Moral Imagination and Character Development

Volume I

The Imagination

edited by
George F. McLean, John Kromkowski

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
p.cm. – (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series VII: Seminar on culture and values ; v. 4)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
I. McLean, George F. II. Kromkowski, John A. III. Series.

BH301.153 M67 2002
128’.3—dc21
ISBN 1-56518-174-3 (pbk.)
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Introduction

George F. McLean

In this transition between the millennia humankind experiences a series of dilemmas which, paradoxically, derive as much from its long accomplishments as from its failures. Descartes launched the modern age with the call for a unified science predicated upon analytically clear and distinct ideas. Besides opening the way for the developments and discoveries of the modern mind, this created a split between spirit and matter, reflected in his fractured notion of the human person. This was a distant, early warning signal of the many problems which would accompany the achievements to follow. Soon reductivist understandings would generate idealisms and materialisms. In either case rigorous clarity would impose either a notion of community without room for persons or self, or a notion of the individual without bonds of community. Both would suppress or pervert personal freedom, and with it the creativity needed for truly humane life in our day.

In these circumstances, much attention has been directed toward elements of synthesis in order to reunite what had been split asunder. More positively, there is need now to harvest and integrate the insights into spirit and matter which, being developed in separation, had been unfairly burdened with the demand that each respond to all questions. Is it possible to find points of mediation and operational integration of matter and spirit? Could there be room for a free play of ideas to enrich and humanize the necessitarian aspects of structures and systems? Is there room for creativity, freedom and new life in and between persons, national efforts and entire cultures? These are central and deeply felt questions and needs of our times. Their examination is the concern of this three volume series: *Moral Imagination and Character Development*.

New attention, and indeed new meaning, is now being given to the imagination as an integrating and creative center for human life. This is the burden of this volume I, *The Imagination*. In the processes of discovering by which a child grows and is educated as a moral person the imagination is most active and remains important in moral life. This will be treated in Volume II *Moral Imagination in Personal Formation and Character Development*. The work of adjustment and innovation by which nations face their economic, social and political life; and the effort to build integrating bonds of understanding and cooperation between peoples at the deepest levels of cultural self-understanding religious commitment and communication between civilizations will be the work of Volume III *Moral Imagination in Religion and Social Life*.

Chapter I by G.F. McLean, "Imagination in Aristotle and Kant" begins this search with a history of the notion of imagination. It reviews the development of the human understanding and employment of the imagination, especially the moral imagination, from the Greek philosophy of Aristotle. By situating it as between intelligence above and sensation below, and hence as being more free than either of the other two. This suggests how it might be a key to human freedom overall. The chapter looks for the creative role of the imagination in both the theoretical and the practical orders. A well oriented imagination enables the intellect to appreciate the circumstances of others more concretely and work out new pattern of human action and interrelation".

In the Christian era this became more than the choice or ordering of forms; it came to be appreciated as central to human participation in the creative emergence of being. Freeing the will, it gave birth in this world to the goodness of being.
The critiques of Kant manifest both the tragedy and the triumph of the work of imagination. In the first *Critique*, reflecting the strictures of rationalism, the imagination figures as a slave to the forms or categories of the intellect and orders all sense data accordingly. In contrast, in the third *Critique*, of aesthetic judgment, the imagination is freed to order and reorder this data and uncover where relatedness and purposefulness can emerge. This is judged not in terms of formal categories, but of aesthetic harmony and beauty. What emerges finally is that all is purposive, that all has been created out of love and for our personal evaluation and response. As free, our task is to assess and chose among the many possibilities, and through our imagination creatively to project them into the flow of actual being. In this manner, we enter into that teleology called Providence by which all are drawn to Resurrection and new life.

Chapter II by Antoni Szwed "Kierkegaard on the Role of Imagination in the Development of the Human Being" looks further into the way in which the openness of the imagination is seen by Kierkegaard to enable the human person to expand indefinitely and to transcend finitude. For him the imagination cannot reproduce, but can only create. To understand the basis of this one must go deeper than the modern focus upon knowledge and reason in order to reach the basic dynamism of being. This emerges not in the mind or even in its rational correlate and extension, the human will.

Chapter III, "The Imagination in the Post-Kantian Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur," by David Power shifts the horizon from the deep and untamed affective source of life to the process of shaping its richness. Noting the weakness of the will and the blindness of perception, Ricoeur turns rather to the imagination to bring drives and desires to be shaped by thought. But he warns against the temptation to feel that this is a task that can be mastered by finite humans. The basic orientation is to thought: symbol gives rise to thought. But he is forced to go beyond this in successive steps to see the imagination unfolding in metaphor and narrative. In his critique, Power would question whether the imagination of the finite human mind can ever be adequately open to the fullness of being. In so doing he challenges the openness and creativity of imagination and underlines the perduing, if stimulating, disproportion between finite and infinite which undergirds the inexhaustible character of human freedom.

Sebastian A. Samay in Chapter IV "Affectivity: The Power Base of Moral Behavior" points rather to affectivity as "protention" or dynamic awareness. He sees knowledge fundamentally not as an arrangement of formal categories, but as the spontaneous urge of self-differentiation and self-actualization. This consciousness is engaged in a dialogue with the world which is only partially reflected in the production of universal propositional judgements. It is, moreover, unqualified receptivity to the presence and meaning of being, no matter how that meaning reveals itself.

In this light Samay outlines a theory of dynamic consciousness which builds upon Merleau-Ponty’s body consciousness. This is actualized though what K. Goldstein describes as a drive toward self-actualization. M. Scheler’s sees it as value orientation, which recognizes a basic vital urge unfolding through instinct, associative memory, and practical intelligence. All are united in the imagination not as a source of reasoning through causes, but as a relatively stable modification of the general value-orientation of affectivity which thereby influencing human action and its quality.

