness of man and society. This is all the more loudly proclaimed by the leaders of different religions. The voice of Christian and Muslim theologians calls the international community’s attention to the need for a concept of spiritualization in human rights, to improve the moral content of these rights, as a sinful person turns freedom into slavery, and finds possible uses for evil. Sinful man cannot “dispose” of human dignity, for they do not know of any dignity or true freedom. Therefore, it may seem trivial, but the elimination of global threats begins with the work of each person on himself, begins with man’s spiritual rebirth. After all, the problems of the modern world, many of which today seem absolutely unsolvable, have been generated, ultimately, by man -- who on earth else? -- Man has already become a hopeless liar, but he himself does not believe that. These problems have reached such a level of complexity and impassability that nothing other than limiting the voltage of power can work. We must limit our base -- i.e. to the area of religion, limiting ourselves to only these relevant problems to be solved. Therefore, thinking and being purely rational, you must appeal to religion -- as it is as unusual for the rational consciousness as it sounds. Addressing the possibilities of religion because other means have been exhausted -- let us turn to these features, the more so as history shows (but we do not learn) that in extremely difficult conditions, it is religious reality which becomes decisive.
Religious Ideals in Solving the Problems of Mass Migration

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Bibliography


Hospitality: A Vulnerable Characteristic of European *Homo Oeconomicus*?

**PETRU-CIPRIAN BRADU & IUSTIN EMANUEL ALEXANDRU**

Motto: “The moon belongs to everyone
The best things in life are free
The stars belong to everyone
They gleam there for you and for me.”
Buddy DeSylva, 1927

**Who and How is *Homo Oeconomicus***?

*Homo oeconomicus* is a phrase that has been assimilated into the local culture, being a neologism of economic science, defined as “human conceived by the economists as an abstract being, framed in society and driven by the stimuli of meeting his material needs.”¹

The concept of economic man, at the level of social sciences for our purposes, was used for the first time at the end of the 19th century by John Stuart Mill in his critique of economics,² in which he observes a selfishness, a personal economic interest in human nature, even in the case of the politician who should be looking towards the common good. This link between the behavior of *homo oeconomicus* and politics has been there in fact since the *Politics* of Aristotle where in the Second Book, Part V he describes the difference between self-love and excessive self-love of the one who represents the interests of the city.³ Starting with Adam Smith, economists have tried to attribute to this economic man a rational behavior, i.e. managing limited resources to meet his needs which are limited also, not to be confused with desires.

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which somehow tend towards infinity. *Homo oeconomicus* is perceived as someone seeking on the one hand, to maximize his use of a product or a service as a consumer, and on the other hand, to maximize his profit as a producer of goods and services.

For *homo oeconomicus* it might seem that assuming hospitality would contravene his fundamental ruling principle, i.e. selfishness. Without the desire to possess as many goods as possible, to obtain profit and to maximize it continuously, economic man would be left without a motivation to invest, to open a business, to develop, to assume certain financial risks. Here we could find an alternative in a rational attitude that will help him suppress the perspective described above: he could channel his attention and efforts towards a social activity, accomplishing the common good that is somehow superior to the personal good without, of course, excluding the latter. We are talking here about the importance of promoting and living the Christian perspective and ideals through which man becomes more human when he assumes in thinking, words and acts, the living of evangelical values and virtues: compassion, reciprocity, sacrifice, rightness, etc.

The principle of selfishness -- promoted consciously by the economic environment -- is nurtured also by the exacerbated competition where economic man, as a producer, and to gain more profit, must always have in view the pulse of the free market or its “invisible hand.” This view of competition -- which up to a point is reasonable -- taken to extremes comes to occupy the mind of economic man and constrains him to act sometimes rationally, at other times irrationally, even illegally, all to find the means -- moral or immoral -- to have a constant flux of customers. The paradigm of exacerbated competition, however, is passed on to consumers, who are urged to “fight each other” to be the first to get the best deal of a product or a service. This is done through selling activities such as Black Friday or other periods that are full of diverse promotions summarized in the slogan “buy ... NOW!” Therefore, we understand that *homo oeconomicus* has assumed this state of competition and taken it to extremes.

We believe that selfishness is what brought *homo oeconomicus* to situations of crisis, as witnessed in ancient or more recent history, at

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times of global economic or ecological crisis. As a side effect of selfishness and irrational consumerism of the last decades, we now know that we are transforming this wonder called Planet Earth, from a place which is fertile and full of life, into a landfill, through depletion of resources and pollution that is destroying the balance of our ecosystems. Again, we notice the living out of this consumerism by economic man in both of his states, as producer and as consumer.

As an approach to these crises we could accept the solution based on the accession to values and virtues which we recalled earlier. We could subordinate these to the concept of hospitality that makes economic man more human by the fact that it opens him towards the horizon of communion. This accession to values and virtues might however be seen with reluctance also because of this line of thought: if European economic man accepted hospitality, then he would become vulnerable. On vulnerability in the economic and business environment has spoken the Italian economist Luigino Bruni who launched in 2015 an interesting theory in Prague, during an economic summer school on the Economy of Communion. About this vision of the Italian economist we will talk in the next part of the paper.

The Vulnerability of European Economic Man

Vulnerability is quite a difficult word, especially when we are talking about a scientific approach, in fact the term is not specific to economy, nor is it common to social sciences, therefore it is rarely used. As for the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, this word designates something that can be hurt, easily attacked, that has weak points, which is sensitive, faulty, and critical. Etymologically, vulnerable comes from the Latin vulnus, meaning wound, and as with most important words in daily life it is ambivalent, being capable of both a negative and a positive tone. Negative vulnerability is attributed to those who have no defense. Examples would refer to the following categories: old people, women, children, even the

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natural environment. We can also speak of a positive vulnerability, specifically, when we refer to closer human relations. Examples can be: the vulnerability of close friendship, the one of parents towards children, the one towards the beloved, and any type of close relationship.

A problem to begin with when talking about vulnerability is the following: where can vulnerability be accepted or where should it be limited within the field of social sciences? Let us start from the observation of Luigino Bruni who considers that in the second millennium two great, extreme perspectives of social sciences have been highlighted: *Homo homini lupus est* (man is a wolf for man, Thomas Hobbes) and *Homo homini natura amicus* (man, by nature, is a friend of man, Antonio Genovesi).

The first perspective belongs to philosopher Thomas Hobbes, from 1642, being conveyed in his works *De cive (On the citizen)*\(^7\) and *Leviathan*\(^8\) that have influenced social sciences and even the beginnings of economics as a science. According to this view, man must not be vulnerable, and what is more, he does not want to be; only those around him can be so. In the context of this paradigm, European economic man cannot afford to be vulnerable in the area of community.

The second perspective, *man, by nature, is a friend of man*, belongs to philosopher and economist Antonio Genovesi who is well-known because of his masterpiece, *Lezizioni di Commercio*.\(^9\) This vision came more than a century after the one of Hobbes, in 1760, as a response to the theory of the Englishman. It is a practical method that offers an opening, a communion, a risk that does not exclude the vulnerability of man.

If we look at Europe, it can be observed that these two opposite perspectives have imposed themselves at the economic and political level (more the former) and social and religious level (more the latter). These two perspectives have pervaded social sciences, developing diverse theories.

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An attempt at choosing the paradigm of Genovesi could be the European Union. This represents a major challenge, due to its opening of links based on commercial aspects between the member countries and on the effort to establish a common social and political view. This opening of links, expressed by steps made towards neighboring nations represents taking a risk, in fact an acceptance of vulnerability. One of the risks taken to establish communion is the fact that hospitality does not exclude fratricide. The renowned story of the hospitable Bedouin makes an eloquent case for this. He sees in the desert a thirsty man and goes towards him to offer him water; he even gets off his camel to take care of him. The one who is helped, as a “reward,” pushes him away and steals his camel. The Bedouin shouts that he is not sorry he theft of his camel, but for the fact that due to this action, other Bedouins will not be willing to help others who might be in such need in the future. We could say that this event offers a possible sequel to the parable of the Good Samaritan which does not reveal how the one taken care of reacted in the end. In real life, what happened to the Bedouin has spread into the public conscience of Europeans, through the experience that they have had with different vulnerable groups that have a negative image, such as immigrants, the Roma community, even some Romanians who have left for the west.

With that as a background, we ask ourselves: is the European citizen prepared to be vulnerable? Can he accept hospitality and receive the waves of immigrants? We can suppose that for European *homo oeconomicus* this represents a challenging perspective. A means of mediating and solving this would be establishing a of reciprocity with someone who came from the east or the Far East. This implies that he, the refugee or the economic migrant, be involved in society as an active member and “not being considered as only a beneficiary of a philanthropic action, but becoming a partner.” This approach belongs to Chiara Lubich and was used in quite a similar context, proposing that those in material need no longer be considered “the poor that must be helped,” but partners at life’s banquet.

This, of course, supposes a change of paradigm that can be made by recourse to authentic moral and social principles. In fact, Chiara Lubich, the founder of the Economy of Communion -- San Paulo, May

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10Chiara Lubich speaking on the Economy of Communion model. Find more on this at http://www.edc-online.org/en/.
1991 -- spoke about the beneficial influence that the then recent social encyclical *Centesimus Annus* of John Paul II had on her. *Centesimus Annus* was written a century after the publishing of *Rerum Novarum* by Leo XIII, an encyclical that marked a turning point in the Doctrine of the Church regarding global economic and social aspects and the progress made by humanity.

The Economy of Communion model assumes this risk of fratricide by the fact that you are vulnerable when you become hospitable. Up to a point, the European Union does the same thing and it can go even further when it comes to refugees. Of course, here the work of risk management comes in, when the institutions of the Union have to turn their politics towards people of a different culture. But analyzing this type of risk represents a dimension of risk management that is not at all unfamiliar to those in Brussels who have experience in this matter due to the integration of the various countries during the process of development of the Community space. Therefore, the present events cannot take them totally by surprise.

**Vulnerability, Indispensable for Hospitality**

The word hospitable can be analyzed from different etymological perspectives, with diverse definitions, during this conference. Our paper is focusing mostly on one socio-economic aspect of hospitality, i.e. vulnerability in economics, politics and the business environment.

When you want to be hospitable, either at a personal level or community level, you expose yourself to some risks, thus becoming vulnerable. Luigino Bruni issued two theses regarding vulnerability: 1). The whole economy, politics and traditions of management see in vulnerability a strong enemy; 2). No communion (union, agreement) is possible without opening towards vulnerability and its risks.

Western civilization has formed a clear separation between the places of positive (thought as good) and negative (thought as bad) vulnerability. Its ambivalence has not been accepted in the public sphere because here vulnerability has always been regarded under its negative aspect, or in other words, under its unfavorable aspect. Positive vulnerability is accepted only in the private sphere, of personal relations.

By analogy, we can say the same about hospitality, this being accepted at the private level: reciprocal visits made by the members of
Hospitality: A Vulnerable Characteristic of European Homo Oeconomicus

a family, hosting some pilgrims, compassion towards the situation of some friends or neighbors; but hospitality at a social level, at the level of a community or country is hardly accepted because of the need to accept responsibilities and of course some risks that make you vulnerable at a community level. In this period, a good example would be Romanian society in which many argue against receiving refugees from the Middle East. The problem might be the lack of information as we found after an activity with our students; we asked them to watch a certain documentary regarding the refugees that came to Romania and afterwards we asked for a review. The stories depicted in the video are impressive and it was interesting to find that in the reviews students said that before watching the documentary they had quite a negative approach to refugees coming to Romania, but after watching the video they had a better understanding of their situation and they think that we should help them. There are also limits to accepting vulnerability and consequently hospitality. An interesting example in this direction is a recent referendum in Switzerland by which citizens have rejected a legislative proposal that would have speeded up the expulsion of immigrants who commit antisocial acts.

Aspects Regarding the Basis of Western Civilization

In line with other thinkers, the Italian economist Luigino Bruni sees two big pillars of western civilization: the Greek culture and the Judeo-Christian culture. We can analyze these two great bases of western civilization and observe, on the one hand, the reluctance towards being vulnerable, and on the other hand, the opening up to and accepting of vulnerability.

As an outstanding personality of the Greek culture, Aristotle, saw that the good life of man is fragile because the happy man needs friends. However, man is not bound to become friends with others, a fact which implies all forms of reciprocity, marked by the difficulty of not being able to completely control the other person’s response. The Italian economist synthesizes the Aristotelian view through the simple example of a coin of which good life (happiness) and tragedy

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11The traw (Năvodul), The Romanian region of Society of Jesus and Jesuit Refugee Service Romania, Bucharest, 2012.
are the two sides. On that note, let us remember that Mother Theresa stated the following at Oslo, after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize: “And love, to be true, should hurt.” Here we are bringing to birth social man proposed by Aristotle who, in order to be happy, must orient himself towards virtues and his peers, but this will not exclude the fact of being betrayed, tortured, wounded or even killed.

The second pillar of western civilization that we are considering in this paper is the Judeo-Christian culture, in which we find the ambivalence of fraternity from the first book of the Bible, that of Genesis. Fraternity is shown both as a blessing and a curse, if we may say so. We have clear examples in Cain and Abel (Gn 4), Jacob and Esau (Gn 33), Joseph and his brothers (Gn 37; 42-45). In these cases, brotherhood meant suffering, betrayal, but also blessing, as was the case of Joseph. Not only did he not take revenge on his brothers, who had sold him as a slave, but he even helped them when they became short of food.

In the context debated in this paper, we can conclude that these two pillars confirm for us that life in common cannot exclude the risk of suffering and of death due to the vulnerability to which we are exposed.

Is this really the reason why over the development of western civilization humans have moved away from profound social links, even when it comes to friendship or family, in order not to suffer? A phenomenon of the migration of contemporary man towards loneliness is seen by Pope Francis who declared during a meeting with families that he prefers the forming of families that can be hurt (vulnerable) in the daily attempt to live their love, to a sick society which has closed in on itself due to loneliness, convenience and fear of loving. The Pontiff affirms:

I would rather have a family that tries every time to start over again than a narcissistic society that is obsessed with luxury and convenience. I would rather have a family with

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a tired face because of sacrifices than made-up faces that do not know sensitivity and compassion.\footnote{Pope Francis, Family is not an outdated model, 16$^{th}$ February 2016 (in Romanian, accessed at http://ro.radiovaticana.va, full link in bibliography).}

Nowadays people do not want to be vulnerable because they would like suffering to be something alien to them, but let us consider the following words of Luigino Bruni: “in life there are good pains and bad pleasures.” When a society is open to healthy human relations, common good economy, hospitality, international unity, it has also to be open to suffering. The same thing also happens in business, whether we are talking of relations in a family enterprise, or business to business relations or other types of partnerships.

Coming back to the case of immigrants, we may see that some of them adapt, conform to the rules, but others don’t, an example being some Romanians that went abroad: some of them are hard workers, bringing added value to the societies into which they have immigrated, but others have committed antisocial acts. Considering these contexts -- personal, economic, community -- we encounter the following dilemma: to be or not to be vulnerable? To be or not to be hospitable?

