Multimodal Education: Philosophy and Practice

Jūratė Baranova & Lilija Duoblienė

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
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Preface

Luc Anckaert

In the international academic reflection on moral education, it has become clear that a purely rational approach is insufficient to foster moral intuitions and attitudes. As early as Aristotle, the importance of habits in ethics had been noted. These habits are not only a rational choice but also acquired through repetition and mimesis. Contemporary authors like Martha Nussbaum also indicate the importance of emotions for moral attitudes. Arts are privileged media for fostering emotions that have a reflective content. This means that the classical Hegelian subordination of the image in favour of the concept is surpassed and that the image is freed from a century long iconoclasm. Moral education is possibly partly a process of learning to think in and with images.

In this international context of reflection on moral education, this book by Baranova and Duoblienė, resulting from a broader research project – Premises and Problems of Multimodal Education supported by the Research Council of Lithuania – and from their previously published research, is a fascinating and inspiring text marked by deep philosophical reflections. It is based on discussions with prominent philosophers as well as on very concrete sources: chosen examples of film and visual material. It innovates not on the basis of the tradition of hermeneutics (which would have been the easy choice) but of the tradition of semiotics and postmodernism/poststructuralism. Important names are, of course, Stiegler, Foucault, Derrida, Barthes, Deleuze and many others. In addition, the choice not to adopt unmediated actual and relevant philosophical insights into multimodal education is very inspiring. A sincere reflection on the sense of education bridges the gap between these two interests. This means that the authors deliver a text which is future oriented both in content and in concept.

The book is divided into different parts, starting from a theoretical reflection on moral education and the use of technology, semiotics (a crucially important chapter), the place of film education in moral education, values and spirituality, multiculturality, the education of children, sound and transversality. The logical structure of the book is complemented by the attention paid to the Eastern cultural atmosphere (for instance a movie of Kim Ki-duk) and the ecological problematic.

No doubt the reader of this manuscript receives an important gift. As the result of long research and reflection, the book can become a standard for philosophers and educators.

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Introduction

JŪRATĖ BARANOVA & LILIJA DUOBLIENĖ

This book presents the results of the research entitled *Premises and Problems of Multimodal Education* supported by the Research Council of Lithuania under Grant No. S-MIP-17-37, which was carried out in cooperation with the Faculty of Philosophy, Vilnius University1 where both authors, Jūratė Baranova and Lilija Duoblienė, are professors. The study is built on the previous theoretical research published in *Gilles Deleuze: Philosophy and Arts*2 by Jūratė Baranova, Laura Junutytė, and Lilija Duoblienė. It also contains insights gathered from the practical experimentation of multimodal education in the concrete practice of both authors.

Chapter I, “Multimodality as a Synthesis of Two Types of Attention,” starts with a challenging question: What is the aim of education? The first section of this chapter focuses on multimodality which describes communication practices in terms of textual, aural, linguistic, spatial, and visual or sound modes. If multimodal education activates brain activity, then what is the aim of this activation? Is it to develop the speed of acting and functioning in a society? If so, what should we consider slowness? In fact, it takes time for a thought to be born in the head of a person. Kristupas Sabolius observes that the aim of education is to stimulate the possibilities of imagination. Imagination, according to Sabolius, functions better in the absence of images, because they can be created. Images should remain only as a provocation and a stimulus for action. Katherine Hayles and Bernard Stiegler think that a technological environment cultivates hyperattention. This is a disastrous position, because it destroys the deep attention cultivated in education through reading and writing. If we take for granted that hyperattention is actually a ‘generational shift’, what are the possible issues from this premise? Stiegler suggests a rather productive idea borrowed from Jacques Derrida, which states that the concept of hyperattention constitutes both a remedy and a poison. We may ask rhetorical questions: Does learning the secrets of programming not need the same concentration? What about the concentration in meditating on a photo (as in Barthes’ case) or a picture, or watching, in Gilles

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1 This project has received funding from the Research Council of Lithuania (LMT), agreement No. S-MIP-17-37 and has been performed in cooperation with the Faculty of Philosophy, the Vilnius University, recommended for publication by the Scientific Council (September 10, 2020, No. 250000-TP-5).

Deleuze’s words, ‘good cinema’, or listening to complicated music? Our research aim is represented by the following question: How can we broaden the scope of critical and creative thinking through the use of multimodality? The concept of ‘multimodal’ refers to creating meaning through a combination of two or more different modalities. We stress that multimodal education is always a question about meaning, not like the use of technology in education just for technology’s sake.

In the second and third sections, the author is inspired to overstep strict boundaries and to start experimenting with different modes of word, thought, image and sound by way of the post-structuralist conception of the philosophy of education: the concepts of deconstruction and dissemination of Jacques Derrida and heterogeneous multiplicity of Michel Foucault and Deleuze.

In Chapter 2, “Semiotics: Language and Image,” we discuss the conception of the relation between verbal and non-verbal signs in the semiotic tradition. Starting from classical semiotics in the first section, “Verbal and Non-Verbal Signs: Eco,” the author concentrates on the conception of the sign in Charles S. Peirce’s semiosis, which includes an interpretant. As a response to the question: What is the relation between verbal and non-verbal signs?, the author discerns two possible different points of view: the first supposes that verbal language can be defined as a primary modelling system, while the non-verbal is only a ‘secondary’ derivative (and partial) translation of some of its devices (Yuri M. Lotman). The second position is more moderate, maintaining that there are contents conveyed by a set of linguistic devices as well as by a set of non-linguistic devices. Both sets contribute to a subset of contents translatable from the linguistic into non-linguistic or vice versa (Emilio Garoni, Umberto Eco). For the authors of this book, the second position seems more persuasive. They also agree with Eco’s conclusion that this conception leaves aside a vast portion of ‘unspeakable’ but not ‘inexpressible’ content. We do agree that the ‘unspeakable’ but not ‘inexpressible’ in both alternatives – verbal and non-verbal – always remains. Eco concludes that although verbal language is without doubt the most powerful semiotic device invented by man, other devices do exist that cover portions of the general semantic space not covered by verbal language. It seems useful to present a preliminary list of different codes that Eco found to be operative within a ‘still picture’. As Christian Metz observes, Eco arrived at the number ten – ten main categories of codes – and his enumeration does not pretend to be exhaustive. Metz, however, considers that the visual image has no meaning without a verbal caption. Language as a verbal message pervades the image from without. We think there is a great difference between
interpreting pictures created by pupils just as an image alone, and interpreting pictures with verbal captions added by pupils. Multimodality starts if the visual is intertwined with the verbal. The pure visual is monomodal.

In the second section, we discuss the functioning of social semiotics in education. We discern the two classical sources of social semiotics stemming from quite different monomodal perspectives: one from linguistics (Michael Halliday), the other from visual arts and design (Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen). The term ‘social semiotics’ can be related to the concept of language as a primary source for meaning by which human beings negotiate and change their social experience (Halliday). In language, Halliday distinguishes three metafunctions: the ideational (pertaining to ‘meaning’ as it arises out of the relation between text and world), the interpersonal (pertaining to the relation between communicator and addressee), and the textual (pertaining to the internal coherence of a discourse and the way it links up to the extratextual context). Kress and van Leeuwen consider that in traditional linguistics language was defined as a system working through a ‘double articulation’, the message being an articulation both as a form and as a meaning, multimodal texts making meaning in multiple articulations. They identify four domains of practice in which meanings are predominantly made: discourse, design, production and distribution. Kress and van Leeuwen also propose that images, like language, always simultaneously realize three different kinds of meanings, for images construct not only representations of ‘material reality’ but also the interpersonal interaction of ‘social reality’ (such as relations between viewers and what is viewed). In addition, images cohere into textual compositions in different ways and so realize ‘semiotic reality’. For educational purposes, their concept of ‘situational variables’ seems productive. These situational variables are related to the three overarching areas of meaning, or metafunctions: ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’.

Len Unsworth relies on both trends in her research, seeking links between semiotics and education. We completely agree with Unsworth’s insight that this kind of transdisciplinary approach has been demonstrably productive to date, and seems crucial in the future for those in social semiotics and education who need to understand how the emerging textual habitat integrates multiple meaning-making systems, such as language, image, sound and movement; multiple ‘text’ generation devices, such as digital cameras, scanners, computer software viz. multimedia authoring systems; and multiple communication formats such as computer screens, iPods, handheld/pocket personal electronic organizing devices, and mobile phones. Our research, however, is far more modest. We do touch on the problem of photographic vision and the image in painting,
but pay greater attention to the role of cinema in multimodal education and the role of sound in education.

The third section, “Barthes: Nietzschean Personalism in Photographic Education,” reveals how easy it is to overstep the strict formalization of semiotics and to see the image as an existential event, as a place of the truth, as reality in itself. For Roland Barthes, the image in a photograph is a possible way to approach reality itself. Victor Burgin, when speaking of photographic education, distinguished two quite different pedagogic practices: first the ‘pragmatic’, where the content is determined by its practical bearing on the specific form of photography being taught, and second the studium where no particular vocational training is imposed but the student is asked to consider photography in its totality as a general cultural phenomenon. This type of education also reveals the possibility of one more approach to the photographic image – punctum, i.e., personal insight and personal vision. Barthes’ suggestion considers how to transcend from the visual image as the content seen in concrete photography to a verbal reflection and description. In Camera Lucida. Reflections on Photography, Barthes proposes the methodology of resistance to any reductive system. He suggests reflecting on the image in a photograph not from the point of view of the photographer but from that of the spectator. For the spectator, the most important questions are: “Did this photograph please me? Interest me? Intrigue me?” These questions are quite appropriate to educational practice. The chapter also discusses how the punctum of the childhood photograph described by the young Lithuanian artist Rūta Spelskytė transforms itself into the studium. It suggests ways for reflecting on the social structure of a past society. Susan Sontag describes the social aspects of photography, which shapes the ethics of seeing and gives us a sense that we can hold the whole world in our hands. But photography can also be a means of investigating the world and experimenting with reality itself, searching for truth, as is reflected in the example of the young Lithuanian photographer Dovilė Dagienė as well as in the work of Rūta Spelskytė.

What is the difference between a photographic image and a cinematic image? The fourth section, “Photography and Cinema: Two Cases of Technical Images,” starts from the thought of Vilém Flusser who distinguishes two very important events in human civilization: ‘the invention of linear writing’ and ‘the invention of technical images’. Flusser says that technical images are not symbols in need of deciphering, but symptoms of the world they convey: a kind of window on the world. A spectator trusts them as he trusts his own eyes. André Bazin treats film as a visual spectacle: a normal narrative film is like a photographed play, with the changes in the camera position selecting and stressing certain details. Photography and cinema belong to the same type, in Metz’s words, the
audiovisual. However, Barthes maintains that cinema and photography have a different phenomenology, cinema is the beginning of a different art, albeit derived from photography.

The fifth section, “Language and Meaning in Cinema,” concentrates on the discovery of semiotic signs mainly characteristic of cinema. Metz argues that the semiotics of cinema is primarily concerned with the ‘filmic fact’. He distinguishes ‘filmic fact’ from ‘cinematic fact’ that represents a vast ensemble of phenomena taking place before, after and during a film. The term ‘film’ means a more manageable, specifiable signifying discourse. ‘Film’ belongs to the same series as ‘book’, ‘statue’, etc. Metz treats ‘cinema’ as a language made up of a combination of moving photographic images, sounds, words, and music, while ‘silent pictures’ is a language utilizing only photographic images. David Bordwell follows Metz’s treatment of feature film as an investigation of the perceptual-cognitive process, and seeks to reflect the narrative activity in fictional cinema. He asks key questions that are important also for filmic educational theories: How does cinematic narration work? What does the spectator do in comprehending a narrative film? According to Bordwell, no previous semiotic theory has much to say about the spectator. When the perceiver is discussed, it is usually as the victim or dupe of narrative illusion-making. Metz’s ‘discourse-disguised-as-history’ fools the viewer into taking the narration for an unmediated and natural ‘representation’. A film, according to Bordwell, cues the spectator to execute a definable variety of operations. It seems quite productive for educational purposes. However, Bordwell’s conception of a spectator denies an emotional response. In our opinion, the existential narrative theory of William C. Pamerleau seems much more suitable for educational purposes. According to Pamerleau, a film, even a documentary, is like our own life which is not an objective chronicle of facts but a narrative construct. Pamerleau identifies a parallel: film-makers impose meaning on the material they capture in film in exactly the same way as we do when we recount the facts of our life, which is why movies can make meaningful observations on life by reproducing the processes of selection and emphasis through which we establish meaning. He also relies on Noël Carroll’s insight when he says that film-makers succeed in creating captivating movies because they call attention to those events that evoke an emotional response.

Chapter 3, “Cinema and Philosophical Education: Contra and Pro,” starts from a question about the meaning and possibility of including movies in the philosophy teaching curriculum. Depending on their answer to this question, philosophy teachers are classified either as Hegelians (who do not accept this possibility), moderate Hegelians and Nietzscheans or Wittgensteinians (who do see this possibility). This part
reflects on several possibilities for including teaching films in philosophy: (1) Films about Philosophers as an Illustration of Philosophy; (2) Screening Philosophical Novels; (3) Films as Thought Experiments; (4) Film as Philosophy (Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze).

The fifth section of this chapter, “Cavell’s Philosophy of Cinema: Film Thinks,” reveals how Cavell comes to this conclusion and how he understands teaching cinema. We do agree with Cavell’s conclusion that philosophy has to respond to events that are happening in life or in a film. It should never be presented in advance as a schema, but come afterwards as an intuitive tool for understanding and descriptive interpretation. The last section also returns to the insight that philosophical film interpretation is not the schematic application of some theories (Marxist, Lacanian, etc.). Vivian Sobchack opposes a priori schemas because her intention is to describe and account for the origin and locus of cinematic signification and significance in the experience of vision as an embodied and meaningful existential activity. Our conception of reflecting cinematic experience in educational experiments also rejects theoretical schemas and is quite close to existential phenomenology, but relies more on feeling and thinking persons who reflect and can be reflected.

In Chapter 4, “Postructuralism: Deleuze and Film Education,” the first section deals with the same question mentioned in the previous chapter: How was it possible for Deleuze to treat cinema teaching as philosophy teaching? Deleuze devoted not only two books but also three academic years and 250 class hours to film philosophy. Cinema was not the only art Deleuze reflected on philosophically. Both Deleuze and Félix Guattari discovered unexpected sources of creativity in heterogeneity and territories in-between passing through philosophical insights and different arts: philosophy and literature, philosophy and painting, philosophy and ecological art, philosophy and music. The main ontological and methodological premises of this heterogeneity were considered by Baranova, Junutytė, and Duoblienė in Rhythm and Refrain: In Between Philosophy and Arts. Transversality, as the main philosophical concept suggested for education by Guattari and Deleuze, had already been discussed in the

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article “Deleuze and Education.” Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema was also discussed from different perspectives. In this book, we concentrate on Deleuze’s pedagogy of signs in teaching cinema. Deleuze was intrigued by such questions as: How it is possible to escape the pressure of technology? What is there to see behind the image? Deleuze borrowed the concept of sign as semiotics from the American logician and pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce. Unlike some semioticians, Deleuze was impressed by Pierce’s semiology due to the fact that Pierce wrote about signs on the basis of images and their combinations, not as a function of determinants which were already linguistic. As a result, Deleuze suggested six, not three, types of perceptible visible images: perception-image, affection-image, impulse-image (intermediate between affection and action), action-image, reflection-image (intermediate between action and relation), relation-image.

The third section, “Cavell and Deleuze: How to Learn the New Vision of Reality?” once again returns to Cavell’s philosophy of cinema in comparison with that of Deleuze. Cavell looks for the education of new emotions in cinema whereas Deleuze seeks the birth of new thought. Cavell is interested more in our relationship with others; Deleuze is concerned with our relationship to the world, but both approaches to cinema share a common inclination towards moral reasoning. Cavell discerns one common feature uniting film with philosophy: “They are both preoccupied with ways in which we miss our lives, miss the density of significance passing by in a film, or in speech, in our lives.” 5 Deleuze observes one common feature shared between philosophy and cinema: they both say something about the encounter of the subject with reality and are very productive in approaching the problem of cinematic education.

From Chapters 5 to 7 Baranova presents the results of her experiments over the last twenty years in teaching film to students of practical philosophy in different universities (Vilnius University, Lithuanian University of Educational Studies, International School of Management) and the interviews with 147 high-school students concerning their opinions about film teaching in ethics and philosophy courses.

In Chapter 5, “Cinema and Moral Education: Contra and Pro,” the author analyses two traditions of teaching with films. The first, which is oriented toward teaching social problems, is set out by William B. Russell’s book Teaching Social Issues with Films (2009) and Stewart Waters and William B. Russell’s publication The Fundamentals of Teaching with Films

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Baranova compares the interview results from her experiment with high-school students on the teaching of ethics and philosophy with a historical overview of the effectiveness of using films for teaching and learning social problems based on Russell and Waters’ book *Cinematic Social Studies: A Resource for Teaching and Learning Social Studies with Film*. By using many methodologies in the classroom for teaching with films, Russell and Waters discern the following as the most effective: (1) Using film as a visual textbook; (2) Film as a depicter of atmosphere; (3) Film as an analogy; (4) Film as historiography; (5) Film as a spring-board. In their opinion, the most productive methodology is to use film as analogy as well as historiography. The method used by Baranova is similar to Russell and Waters’, that is to encourage students to discern analogies, but not so much concerned with places and events as is the case with Russell (this being important for history teaching). Baranova’s method is to ask students to search for an analogy between the problems discerned in the movie and some ethical problems in philosophy textbooks, in lectures and in everyday life. The ‘Baranova methodology’ is without the second pre-viewing stage suggested by Russell, or the advance discussion of necessary prior background knowledge, context or vocabulary, as well as any synopsis of the film or short extracts. In order to step into the movie, students need to carry out two preparatory actions: to read the selected text from a philosophy textbook and to reflect on the suggested essay topic. They should know in advance the question they should answer, so that when they watch the film they could make notes on possible orientations for the answer. This aspect bears a close resemblance to the Stage 3 indicated by Russell and Waters, as they state that teachers should remember to share with students what exactly they should be doing during viewing. Russell indicates as being very important, even absolutely necessary, the fourth or culminating activity stage, saying that students need to know why they view the film or clip and how it connects to the overall curriculum or their daily lives. Russell and Waters also suggest discussions, debates, worksheets, role playing or any number of other assessment methods. Baranova’s methodology is to ask students to write essays and present them along with discussion in meetings. The material from students’ essays their insights and ideas, are used as the most important outcome of this research.

When watching films, one glimpses a different spectrum of perspectives that cannot be experienced in everyday life. Films selected for humanitarian education need to meet the requirement of a hidden secret not
directly expressed in the image. The education process should presuppose the hidden encounter. For Baranova, spiritual films seem to offer the best examples for an educational experiment teaching philosophical ethics. Tomas Sodeika in *The Holy in the Process of Secularisation* puts in doubt the possibility of teaching religious arts and religious cinema. We agree with his arguments but consider that it is nonetheless meaningful to teach spiritual films. The theoretical premise for this selection is the concept of ‘spiritual cinema’ suggested in the philosophy of cinema by Deleuze. The term ‘spiritual style’ was used by Susan Sontag when she identified it in the films of Robert Bresson. We consider the most important spiritual film directors to be Andrey Tarkovsky, Ingmar Bergman, Bresson and Krzysztof Kieślowski. Baranova presents the results of teaching experiments with students in watching Bergman’s *The Winter Light* (1963), Bresson’s *Diary of a Country Priest* (1951) and Kieślowski’s *Three Colours*.

Chapter 7, “Eastern Ethics for Western Students: Experimenting with Multimodal Education,” is devoted to the philosophical interpretation of philosophy students’ essays in comparison with the texts of ‘serious philosophers’ on Eastern and Western ethics. The students watch such movies as *Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter…and Spring* (2003) by Kim Ki-duk and *Hana-bi* (*Fireworks*, 1997) by Takeshi Kitano and read Eastern philosophers’ texts.

The most interesting result from this practical research can be seen in the qualitative interviews with 147 high school students. They are discussed in the third section of Chapter 5, “Which Films are Suitable for Moral Education? High School Student Answers.” The result reveals the variety of students’ interests, but the dominant tendency is towards a rather high level of social responsibility. Three feature films suggested by these students as examples are presented for further reflection in “Truth and Power: the Running Abandoned Girl in Fernando Meirelles’ *The Constant Gardener* (2005); “Personal Identity and Freedom in Kevin Macdonald’s *The Last King of Scotland* (2006); “Individualistic Altruism in Terry George’s *Hotel Rwanda* (2004).”

In Chapter 8, “Philosophy for Children and Multimodal Education,” multimodality meets with *Philosophy for Children* created by Matthew Lipman (1923-2010). Recently, the authors of this study published a new methodical textbook *Philosophy for Children and Multimodal Education*.6

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6 (Vilnius: The Vilnius University Press, 2020).
In Chapters 9 to 11, “Sound Multimodality and Sound in Multimodality: A Semiotic Approach,” “Sound, Noise and Voice: Beyond Semiotics” and “Noise, Sound and Voice: From the Pedagogy of Aesthetic to Eco-pedagogy and Beyond,” Duoblienė reflects on the relation between sound and image in multimodal education. Although sound, together with images, has a tremendous impact on the perception of the world, studies devoted to sound in education are still relatively scarce. For that reason we attempt in this text to understand why and how does voice, sound and especially noise become an object, instrument and environment of education. It was only a few decades ago that the ideas proposed by critical pedagogy concerning voice discourse analysis became applicable in practice, and the ideas concerning sound analysis in combination with the image became applicable following semiotic instruments: the science of signs. Meanwhile, the concepts and ideas of postmodern and posthumanist philosophy, and of their followers in educational philosophy, toward sound, voice and noise as unpleasant sound are neither simple nor easily applicable. Nevertheless, new projects on sound in educational practice are already being tested and carried out.

In her research, Duoblienė takes into account on the one hand the position of Rowland Atkinson, who declares an ‘ambient turn’, and whose investigations seem to be an invitation for greater sensitivity towards urban sound and the construction of spaces, as well as for examining the influence of sound on the human body. It is clear that noise pollution is a contemporary challenge, which is why Duoblienė would endorse the position of Paul Hegarty, who is interested in the human hearing of noise. Since we live in Anthropocene times, reference to animals and their perception as well as their expression of sound is also very important. For this reason, Duoblienė starts from an explanation of sound in multimodality from a semiotic point of view (Kress, van Leeuwen, Barthes), moves towards R. Murray Schafer’s theory of soundscape and acoustic design and its critique, and then dives into the field of sound, noise and voice perception beyond semiotics, mostly developed by Deleuze and Guattari and their followers. Duoblienė discusses the trend in the perception of sound and noise in nature, from the eco, non-human and in-human perspectives, meaning their relation to other media and technologies. Her field of interest also includes multimodality through combinations of sound with images in movies, especially the search for quietness and new meanings as well as audio-video performances.

After working on an explanation of sound multimodality in the first part of the chapter, in the second part Duoblienė investigates how raw sounds, natural sounds, and unformed sounds appear as unpredictable in compositions of great or ordinary artists, how these sounds fluctuate in
their nomadic journey and how these artists take part in the deterritorialization of opening up musical refrains to new forces from the outside. What kind of art machine can be found in different examples? How do precepts and affects appear to artists as well as listeners in the art machine? Especially, how does the artistic composition come to affect an event? How does it happen that a musical composition (or part of it) can be treated as a crystal – not just as a musical composition? In order to answer these questions, the author presents different artistic approaches to catastrophes, in particular, flooding. She tries to discover how artists such as Vladimir Tarasov and Bill Viola use speed and varying intensities of sound and image to create different diagrammatic movements when presenting a catastrophe. The artistic project of Paolo Giudici and Andi Spicer, *A Starling*, provides insights to rethink the linkage of different media and different levels in the project. The analysis of Andrey Tarkovsky’s film *Andrey Rublyov*, especially his novel *Bell*, offers an opportunity to discover the appearance in film of a time crystal as well as a sound crystal. The analyses of these artistic projects have already been published.

Duobliene’s research also turns to ecology understood not only in terms of Schafer’s meaning of acoustic ecology but much more related to the Anthropocene age when the sound of nature or technological sounds moved from the centre of utilitarian observation towards the milieu. In this sense, sound has voice without being anthropomorphized by people. On the contrary, as Deleuze and Guattari say, this sound or voice makes humans unhuman or ‘becoming animal’. Artistic and pedagogical projects are presented as outlining a new understanding of the aesthetic, questioning the moral value in a capitalistic world and debating a new perception of the aesthetic and the pedagogic for the Anthropocene age.

Duobliene proposes *transversality* for the educational community as the way of combining objects and subjects in one machine of creation. This includes audio, video, human, non-human, in-human and other aspects in the educational surrounding. Some examples of transversality from educational theory and practice are presented, mostly focusing on experiments carried out in Vilnius Lyceum. A paper about this research project *The Class as a Creation Machine: Teaching For, With and Within* has been published.\(^7\)

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From the material gathered in this research project, Baranova has published the following articles: “How can Christian Love be Taught Using the ‘Spiritual Cinema?’,”9 “The Tension between Created Time and Real Time in Andrey Tarkovsky’s Andrey Rublyov,”10 “The Concept of Spiritual Cinema in Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy,”11 “A Double Capture of Body and Life: Deleuzian Reading of Sauka’s Pictures,”12 “Deleuzian/Guattarian Cartographies: Art Outside Galleries in New Vilnius Map,”13 “Thought and Metaphor: Does Philosophy Teaching Clash or Collaborate with Literary Education?”14 “Meeting with the ‘Unfamiliar Other’ in Multimodal Education”15 and “Multimodal Strategies in Teaching Ethics with Films,”16 by both authors are collected in a methodological textbook in Lithuanian Philosophy for Children and Multimodal Education.17

The project result also includes the following papers presented at various conferences.


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15 Jūratė Baranova and Lilija Duoblienė, “Meeting with the ‘Unfamiliar Other’ in Multimodal Education,” Ethics and Education 15, no. 1 (2019).


The research was also presented in a joint paper, “The Constructive Strategies in Teaching Humanities with Films,” with international collaborators – Jūratė Baranova, Lilija Duoblienė, Luc Anckaert, and Wilfried Baumann – at the international conference “Constructionism: Constructionism, Computational Thinking and Educational Innovation” held at Vilnius University, August 21-25, 2018.
1. What is the Sense of Maximizing the Intensity of Brain Activity?

In 2011, film director Neil Burger created the fantasy thriller *Limitless*, putting forward a provocative question: scientists say that individual human beings normally use only 20 percent of their brain activity potential. The film-makers questioned what would happen if humans were able to rely on 100 percent of their brain activity through the miraculous effect of drugs. Having taken only one pill of these secret drugs, the main hero starts to act with unbelievable speed and intelligence, becoming in some sense a superman able to see everything and to solve every problem without hesitation. He can write a book in 24 hours, earn a million dollars in one week, and learn every language immediately. He is very quick, becomes socially very charming and his girlfriend returns to him. However, the plot supposes that the side effect of these drugs is to create an addiction and by stopping their use one starts to decline and die. Several questions are raised: what is the sense of maximizing the intensity of brain activity? Can it be dangerous? Can intensifying brain activity be an educational goal? The film shows that the intensity of brain activity is the main way to achieve social success evaluated by the amount of money gained. Education that seeks to maximize brain activity can therefore lead to a flourishing contemporary economy and society. But is this really an educational goal? The main hero (played by Bradley Cooper) does in fact have a particular goal – he is trying to survive in the contemporary ‘rat race’. At the end of the film, to survive in the literal meaning of the word, he searches for these particular pills without which he can no longer live. His employee (played by Robert De Niro) discovers the secret of his efficiency and confronts him with the reproach that intelligence gained through the pill is of no value. Educating practical intelligence requires a great deal of time and effort. To reach the top of the economic elite there are many different things that must be learnt, not only theoretically, but first of all in practice. Different capacities and skills have to be developed, many of which, it may be surmised, are formulated in documents of the future: “21st Century Competencies and their Implications for Educational Practices.” These are the competences which activate additional activity in the brain. Once again, however, we may ask: is this the main
goal of education? To develop the speed of acting and functioning in a society? How about slowness? The film reveals how striving for intellectual speed at the very end has no meaning. But what about the meaning of education itself?

We mention this film as a case study for several reasons. The first is that the film’s main idea resembles the actual situation of university students of the new generation as revealed by Katherine Hayles and emphasized by Bernard Stiegler when he quotes her:

High school and university students are taking Ritalin, Dexedrine, and other equivalent drugs in order to prepare for important exams...searching for cortical stimulants that will help them concentrate...Such compensatory tactics have been developed in order to conserve the benefits of deep attention by means of chemical intervention into cortical functioning.¹

Both Hayles and Stiegler think that this is a disaster, albeit not as destructive as in the film. On the other hand, in a book devoted to multimodal education similar questions should be asked. Multimodal education can flourish in the age of technologies including through technologies that stimulate the speed of intellectual movement. Does this mean that technologies are as necessary for the brains of contemporary young people in this situation as the miraculous pills in the movie discussed above, and without them they would not be able to survive? When technologies are included in education for the brains of the new generation what are the corresponding costs? Do the technologies stimulate the functioning of the brain or destroy some of its capacities? What is the purpose and aim of this multimodal education? Does it develop additional brain activity or does it restrict it?

The concept of multimodality came into the twenty-first-century philosophy of education from communication theory and has been broadly discussed in contemporary scientific literature on education. Multimodality describes communication practices in terms of textual, aural, linguistic, spatial, and visual modes. The concept of ‘multimodality’ denotes a combination of two or more different modes to create meaning. As a teaching tool, multimodal education includes material such as picture books, textbooks, graphic novels, comics, posters, and also digital multimodal texts including film, animation, slide shows, e-posters, digital stories, and web pages. Multimodal education also embraces live multimodal texts, for example, dance, performance, and oral storytelling. On

the other hand, media literacy is essential to modern schooling, and step by step is replacing the traditional forms of education or is going side by side with them. New media, such as the electronic extensions of man described by Marshal McLuhan and developed for education by Marc Prensky and Stiegler, reveal the possibility of thinking simultaneously and in different directions, compounding different fragments in a digital field.

But what is the problem? What unexpected effects could there be? The popular young Lithuanian philosopher Kristupas Sabolius, author of *Proteus and the Radical Imaginary*,2 *The Imaginary*,3 and *Furious Sleep. Imagination and Phenomenology*,4 formulated in popular media the main direction towards which education in our country should lead. The creativity of the child is the main value in education.5 It reveals the authenticity of being in the world.6 Creativity goes hand in hand with imagination.7 Sabolius does not see any clash between logical thinking and imagination.8 In this way, the aim of education is to develop the imagination and creative capacities of the young generation, relying on the value of a game as play. Creativity has much to do with plasticity. However, Sabolius identifies two obstacles that most impede developing the imagination through playfulness and creativity: the prevalence of technologies and the use of tests for assessment in high schools.

Why might the prevalence of technologies inhibit the development of the imagination? According to Sabolius, technologies are based on visual dominance. Whatever one's profession, it has become common practice to keep the mobile phone within sight. The social links used in it focus more and more on moving images, and it is true that even scientists and specialists better understand material when it is presented in visual form. Altogether, about 90 percent of information reaches our brain through images. However, Gaston Bachelard has already pointed out that the worst thing for the imagination is to be exposed to images, and contemporary neuroscience and psychology confirm this insight. The imagination, according to Sabolius, functions better in the absence of images, when it has to create them. The images should remain only provocations

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2 (Vilnius: Contemporary Center; Krakow: Bunkier Sztuki Gallery for Contemporary Art, 2016), in Polish and English.
8 Ibid.
and a stimulus for action. Omnipresent technologies function like a prosthesis in the same manner as cars make it easier to move from point A to point B. In this case, it is clear that using a car instead of walking the same distance weakens the activity of the heart and the circulation of blood. The same happens with the imagination: in the presence of an image, it stops functioning and becomes weaker; as pointed out by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno: its functioning is duplicated.9

Why in this case should we encourage multimodal education? Maybe we should simply return to education existing outside technologies and create technology-free space and time in schools. Return in other words from quick time to slow time. Even more, in *Taking Care of Youth and Young Generations (Prendre soin de la jeunesse et des générations)* Stiegler describes the phenomenon caused by the prevalence of technologies as an attention deficit disorder and a case of generational mutation. He warns:

> What parents and educators (when they are themselves mature) patiently, slowly, from infancy, year after year, pass on as the most valuable things civilization has accumulated, the audio-visual industries systematically destroy, every day, with the most brutal and vulgar techniques, while accusing the family and the education system of this disaster. This carelessness is the primary cause of the extreme attenuation of educational institutions – as well as of the family structure.10

Stiegler relies on the distinction between deep attention, cultivated in education by reading and writing, and hyperattention, cultivated in the surrounding of technologies, drawn by Hayles in “Hyper and Deep Attention: The Generational Divide in Cognitive Modes.”11 Following Hayles, Stiegler points out that:

> Since ancient Greece, and in our own industrial societies thanks to public instruction, scholarly education has formed the base and the best guarantee of the kind of attention that Katherine Hayles calls ‘deep’, and that is a condition of the formation of

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9 Ibid.
critical attention through training in reading and writing, and of the likely synaptogenesis it creates in literate children, critical attention constituting the basis for maturity as responsibility.\textsuperscript{12}

Hayles and Stiegler are convinced that any education leading to maturity should be based on reading and writing. Why? They state their reasons: it forms deep consciousness in the following way:

Yet with the book, which also reproduces the world, literally, through a grammatization of speech that becomes logos but does not require any apparatus, since the equipment required for reading has already been interiorized in the form of synaptic circuits in the brain itself, which require that the reader can write as well as read, the time of the text, which is an aspatial object, is controlled by the projection of the time of consciousness itself since text-time is produced by the time of consciousness that, without needing any machinical control over the unfolding of a text or over consciousness itself, flows on throughout the course of a reading which itself then forms deep consciousness.\textsuperscript{13}

Stiegler states, on the other hand, that the psychotechnologies developed by numeric media have in turn led to what Hayles has analysed as a cognitive change in the attention level, and thus to what she has described as a generational mutation: “We find ourselves in the midst of a generational mutation regarding cognitive behavior, one that poses serious challenges to every level of education, including universities.” This mutation occurs through what Hayles calls hyperattention, which she opposes to deep attention. She characterizes deep attention as the capturing of attention by a single object, sustained over a long period of time. Her example is reading a Dickens’ novel.

Hyperattention, on the contrary, is characterized by a rapid oscillation among different tasks, in the flux of multiple sources of information, in search of a heightened level of stimulation, and having a weak tolerance for boredom…. Developed societies have for a long time been capable of creating the kind of

\textsuperscript{12} Stiegler, \textit{Taking Care of Youth and the Generations}, 89.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 84.
environment in which deep attention is possible....A generational mutation has taken place, transforming deep attention into hyperattention.14

Stiegler affirms that the criterion for deep attention suggested by Hayles focuses not so much on the concentration of attention but on its duration – the ability to sustain it over a long period of time. Reflecting on this situation, we should consider the following questions. Is it always for reading and writing that concentrating the attention is a necessary educational step? How about the ability to concentrate for painting? Or for listening to music? Or composing music? Or building different objects? Sometimes these arts require abilities that are different from those required for perfect writing or reading. How about the ability to read the signs of nature? Or the ability to concentrate one’s attention in order to master different sports? In fishing? Playing cards? Keeping up a conversation? Acting or staging in a theatre? Sculpting? Life has many different forms of expression.

Perhaps the most paradoxical example of prolonged and concentrated attention is demonstrated by the familiar teenager with a real interest in technologies verging on addiction. Since he was not very interested in school subjects one could have concluded he had a lack of deep attention, and that hyperattention prevailed in his consciousness. However, an internet newspaper reported the case of a thirteen-year-old teenager who hacked the data on the internet page of the Ministry of Education by guessing the passwords. He wrote a letter to the ministry warning them that their data were not secure. When the director of the school attended by the teenager was interviewed without revealing the name of the pupil, as required by law, he stated that he considering the pupil very talented because he learned the secrets of programming by himself, sitting at the computer – simply searching them out on YouTube. Obviously, this alternative form of learning required a huge amount of attention, concentration, and authentic interest. Something really deep. When the teenager was at primary school, his parents were asked by the school’s social-care advisers to keep him away from the internet at home in order to avoid addiction, with the result that he had to struggle for years for the right to use the internet. One can see that this fight between the adult generation and the young generation over access to technologies is lost before it starts, and anyone who has the slightest acquaintance with Karl Marx’s ideas sees clearly that the growth of technologies will not stop. The only wise and responsible decision for the adult generation is to accept reality and transfer alternative reality into school reality: transfer technologies

14 Ibid., 73.
from alternative education to education in the classroom. The question remains: How should this be done in the best and most meaningful way? This is the problem at the heart of this book. We dedicate the book to those young people who suffer from hyperattention. Let's make their classes at school more interesting and inspiring. One of the ways to do this is to take the possibility of multimodal education seriously.

Stiegler puts forward the same idea, saying: “If hyperattention is actually a ‘generational shift’, as Hayles points out, we must explore the possibility of achieving a synthesis between these two types of attention.” Stiegler makes a rather productive concept in this case, borrowed from Derrida, meaning that his concept constitutes remedy and poison at the same time:

Obviously, I do not mean that an audiovisual temporal object does not allow for the creation of deep attention. On the contrary, I mean that as a pharmakon, it has characteristics that have currently, within the context of the programming industries, been put to the service of a set of attention capture devices that are fundamentally destructive, like the hyper-solicitation of attention that gives rise to attention deficit, even though by all evidence the cinema is indeed an art and that like all art it solicits and constructs deep attention and is thereby both poison and remedy. Because it can anamnestically temporalize this temporal object, consciousness must understand it spatially, thus reconquering the motor machinery through which it is a function of time.

We also place great reliance on the obvious truth that “the cinema is indeed an art and that like all art it solicits and constructs deep attention and is thereby both poison and remedy.” In this book, we concentrate on stressing and exploring its functions mainly as a remedy, at the same time being aware of its potential to become a poison. The concept of ‘multimodal’ refers to the combination of two or more different modes to create meaning. We stress that multimodal education is always a question about meaning, and is never about using technology in education just for technology’s sake. The last possibility can become poisonous. How can we distinguish very clearly between these two possibilities – remedy and poison?

15 Ibid., 73.
16 Ibid., 85.
2. Multimodal Education and Visual Literacy

In its most basic sense, multimodality is a theory of communication and social semiotics. Multimodality describes communication practices in terms of the textual, aural, linguistic, spatial, and visual resources, or modes, used to compose messages. The concept of multimodality was introduced into twenty-first century philosophy of education from communication theory by the author Gunther Kress. In a book written together with Theo van Leeuwen, *Multimodal Discourse. The Modes and Media in Contemporary Communication* (2001), Kress observes that Western culture preferred monomodality for a very long time. Each sphere of culture, each discipline, developed its own language. One language was developed to speak about linguistic matters, another for visual art or its history, and another for music in the context of musicology. Each discipline developed its own methods, its own technical vocabulary, its own assumptions, “its own strengths and its own blind spots.” The desire to cross boundaries is a twentieth-century phenomenon inspired twentieth-century semiotics. One of the challenges for transferring monomodality to multimodality was the appearance of the cinema at the beginning of the twentieth century. As van Leeuwen states: in a film, the images can provide the action, sync sounds a sense of realism, music a layer of emotion, and so on, with the editing process supplying the ‘integration code’, the means for synchronising the elements through a common rhythm. But this editing process is also hierarchical – with specialists in the different modes integrated through the editing process. Kress and van Leeuwen suppose that today we live in an age of digitization when technically different modes have become the same at the level of representation, when one and the same multi-skilled person can ask: “Shall I say it visually or verbally?”

As a matter of fact, the question “Shall I say it visually or verbally?” was quite familiar to Zen masters in ancient Chinese and Japanese cultures, most of whom had their own answer: it is possible that what one wants to say about a glimpse of being can be said visually and verbally at one and the same time. Zen masters frequently used to draw pictures on one side of the paper and write haiku on the other. Or even on the same side as the picture itself. They were the multi-skilled masters of multimodality long before the digitization age.

The concept of multimodality was used to define the turn in education theory towards integrating the different communication regimes into

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18 Ibid., 2.
education: writing, speech, gesticulation, gaze and different forms of visuality and sound. Dawnene D. Hassett and Jean Scott Curwood wrote about different aspects of multimodality in contemporary theories of education. The significance of multimodal education in early childhood was investigated by Marilyn J. Narey. The relations between multimodality and multilingualism in education were described by two professors from Luxemburg University, Ingrid de Saint Georges and Jean Jacques Weber, and also by others who published in Multilingualism and Multimodality. Current Challenges for Education Studies. Semiotic aspects of multimodality in education were analysed by Len Unsworth. Multimodal Literacy is the mode for the representation of knowledge and the creation of new meanings. The semiotic analysis of speech and sound, movement or image, and their mutual relations, helps to understand and to construct multimodal texts: advertisements, films, websites, artistic projects etc. Multimodal theory is the theory of communication through signs, based on the possibility offered by new tech-nologies to activate all the senses.

When integrated into education theory, the concept of multimodality received a new direction. Fiona Maine observes that the term ‘multimodal’, and “what it actually means, are increasingly drawing critical response. On the one hand, embracing non-print forms of text can be seen as a prerequisite to twenty-first century literacy where the digital, moving image and other visual modes are prevalent in communicative practice outside school. For example, Bearne et al. (2007) raises the question of how teaching reading can encompass all available text modes and make use of the fact that children experience many different multimodal text forms outside school. However, Bazalgette and Buckingham (2013) recommend caution when embracing the term ‘multimodal’. They suggest that, as a label for non-print forms and texts, it oversimplifies the complexity of modes and is used merely as an opportunity to bring to the classroom text forms that might otherwise be regarded as less valuable than the written word. They also argue that the word ‘multimodal’ creates an inappropriate distinction between ‘written’ and ‘other’, when in fact printed written texts contain visual element that makes multimodal analysis possible…”


The topic of multimodal education is broadly discussed in the contemporary scientific literature on education. Media literacy is inevitable in modern schooling, and step by step is replacing the traditional ways of education or is accompanying them side by side. New media, such as the electronic extensions of man described by McLuhan and developed for education by Prensky and Stiegler, reveal the possibility of thinking simultaneously and in different directions, compounding different fragments in a digital field. That corresponds to Deleuze’s concept of the rhizomatic movement of thought, producing novelty through the communication and intersections of different heterogeneous elements in philosophy and art, and already applied to the investigation of digital space in the philosophy of education by Jessica Ringrose. Cinema is one of the possible means in this education. The Deleuzian idea of the possibility of the cinema revealing the movements of spiritual life is the theoretical basis for this research. Our intention is to include cinema as one of the methods of moral and philosophical education.

3. Deconstruction of Boundaries and Heterogeneity of Word and Image

To overstep the strict boundaries of different disciplines and to start experimenting with different modes of word, thought, image and sound, both authors of this book were first inspired by studies of the poststructuralist conception of philosophy of education. The first step was to question the relation between philosophy and literature. Literature as a discipline also creates images by inventing metaphors. To write, just as to read, means to see, states Lithuanian writer Giedra Radvilavičiūtė. Literary text first of all is visual. The literary text without created inside visual image is flat and dull. We see first of all black words in the white background, but as in Japanese drawing when reading the light appears, the shadows, the movement, the space, the texture and emotion.

25 Ibid.
Philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum worked a great deal on this topic. In *Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature* she argues that form and style are not incidental features to the exploration of some important questions about human beings and human life.

A view of life is told. The telling itself – the selection of genre, formal structures, vocabulary, of the whole manner of addressing the reader’s sense of life – all of this expresses the sense of life and of value, a sense of what matters and what does not, of what learning and communicating are, of life’s relations and connections. Life is never simply presented by a text, it is always represented as something. This can, and must, be seen not only in the paraphrasable content, but also in the style. Which itself expresses choices and selections, and sets up, in the reader, certain activities and transactions rather than others.28

Can literature as an interdisciplinary subject be included on equal grounds in the philosophy curriculum? Can philosophy on equal grounds be included in the literature curriculum? If not, what is the reason for their separation? Some writers will never agree.

Applying the same treatment to a poet and a thinker strikes me as a lapse in taste, – wrote Emil Michael Cioran. There are realms from which philosophers ought to abstain. To dissect a poem as if it were a system is a crime, even a sacrilege. Oddly enough, the poets exult when they do not understand the pronouncements made upon them. The jargon flatters them, gives them the illusion of preferment. Such weakness demeans them to the level of their glossators.29

Witold Gombrowicz, a writer of Polish origin from Argentina, sagaciously argues that literary men should protect their art from the compulsion of philosophical speculations. He states that an art is a fact, but not a commentary, attached with a pin to a fact. It is not the business of writers to explain, teach, systematize and prove. Writers are the word which testifies: here I have a pain, – this attracts me – I love this – I hate this – I desire this – I do not want this…Science, according to Gombrowicz, remains abstract, but the writer’s word is the voice of a man from body

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and blood, an individual voice. For writers, it is not an idea that is important but personality. They realize themselves not through concepts, but through individuals. They are and must remain individuals, their task is to maintain the living human voice in a world becoming more and more abstract, — as a programme formulates the writer. Gombrowicz states that, unlike philosophers, moralists, thinkers or theologists, the artist is permanently changing. The artist cannot see the world from one point of view; he experiences a permanent shift inside himself and can oppose only his own movement to the movement of the world. Gombrowicz considers that the easiness of the artist is in fact his depth, and contrasts this trait with the abstractness of the philosopher:

The artist who allows himself to be led astray into the terrain of these cerebral speculations is lost. Lately, we artists have allowed ourselves to be led around too sheepishly by philosophers and other scientists. We have proved incapable of being sufficiently different.  

What do philosophers think about the relation between metaphor as an image and thought? Can thought be expressed by metaphor? Philosophy is the search for truth. Can reality be approached also through metaphor? Aristotle in his Poetics turned his attention to the phenomenon of metaphor. He made a distinction between, on the one hand, ordinary descriptive language as literal language and, on the other hand, metaphorical figurative language. He left epistemic primacy only to the literal language, where metaphor, according to Aristotle, can only operate as a secondary device that is dependent on the prior level of ordinary descriptive language. Philosophical language is the first-order language and in itself contains nothing metaphorical. Aristotle says that, in purely conventional terms, poetic language can only be said to refer to itself; that is, it can accomplish imaginative description through metaphorical attribution, but the description does not refer to any reality outside of itself. For the purposes of traditional rhetoric and poetics in the Aristotelian mode, metaphor may serve many purposes; it can be clever, creative, or eloquent, but never true in terms of referring to new propositional content. If on the contrary one chooses the opposite premise that they can be included: what are the philosophical suppositions for their meeting? Nietzsche challenged the Aristotelian understanding of the role of metaphor together with Aristotelian theory of truth as correspondence. He saw in metaphor the direct path to truth. Nietzsche suggests that we are,

from the outset, ‘already in metaphor’. The concepts and judgments we use to describe reality do not flatly reflect pre-existing similarities or causal relationships between themselves and our physical intuitions about reality, they are themselves metaphorical constructions; in other words, they are creative forms of differentiation emerging out of a deeper undifferentiated primordiality of being. Derrida follows the Nietzschean way.

There are concepts he does not want to renounce or to deconstruct. Similarly, he does not want to be excluded from philosophy or from truth. In *A Taste for the Secret* he says:

> Truth is not a value one can renounce. The deconstruction of philosophy does not renounce truth – anymore, for that matter, than literature does. It is a question of thinking this other relation to truth.

Literature is no less good than philosophy: it has its own arguments. Derrida suggest broadening the concept of argumentation. When philosophers speak of argument, argues Derrida, they very often have a certain model of argument in mind, and when they fail to recognize the familiar model they hasten to conclude that there is no argument. Derrida thinks that there is argument, but in another form. He concludes:

> I think that literature is argumentative, in another way, with different procedures. Literature attempts to lead to conclusion, even if they are suspensive or undecidable; it is an organized discourse that exchanges with the other, needs the response of the other, is discursive, and therefore passes through a temporality.

Derrida’s main idea is the following: even if literary arguments do not coincide with philosophical arguments, that does not deny them the status of arguments. For him every text – philosophical or literary – has its own context and its signature. The contexts change, but in this change

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34 Ibid., 28-29.
something stable nevertheless is left. “So by oeuvre I mean something that remains, that is absolutely not translatable, that bears a signature.”

What does the idea of deconstruction have in common with moral discourse? How can it be included in multimodal education for philosophical ethics? Derrida, like Heidegger, can be considered as a philosopher concerned with the possibility of opposing logocentrism in ontology and suggesting new strategies for reading texts, but not as a true moral philosopher. However, unlike Heidegger, Derrida does not agree with the conclusion. In his essay “Passions” he proposes a new form which he calls the ‘new morality of deconstruction’. He challenges Kantian ethics by asking questions: What is the ethical aspect of ethics? Is there a moral aspect of morality? He suggests looking for a possibility of obligation that does not follow from *pflichtmassig*, nor from *aus Pflicht*. He questions the concepts suggested by Kant: duty in itself, responsibility in itself. In our opinion, however, this questioning creates a new moral discourse. A deconstructionist, not finding final solutions, is prepared to take responsibility for the uncertainty of this never-ending ‘may be’ moral discourse. Jürgen Habermas opposed Derrida for overemphasizing the poetic function of language and ignoring the power of daily language to solve the concrete problems of a communicative community. It can be seen that Derrida is simply missing in this Habermasian communicative space where it is necessary to formulate clear and understandable arguments for discussion. Habermas withdraws into his autobiography, singularity, secret, into his zone of signature on the deconstructive reading of Derrida.

How should we think about this ‘other relation to truth’ mentioned by Derrida? Can it be also visible? For our research, the most important are two Derrida texts: *The Truth in Painting* (*La Vérité en peinture*, 1978) and *Memoirs of the Blind: The Self Portrait and Other Ruins* (*Mémoires d’aveugle: L’autoportrait et autres ruines*, 1990). When Derrida wrote *The Truth in Painting*, he relied on the painter Paul Cezanne’s promise in his letter to Emile Bernard: “I owe you the truth in painting and I will tell it to you.”

**To tell or to paint?** The ambiguity of Cezanne’s expression opens the way for the deconstructive approach to the question.

In *Memoirs of the Blind* Derrida investigates the interconnections between visuality and the movements of the body (hand) using the reflections on the phenomenon of blindness in the history of philosophy. We consider the transformation of the Cartesian hypotheses concerning the parallel between vision and the hand movements of the blind as a rather

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informative example of a postmodern ‘turn towards vision’. The supposed idea of Descartes that a blind man sees with his hands invokes a phenomenological and deconstructive response in twentieth-century philosophy. Maurice Merleau-Ponty opposes Descartes’ hypothesis of possible second eyes in the consciousness of the seer suggesting the possibility of thought creating the image. Trying to negate the rational sources for the emergence of a vision, Merleau-Ponty stresses its pre-theoretical, prerrefective, and intuitive genesis. On the other hand, opposing Descartes’ supposed external relation between subject and object, Merleau-Ponty stresses a closer and more interrelated being in the world of a sentient body. This supposition of body as a medium between the relation of the subject and the world is stressed by Merleau-Ponty using a parallel between seeing and touching. Derrida meditates upon the insights of Merleau-Ponty, stressing the possibility of absolute invisibility. Derrida distinguishes two aspects of this absolute invisibility: transcendental and sacrificial. We consider that the argumentative strategy suggested by Derrida is much clearer when viewed from the perspective of his common practice of deconstructive reading of texts, symbols or culture, in which he merges a peculiar interchanged tissue consisting of a religious dimension, plots from the Bible, personal life experience and even dreams, conceptual modes of meaning coming from some of his other texts (in this case, the problem of sacrifice), and the experience of reading other philosophical and literary texts. In comparison with the two other philosophers mentioned, Derrida mediates the movements of the hands of a blind man totally from the perspective of the ‘turn towards vision’, all the strategies mentioned in his writing revolve around the phenomenon of blindness represented as expressed in the works of graphic art. Unlike Descartes, for meditating upon the parallel between seeing and hand movements Merleau-Ponty and Derrida used the visual arts (Merleau-Ponty – works with a colour; Derrida – graphics). In his hypothesis, Derrida concludes that a drawing of a blind man made by a blind man opens new possibilities for further reflection upon the inner phenomenology of visual art.

In contrast to Derrida, Michel Foucault concentrates his attention on the essential heterogeneity between the visible and the speakable. In collaboration with Magritte, Foucault in *This Is Not a Pipe* discovered the innate incompatibility between the word and the image. Foucault remarked that Magritte discovered the gulf “which prevents us from being both the reader and the viewer at the same time…”38

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In his experiment with words and images, Magritte included in the pictures words alongside the image, or even instead of the image, or in paradoxical correlation with the image. In 1928-29 he created the famous picture *The Treason of the Pictures (This is Not a Pipe)*, in French *La trahison des images (Ceci n’est pas une pipe*, 1928-29) in which the painted pipe coexists with the explanation written below ‘This is Not a Pipe’. In 1964 Magritte repeated this surreal word and image puzzle in the picture *This is Not an Apple (Ceci n’est pas une pomme*, 1964) in which in the same manner the realistic depiction of an apple is accompanied by the subtitle ‘This is Not an Apple’. Two years later, Magritte repeated the idea in the picture *The Two Mysteries (Les deux mystères*, 1966), in which one sees the previous picture *This is Not a Pipe* as an object in the painter’s studio with one more pipe hanging above as an air-balloon pretending to be the real pipe. Foucault reflected upon both variants of *This is Not a Pipe* with similar titles: “The first version disconcerts us by its very simplicity. The second multiplies intentional ambiguities before our eyes.”

This sequence of the painted pipes inspires Foucault to ask a number of questions leading to possible multiplicities in the relations between the pipe and its image: Are there two pipes? Or are there two drawings of the same pipe? Is there a pipe and a drawing of the same pipe, or two drawings each representing a different pipe? Or maybe there are two drawings: one representing a pipe and the other not, or still two more drawings neither of which are or represent pipes? Is a drawing representing not a pipe at all but another drawing, itself representing a pipe so that I must wonder: To what does the sentence written in the painting relate? These questions open up a kind of gap between the discourse about the pipe and the visual image of a pipe. Deleuze writing about Foucault would reflect:

In his commentary on Magritte, Foucault shows that there will always be a resurgence of ‘the little thin band, colorless and neutral’ separating text from figure, the drawing of the pipe from the statement ‘this is a pipe’ to the point where the statement becomes ‘this is not a pipe’, since neither the drawing, nor the statement, nor the ‘this’ as an apparently common form is a pipe: ‘the drawing of the pipe and the text that ought to name it cannot find a place to meet, either on the black canvas or above it’. It is a ‘non-relation’.

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39 Foucault indicates the other date 1926. Ibid., 15.
40 Ibid., 15.
41 Foucault, *This Is Not a Pipe, With Illustrations and Letters by Rene Magritte*, 16.
There is no preformed order between heterogeneities, but is there any possible common point of communication between them? In *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that this communication is neither imitation nor resemblance: at the same time, something entirely different is going on. What is this something different? In the early book *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze wrote that every system contains its dark precursor, the third party, which ensures the communication of peripheral series. Given the variety among systems, this role is fulfilled by quite diverse determinations. Deleuze does not define exactly what this dark precursor or third party is. In his book on Foucault, Deleuze returned to the problem by mentioning that Kant had already encountered a similar problem: he had to find a third agency beyond the two forms – spontaneity of understanding and the receptivity of intuition: the ‘schema’ of imagination. Deleuze discerns that even Foucault “needs a third agency to coadapt the determinable and determination, the visible and the articulable, the receptivity of light and the spontaneity of language…”

The Lithuanian artist and writer Jurga Ivanauskaitė (1961-2007) was inspired by Magritte’s experimental games both in her visual works and in her literature. Her poster for the rock group Antis (in English, *The Duck*) is based on the heterogeneity of the three meanings of the word ‘antis’ and the impossibility of reducing the three meanings to any single one. This picture raises questions very similar to those that Foucault asked about Magritte’s *This Is Not a Pipe*: Does the word ‘duck’ (Antis) written on the wall have anything in common with a real duck or only with a metaphorical duck, meaning the duck as ‘the forgery in the press’? Do these three ducks (the painted object, the name of the rock group, and the word on the wall) have something in common? Is there any hierarchy between the ducks? Which one of these is the most ‘real’? What is the possible point of meeting, the dark precursor of the three heterogeneous ducks in the picture? Our hypothesis is that Deleuze would have answered: it is a thought. This battle between heterogeneous spheres, the impossibility to be a reader and a seer at the same time, inspires thought. In his book on Foucault, Deleuze writes: “Visibilities are not denned by sight but are complexes of actions and passions, actions and reactions, multisensorial complexes, which emerge into the light of day.” As Ma-

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43 Ibid., 68.
gritte says in a letter to Foucault: “thought is what sees and can be described visibly.” The deconstruction of boundaries and the premise of heterogeneity inspiring the birth of a new thought which can be described visibly are, in our opinion, the first theoretical premise for starting to take seriously multimodality in education. The second premise was the reflection on the relation between image, word and sound in semiotics.

The desire to catch the bliss of reality through the image can be traced in the artifacts of different arts. Roland Barthes prefers the image to the photograph as a means to approach the very essence of reality’s presence. But are photographic images the only way to reality? For example, for Heidegger the secret of the concreteness of being in the world is revealed in the images painted by Vincent van Gogh, in the concreteness of the peasant’s boots. Truth in Painting, the title of Derrida’s book, challenges the discourse about the relation between painted image and reality. For film director Andrey Tarkovsky, the way to reality can be traced through the filmic shots of time itself. Deleuze in his postructuralist philosophy of cinema also mentions his belief in reality as the ideal aim for contemporary cinema. This belief means: “To believe, not in a different world, but in a link between man and the world, in love or life…” Foucault challenges the direct link between the painted image and the name in the caption as two different approaches and experiments with reality. What kind of reality are we talking about? – asks Rita Šerpytytė in her book when reflecting the forms of the new realism, challenging the lost reality of postmodern thinkers. The question is: what kind of reality had the postructuralists lost that the new realists had to restore? And what do they gain in place of this lost reality? Is reality in post-structuralist texts really lost? In any text is anything possible that can preserve and expose reality? What meaning for educational practice is held by these reflections upon the relation between image and reality?

Bibliography


45 Deleuze, Foucault, 59.
46 Deleuze, Cinema 2. The Time-Image, 170.


Chapter 2
Semiotics: Language and Image

JŪRATĖ BARANOVA

1. Verbal and Non-Verbal Signs: Eco

A discussion of the relation between language and visuality must begin by returning to the origin of the idea in classical semiotics. In *A Theory of Semiotics*, Umberto Eco returns to the father of the idea – the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), who suggested a whole new way of understanding real objects. Confronted with experience, he says, we try to elaborate ideas in order to know it. “These ideas are the first logical interpretants of the phenomena that suggest them, and which, as suggesting them, are signs, of which they are the interpretants.” Peirce maintained that objects, concepts and even ideas can be signs. Objects, insofar as they are perceived, can be approached as signs. On the other hand, it has to be stated that even the concepts of objects (as the result or as the determining schema of every perception) must be considered in a semiotic way. According to Eco, interpreting Peirce’s ideas, this leads to the straightforward assertion that ‘even ideas are signs’.

Eco concludes that this is exactly the philosophico-semiotical position of Peirce: “Whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign” (5.283). Thinking is also connecting signs together: “Each former thought suggests something to the thought which follows it, i.e., is the sign of something to this latter” (5.284). Following Peirce’s trichotomy, Eco argues that signs can be classified as ‘symbols’ (arbitrarily linked with their object), ‘icons’ (similar to their object) and ‘indices’ (physically connected with their object).

In *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, Eco seeks to reconcile a semiotic theory of signs as a correlation between a signifier and a signified (or between expression and content) and therefore an action between pairs with Peircean semiosis, which includes an interpretant. Semiosis is, according to Peirce, “an action, or influence. which is, or involves, an operation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into an action.

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2 Ibid., 166.
3 Ibid., 178.
between pairs” (c.p. 5.484). Gilles Deleuze would also return to Peircean theory in his philosophy of cinema and pedagogy of signs. We shall reflect upon that later.

Eco also relies on Piaget, who sees perception as interpretation of sensory disconnected data that are organized through a complex transactional process by a cognitive hypothesis based on previous experiences. The field of stimuli appears to the interpretant as the sign-vehicle of a possible meaning that was already possessed before the perceptual event. Eco also refers to Ward H. Goodenough who maintains that: “Every object, event or act has stimulus value for the members of a society only insofar as it is an iconic sign signifying some corresponding form in their culture.”

For this particular research on multimodal education, there is an important presumption in semiotics that every given content can be expressed both by verbal and non-verbal signs. Even in semiotics, there are different points of view as to which are more important.

For example, according to Yuri M. Lotman, verbal language can be defined as the ‘primary modelling system’, the others being only ‘secondary’, derivative (and partial) translations of some of its devices. Verbal language can be defined as the primary way in which man specularly translates his thoughts, speaking and thinking, and thus a privileged area of semiotic enquiry, so that linguistics is not only the most important branch of semiotics but the model for every semiotic activity; semiotics as a whole, according to Eco, thus becomes no more than a derivation from linguistics. As Christian Metz observes, Julien Greimas has for his part heavily stressed the importance of the linguistic code in the decipherment of visual objects. Sight, it has often been said, recognizes those things for which language has provided a name. There is, for Greimas, a large correspondence between ‘visual figures’ (optically recognizable objects, each of which is a class of object-occurrences) and certain sememes of natural languages (a sememe is the meaning of a lexeme). The optical figure of a ‘train’ – a stable, visual unit capable of being recognized among the numerous sensible variations differentiating between the diverse railroad vehicles that can be perceived – corresponds to the sememe ‘train’.

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7 Ibid., 172.
8 Ibid.
i.e., the lexeme ‘train’ where it designates a group of cars drawn by a locomotive.\(^9\) This is not a conception with which Eco totally agrees.

Eco also questions a more moderate point of view according to which only verbal language has the property of satisfying the requirement of ‘effability’. Thus, not only every human experience, but also every content expressed by means of other semiotic devices, can be translated into terms of verbal language, while the contrary is not true. Is this really so? Eco expressed doubts. He acknowledges the effability power of verbal language linked to its great articulatory and combinational flexibility, and agrees that every content expressed by a verbal unit can indeed be translated into another verbal unit; it is also true that the greater part of the content expressed by non-verbal units can also be translated into verbal units; but he also asserts:

It is likewise true that there are many contents expressed by complex non-verbal units which cannot be translated into one or more verbal units (other than by means of a very weak approximation). Wittgenstein underwent this dramatic revelation (as the Acta Philosophorum relate) during a train journey when Professor Sraffa asked him what the ‘meaning’ of a certain Neapolitan gesture was.\(^10\)

For Eco, the conception of Garroni seems more reasonable when he suggests that there is a set of contents conveyed by the set of linguistic devices, and a set of contents that is usually conveyed by a set of non-linguistic devices; both sets contribute to a subset of contents which are translatable from the ‘linguistic’ into ‘non-linguistic’ or vice versa, but this conception leaves aside a vast portion of ‘unspeakable’ but not ‘inexpressible’ contents. Eco reflects on the case of Proust’s ability to describe through words in a written text the richness of perceptions and feelings taken from the real visual world as in an impressionist-like painting, but no linguistic description can cover the content of a real painting. On the other hand, it is possible to paint some real pictures related to the content of Proust’s novel, but no painting, or even series of paintings, can possibly convey this novel as such. The ‘unspeakable’ but not ‘inexpressible’ in both alternatives – verbal and non-verbal – always remain.