Chapter V by Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" carries further this investigation into the work of moral imagination according to Kant. It shows how it takes Kant’s deontological ethics beyond the work of repeating frozen categories to the playful presentations of
a creative imagination. This enables social life and ethics to be seen as matters not of restraints but of freedom, and as creating life as a new work of art in a passionately dynamic moral story.

Finally, chapter VI by George Worgul, "Imagination, Epistemology and Values: A Perspective from Religious Thinkers," sketches out the real newness of present attention to imagination. This lies both in the contemporary context or Weltenschauung in which it is being explored and in the varied interdisciplinary roads being traveled in its pursuit. Above all else, the altered worldview marking our contemporary age is the newness in which the imagination can be rediscovered and flourish. The turn from autonomous existence and the reign of detached objective reason to the embrace of interpersonal human existence and the dynamic integrative human experience has once again set the human imagination free to find itself and release its creative and corrective energy. Additionally, the maturation of the human, social and technological sciences has empowered them to explore worlds of meaning previously hidden and to chart these new terrains by imaginative study and reflection. Moreover, the various sciences have increasingly recognized that these new worlds are simultaneously too diverse and too diversified to be exhausted or even accurately comprehended by any solitary science. Interdisciplinary collaboration and cooperation promise a great yield of integrative vision. Their nature, interdisciplinarity and integrity are sustained by imagination.

Worgul summaries the importance of this for epistemology and values by noting that "imagination occupies the central place both in the linkage of the human person and community to the real and in the imaginative conceptualization of behavior able both to symbolize and to reflect the organic unity of reality. Imagination discloses the horizon of the real in which values stand out and are desired; it enlivens knowledge of the real so that values are known; and its moves the human will so that values are chosen and a moral life is embraced."

The "Dialogues on Moral Imagination" in the appendix report some of the key issues and views in this discussion.

As the promethean hopes and pretences fade that by rigorous scientific reason humanity could resolve all problems, a much broader and more diverse playing field opens before humankind. It is not without great threats, but neither is it without equally great hopes. The key to making the differences between the two lies notably in the human imagination, to the study of which in its many modes this series of volumes is devoted.
Chapter I
The Imagination in Aristotle and Kant

George F. Mclean

Imagination

The Term

‘Imagination’ should be traced, of course, to its Latin equivalent *imaginatio*, whose root, *imago*, had meant a copy or likeness. In Virgil and Cicero this was used broadly for a statue, signet or spirit, but Cicero gave it also the more technical and psychological meaning of "an image of a thing found in the mind, a conception, a thought, an idea."¹

In this the Latin reflects the Greek term *eikon*, meaning image or copy. Hence, etymologically imagination corresponds to the Greek, *eikasia*, coming from *eiko*, "to be like."² The Greek had also the term *phantasia* from *phaino*, "to appear or to be apparent." This was derived, Aristotle notes, from *phaos*, or light, which enables one to see.³ Neither *phantasia* nor *eikasia* originally referred to anything on the part of the subject rather than on the part of the object. However, through Democritus’ clarification of the distinction between sensation and its stimulus, there arose a greater consciousness of the work of the subject in imagining. From the time of Aristotle this was reflected in the technical use of *phantasia*, rather than *eikasia*, in discussions of the process of knowledge. Hence, though ‘imagination’ can be traced etymologically to the more objective *eikasia*, its meaning corresponds more properly to *phantasia*, as expressing a process of the soul or psyche.

Plato on the Imagination

The imagination appears throughout the works of Plato according to the contexts of the various dialogues. Of the four levels of human knowledge, the *Republic* places *eikasia* as the lowest level of knowledge where images are treated. Its limitations suggest the prison-house in his allegory of the cave. In the *Phaedo*, imagination appears in the context of remembering that which had been known by the *nous* in a better and higher life.

Images here are taken in the objective sense of that which stimulates the mind; they can be either intellectual images concerned with universal meanings or sense images related to particulars. In the *Sophist*, Plato would seem to suggest that God creates not only the concrete objects, but their images.⁴ This raises the issue of art: "Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced by those who are awake?" And, if so, do we make our particular dreams by revelation (to which he refers in another context, *Timaeus* 71E) by reason or by some mixture of sensation and opinion?

³ *De Anima*, III, 3. Cicero would translate *phantasia* by the technical stoic term *visum*, meaning an individual impression or grasp by the mind rather than a power of the mind (Welch, p. 25).
⁴ Bundy, pp. 265-67; Welch, pp. 28-29.
In brief, though Plato introduced many elements relating to the imagination in various contexts, he did not take up a direct discussion of the imagination itself; this remained to be contributed by Aristotle. He treats the nature of the imagination in his work on the Soul (De Anima), and its role in various aspects of human life in his works: Rhetoric, Memory and Reminiscence, and Dreams. His systematic approach in De Anima locates this power in relation to the other human faculties and provides some controlled insight into its nature and distinctive capabilities. Here we shall treat first the soul as the foundation of the imagination, then its special independent and creative character, and finally its role in relation to thought, practice and art.

Aristotle on the Soul

Substance. After surveying alternate opinions in Book I of the De Anima, Aristotle begins in Book II the positive work of constructing the science of the soul by treating it in terms of First Philosophy. In this light, the soul is the first act or substance of a natural body which potentially has life. By laying down this substantial basis, Aristotle distinguishes the soul from things which exist in, or as functions depend upon, others. He thus provides for the basic autonomy and uniqueness of persons in themselves and opens the way for an understanding of that uniqueness in action which can be called creative.