Conclusions. A Few Solutions

“Tear down this wall!”
Ronald Reagan
West Berlin, June 12, 1987

Some sayings remain in history and enlighten people, such as, we believe, the words “Tear down this wall!” of U.S. ex-president Ronald Reagan. Faced with a situation of hostility, as opposed to hospitality, Ronald Reagan gave the right solution in just four words. A simple solution … but not simple to put into practice, as the wall inside the mind and hearts of people was bigger than the Berlin Wall itself. However, history has shown us that even the biggest walls, meant to separate people, can be torn down. Although it is a hard, long task it is worthwhile. So, as Mother Theresa used to say, “let us begin, but let us begin today,” as the people need the works of hospitality.
To this end, European *homo oeconomicus* should become aware and accept his own vulnerability in the face of community values that he adhered to and in which he believes. He must also be ready to be always a good and efficient host, even with the risk of being wounded. Even if only some of the migrants manage to integrate socially into the requirements of the host state, this is a worthy effort as then the settled guests will have more power to persuade others through the effect of education from within the group of refugees (seen as guests).

In the escalation of the causes of migration we need to take a diplomatic position. This means finding solutions to stop violence in the mother countries from where the refugees were forced to flee. Until now, peace efforts have been rather tame, letting countries like Syria be destroyed and then we have “peace conferences” played out for us. In addition, helping with resources and construction partnerships for the countries of origin of the refugees is absolutely necessary.

The European Union must adopt a vision allowing the guests (refugees) to become active members of the Old Continent, so that not only do they not destabilize it on its good course, but on the contrary, they revive and develop it and contribute to its growth. The focus must be on this opportunity and not on considering the case only as a security and cultural threat that must be quickly solved using every legal or just about lawful means of action.

Another action that the present situation requires is included in the Joint Declaration issued by Pope Francis and Patriarch Kiril at the beginning of 2016. In the 17th article they speak of reducing inequalities in the distribution of resources:

Our gaze is also directed to those facing serious difficulties, who live in extreme need and poverty while the material wealth of humanity increases. We cannot remain indifferent to the destines of millions of migrants and refugees knocking on the doors of wealthy nations. The unrelenting consumerism of some more developed countries is gradually depleting the resources of our planet. The growing inequality in the distribution of material goods increases the feeling of the injustice of the international order that has emerged.¹⁶

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¹⁶Read more on this subject in the works of Joseph Stiglitz, “The price of inequality” (2012) and “The great divide” (2015).
In conclusion, we think that in Europe we must maintain a vision based on the core values of the European Union, regarding the right of every man and woman to a dignified life, regardless of who he or she is. Let us be hospitable, even if this means being vulnerable, being wounded. We should prefer a vulnerable hospitality, consciously and positively accepted, capable of spreading a culture of common good, of education and love, creating a prosperous community that takes care of nature, “our common home.” This opposes the negative perception of vulnerable that makes hospitality be regarded with rejection when eventually you are confronted with a surprising situation. A society cannot endlessly be immutable; it cannot respond by force and provoke more harm that it received at a point from those outside it. Every person has a good dimension within and this part must be seen, found, appreciated built on in a functional, social and geopolitical environment. This requires sacrifices, but the result could be peace with brothers, with neighbors whether they are near or far away.

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Europe and the Refugee Crisis: Hospitality and Fear

Cristina Barbu

Introduction

In the last few years European hospitality has been challenged by the incoming waves of refugees and migrants, especially by those coming from the Middle East. These are people fleeing from war, hunger, poverty and terrorism, some of them have been discriminated against because of their ethnicity in their countries of origin. They engage in a long and dangerous journey across different countries to get to the seashore, and then across the sea. On the other side of the Mediterranean Sea the growing number of people arriving in search of refuge has frightened European citizens in different countries. For these reasons, the extremist parties and groups have gained popularity by leading anti-refugee campaigns. Given these facts, one could wonder if European society is responding according to its Christian moral values or is it guided by international law and conventions only? The aim of this article is to outline, using hospitality rules and values as depicted on the Christian continent, the image of European society as it is and as it aspires to be today.

The Roots of the Crisis

The conflict that has governed the entire Middle East since the Iraq war, is now the cause of massive movements of the Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan populations not only towards the neighboring countries, but further to the old continent of Europe.

This situation has provoked across Europe reactions which are both natural and to be expected. Significant events have unleashed reactions that mark the turning point of political debate across the continent: from the decision to welcome refugees, to closing the Balkan route due to the hostile attitude behind the so called “legal hospitality.”
According to the UNHCR statistics, those who follow the refuge path to Europe are 41% Syrians representing a total of 897,695 asylum requests, up to December 2015, while the Lebanon and Turkey alone have registered 4,786,412 refugees. By taking a glance at these numbers, one can deduce and comprehend the gravity of this conflict. Moreover, by carefully looking at who those numbers represent and who Daesh is targeting, one can only think of the last White House statements according to which, the war led by the terrorist group could indeed be declared a genocide.

First, one should understand the roots of this conflict. It broke out in the spring of 2011 in the Southern part of Syria, Dar’a city, where several groups of students led anti-government protests. Soon, they degenerated into what we call today the Syrian civil war. In the beginning, there was a noble purpose of liberating the country from the Alawi “assabiyyah” who, ever since the establishment of the Assad regime in the 70s, have encouraged the growing economic differences between urban and rural communities but also an interethnic clan that dominated the system and promoted people from certain influential families into key positions. This has generated frustration and hatred among the masses, especially among Sunni communities, towards the other minorities.

Soon, the liberating group composed not only of protesters but also of military defectors, split up into several groups across the region. Some of them have adopted a fundamentalist ideology enabling them to have access to funds that were offered by countries such as Qatar or Saudi Arabia.

Another important but unseen phenomenon in the region was the existence of a weak al ‘Qaeda which started to split up into smaller Islamic groups. By fusing some of these Islamic groups with revolutionists, several factions arose but one came to be very fundamentalist and brutal: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

These groups, including IS, have their own identity, but are different in name and purpose from their “mother group,” al-Qaeda. ISIS is the most powerful at this moment, but Jabhat al-Nusra is not far behind. Al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic state comes with a distinct plan, different from every other similar group. Proclaiming himself “caliph” of the new “caliphate,” he has established his rule across large territories in Iraq and Syria. His political aim is to conquer, aiming to control a territory at least as vast as that of the
Baghdad caliphate, reviving and even reinventing the golden era of Islam.

According to the journalist, Loretta Napoleoni al-Baghdadi is the terrorist leader who has managed to look beyond the fight and come up with an alternative project for the Syrian people, almost like a visionary, but an evil one. He offers an Islamic state, just as the name suggests, of Wahhabist inspiration and ruled by sharia law, where heretics are invited to “return” to Sunni Islam or die.

Given the circumstances, the motive for fleeing is easily understandable. People are not only escaping government atrocities on the one hand and rebels on the other hand, but also the Islamic state. The economic differences that the “assabiyyah” around the Assad regime have encouraged, have also determined a series of abuses of the rights and liberties of the person. Indeed, the population has been ruled over in such a manner that any dissident will face time in jail in the state prison, the length to be determined by their actions.

Religious liberties are mostly violated by the terrorist organization IS. They come to international attention because of the “examples” given to young jihadists all over the world, of “Islamic moral gestures,” encouraging them to follow in action and unite., the unfaithful are invited to reconvert to their belief and follow sharia law or die for their misguided beliefs. Inside this auto-proclaimed “state,” minorities such as the Yazidi are enslaved. Basically, what jihadi partisans try to do is to resurrect and raise to lawful action, some of the most violent crimes the world has ever seen: crucifixion, burning at the stake, beheadings and the list goes on.

The Rules of Hospitality

Alain Montandon, in his article “Les règles de l’hospitalité,” defines hospitality as an essential rule of social interaction, a way of living together in harmony, governed by a set of rules, rites and laws. He adds the words of XVII century French diplomat Antoine de Courtin as a rule of good practice in the host-guest “couple”: “It is the duty of the master of the house to do everything he can to show the guest that his visit does not bother him at all, the guest must do everything he can not to cause any bother at all.” Similarly, Marcel Mauss, talks about gift in the act of hospitality, naming it a total social phenomenon.
Therefore, the act of hospitality towards the other, namely refugees, goes beyond the series of rules, as they are presented in the treaty “Les règles de la bienséance civile et chrétienne,” and acquires a stronger significance, linked to the Christian history of Europe. The French moralist also teaches us that above all, the host, as well as the guest, must show each other kindness, sincerity, and civility.

Today’s Europe has all the conditions to become an honourable host. It has the proper legal framework and hundreds of years of good Christian moral practice, that precede international conventions. This should cause Europe to have a better understanding of the need to host asylum seekers and if necessary refugees. Several biblical stories can be given as example, some of which have Jesus Christ portrayed as a guest who bonds with His hosts.

But none of us are biblical characters, therefore we must start with the law.

In 1951, the United Nations, then known as the League of Nations adopted the Refugee Convention because of the persecution of Belarusians during the Bolshevik revolution, the Armenian mass refugee movement from Turkey and the Holocaust. It came into force on 22 April 1954 and it is based on article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The convention is a central piece of international legislation aiming to address the refugee problem. It confers the exact status that enables host states to provide proper protection to persons in need. Together with the Universal Human Rights Declaration, they form an appropriate framework so that persecuted persons can become guests.

Let us return to the Refugee Convention. It confers refugee status to any person, “who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

Also, among its recommendations, there is the principle of family unity, stipulating that “the unity of the family, the natural and fundamental group of society, is an essential right of the refugee” and that being “constantly threatened” all refugee rights should be extended to their families. Consequently, the family remains a priority of this conventions and international law and gives a legal status to Christian morals regarding the family.

Focusing on the rights and regulations that concern refugee status, one can easily see that they are granted in a similar way to those granted to citizens or aliens present on that territory, and they vary only in particularities of national legislation and type of right.

The Refugee Convention mainly creates the legal framework and ensures that any signatory state will comply with those rules, but the way they do that, remains subject to internal decisions. Professionals have identified three types of human rights in law, namely: civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights and solidarity rights. But for a better understanding of how a refugee can become a guest and eventually integrate, I will use another criterion and compare how the rights accord with those of citizens and aliens as mentioned above.

A refugee is granted the right to religious freedom and religious education, access to the benefits of the Convention without any discrimination based on race, religion or origin. The first chapter also stipulates that contracting states should treat refugees in the same way as aliens in general, except for cases where the Convention grants more favorable provisions due to the sensitivity of the status.

Artistic rights and those relating to industrial property, access to court and legal assistance, rationing, where it is the case, elementary education, public relief and assistance, social security and fiscal charges are applied to refugees in a manner “not less favorable” than that accorded to nationals. Moreover, re. movable and immovable property, the right to association in non-profit making or non-political organizations and trade unions, wage-earning contracts, self-employment, liberal profession, education other than primary education, housing and administrative assistance will be accorded to refugees in a manner “not less favorable” than to aliens in that contracting state.
Furthermore, states should not impose penalties on illegal asylum seekers other than those already imposed until the status is determined, should issue identification documents, travel documents, allow transfer of personal assets, should not expel a refugee without a proper trial in court of justice, and naturalization should be facilitated as much as possible.

All these rights are applied, non-discriminately, as already mentioned, to all asylum seekers, but will not be accorded to any person who is charged with crimes against humanity.

In contrast, the European States play the role of the host -- a role, so far, poorly assumed. Even so, the Convention ensures a key role so that each contracting state can have good access to it: it provides all legal background for the state to welcome its guests, applying the principles listed above through a national legal framework.

The Universal declaration of Human Rights, as the document from which emanated the Convention for Refugees, meets the gap that could appear in the process of welcoming guests. Through its principles (by which all states, which are automatically signatories of both, have complied) it ensures an easier path for creating “a couple”/”host-guest” by equalizing both positions. Thus, what Alain Montandon was underlining would be solved by truly applying the principles and norms of the two documents.

The first article of the Declaration says: “All human beings are born equal ....” Moreover, one has the right to security and juridical personality. On the other hand one is not allowed to reduce a human being to slavery, to torture him or her, for that person is born free and has the right to live.

Switching back to our example, one realizes that, even though these principles determine the existence of national legislation, often they are enforced by the law without reference to any morality and lack compassion and fraternal responsibility.

The Obligation to Take Quotas of Refugees

European countries are obliged by the EU council to follow two rules: to take in refugees, but also to take a certain number of refugees, i.e. their quota. This came about in response to Angela Merkel’s encouragement to open the Balkan route. By doing so, the European Union has been overwhelmed by the ever-growing number of people
Europe and the Refugee Crisis: Hospitality and Fear

arriving, asking for asylum in Europe, especially in Germany and Austria, the two countries preferred by the immigrants.

Facing this obligation, most of the countries have failed to comply and choose to refuse. It seems as though they prefer being together for better but not for worse. The European border countries face an influx of migration hard to manage by local authorities alone and this makes Europe look fragmented. Suddenly there is a glimpse of “Fortress Europe,” completely closed to outsiders and unwilling to listen to them.

On the one hand, Germany is leading a pro-immigration policy, actively supporting the European Union council decisions, but on the other hand, there are ultra-nationalist voices being raised all over the European continent. They are not only spreading fear amongst the population, but are also Euro-sceptics. Not only do they refuse immigrants, but they also tend to encourage extreme measures such as building fences around the borders or influencing public opinion in this matter.

At the present time, the ultra-nationalist voices come from two directions: the political parties and the civil society, such as the PEGIDA group. Similarly, there is a growing number of street voices joining in, expressing loudly that refugees are not welcome in their countries. Most of them argue their view by stressing the difference between “us, the citizens” and “them, the immigrants” who have a different culture, different religion, different traditions. The immigrants, in their opinion, are all part of a certain religion that is incompatible with ours. But this reasoning is both minimalist and xenophobic.

The idea that a transit center could be opened in a northern town of Romania, Ardud, has inflamed public opinion so much that several citizens, along with some local city officials, have threatened to use violence if necessary. France is well-known for its party “Le front national.” on the radical nationalist spectrum. The party’s agenda uses a provocative discourse about the rights of citizens that should not be shared with “them,” the migrants. They use as an argument the example of Germany. Hungary in addition, through Viktor Orban’s party Fidezs and the well-known far right wing party Jobbik, is saying a clear “no” to the refugees and denouncing the right to move freely inside the borders. Poland has joined the group with a conservative party in power and a similar discourse. They think that migrants
could bring diseases and parasites into Poland and that is why they
should be double checked. However, no European authority has ever
stated that there should be any question of this and no such cases are
known.

Looking back, the refusal of some Eastern European countries to
receive refugees must be a paradox, since they themselves have
provided an ample source of refugees to the West.

The parties that lead this anti-immigration policy are the very
ones that want the end of the European Union and if they had to
choose between the obligation of receiving refugees and that of getting
out of the union, they would choose to get out rather than to “colonize
alien populations on our ancestors’ land.”

This ambiguous situation is fully exploited by the Islamic funda-
mentalists who have conducted attacks against civilians recently. The
attacks on the journalists of Charlie Hebdo, the 13 November Paris
attacks with 130 people dead and 350 wounded and the 22nd March
Brussels attacks, all have shown the perversity of IS “department of
security.” Moreover, the Cologne attacks on New Year’s Eve have
raised paranoia to the highest point since the beginning of the crisis.
Due to these events, security institutions and politicians have now
begun to question the fundamental right to privacy and freedom.

In all cases, however, it has been proven that the brains behind
these horrifying acts were European citizens or, in any case, economic
immigrants, thus showing that the flow of asylum seekers is not
necessarily the cause of the deterioration of security. As many have
already said, the individuals who conduct acts of terror are usually
travelling just like everyone else.

The more terrorist attacks there are, the louder the extremist
voices are raised and consequently, each government is looking for
loopholes in the law so that they can repatriate or expel the refugees.