Roland Barthes observed in Camera lucida. Reflections on Photography that a photograph as an image cannot be penetrated, referring to Maurice Blanchot and Jean Paul Sartre. Sartre asserted that:


\(^10\) Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 173.
In an image the object yields itself wholly, and our vision of it is certain, contrary to a text or to other perceptions which give me the object in a vague, arguable manner, and therefore incite me to suspicions as to what I think I am seeing.\(^{11}\)

Blanchot also reflected upon the inaccessibility of the image:

The essence of the image is to be altogether outside, without intimacy, and yet more inaccessible and mysterious than the thought of the innermost being; without signification, yet summoning up the depth of any possible meaning; unrevealed yet manifest, having that absence-as-presence which constitutes the lure and the fascination of the Sirens.\(^{12}\)

Susan Sontag in the text “On Photography” remarks: “The very muteness of what is, hypothetically, comprehensible in the photographs is what constitutes their attraction and provocativeness.”\(^{13}\)

From this exploration of the evidential power of the image, Eco concludes that verbal language is without doubt the most powerful semiotic device man has invented; but that nevertheless other devices do exist, covering portions of the general semantic space that verbal language does not. Therefore, even though this latter is the more powerful, it does not wholly satisfy the effability requirement; in order to be so powerful, it must often be helped along by other semiotic systems that add to its power. Eco states that one can hardly conceive of a world in which certain beings communicate without verbal language, restricting themselves to gestures, objects, unshaped sounds, tunes, or tap dancing; but it is equally hard to conceive of a world in which certain beings only utter words.

How concretely can signs be discerned in such visual activity as, for example, photography and cinema? In his text “Critique of the Image,” Eco undertook to draw up a preliminary list of the different codes that can be found to be operative within a ‘still picture’ (which constitutes a physical class of messages):

1. Perceptive Codes: studied within the psychology of perception.
2. Codes of Recognition: these build blocks of conditions of perception into semes, which are “blocks of signifieds (for example, black stripes on

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\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.
a white coat), according to which we recognize objects or recall perceived objects.”

3. **Codes of Transmission**: these construct the determining conditions for the perception of images – the dots of a newspaper photo, for instance, or the lines which make up a TV image.

4. **Tonal Codes**: this is the name we give to
   (i) the systems of optional variants already conventionalized – the prosodic features which are connoted by particular intonations of the sign (such as ‘strength’, ‘tension’, etc.);
   (ii) the true systems of connotations already stylized (for example, the ‘gracious’ or the ‘expressionistic’).

5. **Iconic Codes**: usually based on perceptible elements actualized according to codes of transmission. They are articulated into figures, signs, and semes.
   (a) **Figures**: These are conditions of perception (e.g., subject – background relationship, light contrasts, geometrical values) transcribed into graphic signs according to the rules of the code.
   (b) **Signs**: These denote
      (i) **semes** of recognition (nose, eye, sky, cloud) by conventional graphic means; or
      (ii) ‘abstract models’, symbols, conceptual diagrams of the object (the sun as a circle with radiating lines).
   (c) **Semes**: These are more commonly known as ‘images’ or ‘iconic signs’ (a man, horse, etc.).

6. **Iconographic Codes**: these elevate to ‘signifier’ the ‘signified’ of iconic codes, in order to connote more complex and culturalized semes (not ‘man’, ‘horse’, but ‘king’, ‘Pegasus’, ‘Bucephalus’, or ‘ass of Balaam’).

7. **Codes of Taste and Sensibility**: these establish (with extreme variability) the connotations provoked by semes of the preceding codes.

8. **Rhetorical Codes**: these are born of the conventionalization of as yet unuttered iconic solutions, then assimilated by society to become models or norms of communication. Like rhetorical codes in general, they can be divided into rhetorical figures, premises, and arguments.
   (a) **Visual Rhetorical Figures**: These are reducible to verbal, visualized forms. We find examples in metaphor, metonymy, litotes, amplification, etc.
   (b) **Visual Rhetorical Premises**: These are iconicographic semes bearing particular emotive or taste connotations. For example, the image of a man walking into the distance along a never-ending tree-lined road connotes ‘loneliness’; the image of a man and woman looking lovingly at a child, which connotes ‘family’ according to an iconographic code, becomes the premise for an argument along the lines: “A nice happy family is something to appreciate.”
(c) Visual Rhetorical Arguments: These are true syntagmatic concatenations imbued with argumentative capacity. They are encountered in the course of film editing so that the succession/opposition between different frames communicates certain complex assertions. For example: “Character X arrives at the scene of the crime and looks at the corpse suspiciously – he must either be the guilty party, or at least someone who is to gain from the murder.”

9. Stylistic Codes: these are determinate original solutions, either codified by rhetoric, or actualized once only. They connote a type of stylistic success, the mark of an ‘auteur’ (e.g., for a film ending: “the man walking away along a road until he is only a dot in the distance – Chaplin”), or the typical actualization of an emotive situation (e.g., “a woman clinging to the soft drapes of an antechamber with a wanton air – Belle Époque eroticism”), or again the typical actualization of an aesthetic ideal, technical-stylistic ideal, etc. Codes of the unconscious: these build up determinative configurations, either iconic or iconological, stylistic or rhetorical. By convention, they are held to be capable of permitting certain identifications or projections, of stimulating given reactions, and of expressing psychological situations. They are used particularly in persuasive media.\textsuperscript{14}

As Metz observes, Eco arrived at the number ten – ten main categories of codes – and his enumeration does not pretend to be exhaustive.\textsuperscript{15} Metz refers more to Greimas’ conception of the importance of language in deciphering visual codes. He maintains that the simple fact that a message is visual does not mean that all its codes are visual, and a code being manifested in a visual message does not mean that it is not manifested in other ways. Visual ‘language systems’ maintain with other language systems systematic connections which are many and complex, and nothing is gained by opposing the ‘verbal’ and the ‘visual’ as though they were two large blocks each being homogeneous, massive, and without irregularities, and maintaining with each other purely external logical relations (the absence of any common zone). The ‘visual’, if what is understood by this is the group of properly visual codes, does not reign as uncontested master over the parts of its alleged kingdom, i.e., over the entirety of physically visual messages. On the contrary, it plays an appreciable role.\textsuperscript{16} Even more, Metz considers that the visual image has no meaning without a verbal caption. Language as a verbal message pervades it from ‘without’ (the role of a caption which accompanies a newspaper photograph, dialogues in cinema and television commentaries, etc.), but


\textsuperscript{15} Metz, Film Language. A Semiotics of the Cinema, 31.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 34.
also from ‘within’, and even in its very visuality, which is intelligible only because its structures are partially non-visual. Metz concludes:

In truth, the notion of ‘visual’, in the totalitarian and monolithic sense that it has taken on in certain recent discussions, is a fantasy or an ideology, and the image (at least in this sense) is something which does not exist.17

In *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, Eco discerns the difference between specific and general semiotics. The former strives to become a scientific discipline, whereas the latter does not. General semiotics asks philosophical questions that are close to the capital question of any philosophy of language:

What does it mean for human beings to say, to express meanings, to convey ideas, or to mention states of the world? By which means do people perform this task? Only by words? And, if not, what do verbal activity and other signifying or communicative activities have in common?18

These questions in general semiotics have also given rise to research in the philosophy of education. Semiotics in education is first of all related to social semiotics.

2. Social Semiotics and Making Meaning in Education

Some recent works in the semiotics of education are concerned with the investigation of intermodal relations or ‘intersemiosis’, focussing on exploring the ways in which images and language function both separately and integratively to construct meaning in multimodal texts.19

One can discern the two classical sources of social semiotics stemming from quite different monomodal perspectives: the first coming from linguistics (Halliday),20 the second from visual arts and design

17 Ibid., 35.
18 Eco, *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, 8.
The attempt to overstep the monomodal perspective towards multimodality has been made from both sides. Kress and van Leeuwen in *Reading Images* (1996) suggest the concept of discussed ‘framing’ as specific to visual communication. By ‘framing’ they mean the way elements of a visual composition may be disconnected, marked off from each other, for instance by framelines, pictorial framing devices (boundaries formed by the edge of a building, a tree, etc.), empty space between elements, discontinuities of colour, and so on. The concept also includes the ways in which elements of a composition may be connected to each other, through the absence of disconnection devices, through vectors, and through continuities and similarities of colour, visual shape etc. The significance of this concept is that disconnected elements will be read as, in some sense, separate and independent, perhaps even as contrasting units of meaning, whereas connected elements will be read as belonging together in some sense, as continuous or complementary.

On the other hand, in *Multimodal Discourse: The Modes and Media of Contemporary Communication*, Kress and van Leeuwen argue that where traditional linguistics has defined language as a system working through ‘double articulation’, where a message was an articulation as a form and as a meaning, they see multimodal texts as making meaning in multiple articulations. They discern the four domains of practice in which meanings are dominantly made: discourse, design, production and distribution. In order to show a relation to Halliday’s functional linguistics, they call these domains ‘strata’, but do not see strata as being hierarchically ordered, as ‘one above the other’. Their primary interest is toanalyse the specificities and common traits of semiotic modes taking into account their social, cultural and historical production.

The term ‘social semiotics’ is also related to the concept of language as the primary source for meaning by which human beings negotiate and change their social experience (Halliday). Halliday distinguishes in language three metafunctions: the ideational (pertaining to ‘meaning’ as it arises out of the relation between text and world), the interpersonal (pertaining to the relation between communicator and addressee), and the textual (pertaining to the internal coherence of a discourse and the way it

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23 Ibid., 4.
links up to extratextual context). The followers of Halliday argue that these metafunctions are applicable also to non-verbal texts. As Len Unsworth observes, Halliday emphasizes that language is only one semiotic system among many, which might include forms of art such as painting, sculpture, music and dance and other modes of cultural behaviour not usually classified as art, such as modes of dress, family structures etc. All of these modes of meaning-making interrelate, and their totality might be thought of as a way of defining a culture. All semiotic systems are related to the meaning-making functions they serve within social contexts.

A serious attempt at moving towards multimodality in education relying on Halliday’s social semiotics was made with the book _Multimodal Semiotics. Functional Analysis in Contexts of Education_, edited by Unsworth. Different aspects of social semiotics in education were discussed: semiotics in the school curriculum, semiotics and 3D space, semiotics in film, semiotics in news and film theory.

Kress and van Leeuwen also proposed that images, like language, always simultaneously realize three different kinds of meanings. Images construct not only representations of ‘material reality’ but also the interpersonal interaction of ‘social reality’ (such as relations between viewers and what is viewed). In addition, images cohere into textual compositions in different ways and so realize ‘semiotic reality’. Social-semiotic ideas were further developed in relation to ‘displayed art’ (O’Toole, 1994), music and sound (van Leeuwen, 1999) and action (Martinec, 1998, 2000a, 2000b), and also of 3D space (O’Toole, 1994, 2004; Ravelli, 2006), filmic text (van Leeuwen, 1991, 1996), semiotics of space (O’Toole, 1994, 2004; Ravelli, 2006). As Unsworth remarks: any communicative context can be described in terms of three main variables: field, tenor and mode:

Field is concerned with the social activity, its content or topic; Tenor is the nature of the relationships among the people involved in the communication; and Mode is the medium and channel of communication. In relation to language Mode is concerned with the role of language in the situation – whether spoken or written, accompanying or constitutive of the activity, and the ways in which relative information value is conveyed. These situational variables are related to the three overarching

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areas of meaning, or metafunctions – ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’.27

In “Multimodal Representation of Educational Meanings in Montessori Pedagogy,” Susan Feez reveals the perspective of multimodal semiotics in education in the teaching of the Italian educator Maria Montessori, who suggested starting education from the practical activity of the children (3-6 and 6-9 years old) using concrete objects. In this pedagogy, the children first of all see the action of the teacher and learn to imitate it, only subsequently learning to articulate it in verbal form. Children are involved in practical activity and through it they learn language and meanings. Imitation, following Lev Vygotsky,28 “assumes a certain understanding of the significance of the action of another,” indicating the presence of the type of developmental opportunity Vygotsky describes as a ‘zone of proximal development’. Imitation, from this point of view, “can be compared with dialogue because it is an interactive activity in which meaning is shared (and constructed collaboratively).”29 Thus, as children internalize abstract meanings, they abandon the redundant excess concrete coding. The deliberate use of external objects as signs in order to capture meanings and hold them still for reflection and recall, has further significance in Vygotsky’s model of development. Feez observes that language in this pedagogy is very economical, but nonetheless of crucial importance. The way the Montessori representation of educational meanings in concrete form allows children to retrieve adult symbolic meaning as a ‘signal’ for something that is ‘physically present to the senses’30 can be explored in more detail by means of the ‘grammar of semiosis’,31 i.e., Halliday’s modelling of relational grammar.32

The research carried out by Unsworth and the whole group aimed to transcend disciplinary boundaries in order to achieve the kind of integrated focus necessary to research issues in fields such as multimodal semiotics and education. They consider that this kind of transdisciplinary

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27 Ibid., 2.
32 Feez, Multimodal Representation of Educational Meanings in Montessori Pedagogy, 206. See also Halliday and Matthiessen, An Introduction to Functional Grammar.
approach has been demonstrably productive to date, and seems crucial in the future for those in social-semiotics and in education who need to understand how the emerging textual habitat integrates multiple meaning-making systems, such as language, image, sound, movement; multiple ‘text’ generation devices, such as digital cameras, scanners, computer software viz. multimedia authoring systems; and multiple communication formats such as computer screens, ipods, handheld/pocket personal electronic organizing devices, and mobile phones.

A group of scholars relying on the insights of social semiotics conducted the research on the relation between very young children’s imagination and social interaction presented in Making Meaning Constructing Multimodal Perspectives of Language, Literacy, and Learning through Arts-based Early Childhood Education. The author of the Forward, Mary Jenck Jalongo, points out that for the very young, even more so than for human beings of other ages, visual images, spoken words, interpersonal interactions, and the printed word are all of a piece rather than neatly compartmentalized. The ultimate irony is that, after years of formal education have persuaded them to pigeonhole thought, they will need to reclaim that free-wheeling, nonliteral type of thinking from childhood if ever they hope to excel in any field (Csikzentmihalyi; Shavinina and Ferrari).

In this particular book, we are restricting the domain of our investigation and concentrating on the semiotics of the image in photography, painting, music and film. Although we acknowledge the importance of semiotics in multimodal research, we do wish to reflect the achievements of other methodologies, especially those from French post-structuralism.

3. Barthes: Nietzschean Personalism in Photographic Education

How can photography be included in education? How is it possible to develop a student’s critical thinking by using photographs? Is it possible to take a photo of thought? What does this process of interpreting the images in photographs reveal? In the process of such an interpretation, can we speak of fragments of the ‘real reality’ or just about the images constructed by the technique used?

An attempt to present meaning-making through reflections on photography was made by Victor Burgin in Thinking Photography, in which he gathered essays by Umberto Eco, Allan Sekula, John Tagg and Simon

33 Unsworth, Multimodal Semiotic Analyses and Education, 8-9.
Watney for analysing the semiotics of the image. In the Introduction, Burgin observes:

In speaking of photographic education, we should distinguish between two quite different pedagogic practices. In the first, a vocational training is given for some particular branch of industry and/or commerce – as when a school trains people to become advertising photographers. In this type of course academic studies will tend to be pragmatic – their content being determined by its practical bearing on the specific form of photography being taught. In the second type of course, no particular vocational training is imposed; the student is asked, rather, to consider photography in its totality as a general cultural phenomenon, and to develop his or her own ideas as to what direction to pursue. Academic studies in the context of this latter type of course are presented as heuristic – aiming to provide the student with a wide range of facts, and a number of critical tools, in the interests of developing an informed capacity for independent thought.35

As already mentioned, Eco argues that while there may be no single code at work in the photographic image, no homogeneous ‘language of photography’, there is nevertheless a ‘plurality’ of codes, most of which pre-exist the photograph, and they interact in the photograph in complex ways. An iconic sign, as was said before, is nearly always a seme – i.e., something which does not correspond to a word in the verbal language but is nevertheless an utterance. The image of a horse does not mean ‘horse’ but as a minimum ‘a white horse stands here in profile’.36

French semiotician Roland Barthes (1915–1980) seeks to apply Saussure’s theory of signification to nonlinguistic systems, such as fashions and advertisements, and treats media as analogous to verbal language. But when he reflects on photography in Camera lucida. Reflections on Photography, he turns from semiology to a more personalized interpretation and calls this new approach mathe sis singularis as opposed to universalis. He maintains that he returned to the Nietzschean ‘ego’s ancient sovereignty’ as a heuristic principle.37 He argues that he “wanted to learn at all costs what photography was ‘in itself’: by what essential feature it was to be distinguished

He is not satisfied with the various perspectives imposed upon photography: either empirical (Professionals/Amateurs), or rhetorical (Landscapes/Objects/Portraits/Nudes), or aesthetic (Realism/Pictorialism). Each of these approaches is external to the object, whereas Barthes is concerned about the essence of the object. Barthes maintains that when considering the essence of photography, its first feature is the contingency of the event, which is never transcended for the sake of something else. It designates reality by indicating that it is there. A specific photograph, in fact, is never ‘immediately’ or ‘generally’ distinguished from its referent (from what it represents). This requires a secondary action of knowledge or of reflection. It is impossible to answer why one chose (photographed) this object, this moment, rather than some other. For this reason, according to Barthes, photography is unclassable because “there is no reason to ‘mark’ this or that of its occurrences; it aspires, perhaps, to become as crude, as certain, as noble as a sign, which would afford it access to the dignity of a language: but for there to be a sign there must be a mark; deprived of a principle of marking, photographs are signs which don’t ‘take’, which ‘turn’, as milk does.”

Whatever it grants to vision and whatever its manner, a photograph is always invisible: “it is not it that we see.” For Barthes, no texts on photography are satisfactory. He discerns the uneasiness of being in-between two types of language: expressive and critical. The critical language is also divided into several discourses: of sociology, of semiology, and of psychoanalysis. What is Barthes suggestion: how to transcend from the visual image as a content seen in the concrete photography to the verbal reflection and description? Barthes methodology suggested in Camera lucida. Reflections on Photography is the following: resistance to any reductive system.

What are Barthes’ suggestions for educating this Nietzschean ‘ego’s ancient sovereignty’ as a heuristic principle? Barthes suggests reflecting on the image in a photograph not from the point of view of the photographer, but from the point of view of the spectator. For the spectator, the most important questions are: Did this photograph please me? Interest me? Intrigue me? Barthes identifies with this imaginary spectator and reflects his own content of consciousness during the encounter with the images of the photograph. What particular aspects of this experience does he consider the most important?

The distinction between studium and punctum seems quite productive. When we learn to look at photographs from the point of view of studium,
we see them as political testimony or good historical scenes. From this perspective, we are culturally interested in figures, the settings, the gestures, the actions, and the photographer’s intentions. But when we approach the photograph from the perspective of *punctum*, we are searching for a personal event as an adventure. Barthes writes that at the particular moment of *punctum* “some element rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow and pierces me.” A “Photograph’s *punctum* is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).” The *studium* is the field of liking, not of loving. The *punctum* is a kind of loving. *Punctum* is a detail that elicits sympathy in me, even tenderness. For Barthes, the image in a photograph is a possible way to approach reality itself. He writes: “To perceive the referent, to be no longer medium, to be no longer a sign, but the thing itself.” “This *something* has triggered me, has provoked a tiny shock, a *satori*, the passage of a void (it is of no importance that its referent is insignificant).”

The *studium* is ultimately always coded, but the *punctum* is not. Barthes writes: “I am learning on my own experience as a child (or maniac — without culture codes).” Barthes discerns the *punctum* as a kind of a subtle beyond, towards absolute excellence of being, body and soul together. When he discovered the *punctum* he was overwhelmed by the truth of the image. Every photograph, Barthes says, is a certificate of presence. Its force is nonetheless superior to everything the human mind can or can have conceived to assure us of reality, but also this reality is never anything but a contingency.

The young Lithuanian artist Rūta Spelskytė uses this Barthian heuristic *punctum* approach in her Ph.D. dissertation. She reflects on her own childhood photos trying to catch glimpses of lost reality time. She writes:

*Punctum* – the one that cuts to your heart. I try to find differences between my investigation of the history of WW2 and my memories. *Punctum 1* is a story about me, a five-year-old child, riding a train back home with my mother. During the ride, the last section of the train burst in flames, and we witness it burn down. Unfortunately, twenty years have passed, and I couldn’t find any proof of that event. I write about my deep connection to train travelling in a small chapter “Train practice. *Punctum 2*” which is the story of me, an eleven-year-old girl, acting in a

41 Ibid., 26.
42 Ibid., 27.
43 Ibid., 49.
44 Ibid., 59.
45 Ibid., 76.
movie. I am analysing the movie scene where the camera focuses on me just looking at the camera lens. The sign ‘Hitler’ is behind my back as I watch the street theatre. They are acting the murder of a woman by cutting her head off. I have different memories of the recording, but I can’t deny the fact that the girl in front of the camera is me. The reality is entirely mixed for me in this one.  

(Figure 1 and Figure 2).

Figure 1. Two photos of the same embankment. With the inscription “Hitler kaput!” (“Hitler is dead!” in Russian slang) from Spelskytė’s childhood together with a contemporary photo of the embankment with graffiti pictures. Photo by Rūta Spelskytė.

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As Metz remarks, films could have a ‘meaning’ which is directly comprehended or ‘lived’ by the spectator. Barthes suggested that this phenomenological level of meaning, directly ‘lived’ by the spectator, is possible in photographs. Spelskytė also tries to return to past reality time as experience really lived. She already has doubts about the reality of an event: is this recorded reality truly real? But no records about the terrible fire in the train appeared in the media. Spelskytė checks the newspapers searching for records but finds none. The fire was a real accident during Soviet times and the author of this text remembers it perfectly; everyone was talking about it. But the Soviet newspapers kept silent. The news spread like an epic story from person to person. The reason for there being no photographic record lay in the very conception of socialism: no catastrophes are possible in a country of socialist happiness. In On Photography, Susan Sontag provides a sociological analysis of photographic signs. She affirms that photography is a capitalist invention; capitalism needs the distribution of images, and it diffuses them in order to advertise capitalist production. This particular case of the absence of official photographs of the train fire in a socialist society and its traces remaining only in a personal childhood memory reveals that photography really has a connection with the political structure of society. Suddenly the punctum of the photograph described by Spelskytė transforms itself into studium. It suggests ways for reflecting on the social structure of a past society. This case of the absent photo can be used in teaching history, social sciences, or moral structures in educational practice.

Sontag sees a difference between education using photographs and education using older, more artisan painted images. The sheer number of photographs is immense – they surround us on all sides. They teach us a
new visual code: photographs alter and enlarge our notion of what is worth looking at and what we have a right to observe. Photography shapes the ethics of seeing and gives us a sense that we can hold the whole world in our hands. Some photographers react to this uncontrolled process using Sontag’s words: the ‘insatiability of the photographing eye’. The Lithuanian photographer Dovilė Dagienė says:

I have my own opinion about the noise of images surrounding us. This boundless making of photos and sharing images not only discredits the profession of photographer on the whole, but also breaks us of the experience of the aesthetics of image... There should not be many photographs, but let them be of good quality in all aspects.

Barthes did not care about the number of images surrounding us because he meditated only on those photographs that interested him. Some were the product of well-known photographers; some were cases of war. But most of all he was impressed by family photos, especially by a photo of his mother that was probably made by a professional photographer in a photo studio. Dagienė also says she dislikes being photographed by street photographers, but from time to time she gathers her family together to be photographed in a studio by a professional photographer. Such an attentive approach to a family’s or person’s image in photographs is comparable to the uniqueness of old painted portraits.

Like Barthes, Sontag says that photography is the material evidence of the reality of some event, or unique moment, but, on the other hand, can also be seen as possession of the object that is photographed. In our opinion, this is related to the ‘aggression of the gaze’ Foucault wrote about in *Madness and Civilization*. Emmanuel Lévinas also reflected on this aggression of the gaze and suggested changing the omnipotence of seeing by the potentiality of hearing the other person’s voice crying for mercy: “Do not kill.” In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre, when discussing the phenomenological reflection on concrete relations with the other, revealed the possible shame in the situation of facing the other person’s gaze. The gaze of the other takes us from being a subject of freedom to the state of the body as an object one can choose or control. Barthes reflects a lot about the sign of death emerging in the photograph of a person. He sees death in the picture as a spectator: “By giving me the absolute past of the

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48 https://www.zmones.lt/naujiena/fotomenininke-dovile-dagiene-%E2%80%9Ebėsaikis -fotografavimas-diskreditavo-fotografo-profesija.ffe1d125-7e2c-11e986a7a000054e883?fbclid=IwAR2b7MdBUZ9uYOLcP56sFxxXgvWT2axACKrnE-BiKx8qenOzoR3QhZQijR689.
pose(aorist), the photograph tells me of death in the future.”


But he also sees the signs of death as becoming the object in the photograph: “Each photograph always contains this imperious sign of my future death.”

For a long time, Derrida refused to be photographed, for two reasons as he later explained. The first: to emphasize the text, not the author. The second was to avoid the omnipotence of death he discerns in every one of his personal pictures. By making photographs, one can feel not only the mortality of the other or our own person, but also his or her fragility and vulnerability. In the light of this reflection the question arises: how should we treat the tendency of the young generation to make numerous photos of oneself (selfies) and publish them on social sites (Facebook or Instagram). For the purposes of educational experiments, the following questions are suitable for discussion: What does one seek by fixing one’s face in numerous copies? To overcome mortality through numerous copies? To explore possibilities by feeling satisfaction from inborn narcissism? To overcome inborn insignificance and the feeling of the existential void?

Furthermore, has this ‘black box’ only technical aspects or does it include also the magical creative forces of the photographer? Recent experiments in photography as art and as a way to learn and to reflect some hidden aspects of reality itself, as a ‘black box’, also reveal new possibilities of the photographic image. And what can the photographic image reveal from the point of view not of the spectator, but of the photographer? Is a photographer a person who is always mute? Incapable of explaining what he is doing? Waiting for an explanation?

The Lithuanian photographer Dagienė reflects on how she came to the series of photographs “The Boy with a Stick” (Bermiukas su lazda). She created the series by trying to understand the world of her own children growing up. When one of her boys presented her with a collection of sticks that he gathered himself, she started to make photos of the boys playing with sticks. This habit of playing with sticks, according to the photographer, is common to all children, but due to the fact that she was raising the boys and was close to their world, she titled the series “The Boy with a Stick.” “I understood,” she remarks, “that in the hands of a child a stick is an archaic ahistorical tool to investigate the world. By the use of the imagination a stick is transformed into various different

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50 Ibid., 97.
shapes." This series won the second-place award in the prestigious Sony World Photograph Awards competition.

Another experiment in using photography to explore the secrets of being was provided by Dagiene in a series of photos in her latest project on astrophotography, where the photographic image, astrophysics and philosophical ideas come together. When speaking about her own work, the photographer asks abstract questions: What are time and moment in a photograph? How is it possible to investigate time by the means of a photograph? Her series “Here then, there now” is based on the information that it takes eight minutes for the light of the Sun to reach the surface of Earth. The photographer tries to catch this particular time in the image. She reflects: “When one is taking a photo of the Sun, it moves to a higher point. This series is titled ‘Here then, there now’ for the reason that time as an intangible dimension slips from my hands.” The photos were made in a little town in Italy during sunrise and sunset. The photographer considers that abstract visual language is also present in her photos and they are open to interpretation.

In her multimodal Visual Arts doctoral project How to Get Out of Your Head. Story of Love, War and Clouds (2019), the previously mentioned young Lithuanian artist Spelskytė includes not only reflections on Barthes punctum, but also her own photography, together with works of graphics, sculpture and written text. She reveals how photography can become a channel for learning, for experimental educational investigation, in the process of revealing some aspects of a problem and presenting an abstract question as an event of abstract thought through different installations, graphic works, and projected events, including travel and isolation. The main topic of her investigation is the phenomenon of miscommunication, revealed in misunderstandings, failures of dialogue, lost love, unanswered letters and in extreme cases – in real wars. Her heuristic method can be extrapolated in some sense from Barthes’ distinction between studium and punctum. She is engaged directly in the studium because of the nature of her project. The object of her study is not only photos, texts or

53 See https://www.saatchiart.com/dagiene.
other artefacts, but the places and the remnants of reality itself. In this process, the *studium* becomes *punctum*. She exposes her own self to the world in order to hear the silent voice of things that are unspeakable. She travels to spaces where battles took place, constructs and presents their maps, stays and meditates in the fields surrounded by grass and trees as if by these actions she could catch the secret meaning of miscommunication as destruction by war. In one insight, she is able to unite different fragments of visual seeing, verbal expression and thought. From these fragments she creates a multimodal narrative like a kaleidoscopic mosaic, in which image, thought, word and the idea itself have equal rights. Their mutual relationships depend on the angle from which one is watching the kaleidoscope at any particular moment. There are two photos published in her Ph.D. project material. In a teaching experiment, it is possible to suggest meditation on the first photo at the very beginning. The viewer sees an image of a round hole in the forest floor, full of water. The circumference of the hole is very regular (Figure 3).

The following question can be asked as the first step in the discussion: What do you think – why is the hole so regular? What might be the origin of such a regular shape? When hypotheses on the possible origin of the strange hole have been put forward and discussed, the leader of the teaching experiment can reveal Spelskytė’s caption, which states that the hole is the remnant of an exploded bomb from the Second World War. Even the exact dimensions of the bomb are indicated. In the second photo, one can see the same hole but without water and with the author of the image standing in the centre. The caption announces: “When reflecting on the possibility of lowering the camera into the water after the very hot summer of 2019, we came to the bomb crater and found the
water totally dried up." (Figure 4). The students can be asked what they think the captions reveal about the meaning of the photos. Can their meaning be understood without captions? A possible suggestion would be to write an essay comparing these two photos, asking: What, according to your opinion, is more important: image, thought or word in this particular case? It is also possible to carry out a similar experiment using the signs of lost reality that the students had noticed in their surroundings and present them for discussion to the community of inquiry in the classroom.

Figure 4. Rūta Spelskytė in the same hole

4. Photography and Cinema: Two Cases of Technical Images

Vilém Flusser (1920-1991) distinguishes two very important events in human civilization: ‘the invention of linear writing’ and ‘the invention of technical images’. Photography, like cinema or digital projects, belongs to the sphere of technical images, which essentially differs from writing and from ancient paintings. Technical images are third-degree abstractions; they are indirect products of scientific texts. Flusser says that technical images are not symbols in need of deciphering, but symptoms of the world they convey: a kind of window on the world. A spectator trusts them as he trusts his own eyes. If a spectator criticizes them at all, he does so not as a critique of the image, but of the world ‘as seen through’ them. Flusser concludes:

Such a lack of critical attitude towards technical images is dangerous in a situation where these images are about to displace...

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texts, and because the ‘objectivity’ of the technical image is a delusion.\textsuperscript{58}

Technical images owe their origins to a new type of imagination, the capacity to transcode concepts from texts into images. With traditional images, we easily recognize that we are dealing with symbols. What we see when we look at technical images are newly transcoded concepts concerning the world ‘out there’. According to Flusser, a painter elaborates image symbols ‘in his head’ and then transfers those symbols by means of a brush applying paint to a surface. If one wishes to decipher such images, one must decode the coding process which has occurred ‘in the head’ of the painter. Flusser states that with technical images, however, the matter is not so simple: meaning seems to flow into the factor from one side (the input) and out again from the other side (the output). What occurs during this passage through the factor remains hidden. The factor is a black box. In fact, the coding process of technical images occurs inside this black box, and every critique of technical images must concentrate on ‘whitening’ the interior of the black box.\textsuperscript{59} 

André Bazin treats film as a visual spectacle: a normal narrative film, he asserts, is like a photographed play, with the changes in the camera position selecting and stressing certain details. Photography and cinema belong to the same type, in Metz’ words, the audiovisual, which includes cinema, television, some radiophonic productions (and, more generally, different sorts of sound recordings), photography, the photo-novel (and, more generally, diverse sorts of sequences of still photographs), comic strips, etc. There are certain ‘border areas’, some of which, such as the radar picture, are unexpected, and others like painting and music. Metz supposes that “these diverse language systems have physical definitions which are at the same time different and similar (which explains the complexity of the codes and their respective specificities).”\textsuperscript{60}

What are the differences and similarities between the two types of technical images: photography and cinema? This question can be a good subject for discussion with students relying on their practice.

Barthes states that he liked photography ‘in opposition’ to cinema, from which he nonetheless failed to distinguish it.\textsuperscript{61} According to him, photography differs from cinema because cinema has a power which at

\textsuperscript{58} Vilém Flusser, \textit{Towards a Philosophy of Photography,} ed. Derek Bennett (Göttingen: European Photography, 1984), 4.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 5.


first glance photography does not have: “The screen (as Bazin has re-
marked) is not a frame but a hideout; the man or woman who emerges
from it continues living; a ‘blind field’ constantly doubles our partial vi-
sion.” When he confronts, as he says, millions of photographs, including
those with a good _studium_, he senses no blind field: everything which hap-
pens within the frame dies absolutely once it passes beyond the frame.
Barthes maintains that when we define the photograph as a motionl
ess image, this does not mean only that the figures it represents do not move;
It means that they do not ‘emerge’, do not ‘leave’: they are anesthetized
and fastened down, like butterflies. However, once there is a _punctum_, a
blind field is created: in the photograph, something has ‘posed’ in front
of the tiny hole and remains there forever (that is my feeling); but in cin-
ema, something ‘has passed’ in front of this same tiny hole: the pose is
swept away and denied by a continuous series of images: it is a different
phenomenology, and therefore the beginning of a different art, albeit de-
rived from the first.

Cinema can be different from photography, as Barthes says, from a
phenomenological viewpoint: discovering the presence of the thing.
Barthes supposes that the cinema’s raw material is photographic, but its
image does not have completeness as it does in photography. This may
be fortunate for the cinema. Why? Barthes answers:

Because the photograph, taken in flux, is impelled, ceaselessly
drawn toward other views; in the cinema, no doubt, there is
always a photographic referent, but this referent shifts) it does
not make a claim in favor of its reality, it does not protest its
former existence; it does not cling to me: it is not a _spectre_.

Barthes, returning to Husserl, says that, like the real world, the filmic
world is sustained by the presumption that, as Husserl says, “the experi-
ence will constantly continue to flow by in the same constitutive style”;
but the photograph breaks the ‘constitutive style’ (this is its astonish-
ment); it is ‘without future’ (this is its pathos, its melancholy); in it, there
is no protensity. Whereas the cinema is protensive, hence in no way mel-
ancholic (what is it, then? It is simply normal, like life). Motionless, the
photograph flows back from presentation to retention.

Barthes reflected on the essence of photography without involving
the concept of semiotic signs, but in discussing the different examples of
feature cinema, he again discerned the significance of the signs. In his
essay “Romans in the Movies,” he analysed from this point of view the

63 Ibid., 89-90.
movie *Julius Caesar* (USA, 1953) directed and written by Joseph I. Mankiewicz starring Marlon Brando. Barthes discerned the intention of the creators as being to expose the main sign of Romanity: all male characters wear bangs. The bangs are of different styles: some are curly, some are straight, some are tufted, and some are pomaded, but, as Barthes observes rather ironically, bald men are not allowed in the movie: “… Romans are Roman by the most legible of signs, that bit of toupee over the forehead.”

The other important symbol in this particular feature is ‘sweat as a sign of morality’. Barthes supposes that the effect is obtained by the use of vaseline. Why morality? Everyone sweats because of the inner tension caused by their intention to kill Caesar. To sweat is to think. The only man who fails to sweat is Caesar himself. He does not think, he knows nothing about the plot to kill him, and so remains calm and smooth-skinned. By discerning these two types of signs in *Julius Caesar*, Barthes intends to show the comic aspects of Hollywood production. He concludes that the sign ought to present itself only in two extreme forms: either frankly or intellectually.

Which kind of technical image is able to approach closer to reality – photography or cinema? For an educational experiment, students can be asked to watch the feature *Blow Up* created by Italian director Michelangelo Antonioni: What aspects of photography does this feature reveal?

What can be the possible sources of motivation for choosing the profession of photographer? Watching movies about this profession is one possibility for students to search for the answer to this question; for example *The Salt of the Earth* (2014) by Wim Wenders. A possible suggestion is that they write an essay and organize the discussion relying on the reflections of the main hero: “I must go to the places where the world experiences the largest pain. In order through the photos to tell the history of humankind.” With the feature film *A Thousand Times Good Night* (2013) by the Norwegian film director Erik Poppe, a possible topic for an essay or discussion is: When and why can the profession of photographer become fateful? By including the feature film *Everlasting Moments* (2008) by Swedish film director Jan Troell in the educational process, it is possible to go back to the times when photography was invented. A possible topic for discussion would be: When and how did photography become salvation? The educator can also suggest a documentary on war photography titled *War Photographer* (2001) by Christian Frei. A possible

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topic for discussion: What sources enable one to overcome difficult professional challenges and the fear of war in the hot spots of conflict?

5. Language and Meaning in Cinema

In *Language and Cinema*, Metz declares: “The so-called semiotics of the cinema is primarily concerned with the ‘filmic fact’.” He distinguishes ‘filmic fact’ from ‘cinematic fact’. ‘Cinematic fact’ represents a vast ensemble of phenomena taking place before, after and during a film. Some of these phenomena intervene before the film (the economic infrastructure of production, studios, banks or other financing, national laws, sociology of the contexts of decision making, technological equipment and emulsions, biography of film producers, etc.), others after the film (the social, political, and ideological impact of the film on different publics, ‘patterns’ of behaviour or of sentiments induced by the viewing of films, audience responses, audience surveys, mythology of stars, etc.), and, finally, others during the film but aside from and outside of it (the social ritual of the projection of the film – less formal than in the classic theatre, but retaining its sobriety even in everyday sociocultural situations – the furnishing and decoration of the theatre, the technical operating methods of the projectionist, the role of the theatre attendants – that is to say their function in various economic or symbolic systems, which does not detract from their practical inutility).

On the other hand, the term ‘film’ means a more manageable, specifiable signifying discourse. Metz considers that semiotics, whether of the film or of anything else, is the study of discourses and ‘texts’. Film, because, unlike cinema, it constitutes a delimitable space – an object devoted from beginning to end to signification, a closed discourse – can only be envisaged ‘as a language system’ in its entirety. The economic and technological aspects of film production are excluded from the domain of cinematic discourse and its semiotic analysis. Is this discourse totally closed? How does this cinematic ‘text’ differ from written texts? Metz affirms:

Common intuition situates the film in the same series as ‘book’, ‘statue’, etc., and cinema in the same series as ‘literature’, ‘sculpture’, etc. In music, one speaks of different musical ‘pieces’; in the same way, each film is in some way a cinematic ‘piece’.67

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66 Ibid., 12.
67 Ibid., 24-25.
Is it totally independent from literary texts? Metz affirms that this cinematic discourse depends on five different sensory orders: the visual image, the musical sound, the verbal sound of speech, sound effects, and the graphic form of credits. He therefore concludes that it would in any case be impossible to define the film as a linguistic phenomenon without taking into account the fact that it makes use of five signifying codes. To this extent, the semiotics of film is inextricably tied to the 'psychological' considerations (perceptual mechanisms, inherent properties of the visual image, etc.), utilized in a different perspective. It also cannot ignore the 'form of the content' (Metz used this term in the sense of Louis Hjelmslev) of different films, i.e., the organization of what is called the 'themes' of the film: the internal organization of meaning underlying a given film, etc. Metz concludes that: “a semiotic analysis inevitably encounters sociology, cultural history, aesthetics, psychoanalysis, etc.”

The ‘semiotics’ of film depends not on the methods of these disciplines, but on their data.

Metz treats ‘cinema’ as a language “made up of a combination of moving photographic images, sounds, words, and music; and ‘silent pictures’ is the language which utilizes only the first of these four elements.” Cinema has its own specific language system, as for example photography, drawing, graphic schematization, ‘diagramatization’, cartography, etc. also have their own language systems. On the other hand, Metz observes that these different, perfectly distinct, systems intervene in the same message, and that many of them are not specific to the language system, have a larger socio-cultural significance and also appear in other language systems used by the same civilization at the same time. He relies on the insights of Eco already discussed in this book and also on those of Greimas.

Metz considers that the visible world and language ‘are not strangers to one another'; he states that although the interaction of their codes has not been studied in all its detail, and although one could hardly reduce the relationship between them to an integral and servile ‘copy’ one of the other, it remains no less certain that one function (among others) of spoken language is to name the units articulated by sight (but also to help it to articulate them), and that one function (among others) of sight is to influence the semantic configurations of language (but also to be influenced by it).

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68 Ibid., 16.
69 Ibid., 25.
70 Ibid., 31-32.
In *Narration in the Fiction Film*, David Bordwell follows Metz’s treatment of feature film as an investigation of the perceptual-cognitive process, and also seeks to reflect the narrative activity in fictional cinema. He asks key questions that are important also for filmic educational theory: How does cinematic narration work? What does the spectator do in comprehending a narrative film? He treats film viewing as a dynamic perceptual-cognitive process and opposes the passive role of the spectator. He uses the theory of narration to explain the narrational operations across entire films, also including time and space in the narrational mediums. Bordwell discerns two types of narration theories: diegetic and mimetic. Diegetic theories conceive of narration as consisting either literally or analogically of verbal activity, i.e., telling. A telling can be verbal or written. Mimetic theories conceive of narration as consisting of the presentation of a spectacle: i.e., showing. This considers only the mode of imitation and either can be applied to any medium. A narrative film represents story events from the point of view of an invisible observer or imaginary witness. The film creator and theoretician Vsevolod Pudovkin claimed that utilizing an invisible observer’s perceptions in a film style could mimic ordinary experience. Ivor Montagu observed that the spectator is mainly the invisible observer and can see in films unseen details of everyday life. Some film creators from Hollywood state that the camera is the invisible observer. The theory of the invisible observer tries to catch the flux of everyday life and is opposed to distanced theatrical filming. Relying on the concept of the invisible spectator, MacCabe develops the theory of meta-language he discerns as being parallel in the literary novel and narrative cinema, expressing the diegetic approach to narration. In the novel, the narrative prose is meta-language that can state all the truths in object language (in inverted commas) and can also explain its relation to the world. In classical film, the same meta-language is the camera, which tells a truth against which one can measure all other discourses. There is an opposition between spoken discourse, which can be mistaken, and visual discourse, which tells the truth. Because of the visual language, the spectator can understand truth that is not clear for the characters. Bordwell disagrees with the idea of meta-language and opposes to it the theory of Mikhail Bakhtin, who also sees the novel as a set of discourses. But these discourses are based on dialogue or heteroglossia, more like the Galilean conception of language. Bordwell transfers Bakhtin’s idea to cinema and says that “filmic narration can often be better characterized by the interplay of potentially equivalent narrational factors than by the flattering of all elements under a monolithic “meta-language.”

Bordwell also leaves behind film narration as an enunciation theory based on Emile Benveninte’s pairing of the enounced or the utterance and the enunciation. The utterance is a stretch of text, a string of words, sentences, linked by the principles of coherence the enunciation is the general process that creates the utterance. It includes the speaker, the listener and some references to their shared world. Metz in his text “Histoire/Discourse” also thinks that cinema as an institution has some aspects of the enunciative dimension by virtue of the filmmaker’s intentions and the influence he wields over the general public. The questions: How do we find the enunciation? Who ‘speaks’ in a film? To whom is it addressed? In what circumstances is it spoken? can be suggested for discussion in educational practice. Bordwell agrees that enunciation theory gave a great deal of impetus to film style and more sophisticated cinephile discussion, but, according to him:

We need a theory of narration that it is not bound to vague or atomistic analogies between representational systems, that does not privilege certain techniques and that is broad enough to cover many cases, but supple enough to discriminate among types, levels and historical manifestations of narration.\(^72\)

In Bordwell’s view, however, none of these theories has much to say about the spectator. When the perceiver is discussed, it is usually as the victim or dupe of narrational illusion-making. According to Bordwell, MacCabe’s ‘metalanguage’ or Metz’s ‘discourse-disguised-as-history’ fool the viewer into taking the narration for an unmediated and natural ‘representation’. But Bordwell argues that a film cues the spectator to execute a definable variety of operations.\(^73\) These operations are not necessarily modelled on linguistic activities: the principles of metaphor or metonymy. The narrative film is constructed in such a way as to encourage the spectator to treat story telling as story-constructing activities. According to Bordwell, the film presents cues, patterns and gaps that shape the spectator’s application of schemata and the testing of hypotheses, based on prior knowledge and experience.\(^74\) While watching a narrative film, the spectator takes it as a goal to arrange the events in temporal sequence. The narrative requires chronological order. Bordwell affirms that films with complex time patterns can supply the audience with new schemata or encourage seeing the film more than once. Film viewing can therefore be seen as a complicated, or even skilled activity. Bordwell suggests a

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 26.
\(^{73}\) Ibid., 29.
\(^{74}\) Ibid., 32.
schema stating that the spectator’s thinking ability is involved in this operation. As the spectator constructs the narrative, he believes his central goal is to construct an intelligible story. The patterns of comprehending and recalling a story are the same for all age groups. One must assume that stories are composed of discriminate elements united by certain principles, and that they contain essential and secondary points. In the context of our educational experiments, it is quite important to consider Bordwell’s conclusion that, faced with the absence of information, the storyteller makes some hypotheses and actively constructs omitted parts seeking causal relations between events, irrespective of whether the story is about past or future events. According to Bordwell, striving for unity, including unity with previous experience, provides the drive to achieve meaning. The viewer must grasp character relations and dialogues and test the narrative information for consistency. The question, Does it hang together in a way one can identify with?, is important for every comprehension of a narrative text – written or visual.

In the chapter “Three Dimensions of Film Narrative,” from A Poetics of Cinema, Bordwell states that a story can be presented not only in language but also through pantomime, dance, images, and even music. He raises the question: What are the connections between verbal and other kinds of narrative? The answer to this question influences the analysis of media and film narratives. Bordwell maintains that those who consider that language remains our most important way of communicating with one another, and other kinds of communication derive from verbal storytelling, expect to find in media and films the equivalents of the first-person point of view, or something analogous to the voice of a literary narrator. Those, however, who think that language is on the same footing as other media, a vehicle for some of the more fundamental narrative capacities but not for all of them, do not expect exact parallels between literary and filmic devices. He considers that:

Alternatively, perhaps both verbal and nonverbal narratives tap into some more basic conceptual skills – ideas of agency, causality, time, and the like – which we deploy to make sense of anything we encounter. Once you have the idea of a person, you can understand characters’ identity, motives, and the like, whether you meet them in the pages of a book or on the screen.

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75 Ibid., 34.
Bordwell discerns three dimensions in the narrative: “We tacitly as-
say a character’s prominence in the story world, her structural role, and
her narrational salience.” Instead of treating the narrative as a message
to be decoded, Bordwell takes it to be a representation that offers an
occasion for ‘inferential’ elaboration. Following his own model of spec-
tatorship, he suggests that given a representation, the spectator processes
it perceptually and then elaborates it on the bases of schemas she or he
has to hand. These schemas are not necessarily codes in the strict sense,
because many are loosely structured, semantically vague, and open-ended,
but the elaboration is not wholly a matter of individual taste either.

What is the relation between cinematic and literary narration? Ac-
cording to Bordwell, cinematic narration overlaps with literary narration,
but the two are not perfectly congruent. For instance, the filmic ‘point of
view’ is rarely as stringent and sustained as the literary variety. The first-
person narrator in a novel restricts us to a single consciousness, but a
film’s voice-over narrator can initiate a revelation of events that she did
not witness, or even know about. Bordwell observes that a film’s syuzhet
and style are not in any event bound by the constraints of verbal commu-
nication. Cinematic narration, being an audiovisual display rather than a
written text, appropriates bits and pieces of the communication model
opportunistically. In this way, there can be a voice-over commentary
from the protagonist without there being any indication that someone in
the fictional world is being addressed. Bordwell maintains that the com-
mentary may be taken as stream-of-consciousness musings or as simply
another conduit for story information, without any need for the real-
world baggage of speaker-listener relationships. Bordwell reflects on
Sternberg’s suggestion regarding three aspects of our narrative appetites:

*Curiosity* stems from past events: What led up to what we’re see-
ing now? *Suspense* points us forward: What will happen next? *Surprise*
foils our expectations and demands that we find alternative explanations for what has happened. *Syuzhet* arrange-
ments of events arouse and fulfill these cognition-based emo-
tions. Sternberg’s account of the experiential logic of narration
fits well with my concern for a poetics of effect.

Bordwell’s conception of narrativity in cinema offers a good expla-
nation of how cinema as art can be included in the educational process,
how students can grasp and reflect the film’s meaning as suggested by the

77 Ibid., 7.
78 Ibid., 9.
79 Ibid., 15.
80 Ibid., 16.
educator. The problem is that Bordwell considers emotions to be irrelevant to our experience of cinematic storytelling, and his positions therefore seem a little restricted. We do consider the importance of educating emotional intellect. If the cinematic creation of meaning by viewers is based on previous experience, is it possible exclude emotional trends?

In *Existentialist Cinema*, William C. Pamerleau relies on Bordwell’s conception to propose that the understanding of narrative existentialism should be closer to educational experience. According to Pamerleau, a film, even a documentary, is like our own lives in that it is not an objective chronicle of facts but a narrative construct. Pamerleau identifies a parallel: film-makers impose meaning with the material they capture in film in exactly the same way as we do when we recount the facts of our life, which is why movies can make meaningful observations on life by reproducing the processes of selection and emphasis through which we establish meaning. He also relies on Noël Caroll’s insight when he says that film-makers succeed in creating captivating movies because they call attention to those events that evoke an emotional response. We also agree with this insight, and extend it by our observation that the movies which are very important in our educational experiments are those evoking emotional intelligence, which means the capability of individuals to recognize their own emotions and those of others, to discern between different feelings and label them appropriately, to use emotional information to guide thinking and behaviour, and to manage and/or adjust emotions to adapt to environments or achieve one’s goal(s).

Deleuze had read Metz’s books *Essais sur la signification au cinéma* and *Psychoanalysis and the Cinema: the Imaginary Signifier*, but was not fascinated with such a semiolinguistic reading of film, along the lines of Saussurian linguistics. For Metz, cinema is a narrative language: the cinema-image is approximately the same as an utterance. Deleuze agrees with Metz’s analyses of the historical fact of the American model which was constituted as the cinema of narration and his account for the deliberate disturbances of narration in modern cinema. “The difficulty,” according to Deleuze, is therefore elsewhere: it is that, for Metz, narration refers to one or several codes as underlying linguistic determinants from which it flows into the image in the shape of an evident given. On the contrary, it seems to us that narration is only a consequence of the visible [apparent] images themselves and their direct combinations – it is never a given.

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To Saussurian linguistics, Deleuze opposes not belonging to the logic of language semiotics and pragmatics of Peirce. Deleuze turns towards the Russian film director Andrey Tarkovsky (his conception is discussed later) as an ally in his opposition to the formal narrativism of Metz. Deleuze notices and emphasizes Tarkovsky’s idea that cinema is not like a language working with units, even if these are relative and of different orders: montage is not a unit of a higher order which exercises power over unit-shots and which would thereby endow movement images with time as a new quality. What is important for Deleuze in Tarkovsky’s concept of cinema time is the very function of the sign he deciphers. Deleuze observes that Tarkovsky calls his text “On the Cinematographic Figure,” because he calls the figure that which expresses the ‘typical’. Nevertheless, according to Deleuze, Tarkovsky expresses it in a pure singularity as something unique. “This is the sign; it is the very function of the sign,”84 as if Tarkovsky is representing Peirce’s idea of sign in cinema.

Bibliography


84 Ibid., 42.


Chapter 3
Cinema and Philosophical Education:
Contra and Pro

Jūratė Baranova

1. Contra: Visual Imagination versus Thought

As regards the question of the meaning and the possibility of including movies in the curriculum for teaching philosophy, the answer depends on the presuppositions of the educator. One can distinguish three groups of philosophy educators: radical Hegelians, moderate Hegelians and anti-Hegelians (neo-Nietzscheans and neo-Wittgensteinians). The Hegelians radically refuse to include movies in the philosophy curriculum; the moderate Hegelians agree that movies serve as a possible illustration and thought experiment but do not consider them as equal to philosophical argumentation. Neo-Nietzscheans and neo-Wittgensteinians do not make any hierarchical distinction, supposing that both philosophy and cinema are able to meet in the area of creative thought. What are their arguments and what new possibilities are opened up for philosophy education?

Hegelians start from the premise that thought is always higher than image, in the same way as philosophy is of a higher rank than any art, especially cinema art. This conforms to Hegel’s schema for three stages of the objective spirit: in its development, the objective spirit starts from art, then develops towards religion, and finally reaches philosophy, the highest form of abstraction. Cinema is just art. Philosophy, as the abstract power of spirit, outbids cinema as visual seeing, based on images. Philosophy professors and teachers educated in the tradition of reading texts can instinctively oppose the inclusion of cinema in philosophical education because the primacy of the written text expressing thought in comparison to the image is obvious, and they would always prefer the written or, as with Socrates spoken, word. They can also rely on the tacit presumption that philosophers as educators belong to an elite profession whereas cinema belongs only to popular culture. However, it is also possible that those philosophers who oppose the inclusion of cinema art in the teaching of philosophy simply lack erudition in cinema culture, and some of them may wish to avoid the technical difficulties one confronts when starting to use the equipment needed for film demonstration during lectures or classes. In any case, we agree that lectures without visual or cinematic elements, if they are on a high level for the listeners, can be
quite inspiring. Philosophy is simply much older than cinema. For twenty-five centuries, philosophers as educators managed to teach without cinema, relying on dialogue, logic, critical thinking, astonishment and the human drive to ask questions about final truths. Why would they need it now? What is the need? Philosophers did not invent cinematic art, and film creators do not seek a bachelor’s degree in philosophy. Some, of course, may have one, but then it is pure coincidence. In Creative Evolution, Henry Bergson was the first who started to reflect the experience of cinema. He writes rather critically, connecting cinematographic thinking with machinical illusion. The most important twentieth-century philosophers simply ignore cinema picture-palaces. Edmund Husserl says not a word about cinema. Jean-Paul Sartre classifies all the images of the imagination, but cinematic images are not included. Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Phénoménologie de la perception tries to reveal the character of cinematic gestalts but comes to the conclusion that cinema is an ambiguous ally of philosophy (allié ambigu). Analytic contra-arguments against including the cinema in philosophy teaching are clearly formulated by Bruce Russell, who insists that movies cannot create philosophical knowledge because their answers to philosophical questions are contradictory and not obvious, so explicit argumentation is needed if a person intends to present justified answers to these questions. Philosophizing requires more than just useful examples.

Nevertheless, some philosophers do go to the cinema. For Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, cinema is like entertainment, an escape, and has nothing to do with philosophy teaching itself. There was no competition between cinema and seminar. “I loved films,” reflects the character of Wittgenstein in Derek Jarman’s movie Wittgenstein (1993).

Especially Westerns and Musicals. Carmen Miranda and Betty Hutton were my favorite actresses. I always sat in the front row. Film felt like a shower bath, washing away the lecture. I hated the newsreels – far too patriotic.¹

After Wittgenstein, the second famous philosopher who was happy going to the cinema was the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). In contrast to Wittgenstein, for him cinema is not only entertainment, but also of professional interest and he includes cinema in his philosophical teachings and writings. Deleuze considers himself a philosophy teacher with a very obvious metaphysical professional thinking. In the chapter “Deleuze Goes to the Movies” in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

¹ Terry Eagleton, Wittgenstein. Script. The Derek Jarman Film (London: The British Film Institute, 1993).
Intersecting Lives, François Dosse reveals step by step the consequent turn of the philosopher towards cinema. Deleuze would attend film programmes organized by Cahiers du Cinéma, occasionally with his daughter Emilie, who was a film creator herself, or with his wife Fanny. The philosopher first spoke publicly about cinema in 1974, defending Hugo Santiago’s The Others. Deleuze also played the small role of the philosopher Lammenais in the Michele Rosier film on George Sand, George qui? (George Who? 1974).² What is the relation between philosophy and cinema? In Cinema 2. The Time-Image Deleuze answers: good cinema, when it stops being bad, is philosophy (quand il cesse d’être mauvais).³

2. Films about Philosophers as an Illustration of Philosophy

Jerry Goodenough, when writing the introduction to Film as Philosophy. Essays in Cinema after Wittgenstein and Cavell, asks a rhetorical question: Why might a philosopher want to go to the cinema? He discerns four alternative answers as possibilities. Firstly, a philosopher may care about cinema itself, about the technology and processes and social meanings of watching films. The philosopher may have an interest in the nature of film as a perceptual experience. Such a philosopher might enjoy those avant-garde movies that play with the technology. Derek Jarman’s Blue is about the relation between philosophy and the cinematic experience. A second reason for taking an interest in film is that a film may illustrate philosophical themes and issues. Using examples extracted from films for pedagogical purposes may increase student engagement with the topic and brighten seminar discussions with dramatic examples from a medium with which most students are familiar. A third reason for a philosopher to go to the cinema might be to watch a film in which philosophical issues are mentioned in a serious and central way: films ‘about’ philosophy. For example, the best feature film about a philosopher is Derek Jarman’s Wittgenstein (1993). The fourth reason is to see film ‘as’ philosophy, as in some sense ‘doing’ philosophy. It is possible to understand watching a film as engaging in philosophy. Goodenough suggests the examples of Blade Runner (1982) by Ridley Scott and L’Année dernière a Marienbad (1961) by Alain Resnais.⁴ Goodenough also mentioned a fifth reason for a philosopher

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to watch cinema but does not include it in the list: a philosopher, like all ordinary people, wants to watch a film in order to be entertained, as in the case of Wittgenstein as a movie goer. In this case, film can be seen as a relief from the pressures of thinking philosophically.

In philosophy education, it is quite reasonable to use documentaries about philosophers. Quite often TV documentaries are used. The famous Italian film director neorealist Roberto Rossellini created TV documentaries about Socrates (Socrates (1971); about Blaise Pascal (Blaise Pascal (1972) and Descartes (Cartesius (1974). The BBC created a large number of cognitive educational documentaries about philosophers, with records from their lectures and interviews. Goodenough argues that films of this type have no cinematographic value. As an exception, he mentions the documentary about Derrida created by Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman, which reflects different views on the unimportance of the philosopher’s life. We would add that another documentary equally interesting for educational purposes is D’ailleurs Derrida (1999) created by the poetess Safaa Fathy. The action takes place in four different countries: Algeria, Spain, France and United States, but pays most attention to Algeria, the country where Derrida was born, and to his birthplace Al Riar, searching for traces of the philosopher’s childhood. The creators of this documentary succeeded in finding the optimum distance between the real philosopher and the created character in the documentary movie.

Yet, by their very nature, feature films as works of art are based on creative imagination. No clear distinction therefore exists between when features about philosophers illustrate philosophy and when they start to falsify it. For example, the film Beyond Good and Evil by Liliana Cavani clearly distorts Nietzsche’s life. Some facts from his life are transformed and included in a context of sexual perversion, which says more about Cavani’s style than it does about Nietzsche himself, and the film has nothing to say about the philosopher’s teaching. The movie When Nietzsche Wept (2007), created by Pinchas Perry, is a little better, but also says almost nothing about Nietzsche’s ideas. This story about the American Nietzsche as a psychotherapist is based on the novel of the same title written by the psychotherapist Irvin D. Yalom. In the film, as in the novel, the main intrigue is a product of the imagination. Nietzsche never attended Bauer’s psychotherapy course and was never his patient, but a work of art allows this kind of playing with possible situations. The film asks the spectator to imagine what it would have been like if they had indeed met in reality, and also avoids including the deeper context of Nietzsche’s ideas or psychoanalysis teaching. The story centres on the mutual therapy of the two men who suffer because of women. Despite the rather banal content of both the film and the book, the main idea is quite positive: it
reveals that philosophy also could have a therapeutic impact. The film can thus be included in philosophical therapy educational courses.

In the previously mentioned documentary created by Dick and Kofman, Derrida remembers that Heidegger, when asked about Aristotle’s life, answered that it is possible to say only three things about a philosopher’s life: “He was born. He thought. He died. The rest is an anecdote.” It seems that feature films about philosophers raise questions and doubts about their educational value. As usual, feature-film creators are interested in the extreme aspects of a philosopher’s life: impotence, perversion, madness, death and the last days of life. An example of human weakness and approach to death can be seen in the feature The Last Days of Immanuel Kant (1996) created by French film director Philippe Collin, based on Thomas de Quincey’s novel of the same name. Despite the aesthetic value of the feature, it says almost nothing about the ideas of Kant and does not reveal the geniality of his teaching. On the other hand, questions, such as What philosophical aspect have you discerned in the feature? What aspect of Kant’s thought have you noticed?, can challenge students to discuss the nature and tasks of film production itself. They can also provide inspiration for a discussion on the nature of the relation between a philosopher’s life and his thought. Is it possible to film philosophical thought at all?

Every film about a philosopher, even if it is a bad one, can challenge students to find insights if they are asked to do the research themselves. A possible task can be to suggest that the students watch in parallel one bad and one good movie about philosophers’ lives without any a priori evaluation by the professor, and then to write an essay comparing both films. The best feature film about a philosopher is Wittgenstein by Derek Jarman, based on Terry Eagleton’s script. We carried out this teaching experiment with second-year philosophy students at the university. Without any explanation about the value of the two films, one of the students K.K. concluded by drawing a distinction between the philosophical and non-philosophical movie: “After watching Jarman’s Wittgenstein, different thoughts come to mind, you are inspired to think. Cavani’s film Beyond Good and Evil leaves nothing. Some nightmares and that is all.”

Comparing two films on the same philosopher also inspires students to develop their own insights. Two features on the lives of Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Paul Sartre, both created in 2006, open up this kind of possibility. In one of them, Les Amants du Flore (2006) by Duran Cohen, the story of their lives is told more from the perspective of de Beauvoir (played by Anna Mouglalis), whereas Sartre (played by Lorànt Deutsch) has more of secondary role. In the other, Sartre, l’âge des passions by Claude Goretta, the story is told from Sartre’s perspective. He is not portrayed as the author of the philosophical treatise Being and Nothingness, and the
spectator would not understand the real power of his existentialist literature. The film concentrates more on his political ideas, his trip to Cuba, and his love stories. *Les Amants du Flore*, can be used in education for contextualizing the history of feminism.

When envisaging these two films as one story narrated from two different perspectives, one can include a reflection on the narrativistic conception of personality developed by Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. From the point of view of the narrativistic conception of personal identity, the meaning of human life depends on the unity of the story told about a life from birth to death. MacIntyre writes:

> We enter upon a stage which we did not design, and we find ourselves part of an action that was not of our making. Each of us being a main character in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each drama constrains the others.\(^5\)

### 3. Screening Philosophical Novels

A further possibility for the relationship between cinema and philosophy is screening philosophical literature. Every screening can be successful or unsuccessful. A successful screening elicits questions, an unsuccessful does the opposite. Screening literature always raises a question: how much literature should remain in the visual work in order for it to remain literature? When the film director plays easily with the plot of the literary text, is it the literary or the visual text that benefits? Can the visual text become a work of art if it only illustrates the literary work? In the educational process there is a very important question: to what degree can the screening substitute for the literary text? If children do not read classical literary texts, are the screened versions able to fill the gaps in classical education? Can the film director’s ideas distort and smother the insights revealed by the writer’s talent? The visual image is more impressive and can obscure the suggestiveness of the literary text. If this is the case, perhaps including films of screened literature in the curriculum is even dangerous for classical education? Or should a work of literature and the screened version simply be treated as two distinct pieces of art? Or maybe the meeting of the two arts creates a new quality? Concerning philosophical education, the question arises: how much philosophy should be left in the film for the screening to be called philosophical?