A first and basic characteristic of the moral subject and, indeed, of any substance is that it has its identity in its own right rather than through another. Only thus could a human being be responsible for one’s action. Without substances with their distinct identities, one could envisage only a structure of ideals and values inhabited, as it were, by agents without meaning or value. In this light, the task of moral education would be merely to enable one to judge correctly, according to progressively higher ideals. This, indeed, would seem to be the implicit context of Kohlberg’s focus upon moral dilemmas, which omits not only the other dimensions of moral development, but this personal identity as well. Aristotle points instead to the world of persons realizing values in their actions. In their complex reality of body, affections and mind, they act morally and are the subjects of moral education.

Secondly, as the basic building blocks in the constitution of a world, these individuals are not merely undetermined masses. As the basic points of reference in discourse and the bases for the intelligibility for the real world, these individuals must possess some essential determinateness and be of one or another kind or form. The individual, then, is not simply one unit indifferently contrasted to all others; he or she is a being of a definite -- in this case, a human — kind, relating in a distinctively human manner to other beings, each with their own nature or kind. Only thus can one’s interior senses, such as the imagination, as well as one’s life in the universe, have meaning and be able to be valued.

Thirdly, being of a definite kind, the individual has its own proper characteristics and is able to realize a specific or typical set of activities. These activities derive from, or are "born of" (from the Latin, natus), the specific nature of the thing. The determination of what activity is moral and of the role to be played in this by the imagination will need to include not only the good to be derived from the action, but respect for the agent and his or her nature.

Levels of Life. This work of First Philosophy, in laying down the general substantial basis, grounds the autonomy and uniqueness of the person and, hence, of his or her actions. This is essential, but not sufficient, in order to understand the human person. The science of the soul must proceed to identify the distinctive nature of this substance which is the soul, its various levels and
its relation to the body. For this, Aristotle employs an inductive approach, examining the actions of the person and deciphering through them the nature of the soul as living at the level of plant, animal or human life.

This reasoning follows a number of steps, beginning where possible from the object attained by a particular type of life activity, for the level of the object defines the level of the activity. This, in turn, shows the level of the power from which the actions come. Finally, the level of these powers or faculties manifests the level of the soul to which they pertain. For example, from acts of speech one can learn that the agent has the power or faculty of speech and, in turn, that his or her soul is of a rational nature. (Note that it is not the faculty which acts, but the substance: it is not, e.g., the intellect that judges, but the person who judges by his or her intellect.)

On this basis, it is possible to distinguish in a general manner three levels of objects: e.g., food as the object of the power of nutrition food, color as an object of the senses and natures as objects of the intellect, as well as a corresponding three levels of soul. We should be able to learn about the imagination by seeing how Aristotle situates it in relation to these three.

The Independent Character of the Imagination

Within the threefold distinction of levels of life, Aristotle locates the imagination on the second or sense level, rather than in the first or physical level of life. There is a peculiarity to the imagination, however, which we shall see constitutes both its strength and its weakness: namely, the imagination does not have a proper object; by itself; it does not know any external thing. Instead, it works upon the object of sensation to generate an image: it is "that in virtue of which an image arises in us."5 Hence, in order to delineate the nature of imagination, Aristotle proceeds not by way of its object, but rather by contrasting it to intelligence above and sensation below. He carries out this procedure deftly, opening thereby a broad field of human creativity which, in some broad ways, corresponds to Sartre's notion of the whole in being required for freedom.6

First, he contrasts the imagination to the level of intelligence, which consists of science, prudence and opinion. Having the least firm grasp on truth, opinion is the lowest dimension of the intelligence and, hence, is most proximate to sensation. Thus, Aristotle's first step in delineating the realm of the imagination is to contrast it to opinion in two ways.

(1) Whereas opinion is directed toward truth and, hence, does not leave us free, imagination "lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g., we can call up a picture . . . by the use of mental images)."7 Imagination, then, is especially dependent upon the will and hence is more fully at the disposition of the person.

(2) Our opinions are what we really incline to hold. Hence, if we opine something to be threatening, we become frightened, and the like. In imagining, however, we need not consider ourselves involved, but can "remain unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging scene."8

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5 De Anima, III, 3, 428a 1.
7 De Anima, III, 3, 427b 17-22.
8 Ibid., 23-24.
In imagination, then, though we are on a lower level of consciousness than opinion, we retain a greater degree of independence or autonomy than in opinion, both as regards the object and as regards our affective reactions.

Having described, as it were, the upper limits of imagination by contrasting it with opinion, Aristotle next proceeds to establish the lower limits of imagination by contrasting it to sensation in three ways.

(1) As with the contrast to opinion, once again imagination is marked by a special degree of autonomy. Whereas sensations such as sight are always subject to reality and remain in a potential state until they receive a form, imagination carries its own forms within it and, hence, is simultaneously both in act and in potency: it is always determined even though not always fully in act. This independence vis à vis the object appears also in terms of duration, for whereas sensation must cease when the object is no longer present or, e.g., one’s eyes are closed, imagination can continue to function.

(2) If the task of knowledge is considered in realistic terms, however, such independence can also appear to render the imagination less perfect. Whereas sensation is always true, the autonomous character of the imagination means that it is less determined to the environment. In this sense, it is frequently or even "for the most part" false. Thus, imagination approaches imperfect or unclear sensations which enable us to say only "it seems that . . . ".

(3) Conversely, however, it is in just such difficulties of sensation that the imagination, by testing out and comparing alternate possibilities and combinations, can aid sensation to achieve greater surety. Performing some of the steps delineated by Francis Bacon and developed subsequently with endlessly augmenting sophistication, it repairs and improves imperfect sensation.