**Christian Hospitality and Cultural Challenges**

This image of the old continent, is rather the image of a Europe
struggling to function on the same principles it preached, not so long
ago, to others. It has become a host who is not really hospitable who,
even though it receives guests, lets them know that they are not
welcome.
It seems as though Europe hasn’t managed to pass the threshold test, and being unable to create the bond Marcel Mauss talks of, it reduces the ritual of hospitality to an intrusive act. Yet, not only the host is to blame, but also the guest, for if the refugees do not follow the rules, the act of hospitality cannot be completed. A phrase such as: “you can’t do anything to us because Merkel has invited us here” is the perfect example of this mentality. Alain Montandon continues in his article, to mention: “The gesture of hospitality is firstly to put aside the latent hostility of any act of hospitality, because to the host the stranger would always appear as a reservoir of hostility: be he poor, marginal, a wanderer, without fixed abode, be he mad or a vagabond, they hold a threat. His external position marks the difference.” He also adds that instead of imposing himself or herself, the guest should rather show modesty and caution.

It is true though, that the cultural difference seems to be so great that it would be superficial for us to ignore it, or even more, to refuse to think of the long-term impact. One should not, however, reduce the act of hospitality to a simple set of well-known rules, strictly applied, that we will try in the end to break by looking for loopholes to escape responsibility.

In contrast to other hospitality situations, ours has a great asset: we are the beneficiaries of one great intermediary, an arbitrator, The Organization of the United Nations(UN). Unfortunately, the UN discussions are being held at such a high level that the message doesn’t get through to society. Only a few have the privilege of understanding and discussing the resolutions adopted there. The ordinary citizen, the refugee never gets to hear, understand or be part of that. Hence, the conflict is hardly ever solved.

For this situation to improve, there must be understanding on both sides and the dilemma must remain open because of the dynamic aspect. There are, of course, perturbation factors in the diplomatic process as we can all see, for instance, with Turkey’s position in dealing with Europe on migration.

Even so, both refugees as guests and member states as hosts must search for and find those features which are common to cultures and build from there. They need to build a bond, a covenant and a relationship based on trust. As Pope Francis said in his message for the World Day of Migrants and Refugees 2016: “The care for good personal contacts and the capacity to exceed prejudice and fear are
essential ingredients in cultivating the culture of encounter, where it is arranged not only to give, but also to receive from others. Hospitality, in fact, resides in the gestures of giving and receiving.”

Therefore, we must stop trying to create a dialogue by comparing our differences for they will never bring the actors together, but our similarities will help create the bond as many of the guests will stay in Europe.

Given these arguments, we can’t help wondering: What is hospitality towards refugees? Is it a characteristic of Christian culture in a secularized Europe or an obligation stipulated by international law?

The answer lies in chancellor Angela Merkel’s urging Christian democratic parties to act according to their Christian values.

If we leave this issue just to the law, the act of hospitality would not be complete and cultural differences would only create more problems and fear. But if we try to think according to our Christian ethics and values and act according to the rules of a good host, then we will surely be able to live together, when necessary, without being negatively affected by culture, religion or traditions.

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Bibliography


11. Christian Hospitality as a Valid Response to the European Refugee Crisis: Insights from the Caribbean and Disability Theology

ADANNA JAMES

The Refugee Crisis: What Crisis?

What has been deemed the current crisis facing Europe is the alarming escalation in the numbers of persons seeking asylum. A BBC report states that more than a million migrants and refugees had crossed into Europe in 2015 “sparking a crisis as countries struggled to cope with the influx.”\(^1\) The civil war in Syria which started in 2011 has been by far the largest driver of this influx. Since the start of the war, Syrians have been fleeing their country. In 2011 the majority had fled to nearby countries and a relatively small number to Europe.\(^2\) By the end of 2015 as war raged on, reports were estimating that some 5.6 million persons had fled the country. The great majority (4.8 million, or 76 percent of all refugees) has moved to neighboring countries such as Turkey, which (according to statistics at the time of this paper) was housing about thirty-nine percent of all Syrian refugees, or about 2.7

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million Syrians, Lebanon with nineteen percent, or about 1.2 million. Jordan, with eleven percent, or about 651,000 and Iraq, with about 249,463 Syrians, in addition to three million of its own populace being internally displaced and Egypt, which hosts over 132,000 refugees. Twelve percent of Syrian refugees are reported to now be in Europe. That represents a figure of just over one million refugees. Most of them are registered in Germany, Sweden, Hungary and Serbia-Kosovo.

However, despite this surge in numbers seeking refuge in Europe, both the UN and Amnesty International insist that the number of Syrian refugees in Europe remains relatively low. The official website of the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR, states the following:

The number of Syrians arriving in Europe seeking international protection continues to increase. However, it remains low compared to Syria’s neighboring countries, with slightly more than 10% of those who have fled the conflict seeking safety in Europe.

In September 2015 Amnesty International reported that the places being offered by European countries to help ease the burden on

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7. Ibid.
countries neighboring Syria remain few: “Excluding Germany and Sweden, the remaining twenty-six EU countries have pledged around 8,700 resettlement places, or around 0.2% of Syrian refugees …”

In September 2015 the European Commission attempted to implement an emergency relocation and resettlement scheme to deal with the growing numbers of persons fleeing Syria and seeking entry into other countries. Relocation refers to the transfer of refugees from one EU member state to another based on a suggested system of distribution to member states. This was geared primarily toward alleviating some of the burden on Italy and Greece which remain main ports of entry to Europe for Syrian refugees. A report from the Commission in April 2016, however, cited the slow response on the part of the EU community to relocation efforts:

Overall, progress since the Commission’s first report has been unsatisfactory: on relocation, little progress has been made since mid-March … Greater efforts on relocation, however, are increasingly urgent in view of the humanitarian situation in Greece. “… EU Member States need to urgently deliver on their political and legal commitment to relocate persons in need of international protection from Greece and Italy. We cannot be satisfied with the results achieved so far. Relocation efforts have to be increased dramatically to respond to the urgent humanitarian situation in Greece and to prevent any deterioration of the situation in Italy.”

Anna Di Bartolomeo of the Migration Policy Centre notes:

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The Relocation Scheme has clearly been inefficient. The Scheme is to last for two years, i.e. from September 2015 to September 2017 and relocate 160,000 asylum applicants, or 6,667 persons per month. As of April 14, the total number of relocations stands at 1,195 persons -- i.e. 0.7% of 160,000 -- or around 171 migrants per month. So far, the most “generous” states have been France (31.7%), Finland (21.7%) and Portugal (15.1%). The lack of intra-EU solidarity appears to be the main obstacle to the correct functioning of the Scheme.\textsuperscript{11}

Regarding the second part of the Commission’s proposed initiative, the resettlement scheme, greater progress was observed. Resettlement refers to the transfer of stateless persons to an EU member state. Within this scheme, the Commission proposed that EU states make available 20,000 places. Germany has since pledged 30,000, Sweden, 2,700 and all other EU countries just over 5,000. An important factor in this scheme was the EU-Turkey deal. Effected in March 2016, this deal states that Turkey would accept migrants not in need of international protection that had crossed from Turkey into Greece, as well as all irregular migrants (those whose applications were found to be inadmissible for example). For every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands another Syrian would be resettled from Turkey to an EU member state. While it may be too early to judge the effectiveness of this scheme, doubts have already begun to emerge:

From its beginning -- from 4 to 15 of April 2016 --, a total of 79 Syrians had been resettled from Turkey to three EU MSs, while 325 people had been returned from Greece to Turkey. As to the implementation and functioning of the agreement, several doubts emerge. First, the 1:1 mechanism has apparently failed. In the first ten days, there is a high number of returns (325) and a low number of resettlements (79). In

\textsuperscript{11} Anna Di Bartolomeo, “EU Migration Actions with a focus on the EU-Turkey Agreement,” Migration Policy Centre April 2016, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/40925/RSCAS_MPC_2016_04.pdf?sequence=1 [accessed on 31 May 2016].
other words, like for previous programs, the intra-EU solidarity does not seem to work.12

So, what can one make of the present context particularly regarding the presence of Syrian refugees in Europe? Official agencies seem to be of the view that the European community is not overwhelmed by the presence of Syrian refugees. In fact, as of the end of May 2016 when this paper was written, the figures were still being described as relatively low and the response minimal. Rather, what appeared to be of urgent concern, at least according to these agencies, was the lack of solidarity within the European community for one another as well as for the global community evidenced by an unrelenting unwillingness on the part of most political powers in Europe to share in the burden of caring for those directly affected by the ongoing civil war in Syria.

Why Hospitality? The Link between Solidarity and Hospitality

It is thus the crisis of a lack of solidarity that this paper addresses, as it seeks to propose Christian hospitality as an appropriate response. Firstly, there seems to be a direct link between solidarity and Christian hospitality. Christopher Vogt’s virtue ethics-based approach to Catholic social justice helps clarify this connection. Vogt, in his “Fostering a Catholic Commitment to the Common Good: an Approach Rooted in Virtue Ethics,” outlines an interdependence among three virtues: solidarity, compassion and hospitality as he seeks to advance a politics of the common good. This interdependence prevents the exclusion of any one of these virtues in achieving the virtue of justice required for the common good. All three virtues, Vogt asserts, “lead people to be attentive to the suffering of others and to regard that suffering as morally relevant to their own lives.”13 Each of these virtues corresponds to a particular way of thinking, feeling and acting. “Solidarity pertains primarily to thought, compassion to the affections or to feeling, and hospitality to practicality or acting.”14

12 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 401.
Vogt explains that although solidarity attends to right knowledge of the current state of affairs of living together through analysis and perception, “it also includes a way of feeling”\textsuperscript{15} rooted in deep concern for the most vulnerable. It is here that the connection between solidarity and the virtue of compassion can be seen. Compassion entails not just an acquisition of knowledge according to Vogt, but “experiencing suffering emotionally.”\textsuperscript{16} Unlike solidarity, compassion is directed toward specific individuals. Vogt further explains:

the more affective, specific virtue of compassion is needed to create the emotional preconditions for the pursuit of solidarity. Without first becoming adept at the practice of empathetic understanding that is most characteristic of compassion, it would be very difficult to move from the predominant privatized, individualistic view of the world to an embrace of solidarity. In this sense, the virtue of compassion is a prerequisite for the ability to develop solidarity.\textsuperscript{17}

For Vogt, compassion is not just about an emotional experiencing. The final dimension of compassion is action. As such, he refers to compassion as a practice. It is hospitality that gives the practice of compassion and solidarity even more specific roots, since it is focused on vulnerable strangers. According to Vogt:

Even though Christian compassion and solidarity imply that they should be practiced toward anyone and everyone, the full force of this universality will go unrealized unless these virtues are wedded to concrete practices such as hospitality that bring the privileged into meaningful relationship with their otherwise socially invisible neighbors.\textsuperscript{18}

Vogt draws from Christine Pohl’s excursus into the Christian tradition of hospitality, to show how the end point of hospitality is restoration to community which is modeled on Jesus’ teaching of

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 404.]
\item [\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 406.]
\item [\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 405.]
\item [\textsuperscript{18}Vogt, p. 412.]
\end{itemize}
Christian Hospitality as a Response to the European Refugee Crisis

restoring outcasts to community. The practice of offering food and shelter to strangers and making a space for the other has deep roots in the Christian tradition. These activities, Vogt stresses, must take on the affective dimension of compassion and the concerned reflection of solidarity to bring about its end of restoration. This is how Vogt connects solidarity with hospitality. Hospitality is meant to express in very tangible ways the solidarity that is aimed at through reflection on, and because of its rootedness in compassion, experience of, the suffering of others. Hospitality saves solidarity from abstractions and idealism. However, before I launch more deeply into discussions on hospitality as a response, I felt it was necessary to pay closer attention to the crisis of the current refugee situation evidenced in one part by the lack of solidarity being shown to Syrian refugees. If as Vogt says “the virtue of compassion is a prerequisite for the ability to develop solidarity,” then a lack of solidarity can be attributed to a lack of compassion. In the next section I will attempt to discuss what I perceive to be the origins of this lack of compassion, particularly in the wake of such large-scaled suffering.

A Lack of Compassion, a Lack of Solidarity

When UN spokesman for Ban Ki-moon, Stephane Dujarric urged that “refugees deserved compassion” he was appealing specifically to the Danish government and its action on the part of the parliament to approve legislation making it permissible to “confiscate asylum seekers’ valuables [up to one thousand euros and more] to pay for their upkeep.” The Danish government in defending its action said the policy “brings refugees in line with unemployed Danes, who also face having to sell assets above a certain level to claim benefits.” Dujarric however implored the Danish political community to bear in mind that “people who have suffered tremendously, who have escaped war and conflict, who've literally walked hundreds of kilometers if not more and put their lives at risk by crossing the Mediterranean should be treated with compassion and respect, and within their full rights as

19Ibid. This will be outlined in more detail in the section on hospitality.
refugees.”

Given Dujarric’s statement in which he outlines the general background from which many Syrians arrive in Europe, one would think that a feeling of compassion for the refugees and their plight would be a likely response. So how does one explain the adverse public responses to the presence of refugees in Europe, for example, the absolute refusal to take refugees, anti-migrant protests by political movements and even more direct physical abuses like arson attacks on refugee accommodation? I turn now to disability theologian Thomas Reynolds and his view on compassion and what hinders it to present an informed perspective on the lack of compassion in the present circumstances. I opted for a disability perspective to support my belief because much reflection has taken place in this area on the factors that contribute to a lack of compassion exhibited to persons in highly-vulnerable situations.

The Different Other Scares Me

Disability theologian Thomas Reynolds offers the following definition for compassion in his Vulnerable Communion: “to undergo, feel or suffer with another.” He expands that it is a “sympathetic attunement … that desires another’s well-being, works to alleviate suffering and expand joy.” This idea of “sympathetic attunement” Reynolds draws from Stanley Hauerwas’ reading of Adam Smith’s sympathy. Sympathy requires an “imaginative leap,” Reynolds explains, that facilitates the undergoing of another’s suffering as if it were one’s own. Thus, insofar as one is able to recognize oneself in the suffering of the other sympathy can arise. Reynolds states that sympathy in this way is viewed “intuitively as a kind of reflex.” From the discussion in the previous section, however, the view that compassion is an intuitive kind of reflex response to another’s


22 Ibid., p. 126.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.
suffering is seriously challenged. Reynolds is very much aware of the reality of unsympathetic attitudes and behaviors toward persons who suffer especially from his vantage point of writing about persons with disabilities. These unsympathetic behaviors he attributes to a lack of imagination which takes place when one cannot see oneself in the other. Reynolds states “where sympathy runs aground is in the encounter with another whose difference exceeds our imaginative power to share.” When the other is perceived as foreign or a stranger, persons become unsure of who they are and can no longer see themselves as connected to the other. This felt lack of connection is accompanied by thoughts meant to distance oneself from the other. The other is inherently flawed and unable to reciprocate and “tactics of exclusion” are employed.