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This question can be proposed for student discussion, for example before watching Luchino Visconti’s (1906-1976) film The Stranger (1967), the screen version of Albert Camus’ philosophical novel of the same title. The main characters are played by Marcello Mastroianni and Ana Karina. Visconti chose the strategy of keeping the screening very close to the literary text, trying to record and reconstruct the different episodes from the novel. The question for the students for discussion or a possible essay can be the following: Does the closeness of the plot to that of the novel also make the film close to the novel philosophically?

This type of analysis requires and develops three types of hermeneutic and analytic abilities: (1) The ability to understand the main idea of the novel; (2) The ability to recognize the main idea of the film; (3) The ability to carry out an experiment in thought by comparing both contexts and both ideas, searching for their similarities and differences.

The same tasks can be suggested for discussion regarding the screening of Sartre’s philosophical novels, for example The Proud and the Beautiful (Les orgueilleux, 1953, starring Michèle Morgan and Gérard Philipe). The plot of the film is based on a love story. The main character, Nellie, a beautiful French tourist, is left alone in a squalid foreign village where her husband suddenly dies, leaving her without resources. This turn in the plot recalls the similar situation in the feature Sheltering Sky, 1990, by Bernardo Bertolucci, who screened the novel of the same title by Paul Bowles. Both heroines are left alone after the death of their husbands (one in Mexico, the other in Africa) and are sucked into a world of a totally different culture. The following philosophical questions can be used to discuss the ideas in these two movies: How is it possible to maintain one’s personal identity in such a situation? How can one find an adequate relationship with a totally foreign culture while remaining oneself? Do the creators of the film The Proud and the Beautiful succeed in showing the idea of the absolute nature of free choice so important to Sartre? How does the main heroine of Sheltering Sky succeed in dealing with the problem of personal choice?

In 1953, Jacqueline Audry screened one of Sartre’s main plays: No Exit (Huis clos). In this play, Sartre expresses in literary form one of the main ideas of existentialism: the encounter with the Other is an inevitable fight. “Hell is other people,” says a character in the play. The action takes place in the real hell after death. All three characters are real sinners – they caused pain and death to their fellow men, and it would seem that their common fate has to make them closer. But this does not happen. The question for discussion in the education process is – why? Do the

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creators of the film succeed in creating the atmosphere of hell as damnation? If so – how? What does it mean?

In 1962, the Italian film director Vittorio De Sica screened another play by Sartre with the same title as the movie – The Condemned of Altona (Sequestrati di Altona). This feature film is not only challenging as regards philosophical discussion on relationships with the past, but, unlike the other screenings mentioned above, it is also aesthetically suggestive with impressive performances by actors Sophia Loren and Maximilian Schell and talented direction by De Sica.

A dying millionaire and former Nazi, Albrecht Gerpach, invites his son to his villa in order to transfer his inheritance. The son arrives together with his actress wife (played by Sophia Loren), who, becoming aware of a secret lurking in the house, finds her husband’s brother Franz (played by Maximilian Schell) hiding there sixteen years after the end of WWII. Franz is still wearing Nazi uniform, suffers from past nightmares and does not accept the new reality. His madness is a typical example of the bleeding from the past that Nietzsche mentioned in his The Uses and Abuses of History. The question of how it is possible to bury the past is the main conceptual motif of the feature. The Sartrean play suggests therapy by truth. Love compels the solitary recluse to return to the world and destroys his self-delusion. When he comprehends the truth, the hermit cannot bear it. The following question is suggested for educational discussion: What should be the choices of the heroes concerning the past? Nietzsche wrote that an individual or a culture needs the past only insofar as it is necessary to gain the power to approach the future. Which alternative is more adequate – Sartrean or Nietzschean?

4. Films as Thought Experiments

Thomas Warterberg suggests that films are not explicitly philosophy, but they can do philosophy by providing thought experiments, just as the allegory of the cave is a thought experiment that helps make the case for a theory of knowledge and education. Warterberg also uses The Matrix as a thought experiment for Descartes’ scepticism.7 In a rather similar way, Jonas Dagys uses some episodes from The Matrix as the intrigue for a thought experiment in his article “Putnamiian Anti-envattor ver. 3.00: New Features – Same Results.” At the beginning of every chapter, he quotes dialogues or utterances between different characters in the film. The problem of scepticism is challenged by a discussion between Morpheus and Neo. In the film the problem is formulated in a classical form:

Morpheus: Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure was real? What if you were unable to wake from that dream? How would you know the difference between the dream world and the real world?

The Matrix

The second part reflecting Putnam’s anti-sceptical argument also is approached with the statement of Morpheus:

Morpheus: unfortunately, no one can be told what the Matrix is. You have to see it yourself.

The Matrix

In the third part Neo answers Morpheus:

Neo: Mr Wizard! Get me the hell out of here!

The Matrix

The fourth chapter includes the third personage Cypher in the discussion:

Cypher: You know, I know this steak doesn't exist. I know that when I put it in my mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain that it is juicy and delicious. After nine years, you know what I realize? [Takes a bite of steak] Ignorance is bliss.

The Matrix

The trilogy The Matrix, by the Wachowskis is maybe one of the most popular feature films used in philosophy education. It asks questions that are raised in philosophy itself, as for example, what is the relation between reality and appearance, between real reality and created (virtual) reality. What is the nature of solipsism, what is the relation between dreams and reality? During a seminar on existential ethics, the author of this text spoke about the radicality and pathos of existential choice, reflected by Kierkegaard and Sartre, emphasizing the idea that it does not matter what you choose, but the main point is the seriousness of the choice itself. One of the students from the audience suddenly reflected: “but it is what is going on in the film The Matrix; when the main hero has to choose between the pills of different colour.”

For a thought experiment discussing the problem of the relation between reality and appearance, the film, Total Recall (1990) by Paul

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9 Ibid., 40.
10 Ibid., 42.
11 Ibid., 45.
Verhoeven, with Arnold Schwartznegger playing the main character, can be included in the teaching process. The film encourages reflection on the relation between experience and all-embracing reality. As the main character Philip K. Dick studied philosophy for some time at Berkeley University in California, he can articulate his own insights quite abstractly. He describes himself as a cosmic pantheist who does not believe in the substantiality of reality and who declares that the Universe is the expansion of God in time and space. This film raises a question not only about the nature of our experience, but also touches on the problem of personal identity in time and the topic of the reality of the outer world (is not this reality only a dream?)

The plot of the film is science fiction. The characters live at a time when it is possible for one’s own personal enjoyment to spend some time on Mars. The main character dreams about a trip to Mars, but his blond wife (Sharon Stone) disagrees, arguing that Mars is boring, and the landscape is poor. One day, on his way to work, the main character notices an advertisement for travelling in one’s memory, offering the possibility of travelling while staying in the same place. The impressions they expect from their trip are simply inserted into their memory, and even their travel partners are selected following their desires. The main character decides to try this possibility. The film ends with his arrival on Mars with his dark-haired new wife created according to his desires. They both enjoy the landscape of Mars. She says: “How wonderful. As in a dream.” He responds: “I am afraid that it is a dream.” The spectator is left uncertain as to whether the action of the film ends concretely in reality or in a dream. Which reality (and which wife, the former or the latter) is in fact real?

In *Existentialist Cinema* (2009), Pamerleau observes that film isn’t a dry academic essay but a vibrant art form with the power to affect us at the personal level, and can be a heuristic device in our theorizing on philosophy, especially existential philosophy. Films reveal something about the ambiguity of the human condition, but they do not in themselves philosophize. A film might be an occasion for us to discuss the relevancy of a specific descriptive vocabulary, as, for example Sartre’s account of freedom, but films do not substitute for or demonstrate philosophical propositions. Certain films and certain philosophies try to describe the same thing: the human condition. But films, especially good films, evoke a variety of intellectual and emotional reactions. Goodenough concludes that films do not themselves philosophize. Discussing a thought-provoking movie is entertaining precisely because others can find diverse

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13 Ibid., 36-37.
ways of understanding the film. We would add that it is extremely useful to explore these aspects of film reception in an educational situation. In the context of teaching philosophical ethics, after watching every suggested film students write essays discussing some aspect of the human condition, and present them at educational conferences. By participating in these conferences, they discover the enjoyment of personal investigation and a rich context of different strategies of reception. Pamerleau describes four aspects when a film can challenge insights in philosophical education: (1) the representational nature of the world, (2) freedom, (3) the meaning of life, and (4) the social situation. We agree that these problems are especially close to cinema art. As movies are mere representations of the real world, it is possible to learn about life from film. On the other hand, as Pamerleau argues, some films set out to make us conscious of the contingency of representation. Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon (1950) is a good example. The topic of the meaning of life includes different aspects of possible educational practice. In our educational experiment, we use Kieślowski’s Blue as a challenge to reflect on the topic of life and death, as well as on the topic of unconditional love. The topic of death as possible suicide can be explored by reflecting on Michelangelo Antonioni’s movie The Cry (1957), Ingmar Bergman’s Winter Light (1963), The Hours (2002) by Stephen Daldry, and The Angels of Universe (2000) by Icelandic film director Friðrik Þór Friðriksson. Pamerleau states that movies can reveal the problem of freedom when portraying the inner strength of persons or the situations of characters that fail to be free. We can identify ourselves with the heroes and we fear to become the character who fails to be free. In our educational experiment with students, we used to study the meaning of the Sartrean concepts sadism and masochism from his book Being and Nothingness, together with two of Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s movies: Martha (1974) and The Bitter Tears of Petra von Kant (1972). Pamerleau says that even as films make us think about the world as a contingent interpretation, they elicit for us the possibility of finding meaning where we did not know it existed. In representing the differences of the social world, the films also show how different meanings are possible.

As an example of this type of cinema that can be used in philosophical education, Pamerleau suggests the ‘auteur’ cinema of Antonioni and Bergman. In our educational practice using this experimental teaching, we discovered not only the four mentioned above, but also included more films and topics. For example, the philosophy of dialogue can be chal-

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14 Ibid., 40-41.
15 Ibid., 43.
lenged with Kieślowski’s movie Red (1994). The essay-writing and discussion questions at the concluding conference were the following: How is it possible to transcend one’s personal experience and understand another person of a different kind? How was it possible for two persons to meet with so different life experiences?

Films can be widely used to reflect the multiculturality of human experience. We included the film Farewell My Concubine (1993) by Chinese film director Chen Kaige in the course on the philosophy of history. For the essay writing task and for the concluding conference the students were asked to read texts by Confucius, and to imagine they are perspectivists and historicists approaching the history of a foreign culture without a priori schemas and Eurocentric prejudices: What features of Chinese culture can they discern from the analysis of the movie? K.K., one of the students, started her essay with a rhetorical question:

How can you watch a movie from a very different culture than the one you are living in? Everything here is different – the faces, the language, the milieu, the symbols… As a spectator, I am overcome by shock, not because of a film as product of the cinema industry, but because of the life inside it. I am touched because I trust what I am seeing and hearing in it, I trust the life inside it. Why? A film that is serving no one, fixed in time and a stable media (unlike media reportages) seems trustworthy because it tries to reveal what is most important in the narrated timeline, speaks about things that are real (it even has its own direction in a created plot), and reveals the values, customs, rituals, gestures, and mood of the time. It is important to keep in mind that Chen Kaige is one of the directors who created the type of Chinese trying to liberate himself from the consequences of the ‘cultural revolution’. ‘The shock I experience has two edges: the outer and the inner. The outer is objective, cognitive. The inner is sensible, experienced, cultural’…

Films can challenge reflection on the topic of personal identity. In his text “Film as an Imagination for Creating Identity,” Luc Anckaert observes that:

In education, constructing identity is a search between the idem and the ipse. Mimetic narrativity can be the royal way in this quest. The inscription of one’s own life story in a mimetic plot – for example, provided by a film – leads to the question of what the place of identity is: bound to a solid origin or challenged by the fluidity of an increasingly absence. The answer to
this question requires mimetic imagination that leads to a *catharsis*.16

Anckaert suggests reflecting on the film *Va, vis et deviens* by Radu Mihăileanu from the perspective of narrative identity as suggested by Paul Ricoeur. Through its plot, this film challenges the problem of changing identity. It recounts the fate of an Ethiopian child who gets lost in the misery of an African refugee camp in Sudan. As an adopted orphan, Solomon grew up in Israel. He studied medicine in Paris as an adult and married the girl he had been in love with for a long time in Jerusalem. Eventually the main character returns to Sudan with *Médecins sans frontières* and in an emotional scene finds his wizened old mother.17 Following the signs in the movie, Anckaert comes to the conclusion that in narrative mimetics, the *idem* is challenged to follow the long path of emotional identification that can lead to a cathartic insight into the narrative constructed identity as *Mimēsis* II.

Pamerleau also relies on the relation between time and narrative discerned by Ricoeur. He sees a similarity between the narrative conception of personal identity and the narrative nature of the meaning comprehended by the spectator of a film. He calls his conception ‘narrative existentialism’ and justifies his conception relying on Ricoeur’s book *Time and Narrative* and David Carr’s *Time, Narrative and History*. He concludes that a film, even a documentary film, like our own lives is not an objective chronicle of facts but rather a narrative construct. Film-makers impose meaning with the material they capture on film in just the way we all do when we recount the facts of our life, which is why movies can make meaningful observations on life. Pamerleau’s conclusion that films can be used to describe life as it is lived is quite appropriate for justifying the inclusion of films in both philosophical and ethical education.

5. Cavell’s Philosophy of Cinema: Film Thinks


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17 Ibid.
philosophical suppositions of Deleuze, Cavell came to the same conclusion: films think and think philosophically. Cavell says he was encouraged to turn to cinema as philosophy after he had attended the lectures of Austin, who visited Harvard in 1955, and after he had read Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein did not include movies in philosophy teaching but formulated some ideas in his texts which encourage the appearance of a new type of philosophy open to life and to cinema at the same time. Cavell reflects:

I might specify three issues I recognize as exemplifying the kind of encouragement Austin and Wittgenstein lent to the progress of my thinking about film. One was allowing me to resist the idea that the relation of a photograph to what it is of is well thought of as representation; another is the role of the ordinary, or say the uneventful, in the motion picture camera’s interests in things, especially in the human face and figure; the third, most general, issue is their enabling me to feel that I was at once philosophizing and being responsive to, open to, the endless events (uneventful and eventful events, as it were) of film.\textsuperscript{18}

Wittgenstein’s ideas enabled Cavell to overcome the fear of the irrational that was in some ways pervasive in Western philosophy due to the popularity of such books as Alfred J. Ayer’s \textit{Language, Truth and Logic}. Mainly film philosophy can create an adequate vocabulary of passion. Starting from Wittgenstein’s formulation in \textit{Philosophical Investigations}: “It is grammar that tells us what kind of object anything is,” Cavell concludes that “he is there claiming to satisfy, by educating, an ancient intellectual craving.”\textsuperscript{19} This Wittgensteinian approach enables Cavell to answer the question, What is (the ontology of) film?, and to formulate different types of questions, for example, What is the audience of a film? (as opposed to audiences of plays), What is the director of a film? (as opposed perhaps to the director of a bank), What does the film screen? (in contrast with what the support of a painting supports), What role does the script of a film play? (measured against what role the libretto of an opera plays), What counts as remembering a film? (as compared with remembering a poem, or a novel, or an argument, or what happened yesterday), What is a remake of a film? (as opposed to a new production of a play), etc.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 195.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 195.
Andrew Klevan, at that time lecturer in Film Studies at the University of Kent, discussed with Cavell the features of teaching cinema to students. Their conversation can be summarized by several conclusions they came to:

1. Discussing a film with students differs from discussing a painting, literature or music. In discussing a film, one needs to paraphrase.
2. Teaching cinema and learning the new type of description is very hard, requiring long discussion.
3. Teaching cinema has a basic supposition: the inherent vulnerability of the human being, its openness to tragedy.
4. Teaching cinema requires the ability to tell a story.
5. To see a film and to speak or write about it are mysteriously different things.
6. A film teaches when it strikes the student.

Wittgenstein’s idea that “[in philosophy] we must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place” inspired Cavell to suggest a new type or quality of description suitable for teaching cinema. As usual in universities, when grading student essays on cinema the assessment has two aspects: ‘description’ and ‘analysis’, and analysis is considered the stronger part of the essay.

Cavell states that he expects students to provide not the analysis of a film, but a special kind of description. The starting point for this description is a presumption about ‘the inherent vulnerability’ of human beings, their openness to tragedy.\(^{21}\) Cavell suggests that students should not be afraid of descriptions, remembering that “a serious film, like any work of art, resists interpretation, as it were insists upon being taken in its own terms…They are no more transparent to criticism than persons are.”\(^{22}\) According to him, films “are about how things happen, or happen to happen, or happen just here and now, or happen to look.”\(^{23}\) Every film strives to be seen as it is. For this reason, it is very difficult to pass from viewing a film to interpreting it. Klevan remarked that in order to overcome this difficulty, he always encourages his students to start writing their essay with a moment in the film that particularly struck them. Cavell suggests changing the very understanding of what philosophy is about: to overcome the fear of emotions and to use intuition as an integral part of philosophical thinking. Philosophy has to respond to events that are happening in life or in a film. It should never come first as a schema, but

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 171.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 179.
\(^{23}\) Ibid., 176.
afterwards as an intuitive tool for understanding and descriptive interpretation. This understanding of the relationship between philosophy and the cinematic experience is quite contrary to the customary understanding of cinema critique as a priori superiority. In this relationship, philosophy is not applied for the interpretation of cinema, but rather rediscovers itself. Such an encounter is important both for cinema and for philosophy. In his philosophical methodology for teaching films, Cavell includes the concept of silence as an expression of thought, and in this respect, he is very close to Wittgenstein, saying that: “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They ‘make themselves manifest’. They are what is mystical” (6.522). Wittgenstein concludes that: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in Silence” (7). Concerning the meaning of silence in philosophical thinking, one can recollect not only Wittgenstein, but also Friedrich Nietzsche who, following the Latin medieval proverb – *si tacuisses, Philosophus mansisses* – finished the Preface to his book *Human, All Too Human. A Book for Free Spirits* with the insight: one only remains a philosopher by being silent.25

For philosophers to accept silence inside their thought means taking seriously their mystical, amorphic, and latentic thoughts and feelings. All forms of art invoke such thoughts and feelings, but it is especially so for the cinema. According to Cavell and Kevin, films invoke these ambiguous feelings and thoughts inside us, forcing us to pay attention to their ‘murmurings’, to articulate them in verbal form and to understand the temporality of the words. We sometimes treat our own experience as common, and are afraid to express ourselves, so the most adequate methodological approach for interpreting films according to Cavell can be the following: “avoid voicing a thought awaiting its voice.”26 Our impatient utterances very often do not allow us to hear the voice of the thought we are really thinking.

6. Openness to Reality versus *a priori* Theory

This conception of the meeting between cinema art and philosophy is the opposite of any schematized approach to cinema prevailing in educational programmes for Film studies, approaches such as neo-Marxist, Psychoanalytical or Feminist theoretical models. Vivian Sobchack argues that her espousal of the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and

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the inclusion of the cinematic experience in film reading was a response to the two paradigms prevailing at that time in American Film studies: neo-Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. These two approaches, which at first seemed theoretically quite incompatible, become more and more compatible once movies are read from the perspective of the personal libido economy, political or social sub-consciousness. Sobchack maintains that neo-Freudian psychoanalysis has not exhausted her experience, although it has often exhausted her patience. She refused to be completely contained within its structures and described by its terms. She refused to be completely contained within its structures and described by its terms.27 Her move towards existential phenomenology also reflected the limitations of contemporary Marxist film theory that tended to neglect the embodied experience I live as ‘mine’.28 Sobchack’s intention was to describe and account for the origin and locus of cinematic signification and significance in the experience of vision as an embodied and meaningful existential activity.29 She relies on en-worlded bodies that can see and be seen.

Our conception of reflecting cinematic experience in educational experiments also rejects theoretical schemas and is quite close to existential phenomenology, but relies more on feeling and thinking persons who reflect and can be reflected. Our approach is close to the conceptual approach articulated in Klaven and Cavell’s discussion.30 The premise of the philosophical insight parallel to the response to a film as an event provoking one to feel and think about what is inexpressible in us and in the world was one of the methodological starting points for constructing the multimodal textbook Philosophy for XI-XII31 grades by Tomas Sodeika and Jūratė Baranova, as well as the teachers’ handbook Ethics: Philosophy as a Practice by Jūratė Baranova.32 Philosophy and the concrete feature film meet not in a theoretical schema, but through asking an open question that is important for both of them. For example, at the very beginning of the topic ‘Language’, it is suggested that students watch the film The Silence (1963) by Ingmar Bergman and reflect on the question: Why for understanding each other is it not enough to use the same words in the same language?33 Under the topic ‘Death’ is included the feature film Three Colours: Blue (1993) by Kieślowski asking the question: What are the sources

28 Ibid., xvi.
29 Ibid., xvii.
31 Tomas Sodeika and Jūratė Baranova, Filosofija XI-XII kl. [Philosophy for 11-12 Class] (Vilnius: Tyto alba, 2002).
33 Sodeika and Baranova, Filosofija XI-XII kl., 156.
of strength of the main heroine July allowing her to survive after the death of her dearest family members? The topic of ‘Personal Identity’ is enriched by the film *The Double Life of Veronique* (1991), also directed by Kieślowski.34

Under the topic ‘Love’, in order to introduce the psychoanalytical treatment of love the film *Eyes Wide Shut* (1999) by Stanley Kubrick is suggested for students, together with a discussion question: Why can the subconscious be dangerous for the love relationship between two persons?35 Under the topic ‘Fight’, it is suggested that students watch the film *Before the Rain* (1994) by Milcho Manchevski, which reflects on the meaning and meaninglessness of fighting, and discuss the question: How and why does it happen that an intimate friend becomes an enemy?36

In the teachers’ book on philosophical ethics, *Ethics: Philosophy as a Practice*, the previously mentioned film *The Silence* by Bergman is also suggested as a reflection on the relation between loneliness and death.37 Another Bergman movie, *Through a Glass Darkly* (1961), is proposed for comparison with the philosophical novel *Nausea* by Jean-Paul Sartre, emphasizing the feeling of the existential instability of the world.38 The topic ‘Suicide’ is challenged by Bergman’s movie *Winter Light* (*The Communicants*, 1963). For a discussion on the topic ‘Fideism’ in William James’ philosophy, the film *To Kill a Priest* (1988) by Agnieszka Holland is recommended.39 The problem of choice between optimism and pessimism in the philosophy of William James can be comprehended more deeply by including in the discussion the film *Three Colours: White* (1994) by Kieślowski and asking the question: Why after the all disasters does the main hero Karol (played by Zamachowski) not fall into despair? What are the sources of his optimism?40 Some of the suggestions from these textbooks are included in the educational experiment discussed later.

**Bibliography**


34 Ibid., 17.
35 Ibid., 222.
36 Ibid., 199.
38 Ibid., 325.
39 Ibid., 271.
40 Ibid., 266.


Chapter 4
Postructuralism: Deleuze and Film Education
JŪRATĖ BARANOVA

1. How and Why Should Films be Taught?
The Deleuzian Answer

In 1980, University Paris-VIII started a degree programme curriculum in film, and since the film department had always enjoyed excellent relations with the philosophy department, Jean-François Lyotard and Deleuze were asked to oversee research in the film department. On November 10, 1981, Deleuze gave his first lecture on cinema. He would devote not only two books, but also three academic years and 250 class hours to film philosophy. As Dosse observed, the microcosm at Vincennes where Deleuze lectured was completely unlike traditional academic universities. The new Paris-VIII was a sort of anti-Sorbonne where multidisciplinarity was the religion:

At Paris-VIII no one taught traditional courses to prepare students for the national examinations, preferring instead to work on developing students’ research skills. Lectures were for the most part banned in favour of open group discussions.

Dosse also observed that the intellectual path of Deleuze’s Paris-VIII seminars was particularly rich and closely linked to his publications.


3 Ibid., 144.
He had an immediate rapport with his student audience, albeit without any concession concerning the highly philosophical content of his courses. His reputation as a fantastic teacher was well established in Paris even before he came to Vincennes, and he taught to a very large audience right from the start.4

In an interview about philosophy given after his retirement, Deleuze reflected on this period of lecturing as being a major part of his own life. One of the possible secrets of Deleuze’s popularity as a professor was his passionate involvement. For Deleuze, lecturing for a number of years to a relatively fixed audience could be compared to a research laboratory:

You give courses on what you’re investigating, not on what you know. It takes a lot of preparatory work to get a few minutes of inspiration. I was ready to stop when I saw it was taking more and more preparation to get a more taxing inspiration. And the future’s bleak because it’s becoming more and more difficult to do research in French universities.5

Deleuze also suggested another comparison for teaching philosophy in non-traditional way: he compared it to music, to rock concerts, where the listeners come from multiple spheres: the first and nth-year students, students and non-students, philosophers and non-philosophers, young and old, and many different nationalities. In attendance there were always young painters and musicians, filmmakers, and architects. It seems Deleuze was fascinated by this multiplicity and did not see his aim as a philosophy professor to be progressively ‘building up knowledge’. Philosophy teaching was not strictly scheduled: long sessions (in which, according to Deleuze, nobody took in everything, but everyone took what they needed or wanted, what they could use, even if it was far removed from their own discipline) were broken up by interventions, often schizophrenic, “then there was the taping phase, with everyone watching their cassettes, but even then there were interventions from one week to the next in the form of little notes I got, sometimes anonymously.”6

Deleuze had a charismatic way of teaching films as philosophy and for philosophy. He did not believe in discussions because everyone framed problems in their own way. He compared a discussion to an

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4 Ibid., 147.
6 Ibid., 139.
echo chamber, a feedback loop, in which an idea reappeared after going, as it were, through various filters. It was there that I realized how much philosophy needs not only a philosophical understanding, through concepts, but a non-philosophical understanding, rooted in precepts and affects. You need both.7

Deleuze does not distinguish teaching cinema as philosophy from other philosophical topics because he has a special approach to the heterogeneity of the word and the image. Deleuze and Guattari discovered unexpected sources of creativity namely in heterogeneity and the territories in-between. In What is Philosophy? (Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? 1991), the philosophers identify the territory in-between uniting arts and philosophy. They suppose that art and philosophy cut across chaos and confront it, but not on the same sectional plane.

In the one there is the constellation of a universe of affects and precepts; and in the other, constitutions of immanence or concepts. Art thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and precepts.8

The plane of composition in art and the plane of immanence in philosophy can slip into each other to the degree that parts of one may be occupied by entities of the other. In fact, in each case the plane, and that which occupies it, are like two relatively distinct and heterogeneous parts.

In their last book, What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari maintained that philosophy is not discussion, nor meditation, nor contemplation. Philosophy is the creation of new concepts. But first of all, from the Deleuzian point of view philosophy is permanent experimentation, which needs openness to life in general and to the arts in particular. Vision and word do not confront each other in education. They meet. Where? And when?

2. The Pedagogy of Signs by Deleuze

How does it happen that ‘thought is what sees and can be described visibly’ and how could it be that thought, but not imagination, plays the main part in the process of creating cinema art? What are the presuppositions for this radical conceptualism of Deleuze?

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7 Ibid., 159.
Deleuze does not consider that cinema might be dangerous for education based on the word and the argumentation. He discerns two possible visions and extracts the cinema from obsession with technique. In his *Letter to Sergey Daney*, Deleuze reflects upon the new pedagogy of perception related to cinema, and also to television. The philosopher was responding to Daney’s book *La Rampe* (1983). Deleuze was intrigued by the question posed in the book: “What is there to see behind the image?” Reflecting upon possible answers, Deleuze observes new tendencies in the function of the image:

The relation between images and words, sounds, music changed too, with basic dissymmetries between the aural and visual that allow the eye to read images, but also allow the ear to imagine the slightest noise. Finally, this new age of cinema, this new function of the image, was a *pedagogy of perception*, taking the place of an *encyclopaedia of the world* that had fallen apart: a visionary cinema that no longer sets out in any sense to beautify nature but *spiritualizes* it in the most intense way. How can we wonder what there is to see behind an image (or following on from it…), when we can’t even see what’s in it or on the surface until we look with our mind’s eye? And while we can identify many high points in this new cinema, it’s the same pedagogical path that leads to all of them – Rossellini’s pedagogy, ‘a Straubian pedagogy, a Godardian pedagogy’, as you said in *La Rampe*, to which you now add Antonioni’s pedagogy, by analysing the eye and ear of a jealous man as a ‘poetics’ registering everything evanescent, everything that might disappear, a woman on the desert island in particular.⁹

But this new pedagogy of perception is threatened by the increasing interest in technique. Deleuze discerns possible sources of Daney’s pessimistic point of view towards this new pedagogy of perception in a new approach towards the image:

The question is no longer what there is to see behind the image, nor how we can see the image itself – it’s how we can find a way into it, how we can slip in, because each image now slips across other images, ‘the background in any image is always another image’, and the vacant gaze is a contact lens.¹⁰

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⁹ Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 70.
¹⁰ Ibid., 71.
Deleuze concludes that in this case,

the encyclopaedia of the world and the pedagogy of perception collapse to make way for a professional training of the eye, a world of controllers and controlled communing in their admiration for technology, mere technology.\textsuperscript{11}

How it is possible to escape the pressure of technology? Once again the question remains: What is there to see behind the image? What lessons can be learnt in teaching cinema as philosophy? The answer would be sought by going through two of Deleuze’s books on cinema.

In \textit{The Cinema 1. The Movement-Image}, he starts with a warning that it is not the history of cinema, but its taxonomy. This means that the reader is going to learn not about periods in the history of cinema, but about the signs it deciphered.\textsuperscript{12} The idea that learning is essentially concerned with signs was for the first time expressed in Deleuze’s book \textit{Proust and Signs} (1964). The concept of sign was taken from Proust’s final systematization that constitutes \textit{Time Regained (Le Temps retrouvé)}. Deleuze writes:

Signs are the object of a temporal apprenticeship, not of an abstract knowledge. To learn is first of all to consider a substance, an object, a being as if it emitted signs to be deciphered, interpreted. There is no apprentice who is not ‘the Egyptologist’ of something – one becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a physician by becoming sensitive to the signs of disease. Vocation is always pre-destination with regard to signs. Everything that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs.\textsuperscript{13}

Deleuze, following Proust, concludes that signs are specific and constitute the substance of one world or another. In this plurality of worlds signs are not of the same kind, and they do not have the same way of appearing, do not allow themselves to be deciphered in the same manner, do not have an identical relation with their meaning. Deleuze deciphers four types of world and four types of signs in Proust’s created literary

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 72.
\textsuperscript{12} See also Ronald Bogue, “To Choose to Choose – to Believe in This World,” in \textit{Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film Philosophy}, ed. D.N. Rodowick (Minneapolis, MN/London: The University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 115-134; Ronald Bogue, \textit{Deleuze on Cinema} (London/New York: Routledge, 2003).
universe: the worldly signs, the signs of love, the sensuous signs and the science of art. The researcher learning from signs tries to grasp the essence, but it always escapes in the case of worldly signs, the science of love and sensuous signs. One is able to reach the essence only at the level of art. “But once they are manifested in the work of art they react upon all the other realms; we learn that they already incarnated, that they were already there in all these kinds of signs, in all the types of apprenticeship.”

In both volumes of Cinema, Deleuze discerns a far different plurality of worlds, and when referring to signs he mentions that he had taken this concept from American logician and pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce. In Proust and Signs, Deleuze connected learning from signs with the search for an essence. In cinema philosophy, the essence has no longer a role to play. The concept of sign is able to grasp the most serious philosophical problems that have preoccupied philosophical minds since the Greeks: the problem of movement and the problem of time. Cinema becomes a window through which one can observe these problems from another perspective: from the sphere of moving images. For Deleuze, the semiology of Peirce is like a skeleton supporting this new approach to old philosophical problems. Henry Bergson’s idea of duration gives vitality to the construction. Deleuze was impressed by Pierce’s semiology because he wrote about signs on the basis of images and their combinations, not as a function of determinants which were already linguistic. Deleuze refers to Peirce’s extraordinary classification of images and signs:

Peirce begins with the image, from the phenomenon or from what appears. The image seems to him to be of no more than three kinds: firstness (something that only refers to itself, quality or power, pure possibility; for instance, the red that we find identical to itself in the proposition ‘You have not put on your red dress’ or ‘You are in red’); secondness (something that refers to itself only through something else, existence, action-reaction, effort-resistance); thirdness (something that refers to itself only by comparing one thing to another, relation, the law, the necessary).

In the first volume of Cinema 1. The Movement-Image, Deleuze based this research schema on the firstness, secondness and thirdness of image,
suggesting that these qualities correspond to the affection-image, the action-image and the relation-image. On the other hand, according to Deleuze, all three are deduced from the movement-image as material, as soon as it is related to the interval of movement. In Deleuze’s schema, between the perception-image and the others there is no intermediary, because perception extends by itself into the other images. In the other cases, however, there is necessarily an intermediary indicating the extension as passage. For this reason, Deleuze suggested six, not three, types of perceptible visible images:

- perception-image, affection-image, impulse-image (intermediates between affection and action), action-image, reflection-image (intermediate between action and relation), and relation-image.\(^\text{16}\)

On the other hand, Deleuze considers that he takes the term ‘sign’ in a completely different way from Peirce: he maintains that a sign is a particular image that refers to a type of image, whether from the point of view of its bipolar composition, or from the point of view of its genesis. He therefore constructs his own classification of signs. In the second volume of *Cinema: The Time-Image*, Deleuze asks Peirce a test question: Why does Peirce think that everything ends with thirdness and the relation-image and that there is nothing beyond?\(^\text{17}\) Deleuze steps beyond and finds signs which, eating away at the action-image, also brought their effect to bear above and below, on perception and relation, and called into question the movement-image as a whole: these are opsigns or sonsigns.

We could no longer consider Peirce’s thirdness as a limit of the system of images and signs, because the opsign (or sonsign) set everything off again, from the inside.\(^\text{18}\)

### 3. Cavell and Deleuze: How to Lean the New Vision of Reality?

Cavell and Deleuze did not cooperate in teaching cinema as philosophy. They did not practice philosophical friendship and they created two indispensable schools for teaching cinema as philosophy. They were separated by space, different cultures and different educational backgrounds; as David N. Rodowick observes, they “seem only dimly aware of one

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 32.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 33.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 34.
another.”⁹ They were interested in different movies. In *The Pursuit of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage*, Cavell reflects upon Hollywood’s ‘golden age’ remarriage comedies. Cavell was interested in the moral lessons of these movies that revealed the necessity to grow up together with one’s partner in order to preserve one’s happiness. In order to grow with a woman partner, the man has to acknowledge her autonomy, and she has to see that he acknowledges it. Only by doing so will he make himself worthy of her, so that she may finally give herself to him for the second time (remarry him). Cavell concludes that these films teach that the pursuit of happiness does not require us to fulfil our desires but rather to transform them.


Cavell was looking for the education of new emotions in cinema, Deleuze sought the birth of new thought. Notwithstanding their differences, Rodowick indicates common points between Cavell’s and Deleuze’s approaches to cinema: the inclination towards moral reasoning. Cavell was concerned with the problem of ethics in film and philosophy, above all through his characterization of Emersonian moral perfectionism. Rodowick discerns in Cavell’s Emersonian ethics echoes of Deleuze’s Nietzschean and Bergsonian perspectives on cinema, “wherein concepts of movement and time are related as the expression of belief in the world and its powers of transformation.”¹⁰

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¹⁰ Ibid., 98.
As an important bridge between Deleuze’s and Cavell’s approach to cinema, Rodowick indicates first of all their mutual interest in Nietzsche. Another common point is their original way of asking ethical questions in ontological contexts:

Though Cavell uses the word frequently, and Deleuze rarely, both evaluate ontology as a particular approach to Being. This is not the being or identity of film or what identifies film as art, but rather, the ways of being that art provokes in us – or more deeply, how film and other forms of art express for us or return to us our past, current, and future states of being. Also, in both philosophers, the ethical relation is inseparable from our relationship to thought. For how we think, and whether we sustain a relation to thought, are bound up with our choices of a mode of existence and our relations with others and to the world.21

Cavell is interested more in our relations with others, Deleuze – to the world. Cavell, reflecting upon remarriage comedy, tries to reveal aspects of our relations with others that at first sight are not evident and seem insignificant, and shows that we help, hurt, interest and bore each other in our everyday lives in countless unremarkable and fateful ways, and that while we have to learn to tolerate clumsiness in one another – say inadvertent, heedless, thoughtless, careless slaps in our ignorant or uneducated responses to frustration – we also have to learn not to tolerate slugs, meaning any one of a hundred ways we have of dealing out little deaths of rejection.22

Cavell discerns one common feature uniting film with philosophy: “they are both preoccupied with ways in which we miss our lives, miss the density of significance passing by in a film, in or speech, in our lives.”23 Deleuze observes one common feature between philosophy and cinema: they both say something about the encounter of the subject with reality. The cinema subject – the main character – does not ask a philosophical question: Why is there something instead of nothing? The subject experiences another problem: how to withstand something which is unbearable and unthinkable in reality. Modern cinema invents new signs and breaks old sensory-motor schemas based on movement. Modern cinema turns from action to a purely optical and sound situation:

21 Ibid., 99.
23 Ibid., 206.
It makes us grasp, it is supposed to make us grasp, something intolerable and unbearable. Not a brutality as nervous aggression, an exaggerated violence that can always be extracted from the sensory-motor relations in the action-image. Nor is it a matter of scenes of terror, although there are sometimes corpses and blood. It is a matter of something too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes also too-beautiful, and which hence-forth outstrips our sensory-motor capacities.24

This intolerableness of reality is something similar to what existentialists or Albert Camus were writing about. Deleuze does not articulate the problem in detail in the existentialist manner, he simply states it as a main fact of human existence that the cinema reveals even more clearly than philosophy. Romantics were able to grasp the intolerable or the unbearable, the empire of poverty. They also produced new means of knowledge and action: the visionary approach to reality. Deleuze relies on the experience of romantics. He pays no attention to the actors playing the characters, he almost never mentions their names, but only indicates, that a new type of actor was needed: not simply the non-professional actors that neo-realism had revived at the beginning, but what might be called professional non-actors, or, better, ‘actor mediums’, capable of seeing and showing rather than acting, and either remaining dumb or undertaking some never-ending conversation, rather than of replying or following a dialogue.25

As a matter of fact, when discussing the type of the character ‘clairvoyant’, who reflects the encounter with something unbearable in reality and is learning to see reality from a new side, becoming a visionary, Deleuze usually returns to three women characters: Karin in Roberto Rossellini’s *Stromboli* (1950), Irene in Rossellini’s *Europe-52* and Gertrud in Carl Theodor Dreyer’s *Gertrud* (1964). The first two – Karin and Irene – were played by Ingrid Bergman (1915-1982), who suggested to Rossellini the creation of a common movie *Stromboli*. In this film, Bergman plays Karin, a displaced Lithuanian in Italy, who escapes internment camp by marrying an Italian soldier and fisherman (played by Mario Vitale), whom she met in the camp on the other side of the barbed wire. After their marriage they went to his home island of Stromboli. She tries to adapt to the very harsh and barren environment of the island and to the very traditional

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25 Ibid., 20.
and conservative people – hostile and strange, – but she fails. She becomes pregnant and understands that whatever happens she has to escape. In her escape plan she has to pass the volcano and at that very moment it starts to erupt. Karin has no possibility of going further, but also no possibility of returning. She falls asleep and awakens to reflect on her new situation. The film documentary features real segments about tuna fishing and an actual eruption of the volcano and most villagers are played by real people from the island. Notwithstanding some sceptical acceptance by film critics, Deleuze considers this movie as an example of modern cinema, when all sensory-motor schemes are broken, and the character reflects on the world in the new optical and sound situation and learns things she or he never saw before. Karin becomes a visionary when she suddenly understands the extraordinary greatness of the reality she cannot bear. Deleuze writes:

*Stromboli* presents a foreign woman whose revelation of the island will be all the more profound because she cannot react in a way that softens or compensates for the violence of what she sees, the intensity and the enormity of the tunny fishing (‘It was awful…’), the panic-inducing power of the eruption (‘I am finished, I am afraid, what mystery, what beauty, my God …’).26

Deleuze concludes that the beauty of the island Stromboli is too powerful for Karin and so becomes intolerable, as it does for all the spectators, like too strong a pain. But mainly the greatness of the situation as being something unbearable in reality possibly revealed in the movies engenders real unforgettable philosophical lessons in cinema. On the other hand, something unbearable is experienced when the heroine Gertrud (played by Nina Pens Rode) in Dreyer’s movie *Gertrud* also experiencing difficulties in marriage and her relations with other lovers, reflects her own life in her mentality. Gertrud becomes conscious of belief as thinking of the unthinkable (“Have I been young? No but I have loved. Have I been beautiful? No but I have loved. Have I been in life? No but I have loved.”).27 This limit-situation was repeated in another movie *Europe’ 51* created by Rossellini in which Ingrid Bergman also played the main role of, in Deleuze words, the bourgeois woman Irene. Living in a wealthy family with the industrialist George (played by Alexander Knox) Irene (played by Bergman) is too busy with her social life and the parties they give at home for their friends, and thus has not enough time left for their

26 Ibid., 2.
27 Ibid., 170-171.
son Michele (played by Sandro Franchina). Irene does not notice his loneliness and his longing for her attention. During a dinner party, Michele constantly tries to get his mother’s attention, but Irene is more interested in being a good hostess to her guests. Michele attempts suicide by falling several stories down a stairwell. At the hospital, Irene promises never to leave Michele, but he dies. Irene overcomes her depression and grief and, becoming aware of the poor people starts to take care of them, donating her money. She’s horrified by the factory working conditions, which she sees as slavery. Irene then cares for a prostitute who is dying of tuberculosis. Her family, husband and mother are not able to understand the reason for her absence from home and conclude she is betraying the family and is mentally ill, so commit her to a mental institution.

The end of the movie is very important. Irene had to make her final choice, like the heroine from Kierkegaard’s Either/Or. Her family asked her to decide: either to return to the family and continue living as she lived before, or to stay away in the mental hospital. The people she helped, together with many she did not, stood outside her cell window praying that she could be their new ‘patron saint’. She decided to stay with these people and remain forever an inmate, because she had learnt unforgettable lessons about herself and could no longer betray the reality she was living in. She behaves like Knight Myshkin or Sonia Marmaladova from Dostoyevsky’s novel The Idiot. Rossellini was expressing admiration for the values of Saint Francis of Assisi. For Deleuze, Irene as well as Karin from Stromboli becomes a sign of clairvoyance, a new visionary. These are pure seers, who no longer existed except in the interval of the movement and do not even have the consolation of the sublime, which would connect them to matter or gain control of the spirit for them. They are rather given over to something intolerable which is simply their everydayness itself. It is here that the reversal is produced: the movement is no longer simply aberrant. Deleuze writes,

Time is out of joint: it is off the hinges assigned to it by behaviour in the world, but also by movements of world. It is no longer time that depends on movement; it is aberrant movement that depends on time. The relation, sensory-motor situation – indirect image of time is replaced by a non-localizable relation, pure optical and sound situation-direct time-image. Opsigns and son-signs are direct presentations of time, the grasping of the intolerable even in the everyday and insignificant.28

28 Ibid., 170.
An essential difference can be seen between the lessons learnt from remarriage comedies as discussed by Cavell and the lessons learnt from Deleuze’s clairvoyants. In the case of Deleuze’s favourite three women, Karin, Gertrud and Irene, visionaries never remarry. On the contrary, they start to learn new lessons about reality only when they leave husbands or lovers and start to go their own way. The Visionary is alone, and cares not about relations with other people but only about the visionary itself.

**Bibliography**


Chapter 5
Cinema and Moral Education: Contra and Pro

Jūratė Baranova

1. Discussion with a Sceptic

Teaching ethics with fiction movies can be opposed for several reasons. The authors of this book discussed the arguments with Wilfried Baumann from the Austrian Computer Society, Department of Innovation, who formulated them in a private letter responding to our project during the conference “Constructionism, Computational Thinking and Educational Innovation”1 in Vilnius. Of course, the identity of the critic is not so important, but it is very useful to hear what was said as the discussion with an abstract sceptic allows us to justify our position more clearly.

First, the sceptic says: An educational process implies there is a consensus on what has to be taught and especially in this case on what are the commonly agreed moral values. While this may seem straightforward for many questions, it will surely be controversial for others. Who decides those cases?

Second, the film industry is just another industry trying to make money and under the control of people that follow their own personal interests and not the interests of society as a whole. For any educational process we should ask if it is beneficial for society as a whole. There is a thin line between education (which should benefit society as a whole) and manipulation (which usually benefits only the manipulator).

Third, can there be anything more passive, according to the sceptic, than watching a fiction movie? It tries to involve us emotionally, to incite feelings such as anger, guilt, pity, pride, love, fear, empathy and curiosity. At best, fiction movies merely give the audience the feeling of being involved, not the active involvement required by multimodal education. Fourth, the sceptic argues that the best one can expect from fiction movies is some kind of information. Information that is presented visually is often easier to understand and more convincing than textual information and its effect is in some cases longer lasting than that of other information, because visual information can sometimes be recalled more easily.

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than other information. A written text such as a novel can also try to evoke powerful images, but a much larger group of people can be addressed through a movie. Many people lack the reading competence, the imagination or the patience to read a novel, whereas in a movie it is easy to add subtle, implicit and additional information that is registered and processed subconsciously, at least partly. This somewhat subliminal content passes every person’s innate critical barrier much more easily because it is difficult to scrutinize information when one is not aware that it is being acquired. This subtle additional information can take the form of specific visual clues, for example, the properties of the clothes the hero or the villain is wearing, elements of the soundtrack or generic visual effects like a fisheye view, a tint, a soft focus or a blurred view. In consequence, some people cannot question what is presented to them visually and believe everything they see in a film is real. This visual access to information has nothing to do with student-centred, discovery learning.

Fifth, despite these doubts, the sceptic considers that some movies, albeit usually not those dealing with social issues, have large followings (Star Trek, Rocky Horror Picture Show) with fan screenings where members of the audience dress up in costumes and reenact scenes from the movie. Although this is an act of imitation rather than a learning process, it hints that active involvement is possible and even desired by parts of the audience. What could this kind of active involvement look like? There could be physical symbols for representing characters, important objects or locations from the movie. Participants could discuss and reenact alternative endings, additional scenes, sequels, turns of the stories that they did not like, ethical implications etc. There could be a prepared list of tasks to perform or questions the group has to work on. Members of the group could change the story with new characters or change their role. The results could be entered into a database, and the group could compare their results to those from other groups. In addition, participants inspired by the movie could be encouraged to create a work of art such as a drawing, a painting, a poem…The work of art may refer to elements from the movie, expressing different feelings that the viewer experienced, but could also contradict, challenge or ridicule the movie.

The response to this critique from the proponents of using fiction movies in teaching ethics would be following. First: with regard to the contention that the educational process implies a consensus on what has to be taught and, especially in this case, on what are commonly agreed moral values, we argue: distrust for the teachers’ ability to discern independently what are moral values is a feature of totalitarian education, where the rich variety of ethical life is reduced to several simplified concepts. We consider that the educator’s diploma supposes the required
ability to have the courage to take moral decisions in the incommensurable alternatives of real life; furthermore, we follow Kant’s insight that the rational agent is able to understand the essence of the categorical imperative for the reason of his rationality (even in the case where the agent is a Moon dweller).

We do agree with the sceptic that the film industry is different from the process of education. It has its own pitfalls, which were reflected by the film philosopher Deleuze, when he wrote:

> Cinema is dying, then, from its quantitative mediocrity. But there is a still more important reason: the mass-art, the treatment of masses, which should not have been separable from the accession of the masses to the status of true subject, has degenerated into state propaganda and manipulation, into a kind of fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler.²

On the other hand, however, cinema is not the only sphere of culture to sin by collaborating with fascism. Indeed, the talented film director Leni Riefenstahl can be blamed for being sympathetic to National Socialism, but the fact that such famous writers as Ezra Pound or Thomas S. Elliot or Louis-Ferdinand Celine also expressed anti-Semitic views does not stop their texts from being used in the process of education. The same is true for fictional films or other branches of art. Just as kitsch in a particular painting or an unsuccessful piece of music does not exclude the power of talented works, so the fact that some film production is mediocratic, manipulative or expresses doubtful values does not make films that are real pieces of art less valuable for the purposes of education. How can the distinction be made? Deleuze would have a very simple suggestion: just concentrate attention on good films. In his philosophy of cinema, he identified and discussed about four hundred ‘good movies’. Of course, the educator in this case should possess not only moral rationality, but also the developed aesthetic taste necessary to discern between mediocre and good movies. Unlike the sceptic, we treat fictional movies first of all as works of art. Agreeing with the philosophers

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of education Jan Jagodzinski and Jason J. Wallin, we see a deep need for using arts in teacher education. Third, we disagree with the sceptics’ opinion that films influence only the emotions of the spectators. This would be a very limited aesthetic theory. We treat films as works of art and therefore consider their influence in the light of Kant’s understanding of the nature of aesthetic taste as meaning the disinterested game of imagination and intellectual abilities.

That is in the new direction developed by Deleuze, an approach based on constructing thought side by side with feelings. It is an active process, very far from McLuhan’s statement that film is a hot media, leaving no place for active involvement in the process of watching film. On the contrary, it is active involvement in the sense of thoughts even more than emotions. Fourth, also in contrast to the sceptic’s view, we do not emphasize the process of gaining information when using fiction films in moral education, but consider them as a challenge for creative mental learning and provoking the students’ critical abilities. We follow Deleuze’s insight that watching good movies is first of all an encounter that inspires a thought; not however a thought stemming from the sources of everyday experience but rather a special type of thought, in Deleuze’s words, “the identity of thought with choice as determination of the indeterminable.” The spectator of serious movies faces the problem of how to endure something which is unbearable and unthinkable in reality. Fifth, we do agree that it is possible and useful to use methods for creating different endings for film stories, just as it would be possible to play with written texts. This can create a great deal of interest and amusement for students as well as for the educator, but the question remains as to the value and purpose of such recreated endings. Do they have value in themselves as a source for entertainment? Do we not trust young people to take life seriously and construct through their imagination and mental skill their own reading of serious cinema as a valuable piece of art? As Deleuze says: modern cinema may only be an indirect representation

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6 Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 171.
of reality, but by evoking a special kind of thinking it has the power to restore our belief in the world.\textsuperscript{7}

\section*{2. Teaching with Films: Associated and Differentiated Access to Thought Construction} \textsuperscript{8}

Considering the experience of teaching with films in different countries, we can find more than few strong traditions. We will analyse at least two of them. The first, which is oriented toward teaching social problems, is elaborated by William B. Russell in \textit{Teaching Social Issues with Films},\textsuperscript{9} and also in Stewart Waters’ and Russell’s publication \textit{The Fundamentals of Teaching with Films}.\textsuperscript{10} The second is published by Wallin in \textit{A Deleuzian Approach to Curriculum. Essay on a Pedagogical Life}\textsuperscript{11} and by jagodzinski in \textit{Visual Art and Education in an Era of Designer Capitalism}.\textsuperscript{12} These publications as well as their publications in the book \textit{Deleuze and Guattari, Politics and Education: For a People-yet-to-Come},\textsuperscript{13} suggest a new way of teaching with films for both critical and creative purposes. Both traditions are relatively new and oriented toward teaching and learning to think in a special constructional way. The second, following Deleuze, operates not with association, but with differentiation.

The two schools mentioned above demonstrate that different approaches to applying films for teaching and learning can follow distinctively different methods. They also show what kind of understanding of the world a method constructs and what results can be expected. The first tradition of teaching with films, represented by Russell, is concerned with understanding, recognizing and using associations, whereas the second, represented by Wallin and jagodzinski, is oriented towards criticism, experimentation, invention and creativity. The construction of concepts, thoughts and meanings, in other words ways of thinking, are very important for both of them. In \textit{Teaching Social Issues with Films}, Russell suggests methods, schemas and survey templates, describing and exemplifying the tools very precisely. His main focus is on teaching social problems such as poverty, drugs, socially vulnerable families, bullying, addiction, depression, countering the marginalization of cultures, caring for animals

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 166.
\textsuperscript{8} This part is written with Lilija Duoblienė.
\textsuperscript{9} (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing Inc., 2009).
\textsuperscript{11} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
\textsuperscript{12} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
\textsuperscript{13} Edited by Matthew Carlin and Jason J. Wallin (New York/London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
\end{flushleft}
and other sensitive topics (30 social issues). Russell suggested analysing these problems because of their relation to American social life, culture and pedagogy, a relation also common to many other countries. The theoretician formulates concrete questions for working with film material: questions designed for gathering information, analysis, interpretation and creation. Students can recreate the ending of films or even make a synopsis to present their story (how they understand the film with their personal narration). They are encouraged to discuss key problems, to evaluate the actions of the heroes and the position of the film director. The teachers are provided with a list of films appropriate to the students’ age, and must avoid scenes of violence and sex unless parental permission is obtained.

What is Russell’s theoretical standpoint and methodology? They come mostly from Driscoll’s and Engle’s teaching of critical thinking, decision-making and reflective thinking.14 This is also close to the Deweyan tradition of problem solving, trying to find answers to one’s questions. For Dewey, interest is the most important vehicle acting as a stimulus for the learning process. Films offer a great possibility to compare what is already in a student’s experience and to think while following the moving image. In Democracy and Education Dewey argues:

Any activity with an aim implies a distinction between an earlier incomplete phase and later completing phase; it implies also intermediate steps. To have an interest is to take things as entering into such a continuously developing situation, instead of taking them in isolation15

and adds a pragmatic note that thinking

is the intentional endeavor to discover specific connections between something which we do and the consequences which result, so that the two become continuous.16

Notwithstanding Dewey, who usually has in mind a student’s authentic experience when he discusses experiential learning, Russell claims that the experience of others, especially their social experience, can be transmitted, which explains why films showing real or simulated examples from others’ lives, can also be used to teach. Based on this standpoint, the theory of teaching with films suggests the construction of a

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14 Waters and Russell, “The Fundamentals of Teaching with Film,” 3-16.
15 Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, 137.
16 Ibid., 145.
worldview and especially the understanding of the social field through critical and reflective thinking and decision making. It deals with the connection of various elements and the involvement of new elements appearing in the process of learning, and also with the reconstruction of ideas presented on the basis of the students’ own understanding, values and experience. Russell states that these tools for film analysis increase students’ interest in the material being studied, thus allowing it to become more meaningful and relevant to the student. Furthermore, authentic classroom activities help teachers achieve instructional goals such as retention, understanding, reasoning, and critical thinking.17

Russell presents a list of mostly well-known and popular films, (Schindler’s List, 1993; Trainspotting, 1996; The Terminal, 2004; Scarface, 1983; American Girl, 2002; The Virgin Suicides, 1999; etc.), which have received awards in international film festivals. The wealth of material for interpretation that they contain undoubtedly makes them suitable for analysing social issues. Wallin and Jagodzinski suggest films of a somewhat different kind, probably not always good for teaching teenagers but far more appropriate for curriculum studies at the university level. In any case, they intend to bring a new way of thinking to schools, especially for youth. Wallin suggests Jim Jarmusch’s Ghost Dog: The Way of the Samurai (1999), Quentin Tarantino’s Kill Bill (2003) and Todd Haynes’ I’m Not There (2007).

Wallin demonstrates how to work with the problem of time and the atemporal person, how to link different heterogeneous lines of action, how to treat in a different way the absence of arguments for agreement, and the problem of multiple identity. In this context, he intends to protect students’ thinking from clichés and stereotypes, and to escape repressive techniques during pedagogical activities. Teaching with films, according to him, is a step forward from the banking education criticized by Paul Freire. Wallin explores Deleuzian and Guattarian concepts and cinema theory about the time-image, which interrupts the movement-image and thus breaks the dialectical understanding of film actions, opening up instead a space for the imagination and unexpected combinations of elements that fill the cracks, gaps, and ruptures in films, appearing by means of specific montage. The montage of such films differs from classical montage by being oriented toward the presentation of intervals rather

than the connection of shots.\textsuperscript{18} It can be called a montrage.\textsuperscript{19} It contains a great deal of space for linking different heterogenous elements and planes, because the main vehicle in film teaching is not interest, but desire and affect. How do they differ? Where interest is oriented toward concrete results, desire works much more through involvement in the process of creation through the affect.\textsuperscript{20} This means active participation in the creational process, which is not personal; it means being a part of assemblage – the combination of interconnected elements in the process. The construction is not personal and not even social but much more machinic, dependent on an unpredictable combination of the organic and artificial, real and imaginary, social and natural. It is the construction not of forms, but of forces. It is not about identity and the individual, but about ‘individuation’ and ‘becoming’, in other words – processual. As Deleuze states:

\begin{quote}
Cinema always narrates what the image’s movements and times make it narrate. If the motion’s governed by a sensory-motor scheme, if it shows a character-reacting to a situation, then you get a story. If, on the other hand, the sensory-motor scheme breaks down to leave disoriented and discordant movements, then you get other patterns, becomings rather than stories.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

Breaking, crossing and displacing appear as the main tools, as well as cracks and ruptures. Following from Jean-Luc Godard’s films, Deleuze states:

\begin{quote}
This is not an operation of association, but of differentiation, as mathematicians say, or of disappearance, as physicists say: given one potential, another one has to be chosen, not any whatever, but in such a way that a difference of potential is established between the two, which will be productive of a third or of something new.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Deleuze calls such a method ‘Between’: between two visual or sound images, between two affectations, between sound and visual image etc.

\textsuperscript{19} According to Nerijus Milerius, it stems from the word \textit{montrer} (fr. to show).
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 179-180.
Wallin also uses Godard’s way of montage for the interpretation of *I’m Not There*, and especially Godard’s words: “It is not where you take things from – it’s where you take them to.”

Working in the same tradition, jagodzinski analyses films such as Sergei Eisenstein’s *Battleship Potemkin* (1925), Joaquin Fernandezo’s and Colino Gunno’s *Indoctrination* (2011) or Lana and Lilly Wachowskis’ *The Matrix* (1999). The first film demonstrates a dialectical move and the spectator’s involvement in the action, and the third erases the border between reality and hyper reality. Using these and other films, jagodzinski explores the message of ideology, which is perfectly demonstrated in the film of Eisenstein and, on the other hand, the possibility of constructing another worldview, far more complicated and much richer, integrating the imaginary, the virtual and only the possible, as is the case in the film of the Wachowskis. In both cases, students are encouraged to understand the construction of their worlds, although access is different in the case of each film: to construct one’s vision according to ideology and concrete expectations (*Battleship Potemkin*); to show how one can be constructed in a modern, much more complicated reality, by erasing the borders between the real and imaginary, the natural and technological, the human and non human (*The Matrix*). jagodzinski criticizes the construction of people’s consciousness, especially that of students, and following Deleuze outlines a new way of presenting the image, which does not fit the narrow formation of thinking and the marketization and selling of images for the masses. Moreover, the new procedure of film montage, based on differentiation and intervals, helps to destroy the passive and mainstream way of thinking that offers an easy route for manipulation and is usually supported by the dominant policy and dominant pedagogy. The other kind of film that he chose for in-class analysis is that of performance artist Bill Viola, who is famous for such video installations as *The Greetings* (1995), *Five Angels for the Millennium* (2001), and *The Raft* (2004). His installations offer the perception of different realities. Viola works with consistencies, especially water, in which he creates an absolutely different speed of movement related to a different perception of time, similar to filming in the slow-mood style. jagodzinski’s examples of video projects and fiction films offer an understanding of the world as infinite; more than one usually sees and hears. This method helps to open thinking for imperceptible and what is only possible. It is not a question of how the film or performance directors express their view, but rather of how students are involved in film as *machine*, working through affects, precepts and concepts designated as the main tools for perceiving the

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world and especially arts. By participating actively and creatively during the humanities lessons, the student creates thought and is created by thoughts. She or he becomes one of the elements integrated in the assemblage as a creative machine. This happens during class not through ideological construction but through the creative event. Following Deleuze, jagodzinski maintains that these films bring one much closer to the virtual world, full of surprises and new combinations, and in that way they expand teaching and learning possibilities. The aim of visual studies, according to jagodzinski, is to investigate paradoxes of ‘lived’ life.

The power and force of the image in an expanded sense (be it in performance, film, television installation, and so on) reside in its affect or intensity in parallel with its contents. This means that semantically or semiotically ordered levels of analysis – representation as such – are no longer adequate for the task. A turn to philosophies of the unconscious that address the paradox of these two levels – the semantic and the affective – as they work and twist with each other in different contexts becomes a necessity for VCAE’s advancement.24

The authors of this book experimented with films using different methods and working not with school students but with university students in pedagogical studies. The main result achieved by working with them according to the second methodology (Deleuze, jagodzinski, Wallin) is their great interest in a new way of thinking, in constructing their inner and extrinsic world not with elements of clear shape and content, which can be grouped by concrete features or criteria, but with elements of absolutely different levels, types and planes, from different assemblages. They work on combining heterogeneous elements and consequently inventing the world in the process of ‘becoming’. During the course Visual Studies and Education they watch and interpret but are also involved in practical creativity.

We do not intend to describe their results broadly and in detail but rather on the contrary we will focus very briefly on the involvement of students. Students had to create their own multimodal projects, trying to find proper images for their ideas, to combine them, to add any existing ideas or to create a soundtrack. Their results showed wonderful examples of mixing elements of different types, levels or fields and producing

unique audio-visual constructs, for example: mixing videos from the funeral of President Kennedy and concerts of The Beatles. In this combination, the visual images expressing the different emotions of the crowds are absolutely disturbing. Additionally, the soundtrack added a level of complication. It was created separately and was not diegetic – not coinciding with the visual image. The feeling of reality was mixed with the fantasy of the creator and spectator. The perception and understanding of separate events were confounded, thus creating the enigma of the film. The students’ other film used the image of school children’s legs and their movement under the tables, combined with a special soundtrack. Following the students’ steps, viewers were inspired by this combination to reflect in many different ways on the idea of the film. The question that must be asked is why do education students, who are ready to go to work in schools, choose to experiment with sound and image in an unexpected way and look for new combinations, rather than creating projects in the traditional way? In the context of Visual, cultural and art education, it seems that the new mode involves them strongly, demanding their active and creative thinking and their wish to experiment using the tools for creation presented during the course. The same tendency is evident during in-class analysis of films such as Peter Weir’s Dead Poet Society (1989), Eric Toledano’s Intouchables (2011), Hal Hartley’s Unbelievable Truth (1989) and Wim Wenders’ Wrong Move (1972). Great attention was devoted to Wrong Move, which expresses mostly a new way of thinking: thinking of infinity, experimenting, inventing and thinking in different directions according to the unpredictable vectors of a nomad. The result of teaching with films is not that students think according to the given new constructs of a particular film but that their thinking goes side by side with the invention of constructs, experimentation and creativity.