From Aristotle’s deft delineation of the imagination through its contrast to opinion and sensation, there emerges a curiously independent dimension of the person. From the point of view of a realistic epistemology, this independence can be read as a weakness, inasmuch as the imagination is not bound to the external object. However, it uses this weakness to remain not merely in a potential state, but in one which is always informed and ready — as it were, on low alert. Further, it can continue to work on things after they are no longer present to the senses. Finally, without being captivated emotionally by the situation, it can work aggressively and with some independence to make up for the limitations of the senses.

The Creative Character of the Imagination

This enables Aristotle to move to a proper definition of the imagination and above all to open the road to an appreciation of its creative character, which already had been foreshadowed in the special degree of objective and subjective freedom that distinguished it from opinion and sensation. This he does in a number of steps, each of which points in the direction of the autonomy introduced above.

While remaining on the level of sensation, each step liberates the imagination progressively from domination by the senses. Thereby is established an interiority of nature and of operation which approximates on the sense level the creative life of the spirit.

The first step in this liberation follows from what has been said above, regarding imagination as a special type of knowledge. It is not a transitive or objective act with its own distinct object in
a reality beyond itself. Instead, it concerns the product of sensation of which knowledge it is a further elaboration; its finality is, if anywhere, within itself. The knowledge in which imagination consists is a movement resulting from sensation:

When one thing has been set in motion another thing may be moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, it concerns only things experienced [object] and belongs only to those who have sensation [subject].

Since imagination is dependent upon sensation, it cannot be the first movement, which is the sensation itself, but is a derivative movement: it is a movement of a movement. Its becoming or development is situated properly within the order of knowledge itself with no fixed point outside.

Imagination then is the very flow of consciousness, a fluxus within higher or perfect animals with the power of sensation. The flow is composed of relations between contrary notions derived from the senses. The process of relating them implies "a subject beyond the contraries capable of bearing them" and appreciating their relations as such. The life of the imagination is, then, one of dialectical movement, and the faculty of imagination is the power or capacity had by the soul to execute this movement.

Secondly, inasmuch as imagination depends upon sensation and cannot surpass what has been received by the senses, properly it is knowledge on the sense level. Nevertheless, it differs from the work of the external senses or the other internal senses (common sense and memory) in that it works not only to receive or remember what has been received, but to elaborate and undergo many images, both true and false. It is this active character (poiesis), rather than receptive character, which distinguishes the imagination and provides the basis for its creative contribution. To understand this further, we need to consider to what this active power is applied.

Aristotle approaches this in terms of error: what is it in the senses which makes possible deviation from or progress beyond the external reality which he considers normative. He notes that error is excluded when the proper sensible (e.g., white) is present but becomes increasingly possible when imagination concerns the accidental sensible (this white) or the common sensible (the movement of this white). Here the problem lies not in the work of the imagination itself but in the complexity of the sensible, which is derived from sensation and initiates the movement of the imagination.

To see how and in what sense this opens the possibility of multiple relations, including some which are erroneous, one must consider what this movement concerns. Sensation receives from material things form without matter; sensation concerns the forms of material things. Imagination goes beyond this: "Images are like sensuous contents except that they contain no matter." By not focusing upon matter, but being concerned only with pure sensible forms, the imagination is freed from the sources of its forms and their conditions. It is able instead to interrelate forms purely according to their internal content. One might call this error if one is focused upon knowledge of the concrete situation. Otherwise, it is liberation from the concrete and actual, an opening to the full range of the possible dialectical interrelations of available forms.

Thirdly, having thus freed the imagination from determination by or to any external object, our horizon can shift radically. What becomes of interest is not correspondence to an object, but the fruit which is produced by the work (poiesis) of the imagination. This is precisely the image or phantasm as a form or complex of forms. As M.-D. Philippe keenly observes, in this context

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9 Ibid., 428b 10-11.
11 De Anima, 8, 431b 29.
12 Ibid., 432a 9.
the issue is no longer one of subject and object, as in Aristotle’s analyses of levels of consciousness which was directed toward identifying the ontological level of the living substance or soul. Instead, the focus is now upon the productive exercise of the imagination itself. Being without object, this has no final cause; consequently, it must be understood only in terms of the efficient cause. This constitutes in the human person a unique combination of freedom, at least to the degree that freedom can be understood in terms of indetermination and of action, at least on the sense level. This combination of freedom and productive action rightly is called creativity.

This is not to say that there will not be combinations of these two on the higher level of intellect and will; later philosophers may extend the term ‘imagination’ to that level. For the medieval Aristotelian school, however, with its strong sense of the reality of the physical universe, the incarnation of spirit and the unity and integrity of the person, it will remain important to identify the creative capacity of the material or sense level as it reaches toward the spirit. This capacity will be crucial to the integration of the human person and to creative action in society.

Aristotle himself traces the basic lines of this role in other parts of his De Anima, as well as in his works on memory, dreams and rhetoric. We shall draw upon these while extending our horizon also to the medieval development of Aristotelianism on the basis of an enriched notion of the person and of being within the Christian philosophical horizon. Here we shall focus briefly on three roles of the imagination in relation, namely, to concept formation, to affectivity and to art, i.e., to the orders of theory, praxis and aesthetics.

Imagination and Thought

In order to carry out his realist project, Aristotle criticized Plato’s notion of remembering as the source of the content of concepts and replaced this by the process of abstraction. This was a basic turn away from any form of innate ideational content in the mind or any ability of the intellect to educe or deduce its content therefrom. On the contrary, he would insist that there is nothing at all in the intellect which was not previously in the senses in the form of phantasms. But this is the field also of the imagination that can generate phantasms or forms without matter.