The Vulnerable Other Scares Me

Another inhibitor to compassion, for Reynolds, is suffering, which is interesting to note since he describes compassion as being able to “suffer with another.” Reynolds draws from Hauerwas’ Suffering the Retarded: Should we prevent Retardation? to refer to a particular kind of suffering, the kind that human beings find difficult to integrate and thus accept. This type of suffering is not specified by Reynolds and appears to differ from person to person, but what remains common in his view is the instinctive need we have as human beings to avoid this kind of suffering by escaping from it. Continuing to cite Hauerwas, Reynolds writes that these acts of avoidance can also lead to “dehumanizing ways of living with others.” According to Reynolds, not only do we exclude those persons who we believe may cause such suffering, we also marginalize those who in our minds represent the kind of suffering we find difficult to integrate, the kind of suffering that makes us uncomfortable. For Reynolds, our discomfort in suffering lies with the fact that we do not want to admit to our fundamental vulnerability as human beings. He states: “refusing to own up to our vulnerability cultivates an aversion to

26Ibid., p. 127.
27Ibid., pp. 127-128.
28Ibid., p. 109.
difference. This, in turn, yields ideologies of exclusion and violence, for prejudice is nourished by fear."

In similar vein, though not exclusively from a disability perspective, writers Henri Nouwen, Donald McNeill and Douglas Morrison in their *Compassion: A Reflection on the Christian Life*, reflect on what hinders a show of compassion. They discuss how seeing others in powerless situations of dreadful, human suffering causes persons to face their own powerlessness which many would rather reject: “Confrontation with human pain often creates anger instead of care, irritation instead of sympathy and even fury instead of compassion.”

“What can I really do?” often seems to be the response when one witnesses others in such situations of suffering.

Additionally, if the other’s suffering is so severe to the point where his/her humanity is deprived, persons are also less likely to show compassion to the other. This is because the ability to identify with the person as another human being is undermined. The authors write:

Some of the lowest human drives are brought into the open by a confrontation with miserable-looking people … this was the case in the Nazi, Vietnamese, and Chilean concentration camps, where torture and cruelty seemed easier the worse the prisoners looked.

Following Reynolds, Nouwen, McNeill and Morrison’s thesis about our fear of vulnerability, is it any wonder that a bombardment of images of Syrians in undignified, helpless conditions of suffering via the media would work to hinder a show of compassion to them? Could there be a way of integrating both the difference and vulnerability of the other so that it does not evoke fear, and “exclusionary tactics” in us, thus preventing the ability to feel along with others as they suffer? The tradition of Christian hospitality seems to be grounded in this belief. Directed specifically toward the care of vulnerable strangers, Christian hospitality requires alternative con-

31Ibid.
ceptions of difference and vulnerability in order for it to be effected. The next section will specifically address this aspect of Christian hospitality using Christine Pohl’s excursus into the tradition.

**Christian Hospitality and the Vulnerable Stranger**

Christine Pohl’s research on the history of the tradition of Christian hospitality reveals a “distinctive emphasis on offering welcome to the most vulnerable” which began to be articulated in the fourth century. Pohl states that this articulation was meant in part, to extend the Hebrew concept of hospitality existent in ancient Israel where hospitality took on utmost importance owing to its grand covenant narrative. According to this narrative, Abraham as a founding father was called by God to “be a stranger in a foreign land” and his descendants were also foreigners and slaves in a land “not theirs.” Eventually, the descendants would come to be rescued by God from their oppression in a foreign land to occupy their own land, but were still to see themselves as strangers and sojourners because the land ultimately belonged to the Lord, and they were only living in it because of God’s graciousness. From this worldview, a relationship of “dependence, faithfulness, gratitude and obedience” developed and “provided an experiential basis from which Israelites could know the feelings and needs of sojourners and powerless people living in their midst.”

Hence, the presence of protective legislation for the stranger, who usually ended up vulnerable, marginalized and subject to exploitation because of his/her landlessness in ancient Israel. Pohl refers to the laws in Leviticus 19 on the alien:

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37 Pohl explains that in the agrarian societal system of ancient Israel, land which was considered a highly valuable asset was distributed by inheritance. Because of the alien’s landlessness, he/she was seen as vulnerable and
When an alien resides with you in your land, you shall not oppress the alien. The alien who resides with you shall be to you as the citizen among you; you shall love the alien as yourself, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt.38

According to Pohl, this notion of alien identity would persist as an important component of Christian identity. Jesus was both a gracious recipient and provider of hospitality and welcoming the stranger meant welcoming Jesus. Alien identity was used to transcend national, ethnic differences in the community, and to form the disposition of the early Christians who spread the gospel by journeying from place to place depending on the hospitality of others. Considering oneself as an alien meant keeping a light hold on possessions. Later, the central liturgical celebration of the Christian community, the Eucharist, was considered a meal of welcome signifying God’s hospitality to come in the Kingdom.

By the fourth century, not only were Christians practicing this concept of hospitality, but leaders were also attempting to distinguish Christian hospitality from Hellenistic and Roman practices, where hospitality became associated with benefit and reciprocity.39 Two New Testament texts would become foundational for the early church in this regard, Luke 14:12-14, where Jesus instructs his followers, “when you give a feast invite the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind, and you will be blessed … You will be repaid at the resurrection of the just,”40 and Matt 25:31-46 where Jesus is established as explicitly one with the vulnerable, and powerful consequences are outlined for hospitality or its reverse, exclusion:

for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me … Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of powerless and grouped along with others considered vulnerable in society, like the poor and widows. For more, see Pohl, Making Room, p. 28.

38 Lv. 19, NRSV.
39 Pohl cites Lactantius, Jerome, Chrysostom, and later on Calvin as all being critical of this ‘ambitious’ form of hospitality. See, Pohl, “Responding to Strangers,” p. 91.
40 Pohl, Making Room, p. 20.
the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me.41

A concept of hospitality as “extending to strangers a quality of kindness usually reserved for friends and family [developed], but the focus was on strangers in need, the ‘lowly and abject.’”42

Over the years, Pohl observes a watering-down of Christian hospitality where it eventually became stripped of its moral implications and its connection to vulnerable strangers. She attributes a variety of reasons to this ranging from the growth of institutions, to the changing church-state relationship, to changes in the socio-economic climate, to the transformation of the household which was formerly the center for activities of hospitality.43 However, she maintains that the idea of Christian hospitality as morally significant and geared toward the care of vulnerable strangers was never entirely lost. Such practices of Christian hospitality can still be detected, she shows, in specific communities like the religious communities of the Benedictines where care for strangers is outlined as part of the Rule, and other communities that cater to persons with disabilities, for example.

As I have attempted to show with the help of Pohl, a different concept of the stranger and vulnerability governs Christian hospitality. This is primarily because of a different conceptualization of identity. The Christian community’s identity was an alien identity, in continuation with ancient Israel’s, and was formed around a loving God who saves the powerless. In this way, the stranger is not a stranger to the community, but rather one with the community, since all were to see themselves as aliens, strangers in a land ultimately possessed by the creator God. Additionally, in this worldview, the approach to vulnerability is also different. The vulnerable circumstances of the stranger were not shied away from or a cause of fear. The memory of having been saved by God from past situations of suffering protected against an absolute angst of suffering and impelled persons outward toward vulnerable others. Additionally, the tradition provided stories of divine blessings or divine presence

41Pohl, “Responding to Strangers,” p. 92.
42Ibid.
43Pohl, Making Room, pp. 34-36.
made available to persons who extended hospitality to vulnerable strangers.44 The hope of future blessings, particularly the blessing of divine presence further encouraged one towards others who suffer.

One critique that might be advanced against the attempt to use this model of hospitality for the contemporary context might be the distinct differences between a pre-modern and modern/postmodern worldview. In fact, as Pohl herself admitted in her research, there has been a major shift from this pre-modern understanding of Christian hospitality to what it is largely understood nowadays. For this reason, I turn to postcolonial author, Édouard Glissant. In his understandings of identity, he too envisions alternative conceptions to difference and vulnerability, conceptions divorced from fear, which I believe can support a modern-day appraisal of this rich, ancient tradition of Christian hospitality.

Revisioning Identity: Insights from Édouard Glissant

The Difference of Identity

Édouard Glissant’s oeuvre primarily covers themes such as identity, alterity and difference locating him within a postcolonial genre. However he makes a divergence in his approach to difference and identity as compared with some of his contemporaries who

44Ibid., pp. 24-26. Pohl also cites as foundational to the Christian tradition of hospitality the biblical narratives of Genesis 18 about Abraham, Sarah and the three angels disguised as guests they welcomed, and 1 Kings 17 and 2 Kings 4:9 about the blessings showed to the women who gave hospitality to the prophets Elijah and Elisha.

45Édouard Glissant has been established within francophone literary circles as one of the greatest writers and thinkers of our time. He writes from the specificity of the Caribbean experience, where he has used this locus to engage in global discourse. He is best known for his idea of a relational identity poetics based on the concept of creolité/creolization. Creolization refers to the complex, multiple interactions resulting in the pluralities that make up the Caribbean space. For more see Glissant’s official website, Édouard Glissant, “Une pensée archipelique,” http://www.edouardglissant.fr/creolisation2010.html [accessed 5 June 2016].
visualized this difference in terms of oppositions or lack. In his *Poetics of Relation*, Glissant envisions a difference that transcends the boundaries of exclusion and dualisms, boundaries that inevitably emerge when difference is seen from the perspective of the subject. This perspective is for Glissant a totalizing form of identity built around a single entity, (an identity of the root). He cites identity built around the nation state as an example of this. Instead, he conceives of difference in terms of processes and “active forces” occurring through the interactions and relations of multiple entities “in the really livable world.” This is a positive difference. Glissant, like a number of other Caribbean scholars of his time draws from aspects of chaos theory to scientifically expound on his reflections of

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47 Ibid., p. 125.

48 Root identity and Rhizome identity are two main metaphors used in Glissant’s writings to refer to two opposing conceptualizations of identity. Root identity is an essentialist notion of identity based on “a singular autonomous origin [meant to justify] … a neocolonialist nationalism that serves the interests of a new indigenous ruling elite …” This is contrasted with Glissant’s notion of identity as rhizomed based on the image of multiple roots that “reach out to meet other roots” and symbolizes identity inherent to creolization. For more on this comparison see Celia Britton, *Édouard Glissant and Postcolonial Theory: Strategies of Language and Resistance* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999), p. 18.


50 Burns, *Contemporary Caribbean Writing and Deleuze*, p. 125.

51 Glissant, *Poetics of Relation*, p. 28.


53 Most distinguished by the term “butterfly effect,” chaos theory is described as a ‘new science’ emerging from the seventies that sought to understand and describe seemingly random or complex systems within reality that are characterized by irregular behavior. Its key features consist in the concepts of non-linear change, determinism and unpredictability. See, Edward Lorenz, *The Essence of Chaos* (Washington: UCL Press, 1993).
Caribbean society.\textsuperscript{54} Particularly helpful is the theory’s understanding of differential repetition which highlights the infinitesimal differences occurring in reiterations within phenomena that appear inconsequential but that eventually account for “significant transformations over time.”\textsuperscript{55} This difference constitutive of phenomena accounts for its slow yet significant transformations over time. In the same light, Glissant perceives the difference constitutive of identity. The infinitesimal differences that constitute identity allow identity to be conceived of in terms of relation. He coins the term \textit{Relation} identity, to describe this. This \textit{Relation} identity is simultaneously comprised of chaos. Glissant refers to this as the \textit{chaos-monde}.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Relation} identity is always emerging and expanding towards a \textit{chaos-monde} totality.\textsuperscript{57} Difference, in this scheme, is not subordinated to a preexisting, stable identity.\textsuperscript{58} Difference ought to be protected, states Glissant, “Diversity, the quantifiable totality of every possible difference, is the motor driving universal energy [of \textit{Relation}] and it must be safeguarded from assimilations, from fashions passively accepted as the norm, and from standardized customs.”\textsuperscript{59}

In Glissant’s perspective, because, there is no stable, preexisting identity from which to view the other and the other is considered as constitutive of one’s identity, our relations in “the really livable world” become important. Our identity, according to Glissant, is constantly being expanded through these relations. The destabilization of identity felt when one encounters the other is not something to fear. We do not lose our identities in relations with the other. To further explain this I will highlight another of Glissant’s ideas about identity, the \textit{opacité}/opacity of identity. This describes not just the make-up of

\textsuperscript{54}Murray-Román, “Re-reading the Diminutive,” pp. 20-36.
\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{56}Burns, \textit{Contemporary Caribbean Writing and Deleuze}, p. 124.
\textsuperscript{57}Betsy Wing in her translation of \textit{Poetics} writes that \textit{chaos-monde} is just one of the identities of the world for Glissant. She opts not to translate the term since it would lose its effect in English. He also coins the terms \textit{totalité-monde} and \textit{echos-monde} to refer to how this world is experienced. She translates, “the world is totality, echoes, and chaos, all at once, depending on our many ways of sensing and addressing it.” See Glissant, \textit{Poetics of Relation}, pp. 216-217.
\textsuperscript{58}Burns, \textit{Contemporary Caribbean Writing and Deleuze}, p. 124.
\textsuperscript{59}Glissant, \textit{Poetics of Relation}, p. 30.
our Relation identities but also offers non-exclusionary strategies for relating with the difference that forms our identities.

The Opacity of Identity

As an alternative to the adoption of exclusionary strategies against the other, Glissant proffers opacity. Glissant states: “ambiguity, discontinuity, traces, and remembering, creolization, with its unpredictable results, are not signs of weakness … multiculturalism is not disorder, not extinction ....” Glissant holds this positive position because for him at the core of each of our identities is opacity. Murdoch quoting from Eric Prieto further explicates the term:

the zone of opacity of any individual or community is something that cannot be communicated, that part of its identity which remains inaccessible to outsiders. Glissant uses the term opacity to designate the fundamental core of our identity; opacity is the guarantee of our individuality. Not only is it the basis of identity, Glissant puts opacity forward as “a key praxis” for relationships between individuals and communities. Opacity is a right that must be preserved.

Another main concept in Glissant’s thought centers around the Caribbean experience of creolization. This is distinguished from hybridity or métissage, terms that usually refer to the crossbreeding of two elements. The creolization process which Glissant observes from his reflection on the Caribbean experience refers to “the coming into contact of several cultures or at least of several elements of various cultures, in a specific world-space, and resulting in a new reality, one completely unforeseeable in terms of the sum total or the synthesis of these elements.” See H. Adlai Murdoch on Glissant, “Édouard Glissant’s Creolized World Vision: From Resistance to Opacité,” Callaloo 36 (2013), p. 879.


Ibid. See Murdoch on Eric Prieto’s conception of Glissant’s opacity.

Ibid.

Glissant, Poetics of Relation, p. 120.
because opacity is the core of identity, mutual “opacities can coexist and converge weaving.”

I thus can conceive of the opacity of the other for me without reproach for my opacity for him. To feel in solidarity with him or to build with him or to like what he does, it is not necessary for me to grasp him. It is not necessary to try to become the other (to become other) nor to make him in my image.