This methodology of teaching thinking is not so much humanistic as it is post-humanistic, oriented toward the linkage of all fields – human and technological, natural and artificial, actual and virtual, and lies beyond constructionism. Through the differentiation, cracks, ruptures and in-betweeness, and also by involving new elements, it deals with a broad scale of elements while at the same time being part of a much bigger creatonal and constructional process going beyond what is human. Returning to the question about empathy and feelings expressed in the films: will we skip them? New teaching thinking does not stress the emotional field. It combines perceptions, sensations and thoughts. All are important, though thoughts, according to Deleuzian film theory, are the axis for constructing beyond already legitimated constructionism.

25 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Gilles Deleuze, Cinema
3. Why Teach with Cinema? Teaching *about* and Teaching *with*

When starting to research the possibility of using cinema in the teaching process, the question of possible methodological approaches arises. In this book the authors rely on two different types of source: teaching ‘about films’ and teaching ‘with films’. First, cinema can be taught as a professional subject in cinema-studies courses, which is teaching ‘about films’. The authors of this book often refer to the insights of two cinema-studies educators, namely Stanley Cavell and Andrew Klevan, whose conversation is published in *Film as Philosophy. Essays in Cinema after Wittgenstein and Cavell*, edited by Rupert Read and Jerry Goodenough. Their discussion “What becomes of Thinking on Film?” concerns the peculiarities of teaching in cinema-studies programs.26

On the other hand, in the alternative teaching ‘with films’, different films can be included in the university curricula of different subjects that have no connection to cinema, or even in high-school courses as a source of a different kind of knowledge, specifically humanitarian knowledge. As an example, this type of methodology is used in the textbook *Philosophy through Film* written by Mary M. Litch and Amy Karofsky.27 The authors chose different philosophical problems, for example: truth, scepticism, personal identity, artificial intelligence, free will, determinism and moral responsibility, ethics, political philosophy, the problem of evil, and existentialism. For each chapter they wrote a survey of the philosophical problem, identified the main aspects, selected one or two films for each topic and in the final interpretation of the problem also included material from the movies on an equal footing with the philosophical exegesis. The textbook also suggests reading passages from philosophical texts relevant to the problems being considered.

Teaching social problems with films has a long history. Russell III and Waters in *Cinematic Social Studies. A Resource for Teaching and Learning Social Studies with Film* presented a historical overview of the effectiveness of teaching and learning with films. In the United States, teaching history with films started in 1931 with Frances Consitt, and has recently become a popular method with social-study educators in the USA. Teachers responded to the question: What purposes have films and filmstrips served

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in your teaching most of the time? The teachers checked and approved a list of applied alternatives.

The result showed the most popular purposes according to the teachers interviewed. (97%) To motivate students about some new topic; (92%) To provide students with a common experience, which would be generally unobtainable in any other way; (91%) To provide a review or summary of information learned in other ways by the class; (85%) To convey a set of important facts; (75%) To develop an attitude towards some abstract idea or concept or an appreciation of it; (73%) To provide a supplementary or enrichment experience for individual student study times; (68%) To clarify complex ideas; (68%) To provide an occasional break for enjoyment; (58%) To explain a skill.28

The experiment carried out by Baranova,29 as if following Russell, was in some aspects similar, but in some different. We did not interview teachers, but rather 147 16-18-year-old students from one of the prestigious gymnasia in the capital of the country. The interview was anonymous. As we were not teachers at the school, we could not impose our attitudes on the students. We asked open questions, for example: What do you think – would moral education benefit or not benefit from the inclusion of films in ethics classes? Only 5% answered that they saw no reason for this inclusion. Ninety-five percent answered that it would be beneficial: 47% indicated as a reason that the films illustrate and allow information to be easily comprehended; 28% responded that films would provide a common experience as the background for class discussion; 21% said that films excite curiosity and would make the lesson more interesting; 3% answered that films broaden the worldview; 1% that using films in ethics classes would teach how to analyse them. To the question Are feature films only entertainment, or something else? If something else, say what they are, fifty-two percent of the students answered that both alternatives are correct: films are for entertainment and also for something else. To the question What else? most students responded that films teach and are first of all a source of information (38%). They also indicated films are a means of revealing a thought, a message (14%), something that compels one to think (13%); something that enriches the personality (8%), an art form (5%); an inspiring matter (4%); a possibility


to escape reality (2%); a reflection of time and culture (2%); education of the imagination (2%); a work of art pretending to divinity (1%).

Not one student suggested any reason for including cinema in ethics classes because cinema is a source of moral values or that it leads to better understanding and communication with the different Other. Neither did we see these motives included in the teachers’ list suggested by Russell. But among the alternatives not appearing in Russell’s list, some are mentioned in students’ answers: that films can be considered as a means of revealing a thought, or a message (14%), or something that compels one to think (13%); or enriches the personality (8%), and in these responses one can detect a starting point intuitively leading towards moral education.

4. Which Films are Suitable for Moral Education?
The Author’s Response

What kind of film should be used in moral education during lectures or lessons of humanitarian (ethics, religion, civic) and social (history, education) sciences? To answer this question, we suggest profiting from the insights not only of world-renowned philosophers, but also from the answers given by the students in the Ethics course during the teaching experiment one of the authors carried out with first-year philosophy students at Vilnius University. We understand the teaching experiment to be an experiment during which students not only demonstrate their capacities and present their opinions, but most importantly learn some new capacity and demonstrate the ability to learn something new as compared with the situation before the experiment. The aim of Baranova’s methodology was partly the same as Russell’s, presented in the previous chapter, i.e., to develop active critical thinking by comparing written, spoken and visual texts.

The most visible impact on reflection about including films as a teaching methodology was made by the previously mentioned American educator Russell III. In his joint publication with Waters, different teachers share their experience of teaching social studies with films. The main aim of all the educators included in the volume is to develop the critical thinking and knowledge of their students by including films in the curriculum. Russell and Waters classify the different methodologies used by teachers in the classroom and discern the following as the most effective: (1) Using film as a visual textbook, (2) Film as a depicter of atmosphere, (3) Film as analogy; (4) Film as historiography; and (5) Film as a spring-
board.\textsuperscript{30} Using film as a springboard stimulates student interest in a particular topic, person or event, promoting critical thinking and discussion. As usual, the material is a short video clip used at the beginning of a lesson or at the end as a conclusion. The authors criticize the methodology of using film as a visual textbook because most films are not created for the purpose of being an accurate depiction of historical people, places and events. Using films as a depicter of atmosphere is seen as a peripheral activity, but the authors recognize its productivity when the teachers succeed in providing students with powerful images of different geographic features, cities and cultures from all over the world. However, the most productive methodologies in their opinion are film used as analogy and film used as historiography.

Using films as analogy is a fantastic way to promote higher-order thinking skills among students and help them begin the process of reconceptualizing the viewing experience of films by directly looking for interpretative meanings. This process includes using films that are similar to events, people, places, etc., but otherwise different.\textsuperscript{31}

Much like using films as analogy, the use of films as historiography encourages students to analyse and think critically about film. This methodology use films as artifacts of a specific time. Russell’s model proposes the fundamentals of teaching with films. It recommends the following stages as necessary: (1) The Preparatory stage; (2) The Pre-Viewing stage; (3) Watching the film stage; (4) The Culmination activity stage.\textsuperscript{32}

Baranova’s method is very similar to using film as analogy in the way Russell and Waters indicate, encouraging the students to discern analogies, but not so much with places and events as in Russell’s case (this is important in history teaching), but searching for an analogy between the problems discerned in the movie and some ethical problems set out in philosophy textbooks, discussed in lectures and imbedded in the everyday practice of life. The twenty-seven students in the course on modern ethics were therefore asked to combine text, feature, thought, writing and oral discussion in order to understand the difference between optimism and pessimism.

First, they received information about the problem through the suggested essay title: What, according to your opinion, are the sources of optimism in William James’ philosophy and Kieślowski’s feature film

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 9-10.
Second, they read the extract of the text about James conception of the will to believe and the sources of optimism discerned by the American philosopher in Baranova’s textbook *Ethics: Philosophy as a Practice*. They were also encouraged to read James’ original text *The Will to Believe*. Third, they wrote a 2-3 page essay to present at a seminar that was transformed into a scientific conference. Some of them (selected at random) presented their papers in oral form before the audience. The listeners asked questions and expressed their opinions. The professor was an equal participant in the discussion and confined herself to moderating the discussion and collecting the written essays at the end. The essays were evaluated according to criteria known in advance. For the highest evaluation, the students needed not only to retell the plot of the movie, but to compare the philosophical and moral idea of optimism expressed by James with the idea they could discern behind the image of the film by Kieślowski. Why was this particular film selected? And how should films be selected for moral education? Deleuze would have answered simply: good films, not depending on the genre or topic. Good films, according to Deleuze, are those which are able to restore the link between man and the world, which has been recently broken: “Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears,” concludes Deleuze.

Deleuze does not share the position of intuitive realism, stating that the films will open up reality in itself, and in this respect he is closer to constructionism than to realism. In fact, emphasizing the need for belief in reality, he comes quite close to James’ fideism. This statement can be declared as the one of the main educational aims encouraging the inclusion of films in the humanities’ education curricula. “Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of fundamental encounter,” writes Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*. Watching films, one encounters glimpses of possibilities from the different spectrum of perspectives one is not able to experience in everyday life. We would add: the selection of films for humanitarian education needs to meet the requirement of there being a hidden secret not directly expressed in the image. The education process should presuppose this hidden encounter. As one of the first-year philosophy students wrote in an essay about her impression after watching Kieslowski’s film *Three Colours: White* (Trois Couleurs: Blanc):

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34 Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 166.
Every minute while watching the film and the feeling afterwards, I experienced a strange feeling: I can define it as puzzlement, at the same time as silent admiration, but also as the inability to comprehend what is going on. (K.K.)

The learning experiment with the film was designed to stimulate discussion of such concepts as optimism and pessimism, the will to believe, the will to die and the will to live, stemming from James’ pragmatism in the philosophical ethics course. The encounter with the film as an event brought the twenty students who participated to different conclusions. Some concluded that the stimulus for the main character Karol to radically change his life was simply his temperamental optimism, while some believed it was his obsession with love for his lost wife and others the need for revenge. One student refused to offer his own explanation saying it would be oversimplified. As already mentioned, all the views were expressed during the seminar in the form of a conference: students read their papers, the listeners asked questions and everybody participated in discussing the papers presented. The educator did not have the function of presenting one final and generalized point of view in the guise of a ‘truthful interpretation’. She expressed only her own point of view equally open to criticism. Kearney and Treagust, in their experiments with using digital multimedia to promote students’ conceptual development in the domain of Physics, discerned four methodical steps: “a. articulation and/or justification of the student’s own ideas; b. reflection on the viability of other students’ ideas; c. critical reflection on the student’s own ideas; d. construction and/or negotiation of new ideas.” They also concluded that this “programme provides students with an opportunity to engage in ‘science talk’…and a means of developing science discourse skills (exploration, justification, negotiation, challenge etc.).”

In the philosophical ethics course, the first two steps were present in the experiment with the movie White. Are students able to learn from these different points of view in this open discussion and modify their primary insights, as is presupposed in the pedagogy of social constructionism? Is there a need for this modification mainly in moral education? Or is the educational outcome of this teaching experience an encounter with the inevitability of living in a pluralistic social universe? The educator also hypothesizes that in the pedagogical experiment something should remain as the secret also for the educator. On the other hand, analysis of the essays reveals that the students are able to change their opinions even

during the process of written reflection and engaging in an inner monologue with themselves. Student A. L. in his essay starts to reflect on the movie with a sceptical tone. He had read in advance that in the whole trilogy of Kieslowski’s *Three Colours* this particular film, *White*, is the weakest of all. After the written reflection, he ends with a rather different conclusion:

> It is very difficult to summarize such a subtle and, in many aspects, ambiguous (from the point of view of moral posture) film *White* by Kieślowski, trying to reduce it to one or another stimulus. It would be an idiotic attempt. Kieślowski is not a sorcerer who pronounces how things should be and how one should behave. But the geniality of the film and certainly of Kieślowski is revealed when the situations – hypothetic or realistic – raise the question: what is *this*, which forces us to act and not to give up? And the complaints expressed at the beginning of essay no longer seem so justified (because of the unclear end among other things). What is meaningful is opening up a field for discussion. (A. L.)

> “It was very interesting for me to learn that it is possible to consider Karol’s action as the revenge or obsession with love. It did not come to my mind when I watched the movie,” reflected one of the students K.B., who relied on the alternative of temperamental optimism. Films suitable for moral education are those which resist one straightforward interpretation and create a field for possible multi-dimensional social learning.

> We conclude that cinema can be taught as a professional subject in cinema-studies courses, and it may also be included in the university curricula of different subjects having no connection to cinema, or even in highschool courses as a source of a different kind of knowledge, construction of thought and critical thinking. It is possible to use cinema in education for sensitivity to certain values, for example, moral values. The authors discovered and suggested the two possible strategies in the process of teaching ethics with films: (1) Creation by the students of their own multimodal projects, trying to find proper images for their ideas; (2) Watching films and reflecting at the same time on some philosophical concepts and then presenting written essays to the group in the discussion session as a possibility for encountering glimpses of reality from different perspectives. These multimodal strategies lead to constructing the students’ world view, not with very concrete separate elements of clear shape and content, but with elements of absolutely different levels and planes, and taken from different assemblages, thus expanding the capacity for critical and creative thinking. These approaches also develop social
capacities – the ability to understand and communicate with the different Other.

Following this conclusion, we carried out the following experiment with high-school students.

5. Which Films are Suitable for Moral Education?
   High-School Students’ Answers

In the section Why Teach with Cinema? Teaching about and Teaching with, we discussed the results of the experiment carried out by the authors of this book involving an interview with 147 students in the 16-18-year age bracket from one of the prestigious gymnasias in the capital Vilnius. Not one student suggested that the reason for including cinema in ethics classes was that cinema is a source of moral values or that it leads to better understanding and communication with the different Other. Neither did we see these motives included in the list for teachers suggested by Russell. Nonetheless, among the alternatives not appearing in Russell’s list, some are mentioned in student answers: that films can be considered as a means of revealing a thought, or a message (14%), or something that compels one to think (13%); or enriches the personality (8%), and in these responses one can detect a starting point intuitively leading towards moral education.

This insight was strengthened by the answers to the following open question: Concretely, what films do you suggest including in ethics classes? Not everybody answered, but the group suggested altogether 44 different films from different genres. They mentioned two TV programmes: Tedex and Truman’s Show, 44 feature films and five film directors without indicating particular films: one French, one Russian, one Italian and two Americans. They mentioned Henri-Georges Clouzot (1907-1977), a French film director, screenwriter and producer best remembered for his work in the thriller film genre, having directed The Wages of Fear and Les Diaboliques, which are critically recognized as among the greatest films from the 1950s. Clouzot also directed documentary films, including The Mystery of Picasso, which was declared a national treasure by the government of France. They also included in this list the Russian film director Andrey Tarkovsky (1932-1986), who succeeded in creating seven feature films: Ivan’s Childhood (1962), Andrey Rublyov (1966), Solaris (1972), Mirror (1975), and Stalker (1979). After years of creative conflict with state film authorities, Tarkovsky left Russia in 1979 and made his final two films abroad; Nostalgia (1983) and The Sacrifice (1986) were produced in Italy and Sweden respectively. From Italian film directors they selected Bernardo Bertolucci (1941-2018) who created more than twenty features, and documentaries including The Conformist (1970), Last Tango in Paris.

As has been mentioned, these high-school students are among the best in Lithuania, and their results do not represent the opinion of all the teenagers in the country, but they do offer an opportunity to reflect on the subject from a juvenile point of view. What films do the students consider as suitable for moral and philosophical education? They do not suggest including in the list any so-called avant-garde or experimental movies or genres such as film noir, military, criminal, political, thrillers, westerns, or musicals. Short films are also absent. Very few horror films are suggested. The list contains no musical comedies, no western movies, no detective stories, almost no horror films (with two exceptions), and, unfortunately, no classical Hollywood movies from the ‘golden age’ (as in the Stanley Cavell list). There were also no modern films from Italian neo-realism, and no films created by national film directors. The only feature film related to Lithuania is *Letters to Sofija* (2013) about the Lithuanian composer and painter Mykalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis, but created by British director Robert Mullan. However, their suggestions do reveal their sensibility to so-called ‘spiritual cinema’, the problems of the Holocaust, social responsibility etc. The results are as follows:

(1) The students consider films from very different genres as suitable for moral education: some can be considered films of spiritual cinema such as Krzysztof Kieślowski’s *Dekalog*, Andrey Tarkovsky’s *Stalker*, Lars von Trier’s *Breaking the Waves* (1996), Jim Jarmusch’s *Peterson* (2016) and Julian Schnabel’s *At Eternity’s Gate* (2018).

(2) The experiment revealed that these representatives of Lithuanian youth are open to difficult historical issues and the problems of the contemporary global community. The students are more interested in what is going on in the world than in their own country (not one national heritage film is included). On the other hand, the majority of films chosen by the students reveal that they are emphatically sensitive to the painful experiences of other people, even when distant from their time and space. Most of the suggested films testify to the students’ spiritual maturity:
At the top of their preferences were films on the topic of the Holocaust. The Holocaust film group was the largest, and the most frequently mentioned films are *The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas* by Mark Herman (2008) (recommended by five respondents); *Schindler’s List* by Steven Spielberg (1993) (recommended by three respondents); *Life is Beautiful* (1997) by Roberto Benigni (one respondent); *The Pianist* by Roman Polanski (2002) (one respondent). The list does not include *Goodbye, Children* (*Au revoir les enfants*, 1987) by Louis Malle, which can also be recommended as quite challenging with regard to our topic.

Sensitivity to multiculturalism. The students consider it meaningful to take an interest in the problem of genocide and Western indifference to the exploitation and destiny of humans living in Africa. They do think these films teach moral lessons and they do care about the suffering of unfamiliar Others (to use Rorty’s words) who they never met. They are also too young to have met people from Africa. Although Lithuania never had colonies in Africa, which is thus a continent that seems quite distant practically and theoretically, the students nevertheless revealed some sensitivity to the humiliation and pain of the African people. They suggested three very serious films about deep social problems in that continent: *The Last King of Scotland* (2006) by Kevin Macdonald; *Hotel Rwanda* (2004) by Terry George, and *The Constant Gardener* (2005) by Fernando Meirelles.

The students think that the racism is a real ethical problem even though they live in the context of a relatively homogeneous society. They suggested *The Green Book* by Peterio Farrelly (2018) as material for reflection. This film not only unmasks racism but also opens up ways to go beyond it by showing the possibility for two people, very distinct by origin and social status, to become friends. The film could be compared to the movie *The Intouchables* (2018) by Erico Toledano, also recommended by two students.

The students are also interested in Far Eastern cultures quite distant in space and time. They suggest *The Last Emperor* by Bernardo Bertolucci (1987) reflecting the story of the last emperor of Manchuria and Martin Scorsese’s *Silence* (2016) about 17th century Japan; the story of contemporary homeless from South Korea is told in Jeon Gowoon’s feature film *Microhabitat* (2017).

The students are also interested in the problem of personal identity and psychological difference. The fate of people with distraction of the psyche living outside social norms are in the zone of their interest. The most sophisticated film raising many philosophical questions is *Fight Club* by David Fincher (1999) (recommended by two students). This film can be included when discussing topics such as: Fight, Unconsciousness,
Body, and Personal Identity. The film probably does require parental consent and may not be acceptable to all members of a class. Psychopathology as tragedy is revealed in _We Need to Talk about Kevin_ (2011) by Lynne Ramsay. This film can inspire discussion on the problems of relations between children and parents, and about the genesis of hate, responsibility and forgiveness. It raises serious questions: does the tragedy result from something in the behaviour of the parents, or did it happen simply for genetic reasons, because of an inborn psychopathology? Empathic relations with psychologically different persons can be encouraged by discussions around the feature films _The Rain Man_ (1988) by Barry Levinson and _One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest_ (1975) by Milos Forman, also recommended by students.

(8) One would think that science fiction fantasy films could make suitable material for philosophy lessons because, like philosophy, they ask questions about possible conditions: “what if…” but in this particular experiment science fiction was not very popular. _The Matrix_ by the Wachowskis was not mentioned at all despite the fact that it is the most popular film explored in philosophy teaching. Not here, however. But _Inception_ (2010) by Christopher Nolan and _Children of Men_ (2006) by Alfonso Cuaron are in the list.

(9) The experiment revealed that the students are interested in the genesis of 20th century totalitarian ideologies. They suggest reflecting on the two most destructive ideologies – National Socialism and Stalinism. Interestingly, they do not prefer critical analysis of the phenomena but rather the authentic documents – films created from the point of view of creators staying not outside, but inside the ideology itself. For reflection on National Socialism, they suggest _The Triumph of the Will_ (1935) by Leni Riefenstahl, and for reflection on the genesis of bolshevism – Sergei Eisenstein’s _Battleship Potemkin_ (1925) and also Mikheil Tsirgiladze’s _The Fall of Berlin_ (1950). Doubts may arise concerning _The Triumph of the Will_ – should it be included in the list of films recommended for schools? The film director herself considered it not as propaganda, but as a documentary film about one concrete meeting in Nuremberg held by the Nazi party. It relates what happened during this particular meeting and what the design of Nazi self-expression looked like. Despite the talent displayed in this film, the world has still not forgiven Riefenstahl her sympathy for Adolph Hitler. However, a more urgent case for discussion is the pro-Nazi propaganda film _Adolf Hitler: The Greatest Story Never Told_ (2013), which at first sight appears to be a documentary. This film, created by someone going by the name Dennis Wise, also appeared on the student list. It is accessible on the internet without any censorship, despite its obvious aim to restore the personality cult of Adolph Hitler and to justify the criminal acts of Nazism. The film is based on a vast amount of
documentary material rather skilfully united by the montage. For this reason, it is quite suggestive and ideologically impressive. As a new Nazi propaganda piece, it also includes hatred of the Jews. Having said that, what should the teacher do in this particular case, when one knows the students are watching and that the film is openly accessible? Pretend it does not exist? Or present it as a problem for open discussion? Possibly the teacher can use this case as material for further discussion, for example by asking students to compare this film with *The Triumph of the Will* directed by Riefenstahl. Which of the two is more ideologically engaged? In which of the two can one discern more hatred and enmity for the rest of humanity? Riefenstahl’s film was created in 1934, when the destructive consequences of Nazi ideas were not so visible for all at first sight. The film by Dennis Wise, on the other hand, was produced in 2013, when humanity was perfectly well aware of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime. A topic for further discussion could be the question: How was it possible for such a film to even appear in 2013? What are the moral values of the film creators? How is it even possible to negate the Holocaust? Why can crimes against humanity not be justified by a longing for dominance of any one particular nation?

(10) The majority of the films recommended in this student list are based on a piece of literature as the basis for screen writing, but films based on works of well-known classical or contemporary literature were not popular. The only exception is Scott Fitzgerald’s *Great Gatsby* screened by Baz Luhrmann in 2013.

(11) Crime films or action films also were not popular. The film *Thug* (2017) by Franklin Correa is on the list but it is from a mixed genre – it has a deeper intrigue: the main hero Gino detects the drive to kill within himself.

(12) Woody Allen, the creator of sophisticated intellectual comedy, was mentioned as one of five directors whose films could be recommended in corpora. In general, serious films prevail over comedies. Nevertheless, the students mention *The Upside* (2017) by Neil Burger, *The Life of Brian* (1979) by Terry Jones, created as a joke, and *Forrest Gump* by Robert Zemeckis (1994).


(14) For a reflection on the influence of technology on the lives of youth and for an analysis of a new type of child/parent relations, the film *Searching* (2018) by Aneesh Chaganty seems very relevant and was suggested by one student.
(15) The students suggest that animated films can also be included in philosophical ethics classes, as for example the Oscar winner for animation *Inside out* (2015) by Peter Docter.

(16) Almost half of the respondents reacted positively to the genre of documentary films, but the list of recommended films includes only feature films.

6. Films as a Poison or a Deeper Understanding of Social Reality?

Is cinema always a remedy, or in some cases can one consider it a poison? We gained further information on this question from an interview with students. During the course *Philosophy for Children*, a group of third-year bachelor students in the Pedagogy of Childhood speciality (future primary school teachers) were questioned as to their opinion about cinema being either a poison or a remedy in school curriculum. The students were approximately 21 years old. When asked whether they saw the meaning of including feature films in school programs, all the interview participants answered positively: yes, they see cinema as a remedy. They were then asked: why? For what reasons? What arguments can they suggest in favour of feature films as a remedy? They provided several alternative answers as follows:

(1) The pupil can identify with any of the characters and see his own behaviour and emotions as if from the outside.

(2) A feature film can inspire further learning.

(3) It can inspire interest in historical events.

(4) Sometimes it is difficult to understand one’s own emotions – the feature film helps to understand them more consequently.

(5) A feature film is able to function as an additional means to help students understand what is not clear to them.

(6) The visual element helps to present the topic better: in a more suggestive manner.

(7) Films are especially useful to those pupils who are still not able to read.

(8) Films develop language abilities.

(9) The images allow the pupil to understand things that cannot be grasped through language.

(10) Finally, images have a stronger impact on life experience than language.

The next question concerned the possibility for a film to act as poison in the school curriculum. The question was: Could it happen that a film shown in the classroom has a destructive impact on the process of
learning? In their answers, the students indicated different ways in which a feature could be a poison. The answers indicated that the effect of the film can be destructive to the study process in the following cases:

(1) If the film has nothing in common with the topic discussed in the classroom;

(2) If the film does not suit the particular age group;

(3) If the film is only shown, but not reflected on and not discussed;

(4) If the reason for showing the film is only to keep the pupils busy and quiet in the classroom and to fill the lecture time;

(5) If there is no task suggested before the showing – why and for what reason should one watch this particular movie.

To the final question: Maybe the films in the school curriculum need to be strictly censored? Is it possible for teachers to show offensive films to students in high school? Students answered that: (1) It is very important to select films having in mind the age of the pupils and what is important to them; (2) To demonstrate shocking films is possible only if the teacher is going to discuss with the students every aspect of the film in detail. But what does an offensive film look like? What is the criterion for detecting it? The students suggested the example of an experience they had in school some years before. During a lesson on ethics, the teacher showed the Estonian film director Ilmar Raag’s feature film *The Class* (*Klass*, 2007), which is an extremely shocking film about brutal bullying and the destructive response to bullying. As the film was about 16-year-old teenagers, it was quite actual for the teenagers watching it. Bullying is also a reality in Lithuanian schools, as it is in those of other countries. The two main heroes are Kaspar and Joseph. Kaspar defends Joseph against the bullying of their classmates, causing the students to turn on him as well. Kaspar just wants his friends, his girl and his unassuming life back. Joseph wants to regain his dignity and the chance to go to high school somewhere far away. But their classmates are relentless, going further and further with each attack. The story ends with the deep humiliation of the two and finally with tragedy. The students from our interview remember that they were shocked by the ending of the film and perplexed because they were left without any conclusion from the teacher as to whether the decision of the two to shoot their classmate bullies was really the right solution in this situation.

The anonymous experiment we carried out with high-school students also revealed a dark side to the possible multimodal education students could receive outside school. Cinema can sometimes also be poisonous. Out of 44 suggested movies, there are three that could be categorized in that way. The pro-Nazi propaganda film *Adolf Hitler: The*
Greatest Story Never Told (2013) by Dennis Wise has already been mentioned. The second is the horror thriller Cannibal Holocaust (1980) by Ruggero Deodato, which is not suitable for the age of the students. However, an absolutely unsuitable film that pollutes the young consciousness with pathological cruelty and the sexual perversions of the young generation is A Serbian Film (2010) by Srdjan Spasojevic. Even in Serbia this film was accepted critically, and it was banned in Finland, Portugal, France, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Norway, Brazil, and Singapore, while in the USA it was shortened by 19 minutes. The film conceals a warning behind the image about the dangers lurking in the sexual industry: that the consequences of selling one’s body as if for a job can be unpredictably destructive. Nevertheless, the overabundance of cruelty and sexual perversion can leave subconscious traces in the minds of the young generation. The film is openly accessible on the internet for the Lithuanian user. How can it be banned for the young generation? Still, the fact that only three films out of 44 were considered destructive and poisonous shows that the poison aspect does not constitute a tendency.

Two students from our experiment recommended Stanley Kubrick’s Clockwork Orange (1971) also containing brutal scenes of violence. This particular film, together with the problem of violence in the image, was reflected in Nerijus Milerius’ book Viewing the Viewer: Cinema and Violence.37

In Lithuania, Nerijus Milerius was one of the first to interpret cinema art from the philosophical perspective. For more than twenty years, he would meet with high-school children who had written essays in the Lithuanian Philosophy Olympiads to show extracts from particular feature films and to discuss particular movies with students and their teachers from a philosophical point of view. In 2012, he published in collaboration Cinema and Philosophy. In 2014 in The Apocalypse in Film: Philosophical Presuppositions he contrasted two different codes for treating the apocalypse, one in commercial or genre cinema and the other in genre-transgressing cinema, the main creators of which he considered to be Andrey Tarkovsky, Michael Haneke, Akira Kurosawa, Peter Watkins, Pier Paolo Pasolini, Ingmar Bergman, Chris Marker, Lars von Trier, Andrey Zvyagintsev, and Bela Tarr.38

The monotony of the everyday generates a desire and need for destructive images and stories. By exploring grand events, the apocalyptic commercial ‘end-of-the-world’ industry compensates the lack of excessive experience, as well as rehabilitating everyday routine. Milerius considers this transition from the monotony of everyday

38 See Nerijus Milerius, Apokalipsė kine. Filosfinės prielaidos [The Apocalypse in Film: Philosophical Presuppositions] (Vilnius: The Vilnius University Press, 2014), 244.
living to the apocalypse destroying it, and then back again to the everyday status quo, to be a manifestation of the capitalist entertainment industry. In different contexts this industry transforms terror of the apocalypse into rituals of neutralizing counterfactual threats, strategies for colonizing the imagination, the formation or re-structuring of memory narratives, and political or patriotic propaganda. This rather simple narrative formula is reproduced from one film to another, varying only in the details.\(^{39}\) Genre-transgressing apocalyptic cinema on the contrary radicalizes the motif of ending and rediscovers the dimension of time. Tarkovsky criticizes the cinema genre by stating that it does not plunge deep enough into darkness, in other words excessive experience, and so loses the possibility to emerge on the other side of the light with the power of catharsis.

In his last book \textit{Viewing the Viewer: Cinema and Violence}, Milerius reflects on the heritage of classical cinema creators such as Michelangelo Antonioni, Alfred Hitchcock, Stanley Kubrick, and Michael Haneke, asking: How can violence be reflected in cinema? Milerius observes that violence in cinema is always purposefully balanced on the ostensible threshold of ambiguity. On the one hand, especially in many genre movies, cinematographic violence always aims for mimetic truth as an effective way to affect the viewer. On the other hand, the viewer, even though prepared for the realistic screening of violence, is guided by the universally applicable conventional provision that violence depicted in art cannot be real.\(^{40}\) The ambiguity of the relation between real violence and its screening raises the question of artistic representation. Milerius returns to Magritte’s experiments with artistic representation in his pictures \textit{The Treachery of Images} (1929) and \textit{The Two Mysteries} (1962). Milerius asks a rhetorical question: If the relationship between the phenomenon of violence and its representation is so ambiguous, does that mean that the cinematographic image can actually kill?

In one interview, Milerius reminds us that violence is an inseparable part of our lives: even our beloved fairy tales are connected with violence. Violence is encoded in myths. Milerius discerns different possible approaches to violence for film spectators: from cooperating with a murderer in the act of killing in the limitlessness of the imagination to personally encouraging killing. The highest level of modernity revealed the ambiguity of the code of violence. Violence in films can be aestheticized, which supposes an existing secret agreement between the viewer and the creator: although really unpleasant images are presented to the viewer, only aesthetic pleasure is received. This is the basis of the horror-film

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 243.

\(^{40}\) See Milerius, \textit{Viewing the Viewer: Cinema and Violence}, 287-288.
genre. Milerius is interested in metaviolent cinema, which presents a different dimension. In metaviolent cinema, violence is not presented directly but rather through its functioning. It would seem that meta-cinema works should create a distance between the spectator and the image of violence, but paradoxically they break the aesthetic agreement with the viewer.

However, it is mainly at this moment that the spectator starts to think. Violence without aestheticization compels the viewer to reflect on its meaning in a new way. This presents a problem for multimodal education: how can one transform violence from mimetic encoding inducing the viewer to follow directly the image seen in the film into violence as an object of analysis, constituting a challenge stimulating critical thinking. We suggest two tasks for students. The first: to watch Stanley Kubrik’s feature *A Clockwork Orange* (1971) concerning Alex, a pathological criminal who receives pleasure from violence, and to write an essay interpreting the meaning of violence in this particular movie. Secondly, to read the interpretation of metaviolence in Milerius’ book *Viewing the Viewer: Cinema and Violence* and then in the context of a group discussion or conference reflect on the similarities and differences between possible strategies of interpretation.

7. Cinema as a Remedy: Teaching Social Responsibility through Cinema

A reflection on the possibility of using cinema in teaching social responsibility, raises first of all the following questions: What is the relation between the image and moral feeling (if one is a follower of David Hume or Richard Rorty) or critical thought (if one is Kantian). The problem of the intersection between thought and image in the contemporary philosophy of education in some sense corresponds with the problem of the clash between modern and postmodern paradigms of upbringing. The modernistic model of upbringing emphasizes more cognitive, instrumental competences, and underlines the importance of critical thinking. The postmodern model of upbringing induces more interdisciplinary and creative thinking. The radical modern model of upbringing finds its origin in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, while the contemporary philosophy of education is represented by followers of Jürgen Habermas or Karl Raimund Popper. This latter model emphasizes the power of reason and

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42 See Margaret Walshaw, *Working with Foucault in Education* (Rotterdam, the Netherlands: Sense Publishers, 2007).
is suspicious of the role of imagination and the role of images in the process of moral education.\textsuperscript{43} On the other hand, Richard Rorty, representing the opposite paradigm, stated that human “solidarity is not discovered but created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of others, unfamiliar sorts of people.”\textsuperscript{44} This sensitivity to the pain of the different Other can be developed using images from ethnography, journalists’ reports, comic books, the docudrama, and especially from novels (as, for example, the novels of Charles Dickens or Marcel Proust).

Novels are more suitable for moral upbringing than the abstract concepts of morality created by Kant. Literary images reveal the contingencies of the human being, and in this respect are able to function as tools for developing empathy and sensitivity to the other person’s pain. Philosophy, by imposing abstract concepts as the core of moral upbringing, takes no account of contingencies and all the consequences concerned with their sensation. This discussion is one of the inspirations behind the current investigation in its search for the theoretical bases of multimodal education. If literature is able to increase empathy as sensitivity to the pain of the Others, cinema also may be able to fulfill this task. In a search for concordance between these two seemingly different capacities of the human mind and two models of upbringing, the researchers also take into account the possible philosophical clash between two conceptions of the relation between thought and image. Can cinema be used to develop sensitivity to moral values? At the core of moral values is the question of openness to the Other. The question can be posed also from the other direction: can cinema be included in the methods for inculcating in the young generation the sensitivity and empathy speaking in Rorty’s words to “the unfamiliar sorts of people”?

On the other hand, the majority of films chosen by students reveal that they are emphatically sensitive to the painful experiences of other people, even when distant from their time and space. At the top of the students’ preferences were films on the topic of the Holocaust, Mark Herman’s \textit{The Boy in the Striped Pajamas} (2008) (recommended by five students); Steven Spielberg’s \textit{Schindler’s List} (1993) (three students); Roberto Benigni’s \textit{Life Is Beautiful} (1997) (one student); Roman Polanski’s \textit{The Pianist} (2002) (one student). The sceptic may say: the students just have a very good history teacher who introduce them to this type of film, but whatever the reason, they do think these films teach moral lessons and


they do care about the suffering of unfamiliar Others (to use Rorty’s words) they never met in their life. Lithuania never had colonies in Africa, so it is a continent that seems quite distant practically and theoretically, but the students nevertheless revealed some sensitivity to the humiliation and pain of the African people. They suggested three very serious films about deep social problems in this continent: *The Last King of Scotland* (2006) by Kevin Macdonald; *Hotel Rwanda* (2004) by Terry George, *The Constant Gardener* (2005) by Fernando Meirelles.


The plot of Fernando Meirelles’ feature *The Constant Gardener* is based on John le Carré’s novel of the same name. There are two important parallel plot lines in the film: the first concerns the relations between the two main characters: a loving couple and a second secret plot concerning the malfeasance of international pharmaceutical companies and government bureaucracies exploiting the African people for illegal medical experiments. The main hero, British diplomat Justin (starring Ralph Fiennes), comes to Africa with his beloved wife Tessa Quayle (starring Rachel Weisz) who is an active fighter for civic rights. Together with a colleague doctor, she discovers a secret scheme enabling companies to use the health and lives of the native African people for the purposes of medical experiments, and tries to unmask the leaders of this project. She perfectly understands what the consequences of her actions could be, and she protects her husband from her findings and thus from the truth. Her husband, who has a passion for growing plants and is constantly immersed in his hobby, has no suspicion of what is going on until his wife is brutally killed in Kenya. The shock caused by her death tears him from his harmonious life with plants; he starts to follow her tracks step by step to discover the truth. The film ends with his decision to stay and wait for his own unavoidable death at the hands of the killers who murdered his wife, and in the same place where she was killed. The film has no happy ending and leaves the spectator with the feeling that injustice rules and, where the interests of very powerful groups are concerned, the fight for truth inescapably brings the fighters to ruin. The acting is brilliant, and the film has outer and inner dimensions. The film is certainly suitable for discussion in ethics class and can be used for reflecting on various topics.

As regards the topic ‘Woman and man’, the educator can ask the class: Is it right to hide the truth from your beloved even when it is dangerous to know the truth? Why did the main hero Justin not stay longer with his plants after his wife’s death, but decided instead to set out on this dangerous search for the truth? As regards the topic of human rights,
a possible question for discussion can be: Why do some people risk their lives in order to protect others from exploitation? Why does one need courage in order to stay on the side of truth? Can you imagine yourself in the place of the main heroes? For the topic of racism, one might ask: Why is the exploitation and neglect of African people morally abominable? The film suggests that white Western man cruelly manipulates those who are poorer. Students can be asked: What signs of cruelty, humiliation and manipulation towards the Other have you noticed in this feature?

One very powerful scene deserves to be shown in the class separately for reflection in the discussion. Justin, in search of the traces of his dead wife, visits a small poor tribe that is being attacked at that very time by ruthless men on horseback who gallop through the village killing men, women, and children with wild abandon. The white men escape in a plane sent to rescue them from the situation. Justin tries to take one little African girl inside the plane, but the pilot refuses to let her enter saying that, regulations strongly prohibit taking an African native into the plane. As the plane leaves, the little girl keeps on running after it. She is condemned to be killed by the adults and their regulations. There is a small hope that she might succeed in reaching a secure place in another village, but nobody knows. Class discussion can start from the question: What particular feelings did Justin experience as he hopelessly watched the abandoned girl running? What do you think he could had done otherwise in this situation? Are you able to identify yourself with this running abandoned girl? What does she feel?

7.2. Personal Identity and Freedom in Kevin Macdonald’s 
The Last King of Scotland (2006)

The film plot is fictional, but some episodes are taken from the life of the Briton Bob Astles, an adviser to the former dictator of Uganda Idi Amin Dada (1920-2003) who ruled Uganda from 1971 to 1979 and was famous for his cruelty and persecution of ethnic groups and political opponents. Trying to create a personality cult, he used to call himself: ‘His Excellency, President for Life, Field Marshal Al Hadji Doctor Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC, Lord of All the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of the Seas and Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa in General and Uganda in Particular, in addition to his officially stated claim of being the uncrowned King of Scotland’. The last self-imposed name became the title of the book The Last King of Scotland (2006), written by Scottish writer Giles Foden, and later of the film by Scottish film director Kevin Macdonald. The role of Amin is played by the famous American actor Forest Steven Whitaker III (b.07.15.1961). The film plot starts with the graduation of young Scot Nichol Garrigan (starring Scottish actor James
McAvoy), who feels that his former life is too restricted and decides to travel to different parts of the world. He has no concrete project except generous humanitarianism – to help and to be useful. By chance, he decides to go to Uganda and take up a job at a hospital. One day, Uganda’s President Idi Amin visits a village and organizes a feast, but shortly afterwards he sees a car accident. Nicholas is invited to help the injured. Instead of helping the injured, Nicholas bravely shoots both the injured victim and the bull. This fascinates the Dictator who also appreciates Nicholas as Scottish and asks him for the Scottish sport kilt he is wearing.

In the first part of the film, the spectator sees the meeting between two different others, totally unknown to each other: the charming Dictator and the nice young inexperienced British man who feels confident in the world. The Dictator’s charm is revealed through Whitaker’s excellent portrayal which shows the character of a powerful man with a very broad and diverse diapason of moods and discourses. In the second part of the feature, the real meaning and underlying implication of what is happening step by step start to become clear. Nicholas finally understands that he is trapped. Having no clear plan of how to escape from imprisonment, he starts to use his customary argument that his duty is to continue working together with his old father as a doctor (the alternative before he escaped to Africa), but his efforts are unsuccessful. In the context of his particular relationship, his arguments sound naïve and remain without effect. Events become more intense and drastic.

On the other hand, the questions of personal identity and freedom as the underlying plot of the film are very important for teaching moral education. How can we start a discussion on personal identity before and after the film? Why did Nicholas come to Africa? What was he looking for? Why do young people sometimes strive to leave their parents? What challenges did he have to meet? It is very important to reflect on the moral consequences of our nonreflected behaviour. Why did he make a report against the Minister of Health to the Dictator when he was not sure of his guilt? The Minister was executed – should the blame for this lie not only with the Dictator but also with Nicholas? Nicholas behaved quite boldly – what is the reason for his further misfortunes? Maybe he should have been more cautious? Why was Nicholas so naïve at the beginning of the movie? Later he condemned Idi Amin, telling him boldly that he was an immature child. At the end of the film, Idi Amin replied to Nicholas: “You came to Africa in order to give yourself airs as a white? You thought you could play with us? We are not toys. Africa – it is reality. Your death would be your first reality.” The students can be asked for their opinion – who is more correct? Who is more immature – Idi Amin or Nicholas? The film creators at least decide to release Nicholas, exhausted by persecution, and allow him to retain his freedom. They follow
real events: On 27 June 1976, Amin allowed a hijacked airliner flying from Tel Aviv to Paris to land at Entebbe Airport. One hundred and fifty-six non-Jewish hostages who did not hold Israeli passports were released and flown to safety, while 83 Jews and Israeli citizens, as well as 20 others who refused to abandon them (among whom were the captain and crew of the hijacked Air France jet), continued to be held hostage. Subsequently, a group of Israeli commandos flew in from Israel and seized control of Entebbe Airport, freeing nearly all the hostages. The creators of *The Last King of Scotland* include this real story in the plot and Nicholas escaped on the flight to Paris with the first group of hostages. In the film, the doctor from Uganda who helped him to escape is killed afterwards by the Dictator’s forces.

In real life, the Dictator’s army killed one hostage from the plane who had been hospitalized, together with some doctors and medical personnel because of their efforts to prevent the execution. This weaving of real events with events from the fictional plot raises a question about the relationship between reality and fiction in the art of cinema. Which events are more intriguing – real or created? Why? What is real, what is fiction in this particular plot? How do you decide? Using what criteria? How do the creators of the film reveal the meaning of real events by allusions? This comparison between fiction and reality can lead not only to deepening sensitivity to the criteria for distinguishing between the two but also to a deeper interest in the realities of the contemporary world and history.

For moral education, a very important aspect underlying the plot is the problem of freedom. In what sense is moral freedom different from political freedom or coincide with it? Do we always reflect the sources of our behaviour leading to the loss of personal freedom as authenticity? For deeper discussion, students can read Erich Fromm’s book, *The Escape from Freedom* in which he reflected on totalitarianism and its psychological and sociological sources. He writes:

> Man’s brain lives in the twentieth century; the heart of most men lives still in the Stone Age. The majority of men have not yet acquired the maturity to be independent, to be rational, to be objective. They need myths and idols to endure the fact that man is all by himself, that there is no authority which gives meaning to life except man himself.45

Why did Nicholas so easily and spontaneously succumb to the power of the Dictator? Why did he not suspect the possibility of losing

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his freedom? What are the Dictator’s sources of freedom? How does dictatorship become possible at all?


The scenario is based on real events that took place during 100 days in Rwanda from April 7 to July 15, 1994. After the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana, the Hutu majority used weapons such as machetes to assassinate about a million of the population of Tutsi, Twa and moderate Hutu. Historically Tutsi and Hutu considered themselves as two separate races, and the fight between the two was the driving force in the country’s history. As usual, the Tutsi were richer, while the ruling elite and the majority of Hutu constituted the much-impoverished population. In 1994, the killings were inspired by the army elite. Former neighbours killed each other because they knew perfectly well who was Hutu and who Tutsi. The inhabitants in the towns were asked to show their passports, and if they were not Hutu, they were killed immediately.

The main hero of Hotel Rwanda (2004), Paul Rusesabagina, is the manager of a prestigious hotel in the capital of Rwanda. Due to his sense of responsibility and practical wisdom, he managed to save the lives of 1268 Tutsi inhabitants during the slaughter. It is a true story of a truly heroic deed. In addition, the acting in the film is masterful. Don Cheadle, in the role of Paul Rusesabagina, received five awards for best actor.

On the one hand, it is a rather dark film showing the terrible reality of the genocide events. Paul is driving to get food, but is not able to reach his destination because there are too many corpses lying on the road. Bands of enraged killers are rampaging around, and the hotel staff and guests expect to die at any minute, feeling betrayed and abandoned. The second dark aspect is the frantic escape of Westerners leaving those who remain to inevitable death. Students can be asked to discuss the following problem: Why did Western countries not feel obliged to protect the victims? The USA, Great Britain and Belgium did not intervene. After the genocide, France was even suspected of taking the side of the Hutu. There is only one sentence about this in the film. Epictetus wrote that the most extreme state of loneliness is the state of a man who does not receive help from others when being attacked by robbers. The question for discussion with students can be the following: What do those abandoned people think as they feel totally alone surrounded by enraged killers?

Another question may concern the role of the media in the events of the genocide. Encouragement for the mass killings was broadcast
through the news radio station, which broadcast racist propaganda, obscene jokes and music, and became very popular throughout the country. How could radiobroadcasting be a participant in killings?

On the other hand, the most powerful and positive aspect of this film, against the background of these dark events, is the ability of individual persons to fight with the circumstances and to maintain an example of real human responsibility notwithstanding the danger. Paul feels responsible not only for his own family but also for all the refugees he took into the hotel. When finally the forces of the United Nations arrive to announce that some of the hotel’s inhabitants who received support from foreign countries would be evacuated from the danger zone, Paul put the fortunate ones and his family into the car but decides to stay at the hotel himself. He could not abandon those who still remained there alone. He knew perfectly well that by leaving them he would be simply condemning them to death. Only he is able to protect them due to his practical rationality. Even at the most difficult moments, he maintains his rationality and solves the situations as constructively as possible. If necessary, he contrives, bribes, and persuades but he achieves his goal – saving everyone. Paul suggests that his guests phone their acquaintances in other countries to say farewell, not only because the world should know what is going on in Rwanda, but also because it would create a sense of guilt in the listeners in other countries that might encourage them to do something to save them. He also receives support from the manager of the hotel in Belgium.

The role played by the United Nations general is remarkable. He feels extreme shame for the non-involvement of Western countries. He cannot change the decisions of the authorities but does everything he can through his own personal efforts. The United Nations and Belgium had military forces in Rwanda, but the United Nations decided not to intervene in stopping the killings because some UN soldiers had been killed the previous year in the Somali conflict. The Belgian army and most of the UN forces left when 10 Belgian soldiers were killed. One very powerful scene in the film is the monologue spoken by the general at the bar when he tells Paul the truth about the attitude of the Western countries towards the situation. Paul is only a black-skinned person in Africa, not even an Afro-American in the United States of America, so he is at the lowest level of a human being. Who will care for him? The general speaks ironically because he is ashamed and suffers from his inability to change the situation. Paul himself understands this insignificance when he confesses to his wife that he was a fool to think he is the equal of the other managers who are white, that he is one of the family. These insights could have led to total disappointment and resignation, but Paul continues to do what he feels is his duty. A question for discussion by the students can
be: What are the sources of responsibility and strength for the main hero in such a difficult situation? Why does he care about unfamiliar people who are not members of his family? Why does the general feel ashamed? It is very important that discussion on this film leads to the question: How does it happen that in this particular film a human being becomes more powerful than the situation? Why does he or she become strong? Why has responsibility nothing to do with the colour of a person’s skin?

The film depicts the warm family relations between Paul and his wife Tatyana. As Tatyana is Tutsi, the Hutu are also hunting for her. She asks Paul to leave her and escape with their children but he does not even consider the possibility of betraying her. On the other hand, he understands that Hutu can come at any moment to kill them like cockroaches (the Hutu propaganda concept to inspire killings). He supposes that the most horrible thing in this situation would be for their children to be forced to see the slaughter of their parents before being killed themselves.

“We have to have a plan,” he says to his wife. Even very tragic situations need to be planned. But the film and the true story end happily for them: with the help of the United Nations, they reach a safe territory.

The American social-studies teachers Daniel G. Krutka and R.C. Christ wrote that this film was really their first substantial exposure to the genocide events in Rwanda. One of them reflected: “I experienced confusion and anger that not only could genocide occur in my lifetime, but that the country in which I held citizenship, the United States, did little to stop it.”46 This film encourages interest in going deeper into these events, and when they became social-studies teachers they included in their curriculum the documentary Ghosts of Rwanda (2004). The director of this film, Greg Barker, follows step by step the complete history of the genocide in Rwanda. Krutka and Christ pointed out that the documentary could be used not only for the question of genocide, “but also to teach about short-term and long-term consequences of colonialism and racism, matters of international relations, and how political decisions affect individuals and groups.”47 All these aspects are also very important for analysing the film Hotel Rwanda.

Krutka and Christ conclude that it is very important to include in the discussion of these films the broader problem of, for example, the genocide of Christian Armenians in Turkey (1915-1917), the Jews in the Holocaust during the Second World War, events in Cambodia (1975-1979), Bosnian Muslims and boys in Srebrenica (Bosnia-Herzegovina in

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47 Ibid., 201.
July 1995). As American educators observed, the main lesson from this study should be the question: Why do people participate in genocides? How can we be sure it never happens again? The students must also understand that, as usual, it is not the leaders who commit the mass killings. Many of the atrocities were committed by everyday people, mostly by inexperienced youths, who accept the words of the leaders fanatically without critical thinking. The problem of the bystanders is also very important in the moral lessons of genocide. The most important lesson from this is a moral lesson of how to prevent the possibility of a new genocide. We suggest that the movie Hotel Rwanda is appropriate in this context, together with Karl Raimund Popper’s book The Open Society and its Enemies, stressing the problem of the difference between closed and the open societies. The students can be asked to discern the parallel between the notion of Popper’s individualistic altruism and the moral attitudes of the main hero in Hotel Rwanda. Popper criticized Plato’s idea that individualism is a synonym for egoism and collectivism is a synonym for altruism. Individualists, according to Popper, are not necessarily egoists and collectivists – altruists. According to him:

Collectivism is not opposed to egoism, nor is it identical with altruism or unselfishness. Collective or group egoism, for instance, class egoism, is a very common thing (Plato knew this very well), and this shows clearly enough that collectivism as such is not opposed to selfishness. On the other hand, an anti-collectivist, i.e., an individualist, can, at the same time, be an altruist; he can be ready to make sacrifices in order to help other individuals.48

Popper concludes that this individualism, united with altruism, has become the basis of our Western civilization and it is the central doctrine of Christianity (“love your neighbour,” say the Scriptures, not “love your tribe”); and it is the core of all ethical doctrines which have grown from our civilization and stimulated it. It is also, says Popper,

for instance, Kant’s central practical doctrine (“always recognize that human individuals are ends, and do not use them as mere means to your ends”). There is no other thought which has been so powerful in the moral development of man.49

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49 Ibid.
The students can also be asked what they think – Why is this idea so powerful; is altruistic individualism only a value of Western civilization, or it is recognizable for all humanity? Rorty’s insight saying that solidarity is not discovered but created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of others, unfamiliar people, and that this sensitivity to the pain of the different Other can be developed using images from ethnography, journalists’ reports, comic books, docudramas, and especially from novels, can be further developed by also including feature films in the possible list of sources. For ethics classes, 16-18-year-old gymnasium students suggested feature films on topics of deep social and ethical issues causing humiliation and pain to people very different from their own society and from a continent they possibly never visited. The inclusion of feature films in the curriculum for ethics classes, together with discussion encouraging critical thinking and inspiring self-identification with the experience of distant people from remote countries, reduces the disparity between the modern and postmodern paradigms. This methodology develops in parallel critical-thinking ability and empathetic sensitivity to contingent details of real experience.

Bibliography


Chapter 6
How Can Values Be Taught through Spiritual Cinema?

JūRATĖ BARANOVA

1. Sacred Cinema or Cinema of Spiritual Choice?

Tomas Sodeika in “The Holy in the Process of Secularisation” doubts the possibility of teaching religious arts and religious cinema. He reflects upon the bifurcation of the reception of the painter Paul Gauguin’s painting Vision after the Sermon (Jacob Wrestling with the Angel) (1888). According to this philosopher, Gauguin himself considered the painting an accomplishment, so he decided to present it to the little church in the village in Bretan. When the large painting arrived at its destination, the clergyman refused to accept it, arguing that the community would not be able to comprehend such a work. Gauguin was experimenting with the distortion of shapes, exaggerated features, and use of strong contour lines rather than the gradual shifts in tone that most painters practised before. Gauguin structured the painting by placing a tree trunk diagonally through its centre, thereby creating a visual separation between the Breton women and Jacob wrestling with the Angel. It was a more abstract painting, influenced by Japanese art work, but the clergyman did not appreciate its innovations. A similar experience happened to the Lithuanian painter Šarūnas Sauka. When he painted a series of five pictures Stations of the Cross with Christ in a red garnet and with his own alter ego face, the clergymen of the little village Dusetos also refused to accept it in the church. The clergyman from Dusetos showed even more enthusiasm than the French clergyman in appreciating the artist’s work: he encouraged his parishioners to throw eggs at the painting. Sodeika rhetorically asks: maybe it is the case that the clergyman from Bretan (we can add from Dusetos, as well) lacks the esthetic upbringing to understand great works of art and Sodeika replies himself: “Maybe it is quite the contrary? Maybe the clergyman through inner sight educated by faith understood immediately that ‘sacred art’ is oxymoron par excellence?”

1 The main ideas of this chapter were presented at the INPE conference “Education, Dialogue and Hope,” Haifa, Israel, August 13-17, 2019.
After describing Walter Benjamin’s concept of ‘aura’ as the dialectics of the distance and closeness of the work of art, Sodeika comes to the conclusion that the structure of aura Benjamin had in mind coincides with the structure of phenomena which Rudolf Otto defined by the formula *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. *Tremendum* repudiates and establishes distance. *Fascinosum* beguiles by glamour and establishes closeness.

Whereas *mysterium* states the non-objectivity of aura as the dialectics of distance and closeness due to which the work of art can function as the ideogram of the holy.\(^4\)

But this feature of ‘ideogramness’ starts to crash when, according to Sodeika, aura experiences crisis in the process of secularisation, and extremely so when it becomes possible through technologies of photography and cinematography to produce images that erase the difference between the original and its reproduction. The original gets its ‘values of cult’ by its dependence on the tradition of religious cult, whereas the value of reproduction is determined merely by the possibility to ‘exhibit’ it. The reproduction enables the work of art to be used in any space and at any time and so destroys the dimension of distance. In this way, the exhibitioner value of the work expels the value of cult. Sodeika thus raises the question about the possibility of religious art and religious cinema in the age of the machinical reproduction of a work of art. Sodeika considers religious cinema, which appears under the rubric of sacred art, an oxymoron in itself.\(^5\)

Sodeika justifies his insight by analysing the history of so-called religious cinema. The creation of films depicting the life of Jesus dates from the very beginning of the era of cinematography and they swiftly became popular. However, this popularity is based on kitsch as an orientation towards the consumption of image but not towards the *numinosum*. Sodeika described the series of this type of movie as a simulacra of the holy: Albert Kirkchner’s *La Passion du Christ* (1897), Walter W. Freemanp Horitz’s *Passion Play* (1897), Georges Melies’ *Le Christ marchant sur les flots* (1899), Ferdinand Zecca and Lucieno Nonguest’s *La vie et la passion de notre seigneur Jézus Christ* (1902-1905), Sidney Olcot’s *From the Manger to the Cross* (1913), Cecil B. De Mille’s *The King of Kings* (1913), Nicholas Ray’s *King of Kings* (1961), Georges Stevens’ *The Greatest Story Ever Told* (1965), and John Krish and Peter Sykes’ *Jesus* (1979). Why were these films so popular and attractive to such a massive audience? In answering this

\(^4\) Ibid., 300.
\(^5\) Ibid., 303.
question, Sodeika comes to the conclusion that kitsch is so popular due to the insensibility of contemporary man to sacred symbols.

Sodeika however also ascribes to the category of kitsch films Mel Gibson’s *The Passion of the Christ* (2004), which at first sight is opposed to the esthetics of the films mentioned above. Gibson tried to reconstruct the world of Jesus ‘as it happened in reality’ and followed the descriptions and notes on mystical visions of the mystic Anna Katharina Emmerick. Sodeika, however, argues that Gibson finally declassifies the mystery of religious experience, making from it an image for consumption, and created a film for which “exhibition value finally extrudes any cult value.” Since the content of mystical experience becomes perfectly ‘visible’, an inversion of the structure of aura takes place as already mentioned above: “the revelation of the distance of the very unique and very close thing” is totally substituted by “the massive revelation of closeness of the very distant thing.” Sodeika concludes that this is one of the features of kitsch.

It is possible to imagine what Deleuze might say about *The Passion of the Christ* directed by Gibson:

> When the violence is no longer that of the image and its vibrations but that of the represented, we move into a blood-red arbitrariness. When grandeur is no longer that of the composition, but a pure and simple inflation of the represented, there is no cerebral stimulation or birth of thought.

Deleuze regretfully and rhetorically asks: What becomes of Hitchcock’s suspense, Eisenstein’s shock and Gance’s sublimity when they are taken up by mediocre authors? He concludes that cinema has drowned in the nullity of its productions.

In his philosophy of cinema, Deleuze also comes to the point which inspired Sodeika’s reflections, but turns in a slightly different direction: instead of religious cinema, he speaks about the cinema of spiritual choice. Deleuze is not very original in applying the term ‘spiritual’ for a type of cinema. The term ‘spiritual style’ was used by Susan Sontag (Sontag 1966) and by Joseph Cunneen when they discerned it in the films of Bresson. Paul Schrader, the screenwriter for *Taxi Driver*, used the term ‘transcendental style’ when he wrote about Bresson, Ozu and Dreyer’s movies (Schrader 1972). Deleuze refers to his book *Transcendental Style in Film: Bresson, Ozu, and Dreyer*.

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6 Ibid., 315.
8 Ibid., 178.
2. Teaching a Course in Practical Philosophy by Using Films

As previously mentioned, the author of this particular section discerns some essential similarities and some differences between the methodologies and stages suggested by Russell and the methodology she developed herself and started to use actively from 2002 when teaching practical philosophy in several Lithuanian universities. The aim of her methodology was partly the same as Russell’s: to develop active critical thinking by comparing written, spoken and visual texts. The method used is very similar to that of using film as analogy suggested by Russell and Waters, encouraging the students to discern analogies. It was, however, less oriented towards places and events than in Russell’s case (as is important in history teaching), but rather searched for an analogy between the problems discerned in the movie and ethical problems set out in philosophy textbooks, discussed in lectures and imbedded in the everyday practice of life. There is of course a difference between using films in philosophy classrooms and history classrooms, but there are also some similarities. The first similarity was the emphasis placed on the preparatory stage. In 2002, the author of this text proposed a course in practical philosophy for first-year students at the prestigious, then private, university International School of Management (ISM), recently renamed University of Management and Economics. Teaching with cinema was included in the course methodology together with philosophical textbooks. The preparatory stage included activities not only by the professor, but also by students. As the course was taught to university students, the legal problems Russell raised about juridical parental approval were not relevant and the university administration approved the programme by accepting it and purchasing the necessary films for legal use. Films were also available at the movie library of the Open Society fund, sponsored by Soros. The preparatory stage meant that the films were selected long before they were used, at the very beginning of programme development. The main topics and issues raised in the course, the required textbook reading and the movies included with their particular issues, were all set out in the curriculum.

As usual, three movies were used for this course: Japanese film director Takeshi Kitano’s *Hana-bi*, for reflecting on Eastern ethics, Ingmar Bergman’s *The Winter Light* for reflecting on Christian ethics, and the Iranian film director Abbas Kierostami’s feature film *Taste of Cherry* for reflecting on Islamic ethics (the short scene where the main protagonist in the movie meets an Islamic student and discusses the topic he is interested in). As all three films are united by the single topic of suicide, it was expected that the students could compare and reflect upon different solutions and approaches towards this difficult existential problem, as well
as engaging in multicultural comparisons. At the end of the course, the professor’s point of view was put forward by the topic of ‘possibility for optimism’, including William James’ pragmatic concept of the Will to Believe and Krzysztof Kieślowski’s feature film White, asking students to reflect on the following questions: What are the sources of optimism for the main protagonist in the movie? Why does he never surrender to despair? This methodology resembles what Russell calls ‘using film as analogy’, indicating that the use of film as analogy is likely one of the most unique and challenging methods for both students and teachers. In fact, this was confirmed in our practice, which showed that the students were able to grasp the problem discussed very profoundly. In what sense does essay writing differ from simple discussion? One of the former students reflected on her experience after ten years of discussion on the Internet among alumni. She recounted the psychological difficulties she experienced writing essays at school where there was a requirement to write according to strict patterns. Her work was quoted publicly, but only as an example of how not to write. No differences were tolerated. She wrote:

…many thanks to the person who got me into Baranova’s course in which I wrote essays during the night as long as bed sheets about these ‘strange’ movies. At least I felt good writing freely. According to myself, with all my heart and according to my understanding at the time.

This ‘Baranova methodology’ skipped the second pre-viewing stage suggested by Russell, skipped discussing in advance necessary prior background knowledge, context or vocabulary, as well as any synopsis of the film or short extracts. The films were suggested as visual texts with independent meaning, following Jacques Derrida’s remark: “il n’y a pas de hors-texte.” Only, in this case, ‘there is no subtext’ means also that the visual text as a source of meaning needed not to be deconstructed but rather deciphered. There were no additional requirements related to the intentions of the director, the biography, or the peculiarities of cinema art.

In order to step into the movie, the students had to do two preparatory actions: first, read the set text from the philosophy textbook (the 2002 Philosophy textbook for grades 11-12 by Sodeika and Baranova, and Ethics: Philosophy as a Practice by Baranova), and second, reflect on the essay topic suggested. They knew the question to answer in advance and while watching the film made notes of possible orientations for the answer.

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9 Ibid., 11.
This aspect bears close resemblance to the Stage 3 indicated by Russell and Waters, when they write:

Teachers should also remember to share with students what exactly they should be doing during the film viewing experience. What are the students looking for in the film/clip being shown?  