All content had to be drawn from the external world by way of the external and then of the internal senses: first, common sense which shapes the initial sense presentation of the object, and then memory and imagination. The abstractive intellectual process is not one of adding, but of omitting the individuating material factors in order that its nature might be available to be grasped by the intellect without material delimitations. Thus, for Aristotle the intellectual work of reason and contemplation presupposes phantasms (and hence, the work of imagination and other internal senses); whence are abstracted the intelligible forms which figure in judgments regarding natures.

Aristotle recognizes the role of imagination in the generation of language as well, for voice is not only a matter of producing sound, but "sound with a meaning, . . . for which the soul must be accompanied by an act of the imagination."\(^\text{13}\)

These general themes are elaborated further by Thomas Aquinas\(^\text{14}\) who is concerned not only with realism, but even more with the metaphysical unity of the human being. For this, it is important that human acts not be those of a disincarnate spirit, but always belong to the composite (Aristotle’s synolon) of spirit and matter, soul and body. In Thomas this is ultimately the unity or identity of a unique act of existence. Hence, the internal senses do not provide merely a one time

\(^{13}\) De Anima, 8, 420b 31-34.

\(^{14}\) Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 75-86. See also his commentary on the De Anima (The Soul, J. Rowen, trans. [St. Louis: Herder, 1949]).
noetic conduit from the external world and senses to the intellect; rather, all intellectual acts of conceptualization take place by intimate and continued reference to the phantasm. The reception of really new content via the external senses is but a small part of this intellectual activity. The work of reflection, by which we variously inspect, unfold and elaborate our ideas, is a vastly more extensive and continuing effort which is carried out in repeated reference to the phantasm. No human intellectual act takes place without an accompanying phantasm.

This has great importance for understanding the role of the imagination in knowledge. First, the relation of abstract intellectual concepts back to the phantasms opens the way for their further reference to the external source of that phantasm in the concrete individual. Hence, we are not caught in the dilemma faced by Kant. On the one hand, he confronted a Leibnitzian rationalism without concrete content, which today would translate into systems and structures which have no place for the uniqueness and freedom of the person. On the other hand, he faced a Humean positivism without meaning, which today would convert into a clash of blind market forces, again leaving no place for authentic human concerns.

By intimately binding the distinctive work of the intellect to the phantasms in the internal senses, including the imagination, the intellect is kept open to recognizing the reality of the uniqueness of the person without being able to exhaust this. The person remains ever a mystery which must never be forgotten but always promoted.

Secondly, the imagination plays a crucial role. For, if the capacity of the human mind is limited in abstracting meaning from a phantasm, then it will be important that it have not merely one phantasm for any one act of sensation, but that its object be able to be presented in multiple manners, from many angles as it were, according to its multiple aspects and possible relations. For this, the active work of the imagination is required so that the meaning of a sense experience can continue to unfold.

Thirdly, if the mind were limited only to the number of things experienced, its ability to develop new meaning and open up new possibilities would be severely circumscribed. It is precisely here that the imagination plays its most creative role, by providing, in ever new patterns, phantasms and series of phantasms each of which opens a new possibility for insight, understanding and creative planning. This can be seen in reverse in the effect of central economic planning that is unable to take account of the multiple local circumstances or new possibilities, or of a political party which, having been in power too long, is unable to keep pace with changing times. Both are examples of the importance of imagination and, hence, of the difference it makes in human life at all levels. If all human insight is limited and time bound, then the power to vary our insights endlessly and to sketch out ever new responses to changing circumstances is central to human life.

Imagination and Action

This is not merely a matter of speculative insight, however; it is crucial in the practical order as well. Thus, Aristotle points to a close bond between desire and imagination. Wherever there is change imagination is needed in order to know what to desire and what to avoid. This extends through the range of activities and related desires from the lower to the higher. Thus, Aristotle speaks not only of sensible imagination, but of rational imagination when it works with the intellect. At times, he calls the latter, "deliberative imagination." 

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16 *De Anima*, III, 9-10.
In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle considers the relation of the imagination to the emotions. Having defined pleasure as the sensation of a certain emotion, since imagination is a (feeble) type of sensation, it is tied to experiences of pleasure or its contraries. Hence, when in the act of remembering or expecting one produces an image or phantasm of what is remembered or expected, then pleasure and/or other emotions follow.\(^{17}\)

This could be a matter of our own self-image. Aristotle notes how this can be affected, if through friendship, the love of another and the pleasure it induces "makes a man see himself as the possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling for it desires to possess: to be loved means to be valued for one’s own personal qualities."\(^{18}\) Conversely, imagination could provide the basis for pleasure in thoughts of revenge or the experience of anger and thus push one toward imprudent actions and loss of self-control.

For this reason, control of one’s imagination becomes important for the conduct of a moral life. This can be done by humans in contrast to animals precisely because humans can relate their imagination to the universal horizons of the intellect and will.\(^{19}\)

This interplay of imaginative self-control and self-direction was, of course, a large part of the science of the saints developed in the Christian period as reflected in the second part of the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas. In his dynamic existential sense of being, every apprehension is followed by an appetite or inclination on the sense and/or the intellectual level.

The control or direction of these appetites is not directly a matter of the imagination, for that does not judge good from bad or truth from error. For animals, the estimative sense discernes, in sense terms, the suitability or lack thereof of alternate courses of actions presented by the imagination.\(^{20}\) In the case of humans, it is the intellect which discerns what is true or false, while the will directs the actions which follow.\(^{21}\) It is very important for Thomas and his tradition that this direction by man’s higher or intellective faculty be recognized and realized in practice.