A New Identity Emerging from Inhumanity

Glissant’s ideas on identity also offer some promise for dealing with the fear wrought from encountering others in their vulnerability. As Stanka Radović points out in her explorations into Glissant’s *Relation*, identification with the suffering of peoples of other cultures is possible because all cultures and peoples have had to emerge from situations of devastation at some point or other. Glissant employs a method of deliberately stimulating the memory of a very specific moment in time for a specific group of persons that is fraught with suffering, human decimation and chaos. The memory he invokes is of the experience of the Transatlantic Slave Trade through which many were brought to the Caribbean region. This, he does, in the opening poem of his *Poetics*, “The Open Boat,” the aim of which is to highlight the reality of *Relation* born out of this chaos:

The first dark shadow was cast by being wrenched from their everyday, familiar land … The second dark of night fell as tortures and the deterioration of person … Imagine vomit, naked flesh … the dead slumped, the dying crouched … But that is nothing yet … the belly of this boat dissolves you, precipitates you into a non-world from which you cry out … Although you are alone in this suffering you share in the unknown with others whom you have yet to know. This boat
is a womb, a matrix and yet it expels you. This boat: pregnant
with as many dead as living under sentence of death.\textsuperscript{68}

In triggering this memory, Glissant intends to create a cosmos
gony from an abyss, in so doing linking these beginnings with the
beginnings of other cultures/civilizations which would have started
from a similar kind of chaos or void.\textsuperscript{69} He then demonstrates how the
act of the slave-trade already pulled entities into relations beyond
their own specific territories.\textsuperscript{70} Additionally, the knowledge of those
who survived the boat suffering becomes a shared knowledge among
survivors and “entails an exchange and translation beyond just one
culture.”\textsuperscript{71} Fundamental to this conception of abyss, identity and
relations is the promise of something new. Radović shows how
Glissant creates a new people from his myth of origin that breaks the
stronghold connection between identity and exclusionary genealogies
and filiations. Glissant further demonstrates that a “relation and
deeper knowledge can be born from such pain.”\textsuperscript{72} “His slave ship
remains a historical fact and a poetic image”\textsuperscript{73} that heralds hope.

**A Relation of Christian Hospitality?**

The connections between Glissant’s *Relation* identity and
Christian hospitality may not be readily identifiable. I will therefore
attempt to highlight how practices of Christian hospitality can be
developed from Glissant’s thought. Firstly, in terms of reimagining
possibilities for positively encountering the suffering and vulner-
ability of others, Glissant proposes the deliberate stirring of collective
memories, convinced that in so doing all will find common ground,
because our beginnings were all rooted in stories of suffering. Remember-
ning that Israel was rescued from suffering and delivered into their
own land by God was fundamental to the hospitality framework of
ancient Israel and early Christian communities. This memory was
evoked through biblical narratives and laws. For Glissant the memory

\textsuperscript{68} Glissant, *Poetics of Relation*, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{69} Radović and Glissant, “The Birthplace of Relation,” p. 477.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 478.
\textsuperscript{72} Radović and Glissant, “The Birthplace of Relation,” p. 479.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 480.
of suffering is not a frightening one, because he believes that one has
the opportunity to reflect on the new beginnings that emerged from
these times of suffering. He insists on keeping afloat a spirit of hope
amidst terrible circumstances. Similarly, central to the Christian
community’s reflections is the knowledge of God’s saving presence.
For both Glissant and the Christian community, identity is related to
actual human historical experiences in all their complexities as they
unfold. Most of all we are provided with the emotional acuity needed
to feel with others, to show compassion for others from the fact of
having ourselves suffered, (even if not directly). Finally, attention to
vulnerability at the level of the community protects against the power-
lessness of responding to overwhelming circumstances, like war and
the upheaval of mass groups of persons.

The second component of Glissant’s thought that I feel could be
useful for practices of Christian hospitality today is his notion of
opacity, which if we recall is what he uses to ground his idea of
identity and to offer ways of interacting with the difference of the
other. Were it not for this notion, I believe that some difficulties might
arise in incorporating Glissant’s views into a tradition of Christian
hospitality. His insistence that identity is not based around a single
root/entity may, for some, contradict the Christian notion of identity
as a people of God, or identity in Christ. However, I believe that
Glissant’s opacity should form the basis for a modern-day apprehen-
sion of the ancient Christian tradition of hospitality. To recall
Glissant’s ideas, opacity forms the basis of all our identities, providing
our identities with an incommunicable, non-transparent, mysterious
dimension. I’d like to suggest that we see this dimension as the divine
in us all. This is what lies at the heart of the Christian tradition of
openness to the guest/stranger, even without knowing the guest’s
origins. In biblical narratives, through openness, guests allowed
themselves to be surprised by the actual divine presence in the
stranger which brought blessings and fulfilled promises.

**A Christian Hospitality for Refugees**

This final section seeks to concretize the theories presented thus
far with proposals for practices of hospitality that can respond to the
crisis of a lack of solidarity on the part of some political powers in
Europe amid the refugee situation. Rather than suggest something
new however, I wish to highlight some hospitality practices already at work in the European context which I believe once sustained can have impact in the current crisis. Where I aim to make a contribution is in the process of gathering a diversity of practices together into a step by step approach specifically directed toward countering the fears driving the lack of solidarity, (the fear of the other and the fear of vulnerability). The target group for my discussions is the parish community. I believe parish communities represent small, somewhat individualized clusters that allow for the personalized action hospitality demands. At the same time, the parish offers strength and support in community, so that individuals are not burdened by the demands of hospitality. These actions on the level of parishes should be geared at some point to ecumenical action.

Let’s Talk about It

Patrice and her family open their home to refugees who are awaiting regularization and more permanent housing in France.74 They are part of a network of families and religious communities called the Welcome Project that make their homes available for refugees. The Project currently consists of about three hundred families and arose in 2009 from the French branch of the Jesuit Refugee Service JRS. What I wish to highlight is a very small part of an interview where Patrice spoke about her experience of hosting refugees. In speaking about how she came to be involved in the project she stated that she found out about it after her parish held discussions on the topic of the situation of refugees in France. She also said that she was grateful to have had that opportunity to discuss the refugee situation since it was very difficult to have had such discussions otherwise. As to why this was difficult, Patrice did not state, one can speculate about the reasons, but it provides us with the content for our first reflections on the practices of hospitality. On the level of individual parishes, opportunities can be provided to discuss the topic, including the fears persons have about it. While social media has served a great deal in

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74 The Jesuit Refugee Service JRS broadcast a series of short documentaries on its Welcome Project in France. Only first names are provided in the interviews. For more see “France Jesuit Refugee Service, Welcome Project, the host family experience,” 14 April 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHpB9JRfxHY [accessed 5 June 2016].
generating conversations about issues, oftentimes real discussions are lost in the traffic of posts. Opinions are either praised or violently ridiculed, and tend not to serve a purpose beyond the mere voicing of views. The parish meeting, however, can provide a safe place for persons to voice their fears, and at the same time, inform opinions with educated discussions driven by persons directly involved in work with refugees, or by refugees themselves. The parish meeting should also provide the forum for creatively invoking memories of common suffering aimed at remembering both the painful experiences of the community gathered and the human triumphs that occurred from such experiences. This should be connected to the greater Christian narrative of having been saved and rescued by a compassionate God. The aim of this parish meeting should ultimately be laying the ground to enable parishioners to feel compassion for those who suffer, a major step in the direction of Christian hospitality.

**Clarity the Mission**

The second practice I wish to draw comes from the disability community. Jean Vanier co-founder of the l’Arche communities for persons with disabilities in reflecting on what he perceives to be the strength of l’Arche over the past fifty years stresses the importance of clarity of mission. In summing up the mission of l’Arche, Vanier states that the mission is clear: that people with disabilities are precious and important; furthermore that every person in the community is important. This mission serves as the basis for community living, working together and being with each other.76

In my opinion, clarifying the mission follows from the fellow feeling of compassion generated through encountering each other’s vulnerability. To recall Vogt’s views on compassion, it has its own driving force that impels it toward action, the action of relieving the suffering of others. On the level of the parish community, clarity of

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75L’Arche is an international network of communities existing in over 147 countries that cater to the needs of persons with disabilities. The communities consist of both helpers and persons with disabilities who share their lives together, including meals as well as other common activities.

mission is needed to guide the movements of compassion. The mission that guides compassionate action in the context of the refugee situation is the mission of Christian hospitality; that the vulnerable stranger must be welcomed and cared for. As exactly what this entails would have to be worked out from community to community, but this is a clear mission with welcome at the heart of it. Welcome means a collective ‘yes’ is spoken to the presence of the vulnerable stranger. Without this welcome, Christian hospitality would be impossible. The tradition is replete with narratives about the different shapes welcome has taken throughout the centuries depending on the context. In other words, there are many resources to draw from. Finally, what must be driven home is that the mission is a moral imperative. It is not a matter of choice, a nice extra to be done if one feels like. This is one of the main factors that distinguishes Christian hospitality from other forms of hospitality. Other authors have addressed the importance of the moral dimension of Christian hospitality.⁷⁷

Just Do It!

Lastly, hospitality must involve actual practice, the actual reaching out to refugees in need. A face-to-face encounter is required. The parish community can offer the physical space and opportunities to facilitate such encounters. Apart from the basic needs of food and shelter, the vulnerable stranger has a need to be restored to community. After being uprooted from his/her home, restoration primarily means feeling part of a community again. Returning to our earlier example of the Welcome Project of the JRS in France, Patrice’s husband stated that after four years of opening his home to refugees what he perceived the refugees most wanted was “basic human warmth.”

One of the most daring actions of hospitality that can be offered in the present context is the opening of one’s home to a refugee. Yet, in speaking to the persons actually involved in the Project this appeared not to have been a difficult task. Words like ‘easy’, ‘not very demanding’ were used by Patrice when she related her experience.

Her son, Edward, said “it’s a great experience,” and the family said it will continue to host refugees. But to maintain that offering one’s home is an easy task could do damage to the reality of the experience, especially for those who enter into longer-termed relationships with refugees. Zoe Brennan in reflecting on her apprehension to house a refugee, cites the difficulties her parents experienced in the past when they housed refugees. She referred to it as the ‘gratitude gap.’ She explains in the words of her father, “some of them do feel terribly entitled partly because of the misery they are in, but that can be difficult if you feel they should be really grateful.”

Brennan also mentioned that when her father took in persons from Palestine some time ago they complained about the Wi-Fi and did not say thank you. Interestingly, though, she also writes that this did not stop her parents from continuing to welcome refugees into their homes.

In similar fashion, the action of Christian hospitality does not cease with ingratitude or difficulties. Vanier states that community living is difficult. There may be a lack of understanding in the encounters between different persons. But a hospitality that takes account of the opacities of guest and host allows for the right not to be understood, or for the forfeiting of expectations and opens up toward the ushering in of divine hospitality, which makes itself most present in an acknowledgement of mutual vulnerabilities, that is the vulnerability of both guest and host.

Conclusion

These three movements I have discussed may provide a powerful counter to the lack of solidarity being expressed on a political level. The most concrete expression of the coming together of the three movements is the opening up of homes to refugees. There has been increasing support for this venture throughout Europe through the involvement of a number of charity organizations, where persons agree to take refugees in as flat-mates while having their rent sponsored through donations. In some cases, the year’s rent was 78

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collected in advance. One of the best responses the Christian community can adopt is to encourage its faithful who are in a position to do so to open up their homes and lives to refugees. While I have concentrated thus far on activities at the parish level, I believe a concentrated, ecumenical effort is needed on the level of leadership in the different Christian communities in Europe to encourage the kind of hospitality that would lead to the opening of homes and lives among its faithful. The only counter to the lack of solidarity at the political level is the expression of true genuine solidarity through acts of Christian hospitality to refugees.

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Room for Refugees’ and ‘Refugees Welcome’ are two initiatives started by charity organisations for welcoming refugees into homes.


12.

Host for a Day or Host for a Lifetime:
To Ion de la Raion from Șinca Nouă

GABRIELA BLEBEA NICOLAE

Equations of Hospitality:
What the Host Provides and What the Guest Expects

Romanians self-identify as a hospitable people. Foreigners recount stories of Romanian hospitality. While it might not be true of every encounter, there are sufficient examples of Romanian hospitality for a stereotype to have been formed. It is largely true. For many Romanians are partial to a feast … a feast that will be even more special the more distinguished the guest e.g. a foreigner or someone of note. The more distinguished the guest, the more important the host! Hosts, thus, have an experience of otherness that permits them to escape, if only in the imagination, from their condition, whatever that may be. Many Romanians adore these encounters with the other. It is a way to avoid being alone. For many Romanians do not like being alone. As in any country, some Romanians have the courage to risk their own lives to provide shelter for a fugitive, the politically

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1For as long as I knew him, Ion lived off the charity of the people of the village of Șinca. He slept in their sheds. He was always on the move, being either barked at by dogs or taunted by children, who would call him “Ion de la Raion” (“John from the Raion”). He wore hand-me-down clothes. He ate food given to him by the villagers. For Ion was entirely happy in spirit. He did not know his birthday or what his surname was, he knew not of money, bed linen or cutlery. When he told me he had missed me, he had confuse the first and second person, just as in his heart he would confuse who he was with who the person before him was. He was so happy to see me that he would say “My dear, my dear little sugar cube” repeatedly, and, when he touched my hand there would be such a powerful look of joy in his cataract-ridden eyes that I, too, would be overcome with joy. Of all the people of Șinca, the one who missed me the most was Ion. He was always at my gate, hoping to find it unlocked. Ion, a man with no home, was, until he departed us, the most welcoming “soul host” in the entire village of Șinca.
persecuted or those condemned to death for all manner of invented crimes (being deemed “enemies of the people” or guilty of belonging to a given ethnic group or religion). Of course, Romanians are not the only hospitable people. The French, the Italians, the Spanish, the English are all hospitable, too. In fact almost all Europeans are. As are Africans, Asians, Americans (both North and South) and Australians, too.

Nonetheless, the equations of hospitality differ from one culture to the next. This is as true for Romanians as it is for any other people. Whatever form it takes, hospitality must first and foremost meet the condition of gratuity, for, otherwise, it becomes a commercial relationship in which the criteria by which a host is judged are entirely different. The condition of gratuity is essential, even if hospitality is also a diplomatic tool used in political alliances or as part of other strategies of persuasion. Hosting implies gratuity and willingness. It is essential that the host is willing to receive an other into his or her life, a willingness that would be without substance if the guest had no need or did not accept the conditions of the host. It is in the meeting, even if only hypothetically, of the expectations of the two parties that hospitality becomes possible. For it is always possible, at least in theory, for the expectations of each party to be so different that their accommodation is more likely to result in conflict than in satisfying a need. For instance, the host may only be willing to provide temporary, non-invasive and inexpensive hospitality, for otherwise his or her identity and status would be threatened. On the other hand, it is possible a guest will want to enjoy a longer stay and to become an integral part of the host’s life. In the latter case, the concept of hospitality itself will need to be redefined, for, by its very nature, it implies a finite temporality. We do not call it hospitality when we receive into our living space a life partner or a child. Our relationship with them is on a different level. Similarly, it is not strictly a case of hospitality when we host a close relative, even if the visit is only short. Indeed, when I receive my father into my home, he will not talk about my hospitality, however good a host I might be, except if our relationship is so distant that he has become a “stranger.”

As I have already mentioned, there can be many different equations of hospitality -- equations which, in theory at least, must take into account all of the following three elements: the host, the guest and the reason for his or her stay. It is of relevance if the host is
rich or poor, young or not so young, physically weak or, on the contrary, strong. Similarly, the guest may be young, an adult, a child or an elderly person, he or she may be feeble or at the height of his or her powers, a person of note or a nobody, or rich or poor. The host may be a community (a monastery, a village or a country), just as the guest may be a group. In most cases, we host a friend, sometimes a person unknown to us. In this article, I am concerned with the way in which we host abandoned children. Hosting them can take many forms. Sometimes it will be of a short, celebratory nature. In other cases, it will last for a longer period, rather than a short period of hospitality. In Romania, there are 70,000 abandoned children. Many Romanians believe that hosting a child for a weekend, for a short holiday or even for a longer but still limited period is “the best thing” they could do for them. I have my doubts as to the beneficial nature of such gestures and will therefore attempt an analysis based on the concepts underlying the notion of willingness, which in turn implies an understanding of freedom, which is itself dependent on an understanding of will.