As being very important, even absolutely necessary, Russell indicates the fourth stage, the culminating activity stage, saying: “Students need to know why they viewed the film or clip and how it connects to the overall curriculum or their daily lives.” Russell and Waters suggest discussions, debates, worksheets, role playing or any number of other assessment methods. In our particular ISM case, the suggested methodology was essay writing as a presentation for a conference. The students present their papers, and the discussion follows afterwards in parallel.

The same methodology was subsequently implemented for students specializing in Philosophy at the Lithuanian University of Educational Studies (recently, The Educational Academy at Vytautas Magnus University) and transferred to Vilnius University philosophy students in the Ethics course. Essays written by these students largely made up the material integrated as a case study into the educational teaching experiment discussed in this book.

3. How Can One Teach Values?

Educators using this method of teaching with films customarily stress its purpose as being to develop critical-thinking ability and acquire knowledge. But is it possible to use cinema in education for acquiring sensitivity to certain values? For example, the ability to recognize the values of Christian ethics. One can define the core of Christian ethics as the conscious inclination to restrict personal egocentrism and to accept the value of the Other as transcending the space of personal ego. As Ann Mary Mealay observes:

What is significant for our discussion about the specificity of Christian ethics, however, is that, once again, the disciples are not forced to comply with an abstract set of rules and principles, but they want or desire themselves to do good (attestation) because God has disclosed goodness to them through Jesus

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10 Ibid., 10.
11 Ibid.
(témoignage). To be more precise, the disciples will continue to practise Jewish ethics but their reasons for being ethical at all have now taken on a new meaning. Expressions of hospitality and love are now seen, not so much as a burden imposed by the threat of sanction or punishment for failure to comply, but as acts that make more sense because they are carried out to honour God and to strengthen their identity which is sealed in the Covenant.12

This chapter poses the following question: Are young people (approximately 18-21 years old) brought up in a modern secularized society able to recognize the core Christian values expressed not only in a written text, but also in visual art, namely cinema? Can they reconstruct the meaning of Christian values that are not directly shown in the visual image, but are concealed, as Deleuze would have said, in the sphere of the hors-champ (off-camera)?

The experiment was carried out with first-year university philosophy students. Two lecturers in cinema studies, Klevan (University of Kent) and Cavell (Emeritus at Harvard University) provided the theoretical approach to the experiment. In their conversation, they both agreed that it is very hard to teach film as a subject,13 and they drew a distinction between viewing film critically and viewing it philosophically.14 Cavell proposed the idea that films think, and think philosophically, bearing in mind that students should approach a film without explanations from the outside, or researching the intention of the creator, but by taking “responsibility for finding out what a film is about, what we see and hear in film, and what might be important in it.”15 Cavell also concluded that “a serious film, like any work of art, resists interpretation, insists as it were upon being taken on its own terms.”16 By suggesting a philosophy for interpreting a film, Cavell does not consider the film as an illustration of philosophy. From his students he expects not analysis, but a whole descriptive essay, which would nevertheless have to be a description of a certain type, or quality.17

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14 Ibid., 183.
15 Ibid., 200.
16 Ibid., 179.
17 Ibid., 170.
The twenty-seven students in the course on modern ethics were therefore asked to choose between a reflection on Christian or on Eastern ethics. Eighteen chose the topic of Christian ethics and nine preferred the ethics of the East. Those who had chosen the topic of Christian ethics were asked to reflect upon two examples of spiritual cinema: Ingmar Bergman’s *The Winter Light* (1963) and Robert Bresson’s *Diary of a Country Priest* (1951). No outside information about the directors or the circumstances surrounding the creation of the films was provided. The students’ task was to read the visual text without any intention of treating it as an example of cinema history; they had only to reconstruct the hermeneutic meaning concealed behind the visual image, as Klevan and Cavell concluded: to find out ‘what might be important in it’. No lecture was proposed, and no previous discussion provided.

On the other hand, the experiment also included a parallel educational task to stimulate the students’ ability for simultaneous comparison of written and visual texts. They were asked to read a text in advance from the textbook *Ethics: Philosophy as a Practice*, a text of about forty pages on the main values of Christian ethics. The second step was to watch the two movies, and the third to compare the *hors-champ* territories of these two movies. The following methodology was applied for the fourth step: students had to express their insights in a written essay by trying to answer the following question:

> The situation of the clergyman from the Bresson’s film very much resembles the situation of the pastor in Bergman’s movie. But what is the essential difference between their two different stances? Why was the pastor in Bergman’s movie unable to prevent the fisherman from committing suicide? What would you have done differently in a situation like the pastor’s?

The hidden premise for the task was the intuition that by comparing these two movies a message that was not openly articulated would be revealed.

**4. Bresson and Bergman as the Creators of Spiritual Cinema**

Why were these particular movies of Bresson and Bergman selected? One can discern a deeper undercurrent in all of Bergman’s and Bresson’s films. They both belong to the tradition of ‘spiritual cinema’. The theoretical premise for this selection was the concept of ‘spiritual cinema’ suggested in the philosophy of cinema by French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. The term ‘spiritual style’ was used by Susan Sontag when she
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identified it in the films of Robert Bresson. The term ‘spiritual’ seems to go against the materialism Deleuze expressed when he says: “Brain is the screen.” Mainly in the interview Brain is the screen, Deleuze recollects his own turn towards cinema art when he says: “Something bizarre about the cinema struck me: its unexpected ability to show not only behaviour, but spiritual life (la vie spirituelle).” Deleuze defines spiritual life not as a dream or fantasy, but rather as the domain of cold decision, of absolute obstinacy, of the choice of existence. He sees the possibility of an alternative for the cinema as spiritual art that studies the spheres of existence. Deleuze designates the acting characters in contemporary cinema with the name ‘spiritual automaton’, but in writing the conclusions to the two volumes of cinema, argues that cinema becomes spiritual art for the reason that “it confronts automata, not accidentally, but fundamentally.”

The concept of ‘spiritual choice’ (un choix de l’esprit) in Deleuze’s film philosophy, unlike other critics’ reflections, is based on Kierkegaard’s philosophical concept of spiritual stages: esthetic, ethical and religious. Deleuze sees the dimension of the spirit revealed in the cinema of spiritual choice as going beyond even Kierkegaard’s three stages of spirit. This new spiritual space is the fourth or even fifth dimension of the spirit.

In Philosophy through Film, Mary M. Litch and Amy Karofsky mention Bergman’s film The Seventh Seal (1957) for its discussion on the problem of evil. The authors remark that the very title of ‘Seventh Seal’ shows the influence of the Christian apocalyptic tradition, the branch of Christianity that takes the last book of the Christian Bible, the Book of Revelation, as a literal tradition of the end of the world. The reference to the ‘seventh seal’ comes from Revelation. How is it possible to compare these two movies? The plots have some similarities: the main protagonists in both films find themselves in very similar social and personal situations. They are both clergymen. The pastor Tom from Bergman’s film is Lutheran, whereas in Bresson’s film the young priest is Catholic. They both practise in small villages; both experience health problems and have difficulties communicating. They even experience very similar outcomes in communication: their conversations with people in their parish end in disaster: their partners in dialogue immediately commit suicide (the fisherman in Bergman’s movie and the countess in Bresson’s). The experimental task

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20 Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 243.
21 Mary M. Litch and Amy Karofsky, Philosophy through Film (London/New York: Routledge, 2015), 204-205.
was to trace what other lines of intersection could be found behind the mere coincidence of the plots. Can the values of Christianity be discerned beneath the plot surface? If so: what are they?

5. Suffering, Love and Patience as Christian Values

The results of the written essays show that students were able to discern three main Christian virtues: suffering, love and patience.

We can now construct the answer from the students’ insights. The students reflected that in both movies “the meaning of human life is approached not through the cold rational mind, but through the conscious experience of suffering.” (M.B.) The main common point uniting the movies identified by the students is the loneliness of those who seek for God in the face of the secularized world. One student wrote: “In both movies, the essence of Christian ethics is revealed through doubting the existence of God, and certainty is obtained through trial and hope.” (M.B.) Another student observed:

Tom, the main protagonist and pastor in Bergman’s film *Winter Light*, and the young country priest who is the main protagonist in Bresson’s film *Diary of a Country Priest*, are symbols of Christianity in small country communities with weak faith and community ties. There is almost no one who believes in God left in these places, and during Mass the Churches in both movies are almost empty. The pastor and the priest are constantly fighting with personal and external problems, which gives even greater absurdity to their lives. This absurdity unites the experience of the priest and the pastor, but the reasons are different in the two movies. (Ž.K.)

The other important message lying hidden behind the movies was a hint about Christian love. Students wrote:

In both films the superior Christian idea of Love as the Cognition of Good and Evil is emphasized. In Bergman’s film the organist pronounces: ‘Love is God and God is love. Love proves the existence of God, love is a real force for mankind’, and in Bresson’s film this is expressed by the utterance: ‘God is not a torturer, He wants us to love one another.’ (S.V.)

One of the students defined the core of Christian ethics as parallel to Emmanuel Lévinas’ approach:
His relation to the Other offers the possibility of approaching God, as Lévinas wrote: ‘The other man is the very place of metaphysical truth and is necessary for my relation to God’. (K.B.)

It is not by accident that Lévinas is mentioned in this context, since one can discern traces of the search for radical Christian morals in the ethics of Lévinas in the writings of Dostoyevsky. A main concept at the core of Lévinasian ethics is disinterestedness (désintéressement). The presupposition of this research relies on the hypothesis that it is not possible to understand the concept of disinterestedness (désintéressement) from the perspective of the Western philosophical tradition. The main thesis states that in his reflection upon the philosophical interpretation of guilt, Lévinas relies not only on Jewish Scriptures, but also on the sources he found in Dostoevsky’s novels where the Russian writer was searching for his own understanding of New Testament morality. In various writings, Lévinas returns with some exaltation to Dostoevsky’s interpretation of guilt in the novel The Brothers Karamazov (Братья Карамазовы) expressed by the monk Zossima’s teaching: Chacun de nous est coupable devant tous pour tous et moi plus que les autres.22 As Marie-Anne Lescourret notes, Lévinas maintained fidelity to this phrase to the end of his life.23 Even in the later book About God Who Came to Reason (Dieu qui vient à l’homme) he states again “Chacun de nous est coupable…” This phrase constitutes the core of Lévinas’ ethics. What is the vulnerability (vulnérabilité) of a person? Vulnerability occurs when one becomes obsessed by the Other and allows the Other to approach, but not by consciousness of representation or proximity. To become vulnerable means to suffer for the Other (souffrir pour autrui), to be able to stand for the Other, to take the place of the Other, to allow the Other to destroy oneself. This is the suffering of the heart, miséricorde, which, according to Lévinas, is the supposition of every love and all hatred for the Other. This is a preliminary vulnerability (vulnérabilité préalable). Responsibility for the Other is a service (servitude), passivity or pre-logical submission of oneself to the Other. This value cannot be thematized. “Her name is God,” says Lévinas in the text The Humanism of the Other Person.24

The importance of Christian love as miséricorde was identified by the students through the comparison of the differences between the messages in the two movies. The written essay revealed that first-year students could perfectly well compare the plot and the situations of the two

clergymen in the two different movies, noticing not only their similarities, but also their differences. Students wrote:

But the main difference is that the country priest from Bresson’s movie tries to fulfil his duty to the end, not closing the door for his parishioners, whereas the pastor Tomas from Bergman’s movie passes his despair on to the others. (M.B.)

Students remarked on the uneven and unjust social situation of the priest and the pastor. They noticed the inability to love, the coldness, even the indifference of the pastor in Bergman’s movie, characteristics for which he is not blamed by those who surround him. Tom in Bergman’s movie despairs for his own personal inability to experience love. Bresson’s country priest also despairs of finding no signs of love from the surrounding world. Some students pointed out the entry he writes in his diary: “Behind me was nothing and before me was a wall, a black wall…God has left me, I am sure.” (S.V.)

How could Bresson’s country priest maintain love as *miséricorde* in such a difficult situation? It was due to the quality of his patience. Patience, as Tertullian observed, is one of the main values of the Christian spirit:

> Let us, on the other hand, love the patience of God, the patience of Christ; let us repay to Him the patience which He has paid down for us! Let us offer to Him the patience of the spirit, the patience of the flesh, believing as we do in the resurrection of flesh and spirit.25

Patience is the third particular virtue essential to Bresson’s priest. The parishioners expect him to leave, but he, as one of the students observed:

> remains spiritually great and obedient, restricting his own egocentricity. Instead of anger he shows forgiveness, he does not disown the unfair parishioners when advised to reject their answers: ‘I won’t close my door to anyone’. (S.V.)

Did the students discover any additional problems they were not asked to identify in advance? Some of them in fact did. The outcome of

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the experiment included rhetorical questions that cannot be answered at once. In one of the essays, a student writes:

It is easier to speak about giving when material things are being given. In this situation it is easy to distinguish what can be given and what cannot. But is it possible to speak about things being given when they are not material, but spiritual? It is possible to imagine a love which one person when feeling it ‘gives’ to another, or to the object of the love, or to humans as a whole, inspiring them to love. But is it possible to give something one does not have? (K.B.)

The student identifies the main problem behind the words of Bresson’s country priest:

I parted the Muslin veil and brushed her forehead with my fingers. I had said to her, ‘Peace be with you’ and she’d received it on her knees. What wonder, that one can give what one does not possess! Oh, the miracle of our empty hands! (K.B.)

Klevan and Cavell observe that good films prompt mysterious thoughts and feelings, amorphous latent thoughts, and the aim of educators teaching through cinema is to teach students the patience to wait for the thought to be born. The experiment with these two movies revealed that students are able to rediscover themselves in the most important messages concealed in examples of spiritual cinema.

6. Deep Attention and Spiritual Cinema: Tarkovsky

We shall now return to the insight of Katherine Hayles and Bernard Stiegler discussed at the beginning of this book: a technological environment cultivates hyperattention because it destroys the deep attention developed in education through reading and writing. To use Deleuze’s words, our conclusion is that like a ‘good book’, every ‘good film’ requires concentrated attention from the spectator in order to comprehend its meaning, not only while watching the film but also for a significant period of time afterwards. The Lithuanian writer Giedra Radvilavičiūtė begins her essay “The Allure of the Text” by reflecting on several criteria for determining the quality of any effective text. She names several: after the text has been read, the narrative must force its way back into the involuntary memory; the text cannot be far removed from experience; while
reading the text, everything around the reader must be forgotten; the narrative must reveal something new about well-known things. In our opinion, these criteria also serve to define what, in Deleuze’s words, constitutes a ‘good film’ suitable for education. A good film must force its way back into the involuntary memory, it cannot be far removed from experience; while watching the film, the spectator must be oblivious to the surroundings; the film must reveal something new about well-known things. In addition, a ‘good film’ suitable for humanitarian education has to stimulate interest in reflecting on what is significant behind the image, or as Deleuze says, hors-image. This is the task of every film from ‘spiritual cinema’. Russian film director Tarkovsky would have answered: beyond image is time, which coincides with the flow of reality itself. In the second volume of his philosophy of cinema, Deleuze repeats Tarkovsky’s words: “What is essential is the way time flows in the shot, its tension or rarefaction, ‘the pressure of time in the shot’.”

Tarkovsky’s name figured among the five film directors suggested by high-school students in the experiment discussed in “Which Films are Suitable for Moral Education? Student Answers.” His feature film Stalker was also included in the students’ list of films they considered suitable for philosophical education. On the other hand, Tarkovsky’s movies involve heterogeneous and complex codes. Occasionally, even master students say they are not able to comprehend the meaning of the narrative, for example after watching the film The Mirror, sometimes suggested by the author of this text for students attending the Deleuze Seminar course. Tarkovsky used to film in long shots, but for The Mirror he created only about two hundred shots – significantly fewer than his usual (between five hundred and a thousand). In order to follow the narrative and to understand the meaning, a student needs to use very deep capacities of attention. Deleuze mentions The Mirror as the best example of crystalline time. In our opinion, the time crystal is also visible in his feature Ivan’s Childhood. Past time as virtual time is expressed in Ivan’s four dreams, in which

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28 Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 42.

29 Deleuze writes: “Mirror is a turning crystal, with two sides if we relate it to the invisible adult character (his mother, his wife), with four sides if we relate it to two visible couples (his mother and the child he was, his wife and the child he has). And the crystal turns on itself, like a homing device that searches for an opaque environment: what is Russia, what is Russia…?” Ibid., 75.
events that happen during the war could have happened before the war when the world was comfortable and nice and when his mother was alive. The real present time is during the war, and little orphan Ivan is fighting as a reconnoiterer. In the second dream, he and his mother are looking at reflections in the water in a well. The viewer sees their reflection in the water as showing virtual time lost in the war. In the present reality when Ivan is dreaming, his mother is already dead, but in the dream, she is still alive. Ivan descends into the well to catch the reflection of a star (“How is it possible that it is shining – isn’t it day?” – Ivan asks). In the next sequence, Ivan is still in the well, but he hears phrases of German and then gunshots. He cannot see what happened but understands. He screams: “Mother!” From the time of the dream Ivan is thrown back into reality time. In the next shot his mother is lying on the ground as water from the well pours over her. The reflection of Ivan and his mother in the well water embraces simultaneously three interwoven time frames: first, the time of the dream in which the war does not exist and which in some sense may coincide with the possible past before the war. Second, Ivan exists in the real present time of the war, and it is mainly here that he is experiencing the dream.

Third, the death of Ivan’s mother, regardless of the fact that it occurs in the dream, in reality happened as a factual event in the past even before the inner time of the dream, as well as before the time of dreaming itself. These three interwoven times are all shown in several minutes of the movie and exist simultaneously. The time of the dream holds up a mirror to reality time exposing what is brutal and unbearable in reality. Although there is no war in the inner time of the dream, war invades this timeframe and turns it back to reality. The time of the dream and real time coexist as two inseparable sides of a single time crystal, like two mirrors reinforcing each other’s reflections. The film Ivan’s Childhood can be used in lectures or in social and historical studies lessons to encourage reflection and discussion on the atrocities that wars impose on children’s lives.

We conclude that the comprehension of Tarkovsky’s films always requires a maximum effort of deep attention. His films are not based on action, but on the inner spiritual meaning concealed behind the image and even behind the narrative. Tarkovsky’s intention of capturing the very essence of time through his shots gives special value to the long image duration and requires the ability to maintain patient and prolonged attention. Even his collaborators sometimes refused to understand the meaning of this cinema time existing very close to reality time. In the

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documentary Andrey Tarkovsky’s Way of Cross (in Russian: Krestnyj put Andreya Tarkovskovo, 2007), the film director Andrey Michalkov-Konchalovsky, Tarkovsky’s former friend and co-author of the script for the film Andrey Rublyov, when asked why their cooperation collapsed after the film Andrey Rublyov, explained that he criticized Tarkovsky for shooting scenes that were too long. He reflects: “I said: ‘It has to be shortened. It is too long. I consider even now that Andrey Rublyov is too long’. In our view, Tarkovsky created a new conception of cinema time. For educational purposes, in order to comprehend how this new time flows inside the image, a comparison can be made between two versions of the same movie. The first version of Tarkovsky’s film The Passion according to Andrey (the original title of Andrey Rublyov was The Beginning and the Ways, in Russian: Nachalo…i puti,) was three hours and twenty minutes long and was completed in July 1966 but suspended by Goskino (the official Soviet film censorship organisation). Tarkovsky was obliged to shorten it for several reasons: the duration was too long, for scenes of violence and for wrong ideology. The second version, reduced to three hours and six minutes and renamed Andrey Rublyov (1969), appeared three years after the first presentation.31

The educator can use the comparison of these two versions as a puzzle, asking the students to identify the scenes that were cut. Then a second, and the most important, question can be asked: What is the meaning of the cuts made in the film? Are the reasons for each of them ideological or aesthetic? What do students think about the problem of violence in this particular Tarkovsky film?

Very important is the novel The Jester. The original quickly moving dancing body of the joker is replaced by long meditation on a calm human face, and the joker’s noisy performance is followed in contrast by a settled silence. Movement is made more meaningful in the context of stillness. The human voice in the discussion of drunken peasants is barely audible as an insignificant setting, strengthening the impression of prevalent silence. The silence is heard even more intensely outside the visible image, despite a woman singing in the musical soundtrack. In this particular episode, Tarkovsky reveals that mainly in silence the human face becomes a place of superior meaning. The camera slowly moves across the faces of the children and the faces of the monks: time passes more and more slowly. The silence and peacefulness of the episode is interrupted only by the joker’s trick. He suddenly appears from outside in the open doorway, hanging upside-down and crowing like a cock. It seems that for a brief moment the slow passage of time reaches the limit of reality, but all at

once it becomes obvious that cinematic time, even in such a slow episode as the meditation on faces and silence, runs much more quickly in Tarkovskiy’s movie than the passage of time in reality. In this scene, however, the shortened version of Andrey Rublyov lacks some aspects present in The Passion according to Andrey which, in our opinion, are quite important for appreciating the movie. It was no great loss to cut down the advance of the monks during the first moments when they left the cottage and to skip over their passage through a little wood, but cutting out the episodes dealing with the meditative faces in the cottage during the ‘silence time’ can be seen as a considerable loss for the conception Tarkovsky puts forward. He suggested his observers should view real time, reality as it passes, and he taught how to meditate not only by observing the pictures, but also the cinematic images. The faces of the monks in the cottage resemble those in old pictures, and the faces of the children express the beauty of childhood. In the shortened version as well, Tarkovsky tries to maintain the slowness of the time of silence when nothing particular happens for as long as possible, but he has to omit the second return of the camera over the children’s faces and the folk peacefully discussing their own affairs in the corners of the cottage.

Indeed, from that moment on, time starts to pass very slowly for events in progress: the speed of the constructed cinematic time approaches the duration of time in life itself. This slow passage of time is very clear because of the contrast: the rapid passage of time during the entertainment is suddenly replaced by the slowness of everyday time when ‘nothing particular happens’. By creating this contrast, Tarkovsky revealed the secret fascination of everyday time, which seems at first sight to be unimportant. It seems that Tarkovsky tried to make time visible as the very essence of life itself. Deleuze referred to it as the direct image of time:

This identity of montage with the image itself can appear only in conditions of the direct time-image. In a text with important implications, Tarkovsky says that what is essential is the way time flows in the shot, its tension or rarefaction, ‘the pressure of time in the shot’. He appears to subscribe to the classical alternative, shot or montage, and to opt strongly for the shot (‘the cinematographic figure only exists inside the shot’). But this is only a superficial appearance, because the force or pressure of time goes outside the limits of the shot, and montage itself works and lives in time.32

32 Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 42.
In Chapter 10 of this book, “Sound, Noise and Voice: Beyond Semiotics,” Lilija Duobliénė also reflects on this particular Tarkovsky film Andrey Rublyov from the multimodal sound-image-thought-word perspective.

Bibliography


1. Two Different Cultures: The Unbridgeable Gap?

Can mutual respect based on equality be achieved in the context of the different values of different countries and different races? How can consensus be built among them? What are the perspectives for cross-cultural communication and dialogue between Eastern and Western youth? Can they identify and understand each other’s main values? This chapter is based on the previously described teaching experiment with groups of Western youth: 18–20-year-old philosophy students living in Europe (Lithuania).

Carl G. Jung in his preface to Daisetsu T. Suzuki’s *Introduction to Zen Buddhism* observed that Eastern religious conceptions differ so much from the Western that it is very difficult to understand even the meaning of simple words, and much more difficult to understand the meaning of the concepts, which usually remain untranslated. The Westerner, according to Jung, cannot understand the majority of the concepts and ideas in Buddhist texts.

The spiritual conceptions necessary to Zen are missing in the West. Who amongst us would produce such implicit trust in a superior master and his incomprehensible ways? This respect for the greater human personality exists only in the East. Who could boast of believing in the possibility of a transformation experience paradoxical beyond measure; to the extent, moreover, of sacrificing many years of life to the wearisome pursuit of such an object? And finally, who would dare to take upon himself the authority of a heterodoxical transformation experience.¹

Erich Fromm was not so sceptical about the gap between the meaning of concepts from the two different civilizations, remarking that even

some Westerners have difficulties understanding Master Eckhart or Martin Heidegger’s texts. In the same way, not everyone from the Eastern culture has a very deep understanding of the meaning of *satori*.

The difficulty lies in the tremendous effort which is required to acquire *satori*; this effort is more than most people are willing to undertake, and that is why *satori* is rare even in Japan.2

Together with Suzuki, Fromm made an attempt to bridge this gap between the two civilizations by suggesting a comparison between Zen Buddhism and psychoanalysis. Suzuki wrote profusely in order to introduce the Western reader to the main aspects of Zen Buddhism. Other followers of Zen Buddhism also tried to explain the secret of this Eastern teaching to the “rational” Western mind.3 The author of this book was inspired by this attempt to write a chapter “Eastern Ethics and Western Ethics” in a textbook for students on the history of ethical ideas *Ethics: Philosophy as a Practice/Eтика: filosofija kaip praktika*.4 Some teachers use this textbook for ethics teaching in Lithuanian schools. The chapter describes Confucianism, compares Confucius to Aristotle, reflects Hegelian scepticism in his philosophy of History, then moves towards Daoism and Buddhism, comparing it with Confucius’ teaching and Hellenism, and reflects on Nietzsche’s comparison between Buddhism and Christianity. The extensive closing section is devoted to Zen Buddhism and presents meditation on haiku and Zen pictures and tries to reveal the possible meaning of the main words describing the teaching. The author avoids personal evaluations and tries to inform the reader about this teaching relying on texts of D.T. Suzuki, Z.A. Shibayama, T. Izutsu, P. Mason, H. Hesse, Ph. Yampolsky, S. Bernet and W. Burto. The chapter also refers to Lao-tze, Confucius and old Chinese and Japanese haiku masters’ texts translated into Lithuanian. One of the former students translated this chapter (together with the chapter on Antique ethics) into Esperanto.5

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*Eastern Ethics and Western Ethics* is used in the multimodal education experiment for first-year Philosophy students in the university Ethics course. Multimodal education relies not only on the words in the texts, but also on images, meaningful pictures and films. The purpose of the educational experiment was to reveal what signs of Eastern ethics the nineteen-year-old Western students consider most important when they discover them in Eastern movies using the textbook as a guideline for reflection. Two groups of students (in 2018 and 2019 spring semester) could choose either Christian or Eastern Ethics as a topic for the conference. They had to watch two movies. If they chose the Christian alternative, Bresson’s *The Diary of a Country Priest* and Bergman’s *The Winter Light*. Before watching the films, they had to read the chapter in the textbook on the main concepts of Christian ethics. If they chose the Eastern alternative, their task was to watch the feature *Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter…and Spring* (2003) by Kim Ki-duk and *Hana-bi* (Fireworks, 1997) by Takeshi Kitano and to read the recommended chapter before watching. The students were asked to write the conference paper on what important signs of Christian or Eastern culture they had discovered. Their choices were optional: no one was obliged to choose Eastern ethics. But Eastern ethics were chosen less than Christian ethics. When asked why more than half of them preferred Christian ethics, they answered that it was much easier to write about Christianity.

The papers from both alternatives were discussed at the same conference and the students were free to ask questions and enter into discussion. Their efforts were evaluated. The professor did not impose any of her ideas before the conference but suggested her own insights only in the discussion. This paper discusses the results of the educational experiment, attempting to answer the following questions: What aspects of Eastern culture could 20th century Westerners perceive from reading the introductory texts and watching the movies? What aspects of Eastern culture appeared to them as most important? Are there any aspects of Western philosophy teaching in Lithuanian textbooks that are suitable for making comparisons between Eastern and Western moral cultures?

### 2. Repetition and Difference

Suzuki writes:

Most Westerners are apt to alienate themselves from nature. They think man and nature have nothing in common except in
some desirable aspects, and that nature exists only to be utilized
by man. But to Eastern people nature is very close.6

Philosophy students from the West study René Descartes, Imman-
uel Kant, Georg Hegel or Jean-Paul Sartre, etc., as these philosophers
reflect the dichotomy of nature and human consciousness and see in na-
ture only the determination of natural causes and the freedom of the spir-
ital being. In The Philosophy of History, Hegel wrote the following about
Eastern culture: “Spirit has not yet attained subjectivity, it wears the ap-
pearance of spirituality still involved in the conditions of Nature.”7 The
Hegelian insight that history in the East is identical with nature or impris-
oned in nature, and for this reason lacks a transcendent aspect and does
not even exist, influences some students’ reactions when reflecting on the
movies. For example, student K. writes that Hegel, when explaining the
sources of the philosophical aspects of religious plots in the East, discerns
abstraction and depersonalization as their common feature. Hegel does
not see the individualization of subjectivity in Eastern religious images:
as they are universal, they appear to be philosophical ideas. He discerns
the same tendency in the feature film by Kim Ki-duk, Spring, Summer, Fall,
Winter… and Spring again. He concludes that the teacher and his student
are not individual agents, they are almost not humans, but more like ab-
stractions.

To a large degree, the cyclical life of the two characters does not
experience change and is not able to change: it returns to its starting point.
It becomes necessary to start learning the mysteries of life anew, to rec-
 oncile oneself to the repeated and tiresome misunderstanding of the hu-
man by the being. This irresistible and irreplaceable cycle depersonalizes
everyone who is drawn into it. And the rollover is inevitable – it is the
fate of every form of life. The only way of escape is to coincide with
nature. At first sight it may appear that the characters become human
individuals when the woman appears and inspires passion and drive. But
this is only another deception: all uniqueness and individuality are
doomed to repetition and cyclical progression. When the symbolic wheel
of the year turns around, everything must be started anew, and new mis-
takes must be made in order to gain new understanding.

With the last sentence in this reflection, student K. departs, in a way
he had not expected, from the Hegelian concept of irresistible and irre-
placeable cyclical progression towards noticing ‘new mistakes’ and ‘new

7 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Kitchener, Can-
understanding’. Thus, the student almost involuntarily agrees that something new can happen in the repetition of the same. As Gilles Deleuze observes: “Difference lies between two repetitions.”8 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze makes the concept of repetition alongside difference one of the key concepts of his new metaphysics. His exegesis relies on the sources of Western philosophy and culture; he does not turn towards the Eastern conception of repetition but finds the sources for counter Hegelian arguments in the Western tradition. He opposes repetition to both moral law and natural law. He opposes repetition not only to the generalities of habit but also to the particularities of memory. Deleuze places the repetition reflected by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in opposition to that of Hegel, as he says, ‘false movement’, in other words, the abstract logical movement of ‘mediation’.9

They no longer reflect on the theatre in the Hegelian manner. Neither do they set up a philosophical theatre. They invent an incredible equivalent of theatre within philosophy, thereby founding simultaneously this theatre of the future and a new philosophy.10

Following Kant, Deleuze maintains that the role of the imagination, or the mind which contemplates in its multiple and fragmented states, is to draw something new from repetition, to draw difference from it. For that matter, repetition is itself in essence imaginary, hence the imagination alone here forms the ‘moment’ of the vis repetativa from the point of view of constitution: it makes that which it contracts appear as elements or cases of repetition. It can be seen that, in the reflections of both the student K. and Deleuze, longing for the future overshadows the aspect of presence, the longing for the new overshadowing living with that which already exists. In any case, for future reflection on possible comparisons between Eastern and Western cultures, some open questions can be proposed by suggesting a mental experiment for the students: How can Hegelian metaphysics be analysed from the point of view of the East? What would the argument from Eastern culture look like when introduced into anti-Hegelian metaphysics of the Deleuzian type?

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9 Ibid., 8.
10 Ibid.
3. The Meaning of Silence

Are Western students able to look openly at the signs of Eastern culture if they have never read Hegel? As a matter of fact, as the students in the pedagogical experiment were first-year students, most of them were relatively free from too much speculation about the meaning of the images they see. They try to be open to the information from the text and the images they see. They also recount their spontaneous reactions. Student D writes:

Stanley Cavell (American film philosopher) suggests beginning the description of a feature film starting from the most shocking moment. This arouses an idea lurking in the spectator and inspires further perceptions. But the feature by Kim Ki-duk Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter…and Spring again even in its title presupposes the idea of cyclical progression, so it is better to discuss it in a consistent, gradual and serene manner. But some aspects from the film inspired a real storm in my inner waters. The director, as the monk who had taken a vow of silence, speaks through symbols, inserting his thoughts into the signs. Unfortunately, my reasoning being imprisoned in Western contexts was not able to give meaning to all the symbolic subtleties which would had given the piece of art deeper content. On the other hand, it detected traces that my intuition was eager to follow. The meaning of the feature is intangible and resists words. But it stimulates us to meditation.

“Why does the author choose to speak without words?” asks student D. rhetorically and proceeds to answer:

Maybe, speaking through symbols, the director tries to reveal that the closest way to serenity and a state of enlightenment is abandoning all definitions and relying in this spiritual journey on intuition, feelings, allowing the reason to rest. Maybe…

Are Westerners totally unable to grasp the inner meaning of silence? It does not look like that. Ludwig Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* persuades his readers that what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”

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The students reading philosophy from the textbook for grades 11-12 in Lithuanian schools (by Tomas Sodeika, Jūratė Baranova) are asked to write an essay on this quotation from Wittgenstein’s using it as their topic. They are also asked to discuss the topic: Is language omnipotent in all situations? Is it possible to express everything in words? Or maybe some things remain inexpressible? They are also asked to compare Wittgenstein’s approach to silence with Martin Buber’s ‘speaking silence’.12 The Western poet of Polish origin Wislava Szymborska (1936-2012) noticed the very paradoxical situation which occurs even in the very fact of speaking about silence. In her verse, written in a very ‘Eastern manner’, i.e., with the minimum number of words, she includes silence in the catalogue of the three strangest words: Future, Silence and Nothingness. Why are they strange? For the reason, that

While I am uttering the word Future / the first syllable yet slinks to the past. / When I utter the word Silence / I destroy it. / When I utter the word Nothing / I create something that does not belong to any nothingness.13

This poem is also included in the textbook mentioned above with a question for contemplation: What things is it possible to remain silent about? How can they be said without words?14

Martin Heidegger in Being and Time warns Dasein that speaking and understanding are two different modes of being, that speaking without understanding creates the possibility of groundless speech – idle talk (das Gerede), saying that “Understanding comes neither from a lot of talking nor from busy listening around. Only he who already understands is able to listen.”15 Heidegger characterizes silence as an essential possibility of discourse. Whoever wants to give something to understand in silence must ‘have something to say’. Reflecting this, the role of silence becomes very important in the philosophical reflection of speech and discourse for Western students as well. In the Philosophy textbook for grades 11-12 in Lithuanian schools (Tomas Sodeika, Jūratė Baranova) the authors include the passage from Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit concerning the paradoxical relation between discourse and silence: “Another essential possibility of

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14 Sodeika and Baranova, Filosofija XI-XII kl., 165-166.
discourse has the same existential foundation, *keeping silent.*” In talking with one another, the person who is silent can ‘let something be understood’, that is, he can develop an understanding more authentically than the person who never runs out of words. Speaking a lot about something does not in the least guarantee that understanding is thus furthered. On the contrary, talking at great length about something covers things over and gives a false impression of clarity to what is understood, that is, the unintelligibility of the trivial. But to keep silent does not mean to be dumb. On the contrary, if a person is dumb, he still has the tendency to ‘speak’. Such a person has not only not proved that he can keep silent, but he also even lacks the possibility of proving this. And the person who is by nature accustomed to speaking little is no better able to show that he can be silent and keep silent. He who never says anything is also unable to keep silent at a given moment. Authentic silence is possible only in genuine discourse. In order to be silent, *Dasein* must have something to say, that is, must be in command of an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. Then reticence makes manifest and puts down ‘idle talk’. As a mode of discourse, reticence articulates the intelligibility of *Dasein* so primordially that it gives rise to a genuine potentiality for hearing and to a being-with-one-another that is transparent. The authors of the textbook invited the students to ask themselves the questions: Does idle talk – tireless talking – strengthen understanding or weaken it? Why is the keeper of silence not necessarily mute? Heidegger also reveals that

Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence. Thus, it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces *Dasein* thus summoned and called upon to the reticence of itself. The fact that what is called in the call is lacking a formulation in words does not shunt this phenomenon into the indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, but only indicates that the understanding of what is called may not cling to the expectation of a communication or any such thing.

These three passages about silence from Szymborska’s, Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s texts are illustrated by the work of famous Lithuanian artist Algimantas Švėgžda (1941-1996).
Antanas Andrijauskas in “Searching for Lithuanian Identity” reflected the influences on Švėgžda’s late works by the masters of Daoism. The creative style of Švėgžda can be defined also by the words of the Lithuanian philosopher Arvydas Šliogeris when, in *Thing and Art* *(Daiktas ir menas)*, he wrote:

The only way for a painter to create a real picture is to show the thing without any comments, refusing any aspects of self-will, any pretensions to demonstrate one’s own ‘deep thinking’ ideas, authenticity, refusing any literature and idle talk. Evidence of a thing or evidence of the thing on the plane picture should be maximum mute, without any rhetorics. Moreover, it is necessary to delete from the picture all traces of the subjective relation towards the thing, it is necessary to be maximum objective, not to show your own feelings, evaluations, experiences, sympathies or antipathies, that is to say: your personal attitude towards the thing. There should not be any psychology or pathology in the picture. According to Rilke, it means to gaze at the thing the same manner as a dog looks at its image in the mirror, as if saying: There is another dog sitting. That’s all.

In 2014, when the International Philosophy Olympiad with 43 countries involved was organized in Lithuania, Šliogeris’ philosophy was presented among others to the international community of teachers and professors. The Japanese philosopher Shinji Kajitani reflected: “The philosophy of Šliogeris has much in common with our Japanese philosophy.” What does it have in common? This needs further investigation, and the question can provide a topic for further student discussion.

**4. Nature as Very Close to Human Beings**

Some of the students discern the tranquillity which comes with Eastern closeness to nature. Student A. writes: “I would like to start from the positive emotions and the inner tranquillity exposed in the feature *Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter…and Spring again.*” The feature is divided into five clear episodes, according to the changing relation between the teacher


and the boy. The teacher teaches the boy wisdom in remote nature near the water pool. They used to pray to a Buddha statue every morning, and afterwards gathered herbs and investigated the bounty provided by nature. The teacher demonstrates how to discern poisonous herbs from the good, which conveys a philosophical lesson: things that are at first sight similar can contain very different hidden features. Every living creature is very important, and a human has no right to take that away. The boy played with the lives of the animals – tied stones to their backs – and was laughing at it. The teacher said nothing, but also tied a stone to his back when he was sleeping at night."

Several students notice and reflect on this pedagogical experiment of the Buddhist teacher: teach not with words, but by experience. Several students remark on the utterance of the teacher, saying to find the animals and to take the stones from their backs until they are alive with the remark: “if any one of them is dead – you’ll carry the stone inside you all your life.” Student B. writes: “The fish and the snake were already dead. In the Winter episode we see that the boy as an adult ties the stone to his own back and takes the statue of Buddha in his hands and carries it to the top of the hill. Taking this statue to the top of the hill can represent the inner tranquillity he attained to become a good monk.”

In the textbook Philosophy for grades 11-12 (T. Sodeika and J. Baranova), the topic ‘Man and animal’ is also suggested. This starts from the question: Is the closeness of a human to an animal an obvious thing? When meeting an animal, is a person able to recognize in it her or his alter ego? The topic for discussion starts with a passage from the diaries of the writer of Polish origin Witold Gombrowicz in which he reflects on how, living in Argentina and crossing a field, he meets with the gaze of a cow. “I stopped and we looked deeply into each other’s eyes.” His mutual gaze gives him a feeling of shame in the face of the animal:

I allowed it to look at me and to see me – by it we became equal, – so I became an animal, but very strangely, even, I would say, impossibly. I continued the interrupted promenade but felt myself uneasy…in the nature surrounding me on all sides, as if…observing me.\(^{21}\)

For discussion after reading the passage the following questions are suggested: Why may a human feel uneasy in the surroundings of nature? Because nature is primary as compared to human? Nature is independent

\(^{21}\) Sodeika and Baranova, Filosofija XI-XII kl., 71-72.
– it can exist even better without humans. But can a man exist independently from nature? Is a man able to understand all the relations lurking in the secrets of nature?

As is always the case, the students enjoy this experiment suggested in the textbook. They are asked:

Close your eyes and meditate, trying to bring back from memory some familiar being. Maybe a fish? Maybe some other creature? For example, a clam. Maybe you can recall the memory of your life in the shell? Let’s dream and imagine that you are an animal. Where does this dream transport you? Please write the dreams and memories down on paper.²²

Students always like to share their discoveries with one another. As usual, every group has very different types of animals in their dreams. But not once in the seventeen years following the publishing of the textbook did any of the philosophy students refuse to participate in the dream experiment, saying they had nothing to do with an animal. This imaginative game also arouses very positive emotions.

For further reflection on the possibility of eliminating the difference between man and nature, students should read extracts from Hermann Hesse’s books *Demian* (1919) and *Siddhartha* (1922).

5. Violence and Tenderness: *Hana-bi*

As indicated in the task assigned to them, the students start to reflect upon a topic from the Kim Ki-duk movie. When they turn towards Takeshi Kitano’s feature *Hana-bi*, they have to say: “This is something different.” What particular differences do they discern?

First they discern ambiguity and violence. “There is no violence in the Kim Ki-dukian sanctuary,” writes student K. “In it, violence and death exist only for educational and allegorical purposes, for reflecting on ethical problems and the question of the meaning of life. Violence that is impulsive, jealous and full of human dynamics takes place beyond the symbolic gate.” Meanwhile, in the Kitano feature, violence already belongs to the spectator. The director blames the audience for almost every death in the movie, showing the dangerousness of film as a media. All dying and abused characters experience violence from the point of view of the spectator: shots, kicks, blows – all these images are seen from the perspective of the first person. Student F. remarks: “People in this feature do not value life; they kill each other the moment it comes into their

²² Ibid., 80.
mind. The discussion starts from words, but as usual ends with fists.” Student D. says that violence without any reason and some cultural differences are shocking for the Western spectator. On the other hand, student B. distinguishes violence in the Takeshi movie from the violence in Quentin Tarantino films. She writes:

For example, the violence in Tarantino movies is bloody and terrible. Kitano himself says he dislikes how Tarantino shows violence. The feature *Pulp Fiction* does not show true reality. In order to show real violence, one needs endurance. In my opinion, Kitano shows violence quite realistically.

Is the problem of violence a special feature of the Eastern mentality, or is violence the dark other side of human beings in all the parts of the world? This question can be suggested for further discussion.

The British philosopher Thomas Hobbes observed that people are usually unable to endure not only the counterarguments of an opponent, but even disagreement with their opinion.\(^{23}\) Carl Schmitt concluded that the very concept of ‘enemy’ is connected with the possibility of a fight lurking in reality and suggests explaining the words ‘fight’ and ‘enemy’ as the primary definitions of being.\(^{24}\) Even Kant, following Hobbes, wrote about antagonism between men ending in asocial sociality. This double nature of asocial sociality means that every man feels the inclination to communicate with similar creatures because it makes him feel more human. But, on the other hand, one feels a parallel drive to isolate oneself, to act only on one’s own opinion, thus expecting resistance from all sides and the need to resist the others. Kant, however, concludes that this resistance is very useful mainly for the reason that it evokes human forces and drives him to overcome in-born laziness. All these passages in the chapter on *Fight* as one of the essential human phenomena are included in the textbook *Philosophy* mentioned above.\(^ {25}\)

Students discern the ambiguity of the human situation and human nature brought out in the Kitano feature. The ambiguity lurks even in the title of the movie. Many of them checked that ‘hana’ means flowers – the symbol of love and life. But ‘bi’ according to old Japanese tradition symbolizes fire as a sign of violence and violent death. “In my opinion,” writes student B.

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\(^{25}\) Sodeika and Baranova, *Filosofija XI-XII kl.*, 200-201.
This title very well reveals the character of the main character Nishi. He is a policeman, so he very well knows what violence is, and is an active producer of violence. On the other hand, with his wife he behaves very gently. His tenderness is visualized by the images and sound. This beauty is connected with suffering. *Hana-bi* is a film in which tension is lingering all the time in the tranquillity.

Nishi had robbed a bank in order to get money for a last journey to the seaside with his mortally ill wife. He also spent the money to support his former colleague and friend, who after an unsuccessful event is disabled and left by his daughter and wife. Nishi encourages him to paint, sending him the materials he needs for painting. Several students notice the value of painting as meditation. Student E. writes: “The most amazing tradition represented in the film is the painting.” Painting in the Eastern world is a form of meditation that helps to concentrate the mind on being in the world and feeling direct contact with the world, with the being ‘here and now’. Students also remark that the paintings showed in this feature were created by Kitano himself at a time when he also experienced disability after an accident. It can be seen that the students were searching for information about the feature and the director on internet sites. Student L. writes:

The former policeman, unable to move, paints modern images of nature – animals with heads like flowers. For him it is like a therapy helping to fight loneliness and depression. Another flower motive is seen at the end of the feature, when the wife seems to wash, or refresh, withered flowers as if trying to enliven the memories of their dead child and in order to bring some life into the last days of her life. This feature stimulates reflection on the eternity of the being, and on the fragility of human life. On the other hand, it shows the value of tranquillity and does not outlive the events even in the face of upcom

Are Lithuanian students able to understand the meaning of this meditation? One may question how many of them have real experience of meditation, but they do have the possibility to be acquainted with the meaning of meditation at the theoretical level. In the textbook for teachers of ethics, the passage from Hesse’s novel *The Glass Bead Game* (also published as *Magister Ludi*, 1947) states that meditation means the ability to stop and regain lost energy. This explanation looks very Western in style: no one can sustain success received without the ability to stop and
meditate. In the textbook, Sodeika suggests that high-school students follow ten steps for meditating on thoughts, encouraging them to read the texts very attentively and to select one thought for meditation. Then sit straight with a straight spine and closed eyes, concentrating attention on different parts of the body, feeling one’s hands, shoulders, feet, shins, thighs, bowels, back, neck, head, face. “Try not to strain,” suggests Sodeika. Afterwards he instructs:

Feel your own breathing, but do not try to control it. Feel the pleasure of breathing. Feel how the centre of your body with every exhalation more and more concentrates in the belly and bowels. Feel how tranquillity and silence arise inside you. Concentrate all attention on one thought. Let it pulse calmly in the rhythm of your breathing and let it spread out through all your body. Do not allow other thoughts to distract you. At the very end of your meditation, again concentrate your attention on breathing and the position of your body. Breathe in and breathe out deeply several times. Open your eyes. After the meditation you can share your impressions with your classmates. The meditation lasts about 15-20 minutes.26

6. Death as the Common Human Destiny

There are some existential aspects of the human being that are common to human beings in every part of the world. Every human is a mortal being: the question of death is an inevitable encounter.

Student M. concludes that the main theme uniting the two rather different movies by Ki-duk and Kitano is mainly death, differing only by approach. “In Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter…and Spring again it is shown as a natural part of the permanently changing life. In Hana-bi approaching death is reflected as a sign for the changes in life, to evaluate the last moments in it and to spend more time with the beloved ones.” M. concludes that in Ki-duk’s feature, life mainly plays the principal role. Death is only secondary, and only as a part of the cycles of life itself. But in Hana-bi death becomes a more personal matter: all the heroes live with death breathing behind their back: Horibe barely escapes death but becomes crippled for the rest of his life. The child of Nishi died before the events in the movie, and the wife is ill with leukaemia. Their journey towards the sea is a journey towards the place of inevitable death, and this is the main fibula of the film.

26 Ibid., 28-29.
Do Westerners fear death more than Eastern people do? In Western philosophy there is also a courageous tradition for reflection upon the encounter with death. Seneca introduces an argument as to why one should not fear death, in which he asserts that those who die suffer no evils, and that all the stories which make us dread what is to come after death are mere fables, and that death is complete freedom from all of that. Then he argues that death is neither a good nor a bad thing for that alone which is something can be a good or a bad thing: but that which is nothing, and reduces all things to nothing, does not hand us over to either fortune, because good and bad require some material to work upon. Seneca tells Marcia that life has meaning at all only because we die. Heidegger in his *Sein und Zeit* said that Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety. But this anxiety is authentic for the reason that it frees Dasein from the cowardly fear of death and the pettiness of life. Being towards-death as we have projected it existentially: anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by solicitude, but of being itself, rather in an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the “they,” and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious.27

The students also notice the two kinds of unnatural death in these two Eastern features: suicide and homicide. Homicide seems a natural flow of events in Kitano’s *Hana-bi*, where no one believes that it is an injustice or evil. A different approach to homicide prevails in Ki-duk’s movie. Homicide is the result of the expression of the evil hidden in lust. The students understand that the teacher warns against this danger, but the young man does not listen. The killer is punished by the organs of justice. The student O. also observes that he who killed also repents personally for his deeds when he returns to the flowing sanctuary. The young man understands that killing his wife is related to his killing minor animals in his childhood. So he ties the stone to his back and carries the Buddha sculpture to the top of the hill. The students interpret these signs in the Kim Ki-duk feature as traces of Buddhist teaching.

The students also remarked on the other kind of unnatural death – the suicide in both of the Eastern movies. The suicide of the teacher in *Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter…and Spring again* is puzzling for the students. Why did the teacher commit suicide after the young man was taken away

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by the officials of justice? Student H. suggested an answer: it was “as if the teacher felt guilty that he improperly raised the young man.” Student F. describes the complete ritual the teacher performed before the suicide: how he glued up white strips of paper on his mouth, ears, and eyes, asking afterwards: “How it is possible to interpret this action?” The first answer suggested also concerns the question of guilt: “Most likely for the reason he felt that he had not taught the student the principles of behaviour and life. So, he feels as if he lost his honour and the meaning of life.” These answers seem rather Western in style. Maybe it symbolizes simply that the cycle was complete, and life naturally came to an end.

In Hana-bi, the first suicide note could be seen in Horibe’s paintings. After the picture in white meaning snow, and yellow meaning light, Horibe paints a picture with red hieroglyphs meaning suicide. Student T. reflects that after this episode Horibe is no longer present in the feature, thus concludes that he committed suicide.

Some of the students were not sure how in fact the plot in Kitano’s Hana-bi ends. The viewer of the feature hears two shots and sees the gaze of the little girl who was playing with a kite near the sea. After the shots, she stops and looks at the place of the event, but the viewer cannot see what she is looking at. The students therefore have to guess at the ending. Student K. was sure that Nishi kills his wife in order to hasten the inevitability of it, but did not mention that Nishi could have killed himself as well. Student N. writes: “The spectator hears two shots, but it is not clear whom in particular they hit – those who were sitting, or the killer who watched.” One can conclude that for Western students it is rather difficult to catch the meaning of this double suicide. It was difficult also for the famous Lithuanian film critic Saulius Macaitis, who, reflecting on the feature, called it ‘a terrible gesture’. Some of the students had read this critique and some preferred not to discuss this final scene at all. If one were a philosopher from Antiquity, it would perhaps be easier to understand what happened. Seneca wrote that it is a great thing to die honourably, prudently and bravely. He connected suicide with the question of liberty or slavery in the hands of an individual. But starting from Saint Augustine, who in De Civitate Dei identified suicide with homicide, Westerners, unlike Easterners, feel a strict ban on suicide. Immanuel Kant took the side of Augustine and argued that suicide cannot be considered as a universal law of nature and is wholly opposed to the supreme principle of all duty. Even more, Kant considers that suicide violates the idea of humanity as an end in itself. Only David Hume and Schopenhauer were more tolerant towards possible suicides. Hume, in his essay “On Suicide,” expressed the idea that suicide should not be treated as a crime and that sometimes suicide can be treated even as advantageous for society. Schopenhauer also treats suicide as a mistake rather than a crime.
Student D. is quite certain that Nishi kills his wife and himself, suggesting that they knew the aim of their journey in advance. For this reason, the moments they spend together gain even greater value. The common suicide of the two heroes in the plot can be treated as the final gift of a loving husband to a dying wife.

The topic of suicide is discussed in the two textbooks on philosophy and philosophical ethics for Lithuanian schools, but the main emphasis is placed not only on discussing the problem, but also on searching for arguments to counter suicide. Discussion on this topic includes arguments taken not only from philosophers (Albert Camus, William James, Erich Fromm), but also from writers (Herman Hesse, Milam Kundera, John Fowles), literary critics (Alfred Alvarez) and psychologists (Edvin S. Shneidman, Erl Grollman). Students who had chosen the alternative of Christian instead of Eastern ethics were asked to reflect on the topic of suicide in Ingmar Bergman’s feature The Winter Light from the perspective of searching for the mistakes of pastor Tomas: Why did he fail to stop fisherman Jonas from committing suicide? They are also asked to carry out the mental experiment of reflecting in written form on the arguments they would have used themselves to prevent the fisherman Jonas from committing suicide.

In any case, it seems that this particular task is not be suitable for reflecting on Ki-duk’s and Kitano’s feature films. As most students concluded, death is not dramatized in these movies and the characters meet it with tranquillity.

**Bibliography**


Chapter 8

Philosophy for Children and Multimodal Education

Jūratė Baranova

1. Why Do Children Need Philosophy?

The methodology of the project Philosophy for Children was created by the American philosophers Matthew Lipman (1923-2010) and Ann Margaret Sharp (1942-2010). Sharp visited Lithuania more than 20 years ago to give seminars on Philosophy for Children, in which both authors of this book participated. The methodology was based on the conceptual ideas of American pragmatists Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952). Lipman remembers that as a soldier in the Second World War travelling with the troops in Europe, he used to carry Dewey’s book Intelligence in the Modern World in his bag and read it every free minute. After the war, he studied in France and was impressed by the ability of some French philosophers (for example Diderot) to express complex ideas in a very simple manner. Mainly in France, he observed very close communication between parents and children at the intellectual level and these experiences influenced him.

This conception of cognition was questioned by the pragmatist conception of truth. Peirce suggested the concept of ‘community of inquiry’, which becomes one of the key ideas in the Philosophy for Children project. In the pragmatist paradigm, knowledge is understood not as a representation of reality, but as a social justification of belief, in Dewey’s words, as ‘warranted assertability’. For pragmatists, the concept of truth as a correspondence between idea and reality had changed into the concept of truth understood more as a social than individual product, based more on action than contemplation. The concept of truth as clear and self-evident knowledge was also challenged in Thom Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), in which the development of knowledge was explained not as changes in the mirror of reality, but as a clash of different paradigms. Human judgment plays an important role in the processes of choosing between the paradigms. These decisions had to be backed up by reasons. Decision, as understood by Kuhn, is somewhere in-between algorithmical or digital procedures and preferences or the expressions of

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taste. This is a rational choice even though not being very rational in a narrow sense. A paradigm does not come from the clear and self-evident ideas of a particular individual scientist, but from the result of rational argumentation by a particular community of inquiry. Such an understanding of knowledge changed the premises of didactics. The community of inquiry becomes an indispensable part of cognition and method. Instead of learning ‘in a group’, the principle of learning ‘as a group’ emerges, where the group is understood not as an economic necessity, but as an integral context of inquiry. As a result, trans-disciplinary and integral learning become possible. Duobliene argues that the Dewey model of upbringing, invented more than hundred years ago, is marginalised again and again “in the process of making the reforms of education.”

The methodology of Philosophy for Children clashes with the premises of child development as described by Jean Piaget. Piaget paid little attention to the emotional development of children; he simply considered as self-evident the idea that intellectual development also influences the emotional and sets limits for it. On the other hand, Piaget did not take into account the social and creative aspect of cognition.

The methodology of Philosophy for Children is opposed to Piaget’s theory of mental stages, which foresees the possibility of abstract philosophical thinking only from the age of eleven. Philosophy for Children takes into account primary and even preprimary school children. On the other hand, Philosophy for Children suggests a richer understanding of logic than the Piaget theory of mental stages. Children, according to the methodology of Philosophy for Children, start to think when they start to give reasons for their ideas, when they begin to see the relation between the reason and the idea they want to justify. They also start to be able to act rationally, which means consequently. They can be mistaken more than adults about the link between the reason and the idea; their reasons may not be as perfect as those suggested by adults, but the creators of the methodology of Philosophy for Children postulate that by making mistakes children acquire the possibility to learn from them. Piaget and the followers of Philosophy for Children have different conceptions about what reasoning is, and what abilities are. The followers of Piaget identify reasoning with the development of logic or thinking skills, thus seeing this possibility only

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from the age of eleven. However, as John C. Thomas observes, the followers of *Philosophy for Children* speak not about ‘thinking skills’, but about ‘being reasonable’,\(^5\) and thus start the education of reasoning much earlier.

There are however two aspects in which *Philosophy for Children* and Piaget’s methodology are closer: in their premises of constructivism and the recognition of the social origin of knowledge. Unlike Plato, who thought that ideas are inborn, and John Locke who stated that the mind of the child is *tabula rasa*, the followers of *Philosophy for Children* proclaim that a child ‘constructs meanings’. Meaning is not inborn – it must be acquired. A child constructs meaning in the process of thinking and giving sense to things. Piaget acknowledges the necessity of the social dimension but does not see the necessity of the community of inquiry; he acknowledges the egocentric aspect of the preformal stage. Margaret Donaldson in *Children’s Minds* concluded that if Piaget’s conception of egocentricity is baseless, then the methodology of *Philosophy for Children* is justified. Differently than for Piaget, the concept of the community of inquiry is basic for the methodology of *Philosophy for Children*. The adherents of *Philosophy for Children* affirm that children start to reason when they are motivated to do so. In this case, they can go beyond the limits of their egocentricity and start reasoning even in early childhood.

### 2. Main Methodological Aspects of *Philosophy for Children*

A community of inquiry differs from a conventional class, even in the space arrangement. In a conventional class all the children sit in rows facing the teacher who sits alone – in an exceptionally privileged position. A community of inquiry sits in circle. The teacher is also part of the circle, the initiator and moderator of the discussion. Sometimes, when they are discussing some particular problem, children also sit in smaller groups, facing each other in circles. The teacher moves around – eager to visualise some ideas on the blackboard but can also approach any one of the small groups to kneel and listen to their discussion. As they are sitting on chairs, the pupils find themselves in a higher position than the teacher. This happens according to the conceptual premises of the community of inquiry, where the children are the main researchers in the group, the teacher being only a master to lead the discussion.\(^6\)

In the methodology of *Philosophy for Children*, the community of inquiry is the main context for educating the ability to ‘be reasonable’. John

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\(^6\) See *Philosophy in Primary Schools*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8D-oXgDRnVc.
C. Thomas discerns five aspects describing the importance of the community of inquiry in the methodology of *Philosophy for Children*:

1. Inclusion of the children in reasoning activity on the basis of their own interests (Donaldson’s idea). Donaldson observes that even three-year-old children understand immediately what they should do if an activity corresponds with their motives and intentions, if it seems meaningful to them. When children are interested, they have no difficulty transcending their own centralised world view (contrary to Piaget’s view).

2. Discussion is very important: speaking and listening (dialectical and social aspects of the reasoning process). The members of the community of inquiry learn to see themselves as active researchers who analyse knowledge and give reasons to it. They follow the communication model established in the communities of adult researchers, which supposes dialogue, a clash of ideas and cooperative actions. The earlier such a type of education starts, the earlier children learn to raise questions and develop the personal qualities needed to be members of the community of inquiry. One of the most important necessary features is the ability to listen patiently to the other. A slogan ‘Please, listen to the other’ written on a poster should be put in a visible place in the classroom until it becomes an interiorised norm for every member of the community of inquiry. As a professional habit, this principle is very important also for a teacher working with the methodology of *Philosophy for Children*. Discussion should continue patiently and slowly. A teacher should not hurry or worry about losing time. The rhythm of this type of teaching should correspond to the speed of the children’s own reasoning. The students have to feel safe, not punished, and not criticised for incorrect ideas.

3. The process of giving reasons and expecting reasons from others is the process of becoming reasonable when reasoning. In a community of inquiry nobody persuades, but presents arguments by giving reasons, using logical connections to join several statements, indicating possibilities by using the connection ‘if’, causes and effects (for the reason, that…), discerning different meanings (so and not so). Argumentation takes place in the process of comparison and relation, dividing facts from opinions, parts from the whole.7

4. Respect for oneself and for others (as the ethical basis for rational acting). In the community of inquiry, the *argumentum ad hominem*, meaning reference to the personal characteristics of any of the participants in the discussion, is not possible. The ability of the group to listen to and respect

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every participant and tolerate their opinions forms the principle of creating a community of inquiry as an ethical community. A very talkative child in a community of inquiry learns to limit his eloquence and one who is very silent should start to speak.

5. Thinking for oneself is the essence of being reasonable, and thus transcends the limit of reasoning abilities and formal logic. Thinking for oneself supposes that the thinking person can give his own reasons for his ideas but should also be able to transform these reasons fluently and critically in response to the ideas put forward by other participants in the discussion. On the other hand, thinking for oneself means that a person is able to recognise the right of others to think for themselves, even if their thinking differs from her or his own. The members of a community of inquiry can express different ideas, but do not strive to unify them or reduce them to one single opinion. The community of inquiry supposes that discussion requiring the participant to give reasons for every opinion forms the ability of every participant to think independently, rejecting any right of prevalence for any member of the group.8

The other methodology very close to Philosophy for Children is ‘Creative dialogue’. Robert Fisher in Creative Dialogue: Talk for Thinking in the Classroom (2009) sets out the following steps for creative dialogue:

1. ‘Listening: learning to attend’: The pupils cannot engage in a dialogue or fully benefit from it before they acquire the skills of focusing and attending, which increase the sustainability of their concentration throughout the dialogue.

2. ‘Questions for thinking’: crucially important for creative dialogue is questioning: What kind of questions should teachers ask students to trigger or maintain a dialogue and how can they help children to generate more and better questions that encourage the extension of the dialogue. Traditional teacher questioning (closed questioning) should be avoided. Teachers are supposed to ask Socratic questions and plan their questioning to promote thinking in the light of Bloom’s taxonomy. In addition, Fisher suggests bringing children to analyse their own questions using the Question Quadrant formulated by Cam (2006).

3. Fisher highlights the vitality of dynamics and creative energy which naturally emerge from the gathering of diverse minds and the interaction of various viewpoints. If this energy does not appear naturally, it should be generated by questioning and challenging, making connections and seeing relationships, imagining what might be, exploring and

extending ideas, reflecting critically on ideas, actions and outcomes, or creative talk in practice.

4. ‘Critical talk: developing verbal reasoning’ maintains that reasoning well is a significant skill enabling children to provide reasons for their beliefs or actions and evaluate their addressees’ reasons. It therefore needs to be improved through dialogue. Dialogue in which children are invited to get involved should be orchestrated in such a way as to ensure that they can put forward their arguments carefully, assess what their interactants put forward, judge how strong their evidence is, use techniques of deduction and inference with precise language while elucidating concepts and opinions, and make causal explanations and judgments depending on criteria, reasons and available evidence.

5. ‘Talking to learn across the curriculum’ first presents a discussion of some major principles of dialogic teaching. Fisher describes certain strategies to encourage children to interpret key concepts and ideas by using their own words and participating in dialogue. The author then illustrates the ways to teach children the skills and strategies needed to function effectively in any subject area as an independent learner and member of a team.

6. ‘Talking together: talk to think in groups’ explores strategies that can be used to help learners talk in pairs and groups, achieve success in talking, solve problems with others and talk together in practice. It is argued that, by talking together in groups, children can learn how to think widely and deeply, learn collaboratively as part of a group, develop dialogic skills and practise social and cooperative skills.