In the more Platonic spiritual traditions, this has been depicted as a battle against the senses. In such works, the imagination, though not itself a choice of the physical, can figure badly. It can be seen especially as presenting attractive physical goods which then powerfully disorient the will from its focus upon higher goods. This concern was not unknown to Aristotle and is commented on by Thomas.\(^{22}\)

However, the special focus of moral development points rather in the opposite direction. As the human person has some control over his or her imagination, this can be oriented by the will. Indeed, Aristotle refers to imagination as coming from thought as well as from sense: "In fact, the organic parts dispose the passions harmoniously and sensitively, whereas imagination makes the apt disposition for desire. But the latter is engendered either by thought or by sensations."\(^{23}\) Thus, the development of a pattern of habits and virtues becomes important for the orientation of our imagination: "The imaginations of virtuous men are better."\(^{24}\) A well-oriented imagination can enable the intellect to appreciate the circumstances of others more concretely and work out new patterns of human action and interrelation.

\(^{17}\) *Rhetoric*, I, 11, 1370a 27-30.


\(^{19}\) *Nic. Ethics*, H 8 1147b 4-5.

\(^{20}\) *Summa Theologica*, I, 81, 3 ad 2.

\(^{21}\) *Ibid.*, 82, 3 ad 2.

\(^{22}\) *De Anima*, III, lect. 15, 819.

\(^{23}\) *The Motion of Animals*, 8, 702a 19.

\(^{24}\) *Eud. Ethics*, B 1, 1219b 24.
To grasp the importance for moral life of the relation of habits and virtues to the imagination we should note that the work of conscience is not a merely theoretical judgment, but the development and exercise of self-possession through one’s actions. In this, one’s reference to moral truth constitutes one’s sense of duty, for the action that is judged to be truly good is experienced also as that which I ought to do. As this is exercised or lived, patterns of action develop which are habitual only in the sense of being repeated. They are modes of activity with which we are familiar. In their exercise — along with the coordinate natural dynamisms they require — we are practiced, and with practice comes facility and spontaneity. These constitute the pattern of our life — its basic, continuing and pervasive shaping influence. For this reason, they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what our life as a whole will add up to or, as is often said, of what we will "amount to." Since Socrates, the technical term used for these specially developed capabilities is ‘virtues.’

It is possible to trace abstractly a general table of virtues required for particular circumstances in order to help clarify the overall terrain of moral action. As with values, however, such a table would not articulate the particulars of one’s own experience, exhaust the inventiveness of one’s imagination, or dictate the next steps in one’s project toward personal realization with others in relation to the Good. This does not mean, however, that such decisions are arbitrary; conscience makes its moral judgments in terms of real goods and real structures of values and virtues. Nevertheless, through and within the breadth of these categories, it is the person who must decide. In so doing one molds progressively his or her unique store of virtues. No one can act without courage and wisdom, but each exercise of these is distinctive and typically one’s own. Step by step, they shape the flow of the imagination and the set of habits which I draw upon and apply the imagination in the exercise of my freedom, enabling it to become more mature and correlative more unique. This often is expressed simply by the term: more ‘personal.’

As a result, a person’s values reflect not only his or her culture and heritage, but within this what he or she has done with its set of values to guide the creative flow of the imagination. One shapes and refines one’s values through one’s personal and, hence, free search to realize the good with others in one’s world. Hence, they reflect not only present circumstances which our forebears could not have experienced, but our own creative imagination and our related free response to the challenges to interpersonal, familial and social justice and love in our days.

In the final analysis, moral development as a process of personal maturation consists in bringing my pattern of personal and social virtues into harmony with the corresponding sets of values along the vertical pole of transcendence. In this manner, we achieve a coordinated pattern of personal capabilities for the realization of our unique response to the Good.

This interplay between imagination, intellect and will can open important roads for moral growth in which the aesthetic plays an important role.

**Christianity and the Notion of Freedom**

The process of transition from Aristotle, The Philosopher, who first gave the scientific structure to Western philosophy, to Kant, who perhaps more than any other structured the modern mind, constitutes the large part of Western philosophical speculation. As our interest is especially in the evolution of the role of the imagination in the appreciation of human freedom, however, special note should be made of two intervening developments.

The first is the impact of Christianity upon Western philosophy. One of the nuclear elements of this impact was to deepen the sense of being, that is, of what it means ‘to be.’ Because the
Greeks presupposed that matter had existed always, the horizon of their sensibilities extended as far as the forms according to which matter was of this, rather than that, type. Hence, for Aristotle the most manifest realities were things precisely as changing from one form to another; he analyzed these in his Physics. Hence, in the Metaphysics his search for the richest manifestation of being sought out the substance according to which a thing was constituted in its own right. This was primarily a search for being as autonomous (autos); to be’ meant primarily to be itself, identity or unity. In this sense, one can gauge the importance of independence, which shaped his analysis of imagination as described above. But is independence as rich a notion as freedom?

If there were limitations to the project of Aristotle — if in the future the notion of being needed to be deepened in radically new ways in order for a new sense of freedom to be opened — this would require radical development of the fundamental horizon of the Western mind. This is precisely what took place under the impact of Christianity. By applying to the Greek notion of matter their Judeo-Christian heritage regarding the complete dominion of God over all things, the Christian Church Fathers were able to open human consciousness to the fact that matter too depended for its reality upon God. Thus, before Plotinus, who was the first philosopher to do so, the Fathers already had noted that matter, rather than simply being considered eternal, needed also to be explained.