The Willingness of the Host as an Exercise in Freedom

In general, no one can force me to be a guest, just as no one can force me not to be. I cannot be forced to host and, at least in principle, I cannot be forced not to host. I therefore have the freedom to choose whether to be a guest and whether to be a host. I have a freedom which, like any other freedom, is often less free in practice than it is in theory. This is not least because this freedom has been and continues to be understood in so many ways. For a long period of history, for example, freedom could only be attributed to the “man and master.” To be free was synonymous with not being a slave. Or a woman. However, if we accept that traditional slavery has been “abolished,” we can still describe as slavery, even if only metaphorically, any limitation of freedom imposed by poverty, a state of dependency or discrimination -- whatever the reason for the dependency or discrimination. It is much harder, if not impossible, for a “slave” to be either a guest or a host.

Whether we like it or not, freedom, in principle equally accessible to everyone, is, if not impossible, then at least difficult to exercise equally by all. While this can be put down to differences of religion,
gender, health and financial resources, it is perhaps especially a result of the different interpretations given by one political regime or another. Freedom of movement, for example, which is essential for a broader understanding of hospitality, is a controversial and frequently contradictory subject given the discrepancy between its practical application and declared adoption. This contradiction is clearly observable today.

I will not perform a detailed study of the different interpretations of freedom or its different forms of expression on a social, political or economic level. I will instead focus on the type of freedom that forms part of the ontological condition of man in respect of our ability to choose. To choose through an exercise of will. My brief foray into the subject of freedom, first begun by the author I am to refer to below, does not involve a theoretical analysis of the many ways in which freedom can be defined, but rather an identification of the ideas that will aid my discussion of the subject mentioned earlier: the hosting of abandoned children.

The Will as an Exercise in the Freedom of Choice

For Thomas Aquinas, the starting point in the understanding of the will is the fundamental question of whether the object of will resides in necessary or contingent things. As our own intuition confirms, we are only able to exercise choice in respect of those things that can exist in one form or another, even where we subject our choice to an understanding of what is necessary. Given the different ways in which we can interpret “necessity,” it becomes essential to the exercise of freedom and, implicitly, of will that necessity does not become the equivalent of coercion.

2Aquinas Thomas, ST I a q 83 a 1 cl: “Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum.”

3Aquinas Thomas, Op.cit. q 82 a 1, cl: “Ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogit tur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur necessitas coactionis. Haec igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat voluntati.”
The necessity to which the correctness of human choices refers primarily depends on how it relates to the attainment of the goal. For if you wish to cross the sea, says Thomas Aquinas, you must take a boat, even if you still get to choose which boat you take. Of course, you can also choose not to cross the sea, although, according to Thomas Aquinas, regardless of what you choose to do, your choice can only concern the means by which you attain your goal. Thus, our choices “on a practical level must take account of the goal, a goal which plays the same role as principle does on a theoretical level.” Clearly, a specific goal, such as crossing the sea, may itself be considered a means of achieving a more important goal, and so with each step we come closer to the final goal, the “natural goal” of every one of us: the desire “to be happy.”

This specific understanding of good coincides with what we might today call subjective truth. That is, the interpretation we give to contingent truth based on our ability to understand it. For there can be no choice without an understanding, even where erroneous, of the options available to us. Understanding these options is the preliminary act by which reason may, if not compare, then at any rate identify at least two possibilities.

Thus, to be exercised correctly, the will requires knowledge, while knowledge itself requires will, for no matter how inevitable the intellective action, the reduction or elimination of ignorance implies an act of volition. The relationship between the intellect and will, especially the issue of which the two determines the other, can be viewed as a regression to infinity, such as in the traditional question

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4Ibid.: “Necessitas autem finis non repugnat voluntati, quando ad finem non potest perveniri nisi uno modo, sicut ex voluntate transeundi mare, fit necessitas in voluntate ut velit navem.”

5Ibid.: “Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo, finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum, quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili.”

6Ibid., q 83, a 1 sol 5: “Ex eo igitur quod homo est aliqualis qualitate naturali quae attenditur secundum intellectivam partem, naturaliter homo appetit ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem.”
as to what came first: the chicken or the egg. This regression is interrupted by Aquinas to announce that it was the intellect that came first, for it is the intellect that has the task of establishing the truth.

Good itself may be the same as truth, just as, conversely, truth itself can be good. The relationship between good and truth is not purely rational, it does not rule out emotions, although these are not allowed to acquire the enslaving power of passion.

For Aquinas, will is no stranger to emotional involvement, only that the “love, desire and other emotional states” it implies do not blind it, as would passion, but rather become the subject of choices that are just as noble as those made by angels and God himself.

If man is only able to choose something that lies within his power, something that comes to him naturally, can we therefore speak of a complete freedom of choice, a kind of freedom that Thomas Aquinas, like other authors, calls free will?

The short answer is yes. We are even obliged to speak of free will because without it we would not be able to speak of responsibility, of “interdiction, reward, punishment ....” Proof of our freedom, proof of our ontological condition resides in our ability not to react implacably, like a “falling stone” or an animal whose reasoning,

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7Ibid., q 82, a 3 r ob 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio causae accipiatur secundum comparationem unius ad alterum, et in tali comparatione ratio boni principalior inventur, sed verum dicitur magis absolute, et ipsius boni rationem significat. Unde et bonum quoddam verum est. Sed rursus et ipsum verum est quoddam bonum; secundum quod intellectus res quaedam est, et verum finis ipsius. Et inter alios fines iste finis est excellenter; sicut intellectus inter alias potentias.”

8Ibid., q 82, a 5 sol 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor, concupiscencia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quaodoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatio anemi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitacione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas.”

9Ibid., q 83, a 1: “Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Glossa, idest in libertate arbitrii.”

10Ibid., q 83 a 1: “Respondeo dicendum quod homo est liberi arbitrii, alioquin frustra essent consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae.”
where it exists, is dominated by the natural instinct that causes it, for example, to run away from another, more powerful animal.\textsuperscript{11}

Man, like the stone, falls. Man, like the sheep, runs away from the wolf. But man, unlike the stone and the sheep, can overcome his natural condition through his “supernatural” condition.\textsuperscript{12} That is, through that which can be added to his physical nature or, in other words, that which his physical nature can transcend -- a nature we cannot deny or overlook, but which we are able to overcome by subjecting it to reason.

\textbf{How to Exercise your Freedom to Host or not to Host a Child}

I do not believe that Thomas Aquinas’ work on the will and, implicitly, freedom has thus far been applied in studies on the theme of hosting, in general, and the hosting of a child, in particular, and even less the hosting of abandoned children. And however unsuitable it may at first appear, this is precisely what I intend to do here. Retaining the same structure of Thomas Aquinas’ questions and answers, I will ask the same questions, albeit in this instance in direct reference to the fate of abandoned children.

Starting with the first question, I believe we can take decisions regarding the fate of abandoned children given that their destiny is not predetermined. The fact of their being abandoned, in most cases at birth, does not necessarily destine them to failure. Their biological relationship with the people not able to take responsibility for raising them and their being born to parents who have not led particularly healthy lives, neither physically nor morally, does not necessarily mean that they, the abandoned children, will turn out to be flawed.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.: ”Ad cius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quaedam agunt absque iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione carentia. Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut animalia bruta. Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali iudicio, et non libero, quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa ferri.”}

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid., q 83, a 1, sol 5: ”Ad quintum dicendum quod qualitas hominis est duplex, una naturalis, et alia superveniens.”}
individuals. We are therefore able to choose “what we do with them,” how we relate to them. While they are unable to choose, at least not rationally, we can do so because what appear to be “constraints” are in fact obstacles that merely restrict our freedom rather than nullify it. Not only are we able to choose, we also have a responsibility to do so. We can do so based on a rational analysis of the available options, options that need to be correctly identified in accordance, naturally, with the goal we have set ourselves. And here, too, the choice of means also implies knowing, wanting to know, what the priorities are.

For many, including those who make the laws in Romania, the greatest concern is to provide abandoned children with food and shelter, without which their physical lives would be in danger. In other words, our main goal is to find a host for them, however short their stay with the said host. At first sight, this would appear to be a well-chosen goal. As such, we no longer care whether the host is an institution or a family being paid to act as a host. Similarly, we view the length of the hosting period as being of secondary importance. The formula for hosting an abandoned child in Romania today would thus appear to be the right one, if all we are concerned with is providing a bed, a plate of food, clothes and toys. For by only viewing hosting from a material perspective we risk becoming indifferent (as we already are) when the “mothers” are working shifts or simultaneously taking care of 15 children of similar ages, as in the case of child placement centers, or when the foster mothers refuse to continue caring for a child, no longer wishing to “work” for said child, as in the case of foster care.

If, on the other hand, our primary concern in respect to the abandoned child is his or her emotional hosting involving long term stability, then the formula we have devised is clearly wrong. For good emotional hosting presupposes the taking of full responsibility over an indefinite period. If this is our goal, then “adoption” becomes the preferred solution … the preferred solution in the case of children who were abandoned at birth and who have not had time to establish emotional bonds with their biological families. Most abandoned children in Romania were abandoned immediately after birth. In such cases, trying to achieve the goal of “family reintegration” is like trying to grow flowers in a bed of concrete. By stubbornly making the adoptability of abandoned children legally dependent on the approval of fourth degree relatives, we create a period in which children are left
emotionally naked and hungry in the face of a hurricane. It is a trauma whose effects are, in the clear majority of cases, extremely difficult to reverse. Therefore, the hosting of a child, any child, should prioritize the emotional side of hosting. It should be free (i.e. not dependent on a salary), long term and with the same reference person. In my opinion, this must be our priority if we want to know the truth about the physical and psychological traumas caused by each day of neglect, indifference and rejection during the period of abandonment. It is, first and foremost, an act of will to want to know how the brains of abandoned children do not develop, how their physical growth is, in general, stunted, how the first years in the life of a human being are crucial for his or her subsequent life.

My conviction in this matter is shared by all those concerned with the fate of abandoned children. None, however, have used Thomas Aquinas’ text about the will as part of their reasoning. Indeed, most of these authors employ arguments from the fields of sociology, psychology and medicine. Many of us show no interest in these arguments and treat abandoned children as if they are the victims of fate (“they were destined to be that way”) or the failures of social integration (“like father, like son” for the “apple does not fall far from the tree”). I accept that my reference to Thomas Aquinas may seem unsuitable, may seem to be far too abstract vis-à-vis the practical subject of the parental hosting of abandoned children. But however abstract “Thomas Aquinas’ position” might appear, I believe it can be applied in the case of this subject that concerns me so much, because the reality has shown me that we are apt to forget what Thomas Aquinas considered fundamental to making a good choice: the establishment of the goal. Just as we also forget that a good choice necessarily implies a thorough knowledge of the available options, with all the attendant causes and effects. It is my feeling that we are more concerned with finding a simple, partial, superficial solution and that we are overwhelmed by ignorance, momentary passions and pride -- that is, everything that stops us from making a correct choice. And we are therefore laying the foundations of a situation with serious long term consequences without seeking a solution more in tune with the human condition.
The Quality of Being Human

When engaged in philosophical discussion we are rarely able to avoid referring to metaphysics. Whether discussing what we can know, what we can hope for, what we should do and so forth, we cannot ignore the fundamental question of what we are. The answer to this question to a greater or lesser extent determines the answers to all the other questions. Just as all the questions identified by Kant are intimately related to one another. Considering this, in this article the main question I pose is this: “In what way do we define ourselves as people through the act of hosting?” Through committed, responsible, sincere, non-manipulative, free and indefinite hosting? As implicit in the condition of being a parent? As implicit in the condition of being an adoptive parent with all the greater challenges that involves?

Whatever the case, the approach taken implies different perspectives. Theoretically, these approaches can be extremely impressive. In practice, however, I firmly believe that the proof of a person’s “human” quality is given by the way he or she engages in interpersonal relationships. Naturally, except for anchorites. For this reason, I believe that God is most concerned with the way we treat the other, which is intrinsically related to the way in which we treat ourselves. Indeed, viewed from the standpoint of taking responsibility for the other, the condition of being a parent becomes an important “test.” One that becomes more difficult if the child you accept as your own is biologically not yours. Adoption is a difficult test because through it you take on the task of washing away the shame of an indifferent world and the cynicism of a world more concerned with finding bureaucratic solutions to human lives than with promoting responsible involvement. It is highly probable that as an adoptive parent you will become a lightning rod for the diffusion of storms that have accumulated in time, even beginning with the moment of conception. It is highly probable that you will need to demonstrate that, despite all the challenges, which are frequently much greater than expected, you are maintaining your commitment. And, however difficult it may seem, you will be happy to do so. It is not easy but, ontologically speaking, as a means of exceeding your own limitations, I believe this hosting is fully worth the effort if only because, in so doing, you will be able to show that every human being, and more so someone in difficulty, is, in a very personal way, also in your care.
Bibliography

Epilogue
How Should Immigrants Be Received?
Some Christian Social Proposals

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Hospitality, Ambiguous Term

Migration is a structural phenomenon of our contemporary society. Neither the eruption of international terrorism, nor the policies that restrict people’s free circulation have managed to impede or diminish the migration phenomenon. Today’s economic discrepancies, demographic disproportions, the unsolved social and political conflicts at the European and international levels, are sufficient reasons to make one think that the migration of various populations will only increase.¹

Due to their precarious situation and to their ambiguous nature, immigrants stir fear among those that host them. Indeed, depending on the hospitality of the host, the immigrant can become attractive or repulsive, destructive or civilizing. Jean Daniélou claimed “civilization made a decisive step, maybe the decisive step, on the day in which the enemy (hostis) turned into a guest (hospes), namely the day in which the human community was created.”² It is true that hospitality and hostility both derive from one and the same etymon, while the difference is made by the extent of hospitality. When excessive, vain, unbalanced, possessive, hospitality can become an impediment in the foreigner’s attempt to integrate him or to return to his home. True hospitality is tempered by the harmony between identity and otherness. How could we manage this kind of harmony?

The encounter between a guest and a person or a people that offers hospitality may become a failure either because of the social vulnerability in which the guest finds himself, or because of the host’s

¹See Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, the Instruction “The Love of Christ towards Migrants [“Erga migrantes caritas Christi”]” (Vatican City, 2004), “Introduction.”
tendency towards excess. Bearing in mind these two factors of the guest-host relationship, we notice that nowadays there is taking shape, especially in Europe, a certain model of hospitality, which could be labelled as “the hospitality of the lonely.” According to this pattern hospitality is no longer an opportunity to meet the other in his otherness, but rather the encounter of one’s own ego in the other. If in the Greek and Hebrew antiquity the guest was a kind of god, and hospitality was a sacred duty, today the guest is considered an intruder, a trespasser on one’s privacy, and therefore he ought to be treated with contempt or disregard. The guests of today are called immigrants and they are offered hospitality with a sense of regret, since they have been imposed as guests, and are, therefore, undesired, unwelcome, and parasites.

The phrase “compulsory refugee quotas” used today in political discussions throughout Europe reveals yet another distorted aspect of the act of hospitality, namely a forced or stolen hospitality. In this context, the friendly relationship between identity and otherness turns into the relation between invader and invaded. Today’s guests are foreigners “shipwrecked” in all respects, since they are imposed as guests. They risk living forever as strangers in the loneliness of an absolute exile, even if they gather in larger or smaller religious and linguistic groups amidst the majority.