7. ‘Extending talk for thinking’ discusses ways to facilitate learners engaging in philosophical discussion, create a community of inquiry, and extend dialogue. Through their engagement in philosophical discussions with others having different mind sets in a community of inquiry, learners will be able to identify philosophical problems, questions and issues, create their own agenda for dialogue, develop social and emotional skills, and internalise the habits of intelligent behaviour.

8. ‘Dialogic assessment’. Fisher argues for an unconventional conceptualisation of assessment. He contends that learners’ writing or the tasks they are supposed to complete inside and outside classrooms do not display the extent to which their learning has progressed. He advocates for such recent assessment teacher practices as discussing with learners what they have learnt and what they might need to do in order to become better learners. This kind of dialogic approach can increase learners’ self-awareness and autonomy. Laying out his arguments, Fisher explores the stages of dialogic assessment.
9. ‘The dialogic future’ discusses the necessity to bring children to focus on their creative future, face environmental challenges, create possible and better worlds and develop dialogue in a techno-world.9

However, the methodology of *Philosophy for Children* does not need visuality as the basis for multimodal education. *Philosophy for Children* is based on verbal activity and its aim is critical and creative thinking. But, step by step the multimodal education project has been integrated into the programme of *Philosophy for Children*.

3. How Can a Thought be Drawn?

Lipman had the idea of including a literary text for educating critical and creative thinking and wrote literary stories for his own textbooks. The same idea was followed by the Lithuanian philosopher of education Rasa Aškinytė, who used to participate in Sharp’s seminars in the USA. She wrote a textbook for primary classes and a book of methodological instructions for teachers with the same title: *Philosophy for Children*. The main protagonist in the textbook is a little boy Kostas, and every topic starts with a suggested discussion and reflection on some episode from his life. For example, an experiment with the language conjunction ‘if’, meaning supposing, starts with a situation from Kostas’ sixth birthday. In his thoughts, Kostas is experimenting with supposing: ‘What would happen, if...’ Aškinytė encourages paradoxical thinking very close to that in Lewis Caroll’s book *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* (1865), which stimulates experimentation with intellectual imagination. Kostas demonstrates the paradoxical reasoning that questions the possibilities of reality. Kostas writes:

If children never celebrated their birthdays, they would never grow up. If children never ate sweets, the sweets would eat children. If children never dreamed, their dreams would be dreamed by elephants. If children never thought, they would lose their heads. If children were able to fly, there would be no need for storks to bring them. If houses were round, mother would not have been able to punish them by making them stand in a corner.10

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Later Kostas said: “Nice word ‘if’. I would like my name to be ‘If’. I am not Kostas. I am If. Then If crawls out from a place under the bed and says: ‘I am If. And You are Kostas.'”  

The end of the story returns to reality. By initiating the discussion, however, the conjunction “if” prolongs the game of paradoxical thinking.

Aškinytė further extends this possibility for broadening the limits of imagination by suggesting a literary text for children not to discuss verbally, but to draw visually. The textbook is divided into segments with the suggestion: “Please draw Kostas here”; “Please draw ‘if’ here”; “Please draw any event from the story.” The tasks encourage the development of children’s rhizomic thinking, forking in different directions. The fourth suggestion redirects the child to the task of writing and encourages flexibility in meta-thinking: “Please write what you have drawn here.” The task starts from the literary story, from the written text, then turns towards the visualisation of the story and afterwards to a written verbal reflection on what has been done. This path is entirely independent for each child, who creates the object from the written story, names the object and mentally discusses this path independently. Up to this point, the child is not involved in discussion with others.

The next tasks do not follow on from the previous one and deconstruct learning as a linear process. The task “Please draw any phenomenon of nature” does not follow from this particular episode and creates space for the alternative of rhizomic forked thinking. Neither does the following suggestion correlate with the main story: “Please draw what would have happened if the water in the sea turned into jam.” This task suggests further development of the visualisation of paradoxical thinking. All the children’s drawings are then displayed in the class. The teacher is also encouraged to draw a version and to hang the picture near the others, observing that this exercise helps to cultivate abstract thinking and the children’s imagination. In addition, this exercise helps to develop tolerance for the unknown and obscurity – a child has to overcome fear and draw the character ‘if’ from the story, which means drawing something the child has never seen and which does not even exist. This is much more difficult than drawing real things.

The task subsequently suggests that all the children should discuss their own work providing reasons (argumentation) why they drew that kind of picture. If a child replies in such ways as: “I do not know,” “It seems to me,” “I am drawing what I want,” help to construct the answer. It is also possible to ask other children to help their friend, which teaches

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11 Ibid.
12 Aškinytė, Filosofija vaikams. Užduočių knyga pradininkams, 21.
them to cooperate. Aškinytė also suggests not only drawing the ideas, but also making applications, modelling them in plasticine.

4. Philosophy for Children and Picturebooks

The Irish teacher and scientist Mary Roche followed Lipman’s methodology of *Philosophy for Children*, which Philomena Donnelly put into practice in Irish schools. She saw the aim of this education process as the development of critical thinking. She succeeded afterwards in integrating into this programme the practice of reading high-quality picture-books. Her own trend in education is titled *Critical Thinking and Book Talk* (CT & BT). This experience is reflected in *Developing Children’s Critical Thinking through Picturebooks* (2015). The followers of this programme believe that no one needs to write new texts because the impulses for stimulating children’s critical thinking are already present in high-quality picture-books. One needs only to learn how to read them attentively and critically. On the other hand, she proposes that the illustrations in these books should be studied, reflected on and discussed very attentively, even meditatively. Roche discerned two possible stages of reading classical books: uncritical and critical. During the uncritical stage, the readers simply enjoy the pleasure of reading. During the critical period, they learn to read between the lines and to ‘generate alternative explanations’.

I wanted to encourage them to take an active role in questioning and challenging their own and each other’s views, as well as critically examining books, and the overt and covert ideologies and messages about life and living that they might contain: in short I wanted my students to become critically literate agents in their own learning. Roche further develops the theme of the importance of critical thinking and the conception of children as theorists, as curious and unique thinkers, taken from the programme *Philosophy for Children*. She writes: “CT&BT can involve children in philosophizing.” She emphasises the importance of open questions, with the beginning “I wonder why…,” “What if we were…” and “What would happen if….” In her opinion, by exposing children to rich texts and pictures, they are encouraged to ask questions and to speculate:

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13 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 107.
I wonder why the illustrator shows us the boy’s back rather than his face; I wonder why the illustration has a frame around it; I wonder why the illustrator put a cage on the title page.\textsuperscript{16}

She discusses several hypotheses concerning the importance of high-quality literature for educating children: it broadens the individual experience of life; it helps children to connect with their cultural and historical context; it helps to develop children’s aesthetic taste. A very significant part of her methodology is reading aloud in class. For the development of the children’s literacy, a very important event is parents reading aloud for their children. Yet researchers show that in Ireland and Great Britain eighteen percent of pupils come to school without having heard their parents read aloud. The interactive reading of picturebooks in class, combined with discussion, stimulates quicker development of literacy and vocabulary.

The author raises the following question: which is more important when reading: illustrations first and text afterwards, or \textit{vice versa}. She discerns two different types of books: the ‘illustrated story’ or ‘illustrated book’, and the ‘picturebook’, and chooses to refer to them by the one word ‘picturebooks’, not as other possible alternatives such as ‘picture book’ or ‘picturebook’. She considers that reading pictures can require the same complex process as reading texts, even more complex.

The pictures and text in good picturebooks should complement each other in a special way, each leaving gaps for the reader to fill, perhaps even telling different narratives, and demanding different types of analyses and comprehension.\textsuperscript{17}

When the two symbolic systems work together, enjoyment and stimulation are doubled. This understanding makes the process of reading the visual texts of the same importance as reading the verbal texts. Roche argues that it is very important for children to realise that in a good quality picturebook the picture and text have been pared down to the essence, and the pictures have been very carefully constructed. Nothing is there by accident. There are also ‘wordless’ or ‘pictures only’ picturebooks in which the pictures alone carry the main meaning. Roche says, that

making meaning from these books is rarely linear or straightforward. Wordless picturebooks are usually very complex and multilayered…In a recent workshop a group of teachers agreed

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 113.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 101.
that a very high level of comprehension was needed for making meaning from wordless picturebooks.\footnote{Ibid., 102.}

They can be read using a variety of approaches: whole-class ‘reading’ where the images are projected for all to see; small group or pair work or individual work followed by a plenary so that ideas can be shared.\footnote{Ibid., 103.}

At the end of the book, Roche presents a list of the high-quality picturebooks she refers to in her research, but they are suitable only for the children of one particular culture. Every society has its own list of high-quality picturebooks. Some can be translations but presented to the children in their native language. Such a paradigmatic book for myself was a picturebook about the dog Pifas\footnote{Pifo nuotykiai, trans. J. Stukas (Vilnius: Valstybinë grožinės literatūros leidykla, 1959).} translated from French to Russian, illustrated there and afterwards translated into Lithuanian. Being four or five years old at the time, without being able to read the book I knew by heart all the text related to the pictures. The experience of having it read to me by my parents was exciting. This image often comes to my mind in some adult life situations. Sometimes when tired I say to myself: “I do feel like Pifas when peeling potatoes.” A very particular example can be books written and illustrated by the same person. An example is \textit{Miraculous Berry (Stebuklinga spanguolė)} by Jurga Ivanauskaitë, written in the manner of Lewis Carrol’s \textit{Alice in Wonderland}. This picturebook stimulates creative and critical thinking, and the events happening to the main heroes transcend the limits of concrete reality. On the other hand, the picturebook has very clear didactic intentions. Its main character is The Queen Giant – us enveloping universe. The book can also be used for encouraging ecological thinking. We suggest that teachers create their own lists of high-quality picture-books suitable for children of different age groups. For students in the course \textit{Philosophy for Children}, future primary school teachers, I suggest as one of the tasks to choose different excerpts from Sergey Kozlov’s book, \textit{Little Hedgehog in the Fog},\footnote{Sergej Kozlov, \textit{Ežiukas rūke}, trans. Dalia Saukaitytë (Vilnius: Nieko rimta, 2010).} and to decide for what particular topic it could be used and what open questions can be suggested for further discussion relying on selected text from the book. The book is published in Lithuanian (translation from Russian) and has no pictures. The second task proposed for the same students is to watch the animated cartoon by Jurij Norstain with the same title \textit{Little Hedgehog in the Fog},\footnote{Animation by Yuri Norstein, “Hedgehog in the Fog” (1975).} which is based on one story from the book. The students must decide what topic the animation would be suitable for, what open questions they might suggest in order to engage discussion,
and what different things the pupils could discern independently according to their second reflection (meta-level). The second step would be to compare the ‘written’ and ‘animated’ Little Hedgehog. Have they something in common? Or maybe they differ? If so, then how? Does it depend on the difference between the two creators – Kozlov and Norstein? Or between the specifics of a written text and an animated cartoon?

5. Film as a Text in Dialogical Talking and Thinking

In Dialogic Readers: Children Talking and Thinking Together about Visual Texts, Fiona Maine starts by presenting part of an experiment where two six-year-old boys are discussing a film they had watched together, Baboon on the Moon. The two children were asked to discuss what the film is ‘all about’ and ask questions. She records some moments of their verbal exchange on video. Her central thesis is that even primary-school-aged children are able to jointly construct meaning through dialogue. She relies on the Bakhtin notion of a continual iterative motion of understanding when meanings change as they move back and forth between speakers. This creates the dialogical space of possibility or ‘Inter-Mental Creative Zone’. Unlike Philosophy for Children and Mary Roche’s methodology, based on a dialogue as polylogue in a round-circle group, Maine’s experiment relies on the real meaning of dialogue: the intercourse between two speakers. Unlike Roche, who relies only on picturebooks, and Aškinytė, who, like Lipman, relies on her own written texts, Maine suggests short films in addition to written texts and picturebooks as a challenge for dialogical creative thinking.

At the heart of her study is the concept of comprehension and the role of language in the co-construction of meaning. She discerns two slightly different points concerning meaning-making.

On the one hand, meaning-making can be seen as interpretation, suggesting that all experiences/perceptions are assigned meaning by the receiver. Gergen, on the other hand, is describing meaning-making as the creation of meaning to be communicated, suggesting that this cannot happen in a vacuum and must involve the respondent.

24 Christopher Duriez (2003).
26 Ibid., 15.
To reflect on multimodal education, one needs to turn towards semiotics. She recognises Halliday’s idea that

The distinctive feature characteristic of human learning is that it is a process of meaning-making – a semiotic process, and the prototypical form of human semiotics is language. Hence the ontogenesis of language is at the same time the ontogenesis of learning.27

However, Maine challenges Halliday’s rather strict assumption that there is no learning without language. The children in her book are engaged in discussions about films, books and pictures. She describes reading as a meaning-making process, a co-constructive comprehension event which necessarily hinges on the interaction between children discussing texts together, and also on the way they interact with the texts themselves.28 For Maine, the concept of reading includes not only reading texts with words since the same reading happens when one is reading film. Whilst the technical codes are different, there are many narrative features that transcend the text mode, and we draw on the same strategies to make meaning from them.29 What are these strategies?

To comprehend the text more fully, we predict what is going to happen, we ask questions of the texts in order to explore meanings, we empathize with the characters and imagine ourselves in the story, and we make connections to situations we know, or to other stories that we have encountered. This process is the same, whether we are reading a film or reading a book; we just use different ‘clues’ to support our mental image of meaning.30

Bibliography


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27 Ibid., 17.
28 Ibid., 14.
30 Ibid.
1. Sound in Multimodality: Kress, van Leeuwen, Barthes

Gunther Kress, a professor of Semiotics and Education, made a major contribution to developing multimodal education theory and practice based on semiotics. Both alone and with colleagues, he broadened the language-centred focus in order to demonstrate the interrelation between language and other modalities of communication. Despite his deep analysis of multimodality, together with his colleagues Carey Jewitt, Jon Ogborn, and Tsatsarelis Charalambos, he paid a great deal of attention to teaching and learning in written material *Multimodal Teaching and Learning*, claiming that for them

learning is a perpetually transformative action of sign-making through which students are involved in the active ‘remaking’ of teachers’ (and others’) signs according to the context of the lesson, and the different interests of the teacher and students.¹

Developing Halliday’s social theory of communication, they step out from the language centred approach turning to other media such as visual and audio. They analyse meaning-making systems in these separate modes, taking into account that communication and exchanges take place in different communities, are dependent on the peculiarities of the context, and are especially differentiated in academic groups or lower educational contexts, and in different groups of disciplines. They gave practical examples in science education. The researchers argue that

a multimodal and social semiotic approach starts from the position that visual communication, gesture and action have evolved through their social usage into articulated or partially articulated semiotic systems in the same way that language has.²

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² Ibid., 53.
This team of scholars gives practical advice for science education, while Andrew Burn and David Parker in *Analyzing Media Texts* provide frameworks for social sciences and educational research by expanding conceptions of literacy. These scholars also work with Kress’ theoretical framework and with the structure of semiotic analysis proposed by Theo van Leeuwen, who collaborated with Kress.

The basis for understanding signs and meaning-making in semiotics is given in van Leeuwen’s *Speech, Music, Sound*. Writing about different modes, he stresses sound: sound in speech, sound in relation to films, sound in music, and especially music in films. He says:

A semiotics of sound should describe sound as a semiotic resource offering its users a rich array of semiotic choices, not as a rule book telling you what to do, or how to use sound ‘correctly’. To create a usable catalogue you need usable headings, and that means classifying.

In this way, he tries to create ‘a usable catalogue’ for classification in a systemic-functional approach.

van Leeuwen distinguished sound and image media, finding their common peculiarities, especially the relations between the subject they represent and the receiver they address and their dependence on distance. That implies the markable role of social distance. This is described in the medias mentioned below using different words; in other words, van Leeuwen creates a classification dependent on social distance. In image: close shot, medium shot, long shot and in sound: foreground, mid-ground, back-ground (used according to the Raymond Murray Schafer classification) or immediate, support, background.

In addition to trying to map sound and image in space, there are other very important aspects: time and pitch. How sound is measured, how it is expressed in time, and which rhythm is constructed. From this point of view, it can be measured and unmeasured, and also has its own pitch or its own perception in distance; it can be loud or soft. van Leeuwen again cites Schafer who described hearing sound in a different environment and at a different distance in these words: “The hi-fi soundscape is one in which discrete sounds can be heard clearly because of the low

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5 Ibid., 6.
6 Ibid., 12.
7 Ibid., 16.
ambient noise level,” and “In a lo-fi soundscape individual acoustic signals are obscured in an overdense population of sounds.” In a lo-fi soundscape, the signal and noise are not easily distinguished, there is “an overpopulation of sounds,” very far from quiet. And there is no perspective, only presence. All separate sounds are masked by a broad spectrum of noise. Schafer’s idea was in fact to create a positive study programme for listening and perceiving the acoustic environment, to discover how to preserve it, encourage or multiply.

van Leeuwen adopted Schafer’s classification of sound, dividing the groups as Figure (sound signal), Ground (keynote sound) and Field (soundscape), and decided to change it by trying to escape hierarchization where one group of sounds is more important than the other. First of all, because sound in van Leeuwen’s words is dynamic, it changes position and also our perception. It can be perceived as mixed sound, without separation into hi-fi and lo-fi, sound and noise. More importantly, for van Leeuwen sounds are actions, not things or a representation of things. We can suppose that here he is influenced directly by Alan Lomax (ethnographer, musician and anthropologist, working with non-European music, describing unstructured sound and extreme heterogeneity and diffuseness, and the creation of heterophonic effects), whom he cites as often as he cites Schafer, looking in the same way for his own way of understanding sound.

Nevertheless, van Leeuwen gives excellent examples of structural semiotic analysis, for example the sonic interaction schema of Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess, the system network for describing melodies in the film The Piano and also the schema of the sound-quality system network for Madonna’s singing voice. His attention is directed not to separate sounds, but to analysing sound in relation to image, in his cases with movement-image or films. He therefore gives film soundtrack analyses, the interrelation of voice, sound and music (audio) and, on the other hand, actions in films, dialogues and melodies. van Leeuwen observes that

Until recently most film-makers paid little attention to sound, concentrating mainly on ‘clean’ dialogue and ‘sync’ effects. Sound effects were ‘slaved’ to the picture, just as sound effects

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10 Ibid., 93.
11 Ibid., 85.
12 Ibid., 151.
in the urban environment are ‘slaved’ to the machinical processes that cause them.\textsuperscript{13}

With the extract from *The Piano*, he demonstrates a different form of access. He finds a new function of sound in film, not only providing the sense of ‘presence’, but supporting the soundtrack and at the same time image with special effect.

Sound effects of the creaking and groaning of timber and of the soft sighing and deep mysterious rumbling of the ocean can thus become as telling and emotionally affective as music.\textsuperscript{14}

For the analysis of what sound does in a performance, van Leeuwen referred to the arguments of Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva on the materiality of the sign, the peculiarities in coding of voice quality and timbre in comparison to how it is done in music; in other words a reinterpretation of language (speech) and music and how they affect the listener and viewer. He finds that meaning and emotion are inseparable:

The ‘grain of the voice’, he argues,

affects the listener in a completely personal, even quasi-erotic way, providing pleasure and escaping the semiotic and the social. Barthes’ and Kristeva’s reinstatement of the affective dimensions of language and music was important and timely. However, perhaps it only reversed the polarities and placed on a pedestal what earlier had been marginalized as ‘mere’ performance. Sound never just ‘expresses’ or ‘represents’, it always also, and at the same time, affects us. The two cannot and should not be separated and opposed to each other, especially not in the case of sound. There is always both the social and the personal, both meaning and pleasure – or displeasure. The difference lies in how we value the social and the personal, or meaning and pleasure, and in the degree to which we acknowledge their unavoidable interconnections.\textsuperscript{15}

Barthes himself explains that in some cases the evaluation gets out of control, showing far more aspects of perception than could somehow be very clearly classified, and at least leaving room for some indescribable,

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 128.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
imperceptible or more precisely very subtly perceived aspects of a performance, and also grasping the new message. He says:

The ‘grain’ is the body in the voice as it sings, the hand as it writes, the limb as it performs. If I perceive the ‘grain’ in a piece of music and accord this ‘grain’ a theoretical value (the emergence of the text in the work), I inevitably set up a new scheme of evaluation which will certainly be individual – I am determined to listen to my relation with the body of the man or woman singing or playing and that relation is erotic – but in no way ‘subjective’ (it is not the psychological ‘subject’ in me who is listening; the climactic pleasure hoped for is not going to reinforce – to express – that subject but, on the contrary, to lose it). The evaluation will be made outside of any law, out-playing not only the law of culture but equally that of anti-culture, developing beyond the subject all the value hidden behind ‘I like’ or ‘I don’t like’.16

Nevertheless, in some notes on the image in Ivan the Terrible (1944) and in others on some of Sergei Eisenstein’s stills, Barthes specifies signification and distinguishes three levels of meaning: an informational, a symbolic and a third meaning. If the second meaning is obvious, the third is supplementary, in Barthes’ words, ‘obtuse’. It opens ‘the field of meaning totally, that is infinitely’.17 Most interesting is Barthes remark and reference to the classical paradigm of the five senses, where the third is related to hearing and listening. This is related to Eisenstein’s films and the appearance of special sound in films. With admiration, Barthes cites Eisenstein’s thoughts that:

Art begins the moment the creaking of a boot on the soundtrack occurs against a different visual shot and thus gives rise to corresponding associations. It is the same with colour: colour begins where it no longer corresponds to natural colouration…18

In other words, this third or obtuse meaning could be described according to Barthes as Japanese haiku and desire for meaning, meaning that allows for expanding the historical, political, and cultural context.

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18 Ibid., 327.
Although this seems to be a quite liberated understanding of the third meaning of image in relation to sound, another master of semiotics, Julius Greimas, a Lithuanian living and creating in France, when describing the work of his colleague Barthes in *Le Quotidien de Paris* (an interview with Philippe Manier in 1986), noted that Barthes (especially at the beginning of the semiotic school) did a great deal to develop semiotics in the direction of demythification, i.e., to show things as they are, not as they appear.\(^{19}\) His pretension to open truth was very ambitious. In Greimas’ view, semiotics later turned towards the development of values, trying to describe what humans should be in the future, not what they are today, and also to expanding the limits of cognition. But in general, on the question of what semiotics does, Greimas answered:

We worry about everything, the object of our research is anyone, and we want to prepare ‘metallanguage’, universally applicable. We search to unite knowledge, instead of change it as is sometimes attached to us.\(^{20}\)

Greimas’ explanation of Barthes’ approach to semiotic creation, as well as the approach of Greimas himself, was grounded on very strict semiotic analysis, moving to a quite liberal position towards signs and their representation, thus leaving a lot of room for a much broader interpretation of signification and communication.

Coming back from the two ‘Grands’ of semiotics and their arguments on the question of sound modality in van Leeuwen’s book, we find that he tended to use the principle of image modality, going beyond linguistic modality. In the case of sound modality, van Leeuwen applies the same understanding of truth representation in sound, stating that:

The term ‘modality’ refers to the degree of truth assigned to a given sound event. The term ‘truth’ takes on a somewhat different meaning depending on whether it pertains to presentation or representation. In the case of representation, ‘truth’ means ‘a true representation of the people, places and/or things represented’, in the case of presentation it means ‘true to the spirit of the genre, and the values which underpin it in its context’.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{20}\) Ibid., 94.

He separated two key concepts: modality configuration and coding orientation, which he distinguished together with his colleague Kress. For the modality configuration analysis he listed some articulatory parameters, which helps to judge modality: Pitch extent is a scale running from monotone to a maximally wide pitch range; Durational variety is a scale running from a single standard length of sound for all the sounds of a sound event to a maximally varied range of durations; Dynamic range is a scale running from a single level of loudness to a maximally wide loudness range; Perceptual depth is a scale running from a ‘flat’ representation (‘Figure’ only, and no ‘Ground’ and/or ‘Field’) to maximum articulation of the ‘setting’ (that is ‘Ground’ and/or ‘Field’); Fluctuation range is a scale running from a completely steady sound to maximally deep and/or rapid fluctuation; Friction range is a scale running from maximally smooth to maximally rough sound; Absorption range is a scale running from maximally dry to maximally spacious, reverberating and resonant sound; Degree of directionality is a scale running from the sounds whose sources are most easy to pinpoint to the sounds whose sources are least easy to pinpoint. The question of sound quality is resolved arguing that it is multidimensional, a combination of different features that all help define what the sound quality presents or represents. Key sound quality features include (i) tension; (ii) roughness; (iii) breathiness; (iv) loudness; (v) pitch register; (vi) vibrato and (vii) nasality. And coding orientation helps to analyse all these features in different contexts. Modality configuration thus depends on the choice of a particular kind of modality preferred in the given context.

All these parameters, codes, and configurations are the main instruments for semiotic and multimodal analysis, nevertheless they are not the only instruments used for multimodal understanding and application in education. There is another access to multimodality, which is developed in the Deleuzoguattarian sense. Neither Deleuze nor Guattari pretended to give a multimodal explanation, but their philosophy can nevertheless open new gates to understanding the link between different medias, especially in arts. This mode was adopted by many scholars whose popularity is still growing. As a bridge, one can find semiology, which was also cultivated as a more liberal trend in comparison with semiotics, though both are very close. A more radical approach towards semiotics, which we treat as moving beyond semiotics, appeared in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. Inna Semetsky tries to build a bridge between semiotics and the Deleuzoguattarian philosophy of education. In the article

22 Ibid., 181.
23 Ibid., 140.
24 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN/London: The University of Minnesota Press, 1987); also
“Deleuze, Edusemiotics, and the Logic of Affects,” she notes that edusemiotics “addresses the value of experiential knowledge, partaking of the practical art of interpreting signs and is irreducible to preconceived theoretical judgement.” Following Gary Genosko, she discusses Deleuzoguattarian semiotics, describing it as a “conceptual mix of Peirce’s relational logic and Hjelmslev’s linguistics, both frameworks opposing Saussurean semiology.” Semetsky relates this Deleuzoguattarian semiotics to process-ontology and the logic of conjunctions And, And, And, which also means the logic of multiplicities. This means that every And forms a new sign and sets a new direction of moving. It is this infinite process and linkage of elements at different levels that is named transversality. In Semetsky’s words, citing Deleuze, he understands semiotics as a-signifying, that is, as defying a presupposed signifier-signified identity. His emphasis is on the dynamical and triadic nature of signs, that is, their having an ‘increasingly intimate’ relation with their enfolded meanings which are never given, but depend on signs entering into “surface organization which ensures the resonance of two series” thereby converging on a paradoxical differentiator, which becomes “both word and object at once.” Returning to music, sound and multimodal pedagogy, we find that, according to the Deleuzoguattarian view, each motif serves as a motif for another, each sign serves as a sign for another, drawing connections, different lines and opening zones of in-betweenness. Consequently, the knowledge and multiplicity of connections among different experiences, thoughts and sensations is increased.

2. Schafer’s Theory of Soundscape: In and Out Semiotics

Raymond Murray Schafer, mentioned above, one of the best-known musicians, composers and music theoreticians, created many new concepts for sound and music analysis and his ideas also extended into pedagogy. He is sometimes cited by semioticians and sometimes also by those who have moved from semiotics towards a new understanding and different perception of signs in multimodality. His best-known concept is soundscape, which differs from landscape, because “soundscape consists of events heard not objects seen” and can be treated as an acoustic field

26 Ibid., 215.
27 Ibid., 221.
of study. Nevertheless, in his view, catching sound is not as easy as fixing an image in photography. He constructs a schema with distinct features for soundscape analysis and established The World Soundscape Project (WSP) for broader analysis and practice. Schafer gives some very good examples from painting and music in the past, especially from the beginning of the twentieth century, and declares the evolution of art from a stable state with easily recognizable universal values – Apollonian – into Dionysian, which is dynamic, and in his view becomes hedonistic. This is related to the move from the individual to mass production and machinery. Nevertheless, as he misses a kind of order and human control over industrial development, he is preoccupied with elaborating instruments for perceiving acoustic balance in the environment, developing the ability to be an earwitness, to work on acoustic design in an interdisciplinary perspective and to find the ‘tuning secret’ in the world. In this respect, he distinguishes three main features of soundscape. Keynote sounds, which “do not have to be listened to consciously; they are overhead but cannot be overlooked, for keynote sounds become listening habits in spite of themselves” and the fact that “they are ubiquitously there suggests the possibility of deep and pervasive influence on our behaviors and mood.”29 Keynote sounds can be environmental sounds such as the wind, birds, forest etc. The other distinct group is signals. “They are foreground sounds and they are listened to consciously”; they are listened to because they “constitute acoustic warning devices: bells, whistles, horns and sirens.”30 They transmit a clear message. Finally, the third group is soundmarks. They “refer to a community sound which is unique or possesses qualities which make it especially regarded or noticed by the people in the community.”31 Since these sounds make the community unique, they are usually protected by the community. In general, similarly to semioticians, he claims that:

The sounds of the environment have referential meanings. For the soundscape researcher they are not merely abstract acoustical events, but must be investigated as acoustic signs, signals and symbols…32

He therefore classifies sounds in two ways: first trying to separate pleasant from unpleasant sounds, to clarify different meanings – aesthetic and semantic – of the same sound, and second seeing their composition as a sonic event and a ‘plastic mold of time’.

29 Ibid., 9.
30 Ibid., 10.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 169.
David Holland investigated 7-11 year-old students to determine how they hear, listen, and perceive sound and how they experiment, record, and create their own compositions, and in this way found a great deal of potential for fostering student creativity. Both in his writings and his experiments he followed Schafer’s theory, and, placing importance on everyday sounds (at home, in the office, on the street and in the general surroundings), suggested using the concept of acoustic ecology, which proposes establishing a relationship with sound, examines the influence of sound on society and explores what can be changed for the better in making a differently sounding environment. He invites us to close our eyes and open our ears, and following Schafer (1977/1994) describes three main features and approaches in order to understand the soundscape to identify: (1) the landscape and its fundamental tone, (2) the signals which attract attention, and (3) the soundmark, derived from the landmark, which is important for a particular locality and community. He asks why teaching listening is not included in school curricula. Why do we work mostly on visual understanding, avoiding sound perception? Similarly to Schafer, he cares about sound ecology in the school environment as well as the understanding of sound. In his view, the ability to listen and the ability to hear everything also produces a counterability: not to hear everything. In this way, skills necessary to manage sound perception and the soundscape are fostered.

According to Schafer, sound reaching our ears can be a pollutant like any other contaminant in our surroundings and can influence them in the same way as bad weather does. The sound can be recognized but first of all must be heard. In his view, we usually ignore noise because we are not sufficiently prepared to listen to it. “Noise pollution today is being resisted by noise abatement.” That he treats as a negative approach. To educate in another ecological way, the teacher, or any other adult related to teaching, has to create the opportunity to listen to sounds, especially by using walking in the countryside and in the forest as well as in the town. Again following Schafer, Holland recommends listening to sounds and silence, to later find names for sounds, to describe them, to write poems about sounds, to create maps, to make records, to add electronic modification. He already practiced all these methods with students: walk-

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33 David Holland, “Heightened Listening: A Creative Tool for Opening Ears and Minds to Sound Based Music,” in Open Ears-Open Minds: Listening and Understanding Music, eds. Oliver Kramer and Isolde Malmberg (Innsbruck, Austria: Helbling, 2016), 201-221.
Sound and Listening, then creating maps, drawings, poems, electronic compositions etc. Providing more evidence, Holland\textsuperscript{36} describes not only his own experiment following Schafer’s theory, but also experiments carried out by colleagues and teachers in other countries (Canada, UK), and like many other pedagogues he appreciates the Cagean point of view on sound. In his view, the method of honing the ear and listening is not only the music teacher’s duty but should also be understood by other teachers and integrated into all other subjects. This should ensure better understanding of the harmony of the world and a proper perception of the teaching material, which is very often multimodal with integrated audio; it should also encourage greater attention to small details and creative thinking and doing.

Nevertheless, there is another position that does not extol Schafer’s theory but rather criticizes it. Ari Y. Kelman\textsuperscript{37} thinks in a much more radical way and criticizes the interpretation of Shafer’s theory found in the texts of most sound specialists and theoreticians. Schafer’s concepts, according to Kelman, became very popular for teaching and understanding sound in the cultural and social context, sound perception, listening and design. In his view, however, scholars who follow Schafer do not always properly understand his theory. Kelman interprets Schafer’s ‘soundscape’, the definition and understanding of which appeared as the central concept in his reprinted book \textit{The Soundscape} (1994) after \textit{The Tuning of the World} (1977). The concept left a lot of room for broader interpretations. Kelman argues that:

Schafer’s soundscape is not a neutral field of aural investigation at all; rather it is deeply informed by Schafer’s own preferences for certain sounds over others. \textit{The Soundscape} is a prescriptive text that is often referred to as a descriptive one.\textsuperscript{38}

The last sentence of the quote is not original, as the critique had already been mentioned by other sound investigators who we will discuss later. In Kelman’s view, Schafer “heard noise and wanted to hear silence.”\textsuperscript{39} Schafer did not like urban traffic and was not sufficiently familiar with it. He needed to hear an ‘environmental symphony’ instead of ‘noise pollution’. How can noise be avoided? Can it be transformed? Can

\textsuperscript{36} Holland, “Acoustic Ecology and its Role in Education: Learning to Listen to the Soundscape.”


\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 214.

\textsuperscript{39} Kelman, “Rethinking the Soundscape. A Critical Genealogy of a Key Term in Sound Studies,” 216.
it be listened to in another way? Or is there just one way – to stop and listen to it? Asking the questions Kelman criticizes Schafer’s pretension to find harmony, his done distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’, and also the unnatural distance between makers of sounds and their listeners, which creates the situation of a schizophrenic.

Schafer’s notion of schizophonia circularly suggests that all sounds encountered ‘out of place’ become troubling, anxious, and noisy by virtue of their being heard out of place. Eclectic audition, he warns, will lead to social confusion.40

According to Kelman, Schafer was insufficiently attentive to the social and cultural context and its changes. Even background noise, according to Schafer, should first be reduced to silence, although the new modern cultural context requires that one be much more open and listen to background noise as sounds, to perceive it as sounds, not as noise. Taking into account many of Kelman’s arguments, our critique of Kelman is his excessive emphasis on the cultural context, and the insufficient attention he pays to the affects in the environment, where sound and listening can be heterogeneous elements of different level of the same sound machine or machine of creation.41

Artist-educator Adam Tinkle42 also criticizes Schafer’s theory in a different but similar way, recognizing his limitations in sound and especially noise interpretation, with reference also to listening, but on the other hand agreeing with him that it is extremely difficult to avoid having a preconceived skill of listening from former experience in education. In any case, this influences the listener in his perception. Tinkle writing about sound pedagogy paid a lot of attention to teaching listening, especially after the cultural move following John Cage and his composition 4’33. According to Tinkle: “Sound pedagogy resonates with Critical pedagogy discourse: both claim to offer anti-repressive knowledge, a means towards liberation from entrenched systems of knowledge/power.”43 He also outlines that

sound pedagogy functions are a critique of the narrow and parochial public address of art music – with the Western classics presumably squarely in the crosshairs – that assume and require

40 Ibid., 219.
43 Ibid., 222.
a rarefied cultural competence to be understood (let alone to be composed and performed). 44

Sound pedagogy is different from music pedagogy and related to the authentic and immediate experience of listening to the surrounding world, in other words – world sounding. In Tinkle’s view, sound pedagogy necessarily works with ‘ear cleaning’, as emphasized by Schafer and Cage. With a soft critique of Schafer, Tinkle finds many similarities between the theoretical positions of Cage 45 and Schafer. He observed the emphasis both musicians placed not only on attention to the full range of sounds and the perception of special sounds and their artistic possibilities, but especially on the need to have clean ears to perceive the sounds. Tinkle described lessons of cultural deprogramming of sound pedagogy, letting sounds ‘be themselves’, instead of being perceived according to some school of listening, which in most cases is an organized representation of power by those who approve the system of aesthetical perception. Despite many examples of sound pedagogy lessons, he comes to the conclusion that cleaning the ear is always related to some earlier practices and traditions, and therefore we should not be radical or spend time declaring absolute differences in the perception of sound in post-Cagean listening. Tinkle discussion and conclusion is close to the discussion of Deleuzian interpreters about standing music or sound on its own. Probably the best explanation of how a sound can stay on its own is given in the examples of Sean Higgins, 46 who erases the difference between actual and virtual, or structured and non-structured sound and noise that is on its way to actualization and formation as it comes to our ear. Traditional ‘structured listening’ is supplanted by Cagean ‘sudden listening’ and opens up a much broader space for the interpretation of meaning as well as for the traveling of sound. Deleuze himself was not very interested in listening but much more in sound expression, which allowed his followers to talk about sound itself. Nevertheless, many sound teachers use the theory of Schafer, who suggests that lectures on listening can be mixed with lectures on making sound, though both actions are separate in their origin and practice. This differs from Deleuzian indifference towards argumentation of the border between listening and expression. Tinkle also follows the great example of Schafer, who devalues this binary of listener/maker. He proposes coming to listening and creating at first through a period of

44 Ibid., 222-223.
silence, and in this sense his attention to silence is rather similar to Cage’s position of waiting, although at the same time it differs a little from the perspective of evaluating the silence. Schafer says: “All research into sound must conclude with silence – not the silence of negative vacuum, but the positive silence of perfection and fulfilment.”47 That statement sounds like a preconceived notion. Tinkle criticizes Schafer’s pedagogy for training the ear and for the ‘acoustic design’, which stands outside the natural, primordial perception of sound. In Schafer’s words:

The true acoustic designer must thoroughly understand the environment he is tackling; he must have training in acoustics, psychology, sociology, music, and a great deal more…48

With these words, Schafer can be treated not as being open to experiments and inventions starting from zero, but on the contrary still as a traditional thinker. Nevertheless, Steph Ceraso49 finds in Schafer’s acoustic design many advantages for developing multimodal listening through fully multimodal sensory engagement and affectation of body, and in that way trying to diminish the borders between the still traditional and the new.

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48 Ibid., 206.
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Chapter 10
Sound, Noise and Voice: *Beyond* Semiotics

LILJA DUOBLIENĖ

1. Noise and Silence: The Problem of Perception

Noise analysis already has a long history and has been understood and interpreted in different ways. Noise is usually understood as unpleasant sound, as being negative: “unwanted, other, not something ordered.”¹ It is mostly related to the perception and education of the listener, which is why Paul Hegarty, following Jean-Luc Nancy, emphasizes that the problem of hearing has been neglected within Western philosophy, as has the difference between listening and hearing. Despite the history of noise found in literature, depending on the cultural codes of different times, there is a move from culture stemming from silence towards culture influenced by machines and urban noise, and noise has also started to be rethought in a social perspective. Its definition has been reshaped in relation to the regime of society, in other words, by those who control the understanding of culture. The elitist element of society treated music and sound differently than did the lower classes living in a world where noise, especially from factories, is part of their everyday experience. For one part of society, noise was just normal sound. This perception comes from living permanently with background noise and transforming it into sound that is normal, and recognizable through habits of hearing. Theodor Adorno² and Jacques Attali³ did a great deal for the reflection of noise in culture. How can sound and noise be understood in the perspective of resistance to mass culture and within mass culture, and what is the meaning of silence, which were investigated in the compositions of Cage?

In my research, I take into account on the one hand the position of Rowland Atkinson:

> We live in an era of war between calm and noise, where some groups articulate the need or legitimacy of certain types of noise

(such as airports and clubs) while others lobby for quiet and calm (neighbourhood forums and institutes of the deaf).4

He declares an ‘ambient turn’, and his investigations seem to be an invitation for greater sensitivity towards urban sound and the construction of spaces, as well as examining the influence of sound on the human body. It is clear that noise pollution is one of the contemporary challenges, which is why I would endorse the position of Hegarty, who is interested in human hearing of noise, and human cultures display a variety we can understand more clearly than the range of sound ecologies for dolphins, whales, primates or birds.5

Nevertheless, in the following section referring to animals is also very important, since we live in the Anthropocene times.6 Starting from the description of noise, its definition in relation to sound, silence and music, and also from some cultural inventions, mostly by Deleuze and Guattari, I will therefore discuss the direction of the perception of sound and noise in nature, their perception in the eco, non-human and in-human perspectives, meaning their relation to other media and technologies. My field of interest also includes multimodality through sound combinations with images in movies, especially the search for quietness and new meanings as well as audio video performances. I will also emphasize the educational purposes of hearing and listening to sound, and sound pedagogy inspired by Schafer and followed by numerous theoreticians of education as well as by critics.

2. Structured and Unstructured Sound: 
   The Deleuzoguattarian Perspective

   Describing music creation and its novelty in relation to forces of chaos and cosmos, Deleuze and Guattari discuss sounds travelling between the virtual and actual planes. These sounds are hardly definable and imperceptible by their form (pitch, timbre, intensity, time), which is why they use the concept ‘unformed’ to rethink sound’s virtuality and potentiality, and on the other hand, its ability to express cosmic forces. The possibility to open the compositional territory to outside forces has

been described by Pierre Boulez and Olivier Messiaen, whose inventions functioned as a key in Deleuzoguattarian music philosophy. In contemporary music, the forces are rendered in an unusual way, more or less developing Boulez and Messiaen inventions, and quite often using raw sound and natural everyday sound. In Deleuze and Guattari’s texts such sounds are mentioned as non-musical sounds. Any sound in expression can be treated as formed. Non-music is not exactly unformed, but as it is nonstructured in a musical way, it can be treated as unformed. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze describes the empirical and conceptual perspective and consequently the extrinsic difference between forms. Discussing representation, he states that: “The prefix ‘RE’ in the word representation signifies this conceptual form of the identical which subordinates differences.” By using time, Kant’s third value of the determinable, which has a pure and empty form, he finds the internal difference on the conceptual level. The form in an extrinsic sense appears through the actualization of the formless Being. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze investigates the way the unformless becomes formed, noise becomes voice, the individual and singular appear through actualization in the event, while all possible voices are in one – *Univocity*. It is being which is Difference. The form is related to differential repetition and is actualized in expression. It is affirmed by senses in the actual experience.

Anne Sauvagnargues in *Delaune and Art*, borrowing from Gilbert Simondon’s semiotics of forces, puts forces at the centre of creation and force-material instead of form-matter. She says: “the modest capture of immanent forces replaces the invention or reproduction of forms.” Art is defined as a captor of forces, which expresses in material as singularities and the logic of sensations refers “to the relationship between the works of art and the spectator in terms of affects and sensations, which must also be understood as modulations.” The question of form is replaced by the question of imperceptible forces, which become perceptible in material: “the music must render non sonorous forces sonorous.”

But how is sound legitimated in being music sound rather noise? Is there any difference between music and non-music sound in art?

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10 Sauvagnargues, *Delaune and Art*, 70.
Sound legitimation was discussed in Attali’s study *Noise: The Political Economy of Music*.\(^\text{12}\) It was approached from the social-political perspective, emphasizing the organizational power of decision makers that attracted many of his followers as well as his forerunner Theodor Adorno, who simultaneously through a critique of pop culture and the formation of cultural industries worked on the liberation of music material.\(^\text{13}\) The noise becoming music was developed and defined from a political point of view and most often – an elitist perspective. Guattari’s texts are penetrated by the critique of the capitalist society and seeing the ability of contemporary art to change the perception of self and the politically determined structure. He gave the scheme of relationship between content form and expression form in *ritournelle*, the affects and abstract machine, which works for a new aesthetic of the world, and had the intention to escape the stratified plane, to break the determination of resenting the creation process for letting the polyphony of enunciation.\(^\text{14}\)

As Stephen Zepke states the Guattarian “extension of art into the everyday is precisely the mark of its political power and necessity.”\(^\text{15}\) Deleuze is less interested in the political aspects of art as well as sound legitimation. His writings, or his writings with Guattari, provoke scholars to rethink the sound body and how it becomes actualized and audible, and creates fresh, new, unexpected content in its travel between Earth and the cosmos, chaos and the cosmos. In the process the inaudible becomes audible, in the fluctuation of sonority a lot of sound variations appear, and noise is among them. That brings and transforms the forces necessary for creation.

Sean Higgins investigated sound’s body and noise, the development of these concepts in music philosophy and in Deleuzoguattarian works and tried to answer how noise as a medium becomes pure sound, tune and music depending on an instrument’s sonic potentiality, and how suppressed noise through the signals that are recognizable for a listener is realized in the musical event which is finalized in the listener’s perception. The noise or unexpected sound is a sonic object which breaks reproduction and allows the music to be developed in a new path and heard in a


listener’s skills and taste. Due to Higgins’ analysis, sound form appears in the event as an object of encountering:

To present the sonic event as such is to take the medium to its transcendental exercise, to have it operate as an object of encounter, an inexhaustible sign of difference to the listener and the motor of development for a dynamic listening practice unconcerned with instantaneous recognition.\(^\text{16}\)

Similarly, however, from the perspective of performances, Christof Migone\(^\text{17}\) investigates inaudible sound, broken down sound and frozen sound and how it depends on space and time, sound’s environment. Both authors – Higgins and Migone – use the example of Alvin Lucier’s performance *I am Sitting in the Room* (1969), where he is experimenting with a record of reading text and waiting for the resonance in the room. According to Higgins:

The score as the representation of the Same has been replaced by Lucier’s proper Deleuze’s idea, a diagram of the differential relationships, the emphasis on the difference of each empirical sonic event in any environment in which it is performed. He has used recording technology for an art of sonic difference, or noise, suggesting that the listener performs it again. Though the piece may be presented in the form of a recognizable recording taken from a particular performance, such a recording does not represent the piece as such, merely an instance of a sonic diagram of noise.\(^\text{18}\)

The diagram of noise and sound travelling in this formless way until the event in music performance is discussed by taking into account not only the role of the composer, but mostly the role of listener. Despite Deleuze’s insufficient attention to the listener, Higgins as well as others\(^\text{19}\) puts the role of listener into the centre of some interpretations. For


\(^{18}\) Higgins, “A Deleuzian Noise/Excavating the Body of Abstract Sound,” 73.

Deleuze, as Bogue\(^{20}\) states, the listener is part of the event, when the noise becomes music. That is obvious in Deleuze’s philosophy, though this ontology of sound and its cognition still provokes clarification that this does not fully explicate Deleuzian access to sound perception. The Deleuzoguattarian movement into sound and music itself was partly influenced by Cage, who claimed that the purpose of the composition is not a creative process, not ordering chaos, but sound itself, and by Edgard Varèse, who “while others were still discriminating ‘musical’ tones from noises,” “moved into the field of sound itself, not splitting it in two by introducing into the perception of it a mental prejudice.”\(^{21}\) However Cage’s view was far from Deleuze; he was influenced by Eastern philosophy, particularly Zen. In the Deleuzoguattarian perspective, art is sensations, but sensations exist without being sensed; they are producers. Deleuze and Guattari offer concepts of assemblage, abstract machine and apersonalization, which are partly taken from the Varèse understanding of sound production:

Varèse’s procedure, at the dawn of this age, is exemplary: a musical machine of consistency, a *sound machine* (not a machine for reproducing sounds), which molecularizes and atomizes, ionizes sound matter, and harnesses a cosmic energy.\(^{22}\)

That allows Deleuze and Guattari to escape straight questions addressed to the listener, involving him in the machine, which as they claim “puts us in contact with still other elements beyond sound matter.”\(^{23}\) Following Messiaen and Boulez as well as other musicians, Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* give an explanation of refrain and sound in assemblage, saying: “The difference between noise and sound is definitely not a basis for a definition of music or even for the distinction between musician birds and non-musician birds.”\(^{24}\) What does this ‘non-musician’ mean? This passage allows for rethinking the coexistence of different sounds in the process of becoming music: structured and musically performed sound, as well as noise and natural or raw sound. That could also include non-technically performed human sound, like the sound of a non-musician bird. This parallel between human and bird, musician and non-musician in the Deleuzoguattarian philosophy partly

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\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 302.
appeared from Messiaen’s admiration of birds singing, their different tunes, pitches and rhythms treated as music, though Messiaen by himself applied this inspiration to music instead of using their original sounds within music. The above-mentioned Deleuzoguattarian statement on the sound specificity of musical and non-musical birds became a cliche of the inseparables of the natural and cultural for each Deleuzoguattarian interpreter, unfortunately with quite different access to this statement.

Alongside the positive treatment of non-musical sound, which is valuable for the innovations in creation, noise or any other non-musical sound can be used for stabilization and stagnation – territorialization and closeness in the creative process, instead of opening access to the forces of chaos:

The material must be sufficiently deterritorialized to be molecularized and open onto something cosmic, instead of lapsing into a statistical heap...People often have too much of a tendency to reterritorialize on the child, the mad, noise. If this is done, one fuzzifies instead of making the fuzzy aggregate consist, or harnessing cosmic forces in the deterritorialized material.25

Therefore, the problem is not the legitimation of noise, but its function in the process of creation, how it can help or destroy the line of creation.

The inaudible, non-sonorous in music is another object for Deleuze’s theory of the unformed. In the creation of music while harnessing the forces of chaos, pauses are as important as sounds. Non-sonorous sounds are not, or not necessarily, heard by the human ear. Bogue in Deleuze on Music, Painting and Art26 starts the explanation of the non-sonorous from cosmic sound existence, which is not audible in a Pythagoras and Plato perspective. That old metaphysical understanding of the sounding cosmos has been turned over by outlining sound travelling through the cosmic spheres, or in Deleuzian words, plateaus and becoming sonorous in events. It is a matter of actualization, making audible in the process of creation that which was not audible and, in that way, expressing novelty, the appearance of the singular. Zafer Aracagök in his article “Deleuze on Sound, Music and Schizo-incest,”27 analyses the meaning of sound and thinks that Deleuze was keen on the effect of sound in the process of deterritorialization. According to him, Deleuze puts less emphasis on its expression, though we can find passages of Deleuze and Guattari on actualizing the virtual. The mystery of the non-

26 Bogue, Deleuze: on Music, Painting, and the Arts.
sonorous and inaudible is in the passage of sound between unformed and formed, virtual and actual, articulated and not articulated. It is about what potentially exists. According to Aracagök, strange or inaudible sound is a matter of distance between being and not being, absence and presence. Sound’s being between formless and formed is kind of meta-audible, which Aracagök tries to explain in the perspective of schizo-incest, with help from Deleuze’s *The Logic of Sense* and *Kafka: Toward Minor Literature*, where it is said: “In short, sound doesn’t show up here as a form of expression, but rather as an unformed material of expression, that will act on the other terms.”

In Kafka’s version of the myth of Sirens, the seduction of Odysseus is one of the examples of such a schizo situation. Sirens did not sing, but Odysseus heard their singing and used the perception as a ‘shield’ against their silent weapon. Aracagök, working on Deleuzoguattarian inaudible sound, contrasts its existence to Cage’s theory on *Silence* and outlines Cage’s philosophy of ‘waiting’. Silence in Cage’s view is full of noises, or at least the two are always there (the impulses of our nervous system and our heartbeat); silence in music opens “the doors of the music to the sounds that happen to be in the environment.” Sound travelling in silence is based on a chance to appear, but with the absence of a goal. What must happen happens. That is probably the way to understand Cage’s ‘waiting’, emphasized by Aracagök as different from his interpretation, which pretends to be more discerning toward Deleuzoguattarian philosophy. Nevertheless, Deleuze in *Negotiations* writes that: “events always involve periods when nothing happens” and “[p]eople miss the amazing *wait* in events they were least awaiting,” in this way confirming the gap, which can be the silence in event; silence as waiting, which Aracagök criticizes. Aracagök uses schizo-incest and meta-audible as expression of unformed material in silence, not as a chance for the audible appearing. The third position, different from that of Cage and Aracagök, can be found in the Deleuzian study of Sauvagnargues’ *Deleuze and Art*. In analysing Francis Bacon: *The Logic of Sensations* as well as *Two Regimes of Madness* and *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, she discusses the process of capturing non-sensed forces and, in contrast to Aracagök, argues that the expression of forces in music art can only be captured in materiality, when

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29 Aracagök, “Deleuze on Sound, Music and Schizo-incest.”
31 Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 160.
the non-sonorous becomes sonorous and audible which allows us “to
talk about a sonorous body ‘with exactitude’.”

From the discussion of form in Deleuze’s *The Logic of Sense*, present-
ing the way of noise becoming voice, the individual appearance in the
actualization and the event, when all possible voices are in one, ‘uni-
vocity’, and referring on cosmic sonority as a pleat with the enfolded au-
dible in inaudible as it is presented in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*,
we presume that sonority in art is a matter of art machine production, its
creation of the fluctuation of pauses as ruptures, and sound as the ex-
pression of the virtual in the material. That opens up all possibilities: au-
dible, inaudible, meta-audible, and strangely audible. While music art is
conceptualizing, it accommodates all possibilities. Peter Hallward finds
in Deleuze’s philosophy outlines of music ability to disemboby and de-
materialize bodies and describes the specificity of music as its closeness
to pure thought, its correlation with virtual creation, though his access to
Deleuze’s writings is special. Hallward treats Deleuze as a spiritual phi-
losopher rather than a thinker of conceptual art.

When sound and music are perceived by senses, the problem of
taste, intuition, experience is raised, but not that of limitation. From a
Deleuzian point of view, the problem of noise legitimation disappears,
and the non-musical and non-audible sounds are no less important than
the musical. Moreover, “[m]usic is thus is no longer limited to musicians
to the extent that sound is not its exclusive and fundamental element. Its
element is all the non-sound forces that sound material elaborated by the
composer will make perceptible…” In this way, Deleuze opens the per-
spective of thinking not only of the sound, but what is behind the sound
in music – the forces which are inaudible.

Whether noise or silence is music is no longer under question, not
only in a Deleuzoguattarian view, but in postmodern discourse and mu-
sic as well. The practice of long pauses and silence, as well as the openness
for and production of different kinds of noises, has already become part
of music in new experimental music and ambient, minimalism, and inter-
disciplinary performances.

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32 Sauvagnargues, *Delaune and Art*, 142. Zepke in “Becoming a Citizen of the World: Deleuze between Alan Kaprov and Adrian Piper” (2009) would faithfully agree with Sauvagnargues’ interpretation, though he finds an impressed example for another interpretation. Discussing art materialization, he shows how Allan Kaprov’s performances and happenings (some of them use music and noise) dematerialize art, while moving on an imminent, conceptual plane.


Jason J. Wallin and Jan Jagodzinski work with the Deleuzoguattarian understanding of sound, its (non)formation, expression and being in the art machine, and also apply Deleuzoguattarian concepts to education. Wallin, when talking about voice at school, refers first of all to street culture and the culture of marginalized groups. He turns his attention away from their voice, based on critical theory, critical pedagogy discourse and the attention requirements of different groups in society, and considers new sound as new phenomena of self-expression and resistance to the dominant apparatus of power, as well as a new tool for political, cultural, social or economic action. It is resistance against stagnation and stable rules, rising towards a culture for the new generation and the creation of a new culture. The new sound reflects the expression of rap, practitioners of metallic culture, punks, anarchists and other sub-groups, in no way avoiding noise and the loud (a)rhymic beat of drums. This is absolutely different from Schaefer’s theory based on purging not only the ear but also the surroundings from noise. The actions of youth today go in the direction of ‘becoming sound’, a movement that avoids identifying sound as good or bad, noisy or harmonious, calm or irritating. Sound is not separated from the student, from instruments, from sources, from other things that encounter sound. Sound is in an assemblage.

Chris Stover, following Deleuze and Guattari, places the process of education first of all in the context of the environment (natural and cultural), through the participatory ‘interactions’ between humans and nonhumans, different kind of bodies and, most importantly, following Erin Manning – through transforming ‘agency’ into ‘agencement’. Meanwhile Angie Zapata, Candace Kuby, and Jaye Johnson Thiel rethink ‘intra-activity’ and ‘Enacted agency’ in educational research in their own way, coming very close to Karen Barad’s theory. ‘Intra-activity’ is slightly different from ‘interactivity’: ‘intra-activity’ works with the human, non-human and more than human, and ‘Enacted agency’, following Karen Barad and Zapata, Kuby, Thiel, means that: “bodies do not preexist relationships; they come into being through/with/in relationships,” be-

having as an *active ‘agent’*. Barad, following her own so-called ‘agential realism’, analyses how differential constitutions of ‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’ are enacted, how any phenomenon is constructed from the smallest units and keeps its dynamic through the interaction. She argues that:

intra-actions are constraining but not determining. That is, intra-activity is neither a matter of strict determinism nor unconstrained freedom. The future is radically open at every turn. This open sense of futurity does not depend on the clash or collision of cultural demands; rather, it is inherent in the nature of intra-activity, even when apparatuses are primarily reinforcing, agency is not foreclosed. Hence, the notion of intra-actions reformulates the traditional notion of causality and opens up a space, indeed a relatively large space, for material-discursive forms of agency.41

From Barad’s viewpoint, one can recognize greater attention being paid to the agent, and in that way she proposes a different understanding of the interactions among human and nonhuman in the apparatus, compared to Deleuze and Guattari’s42 assemblages, mostly based on a changeable rhythmic line, and Bruno Latour’s43 actor-network theory. This is because she defines agency as a relationship, not as a particular feature, while the apparatus and assemblages in her view are material-discursive, a dynamic for grouping agencies, and in that way are a condition of possibility.

Wallin44 distinguishes another aspect: games, which students use to play and in which they find a power for deterritorialization similar to the technological deterritorialization of images. In that way, he observes how youth works with a different meaning for sound. In his view, youth masters step by step the dynamic of recognizing representative and non-representative ways of expressing sound and this process is both very progressive but on the other hand dangerous, because nobody knows

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how it may influence the psyche of a young person. jagodzinski also demonstrates the power of sound in the conditions of design capitalism, when sound becomes an inseparable part of the market, advertising and commodities, all of which have already pervaded schools. Both scholars emphasize the importance of contemporary media and how media helps to transform the function of sound in accordance with the ability to modify, or affectate the process of expression, and to create a message able to transmit new information. Nevertheless, society can face another effect when opening the flow of different forces, which become an incriminated and dead instrument for transmitting non-creative knowledge stereotypes.

Although jagodzinski concentrates his attention on the sound-image and soundscape, and Wallin tends rather to investigate new media, new techne as a power for repressive policy, both scholars link art, philosophy and pedagogy and have much in common: they mostly use Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy for argumentation and interpretation. Meanwhile Stover has another access to the sound games and play in education: he maintains his distance from the radical criticism of official policy, and in his view when working with children or investigating the educational process one should move from paideia to paidia, which is seeking for play and joy, keeping to the direction of ‘becoming-musician’ rather than waiting for an expected production. All theoreticians claim that there is no difference between the natural and the artificial, the natural and the cultural, sound and noise, or music and non-music in a similar way as Deleuze and Guattari express:

The difference between noise and sound is definitely not a basis for a definition of music, or even for the distinction between musician birds and nonmusician birds.

Life should be perceived as dynamic, in flow, in becoming. That is why we have to be open and ready for everything that exists in chaos to be full of possibilities, and to be able to reterritorialize all that is new in the cosmos, at the same time being involved in the actualization of potentiality. A promise for better pedagogy can be inferred from the readiness to face different sound combinations: technological and natural, planned and not planned, pleasant sounds and unpleasant noise, and especially, in

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46 Stover, “Affect, Play and Becoming-Musicking.”

accordance with Marie Thompson, learning how to separate destructive sounds and to transform their perception into creativity and in affectivity.

In the next section, we investigate how raw sounds, natural sounds, and sounds that appear unpredictably as unformed sounds appear in the compositions of great or ordinary musicians, how these sounds fluctuate in their nomadic journey and how they take part in the deterritorialization of opening musical refrains to new forces from the outside. What kind of art machine can be found in different examples, how do percepts and affects appear involving artists as well as listeners in the art machine, and especially how does artistic composition come to affect an event? How does it come about that a musical composition (or part of it) can be treated as a crystal – not just as a musical composition?

3. Sound and Image in Artistic Flooding: Tarasov, Viola

In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari use Jakob von Uexküll’s theory of transcodance in nature, according to which nature is treated as music with ‘components as melodies in counterpoints’. They develop this idea proposing an encounter of two different components, a wasp and an orchid where the implication is reciprocal. They assert that:

Whenever there is transcodding, we can be sure that there is not a simple addition, but the constitution of a new plane, as of a surplus value. A melodic or rhythmic plane, surplus value of passage or bridging. The two cases, however, are never pure; they are in reality mixed (for example, the relation of the leaf, this time not to water in general but to rain.

This quotation leads us to rethink water installations in art. Artists from all over the world, from different continents (as mentioned Bill Viola, Vladimir Tarasov, and also Shaun Gladwell and others) experimenting with sound use water in different water states (sinking, dripping and flooding). The sound of flooding gives a special opportunity to think about art in a Deleuzoguattarian perspective. It opens territory into absolute chaos, it is ‘a catastrophe’ in which ‘form collapses’ and ‘everything changes direction’. Flooding means another consistence of space, a transcoding that requires a fresh eye and understanding of things, of which positions they take; it creates conditions on a very broad scale:

49 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 314.
50 See Zepke, Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and Guattari, 191, 177.
from contemplation to affectation, seeing, hearing and being in different regimes at the same time, finding novelty that arises from the encounter of two apparently different elements that look like the singularities’ variation in a relationship. “The artist must venture into this catastrophe-chaos in order to bring something out of it, to construct something of it.”

Although Deleuze in Francis Bacon. The Logic of Sensation emphasizes that the artistic process has its own catastrophe, which has little in common with a catastrophe as a destructive natural event, I prefer to work with flooding as a direct reference to natural catastrophes that confuse the senses. This opens new indiscernible zones that allow us to think and imagine the diversity of inscriptions of nuptials and the ‘possibility of fact’ in different diagrams in art. In this section, I will investigate different artistic approaches to catastrophes, in particular flooding. I am trying to discover how artists such as Vladimir Tarasov and Bill Viola use speed and varying intensities of sound and image when presenting a catastrophe to create different diagrammatic movements.

Lithuanian artist Vladimir Tarasov, a drum player experimenting with the sound of water and aleatoric compositional subtleties, has created numerous installations to investigate the possibilities and limits of sound (Incident at the Museum or Water Music 1992, Installation at Solitude 1996, Music on the Water 1996, The First River 2007, Flood 2009). He used to give impulses to the independent fluctuation and unpredictable logic of installations, combining sound and image as well as different time and space perceptions.

I will describe this through the installation Incident at the Museum or Water Music (1992, 1993, 1994), displayed at the Chicago Museum for Contemporary Art, the New York Ronald Feldman gallery and in other world galleries. The initial idea and visual realization were implemented by Tarasov’s friend and collaborator, conceptual artist Ilya Kabakov, while Vladimir Tarasov mostly worked on sound. Kabakov and Tarasov experimented with the sound of water dripping into buckets during the performance of a major leak at the art gallery. The encounter of water drops and metal, water drops and plastic, and their dripping in a variety of rhythms gave an impetus for Tarasov to present a composition following the pattern.

Incident at the Museum or Water Music is documented in photographs, drawings, and writings on the website Fine Art Biblio:

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51 Ibid., 172.
52 Deleuze, Francis Bacon. The Logic of Sensation.
The exhibit consists of two large galleries of an old, respectable museum with a very good reputation, similar to the Louvre or to London’s National Gallery. The light is concentrated on the ‘masterpieces’ that are hanging around the room…that morning and extremely unpleasant incident occurred at the museum…water was streaming down from the ceiling in various places…

Initial ‘fire’ measures are taken. ‘Circles’ are arranged out of the chairs around particularly dangerous places. A plastic film is stretched over the chair and a hole is punched in its middle so that the water could run into bucket placed under it. There, where the streams of water were smaller, jars are placed, troughs, everything that could be found at the moment.