As a result, the horizons of human sensibility were vastly expanded and deepened. It was no longer merely the Greek question of how beings had this, rather than that, form, or even of the identity of a being in contrast to all others; it became the much more radical issue of being as existing, rather than not existing. Quite literally, "To be or not to be" had become the question.

For human beings with self-awareness and will, this meant consciously to assume and to affirm one’s existence, and, hence, to be and to act freely. What are the characteristics of this newly appreciated freedom? First, self-affirmation is no longer simply a choice of one or another type of object or action as a means to an end, but a radical self-affirmation of existence itself. Secondly, self-consciousness no longer is simply self-directed after the manner of Aristotle’s absolute "knowing on knowing"; instead, the highest consciousness knows all that it creates, and more limited instances of self-awareness transcend themselves in relations with others. Finally, this new human freedom is an affirmation of existence as sharing in Love Itself, the creative and ultimately attractive divine life — or in Indian terms, ‘Bliss’ (ananda).

This new sense of being and of freedom reflects the radical character of the Christian mysteries. Expressing far more than a transition from one life-style to another, they are based in Christ’s death and resurrection to new life. Hence, Christian baptism is a death to the slavery of selfishness and a rebirth to a new life of service and celebration with others. This is carried out by divine grace but is no less a radically free option for life on one’s own part; this is the new life of freedom. This means, of course, combating evil in whatever form: hatred, injustice and perhaps especially, the oppression of freedom; but it is not centered upon negations. Its heart is rather in giving birth in this world to the goodness of being and in bringing this to the level of human life that is marked by love and beauty.

Kant

25 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, 4 1029b 13. A mark of substance is "What is said to be propter se."
This transformation — of the Greek notion of independence of choice between forms to the Christian sense of radical freedom in being — is rightly considered the dividing point in human history. As the divine Word is essentially communication and proclamation, it reechoes in ever new ways throughout the ages. Therefore, one might expect its more ample expression in human thought, especially once the Renaissance had directed new attention to the creativity of the person.

For Descartes, as for Locke, the object of knowledge no longer would be Aristotle’s substances as things in themselves, but ideas in the human mind. The self no longer would be manifest only indirectly in function of its knowing other things, but would be the focus of direct attention. And though for Descartes the epistemological subject was still an organ for objective knowledge, for Descartes, human consciousness was now directed primarily to the inner workings of the person. When Kant extended this beyond issues regarding knowledge and focused upon uncovering the will, the way was opened for dramatic new steps in uncovering the reality of human freedom. Indeed, proceeding in an architectonic manner somewhat reminiscent of Aristotle, based upon his insight into freedom, Kant enriched our understanding of the whole of being in which human freedom and the human imagination play central roles. Thus, this search for the role of imagination in freedom turns now to Kant’s *Critique*.

*The Critique of Pure Reason*

It is unfortunate that the range of Kant’s work has been so little appreciated. Until recently, the rationalist impact of Descartes directed almost exclusive attention to the first of Kant’s critiques, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which concerned the conditions of possibility of the physical sciences. Its rejection of metaphysics as a science was warmly greeted in empiricist, positivist and then materialist circles as a dispensation from any search beyond the phenomenal or inherently spatial and/or temporal.

Kant himself, however, insisted upon going further. If the terms of the sciences were inherently phenomenal, then his justification of the sciences was precisely to identify and to justify, through metaphysical and transcendental deductions respectively, the sets of categories which enable the phenomenal world to have intelligibility and scientific meaning. Such *a priori* categories belong properly to the subject inasmuch as it is not material.

We are here at the essential turning point for the modern mind where Kant takes a definitive step in identifying the subject as more than a wayfarer in a world encountered as a given and to which one can but react. He shows the subject to be an active force engaged in the creation even of the empirical world in which one lives. The meaning or intelligible order of things is due not only to their creation according to a divine intellect, but also to the work of the human intellect and its categories. If, however, man is to have such a central role in the constitution of his world, then certain elements will be required, and this requirement itself will be their justification.

First, there must be an imagination which can bring together the flow of disparate sensations. This plays a reproductive role which consists in the empirical and psychological activity by which it reproduces within the mind according to the forms of space and the amorphous data received from without time. This merely reproductive role is by no means sufficient, however, for since the received data is amorphous, any mere reproduction would lack coherence and generate a chaotic world: "a blind play of representations less even than a dream."\(^28\) Hence, the imagination must

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have also a productive dimension which enables the multiple empirical intuitions to achieve some unity. This is ruled by "the principle of the unity of apperception" (understanding or intellec­tion), namely, "that all appearances without exception, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception." This is done according to such abstract categories and concepts of the intellect as cause, substance and the like which rule the work of the imagination at this level in accord with the principle of the unity of apperception.

Secondly, this process of association must have some foundation in order that the multiple sensations be related or even relatable one to another, and hence enter into the same unity of apperception. There must be some objective affinity of the multiple found in past experience — an "affinity of appearances" — in order for the reproductive or associative work of the imagination to be possible. However, as such this unity does not exist in past experiences. Rather, the unitive rule or principle of the reproductive activity of the imagination is its very productive or transcendental work as "a spontaneous faculty not dependent upon empirical laws but rather constitutive of them and hence constitutive of empirical objects." Though the unity is not in the disparate phenomena, nevertheless they can be brought together by the imagination to form a unity only in certain manners if they are to be informed by the categories of the intellect.

Kant illustrates this by the examples of perceiving a house and a boat receding downstream. The parts of the house can be intuited successively in any order (door-roof-stairs or stairs-door-roof), but my judgment must be of the house as having all of its parts simultaneously. The boat is intuited successively as moving downstream. However, though I must judge its actual motion in that order, I could imagine the contrary. Hence the imagination in bringing together the many intuitions goes beyond the simple order of appearances and unifies phenomenal objects in an order to which concepts can be applied. "Objectivity is a product of cognition, not of apprehension," for though we can observe appearances in any sequence, they can be unified and hence thought only in certain orders as ruled by the categories of the mind.