Nevertheless, unchecked hospitality affects not only the relation with the other, but also the relation with oneself. The host becomes a stranger in his own home; his fatherland, town, domestic spaces become awkward spaces, restrictive and unfriendly, and the host cannot but emigrate. The mark of a migrating host is the rented house, the hotel room, and a space that signifies freedom, autonomy, the existential temporality and the lack of constraints. In France, many churches and museums are presently being closed, in Hungary security enclosures have been raised at the border, in Poland people support a similar border enclosure to be raised at the Ukrainian border, in Denmark the Schengen agreement has been suspended.

What does all this mean? While experiencing the sharp feeling of being torn apart between inclusion and exclusion, the nations that are...

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hosts to the immigrants who come to Europe reject the idea of living at home as in an exile and strive to shelter themselves from the danger of becoming uprooted and alienated.

So, today’s foreigner -- guest or host -- can only come home, to himself and to the gift of hospitality, if he manages to discover a way towards transcendence or towards the other. This way has always been recommended by religion and promoted by culture. Unfortunately, the predominant current religious attitudes in Europe have the scent of a museum, nationalist and egoistic perfume, and cultural attitudes have become more and more those of an entertainment culture. The causes are complex. But, going beyond these critical

4Religion is still very present in social life; many political leaders respect the Church and support its religious programs. At European level, there are financing programs for the restoration of churches that are historical monuments and for their inclusion in the cultural European tourism. See Mario Vargas Llosa, *The Civilization of the Show* (Civilizația spectacolului [2012]), translation into Romanian by Marin Mălaicu-Hondrari, București: Humanitas 2016), p. 170. For instance, in Romania religious education is financed by the State.

5The products of past cultures meant to transcend the time and to reach the next generations; nevertheless, the products of the *entertainment culture* are consumed instantaneously and vanish immediately after. For the first time, we are witnessing a worldwide phenomenon in which all the countries take part regardless of their traditions, religious beliefs or political systems. For the new *entertainment culture*, the only things that matter are industrial production and commercial success. Once the former culture disappeared, the concept of value has vanished as well. The only valid criterion for distinguishing among the products of the *entertainment culture* is the market price. See Frédéric Martel, *The Mainstream Culture* (Paris: Flammarion, 2010).

6Culture is not the sum of entertaining activities, or of technical and scientific knowledge. Being a daughter of religion, culture manifests itself as a life style, as a way of being in which both the form and the content are equally significant. It is primarily taught within one’s family and Church. Whenever these two institutions cease to function as they should, the immediate result is the degradation of culture. See Llosa, *The Civilization of the Show*, pp. 9-28.

In the context of globalization, there is frequently mentioned the disappearance of high, elitist culture, and its substitution with a new form -- a culture of the masses -- the world-culture, as Gilles Lipovetsky and Jean Serroy label it. The foundation of this global culture incorporates certain cultural common denominations in which societies and individuals from all
aspects of today's religion and of contemporary culture, to find the human or civilized form of hospitality, I shall move back to the religious roots of hospitality and I shall explain them.

The Biblical Roots of Hospitality

Hospitality is a fundamental Christian virtue, and yet it is not just specific to Christianity. It is to be found in any of the world's cultures, from Babylon to China, from India to Australia. Christian hospitality has its roots in the Hebrew culture. Here we find four terms, which denote the foreigner as guest: gher -- the residing foreigner, nekâr -- the occasional foreigner, nokri -- the foreigner who belongs to a different social group, and zar -- the foreigner, who from an ethnical and collective point of view, represents a menace. Those who translated the Hebrew Bible into Greek (LXX) have employed the term prosèlytos (proselite) or pàroikos (neighbour) for gher; for nokri they used xènos (foreigner) or allòtrios (other/another); for zar they chose allogenès (the one who belongs to a different people or ethnical group). All these terms can be found in the New Testament where xènos appears twenty-one times; this term became the root of filoxenia (Cf. Rom 12:13; Heb 13:2), philoxenos (Cf. 1 Tim 3:2; Tit 1:8; 1 Pet 4:9) and xenodochèo; (Cf. 1 Tim 5:10) all these terms refer to receiving a foreigner, i.e. they contain the idea of hospitality.

Of all these words, the noun gher from the Hebrew Bible has the closest meaning to our current term immigrant. It refers to a person who moves to a foreign country to live there, to work, to learn the local

over the world can participate, independent of their tradition, religion or language. A characteristic feature of this world-culture is the pre-eminence of the image and of the sound over the word. Their access to cultural products is no longer conditioned by an intellectual formation or by a certain specialization. By means of the Internet and of television, publicity and fashions overcome any barriers and place their cultural products within the reach of anyone. The vicious effect of cultural democracy is that this new type of culture has brought about the emergence and development of an aggressive individualism. Indeed, instead of promoting the individual, the world-culture deprives him of judgment and of free will, determining him to behave in a gregarious manner. Cf. Gilles Lipovetsky / Jean Serroy, The World-Culture. An Answer for a Confused Society (La culture-monde. Réponse à une société désorientée, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008).
language, and to observe the laws of the country which hosts him and -- at times -- to embrace the religious creed of that country. Of all biblical books Deuteronomy is the one in which we have the most frequent occurrences of the term *gher*, and contains a systematic and exhaustive development of the theological vision of the foreigner as immigrant. In summary, Deuteronomy states that the foreigner is part of the people, enjoys all the rights reserved for those considered “disadvantaged,” such as Levites, orphans and widows, and benefits from all the material support he needs to survive -- support sourced from taxes collected at the Israelite temples. Deuteronomy shows an opening towards immigrants of any kind, and the immigrants enjoy a privileged relation with the Jewish people.

The Bible, however, lacks a coherent and uniform discourse on the attitude towards foreigners. From a theological point of view, the foreigner is par excellence the place of God’s revealing himself. From a historical point of view, the foreigner is a being protected by God (Cf. Ps 146:9), on the one hand, and on the other hand, as the enemy which the King of Israel will break “with a rod of iron,” will dash “into pieces like a potter’s vessel” (Ps 2:9). Nevertheless, the Bible contains a progressive series of statements that, beginning with the Old Testament and continuing with the New Testament, end by supporting the idea that human beings are human beings if they are hospitable, if no one among them feels himself a foreigner in the eyes

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8 Immigrants enjoy the protection of the Jewish law, therefore they have rights: to be treated impartially in tribunal, to satisfy their primordial existential necessities; to be loved; to labor on the domains of an Israelite; to equal payment; to become an Israelite, if they belong to the third generation born in the land of Israel, and if they accept to be circumcised. The integrated immigrants have the right to pay their debts without interest, to preserve their traditional cuisine, to participate in the sacred liturgies, except the Passover, to rest on the Sabbath day. The immigrant is an immigrant no matter to which group he belongs. The immigrants remain foreigners, welcomed people, and yet they live and work completely integrated within the people of Israel. The Israelite is blessed if he helps the immigrants. See Bruscolotti, *The Foreigner Helps Us*, pp. 66-70.
of the others, both at the level of personal relations and from a political and cultural point of view.

The first name, which in the biblical reflection appears about hospitality, is Abraham, the man whom God commanded to come out of his own land (Cf. Gen 12:1). As a prefiguration of the Jewish people’s nature and model of existence, Abraham never came back into his land of origin and remained forever a gher wetoshâb (a foreigner and a resident), as he presented himself at Horeb when asking for a piece of land to bury his wife, Sarah (Cf. Gen 23:4). Although a foreigner himself, Abraham in his turn received other foreigners as well, as we can read in the Book of Genesis Chapter 18, where the Bible describes the warm welcome made by the patriarch to the three unknown visitors. The image of Abraham, the hospitable one, reached the New Testament, which reminds us to be hospitable always (Cf. Heb 13:2). As an example of a hospitable man, Abraham plays a paradigmatic role not only at a personal level, but also at a political and cultural one. Abraham embodies the pacifist perspective of the relations between Israel and the neighboring people, in accordance with the nature of God as seen in the Book of Genesis, who is not a nationalistic God, but a God who lives with us.

The second name is a collective one, referring to the descendants of Abraham, i.e. the Israelite people, who will remember that they themselves had been foreigners during their exodus from Egypt, on Mount Sinai, and while entering the Promised Land. Thus, God, who freed the Jews from Egyptian slavery, will become a constitutive part of Israel’s profession of faith, of the text that is considered to be the first Hebrew Creed: “A wandering Aramean was my father, and he went down into Egypt … the Lord, the God of our fathers … brought us out of Egypt … and gave us this land” (Deut 26:5-9). On Mount Sinai, the freed immigrant is called to love the immigrant, who comes and abides with him, always remembering that he himself had been an immigrant in Egypt (Cf. Exod 20:20; Lev 19:33-34; Deut 24:17-18). When they enter the Promised Land, Israel learns that the land is not theirs but God’s and they are foreigners and God’s guests (Cf. Lev 25:23). “Strangers and guests” (gherim wetoshabim) means that the Israelites cannot own that land and cannot become rooted in one place, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the fact that they are not allowed to own the land and to become rooted in a certain place does not mean anything less (as the gnostic, dualist, existentialist or
romantic interpreters claim), but on the contrary something more which reveals the horizon of gratuitousness and grace. He, who lives in the horizon of gratuitousness, lives in accordance with the logic of the gift, i.e. the logic of freedom. In other words, Israel is guest in a double sense, receptive and active: guest, since he is the guest of God, and as the guest of God, as he is expected to become hospitable towards others who bear the likeness of God. The awareness of this double aspect of hospitality, namely that of a people who are the guest of God and of a people hospitable towards others, is known as justice (zēdaqā) and is the synthesis of the Jewish culture.

What the Bible says about Israel, however, is also valid for any human being from any place and from any time. All people and all nations are the guests of God, guests expected to offer the other people hospitality in a responsible and just way. This is the ideal of biblical man, as in the concrete reality he senses that he is stateless and a stranger, a passing shadow of little or no importance, that he come out of nothing and returns to nothing. The Psalmist says: “Hear my prayer, O Lord, … hold not thy peace at my tears … for I am a stranger with thee as all my fathers were” (Ps 39:13).

In the New Testament, however, there will gradually appear another vision, especially found in the First Epistle of St. Peter and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, namely that man does not come out of nothing but out of heaven, and there he is bound to return, the heavens being man’s true fatherland (Cf. Heb 11:8-10).

Finally, the third name is Jesus, the Incarnate Word, who “came unto his own, and his own received him not” (John 1:11). This means that Jesus himself had been a stranger in the world into which he came. First, that world was filled with wickedness, injustice and violence. Then because, being God, he renounced his way of being God and adopted the human way of being. We can say that in a certain sense Jesus became a stranger to himself as well, as he left his eternity and entered human time, as he renounced divine power and chose human weakness (Cf. Phil 2:7; 2 Cor 8:9; Rom 8:3; Gal 3:13). Moreover, Jesus was a stranger to the world as the world failed to recognize him and to host him; he was rejected, betrayed and crucified on the cross as an evildoer. The cross is the silent and eloquent image of a violent and inhospitable world, unable to receive and to love the one that desires its welfare. And yet Jesus’ last word is not the cross but his promise that once risen from the dead he will be with his own until
the end of the world (Cf. Matt 28:20). Once again, however, Jesus resurrected is present among his own as a stranger, as the two disciples were to discover on the way to Emmaus or as Jesus himself will say at the FinalJudgement that he had been hiding not only in those hungry, thirsty, imprisoned or naked, but also in those who were strangers (Cf. Luke 24:13-16; Matt 25:31-45).

The hospitable space opened by Jesus by means of his self-estrangement should be promoted first at the level of the ego, which is called to perceive itself not so much under the aspect of its own frailness, but rather in the light of the Father’s love, who in Jesus offered himself to all people. Then, there is an invitation at an intersubjective level to transcend hostility, animosity and indifference towards foreigners, by seeing others through the eyes of God, who “makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good” (Matt 5:45). At a political and cultural level, the hospitable space inaugurated by Jesus undermines totalitarian identity conceptions and opens relations of trust, friendship and respect, for which differences and otherness are not perceived as a menace but as opportunities and enrichment. For St. Paul, the absolute novelty brought by Jesus is the abolition of any division, beginning with that between Israel and the pagans, and ending with that between friends and enemies. God refuses to identify himself with a single people and announces an alliance with all the peoples on the earth. This alliance was realized in Jesus, as he was the one to inaugurate the real and universal space of mutual hospitality where no one is a stranger but all are the sons of the one Father and brothers with one another (Cf. Eph 2:11-19). The gospel is the beautiful news of human fraternity, often contradicted by history, expelled or marginalized from the public space by policy, and spiritualized by most religions. Nevertheless, the walls that divide people cannot be demolished simply by a free exchange of goods and capital. We need a culture of fraternity, which should recognize and respect otherness, the dignity and uniqueness of each person.⁹

In the 2nd century AD, the Letter to Diognetes stated about Christians that they are “resident strangers” (pàroikoi)¹⁰ or passing

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¹⁰Letter to Diognet [Scrisoarea către Diognet] 5, 5.
people, who do not enjoy all the privileges of the local citizens. By using similar words, the First Epistle of St. Peter presents the believers in Christ as “resident strangers and guests” (παροικοὶ καὶ παρεπιδημοί) (1 Pet 2:11), as the Christians’ true fatherland is the heaven which they share together with the saints and with those of the household of God (Cf. Eph 2:19). The Christians’ estrangement, however, does not only refer to their relations towards the present world, but in a translated sense it became an interior dimension of man in relation to his own shadow or with his interior being unknown to those around him, and often equally unknown to himself. Then when we offer hospitality to the foreigner that lives within ourselves, and when we introduce to him the foreigner in front of us, only then the foreigner within us and before us will cease to be a stranger and, while preserving his blessed diversity, he will turn into a brother.\textsuperscript{11}

The Laws of Hospitality

Hospitality should be equally beautiful and generous at a social and at a religious level. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Although all religions praise hospitality, there is no tradition of inter-religious hospitality, at least not in the Christian world. There are certain exceptions. During the latest centuries, the Abrahamic religions have attempted to develop the notion of tolerance, but tolerance means to bear an error, something harmful, and in this respect tolerance has nothing to do with hospitality.

Returning to the Bible we find plenty of instances of hospitality. Hosting foreigners is recommended regardless of their religion, but it only refers to offering them shelter and food. When a foreigner is completely accepted, as for example in the case of Ruth, the Moabite, then he/she is expected to renounce his/her identity and religion completely. When the contact with another religion is inevitable, there is only one alternative – the rejection or destruction of the unbelievers. In this case, sacred hospitality turns into sacred rejection. The Biblical texts that contain strict recommendations about the religion of foreigners should be understood in their historical context, and not interpreted \textit{ad litteram} or sanctified. Unfortunately, ignoring the teachings of Jesus, many Christians throughout the centuries have

\textsuperscript{11}Di Sante / Giuntoli, \textit{The Foreigner in the Bible}, pp. 44-5.
made use of these texts to justify their attitudes of rejection, conquests, and violence.