And the quiet of museum halls is suddenly transformed into a strange music, a music of falling water. Streams and drops in various ends of the halls form a complex, multi-voice polyphony, where in contemplated combinations the low ‘voices’ of the stream, beating the stretched plastic like a drum, combine with the ‘bells’ of the droplets which are falling into the metal buckets, with the ‘staccato’ of the glass jars and the slow, rhythmic blows in the large, metal trough.54

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54 Ibid.
According to the exhibition announcement, at the time the catastrophe occurred, the gallery was displaying fourteen paintings by the early-twentieth-century impressionist Sergei Yakovlevich Koshelev. However, this was not a real flood. It was ‘fabricated’ by the artists. Moreover, the painter, Koshelev, is fictitious, though critics believed he was a real person. The idea of composer Tarasov and his friend Kabakov was to draw attention to the sound and to induce a transformation of the view:

A catastrophe, destruction, turns into construction, and contemplation with the sudden shift in point of view. Water, as the image of the all-destructive flood, self-propelling, turns into the image of a different flood – of the all-consuming element of music.

One room was filled with the intense and frightening sound of falling water while the other room was calm, with ambient sounds of water dripping into different buckets and onto stretched plastic. For the composition of the installation the authors used everything they found lying around or created from everyday things (jars, buckets, aluminum pans, an iron basin, plastic film). In Deleuzian words:

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55 Vladimir Tarasov, personal communication, June 3, 2017.
56 See Kabakov and Kabakov, “Incident at the Museum or Water Music.”
Having a bag into which I (they-LD) put everything I (they-LD) encounter, provided that I am (they are-LD) also put in bag. Finding, encountering, stealing instead of regulating, recognizing and judging.\textsuperscript{57}

This unexpected event in a museum, generated absolute deterritorialization; it was functional and also aesthetic deterritorialization. Visitors became not only listeners and observers, but also part of the installation, behaving in a way that was different from what they came for, joining the disorder and the chaotic forces among all the characters. The installation destroys the state of things, confuses sensations, which is the condition for transcoding, creating a new function for the gallery sound, a new hearing that consequently directs one to a new gaze. Tarasov shared his impressions, saying that the visitors walked between and around objects, listening to how the drops in different corners of the room created rhythmic flow and polyrhythm; later the visitors relaxed, sat down and even fell asleep.\textsuperscript{58}

Following Deleuzian ideas on opening to chaos, I would like to emphasize the double function of the encounter of a water drop with the surface: one function is designed to destroy things, transform them or even lead to death, while the other serves for creating a unique polyphony of sound and rhythm that comes from efforts to protect the floor by putting down aluminum pans, large iron buckets, and stretching plastic between the chairs.

This represents the fluctuation between chaos and cosmos, death and birth, a change in intensity for power to occupy the territory destructively or to create calm. As the authors explained, they were trying to create “the impression of tension and release”; to show, how “chaos on one, lower level transforms into harmony on the next, higher level.”\textsuperscript{59} In Tarasov’s words, it “has the capacity to create stillness in the viewer.”\textsuperscript{60}

Following the Deleuzoguattarian idea of encountering different components and transcodance, mentioned at the beginning: “The two cases, however, are never pure; they are in reality mixed.”\textsuperscript{61} I would like to focus here not on the double function of a water drop, but on the view of the water drops falling into dishes as related to the sound from the encounter of the water drop with different objects. My interest arises


\textsuperscript{59} Kabakov and Kabakov, “Incident at the Museum or Water Music.”

\textsuperscript{60} Tarasov, “Sound Games. Installations by Vladimir Tarasov,” 48.

\textsuperscript{61} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}, 314.
from the latest and slightly different solo installation by Tarasov. He named the modified installation *Water Music*. I saw it in the Vilnius Gallery of Contemporary Art in 1996; it was later presented in the Kumu Art Museum in Tallinn (2016-2017). Tarasov’s solo installation was arranged without using any paintings on the walls of galleries, only with the similar idea of water flooding and dripping.62

In this installation, Tarasov bases attraction and affection not so much on the transformation of the situation by using sound for a new look at the paintings or sculptures exhibited in the gallery, but rather by the focus on observing the falling drops, the live sound show, as the intensity of the image and sound of dripping water increases.

![Image of Water Music installation by Vladimir Tarasov](image)

Figure 6. *Water Music*, installation by Vladimir Tarasov, 1996. Vilnius Gallery of Contemporary Art

The visual installation turns into a sound installation, although the optical scene remains important. If, in his joint installation with Kabakov, Tarasov created a perfect effect of the relative speed of dripping in two different rooms, in his solo installation the unique rhythm and motifs from combinations of random characters create the absolute speed important for the transformation of consistency and artistic novelty. In *Dialogues*, Claire Parnet, following a Deleuzian idea, mentioned that absolute speed “knows lines not points,” it is “the speed of movement between the two, in the middle of the two, which traces a line of flight,” and it “is not an effect but a product.”63 In this installation the product appears not

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62 See excerpt on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jAqNVhxets.
63 Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 31, 33.
only by the appearance of affects and percepts in the regime of fluctuation between virtual and actual, but as an intimate experience of the observer.

What is the difference between a falling drop and a sounding drop in drop orchestration? The first has a potential sound, while the second is actual. Between visual-dropping and audio-encountering there is a zone of possible sounds. Falling droplets possess virtual sonority, no less than droplets encountering a material. Eventually the visual experience transforms into the potential and actual sonoric experience. The image becomes a sound that can be seen. This nuptial stems not from a water drop encountering the surface, as if witnessing the fight between birth and death, but somewhere in the zone of falling. The nuptial appears before the encountering; it pre-exists and waits for actualization.

Different audio and video projects using a flood have been produced by American artist Bill Viola. He experiments with the sound and image of water with the help of the media, e.g., in The Raft (2004), and especially in Five Angels for the Millennium (2001) and many other installations. Numerous narratives have been disseminated concerning the sacral content of Viola’s art, about how his work expresses the deepest and purest things in the Universe, opening unseen zones for an observer. In his installations, we can see a unique method of working with the sound of water and the movement-image, mixing with the time-image. While movement-image “is based on rational cuts and linkage and itself sets forth model of truth,” and can therefore be called an ‘organic system’, the time-image is “based on irrational cuts with only relinkings, and substituting for the model of truth the power of falsity as becoming,” and can be referred to as a ‘crystalline system’.64 This effect appears especially where water occupies a vast space.

A catastrophe is presented in his video installation The Raft.65 This is a media installation, without live view or sound, in the same way as it is in Tarasov’s solo installation presented above. The visualization of the encounter of a tidal wave with a crowd on a platform is strengthened by the electronic sound of water. It seems that Bill Viola gives priority to the image rather than to the sound. A very powerful expression of the wave encountering the crowd is accompanied by quiet and inexpressive sound, maintained like unrecognizable noise whose message is unreadable and terrifying. The encounter of the water with the crowd is initially perceived optically, not audibly. The movement of the image is composed in a very slow rhythm. In an interview, Viola comments:

64 Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, 67.
65 The Raft directed by Bill Viola, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ypdZ_7xw79Y.
The Raft came from an idea that a group of innocent people face and fight off an enormous power that tries to destroy them. I chose water because it embodies the power and movement of the universe. It is both comforting and terrifying with its endless cycle of creation and destruction.  

According to Viola, water gives life and takes it away. It is the beginning and the end, and it always sounds. Deleuze in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*\(^6^7\) states that the French school found in water the promise of another state of perception, ‘a more than human perception’, ‘more delicate’, ‘a molecular perception’. While I accept Deleuze’s point of view, I also agree with Viola’s idea of water as an “enormous power that tries to destroy” people as well as giving them life. Keeping this double function of water in mind, I move from this idea using an element similar to one used in the interpretation of the previous installation, to focus on image and sound composition and Viola’s technique that transforms the movement-image and sound perception. Therefore, my understanding from a Deleuzian perspective only uses Viola’s thoughts in part.

Viola plays with different speeds and intensity; his words “things are not what you see”\(^6^8\) are important for watching his video and audio installation The Raft. It seems there is a gap between two times: the time of the flood coming, the drowning of the crowd, and the time of the crowd moving away, its reaction to the flood, or in other words its reaction to the encounter with the wave. The water finds them before the bodies in the crowd react. These two actions are shown in one regime, but the effects seem to take place in two different time regimes, and this is caused by slow motion created in post-production; it is similar to David Clearbout’s expansion of time, but different from the Godard and Soviet film school description in Deleuze. Slowing down the motion produces a gap between the time when the first wave breaks over the crowd and the reaction of the crowd. This allows us to compare it with an interval in the Deleuzian sense.

Although the interval means the extraction of actions in time, in Viola’s slow motion it appears as the expansion of time, and in this way

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\(^6^8\) Bill Viola, “The Movement in the Moving Image,” Lecture at the Center for the Humanities (The University of California, Berkeley, September 28, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t0RCkNoU8mt&sf=4088s.
transforms the relations between actions. It is possible to view this transformation as a time-image, because of ‘autotemporalization of the image’.\(^{69}\) Like the interval, this “movement produced the appearance of an image other than the movement-image.”\(^{70}\) ‘Aberrant movements and false continuity shots’\(^{71}\) create the conditions that Viola calls ‘empty space’. It is the space in-between things and according to Viola it is a real space, an empty space filled with chaotic forces that Viola tries to catch and harness. Viola points out\(^{72}\) that the energy harnesses only in-between the things. *The Raft* means not only the flood, which we see, but also unseen flooding space, because of the transformation in the continuous extension of time, especially in the image of an encounter of two substances: water and the crowd. This allows for an aberrant nuptial, not on the actual, but rather on the virtual plane, which is seen in a different regime.

The sound is continuous and does not seem very important. However, the soundtrack creates a special impression for the image, transcoding it. According to Rhys Davies:

> To Viola the sound of being, heard from a distance, is the combination of all the disparate elements that make up the infinite variety of sensations and physicality, resolved into a constant low rumbling – the frequency of existence.\(^{73}\)

In this case, the sonoric intensity, resembling noise, signs the sound of a wave, flood, fear, power and is inseparable from the sound of the crowd. The sound of the crowd, according to Deleuze and Guattari,\(^{74}\) is cosmic, full of forces and able to harness chaotic forces. This is expressed in the soundtrack that sounds non-human or post-human; we can hardly hear any human voice or natural sound, although it is an expression of the crowd. The sound becomes very informative despite its rather simple modification. Its intensive vibration and encounter with the time-image, i.e., the sound and image, create an absolute speed within the slow image picture of catastrophe. Music imparts an internal rhythm to the image,\(^{75}\) that has evolved from empty space in a long encounter between the wave and the crowd and the image and the soundtrack.

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\(^{69}\) Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972-1990*, 64.


\(^{71}\) Ibid., 41.

\(^{72}\) Viola, “The Movement in the Moving Image.”


\(^{74}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.

\(^{75}\) Gregg Redner, *Deleuze and Film Music: Building a Methodological Bridge between Film Theory and Music* (Bristol, UK/Chicago, IL: Intelect, 2011), 33.
Both Tarasov’s and Viola’s installations present the encounter of different objects mediated by sound (natural, acoustic and electronic) or view (natural and created by post-production) in the process of catastrophe. Tarasov works with a slow speed of catastrophe and small spaces. Viola also works with slowness, but with great spaces of water. Tarasov waits for performative transformation; he works with sound more like Cage, while Viola creates transformation by using slow motion, an empty space and modification of the sound in Varèse’s mode of sound creation. In both cases, it is involutional creation “in the domain of symbioses that bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms.”\textsuperscript{76} Media installation as well as live sound installation create nuptials and allow absolute speed to be produced. However, they do not appear in a process of encountering like a ‘wasp and orchid’, but somewhere on the way to this encounter, in an unfixed place and time.

4. Machining the Bird: A Multimodal Artistic Project Approach

The art project by Paolo Giudici and Andi Spicer titled \textit{A Starling}\textsuperscript{77} is an inspiration to rethink an art machine that produces (a)synchronized images of folding an origami bird, multiplied and composed with sounds reinterpreting fragments of Mozart’s Concerto No. 17. How does the (a)logic of artistic assemblage relate to Deleuzoguattarian machinic movement and aesthetico-functional thinking? Although some time had passed since I saw the project in 2016 on the conference in Rome, I felt involved in the project both academically and personally, trying to decode, interpret, and in some sense to become the imaginative co-author of the project, thus overcoming the dualism in visuality, in sound, and to enter a space for multiplicity in multimodality.

Mozart’s (the name of the caged starling) talking combined with the refrain from Mozart’s Concerto No. 17 at the beginning of the project, make one rethink not only the territory marked by the motif but also movement, the process of the \textit{becoming a bird}, which was described by Deleuze and Guattari. Becoming is never imitating; but is rather becoming-other. Deleuze and Guattari say that

\[\text{[i]t is the accents that form the diagonal in Mozart, the accents above all. If one does not follow the accents, if one does not observe them, one falls back into a relatively impoverished punctual system. The human musician is deterritorialized in the}\]

\textsuperscript{76} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}, 238.

\textsuperscript{77} See \textit{A Starling} directed by Paolo Giudici and Andi Spicer (2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QGouc9QQrUw.
bird, but it is a bird that is itself deterritorialized, ‘transfigured’, a celestial bird that has just as much of a becoming as that which becomes with it.78

This reminds us of the special style of Mozart’s compositions and calls on us to talk of dynamics, live interpretation, and, in following Deleuzoguattarian becomings, diagonals, and unpredictable links in the machinic process. Image and sound are not easily separable in this project – they are interconnected, even though it seems they are running in different regimes when they begin with the rhythm of sound, which gives the image an internal rhythm.79 Later, the process is reversed and visuality lends rhythm to the sound.

**Visuality.** The project’s visual material demonstrates the lengthy process of folding the starling from a sheet of paper with two different sides: one blank and one decorated in a baroque style. As we view it, we see multiple repetitions, a series of folding images, like mirror reflections, distorted mirror reflections, delayed reflections, synchronically asynchronous folding in series. The number of images increases in the progression: 1-2-4-8-16-32 and 64. A rational, metrical rhythm. Nevertheless, the process leads to a new consistency. The sheet of paper becomes a figure and is transformed into a beak (mouth), and then into a paper bird, a baroque décor/plateau/milieu, composed with Mozart’s Concerto No. 17, and is finally transformed into a flock of live birds, flying above a baroque cupola. Such is the murmuring of starlings in the electronic version.

I would like to focus on two moments in this creational process of the image, two thresholds in the process of folding: the becoming of the beak (mouth) and the origami becoming a flock of birds, in addition to two musical refrains – small and great.

In *The Machinic Unconscious: Essay on Schizoanalysis*80 Guattari discusses abstract machines, which are dynamic, working in nature as well as in the socion and every environment, including the world of technologies. They work as magic. An abstract machine creates and folds schemas, links elements, creates a kind of machinic engineering, complexity, multiplicity, not separated from the actual world. Through these machines, Guattari tries to explain the life of birds: rituals, mating, delineating territory, and melodies. He is interested in the dynamic of passing from one level or

order to another, but not in the hierarchical relations between components and not in predictable movements. According to him:

_abstract machines cling not to a single universal time but to a trans-spacial plant of consistency and trans-temporal which affects through them a relative coefficient of existence. Consequently, their ‘appearance’ in reality can no longer claim to be given all in one piece; it is negotiated on the basis of quanta of possibles.\(^{81}\)

Also, that ‘they would belong to no one’.\(^{82}\) He is talking not about a predictable, semiotically understood and explained world of signs, but about non-prognostically linking elements and signs from biological, ecological, physical, and other fields and from different intensities. He destroys the codes of psychoanalysis and structuralism. Guattari talks about all species of birds, also mentioning and separating different species of birds, but that is not the most important aspect of his statement. It is of the same importance as the leaf, the blade, or other elements of nature. In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari outline:

_The concept of bird is found not in its genus or species but in the composition of its postures, colors, and songs; something indiscernible that is not so much synesthetic but syneidetic.\(^{83}\)"

How does that relate to the project? A machinic regime can be recognized in the project, the operation of an abstract machine. I would maintain that one of the thresholds in this process of machining the bird with a serial movement of folding images is creating the beak of the bird, which in human terms would be named a faciality. In *The Machinic Unconscious*, Guattari raises

_a hypothesis that assemblage of faciality necessarily ‘precedes’ the existence of animal mouths and human faces, in other words that the expressive machines ‘precede’ the means of expression (free so that these means interact in turn upon the machinisms in question).\(^{84}\)"


\(^{82}\) Ibid., 130-131.


The formation of faciality signifies individualization, a common trait in Western cultures that emphasize the head and the voice, quite unlike archaic cultures, which first of all used to emphasize spirituality and the soul. In the socio-political sense, the face is a sign of power, structure, an individual, or an assemblage of individuals, whereas in the context of our project it has the image of a beak, which in the lives of birds refers to a clearly structural organization. In this project, it constitutes only one of the thresholds that must be overcome on the path toward the others.

It is important to note that the beak constructed in the project’s abstract machine is not created from the paper but by the hands (human fingers) which fold the origami (see figure 7).

Figure 7. A Starling.

It is therefore not only the folding of birds that is seen in the project but also the flexing of fingers, which are not only a tool, but also the birds; they become the birds themselves. In this way, the human is involved in the regime of the abstract machine. The human becomes a bird or, on the contrary, the bird becomes a human through faciality and individuality, as described by Guattari. The fingers of a human become only an element of machine; they are organs without a body, or rather a body without organs; they are a kind of animated tool, or unrecognizable animals, half-human, but also birds, and they lose their faciality in the following phase of becoming the flock (see figure 8).
In Deleuze’s words, the basic image comes from a series, and a bird is rather an event that is “related to a history or to a series inverse.”\textsuperscript{85} When Deleuze asks: “where is the folding moving?,”\textsuperscript{86} he answers that it moves not only between essences and existences; it surely flows between the body and the soul, but clearly between the inorganic and the organic in the sense of bodies, and between the ‘species’ of monads in the sense of souls. The meaning of monad, which is important for understanding the construction and functioning of reality, is taken by Deleuze from Leibniz. In the Deleuzian view, it refers to unity between object and subject, and erases the distinction between inside and outside, body and soul; it denotes the oneness that envelops a multiplicity. He explicated the borrowed concept of monad in its relation to Baroque folding, and in his view contemporary world changes monadology. Priority is given to the dynamic and movement between different worlds and units, as well as different planes, allowing transversal lines to appear between different elements on different planes. Monad now opens on a trajectory or a spiral in expansion that moves further and further away from a center...The two begin to fuse on a sort of diagonal, where the monads penetrate each other, are modified, inseparable from the groups of prehension that carry them along and make up as many transitory captures.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{85} Deleuze, \textit{The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque}, 120.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 119-120.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 137.
The event of becoming a bird and a flock of birds is thus the second threshold overstepped in the series of foldings, leading to a new assemblage and most important – new consistency. That is a threshold in art performance, combining natural and artificial, actual and virtual, factual and imaginary.

**Sound line.** The project is multimodal in nature, not visual, and actually starts with a sound effect: the quite recognizable effect of Mozart’s musical motive, which is repeated again at the end. Although the middle section is completed by different electronic and live sounds, from the talking of a starling to a noise like rubbing or grinding, it seems that something is producing a braking effect and trying to regulate, to find a proper tune. The sound is combined from live and artificial sounds as well as from music and non-music; different kinds of sounds overlap. It seems that the process of transformation and deterritorialization is a little annoying, and this happens together with the very aesthetic folding in the series of images containing a strong rhythm (2-4-8-16, etc.). This is the process of becoming: sounds that are still not clear covered by impurities, being largely distant from Mozart’s refrain. They are artificial, but no less valued, because, in accordance with Deleuze and Guattari,

> the difference between noise and sound is definitely not a basis for a definition of music or even for distinction between musician birds and non-musician birds.88

However, the most interesting fact is that, according to scientists, starlings can sing two melodies using two different refrains at the same time. Guattari also mentioned the research of ornithologist William H. Thorp, who found that birds repeat melodies and learn how to do that, but that very often they finalize the melodies themselves, as if improving. An even more interesting fact is that starlings very easily imitate street noise and urban sounds.89 It is not clear which idea was adopted by the authors of project, but neither is it particularly important, since we are considering a machine that involves the authors in the process, where they perhaps lose their tools, identities, and, at least for a little while, become birds in the machinic process. In *The Fold*, Deleuze says that harmonization comes after pain expressed as discordance, going through the stage of spontaneity to concertation, and outlines in particular that folding today is different from the Baroque, because there is a different understanding of

home and nature, and there is a movement to harmony not through monadology, but through nomadology and diagonals. In this way, the project combines the Deleuzian kind of critique of a baroque understanding of harmony and the search for possibilities of a modern understanding of harmony, i.e., no vertical harmony and horizontal melody instead of diagonals (despite everybody questioning his understanding of modernity), with a Guattarian rethinking of the semiotics of signs and new assemblages of signs. These links create the machinic process, where “theme” was variation from the start,” as is mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari in the description of the Rediscovering of Mozart. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, continuing the quote on Mozart, it is said that:

Varèse explains that the sound molecule (the block) separates into elements arranged in different ways according to variable relations of speed, but also into so many waves or flows of sonic energy irradiating the entire universe, a headlong line of flight. That is how he populated the Gobi Desert with insects and stars constituting a becoming-music of the world, or a diagonal for a cosmos.90

The next threshold in the project’s machinic regime is more important in leading to the second type of refrain. In other words, the sound in combination with the image gradually leads to the second type refrain, as is described in *A Thousand Plateaus*, drawing a line of flight from earth to the cosmic:

Crystal: the becoming-bird of Mozart is inseparable from a becoming-initiate of the bird, and forms a block with it. It is the extremely profound labor dedicated to the first type refrain that creates the second type or the little phrase of the Cosmos.91

That little phrase is already heard at the beginning of the project. It is a motive from Mozart’s concerto but was sung by the voice of one man and followed by a short fragment played on a piano (by Lang Lang). When it appears in the second type circle and changed by its consistency, it is played by the orchestra (by the crowd). That should be understood as *becoming cosmic, becoming the flock of starlings* through deterritorialization and reterritorialization. It is a new machinic territoriality, working in an absolutely new regime – the regime of multiplicity. Unfortunately, the

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91 Ibid., 350.
project does not end there, as it would be nice to finalize it in Deleuzoguattarian style. The second type refrain is removed by a continuation of noise, reaching to infinity. It is the murmuring of the flock of starlings in the electronic Giudici and Spicer version, or perhaps a Varésean version. Agreeing with ‘cosmization’ of the refrain, the author of this text finds the threshold that opens a cosmic zone in the project not at the exact moment of the repetition of the refrain in the second version, performed with orchestration, which is heard synchronically with the image of the flock flying above the Baroque cupola, but a little later when the recognizable phrase transforms into a continuity of electronic sound, more similar to noise than to musical sound. Perhaps this could be better expressed as the stage of the transformation of a clearly recognizable motive into prolonged sounding, going back from actual to virtual, somewhere in-between.

The artistic intrigue thus comes through the territorialization of the ‘bird face’ and, inversely, the deterritorialization of the ‘bird voice’. In the machinic regime of folding, all elements (origami, human fingers, the bird voice, Mozart’s fragment, and electronic sound) are activated by becoming a bird in the Deleuzoguattarian sense. This erases any boundaries between the artificial and natural, virtual and actual, freedom and imprisonment, creating a flock territory beyond any dichotomy. The second type is the Great Refrain, which, in the Deleuzoguattarian sense, is cosmic and should also promise the final end of music.\(^\text{92}\)

According to some Deleuzian interpretations, it is a little pretentious to talk about a cosmic refrain, especially to claim some ‘final end of music’, when it stands up on its own, as mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari, and to expect it to be actual, when ‘the cosmic force was already present in the material, the great refrain in the little refrains.’\(^\text{93}\) But at the same time, according to \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, it may “[p]roduce a deterritorialized refrain as the final end of music, release it in the Cosmos – that is more important than building a new system.”\(^\text{94}\) Vernon questions this idea of music standing on its own; according to him it stands through the efforts of musicians.\(^\text{95}\)

What is the position of Giudici and Spicer, and the diagrammatic moving of their artistic machine? On the one hand, they allow us to think that the cosmic refrain is virtual, enabling us to hear numerous formed or non-formed sounds and their assemblages, different and parallel at the same time and in a non-formed way. In Deleuzoguattarian texts, it is said that these forces are present in material. Yes, there is a long-sustained

\(^{92}\) Ibid.
\(^{93}\) Ibid.
\(^{94}\) Ibid.
\(^{95}\) Vernon, “Deleuze on the Musical Work of Art.”
tone. They begin with a small refrain (the singing bird and the voice of a man, as well as a piano fragment) as a replica or a germ for the Great and Cosmic refrain. It was actualized as a variation and work of separate “variable relations of speed, but also into so many waves or flows of a sonic energy irradiating the entire universe, a head-long line of flight,” as Deleuze said about Varèse’s music. I think in the same way about the sonic effect in this project. The sound is heard after a ‘great refrain’, after ‘finalization’, after the ‘final end of music’, and it seems beyond any finalization. It is the travelling of sound itself, “emissions of waves without harmonic.”96 It is a refrain of a sound machine. In accordance with Gallope, a sound machine turns into a virtualization, reorienting the creator and listener back to the virtual, despite the very realistic view of the documentary image and the kind of noise or long electronic tone in the project.97 I would maintain that it is the same abstract machine mentioned by Guattari when rethinking the world of animals, birds, and their territorialization; it pre-exists any start and is beyond any finalization. It is rather the enunciation of a new consistency and another life form, another kind of being, way of thinking, and creating within the lines of different directions – not in closed and hierarchic systems. It is way of being in a crowd, flock, or pack. A flock of starlings is assemblaged in such a way that all the birds are equal in their functions, without leaders. Each bird has its own mobile way, sometimes in the centre and sometimes on the edge and is never found in a predicted place. It is able to react very fast in their communication98 being in a territory that is dynamic, not centred, not oneway directed. The flock is plastic, transformative, intangible, and elusive. The movement of a flock looks like an event, while the murmuring of the flock is nothing more than the cosmic sound in Giudici and Spicer’s vision and creation. As observers and creators, we were fortuitously involved in this prolonged process of an abstract machine; subsequently, the starling image and speech appeared on the screen for reasons that we didn’t know and didn’t need to. The most important thing was that we were then better able to see at least one of the diagrams moving between the ethical-aesthetical refrain of music (culture) and the functional refrain (nature), both combining into one, where one is determinantalized and reterritorialized by the other in diagonals, thus helping us to understand music standing on its own.

96 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 344.
5. Sound and Image in Tarkovsky’s Novel Bell

The film of Andrey Tarkovsky’s Andrey Rublyov and particularly of the novel Bell, which forms part of the film, present the concept of mastery and the master in the Middle Ages. The historical approach and the various sources that reconstruct the concept of master are put into an artistic context partly based on medieval tradition and partly interpreting it. Young Boriska in the novel Bell pretends to be a master and is looking for a way to prove his mastery. In this way, the medieval tradition of crafts and training that breaks the established order can be interpreted using Deleuzoguattarian philosophy, and some connections can also be found with Deleuze’s concept of creativity and the special role of craftsmen. Deleuze’s attention to Tarkovsky’s work, especially the film Andrey Rublyov, offers many insights and unexpected meanings to fuel this comparison. The fact that they are also visual and audio in nature provides inspiration to interpret the novel in a visual, audio and pedagogic perspective.

5.1. Master in the Desert: Time Crystal in Image

Let us briefly recall the plot: it is medieval Russia. Young Boriska, who can be treated as an apprentice, promises to produce a church bell because he alone knows the secret left to him by his father, a true master of bells. The strangeness of the situation is that Boriska (actor Nikolai Burlyaev) later confesses that he did not know the secret, more precisely, his father did not pass it on to him before he died. The end of the story is predictable – ignorance does not prevent the disciple from casting an amazing bell. Tarkovsky works with a kind of metaphysical silence – no word about the secret, but on the other hand a lot of hysterical and meaningful words from the pretender to prove his familiarity with the secret of making a bell. The entire plot embodies an amazing style of visualization.

This film has been interpreted differently by critics. Robert Bird seeks impressions of time included in the production of Bell, revealing a new approach to contemporary art that composes different times. In Tarkovsky’s work, he sees the great influence it has had on contemporary art. Meanwhile Lindsay Powell-Jones emphasizes the importance of testimonies in Tarkovsky’s work and in Boriska’s history as well.

In the novel *Bell*, Valentin Michalkovic\(^{102}\) sees the philosophy of Gregory of Nazianzus, demonstrating the effect of merging several forces: fire and metal, i.e., a fusion of the different beginnings embodied in the production of the bell. In the view of others, such as Alexander Kazin,\(^{103}\) Tarkovsky’s view of the world and man is individual and romanticized, distorting the concept of religiosity and allowing man more than God allows. However, in Tarkovsky’s memoirs it is evident that he did not see himself in that way, though religiosity and God are of course different concepts with different access in Tarkovsky’s films.\(^{104}\) There is another view that Tarkovsky represents Neoplatonism, claiming that truth does not perish, and that the father’s death did not take away the secret lying behind the truth of the craft. Even so, we see that there is no attempt in the film to reveal the secret of making a bell. This is where the idea of a sounding bell takes place, which turns into a mystery. And yet, how should we treat Boriska’s attitude, his determination to take what he does not know, and finally his lie in this short story? What does this represent – a new, non-binding approach to ingenuity or the deliberate display of a world created by other principles? The medieval order was broken, and only the flowing of the river would appear, according to Powell-Jones,\(^{105}\) as a permanent stream throughout the film.

Above all, the author creates an emotional spectacle: episodes of the affectation of Boriska, increasing the psychological tension in him, and the viewer who identifies with him, while waiting for the event. Boriska undergoes several tests: a swampy space in which recognizable signs are sought, distraction, hysteria, faith of unclear origin, and finally the exit to some ‘promised land’ where the clay needed to obtain the shape of a bell is discovered. In the end, the Bell peals without the help of the teacher-master and the mystery he transmits. It is not the knowledge of the mystery that determines the work, but rather that the apprentice creates a mystery through his activities and becomes a master. The truth sought by an apprentice who determined and legitimized himself as a master is embodied and revealed, thus becoming a mystery.

Tarkovsky plays with the mystery of the craft in order to move on to other fundamental and simple everyday things that are important for the creation of the world. The world created by the director is simply the opposite of the world described by medievalists according to the traditional sequence of actions, especially with regard to master training.

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\(^{103}\) Александер Леонидович Казин, *Философия искусства в русской и европейской духовной традиции* (Алетейя, 2000).


Tarkovsky shows a pulsating reality, revealed various events. We can assume that the diversity of that world is due to personal service as a particularly sensitive, refined relationship with the world, and the creativity that accompanies it. Boriska, who has mastered the mystery in such a sensitive and fragile yet at the same time responsible position, thus initiating himself, is at the end of the story crying in a very human way overshadowed by the sound of a bell testifying to a sacred moment. No act of enlightenment revealed the secret to Boriska as an apprentice, just as there were no mystical experiences revealing the secret.

We see that the awakening took place in another person, one who, like Boriska, lived in a wilderness period because he had made vows of silence. The event awakens the iconic master Andrey Rublyov and shatters his silence: not bringing him to return to the rhythm of the verbalized world, but to show attention to Boriska, who is crushed by his miraculous activities. Saying a word that focuses on the crushed other is an action for which it is worth breaking silence. Rublyov is not a participant in the event who suddenly awakes, but the observer. We could attribute such an event to the eventuality and transversality discussed by Deleuze and Guattari, where a component of one assemblage merges with a component from a completely different assemblage when those assemblages are connected in interassemblage. If we continue to apply the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari in order to understand Tarkovsky’s work, and in particular that of Deleuze, who studied Tarkovsky’s films in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, we see another conception of this process, in which the virtual is real but simply waiting for an opportunity to actualize, and this requires a corresponding consistency of forces (in this case conviction and effort). This also allows us to consider the unpredictable medieval reality created by Tarkovsky, which turns into a chain of events that is difficult for the human mind to comprehend because it combines semantic fields with nothing in common at first sight.

However, it is precisely this ‘at first sight’ that must be denied here in order to have another look at the world, allowing us to notice and connect the most unexpected things. From the many images that emerge in the consciousness on a difficult-to-tangible basis but have a common connection: from the harmony of the bell’s abundance and the weeping of the apprentice, from suffering and joy at the same time, from the invigorating force of nature, emerges the recognizable figure of the teacher. That cannot be explained or understood from God’s words to the artisan Bazalel in the Bible and what St. Augustine heard from the inner

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107 Deleuze, *Cinema 2. The Time-Image*. 
Boriska became a master not of the same craft as the master of icons Andrey Rublyov, but of a different craft. It does not matter. As reality opens up, as potential opportunities emerge, the teacher and his known mystery emerge. It is a testimony to occurrence and therefore it is not the revelation of the mystery that leads to creation, but rather creation that opens the mystery. Our traditionally perceived order of teaching: the teacher/master — his secret — the disciple/apprentice is reversed and found in the following order: the apprentice — the secret he seeks — the master. The only action taken by the emerging teacher is the attention shown to the student. Nothing special happened between them except for one action, and that was not taken to encourage the student before his work, but afterwards. Such unexpected action interfaces were detected by chance. Connections in the event are detected in different places, or rather spaces.

From Deleuze’s point of view, we could say that this image is a crystal. In *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, Deleuze discusses image-time as an opportunity to reach the depths of virtuality. He associates the image with time. Time-image allows for present, past, and future experiences independent of our usual chronological time and cinematic montage. Deleuze sees time-image as a way to understand and express a world that seems inexpressible and imperceptible. The relationship between man and the world, according to him, is in perpetual rupture and can be restored only by faith, which is properly woven into our relationship with the world by effective cinema. “Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears. The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link.”

That is absolutely in correspondence with Tarkovsky’s claim regarding the importance of faith, even when the situation is absolutely destroyed, apocalyptic or desperate. Describing the image, Deleuze states that:

The image itself is the system of the relationships between its elements, that is, a set of relationships of time from which the variable present only flows. It is in this sense, I think, that Tarkovsky challenges the distinction between montage and shot when he defines cinema by the ‘pressure of time’ in the shot.

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111 Deleuze, *Cinema 2. The Time-Image*, xii.
The understanding of cinema as a moving image was served by the division of Deleuze’s image into movement-image and time-image, the former classified as used in classical cinema and the latter in contemporary cinema, or more precisely only in a part of contemporary cinema. The second is also related to the imagination, and

The imaginary isn’t the unreal; it’s the indiscernibility of real and unreal. The two terms don’t become interchangeable, they remain distinct, but the distinction between them keeps changing round.112

Moreover ‘The imaginary is the crystal-image’,113 although imagination is more of a means of producing crystals, and, according to Deleuze, only the crystal has a heuristic function. The power of uncertainty is visible in the crystal, in other words the worth of imagination is overstepped by visibility in the crystal and presentation of pure time. “The power of falsity is time itself, not because time has changing contents but because the form of time as becoming brings into question any formal model of truth.”114 This kind of cinema is called by the author a cinema of time or a cinema of undecidability. Jūratė Baranova, based on Deleuze and other philosophers, analyses and compares two similar situations revealing crystals in Tarkovsky’s and Werner Herzog’s work, when the secret of mastery is unknown, and when masterful action is required. Nevertheless, they are both forced by desperation, showing the difference: in Herzog’s film The Heart of Glass (1976), desperation manifests itself as madness, and in Tarkovsky’s Andrey Rublyov, as attention, compassion, reconciliation. She states that:

Although Deleuze (in our mind undeservedly) sees Tarkovsky’s time crystal as closed and Herzog’s as open, Deleuze constantly mentions Tarkovsky when considering the problem of crystalline time.115

In doing so, the author calls the closed nature of the Tarkovsky crystal into question. Bird and Powell-Jones also find in Tarkovsky’s Andrey Rublyov and his short story Bell a film of unpredictability, although they emphasize not the crystals, as Deleuze does, but the imprints, the medium,

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113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
and the testimony. Tarkovsky had his special access to time; he thought that cinema is able to record time. In *Sculpting in Time* he says:

I see it as my professional task then, to create my own, distinctive flow of time, and convey in the shot a sense of its movement – from lazy and soporific to stormy and swift – and to one person it will seem one way, to another, another.\(^{116}\)

That is sculpting in time. What Deleuze named as crystals, especially when discussing time-image, Tarkovsky named as visible time, the real form of time. Baranova explicated its visibility through the analysis of two versions of the film *Andrey Rublyov*, and following Tarkovsky arguing that the shortened version “speaks not about defects in the film, but rather about the inability of observers to grasp Tarkovsky’s new conception of cinematic time.”\(^ {117}\)

5.2. The Master’s Lie and Breaking Silence

As we can see, Tarkovsky offers a distorted relation to social and historical reality – the manifestation of Boriska’s lie. Boriska is afraid of his lies, whose positive intention seems to be not enough to guarantee positive results. Still, his lie is an opportunity for his promise to become true but doubt and uncertainty frighten him. Man is typically afraid of the unknown, while the stress of knowledge based on clear arguments is seen as true, as the basis of worldly order and peace. Tarkovsky obviously denies the lie by showing a different world in which all possibilities are potentialities, and which is partly reminiscent of a delicately adventurous experience through risk and the actualization of uncertainty. Boriska is like a ‘Deleuzian gang’:

being a ‘gang’ – gangs live through the worst dangers; forming judges, courts, schools, families and conjugalities again. But what is good in a gang, in principle, is that each goes about his own business while encountering others, each brings in his loot and a becoming is sketched out – a bloc starts moving – which no longer belongs to anyone, but is ‘between’ everyone, like a little boat which children let slip and lose, and is stolen by others.\(^ {118}\)

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\(^{116}\) Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time*, 120-121.

\(^{117}\) Jūratė Baranova, “The Tension between Created Time and Real Time in Andrey Tarkovsky’s Film Andrey Rublyov,” in *Creativity Studies* 12, no. 2 (2019): 338.

\(^{118}\) Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 9.
A similar example is described by the Deleuze scholar Semetsky, who recounts a historical event in which a girl from a Russian dissident family cannot read but lies that she understands because she recognizes some pictures next to the text. Indeed, after several pretended readings of the text, she begins in fact to read the unfamiliar text, recognizing the words. In this case, there is no lie; there is a fear of uncertainty and by overcoming it and mediating the flows of information forces, the potential possibilities come true. This has to do with risk, tension, and adventure. This state requires special attention to a world already full of surprises. No truth, no lie, just an event occurring as a surprise at the right time, with the maximum human readiness to be in an open, tense relationship with the environment, to be a medium. It is like fulfilment achieved in the state of affect, a resonance that provides a new quality when moving from an increase of intensity to a new consistency. Such an open relationship is an essential condition for the diversity of reality, for its crystals to emerge.

We can say that Tarkovsky’s cinema shows how the virtual and the unknown can be fulfilled. In this world created by Tarkovsky, there is no lie as traditionally understood; it is a testimony of fulfilment. And the ingenuity of the master here means a purified relationship with reality, in which there is no separation between ‘I know – I do not know’ or ‘virtual – real’, there is no inspiration and no transmission of mystery, only a bold move into an unknown space, risk, self-sacrifice and experimenting in experience. All confused, rationally inexplicable or inverse sights are needed to see bright things in grey things and sacred things in profane things, because the world has turned to completely different values and there are no longer any instructions from the lord or evaluation of masterpieces by experts, as we find in medieval texts or the Bible. The spilled and merged world still ‘plays’ with contrasts, like miracles: there is no visible – invisible, it does not allow for stopping their dynamics, for preserving it and finally explaining it. Anyone can now be in the place of an expert. Boriska called himself a master or an expert in mastery and became one. His ingenuity was simply the courage to dive into the creation of the lust for creating that had overwhelmed him and to become an expert who was rather a mediator at some other indefinable level of expert activity.

Deleuze and Guattari distinguish the concept of artist-artisan in their philosophy. This means that such a person is only a mediator in opening up space to chaos and mediating the flows streaming from it. Not just

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when opening, but also when closing. It takes courage to stand in between, to be the one through whom and through which the forces flow, waiting for fulfilment and eventfulness. Deleuze and Guattari see the creative forces of the universe through interactions with the forces of chaos that provide novelty, and therefore perceive the creator not primarily as a unique personality, a genius, but rather as an artisan. An artisan, not in the old sense as one who argues that the most important thing is to do his technical work very professionally, but in another sense that allows him to be treated as a mediator in the flow of large forces and energy flows. A mediator between the old and the new who takes advantage of affectation, thus opening up to the novelty and potential of chaos, opportunities that are temporarily limited, i.e., flows by reterritorializing and stabilizing. “To be an artisan and no longer an artist, creator, or founder, is the only way to become cosmic, to leave the milieus and the earth behind.”

The creator is an artist-artisan, very close to the earth, to existing reality, and at the same time making an effort to break away from it towards chaos, towards what is beyond everyday life – towards ideals, dreams, imagination. Is it possible to link this reterritorialization in the person of Boriska to the imprinted time and the images imprinted during it, as Bird suggests, pointing to the imprint of St. George on a cast bell and Boriska sitting beside it? Probably by opening a link to another layer of interpretation of the short story, by linking events at different times, with different meanings and different knowledge, making one imprint on another, and, as Deleuze argues, questioning ‘any formal model of truth’ in visual-time.

At the end of Tarkovsky’s film, fragments of icons are shown, in which the details are completely separated, and it seems that what matters here is not their horizontal coupling with others, but their scattering over a wide surface and at the same time depth. In this case, the viewer’s gaze seems to encompass not only a planar image, and testify to the perfection of the work, but to see fragments as the master’s special touches with reality, testifying to what is timeless, and posed as if by someone other than the master.

5.3. Time Crystal and Sound: Between Silence and Hysterical Speech

Analyzing the sound in Tarkovsky’s films, Julia Shpinitskaya followed by Andrea Truppin, says:

121 See Bird, *Andrey Tarkovsky and Contemporary Art: Medium and Mediation*.
Tarkovsky’s use of sound permits his films to travel smoothly through multiple and equally weighted layers of experience. These layers flow simultaneously through one another without the rigid hierarchy that separates most filmic worlds into ‘reality’ and ‘fantasy’.

She names Tarkovsky’s films as magic realism, finding in his films a lot of natural sounds, some everyday noise, classical music such as Bach, and also electronic music and Eastern traditional tunes. Tarkovsky in her view has great sensitivity towards sound in his films.

Redner tried to identify a methodological bridge to link film theory and music. In Deleuzian philosophy he found many possibilities to extend the traditional understanding and to apply his theory for film analysis relating to scores and music. In our case, it is not so much music as sound that is important, because music is used only twice and then quite briefly.

We hear a large number of natural sounds from nature and everyday life. Music appears meaningfully only at the end of the novel. There are numerous birds singing, nature sounds, and later sounds of the main natural elements such as rain, fire, and earth, which really recalls Michalkovic’s interpretation when he described the main forces in films: fire, earth, and water. There is especially a great deal of rain imagery and sound, as Deleuze noticed in his analysis of Tarkovsky’s films, saying that rain “provides rhythm for each film” and asking what is the purpose of it? What is its function? Deleuze is looking for time crystals and asks whether they are open as in Herzog’s films, or on the contrary closed. In one way, that is a difficult question. For example, Baranova, as we mentioned, already questions the Deleuzian position towards crystals of time in Tarkovsky’s films, though she is investigating image, not sound, which is also related to time, especially when describing crystalline films. Deleuze says that “time itself becomes a thing of sound.” How does that happen?

Among different sounds – the noise of ropes stretching and a strange woman crying – we hear that Boriska speaks with a stammer.

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124 Redner, Deleuze and Film Music. Building a Methodological Bridge between Film Theory and Music.
125 Михалкович, Андрея Тарковский.
126 Deleuze, Cinema 2. The Time-Image, 75.
127 Ibid., 94.
Moreover, he shouts throughout the entire production of Bell. His behaviour is hysterical, abnormal and very passionate. His desire leads to absolute affection. Only such a crazy person can take responsibility for creating the bell. In Deleuze and Parnet’s Dialogues, Deleuze says that stammering, running, stealing, being a child, is the way to create novelty. In Deleuzian words: “A style is managing to stammer in one’s own language. It is difficult, because there has to be a need for such stammering,” although he emphasizes not so much stammering in speech, as the stammerer of the language itself.

We have a similar example in this film, where Boriska is a stammerer, a teenager, who we can also consider as a child, naïve, not sensible enough, much more spontaneous, experimenting, running, changing places, moving through the chaos. Boriska’s voice is irritating and hysterical, and he seems to destroy order around him rather creating something. On the one hand, his stammering is a question of speech, not of language itself, but on the other hand, taking into account many other aspects, such as timbre, screams, shouting, and emotional or hysterical cracks in his speech, we can see that the stammering touches upon the language itself. It is

…minoritarian-becoming, not pretending, not playing or imitating the child, the madman, the woman, the animal, the stammerer or the foreigner, but becoming all these, in order to invent new forces or new weapons.129

There is no doubt that his behaviour and voice are deterritorializing, quite unlike the voice of Rublyov, which is always quiet and mature until he decides to dive into silence – to make vows of silence. Andrey Tarkovsky plays with this contrast – the hysterical and very childish voice of Boriska and the seriousness and silence of Rublyov. Both are masters or on the way to becoming masters, both are absolutely different, their expressions belying comparison. Rublyov’s silence when compared with Boriska’s neurotic speech is exactly the link of difference and at the same time of rupture in tradition that allows giving birth to the new. New bell, new connection of both, new assemblage. This needed a great amount of effort and desire and led to the total exhaustion of Boriska. As Deleuze states:

The voices are waves or flows that direct and distribute linguistic corpuscles. When one exhausts the possible with words, one

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128 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 4.  
129 Ibid., 5.
cuts and chops atoms, and when one exhausts the words themselves, one dries up the flows.\textsuperscript{130}

Perhaps we can consider that Boriska’s cry was exactly that cutting and chopping of atoms, and on the other hand also the way to wet the dried-up flow. It was the absolute manifestation of Boriska’s imagination, ideas, and dreams. According to Redner’s theory, voice and sound in Tarkovsky’s films provide the image with rhythmic lines. Deleuze in \textit{Cinema 2: The Time–Image} distinguishes two regimes of rhythm: \textit{gallop} and \textit{ritornello}:

The horse and the bird would be two great figures, one of which carries away and speeds up the order, but the other of which is reborn from itself up to the final destruction.\textsuperscript{131}

The first is braking, moving, running, giving impetus, while the second is calm, practically wordless and reterritorializing. In this case, we can see the galloping rhythmic line in the voice of Boriska and \textit{ritornello} in Rublyov. Both have to meet or be interchangeable, and their meeting was exactly that composition. Both living for creation, art, becoming artisans. In their meeting we can observe and hear the crystal-image, which “is as much a matter of sound as it is optical.”\textsuperscript{132} Tarkovsky himself said, that there is no need for music in films, because “properly organized in a film, the resonant world is musical in its essence – and that is the true music of cinema”;\textsuperscript{133} nevertheless, he did use music, and he preferred electronic sounds having the special effect of imprinting the sounding world. In his view, however, sound and image composition have a particular style:

As soon as the sounds of the visible world, reflected by the screen, are removed from it, or that world is filled, for the sake of the image, with extraneous sounds that don’t exist literally, or if the real sounds are distorted so that they no longer correspond with the image – then the film acquires a resonance.\textsuperscript{134}

In sum, the beauty of grey connections in cinematic art (in this case, in Tarkovsky’s black-and-white film \textit{Andrey Rublyov}) opens as a crystal, which can be named a time crystal, an image crystal and a sound crystal. In the film, the portrait of the master, or more exactly of the apprentice,

\textsuperscript{131} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 2. The Time–Image}, 94.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{133} Tarkovsky, \textit{Sculpting in Time}, 159.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 162.
is only a medium for revealing a crystal. He experiments, takes risks, and
dives into the whirlpool of chaos to create order. According to Deleuze
and Guattari’s philosophy, his imagination works for production, while
the crystal has heuristic purposes. On the other hand, he is confronted
with the universe and others, who become witnesses to his minoritarian
position, nevertheless taking responsibility, and the ingenuity that
emerges and manifests from different encounters remains beyond any
rational cognition. In this way, the secret is not repudiated but is discov-
ered in the most unexpected ways and in the most unexpected places,
because it can be scattered, it can be transferred to the lips of stranger, a
seemingly unrelated person, and it can be uttered in an absolutely irrele-
vant form. It is not knowledge of the mystery that makes it possible to
create the object, but the creative process that reveals the mystery. This
offers a pedagogical insight: the structure of the hierarchical vertical divi-
sion ‘disciple-apprentice-master’ also undergoes a change by shifting the
emphasis from the master to the apprentice as a medium, one who does
not yet know how, but can potentially create as a master. Tarkovsky, cre-
ator of the film Andrey Rublyov and the short story Bell, says that it is not
important to give ready-made answers. It is more important for him to
believe in light and perspective, having previously experienced suffering,
fear and catharsis – purification.135 Neither does the author say whether
this light is sacred, for light is a refined relationship with reality that has
no clear boundaries: neither truth nor lie.

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Chapter 11

Voice, Sound and Noise: From the Pedagogy of Aesthetic to Eco-Pedagogy and Beyond

LILJA DUOBLIENĖ

1. To Hear, Listen and Investigate

Whereas in the previous chapter our research was inspired by theoretical interest and love for music and sound in films and performances, in this chapter we start from an experience: when we are with colleagues and students in open spaces subject to a lot of different sounds and noise, we have almost no reaction to the sound and background noise except in the case of extremely loud, unpleasant or very unexpected noises. Meanwhile other details, visual for example, are noticed very easily and quickly. Why is this? What is wrong with the pedagogy of listening? Why does sound so unnoticeably slip through our ears? The end of last century brought a new direction in the visual,\(^1\) do we need another direction? If the visual change is related to media development and to multimodality in culture and education, can we relate audio media to this technological change? Why do educators still not pay enough attention to sound? One of the responses to that question is that Western culture did not pay enough attention to listening and hearing.\(^2\) John Cage obviously had great influence on changing the understanding of sound, noise and silence,\(^3\) especially after releasing his composition 4’33 in 1954, which changed the understanding of music culture. Nevertheless, with the exception of music education, education in general was not influenced by sound pedagogy. Raymond Murray Schafer was without doubt one of those who worked intensively with the perception of sound, although this has been recognized only fairly recently since noise pollution and also noise culture have started to be discussed in our everyday and cultural lives. Sound perception was first of all experimented in art, in performances (like those

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of George Maciunas, author of the Fluxus manifesto), but later step by step it penetrated into the communication and educational fields.

School has changed fundamentally in recent decades and is now quite different from the school described by Michel Foucault⁴ or Ivan Illich,⁵ when the school functioned more like a prison with a very strict disciplinary regime for the body and soul. Nevertheless, we still have many carry-overs from the past, especially as regards sound, when silence is a tool for the disciplinary apparatus, punishing everybody who uses or produces sound at the wrong time or place. Sound and noise through play, projects, group work, and discussions enter the educational process unavoidably; they contribute to emotional expression but are rarely treated as an educational object needing investigation. Sound is the privilege of music schools or music lessons and is quite unusual in other school subjects, except when it annoys administrators or disturbs control of the educational process.

Voice, sound and noise have much in common – all are heard and relate to one sense, though their meaning, importance and investigation are understood and discussed differently depending on the point of view and approach to the analysis. I distinguish two approaches: (1) ‘voice’ discourse in sociology and critical theory and following it critical pedagogy, (2) the postmodern/posthumanist/postqualitative research perspective towards voice, sound and noise. According to the first approach in sociology and the philosophy of education, the investigation of voice is related to the right of students to have their own opinion, express it, and make an authentic utterance when somebody gives them the right to speak, or they find a way to express their opinion by themselves. The second approach focuses not on a person and a person’s viewpoint, but rather on the voice, or if that is not allowed, simply on sound and noise. It investigates how sound influences the educational process. It is related to ethico-onto-epistemological philosophy rather than critical theory.

The investigation of ‘voice’ discourse, side by side with the investigation of visual material, is on the agenda of many scholars, especially Peter McLaren, Henry Giroux, Joe Kincheloe⁶ and some other representatives of critical pedagogy. McLaren, who struggled a great deal for the

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recognition of students’ right to express their voice, in a similar way to Giroux, thinks that:

Critical and affirming pedagogy has to be constructed around the stories that people tell, the ways in which students and teachers author meaning, and the possibilities that underlie the experiences that shape their voices. It is around the concept of voice that a theory of both teaching and learning can take place, one that points to new forms of social relations and to new and challenging ways of confronting everyday life.\(^7\)

From the critical pedagogy approach, voice is treated as a weapon of liberation of power, liberation of music understanding and sound understanding. For example, Adorno, who was quite popular among critical pedagogues, treats the liberation of music and sound like social liberalization, where every event depends on the context and social flow. In his words: “The most progressive level of technical procedures designs tasks before which traditional sounds reveal themselves as impotent clichés,”\(^8\) also because “the faculty of the ear to perceive what is right or wrong is unequivocally dependent upon this single chord and not upon abstract reflection regarding the total niveau of technique.”\(^9\) In his view:

This energy pursues its course in the same sense as does actual society, even when energy and society have become totally unaware of each other and have come into conflict with each other.\(^10\)

In “Education after Auschwitz,” Adorno worries about the humanization of education, recognizing that the main purpose of pedagogy is to reveal the problems of capitalism and the consumer society; Giroux saw that as good arguments for talking about crossing borders. In his view:

Recognizing how crucial education was in shaping everyday life and the conditions that made critique both possible and necessary, Adorno insisted that the desire for freedom and liberation

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\(^9\) Ibid., 36.

\(^10\) Ibid., 33.
was function of pedagogy and could not be assumed a priori. At the same time, Adorno was acutely aware that education took place both in schools and in large public spheres, especially in the realm of media.\textsuperscript{11}

But the biggest role that Giroux found in Adorno’s texts is imagination and pedagogy “as a point of departure for imagining autonomy, recognizing the interdependency of human life, and stopping cycles of violence.”\textsuperscript{12}

Frank Abrahams, following Joe Kincheloe’s descriptions of critical pedagogy, says that: “Critical pedagogy means different things to different people.”\textsuperscript{13} More than that, in his view it should be described through the understanding of policy and ideology and power struggles: the struggling of those who are powerless against those who are in power. In the educational context, this can be teachers struggling against head teachers, the school community against political power, students against teachers etc., and all of them struggle for access to knowledge and one’s ‘own voice and practice’. In Kincheloe’s view:

In this context, educators deal not only with questions of schooling, curriculum, and educational policy but also with social justice and human possibility.\textsuperscript{14}

Abrahams rethought critical pedagogy in the perspective of music and musicking and showed the way to liberalize music education, to turn to experimentation and autonomous taste and understanding, in other words to ‘the child’s own music’. He describes how students react in different ways to sounds they hear, and express their reactions through different instruments, signs and movements. “Children can be seen teaching their teachers in addition to the teachers instructing the children.”\textsuperscript{15} The analysis of experimentation with sound and musicking is used also by Stover,\textsuperscript{16} though he interprets the same things using Deleuzian approach, according to which emphasis is placed not on the rights of students and their struggle for freedom in education, but rather on seeking to catch the

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 248.
\textsuperscript{14} Kincheloe, \textit{Critical Pedagogy}, 7.
\textsuperscript{15} Abrahams, “Musicing Paolo Freire,” 227.
\textsuperscript{16} Stover, “Affect, Play and Becoming-Musicking.”
unique possibilities of play in assemblages, which include, and are composed of heterogenic elements. He raises the question: What would this kind of musicking look like – or, better, sound like? He finds the process of education first of all in the context of the natural and cultural environment through the participatory interactions between humans and nonhumans, and most importantly, as has been mentioned above, through transforming ‘agency’ into ‘agence-ment’. That is related to play (paidia) and especially playing with time – in Stover’s view. Unfortunately, the question of how education can contribute more or less to this vision remains a question for the discussion. It requires the perspective of minor musicking, becoming-minor, which on the one hand means active relational behaviour and involvement in affect, dealing with experimentation and invention, and on the other hand is always beyond the broad understanding and perception of political decisions to teach students according to the official requirements. It always works only as a minor.

In the context of Lithuania (the author’s country), it is important to mention Irena Juozeliūnienė, who rethought voice methodologies in a broader world context, and only subsequently provided some suggestions for Lithuania. It is also important to mention the great theoretician Pat Thomson from Nottingham University, who visited Lithuania as a consultant for a Creative Partnership project and gave many new insights and recommendations regarding research into student creativity, voice and expression. Juozeliūnienė discusses voice discourse from the perspective of research in sociology and describes the meaning of this research: to hear the voice of different social groups, especially what is not said directly and what is not normative. In her view, the research allows one to hear not only the ‘critical voice’, ‘therapeutic voice’ or ‘consumer voice’, but what is most important – the ‘authentic voice’. On the other hand, she thinks that research into the authentic voice cannot avoid a lot of different contextual details, which is why it gives more space to interpretations and eventually different results, and as a consequence loses validity. Voice discourse gives rise to a question: if voice research really works with authenticity, is the origin of the voice authentic and can linguistic information be privileged? Juozeliūnienė especially emphasizes Madeleine Arnot and Diane Reay’s description of ‘pedagogical voice’, which

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17 Ibid., 158.
narrates ‘learned experience’. As regards Arnot and Reay, there is doubt about the authenticity of the voice because it is very often already constructed by the pedagogic code as described by Basil Bernstein. Juozeliūnienė’s suggestion is to involve other media in this voice research, such as visual or audial, because the student voice cannot be identified with a mental solution and its utterance; it usually hides some irrational aspects that could be expressed in a visual way. Some scholars therefore criticize voice research and try to study voice in other ways, adding visual material or changing the ‘voice discourse’.

2. Listening and Having Voice: Methodological Doubts

Tricia M. Kress and Kimberly J. Frazier-Booth, while remaining in the field of voice discourse, try to enrich it through the interpretation of noise. They raise the question of radical listening in the class. What does the teacher hear? How does the teacher react to the noise: ‘white’ (positive) and ‘black’ (negative) noise? Is the teacher prepared to listen to sounds that go beyond white noise and give voice to the student? What is the meaning of Echoes in the voicing process? Both authors and pedagogues with considerable work experience decided to experiment and carry out co/autoethnographic postformal research. They observed their own relationship with their environment, as well as dialogues and reactions to noise. In their case, noise was understood as a metaphor, as something not structured by order and unexpected. “Yet we also recognize, not all ‘noise’ is bad. There is also noise that is harmonious with our worldviews and nudges us forward toward new perspectives” – say the authors. Meanwhile, in academic literature noise is understood as “negative: it is unwanted, other, not something ordered. It is negatively defined – i.e., by what it is not (not acceptable sound, not music, not valid, not a message or a meaning), but it is also a negativity.” It cannot be

25 Though in the scale of noise we find white, brown, pink and grey noise, authors, Kress and Frazier-Booth in their own way, are grouping noise metaphorically.
independent, but on the contrary always depends on reaction. Kress and Frazier-Booth want to show the transformation of noise into voice. They narrate some stories from their lessons, when they used different tools and sources and analyse students’ reactions, thus generating an understanding of students’ needs and problems. Teachers are consequently stimulated to speak in a different way. Both practitioners manage to involve the whole class. The most impressive example of a girl’s voice, which appeared as a venting of her courage and power after a long silence, came from deep frustration. Through this and other examples presented by the authors one can understand the expression of different voices coming from teachers, students, schools or classes as described by McLaren. Nonetheless, it is not clear to what degree these voices perceived through radical listening are authentic, or how much they represent the contrary: the pedagogical code. According to Kress and Frazier-Booth, their research stimulated the appearance of the voice lying under the surface, and the perception of Echoes (another metaphor used in the research). They say:

Sometimes the echoes of one student are revived by a new student years after the first voice has been placed aside – with the same yet different sameness we are constantly looking for.

It is obvious that these student voices are not necessarily rational, and do not represent a direct clear message. They stem from something vague and unstructured. Sometimes they arise from texts and sometimes from created video. Kress and Frazier-Booth name this ‘white noise’. The flow of voices among students and teachers and their exchange of messages, especially when appearing in the form of noise, provided new aspects for this research, aspects that are rather typical for postmodern experiments. Nevertheless, the authors state that first of all they referred to critical pedagogy (Freire, Kincheloe, Giroux and McLaren) as the main theory for the research, then they treat the school community, relationships and dialogue accordingly as a way for asserting equality in the teaching and learning process. Usually, teachers represent power and the oppression of lower groups, but on the contrary their behaviour can be effective in creating democracy through the liberalization of relationships in dialogues with students. In this way, the authors try to show student trans-

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formation through their own transformation: they reflect their own nature and want to transform themselves into ‘educator-activists’, applying their own research in the practice. They note:

But as radical listeners, we need to consider the transformative potential of all noise we encounter in concert with our own worldviews, even noise that is agitating.31

It may be asked, then, how the authors of the research reconcile the two different viewpoints of critical pedagogy and postmodernism, when the former is concerned with social justice and student rights, and also their voice expression, and the latter works with multi-vocasy, assemblages, subjects and objects without clear identity and strict distinctions, but much more with becomings. It seems that Kincheloe mostly provided the incentive to combine the two theories. Kincheloe valued the Freirean position, emphasizing phenomenology as well as some aspects of the postmodern view, mostly related to variability and difference, but also to uncertainty, strangely described as ill-defined and ill-structured problems.32 Raymond A. Horn made great efforts to explain Kincheloe’s viewpoint, especially his post-formal method of research, used also by Kress and Frazier-Boothe. According to Horn:

To understand Joe L. Kincheloe is to understand post-formal thinking; all of his work involves this extension of post-modern political theory into the realm of cognitive theory. This synthesis of postmodern, critical and cognitive theory grounds all of his work.33

He used some of Kincheloe’s older texts in comparison to a kind of dictionary or encyclopedia Kincheloe edited under the title of Critical Pedagogy Primer, published for the first time in 2004. I use this publication for supporting better argumentation around critical pedagogy, although it is very limited with regard to the description of postmodern patterns, except for some aspects we have already mentioned. It is important to take into account that this encyclopedia is written to present the general the-

31 Ibid., 105.
32 Kincheloe, Critical Pedagogy, 165.
From the Pedagogy of Aesthetic to Eco-Pedagogy and Beyond

ory, not just Kincheloe’s personal view, and for this reason Horn’s opinion should not be taken very critically. Critical pedagogist McLaren\textsuperscript{34} similarly referred to some postmodernists such as Jacques Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari. Considering this, we may agree that critical pedagogy can be situated along the way to postmodernism.

In relation to the crisis of representation, scholars have recently started to discuss difficulties in research methodologies. For example, Rupert Cox in \textit{Senses, Anthropology Of} states that

Sarah Pink’s book \textit{Doing Sensory Ethnography} (2009) also tackles this crisis of representation, pushing anthropologists to explore the possibilities of different forms of media, including multimedia, performance and installation, in order to convey sensory experience. These new and varied forms of ethnographic representation require new ways of doing anthropology and of acknowledging the methodological challenges in what Robben and Sluaka describe as ‘sensory fieldwork’.\textsuperscript{35}

In this way, “Pink’s idea of sensory ethnography responds to three theoretical challenges: emplacement, sensory interconnection, and practice as a way of knowing.”\textsuperscript{36} However, an even bigger and deeper research problem stems from the transition from qualitative to post-qualitative research.

Ethnographic research\textsuperscript{37} is very useful for investigating the different practices, views, the human sensory and ‘voice research’.\textsuperscript{38} This is important for overcoming the powerful discourse of educators, whereas postqualitative research methodology, first developed by Elizabeth Adams Pierre,\textsuperscript{39} is much more related to new materialism and the philosophy

\textsuperscript{34} McLaren, \textit{Schooling as a Ritual Performance. Toward a Political Economy of Educational Symbols and Gestures.}


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.


of Deleuze and Guattari, according to which, assemblages are more important than human sensory or voice. Eve Mayes tried to find arguments for and against the mis/use of voice in (post)qualitative voice research. She does not want to be radical, or to find an absolutely pure path following one particular theory (Deleuze, Guattari; or Barad), but taking some elements from both, proposes not to give herself absolute freedom as a researcher by putting all reasons under the umbrella of the (post)qualitative. Instead, she argues the need for responsive engagements:

It is not enough to write about the agential force of matter in our research intra-actions without clearly accounting for what this does to the human utterances that materialized as ‘data’ in our research, and to account for what these methodological moves brought to matter, and what they excluded. This does not mean that ‘participants’ need to always share my questions, or understand everything that I write, but rather that responsive engagements are pursued.\footnote{Mayes, “The Mis/Uses of ‘Voice’ in (Post)Qualitative Research with Children and Young People: Histories, Politics and Ethics,” 1205.}

Working with concept and imagination, Rebecca Coleman and Jessica Ringrose\footnote{Rebecca Coleman and Jessica Ringrose, “Introduction: Deleuze and Research Methodologies,” in \textit{Deleuze and Research Methodologies}, eds. Rebecca Coleman and Jessica Ringrose (Edinburgh, UK: The Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 1-23.} in \textit{Deleuze and Research Methodology} stress the Deleuzoguattarian definition of invention and creation. New concepts help to imagine the potentiality in the world of sounds, to open the real to the potential and to capture the singular in the event. Playing with concepts and looking through their prism is of great interest for the interpretation of music, as well as sound and silence.

Coming back to voice research not only as the right to give an opinion but also as sound, we can consider Riddle’s description, which follows Mazzei in arguing that voice in postqualitative research is not separable from desire, intensities and flows.\footnote{Riddle, “Disrupting Student Voice in Education Research through Music.”} The voice in this case is partial and meaning cannot be captured. This is closer to Pink’s position towards voice, which should be rethought if we adopt postqualitative research methodology, skipping the pretension to seize a pure representation of the meaning. Meanwhile Kress and Frazier-Booth are searching not for representation, but for how noise gave birth to the Echo, which in some way gave us a kind of message, revealed some hidden inner thoughts and emotions finally able to be expressed in an unexpected way, opening up a view of what is going on in the classroom. Noise is not an obstacle or
element of disorder. They give an example taken from the activities of musicians, who are ready to incorporate any sound in their music, even noise. “But a musician will learn the unfamiliar, distant, and even discordant, incorporating it into his own music.” Indeed, following critical pedagogy and post-formal research methodology, the authors tend to outline dialogue and reflection, not diffraction, and to carry out postqualitative research. Indeed Attali and Adorno demonstrated how historically, when towns were expanding rapidly, noise went beyond its traditional understanding of being negative sound. It became part of urban cultural life. Cage described how noise came to music in these words, saying that the creator has to make music not only with an instrument: “hitting, but rubbing, smashing, making sound in every possible way.” In Kress and Frazier-Booth’s analysis that is only partly important as they try to show how in social surroundings a recognizable white noise can encounter black noise, which is unrecognizable and comes from somewhere outside. This is much more difficult to perceive, and everyone must be prepared for that. In their experiments, Kress and Frazier-Booth did a great deal to relate theory with practice, starting from their own reflections on listening, and broadening the understanding of voice discourse with sound pedagogy. They took a step towards new materialism and postqualitative research, but still generally stayed within the position of critical theory, incorporating a large number of modern binary positions.

3. Struggle and Coherence in Sound and Image

Visual culture has come to dominate cultural and social life over the last few decades. It speaks to the audience through images, as Mitchell and Mirzoeff point out, and constitutes a new way of thinking, although today we tend to discuss multimodal culture rather than visual culture, or at least a visual culture involving all other senses and accordingly the media. In social and cultural life, we usually associate video with audio and linguistic, and in education this is often referred to as multiliteracy or multimodal literacy. The move from literacy to multi-literacy and new

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45 Cage, Silence, 87.
literacy is evident in contemporary education. The New London Group distinguishes the following different meanings in describing multiliteracy: linguistic meaning, visual meaning, audio meaning, gestural, spatial, and multimodal patterns of meaning. All of these are important when teaching how to communicate and behave in the modern world and how to acquire a set of important competences. One of the priorities in fostering multiliteracy is multimodal education, which means that the process of learning, and especially teaching, must be focused not only on texts, or verbal messages, but much more on messages coming from the other senses. This requires searching for the most effective ways to link the text and the image, the text and the sound as well as the image and the sound, thus creating a multimodal approach to teaching and learning. The question as to how all these media can be linked creates a challenge for contemporary education. To understand the ‘machine’ of multimodality and how all these media are composed and work together, it is not enough to be familiar with the traditional semiotic explanation of signs in different media as we have already seen above; new ways for composition must be used and invented.

What do we hear when looking into an image? How is sound related to an image? Which senses are stronger? To which sense do we give priority in perception? Remaining for now at a distance from voice research in sociology and education where the voice belongs to somebody and represents their position and emotion, I will consider more closely sound around both agents in the study process – students and teachers. Attention to sound in education was very important in Aristotle’s Politics Book VIII where a distinction is already made between different sounds and harmonies: those which are appropriate for educating students and others which do not fit because they are too emotional or even aggressive. This discourse has been preserved mostly in music schools and music lessons, together with rethinking taste and a new understanding of proper sound as well as its legitimization. It disappeared, however, from general schools and other teaching subjects, or stayed for purposes of discipline and punishment as described by Foucault. The distinction sound-silence or noise-silence was basic in schools for many years and even centuries. It was an instrument for discipline and control, not only of the body but

50 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.
also of the soul of the student. Nowadays we are surrounded by a great number of sounds, usually appearing side by side with visual elements in an educational process; nevertheless, their perception is not being sufficiently developed in practice in comparison with the attention paid to images and visual culture as well as visual education, with the exception of some attention paid to sound in voice projects representing students’ opinions and emotions. It is evident that sound education is more important in different educational projects targeting creativity, and also in cultural or environmental education in lower-level classes, while in upper-level classes students tend much more to express their voice and are trained to do so. If a car passes by outside the classroom, or it is raining, or somebody shouts, or there are noises of pecking, hammering, or buzzing, all these sounds are treated as unimportant and unwanted, or as noise that must be blocked, and immediately windows are closed. Teachers easily recognize what is inappropriate for students and very quickly remove such sounds from the educational environment as ‘trash’ or extraneous sound; meanwhile images which appear unexpectedly provoke a reaction, reflection or evaluation. Why and how this interrelation of image and sound runs in the educational process, how it combines and what is taken into account and what is not—these are questions which can be answered by giving attention to visual culture. Visual culture most often integrates audio: from films to performances, art projects, where sound conquers or is in accord with the visual, also in experiments with imperceptible visual and sound elements.

First, it is important to understand the meaning of sound and image, taking into account traditions that are already popular in contemporary visual art, especially films. They describe how sound gives added value to visual perception or on the contrary minimizes it, how they can be combined to create great and unexpected effects and how the spectator is affected. Images come to our perceptions through space locuses (fragments) and sound comes as a whole acoustic space with its own centre. According to Michail Jampolskij, the source of the sound “essentially restricts imaginable acoustic space, ‘gathering’ it around” and “chimeric construction of visual space finalizes its expression in the acoustic space.” Moreover sound moves in all directions, while the image moves in one direction, and their relationship creates space-time, allowing the spectator to appear in different spaces.

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52 Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener, Film Theory: An Introduction through the Senses (New York: Routledge, 2010).
In academic literature, audible sound is generally described as acoustic waves, with vibration frequencies of 20Hz and 20kHz. It has duration, pitch and loudness. Unlike noise, sound does not have any negative connotation, in other words sound has more or less clear form and structure. In cinema, where our consciousness is very often represented and is reflected as in a mirror, different sounds and noise, as well as music, are among the most important aspects presenting the pulse of daily life. It may be urban noise in the streets in a big city or town, or the rustling of grass and gurgling flow of a river in the countryside, but they are also treated as noise if they are undesirable. In films we can hear very loud sounds or the noise of catastrophes, accidents and other unusual actions with prolonged noisy sounds. Sound can be loud. “One can easily be tempted to follow the dominant path and show students how to navigate it.” But the contrary can also be true, when video material or film works with silence, with different separate sounds in silence, and experiments with a soundscape which is heard. Isabelle Delmotte, working on sound in cinema and agreeing with Béla Balásh that “the use of asynchronicity between sounds and images enables cinema sound to better convey pathos and intimacy in audio-visual narratives,” argues that “cinema sound has the propensity to simultaneously reflect and nourish our individual and cultural relationships to the sonic worlds in which we live.” Delmotte says that:

Our cinematic experience depends on the awareness and sensorial memory of sound professionals, their life through sounds and their listening habits. A fuller understanding of our perpetually changing environments depends on our will to practice a sensorial listening and to lend an ear, and a body, to the fluctuations of sounds and silences, inside and outside movie theaters.

By using the Schafer soundscape theory, she finds the meaning of sound pedagogy and teaching listening.

Nonmusic, artificial effects or natural everyday sound, seems to give a very natural flavour to images we are watching, creating the effect of richness and variability in our lives. These sounds can be diegetic but also not diegetic, i.e., not illustrating an image, having their own rhythmic line. Sounds of this kind can be assessed very differently: the rustling of grass

55 Ibid., 7.
and the flowing stream of a river in the countryside can be very calm and lend to meditation or aesthetization, but may also be perceived as noise in a situation where they are not at the right time or in the right place. Then they become an unpleasant intrusion. These binary perceptions and communications depend on the context, and for many theoreticians and practitioners seem too rigorous. For this reason, many film makers as well as performers nowadays experiment with different compositions of sound and image, trying to give their combinations a new ‘flavour’, new meaning, and open up new possibilities for perceiving the world of sound. In most cases they favour performances from every day in combinations with nature, as well as using combinations of technologies in nature and experimenting with sound and image flow independent of any human intervention. Projects of this kind were started many years ago and still continue (e.g., George Maciunas, Vladimir Tarasov, Alan Kaprov, John Cage, Arnold Schönberg and many others). Of course, as mentioned in the previous chapter, silence is also treated as a special sound in the world and as a part of music. The understanding and explanation of silence as described by Cage in his lectures, was a persuasive example of a new view of music, sound and composition. The easiest way to understand the sounding of silence is to listen to the heart beating, something one can always hear. There are also a great many sounds waiting for actualization and recognition; they may be pleasant or not, loud or not, wanted or not, and treated as noise or not. Step by step, silence and also noise have acquired a respectable place in different art compositions, films and other media products.

We have to know how to work with different media assemblages, multimodality and especially multimodal education. There are examples of people who have the gift of seeing colours with sounds, for example the well-known French musician and composer Olivier Messiaen and Lithuanian painter and composer Mykalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis, whom Messiaen held in high esteem.56 Other people have these skills. This phenomenon of gifted people, where one sensory or cognitive pathway leads to involuntary experiences in a second sensory or cognitive pathway, is named synesthesia. It is a form of hearing colours and seeing sounds. In a conversation with Claude Samuel, Messiaen said:

When I hear music, I see in my mind complexes of colors corresponding to complex of sounds, so it’s understandable that color interests me as well as sound.57

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It is a quite rare phenomenon. Nevertheless experimentally, a search for the union or any combination of colour and sound, and consequently image and sound, can be fostered in every child without any pretension to become one of these gifted people. From this great composer we can also learn the combination of observation and listening of birds. He investigated different birds in different countries and used their melodies and rhythm in his compositions. Being surrounded by nature gave him great inspiration in his work and cultural development in general. In his words: “Civilization has spoiled us, has taken away our freshness of observation.” In this perspective, Messiaen can be considered as an influence on the development of multimodality.

In Lithuania, very few research studies have been carried out on sound education, and on the relationship of sound to image and imagination. No doubt there are studies of synaesthetic ability in the personality of Čiurlionis, but they are mostly found in art studies rather than in pedagogy. One piece of educational research is Vita Venslovaite’s doctoral thesis, which researched sound appearance and perception from a phenomenological point of view. Some other scholars have done more work on creativity in music education, paying less attention to sound perception. Meanwhile a great deal of sound analysis in pedagogy, or literature on teaching listening, can be found in other countries.

I would like now to turn to ecology understood not only in Schafer’s meaning of acoustic ecology, but much more related to the Anthropocene age where sounds of nature or technological sound moved from being the centre of utilitarian observation towards becoming the milieu. In this sense it has voice without being anthropomorphized by people. On the contrary, as Deleuze and Guattari say this sound or voice makes humans unhuman or ‘becoming animal’.

4. Sound in the Ecosystem: Educational Narratives for Protection

Some educationalists have developed sound pedagogy and sound listening involving acoustic ecology, mostly based on Schafer’s theory. There are different kinds of projects related to ecological problems touching upon how capital and technologies have invaded the natural living area, and the disturbance introduced into the order and rhythm of nature, for example Michael B. MacDonald’s project. He works with musicology, trying to adapt Freire’s theory of critical pedagogy to ecological research and also to aesthetics. In his view, ecomusicology “studies the

58 Ibid., 97.
relationships and interconnections between music, people and place, as well as the repercussions and consequences that affect nature and culture.”

MacDonald adopts a critical position towards projects started by government, in other words, towards power. Such projects (for example building oil pipelines) develop natural resources and at the same time destroy the ecosystem in that particular place. He seeks firstly to gain the attention of adults living close to the area in question and involve them in his counter-project. In his research, he used second-order observation, also rooted in Freire’s approach towards developing critical consciousness and critical awareness in the community. MacDonald’s project Sounding the Sacred Headwaters struggles with colonization and the transformation of the world by the capitalist-world system, the use of nature for capitalistic purposes to build oil pipelines. In his words:

The political discourse we were engaging in, our political environment, was bifurcated along Man/Nature binaries inherited from the enlightenment. On the one hand, the colonial capitalist narrative of ‘progress’ and of ‘man against nature’, and on the other, the colonial Romantic construction of a nature without man.

He sees the contradictions of politics, and claims the need to rethink the problems of Man. He started to record sound on location, creating audio maps that were a mix of songs, stories and environmental sounds.

In his approach, a critical pedagogy of music may involve the community and its critical analysis of the situation, integrating “aesthetic systems coupled with linguistic, ethnic, political, legal and economic systems.” That should help the second-order observation he used in his research, and in that way improve awareness in the community. In this way, he seeks to unmask the real purposes of governmental policy and to fight against the hyperreality responsible for misunderstanding the real situation.

MacDonald outlined in his research a multiliteral discourse, in the belief that it helps to involve adults in research and at the same time to

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61 The Sacred Headwaters is a sub-alpine basin and source of the Stikine, the “Grand Canyon of the North,” the Nass and the Skeena rivers which feed the North Pacific in Alaska, the BC coast at Iskut, and a series of inland waterways important to the province of British Columbia.
62 Ibid., 220.
63 Ibid., 222.
foster new skills for adults, to let them acquire new knowledge. He affirms: “Multiliteracies discourse can benefit from the inclusion of Baudrillard’s critical aesthetics, can fit well within critical pedagogy, and can be enhanced through social systems theory.” In MacDonald’s view, that is also an important input critical pedagogy has on ethics in the Anthropocene age. Despite the elegant composition of all these theories he used for research: systems theory, critical pedagogy, multiliteracies discourse and also Anthropocene discourse, doubts do appear regarding their adequacy. Starting with humans worrying about nature, the author involves humans in his project believing that human critical consciousness can be strengthened and reach success. Autopoiesis, as mentioned by the author, can help in the reproduction of the environment, but it is even more important to think about all living beings apart from the human and his consciousness, having in mind sympoiesis. In that case, the human being is not the main agency. A dilemma therefore exists between prioritizing human ethics and consciousness in new conditions and minimizing the human role in Gaia. The author declares that:

There is no privileged claim to ontology here; the community does not get access to the environment in a clearer way, only to an awareness of what they think they know. This is when social systems theory and critical constructivism come into alignment.

The author is evidently close to a more radical approach, though not exactly following it. A more radical view on ethico-onto-epistemology is held by a group of researchers – followers of Barad. They do not separate ontology from ethics and epistemology, allowing them to support one another.

A great deal of discussion has appeared concerning the understanding of the Anthropocene as a time that requires an absolutely different approach to understanding humanity, its habits, its culture and art, and consequently a different education. The Anthropocene is an epoch in which the effect of human behaviour on planet Earth have become absolutely hegemonic and irreversible. The name Anthropocene was suggested in 2000, and although the time when this period started is still a matter of discussion, most agree with the middle of last century. This is the epoch in which there is evident change in the planet’s environment, climate warming, aerosol loading of the atmosphere, ocean acidification,

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64 Ibid., 223.
65 Ibid., 222.
biodiversity loss, a push in uncontrolled directions, and unnatural de velopment selfishly promoting long and comfortable lives for humans. These consequences are usually related to the capitalistic system. Theoreticians rethink the notion of a new agency “not necessarily human, but instead, the one that is at the same time human and nonhuman, organic and inorganic, historical and geological” and not limited to the human brain.

In this situation, two approaches have been suggested for taking responsibility:

1. Reasonable decisions taking into regard consequences, and a radical policy to stop unecological behaviour in the environment, to create green zones, some to protect from human and technological intrusion, and to take much stronger control.

2. Change of behaviour on the part of humans, treating the human being as only one species among many, and behaving in harmony with the rhythms of the planet, minimizing human activities and unmasking the way manipulative capitalism is turning towards ecology.

Describing this debate and the different approaches to the new ethics, David A.G. Clarke makes a distinction between the first, which accepts that nature is the home of culture and is of the same essence, and the second, which is dualistic, describing romantic wild nature and, on the other hand, human culture. In contrast to both approaches, he suggests a third way of Deleuzoguattarian flat ecology, which, in his words “places the emphasis on the continuous and immanent materiality of the world, before the formation of signifying language (i.e., ‘nature’ and ‘culture’).” It presents an “anti-hierarchical plane of continuity.”

Why that is important to us? Research on sound, voice and noise has taken a different direction. Research on sound has moved in the direction of ethico-onto-epistemology or transcendental empiricism or realism, or also speculative realism, object-oriented ontology and consequently flat environmental pedagogy, partly stemming from the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari.

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How can image or sound be investigated not from a human position and not only subjectively? How can we recognize the sounding of a planet, other creations and objects? A large number of new projects appeared, some related to Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of sound and others taking a slightly different approach, related to the ideas of Meillassoux, Malabou, Barad, Braidotti, and Haraway.

Mickey Vallee in *Sounding the Anthropocene* gives us a description of the specificity of sounding, affirming that it differs from “sonification, the latter of which refers to contemporary practices that organize data into sound (a transduction)” and that “sounding has little to do with sound, and less so with the physiology of hearing.” He thinks of sounding as kinetic activity, suggesting that sounding beholds a unique relationship with emerging sound technologies, which can capture a higher-resolution larger data set of imperceptible vibrations through a coded and technologically bound interface. Contemporary scientific research uses sounding as a method for detecting changes in biodiversity and the environment. In sounding, animals are defined by their acoustic properties over and above their visual phenotypes.

He tries to rethink sounding from two positions: Heideggerian, which works with the problem of sounding representation and tension between earth and the world, and Julian Henriques’ based on kinetic activities, social and cultural practices and also becoming. Consequently Vallee finds a way to link both approaches. He distinguishes three components required by sounding:

1. the global concept through which sounding is theorized as based on strife between earth and world (*Anthropocene*);
2. the scientific practice of sounding as a kinetic transduction of imperceptible vibrations (*bioacoustics*); and
3. the collective response to the necessity for sounding on global and local timeframes (*citizen science*).

Vallee’s research is characterized by a move towards ‘datum’ and ‘captum’, devoting considerable argumentation to understanding how to perceive and use bioacoustics and citizen science, which absolutely

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71 Ibid., 202.
change the understanding of the role of science, knowledge, experimentation and invention. He stresses the role of the community in gathering and recognizing knowledge, and how the community can navigate in a society of control and despite control, appearing as active citizenship and making knowledge not only interdisciplinary but also intra-disciplinary. The description of meta sound (vibrations undetectable by the human ear) and special behaviour with the imperceptible as well as the invisible enables him to come to some conclusions, among which I would like to stress one in particular:

Bioacoustics research is based less in the aesthetic consideration of the ‘nature which moves itself’ than it is of using the aesthetic (the ‘sensoria’ of the Anthropocene) as a means of rupturing and changing our ethics and our morality. Bioacoustics seeks to repair the damage of aesthetic instantiation as well as corporate extraction, both of which belong to the same colonialist enterprise.73

It is a matter of absolutely different cognition and research methodology, close to what Barad mentions regarding ethico-onto-epistemology.

In support of these approaches, it is important to give examples of some projects which are more or less related to this theory and description of sounding. jagodzinski, for example, describes Denis Herzing’s project with dolphins: Playing ‘scarf thief’. Each dolphin in a pod has a signature ‘voice’ or sound.74 “The dolphins began to spontaneously mimic researchers’ vocalizations, postures,”75 and in that way invited Herzing into their game. In jagodzinski’s words, it was not like a circus performance, but a dialogue, a new relationship, communication, which later helped researchers create a new device allowing for speech in a purposeful way. Despite that, this game created a ‘zone of discernibility-nature-culture in alliance’;76 moreover through his game Herzing became an animal — became a dolphin. Coinciding with Ziarek, jagodzinski calls that the ‘middle voice’ which works through ‘relating by non-relating’, because “letting be happens, instead enables something to become what it properly is.”77

73 Ibid., 206.
75 Ibid., 164.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
In that way, its relating is released from power. In his Introduction to *Interrogating the Anthropocene*, jagodzinski lists many creative and imaginary projects about human relations with the world of minerals as well as phenomena of nature in the mode of passive vitalism, following Colebrook.\(^78\) It can be becoming stone, becoming cloud or becoming water. That is also the exploration of nature intelligence. jagodzinski gives an impressive example from Natalie Jeremijenko’s Mussel Choir. The art project

utilizes a ‘computer-model-based approach’. Mussels are fitted with sensors in their shells that measure the opening and closing of the shells in reaction to the freshness and health of the water they are placed in. The data collected is then converted into sound for public display, which makes legible ‘mussel’ behavior that is otherwise imperceptible.\(^79\)

In jagodzinski’s view, a distinction is thus established between Anthropocene art and ecological or environmental art. The former presents difficulties as regards visual and audio representation, creating the need for technologies to collaborate in such projects. Once again: it is oriented not towards aesthetization, but towards a rethinking and new understanding of the processes in our planet. Though Anthropocene art, like every other new phenomenon, can be understood as a stage for continuing biopolitics, and the selection and redistribution of power, Audronė Žukauskaitė rethinks the subject of Anthropocene art and, using Mirzoeff’s ideas towards the commercial visualization of the Anthropocene, looks for other opportunities for art.\(^80\) She finds a way to visualize alternatively, or in other words to understand visualization from the viewpoint of other species. For that, she presented two audio-visual projects in Lithuania: *Acid Forest* (2018, a documentary film directed by Rugilė Barzdžiukaitė) and *Sun and Sea (Marina)* (2019, award winner at the Venice biennale directed by Rugilė Barzdžiukaitė, Vaiva Grainytė, and Lina Lapelytė). Žukauskaitė does not abandon visualization as an alternative way to struggle with capitalistic global policy but reverses the direction of the gaze. According to Žukauskaitė, from the viewpoint of the flight of a bird, the gaze becomes not-quite-human or non-human, and shows the risky situation of humanity, which potentially becomes ‘bare life’, facing


\(^79\) Ibid., 44.

its end. I would say that these projects, working with audio as well as the visual, pay a lot of attention to sound and music. If Žukauskaitė finds a reversed gaze, I find in these projects other aberrant aspects of sound: the kind of sounding mentioned by Vallee and also by Deleuze and Guattari affirming that

the reign of birds seems to have been replaced by the age of insects, with its much more molecular vibrations, chirring, rustling, buzzing, clicking, scratching, and scraping…The insect is closer, better able to make audible the truth that all becomings are molecular…The molecular has the capacity to make the elementary communicate with the cosmic.81

As Vallee observes, Deleuze and Guattari stress not the watcherbird, not the gaze in isolation, but rather the sound of insects, and the capture of warbling,82 and in my view that is a molecular move and becoming which means much more being imperceptible. Unfortunately, in Acid Forest83 the sound is produced by a flock of birds, not by insects. Nevertheless, it has its own unpleasant buzzing sound, which the human ear can detect as noise, and which it is hardly possible to describe as formed or structured. Image transforms audio perception and sound becomes unwanted and unpleasant. It seems that it is de-aesthetization of anesthetic aesthetic through demonstrating the hyperobject – the situation of the Anthropocene.84

Another example from Žukauskaitė is directly related to sounding in the bioworld. In Interspecies Sonification: Deleuze, Simondon and Bioart, she presents a project, or rather a specific example of bioart, namely, Aurelia 1+Hz/ proto viva sonification (2015) by Robertina Šebjanič.

The artwork uses bioacoustics (sounds, produced by Aurelia aurita, of a moon jellyfish, which were recorded at a marine station) to interrogate the interspecies communication between humans and marine animals. Aurelia aurita is an ancient species, having rudimentary sensory nerves that allow it to perceive light, smell, and orientation. Its gravity receptors, containing calcium crystals, are similar to our Vestibule system. In this sense, the artwork creates a certain ‘analogical paradigmatism’, which makes it possible to examine its cohabitation with other

81 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 308.
82 Vallee, “Sounding the Anthropocene,” 211.
83 Acid Forest directed by Rugilė Barzdžiukaitė (2018).
living systems. The interactive performance features live transmitted sound generated by Aurelia aurita; this sound is navigated by the performer Robertina Šebjanič, thus creating interspecies sonification as a kind of ‘unnatural participation’.  

In her artistic research, Šebjanič finds a major human intervention that destroys the natural life of ocean. The recording of sound in water gives a real view of oceans and the lives of species that are disturbed by human intervention and technological noise. She also shows how ocean creations are used for producing cosmetics promising to prolong human lives. This is done at the expense of other lives.

There are more or less similar experimental projects and installations in Lithuania. For example, the documentary film Sengėrė (The Ancient Woods) directed by Mindaugas Survila. He filmed animals in an almost uninhabited old forest. At the same time, he records natural sound in the empty forest, in the kingdom of animals, using a portable tent placed somewhere on the branches of big trees or similar objects to provide a shelter for the photographer. The problem was keeping him and his camera in complete silence, without the slightest movement inside the tent, so as not to attract the attention of forest animals. This project aimed to fix the natural forest life, avoiding any intervention from civilization. It is very ambitious to describe the project as Anthropocene art; it is too aesthetic; nevertheless, it appeared as quite progressive in the Lithuanian context.

Another project was carried out by Andrius Šarapovas, who recorded the humming of forest trees in winter: a recording of winter forest silence, but silence only from the human point of view. In fact, there was a rhythm, a very specific rhythm of nature, stemming from the humming sound of trees. Šarapovas is very sensitive towards the sounds of nature and of technologies also. The former project was very different from the art project ‘Tele2’, which transformed the domestic calls of one telephone company into rhythm, and then sounded them as music. Every call was programmed so that a small rod struck one of hundreds of metal plates, like the working of a metallophone. The project was installed in a hall (built as a church and rebuilt as a cultural space) with a large number of small machinical kits creating an impressive sound involving all the people in Lithuania using tele-communications at that time. The problem was that, as the project had been ordered by a tele-communications company, it could be treated as an advertisement.

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85 Audronė Žukauskaitė, “Interspecies Sonification: Deleuze, Simondon and Bioart,” in Aberrant Nuptials. DARE 2017 (Ghent: Orpheus Institute, 2017), 120-121.
87 Information about these projects is taken from Andrius Šarapovas FB.
This and many other art projects in the world investigating urban sound, street sound, industry sound, the sound of airports and many others, work with marvelous rhythmic and sound lines, but also discuss the problems of sound pollution and loudness, when the normal human ear perceives sounds with frequencies from 20 Hz to 20,000 Hz. Sound around us increases every day and every year, and now raises problems of disturbing not only the oceans, as was shown in Šebjanič’s projects, but also our planet (Earth pulse) as attested by very important remarks of jagodzinski: the Earth pulse has increased from 7.83 Hz to 36+ Hz, which means a very large change related to climate change (warming). These projects, like that of Šarapovas, illustrate other relationships in the Anthropocene: relations with technologies, with which we should have an appropriate relationship linking not only human and non-human, but human and inhuman (technological), not necessarily cyborgian, as described by Donna Haraway in A Cyborg Manifesto, but in the sense Bernard Stiegler described in Taking Care of Youth and the Generations:

The great question of the twenty-first century will be finding the way to abandon this way of life and to invent new modalities of non-inhuman existence within societies that have become thoroughly technological – modalities that are less toxic, more useful to a non-inhumanity that has become a global community in which isolation is impossible...

Stiegler, who developed the idea of the pharmacological contemporary situation and the individuation of technologies, demonstrated what it means to live in this society, to be part of it, to use the surroundings and to understand that we use our technological surrounding to produce technological, commercial, and consumer skills. We become in-human step by step by changing our memory, attention and values. We may therefore suppose that the invention of new modalities should absolutely change our life, erasing us as human individualities and identities in the individuation of technologies and at the same time trying to keep us from this inhuman. As regards youth education, Stiegler’s words would be an example of some delay in the situation, where human, non-human and

91 Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, 183.
inhuman are intermixed and lose their distinctions. He still believes that we can control the situation, which is why some scholars criticize Stiegler’s aesthetics and other suggestions regarding the education of the next generations.\(^{92}\)

Going back to Schafer’s soundscape and acoustic ecology at the time of the Anthropocene, we agree with Robin Parmar\(^{93}\) who rethinks sounding the Anthropocene, and similarly to Kelman finds that the Anthropocene requires absolutely new access to soundscape. He, like Kelman, criticizes Schafer, saying: “Here lies a contradiction in Schafer’s formulation,”\(^{94}\) who over-romanticized the treatment of music and sound, especially acoustic ecology, and in the conclusion of his research claims that “it’s important to remember that Schafer’s soundscape is fifty years old, the product of a particular Canadian culture and concerns with noise abatement.”\(^{95}\)

5. Sound Media in a Creation Machine: Teaching for, with and within Transversality

Contemporary culture requires searching for the most effective and creative ways to link text and image, text and sound as well as image and sound, thus creating multimodal access to teaching and learning. Are we satisfied with the traditional diegetic and synchronized way of combining all media based on a semiotic regime of signs or could they be combined in new ways? What is the teacher’s role in the construction of new ways of multimodal teaching and learning? Do new methods depend on the teacher’s reasoning or rather on an unconscious abstract machine that “creates a new reality, constructs new ways of being.”\(^{96}\) Is the scenario of abstract machine and transversality in education utopian, or considered possible, or probably already used and giving a fresh brief to education? To answer these questions, I intend to analyse, use and reflect on the concept of ‘transversality’, suggested by Guattari almost five decades ago.


\(^{95}\) Ibid., 18.

and developed by Deleuze, Braidotti and other scholars in relation to the abstract machine. The concept of transversality is already used in educational theory, but less in practice, although interest in it is growing very quickly. The practice is still at the experimental stage, opening up a lot of versions and discussion, and transversality in practice is still being used mostly as a secondary and not as the main concept of Guattarian philosophy. Meanwhile in official education documents the concept appears as separate and has a distinct connotation. Its correspondence in philosophy and education policy has recently been the subject of active discussion.

In the next section I will describe the concept and meaning of transversality and the already-existing discussion related to it in education, revealing its advantages and disadvantages and how it functions in an abstract machine. Further, I will present my experiment with a class using transversality. In practice, transversality can be interpreted in two ways: ‘radical’, which means working with and within transversality in the creational machine and ‘soft’, which refers to working for transversality, that is, the creation of new possibilities and new assemblages, opening a zone for the appearance of an abstract machine. Radical is the first in my case, because it covers all the possibilities and presents the production or rather antiproduction, while soft shows more preconditions rather than transversal lines themselves. The radical way was evident, as it comes to the event in a creational machine, while soft was logically identified afterward, though it came first. And, finally, I shall formulate some conclusions from my experiment with the use of transversality in a class setting.

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5.1. The Meaning of Transversality and its Purpose in Education

First, it is important to mention that the concept of ‘transversality’ was coined by the French thinker Guattari. Originally, he was a psychotherapist and started to use this word to name a new method of working with clients. Working at La Borde Clinique, Guattari invented and experimented with group work without hierarchical structure. All staff members were welcome to take part in the daily agenda of working with the patients. He used the concept of ‘transversality’ “as opposed to the hierarchical groups in which one person speaks on behalf of everyone else.” In Guattari’s words: “Transversality is a dimension that tries to overcome both the impasse of pure verticality and that of mere horizontality: it tends to be achieved when there is maximum communication among different levels and, above all, in different meanings.” In this way, he broke the traditional system of working in a hierarchically structured group. Moreover, he stressed becoming rather than creating and maintaining identities. As the scholar of the philosophy of Guattari and Deleuze, Sauvagnargues states, the principle of transversality “affirms the priority of relations over structures, and becomings over identities.”

The concept or meaning of transversality was used in joint works by coauthors Deleuze and Guattari and also used by Deleuze in his own works in the analysis of signs employed by Marcel Proust. This gave a new perspective for reading Proust’s works through the aberration of usual expression and perception of signs as well as the linkage of different sensations. In the texts of Proust, especially in In Search of Lost Time, Deleuze finds not associations but differentiation through signs that give a different rhythm when reading the text. Proust, in accordance with Deleuze, experiments with combinations of different lines, such as the line of sound, the line of smell or the line of sight, with their interrelation and with heterogeneous elements, thus destroying the order of signs and hierarchy and allowing for the understanding of any given structure in a special way. The use of transversality, following Deleuze and Guattari, became popular in arts, especially contemporary art, performances, installations, films and many other artistic mediums. It provided a lot of possibilities for interpreting and experimenting with different combinations of signs, because the transversal line of becoming

104 Deleuze, Proust et les signes, 202.
is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points, it comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first perceived, transversally to the localizable relation of distant or contiguous points.\footnote{Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}, 293-294.}

One may ask why that is needed in education. The answer should be because it gives education the opportunity to work through the joy of invention, creativity, actualization of visions, imagination and new ideas, and not only with material which is ordered and already boring, brimming with repetition of the same content and typical combinations of elements. The transversality method is very useful when we rethink the usual methods, especially, when we try to create conditions for the appearance of new methods, to open education up to new structures and imaginary projects. It helps to open the traditional zone of teaching and learning to allow for new combinations of elements in the class assemblage and to practice multimodality (a combination of different media) regardless of what we teach: literature, languages, films, history or even mathematics. Traditional textual and numeric exercises should be integrated with the visual and audio material. Obviously, visual and audio material has been used for teaching purposes for many years, so one can indeed question the novelty of such a method. The issue at hand is that it was used mostly in a linear and synchronized way, composing parallels and not working with media in a diagonal, transversal way. Usually one media supports the other; audio material is diegetically composed with the visual material, whereby the words and sounds coincide with the image and their intersections are logically composed under the strict control of the creator. The transversal line goes against disciplinary categories and in that way resists hierarchies, allowing for the appearance of an unpredictable linkage and a communication of signs and messages from different media. In François Dosse’s words:

\begin{quote}
Transversals were fundamental for understanding the transition from one closed world to another, which does not destroy the specificity of either world but which, without there being any possibility of totalization or confusion, makes it possible to go from one universe of signs to another.\footnote{François Dosse, \textit{Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives}, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: The Columbia University Press, 2010), 128.}
\end{quote}
Transition is not chaotic; it is nomadic – claims Braidotti. It depends less on the creator and more on the affect and effect of the creational machine, which combines different lines and elements.

Transversal skills are not unknown in education; first of all, Freinetian pedagogy, which used a method very close to Guattarian ‘transversality’, has fortunately been reinvented and applied today in pedagogy (for example in Brazil, Sweden, Mexico, Denmark and Finland), though it was, and still is, less known in the Anglophone educational context.\(^{107}\) Transversal skills already appeared in the UNESCO report *School and Teaching Practices for Twenty-First Century Challenges* (2016) and have been generally described in the Finnish National Core Curriculum (2016).\(^{108}\) They are also followed by other countries that consider Finland a leader in educational reform. The Finnish description is good, though not sufficient to understand the exact meaning of transversality, which stems from philosophy and psychology, and especially how it can come into practice. The competence of transversality in the UNESCO report for education in the XXI century was analysed and strongly criticized. In the view of Hans Skott-Myhre, Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw and Luke Kalfleish,\(^{109}\) this competence is oriented towards global capitalism and its purpose is for students to enter the workforce for twenty-first century capitalism. But it can be used for other purposes also – ‘inventing aberrations’, working in the “sense of *undoing* and *unfolding* what has been already done and actualized.”\(^{110}\) Not only to repeat, not only to critique, but also, as Bradley states, “to go beyond globalization.”\(^{111}\)

These fresh views and thoughts on transversality in education in relation to the abstract machine and especially live streaming are presented in a very recent book edited by Cole and Bradley *Principles of Transversality*

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The book deals with the critics of neoliberal structures and ways of education, suggesting a creative way that stems from the transversal, yet at the same time repeating that “it would be a mistake to think that transversality alone can save us.” There is a clear message that transversality can be used for changes in different directions: for better and for worse. There is no guarantee that it will reform education in the right way. It functions as a neoliberalist tool broadening the power of capitalism transversally; but it can also be used for reinventing and creating new modes of structuring education, struggling with neoliberalist education. The group of thinkers presenting their ideas in the previously mentioned book took into account mostly social and political problems, the expansion of transversality for better social life, the creation of new policy and a new ethico-aesthetic paradigm described by Guattari in *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*. On the other hand, we can also find attention to individuals: learners and teachers, their linkage used as a tactic, going through individuation and becoming. Cole and Bradley say that

Transversality sits in-between the subject and the object of education, between the teacher and the student, and between teaching and learning; it works between the institute and all who function within it.

In my understanding, transversality sits in-between elements of a very different nature and level, and links not only the teacher and the learner, institutions and their functions but also other objects such as the walls or the door of the classroom, the teaching subject, various emotions, thoughts, words and many other elements. Cole and Bradley describe four principles of transversality: *Capitalism Uncovered, Only Our (Multiple) Self(ves) Remain, We Are Deluded by Semiotics* and *The Move to Eco-Revolution*. My interpretation refers to the third principle defined by the editors – *Delusion by Semiotics*, the practical implications of which will be presented in the next section giving two examples of the teaching/learning process: firstly, taking examples from the past – the Freinetian School and secondly – from personal experience. The second exemplifies individuation

112 Cole and Bradley, *Principles of Transversality in Globalization and Education*.
and becoming, while using transversality during the lesson and presenting how the lesson was transformed into a creational machine.

5.2. Félix Guattari and Célestin Freinet: The Flow of Ideas in Practice

What was the precondition for the appearance of transversality in the educational field? Many authors believe that Guattari was in some way acquainted with Célestin Freinet (1896-1966), who founded the new pedagogy and the innovative school. Freinet worked almost a hundred years ago, and his pedagogy spread around many countries but nevertheless remained mostly alternative, not being well enough accepted by the politicians of education. Dosse, Cole and Bradley, Carlin and Wallin as well as James Evans, Ian Cook, and Helen Griffiths described Freinet’s influence on Guattari, and some of them mentioned his influence on the Finnish curriculum, which is considered one of the most successful programs for education. Understanding the relationship among Guattari, Freinet, Transversality and the Finnish School, and how the transversality concept, or rather line of flight, and its corresponding mode of thinking passed into educational practice is still a great mystery. In Cole and Bradley’s description we find that:

Educational systems and innovations that have deployed strategies and tactics taken from Guattari and other collaborators at the La Borde clinic in France such as Fernand Oury, who was the creator of the ‘institutional pedagogy’ movement, show definite gains, educational autonomy, and an increase in what may be called ‘community inquiry’, seen, for example, on a large scale in Finland (MoE, Finland, 2009), whose education system was inspired by Célestin Freinet’s Modern School Movement, and which was influenced by Guattari and Oury.116

Guattarian acquaintances with Freinet: did they meet? It seems not. Guattari worked at La Borde Clinique with Jean Oury; his brother Fernand was a student of Freinet. Guattari admired Fernand’s lectures and his institutional pedagogy, which took some features from the Freinet Modern School movement.117

Dosse in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari says that Félix and Fernand met at high school:

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117 Ibid.
Their first meeting was very brief. After three weeks of classes, Fernand disappeared: the Germans imprisoned him in 1943. But the memory of the meeting was so intense that when the fifteen-year-old Guattari learned after the Liberation that Fernand Oury was in charge of recreational activities in the student Hosted organization, he immediately joined.\footnote{Dosse, \textit{Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives}, 25.}

Dosse found in Guattari’s notebook that he was very much fascinated by Oury’s personality and missed “his very special way of looking at things, the way things became enveloped in a mysterious, quasi-poetic veil when you were in his presence.”\footnote{Ibid., 25; Félix Guattari notebook No. 3.}

In the description of Guattari’s life at La Borde, we can find many parallels with life in Freinet’s schools at Le Barsur-Loup and later at Vence. Freinet’s influence on Guattari through Fernand Oury was quite evident: for instance, parallels can be seen between the institutional psychotherapy at La Borde and Oury’s institutional pedagogy, and in the group work and common management decision making at the clinic together with planning methods, group working, role play, writing one’s own opinions and proposals for ideas as well as walking and manual working, and the decentralized governing system at Freinet’s school. Most interesting, however, is that Guattarian transversality appeared at La Borde.

Transversals were fundamental for understanding the transition from one closed world to another, which does not destroy the specificity of either world but which, without there being any possibility of totalization or confusion, makes it possible to go from one universe of signs to another.\footnote{Ibid., 128.}

James Evans, Ian Cook, and Helen Griffiths begin their paper “Creativity, Group Pedagogy and Social Action: A Departure from Gough” by discussing “the role of group creativity as a form of pedagogy through the institutional therapies of Félix Guattari’s schizo-analytic practice in the 1950s and 1960s.”\footnote{James Evans, Ian Cook, and Helen Griffiths, “Creativity, Group Pedagogy and Social Action: A Departure from Gough,” \textit{Educational Philosophy and Theory} 40, no. 2 (2008): 330-345.} For this purpose, they also turn to the Francophone educationalist Célestin Freinet. The authors maintain that group-based practices have been “largely neglected due to the asymmetrical emphasis of the Western academy on the Deleuzian strand of Gilles Deleuze

\[\text{From the Pedagogy of Aesthetic to Eco-Pedagogy and Beyond 287}\]
and Félix Guattari’s corpus,”\textsuperscript{122} so they looked at Guattari’s interest in pedagogy in the first part of the twentieth century, where they found many aspects useful for contemporary school analysis, especially cooperation and collaboration.

Meanwhile Victor Acker in his book on the life and work of Freinet gave us many interesting descriptions of biographic moments, though he did not mention any relationship between the work at La Borde and Freinet’s life. Nevertheless, he enables us to understand Freinet’s work at school and his permanent confrontation with municipalities, government, and state politicians. He shows Freinet as having a very strong personality through his attitudes and values, which is why he claims that Freinet wanted to be rid of school manuals foisted on him and his students by the Ministry of Education, and wanted to replace them with the students’ own compositions, which he called ‘Book of Life’ when it involved their lives, or ‘free texts’ when it involved cooperative school work.\textsuperscript{123}

Acker presents 6 main elements of Freinet’s pedagogy:

1. Teachers are not dictators
2. Motivation makes students learners
3. Participation implies freedom
4. Participation means self-confidence
5. Classrooms are part of the world
6. Freinet’s pedagogy is a participatory pedagogy.\textsuperscript{124}

Although, in the view of Evans, Cook, and Griffiths, the main principles of the Freinet school were ‘pedagogy of walk’, ‘pedagogy of print’, and ‘pedagogy of group working’, students produced material for learning by themselves. The most important feature according to Evans et al. was the social process in the group. Moreover, according to them, Freinet created a de-Oedipalizing institutional context for education. His work was a direct reaction to the highly centralized and prescriptive educational system in France at that time, directly contrasting techniques, which rise from the base, with the immutable curricula and ceremony of teaching imposed from above.\textsuperscript{125} The social group and de-Oedipization is indeed

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 331-332.
\textsuperscript{123} Acker, \textit{Célestin Freinet}, 27.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{125} Evans, Cook, and Griffiths, “Creativity, Group Pedagogy and Social Action: A Departure from Gough,” 338-340.
very important when comparing Freinet with the Guattarian way of working at La Borde and the Guattarian concept of transversality.

Freinet paid much attention to decentralizing class work, replacing the teacher’s podium with a stage for a printing press, creating learning/teaching material by letting students write texts in their own words and vote for the best text, completing cards with texts in one complex and many other teaching aids aimed at avoiding career-oriented education while at the same time fostering the skills necessary for living in contemporary society, living in consonance with a context and ensuring skills for later life. He proposed teaching without marks and classification or the resulting segregation of the students; he implemented many duties inside the school, practical work, creativity, a self-governmental system, and also plans for individual work if somebody needed it to feel special, etc. It was very much cooperative work.\textsuperscript{126}

In his correspondence with Aoki, Wallin describes Freinet’s influence on Guattari from the point of view of educational policy stressing a live curriculum as opposed to the curriculum-as-plan, where there is a “supple line that crossects the molar curriculum’s presumption of how a life ought to go.”\textsuperscript{127} He adds:

As a careful experiment in mixing supple and molar segments to the desiring-production the group, its special interests and auto-articulation through the press as an enunciatory vehicle for connecting the life of the school to broader social forces and realities.\textsuperscript{128}

Meanwhile, Carlin, analyzing Freinet’s influence on Guattari, demonstrates why Freinet’s pedagogy can be called the pedagogy of objects. As previously mentioned, he used collective writing and a printing press in the classroom among students and in that way fundamentally changed the nature of the classroom. The podium or stage was replaced by a printing machine: “Instead of subtraction, he adds, and instead of prioritizing characters/students, he prioritizes objects.”\textsuperscript{129} In Carlin’s view, Freinet transformed the school space “into a source of micropolitical activity,”\textsuperscript{130} which means that it could remain at a distance from State requirements,

\textsuperscript{127} Wallin, “Education Needs to Get a Grip on Life,” 131.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 132.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
rules and standards, and live its own life. Freinet also brought “attention to the aesthetic of the place and the objects that compose it.”

How can Freinet’s personality and role in education be described? Why is he again important? Where is his strength? Acker, summarizing his thoughts in his biographical book on Freinet, states that:

Freinet was like Don Quixote who battled against windmills and usually lost. Like the phoenix that sprang from the ashes, the Ecole Freinet, created in 1935, but shut down during World War II, sprang from its own ashes in 1946 and was ready for more controversy.

In his view, Freinet is still relevant today, though still largely unknown in the Anglophone World (as the titles of two of his chapters make clear: Freinet: Still Unknown in the Anglophone World; Freinet is Still Relevant Today).

What about Guattari? Did he mention Freinet’s name? In a discussion between Oury and Guattari “On the Nurse-Doctor Relationship,” Guattari mentioned Freinet in the context of the political and bureaucratic systems that paralyze the progress of work. He gave the example of Stalinist psychiatrists and nurses, especially those who were good but had no influence because they belonged to an unacceptable minority. Again, in “Institutional Practice and Politics” (an interview with Jacques Pain and Félix Guattari), Guattari mentioned the way of thinking in Freinet’s style among others. Fortunately, Freinet’s ideas have been reinvented and applied today in pedagogy (for example in Brazil, Sweden, Mexico, and Denmark) and especially in Scandinavia, Finland.

5.3. Transversality and the Creation Machine: The Radical Way

My own example is taken from classes I taught when working at a secondary school more than ten years ago. Theoretical discourse on transversality in education was rather weak at that time, or altogether unknown in my country. Nevertheless, it illustrates working for, with and within transversalities.

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131 Ibid., 178.
132 Acker, Célestin Freinet, 112.
The class was conducted in Vilnius Lyceum (a secondary school in Lithuania). It was an optional class on philosophy suggested for those who wished to get a taste of philosophical education integrated with art. As I was the teacher delivering the class, I suggested that the students listen to Gavin Bryars’ composition *Jesus’ blood never failed me yet* (1974). The idea was to provoke the students’ thinking towards text and musical composition and inspire their creativity in expressing such thoughts. Though thinking about freedom was not the special or direct purpose of the class, it is important to say that any religious message at that time in the Lithuanian state was treated as resistance to pressure; it was more related to freedom rather than stagnation because the state had little experience of independence (from 1990) and was still struggling with soviet and post-Soviet traumas when religion was prohibited. Students were first introduced to the story of the composition and then allowed to listen.

Why Bryars? Bryars is one of the best-known minimalists and experimentalists. In an interview presented by Paul Griffiths, Bryars noted that his interest in the composition was based on philosophical access “to find compositional means which may lead to things that sound like something else, but through a different approach, which is a different intention and therefore a different meaning.”

The intrigue of this particular composition is the motif of the authentic singing of a homeless old man. The composer discovered the song, borrowed it and then developed it with orchestration. The motif sung by the homeless man repeats throughout the composition in the form of the narration of a personal story, and can be called molar (stable), meditational or territorialized. Then, step by step, during the composition a very rich orchestration is developed through the addition of different instruments creating the effect of a compositional modification finalized by the very intense voice of Tom Waits. The composition compounds different rhythms, when one voice is singing later than another, some characters repeating with longer duration that finally gives the effect of one holistic impression of the Universe sound with human traces.

Students in the classroom were asked to listen and express their thoughts and feelings wherever and however they wanted: in their notebooks, on the blackboard, walls, doors, floor – anywhere (the marks of pencils, chalk and other writing tools could all be easily cleaned from these surfaces). An atmosphere of affectation was created in the classroom, or, using the concepts proposed by Deleuze and Guattari, students fell into an affect, when “affects are no longer feelings or affections; they

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136 Ibid., 153.
go beyond the strength of those who undergo them,”137 and participated in a collective writing machine. Nobody was talking, only writing. Some of the students were very strongly inspired emotionally and even cried. Nobody insisted on their doing anything; nevertheless, they wrote. Texts covered the space from floor to ceiling, from door to windows and traversed across the space. The room became elastic in the process of students’ submergence in an affect and ‘becoming sound’, ‘becoming word’ or ‘becoming text’. Elasticity was fused with the machinic regime of writing that transformed the class into a performance. Fortunately, the class was held in the evening, after school hours, thus nobody from the outside interrupted this creative process.

It seemed that nothing extreme had happened. Nevertheless, transversal links appeared not only in the form of multimodality such as links between sounds and words; pairings also appeared between sounds and walls, doors and texts, feelings and abstractions as well as there being many other unexpected connections. The creative machine allowed the traditional mode of studies to be broken down and made it possible to jump into a different mode with another consistency – a smooth mode where all things are equally worthy in crystallizing some epistemological moments, all through the invention of different combinations of elements and different assemblages. There was no separation between thought and sensation, concept and affect, philosophy and art, virtual and actual, possible and real.

That was working with transversalities and also within transversalities. This means that everybody in the classroom had the possibility to jump from one plane of creation to another, from music to text, from singing words in English to expressing philosophical concepts or thoughts in Lithuanian, from their own new thoughts to the thoughts they had already known, from their own original thoughts to their classmates’ thoughts written on the blackboard or the wall. That was the process of affectation that allowed everyone to work with different materials and different lines of cognition and creation.

In Deleuzoguattarian words: We may speak of aggregates of consistency when instead of a regulated succession of forms–substances we are presented with consolidations of very heterogeneous elements, orders that have been short-circuited or even reverse causalities, and captures between materials and forces of a different nature: as if a ‘machinic phylum’, a ‘destratifying transversality’ moved through elements, orders, forms and substances, the molar and the molecular, freeing a matter and tapping forces.138

137 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 164.
The working of the above-mentioned aggregate can be defined as a machine of creation, working as an abstract machine – system of flows, breaks and new lines. “Machines are always singular keys that open or close an assemblage, a territory.”\textsuperscript{139} Students (and I as well) were affected and depended on the regime of the machine, breaking the stratified regime of signs. This means that we were working with changing lines, when “lines of change or creation are fully and directly a part of the abstract machine”\textsuperscript{140} and within transversal lines, which appears in the process. Everybody in this machine was an artist rather than a student, and the teacher was an artisan rather than an artist, working with the forces between different media lines, not creating but rather mediating, and, on the other hand, both students and teacher could be considered artisans. The teacher was an artisan managing the multidirectional flow in the classroom, the flow between chaos and cosmos.\textsuperscript{141} It is very important that in this situation the teacher loses personal power and position in the hierarchy.

As mentioned previously, the Guattarian or Deleuzoguattarian method denies borders and helps to find successful means of communication in groups of different elements that at the outset are in different positions. Through transversality they appear in the same – equal – position. An ordinary classical teacher is a power, a function, a profession and a type of person behaving according to prescribed rules. Deleuze and Guattari note that “child, woman, mother, man, father, boss, teacher, police officer, do not speak a general language but one whose signifying traits are indexed to specific faciiality traits.”\textsuperscript{142}

In Deleuzoguattarian philosophy this means that the teacher has a strong identity, a standard identity. Moreover, the “teacher possesses all of the dual foundations of grammar (masculine-feminine, singular-plural, noun-verb, subject of the statement-subject of enunciation, etc.)”\textsuperscript{143} and works in a binary regime. To change the situation in a class, affects and transversal lines are very important. That was the subject of experimentation in the class mentioned above. It was singular, it was creation of a different kind of reality. The teacher became one element among others in the creational machine. Affects and transversal lines gave the opportunity to construct education in a new way that seems to be full of chaos and in that sense very dangerous, yet on the other hand – intentional, creational, interesting, providing for the appearance of what is imaginable, and a life full of wonderful surprises.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 99.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 345.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 167-168.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 75-76.
5.4. Elasticity: The Soft Way of Practice and its Radicalization

Interpreting the example mentioned above through the lens of an observer who is simultaneously an actor in the process, I find more than a radical change in the teaching process. It can also be seen as an openness to new forces in a rather slow way: waiting for something unexpected, unseen, for an event. Wallin’s explanation of some concepts is very useful for understanding the example in this particular way.

Wallin, rethinking the Deleuzian concept of ‘people-yet-to-come’, formulated three main principles (lines) for education: the ‘molar’, the ‘supple’ and the ‘line of flight’, where the last is the most important. “They are vehicles for experimenting with the abstract and material formations of institutional life once it is subtracted from standardization.”

In this way, he suggests ‘the becoming out-of-synch’ with ‘people in general’. He applies these concepts (the ‘molar’, the ‘supple’ and the ‘line of flight’) to the description of a new type of teacher and, following that, a new type of schooling and education.

First of all, it is important to clarify the Deleuzian concept of ‘people-yet-to-come’, which has become quite popular among contemporary thinkers of education. Even though ‘people-yet-to-come’ is usually used for rethinking and discussing the future generation, it does not follow that people of this kind do not yet exist and that they are outside our contemporary society. On the contrary, they are already among us. They are ready for innovations and inventions, experiments and risk; they understand the richness of the world, which must not be recognized and perceived as stratified and standardized. The uniqueness of the world can be grasped and found while working with differences, heterogeneity and ‘in-betweenness’. Therefore, there is an obvious need to create the conditions for new possibilities and inspiration to work with people, materials and forces of different kinds and at different levels, to actualize what already exists in virtual life, in other words, the conditions for the mental capacity and readiness for participation in a permanent creative process.

We shall now return to the previously mentioned concepts for a new education: the ‘molar’, the ‘supple’ and the ‘line of flight’.

The ‘molar’, which in Deleuzian text means stability and stagnation, works as a perfect vehicle for the reterritorialization of order in a chaotic situation. It is based on repetition, working in a closed circle with no interruptions, constantly keeping the same rhythm. In education it is as

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145 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.
much useful as it is deadly dangerous if this closed process continues too long without fluctuation, novelty, or any opening to new forces.

The concept of the ‘supple’ in an educational situation ensures creativity, but not radically – it mainly works for the extension of possibilities. It allows the process of education to be dynamic, to fluctuate between stability and instability, the old and the new, the traditional and the innovative. Its feature is elasticity, which means the inflection of a moving line. In Deleuzian words: “Elasticity is what is determined from without, but not the inner force exerted upon it.”147 Most interesting seems Erin Manning’s description: she elaborates the concept of Deleuzian elasticity for art education, interpreting this concept as producing something ‘more-than’.148 Elasticity is a feature of movement of the human body, any other body, also an institutional body, or finally, the body of a concept.

The third concept mentioned by Wallin is the ‘line of flight’, which refers to a radical turn, a transversal movement, a junction of heterogenic elements and different planes in an unexpected way. ‘Line of flight’ draws an absolutely new vector of movement, opens other planes for action and serves to create new production. It is similar to the second concept of elastic movement, but it differs in its radical move, the appearance of new connections and the combinations of elements of different level. ‘Line of flight’ is dangerous on the one side and full of possibilities for uniqueness and fresh results on the other; similarly to the two states of the abstract machine.149

How do these last two concepts coexist in educational practice? Can we put our classes at risk by asking students for elasticity and a radical line of flight, which is inseparable from transversality? Reflecting my own experience presented above, I can state the following line of creativity: in the beginning ‘supple’, later – ‘line of flight’ or, to be more precise, something in between the supple and the radical line, which has the pretension of being called ‘line of flight’.

On the one hand, I would like to associate the stage of student creation with the stage of the ‘supple’ and elasticity, where the educational space was used for ‘more-than’. That destroyed the ‘order-words’ educational system, the official curricular requirements to learn for expected and measurable results, and should be considered an anti-production.150

149 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 63.
For that process not only elasticity of the space, elasticity of the institutional body, but also “both elasticity of the concept and fluidity of the milieu are needed.”\footnote{Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{What is Philosophy?}, 36.} This spatial elasticity worked side by side with the elasticity of concepts and thoughts.

On the other hand, it is the transversal line as well as the ‘line of flight’. In comparison to elasticity, it works differently. Synchronized learning, structured horizontally and vertically has been transformed into multidirectional learning, creating an opportunity to appear as not only ‘more-than’, but also creating new unexpected pairings as well as very interesting combinations of elements as has already been mentioned: sound and wall, door and text, feeling and abstraction, music and philosophy.

Was it risky? Yes, undoubtedly: nobody knew how the process would develop. Was it worthwhile? Yes, undoubtedly: students learned what cannot be perceived, understood and expressed in an ordinary way during a lesson. This happened during their participation in the process of learning as ‘becoming’. Many new combinations of heterogenic elements appeared grasping the unusual, unseeable, and imperceptible. This happened by opening up to the forces of chaos, which in Deleuzian and Guattarian philosophy play a crucial role in creativity and invention. That was a new mode of learning. At the same time, it was the creation of a common text through the expression of the possible, which existed virtually. It was the ‘art of the possible’.

Summarizing, I maintain that the ‘supple’ way in education works for vibration, pulsation, elasticity, sometimes less and sometimes more for the extension of possibilities and capacities, while ‘line of flight’ shows an absolutely new quality of production. The case of the Vilnius Lyceum class experiencing a musical composition showed how the intercommunication of musical sound and written text produces some extension of physical and mental space, stretches the capacity and elasticity of some objects, opens access to the flow of forces, their fluidity, and allows for the appearance of small crystals of thought. That was the ‘supple’ way, which strongly depended on the conditions created for this class and on creativity in the class. In other words: “In the beginning the ‘abstract machine remains enveloped in the strata’.”\footnote{Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}, 65.} The ‘line of flight’ appeared later in the process of experimentation, as the resonance of differently fluid forces, when transversal lines produced an absolutely new style of lesson – a machine of creation. The use of multimodality: music for teaching about philosophy (concepts, thoughts) and vice versa – philosophy (concepts and thoughts) for teaching music, when the strict border
between both subjects disappears, witnessing that everything is relational. Students understood that “art thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and percepts.”\(^{153}\) The classroom became text, sound, artifact and anti-production. Students did not so much acquire already created knowledge, they created knowledge anew. They became producers of a new kind of knowledge. That was ‘out-of-synch’ with ‘traditional teaching’, because it was the event.

In conclusions we can state that transversality in education is a very strong and at the same time dangerous weapon. It can be used for strengthening the capitalistic stream and transmission among students and teachers, but it can be used for the opposite purposes. The advantage of transversality as a method is its struggle against stagnation in education, against all the clichés that are used for teaching and learning and against all the conservative structures that help to keep education stratified, easily ruled and predictable. In the view of Bradley and Cole who follow Deleuze and Guattari, transversality is a weapon of critical and creative thinking when struggling against bureaucracy and stagnation or the limitation of imagination. Transversality provides for the invention of new lines that help to escape from limited structures and serves as a tool for active participation in the world of potentialities waiting to be actualized.

The bidirectional feature of transversality requires the help of a teacher who is a critic on the one hand and an artisan on the other, mediating the process of creation, the fluctuations of the stable and the unstable, the known and the unknown, the potential and the actual, conscious and unconscious, the real and the imaginary; in other words, a teacher who stands between the two. The teacher also stands between oppression and liberation or better to say – beyond their strict and stable distinction. It is a matter of the possible and the creative in education.

The experience presented in the chapter of working in the class for, with and within transversality is somewhat dated, but nevertheless confirms that this method has been in existence for many years, even at a time when the concept of transversality was unfortunately not yet in use in the educational field. The experiment of the construction of an abstract machine for creational and inventional purposes in the class showed that the opening to transversal lines does not necessarily come suddenly. There is a slower and consistent way – elasticity, which can be used side by side with the transversal ‘line of flight’. Both methods can be experimented with in parallel. The method of elasticity is evidently different from line of flight; nevertheless, it could be a precondition for a more

\(^{153}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 66.
radical way, when the abstract machine starts to work in a machinic assemblage. That is why the distinction is made between education for transversality (preconditional phase), with transversality (machinic phase) and within transversality (machinic phase), even though the distinction between with and within is rather thin. The former means the involvement of the teacher in the machinic process, when a class assemblage is transforming into a machine, while the latter means the involvement of all of the students and other elements working on the plane of consistency.

The new construction and combination of different elements in assemblage and experimentation is a mission that is mostly inherent in the new art and philosophy. Is it also the mission of education? There is no single answer to that, as this method of transversality continues to be debated; nevertheless, some new ideas are evolving and so are novel experiments looking for change in communication between teacher and student, also including the flow of information. Experiments with transversality should radically change our communication and organizational structures as well as social, political and, of course, educational lives. Some authors argue that affects, transversality and the use of the abstract machine are for ‘people-yet-to-come’. If so, not we but others will put this method to use. However, as critics of Deleuze and Guattari say, these ‘people-yet-to-come’ already live among us, hence the time for us to work with innovations is right now.

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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Purpose

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

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A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.
2. *Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues.* This series of 10 week crosscultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

3. *Joint-Colloquia* with Institutes of Philosophy of the National Academies of Science, university philosophy departments, and societies. Underway since 1976 in Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these concern the person in contemporary society.

4. *Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development.* A study in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of education and character development. This work has been underway since 1980.

The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Columbia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.

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