No doubt, hosting a foreigner of a different religion is a difficult aspect. Even the act of hosting a foreigner as such can present certain risks. When the guest is the adherent of a different religion, the risk is even greater, as the relationship between guest and host affects the privacy of the persons involved. In the past inter-religious hospitality was not evident. From this point of view, once again hospitality leaves the impression of having an ambiguous character. To be able to offer complete hospitality to a foreigner of a different religion, we should first look at what this attitude consists of and which are the circumstances that allow us to avoid its equivocal status.12

Drawing inspiration from the Biblical texts that refer to the relation of the Jewish people with other nations, St. Thomas Aquinas established in the 13th century, what the limits of hospitality should be towards foreigners. From a religious point of view, according to Aquinas, the general principle is this: “no nation is excluded from the law which refers to the cult one owes to God and from the redemption of one’s soul.”13 Consequently, foreigners can participate at the fundamental religious feast of the Israelites, the Passover, and can become naturalized in the country that receives them, if they accept to be circumcised (Cf. Exod 12:48). From a social and political point of view, St. Thomas made a distinction between the peaceful and the warrior foreigners. The common good makes the difference between different types of foreigners: whenever it is respected they are peaceful, when it is not they are warriors. Peaceful strangers are of three types: passing foreigners, resident foreigners, and integrated foreigners. We have the moral duty to behave kindly towards the first two categories. As regarding the third type, Aquinas claimed that until they are completely integrated, they ought to observe certain formalities; consequently, their access to the status of full-right citizens should not be immediate. He did not mention exactly how long this integration process should last, but resorting to Aristotle, and to the Bible, he stated that third generation citizens could be fully integrated. A

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certain difference should still be made in this respect, namely their integration ought to be accepted if there are certain connections of a religious, ethnical, and social type between the host people and the people from which the immigrant comes. If the relation between the two peoples is not close enough or at least peaceful, then the integration should be refused. In conclusion, according to St. Thomas, peaceful strangers should be treated kindly, while warrior foreigners should be invited to observe the common good as the law of justice pretends, and if not, they are to be expelled by force.\footnote{See Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I-II, q. 105, a. 3.}

Therefore, the stranger should be received as if he were a brother, and yet we should not forget that for him who receives this foreigner, he is not a real brother. Excessive generosity could lead to a distorted relationship between the guest and his host. Hospitality is a two-way road: to be just, hospitality expects the two partners to make equal efforts. The foundation of hospitality is the conscience that we all share in the same human nature. However, not to require an immigrant to behave properly, to leave him do anything under the pretext that he is sacred, finally leads to a lack of respect towards his human dignity and towards his capacity to behave as one should. Hospitality ought to observe certain limits. We should not keep our guests standing in front of our house or in the hall, but we should invite them into the dining room or into the living room. And yet, he should not be allowed to enter all the rooms of the house. It is a sign of respect towards his own dignity to tell one’s guest which is the threshold, beyond which he ought not to trespass. Consequently, a foreigner can be received as if he were a brother, but by his own nature he will always remain an irreducible stranger, different and unlike the one that receives him.

A newly arrived foreigner has always an ambivalent status. His arrival can be beneficial or harmful, as behind the stranger there could be a friend or an enemy. In the beginning, it was considered that receiving the foreigner well could solve this ambiguity. It seemed more prudent to receive a stranger, as he could offer you some help when having a conflict with the neighboring tribe. Later, the human and religious value of this attitude was stressed, but receiving a guest (\textit{hospes}) necessarily implies one’s capacity to love one’s own enemy (\textit{hostis}). In this way, the logic of common sense can only be overcome.
by superior motivations. If we agree with this statement, we should also agree that until this moment, the human conscience has achieved a rather insignificant progress regarding the love of one’s enemy.

The proof that this is the true stage of our human conscience comes from the Bible, which employs two terms when speaking about the love of one’s neighbor who is a brother and a friend — *philadelphia*, and the love for one’s neighbor who is far away or a stranger — *philoxenia*, the antonym of the latter is xenophobia. However, *philoxenia* is the term that designates hospitality. The first type of love tends towards unanimity, the other one respects diversity. The first kind of love reaches a tacit agreement, a consensus; the second one never ceases to reply, to express itself. There is no difference of degree between these two forms of *agape*, but a difference of nature. Throughout the Christian tradition, however, the first type of love has enjoyed a greater favor, as it is the love that leads to agreement, while *philoxenia* was considered a kind of extension of the love referred to as *philadelphia*. Instead of respecting the stranger’s irreducible diversity, rather were sought his assimilation and integration. It meant an attempt to turn the stranger, the one from far away, into one’s neighbor. Instead of being respected and promoted, diversity was something negative and, eventually, it led to exclusion. Despite these tendencies of Christian love towards one’s neighbor, the difference between the one who is near and the one who is far ought to be preserved, both for the sake of keeping charity in good order, and for the sake of respecting our own fellow citizens. Therefore, hospitality should accept the laws and the conditions imposed by the guest’s nature as a foreigner, and by the exigencies of the society. Still, at the core of hospitality, there lies a love, a *philía*, or a friendship. Hospitality springs from friendship or, better said, it is its fruit. Sometimes it has been compared to an exchange of gifts. This depends, however, on the circumstances, since by its very nature hospitality does not imply reciprocity; hospitality is a gift. *Philoxenia* is never a means of obtaining something else; hospitality offers itself gratuitously and always tends towards a genuine friendship.

To be a good host of guests, we should bear in mind yet another difference, which lies behind the term hospitality, namely the active and the passive sense of hospitality. These two senses are complementary, as the two facets of a medal, but still distinctive. In the active sense, that hospitality that offers itself to someone is generous,
How Should Immigrants Be Received?

gratifying, and little obliged, while the other hospitality, which is received by someone, is in general humiliating and unexpected. They are two opposite and irreducible experiences. Active hospitality is a sign of kindness and the foundation of morality. Received hospitality is a disquieting and memorable experience that deeply marks human life. Offered hospitality is more generous, received hospitality is more difficult, since it is an experience of poverty, of assuming certain risks in a foreign country or even of being unaccepted. Offered hospitality is, finally, a moral duty, while received hospitality is, in general, a spiritual grace. This opposition, however, should not be too emphasized, as certain manners of offering are eminently spiritual, while the beneficiary may, in certain cases, be nothing but a profiteer.

According to the Bible, the condition for being hospitable is that of experiencing first the hospitality received by others. For instance, Abraham, the archetype of hospitality, had first been a traveler and a stranger in the land of Canaan. In the Book of Deuteronomy, it is said: “Love therefore the stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt” (Deut 10:19). The experience of hospitality, received or rejected, bears its influence on hospitable behavior, therefore only the poor, such as the widow from Zarephath of Sidon, can properly receive a stranger. When a rich person receives someone who is poor, the relation tends to be always unbalanced. Jesus says that in this case, reciprocity is impossible. The rich person obliges his poor guest in a certain way who in his turn is unable to receive the former. In an extreme interpretation, the rich person could turn the poor one into a kind of hostage. So, to be able to receive someone well, one should have first had the experience of being received by others.

From Ecumenical and Interreligious Dialogue to Hospitality

For rich individuals and nations, hospitality offered to those strangers who seek safety and vital resources is a moral obligation. In this case, however, there seems to appear a temptation, widespread today in developed countries, namely that of exploiting the foreign workforce, depriving it of the rights guaranteed to domestic workers. The institutions of the host country have the duty to protect the

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15 This term is also derived from the Indo-European root *host*.
foreigners, safeguarding their fundamental rights. In this sense, public authorities can restrict the number of immigrants in at least two circumstances: one refers to the hosting country, namely if the conditions of a dignified reception are not met, and the other refers to the immigrants, i.e. if they fail to fulfil their obligations towards the country that adopts them, if they do not respect the material and spiritual heritage of the hosting country, if they refuse to obey the authorities or to observe the laws of the public power, fail to participate in its duties, are not co-responsible for the common good, e.g. avoid paying taxes, do not exercise their right to vote, do not participate in the defense of the country. Moreover, to have the certainty that the immigrants would have their human dignity recognized and will have the chance to become integrated in social life as persons, together with their families, the immigration as such has to be regulated in accordance with criteria of equity and equilibrium.

The first of these criteria is the principle of the common good and, being aware of the major motivation of today’s migrations, one of its dimensions, namely the principle of the universal destination of goods. Indeed, the principle of using goods in common lies at the foundation of the entire ethical and social order. This right is a natural one as it is inscribed in the very nature of man; it is original, as it is proper to any person; and it is primary in relation to any human intervention regarding goods. The proper setting into practice of this principle -- of the universal destination of goods -- in various cultural and social contexts needs to be regulated, needs a juridical framework, which determines and specifies the exercising of this right, and, especially, the conversion of the vision on economy, which -- if we bear in mind moral values -- will be able to contribute to the promotion of a more equal world, a more sympathetic and more humane, in which any person can give and receive, and in which the progress of some does not constitute an impediment for the development of others or a pretext for subjugating others. With this converted vision on economy, the arrival of immigrants in developed countries will no

17 See the Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2240-2241, (Vatican City, 1992).
18 See the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 298, (Vatican City, 2004).
20 See the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 171-5.
longer be understood as a menace to the welfare of the hosting country.

From a religious point of view, active or passive hospitality is the result of ecumenical or inter-religious dialogues. If the immigrants are Christians, the pastoral institutions of the Church in the hosting country are invited not to aggravate the uprooting to which the immigrants have already been exposed through expatriation (separation from one’s country, family, language etc.) and to promote the rite -- understood as liturgical, theological, spiritual and disciplinary heritage -- or the religious identity of the immigrant. In this sense, we need a conversion of the Christian mentality on the unity of the Church that should pass from the idea of unity in uniformity to the idea of unity in legitimate diversity. This new Christian mentality could both save the Catholics of Roman Rite from a forced assimilation, and would help the Catholics of Oriental Rite preserve their own traditions. At a concrete level, this change of mentality would mean supplying places of worship and pastoral assistants that are knowledgeable in the religious, linguistic and cultural traditions to which the immigrants belong.

If the immigrants are Christians belonging to other Churches and Ecclesiastical Communities, then the passing from dialogue to hospitality is to be embodied by one’s assuming a concrete and daily ecumenism. Thus, for the Catholic Christians, the hospitality offered to their separated brothers or to those who are not in a complete communion with the Church is not a mere question of doctrine, but a genuine sign of serving and of deep brotherly love. In this case, hospitality covers a whole range of circumstances, from the offering of places of worship and objects of cult for a dignified celebration of their liturgical ceremonies, to celebrating the burial rite within Catholic cemeteries for believers of a different denomination. A special case is Eucharistic hospitality, which means that Orthodox believers are allowed to receive Holy Communion within the Catholic Church, in certain circumstances regulated by Canon Law. The sign of true hospitality can also be the partaking in common at different

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21 See the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral of Migrations and Travelers, the Instruction “The Love of Christ towards Migrants,” no. 49.

liturgical feasts specific to each denomination, at the World Days of Peace, of the Migrants and of the Refugees, as well as at the annual Week of Prayers for Christian Unity.23

When the immigrants are not Christians but followers of other religions, passing from dialogue to hospitality can be more difficult and less immediate. First, in order that the inter-religious dialogue should be sincere, open and respectful, it is necessary to reinforce the Christian identity among the members of the hosting communities, to examine carefully their faithfulness towards Christ, to help them to deepen the content of their faith and to commit themselves to being living witnesses of Christ. Therefore, to efficiently assist the non-Christian immigrants to preserve the transcendental dimension of their lives, first the Christians should be properly prepared. Their authentic life should constitute a direct or indirect denouncing of the axiological cleavages from the industrialized and wealthy countries, such as the materialism and consumerism, the moral relativism and religious indifferentism, cleavages that could interfere with the religious convictions of the immigrants. Then, assuming a credible Christian life in view of a sincere dialogue with the non-Christian immigrants should become a program of formation not only for lay Christians considered individually, but also for the traditional organizations that aid, such as the diocesan, national and international caritas, for the ecclesial movements and associations of lay Christians. Bearing in mind, however, religious differences, to avoid confusion a few regulations in the sphere of inter-religious hospitality are still necessary. Thus, it is deemed as improper that the Christian places of worship (churches, chapels, halls used for religious purposes, for evangelizing or pastoral activities) should be set at the disposal of those who belong to non-Christian religions. On the other hand, spaces having a social purpose can remain open to persons of a different religion. Similarly, Catholic schools should not renounce their specific characteristics and their educational programs, which are of a Christian orientation, when receiving the children of immigrants belonging to a different religion. In this case, the parents are to be previously informed about the Christian orientation of the school, while their children should not be obliged to take part in the Catholic

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23See Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, the Instruction “The Love of Christ towards Migrants,” no. 56-8.
Mass or to commit any gesture against their religious convictions. During religion lessons, it should be emphasized -- in the spirit of the inter-religious dialogue and avoiding any religious relativism or syncretism -- that persons of a different religious conviction ought to be equally respected. Finally, regarding marriage between Catholic Christians and non-Christian immigrants should not be encouraged, as the common faith lived by both parents can be more easily transmitted to their children, and constitutes an element of unity within the family. The rule of inter-religious hospitality that should govern the relations between Christians and the adherents of other religions is the principle of mutuality. At an exterior level, the principle of mutuality means mutual respect and justice in juridical and religious relations. At an interior level, it means a spirit of life, which promotes parity in dealing with duties and rights. Assuming this principle of mutuality means that all should become advocates of the minorities' rights whenever their own religious community forms the majority.\textsuperscript{24}

Undoubtedly the societies to which we belong are becoming ever more composite from a religious point of view owing to the increasing numbers of immigrants. To eliminate prejudices, to overcome the religious relativism, and to avoid ungrounded fears and seclusion, Christians should be prepared and open to the inter-religious dialogue by means of consistent programs of formation and information. These programs should focus less on common features that would enable both parties to live peacefully, but rather on retrieving their common religious dimensions, such as prayer, fasting, the fundamental calling of man to open himself towards Transcendence, towards worshipping God and towards solidarity among peoples. Nevertheless, neither fraternal dialogue nor the exchange of gifts, nor the sharing in the common human values should weaken the belief and the duty of Christians to witness to Christ and to his Gospel.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Hospitality as Virtue}

The current phenomenon of migration challenges the various forms of hospitality. For Christians one of these seems primary,

\textsuperscript{24}See \textit{ibid.}, no. 59-64.
\textsuperscript{25}See \textit{ibid.}, no. 69.
namely the significance of hospitality as a way of conversion. We are witnesses of an evolution of mentalities. During the last decades, Christians have passed from anathema to dialogue. This conversion has marked the recent history of Christianity. Now we seem to need a new conversion, i.e. to pass from dialogue to hospitality. It is not enough to meet the others, one should also host them. This new conversion is hazardous, and yet vital for all the religions of the world. The dialogue in its strict sense is a form of objective and neutral encounterering. If we limit ourselves to this type of dialogue, we risk remaining sterile and bearing no influence on the others. Religious tolerance and the respect towards the other’s religious conversion are not creative.

To receive the virtue of hospitality, the first thing one should do -- as Jesus himself used to do -- is to pass beyond the other’s threshold. After entering the other’s house, Jesus recommends that we remain there. The way of hospitality requires spending time together. Only in this way can we understand and appreciate what our guests should offer, the encounter can become deeper and can build mutual trust. Hospitality always presupposes a certain communion of material and spiritual goods. After receiving from our guests that which they can offer, only then can we present them our gifts. Without any doubt, “it is more blessed to give than to receive” (Acts 20:35), but the present signs of the time manifested by immigrants have the following message: “to give” is important, but “to receive” is urgent. In fact, through giving you shall receive!

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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Purpose

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

Projects

A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.
2. Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues. This series of 10 week crosscultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

3. Joint-Colloquia with Institutes of Philosophy of the National Academies of Science, university philosophy departments, and societies. Underway since 1976 in Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these concern the person in contemporary society.

4. Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development. A study in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of education and character development. This work has been underway since 1980.

The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Columbia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.

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