In sum, it is the task of the reproductive imagination to bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in some unity or order capable of being informed by a concept or category of the intellect with a view to making a judgment. On the part of the subject, the imagination here is active. Ultimately, however, its work is necessitated by the categories or concepts as integral to the work of sciences that are characterized by necessity and universality.

The Critique of Practical Reason and The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals

Many materialist philosophies of a reductionist character, such as positivism and the materialistic dialectic, are happy to leave the matter there. The necessity of the sciences gives control over one’s life, while their universality extends this control over others. Their hope is that once, by means of Kant’s categories, the concrete Humean facts have been suffused with the clarity of the rationalist’s simple natures, Descartes’ goal of walking with confidence in the world may yet be achievable.

For Kant, however, this will not do. Clarity which comes at the price of imposing necessity may be acceptable and even desirable in digging ditches, building bridges and the back-breaking slavery of establishing heavy industry, but it is an appalling way to envisage human life. Hence,

29 Ibid., A 121.
30 Donald W. Crawford, Kant’s Aesthetic Theory (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 87-90.
31 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 192-93.
32 Crawford, pp. 83-84.
in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* and his *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant proceeds to identify that which is distinctive of the moral order. His analysis pushes forcefully beyond utilitarian goals, inner instincts and rational scientific relationships — precisely beyond the necessitated order which can be constructed in terms of his first *Critique*. None of these recognizes that which is distinctive of the human person, namely, one’s freedom. To be moral, an act must be based upon the will of the person as autonomous, not heteronomous.

This becomes the touchstone of his philosophy; everything thenceforward will be adapted thereto, and what had been written before will be recontextualized in this new light. The remainder of his *Foundations* will be composed in terms of freedom; his entire *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* will be written to provide a context that enables the previous two critiques to be read in a way that protects this freedom.

First, in the *Foundations* he rearticulates the whole notion of law or moral rule in terms of freedom. If all must be ruled or under law, and yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous, then my maxim must be something which I as a moral agent give to myself. This, in turn, has surprising implications; for if the moral order must be universal, then my own maxim must be fit to be a universal law for all persons.33 On this basis freedom emerges in its true light. It is not whimsy; it is not despotic; it is not the clever self-serving eye of Plato’s rogue.34 Rather, as the highest reality in all creation, freedom is power that is wise and caring, open to all, and bent upon the realization of "the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves." It is, in sum, free men living together in righteous harmony.35

*Critique of Judgment*36

Despite its central importance, I will not remain on practical reason because the role of the imagination is not played there. It is rather in the *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* that the central importance of the freedom, uncovered in the *Foundations*, becomes the basis for a new elaboration of imagination. Or, perhaps it should be said the other way round, namely, the elaboration of the imagination in the third *Critique* enables the freedom previously discovered to unfold its truly pervasive social and cosmic significance.

Kant is so intent not merely upon uncovering the fact of freedom, but upon reconceiving all in its light that he must now recontextualize all the work he has done thus far. For he faces squarely modern man’s most urgent question, namely, what will be the reality of his newly uncovered freedom when confronted with the necessity and universality of the realm of science as understood in the *Critique of Pure Reason*? Will the scientific interpretation of nature trap freedom within the inner realm of each person’s heart and reduce it at best to good intentions or to feelings towards others? When we attempt to act in this world or to reach out to others, must all our categories be universal, and hence insensitive to that which marks others as unique and personal; must they be necessary, and hence leave no room for freedom? If so, then public life can be only impersonal, necessitated and anonymous. Finally, must the human spirit be reduced to the sterile content of empirical facts or to the necessitated and, in its materialist mode, violent unfolding of the dialectic?

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34 Plato, *Republic*, 519.
35 35. *Foundations*, III, p. 82 [463].
If so, then philosophers cannot escape the suicidal choice between either comic irrelevancy as traffic directors in the jungle of unfeathered competition or tragic complicity as jailers in the gulag of the mind. Freedom indeed would have been killed; it would pulse no more as the heart of humankind.

Though subsequent ideologies of liberal capitalism and totalitarian collectivism were willing to accept as total such laws of the market place or of the dialectic, Kant’s answer would be a resounding, "No!" Taking as his basis the reality of freedom — so passionately if tragically affirmed at the end of the 20th century by Gandhi, Martin Luther King and the events from the Berlin Wall to Tienanmen Square — Kant proceeded to develop his Critique of Judgment. He did so precisely in order to provide a context within which freedom and scientific necessity could coexist, indeed in which necessity could be the support and instrument of freedom.

In the face off between freedom and necessity his refusal to compromise freedom both leads him to affirm the teleological character of nature as the broader context of scientific necessity and provides the justification for his affirmation. For if there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws — if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom — then nature too must be directed toward a goal; it must manifest throughout an intent within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, nature no longer is alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliative with human freedom. Though Kant’s system will not enable him to affirm that this teleological character of reality is a metaphysical reality, nevertheless, we must proceed "as if" it is teleological precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in this ordered universe. This is the second part of his Critique of Judgment, the "Critique of Teleological Judgment." 37

But if teleology in principle provides the needed space, how can freedom be exercised; what mediates it to the necessary and universal laws of science which the first Critique sought to ground? This is the task of Part One of the Critique of Judgment, its "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," 38 and it is here that the imagination reemerges to play its key integrating role in human life. From the point of view of the human person, its task is to explain how one can live in freedom with nature. For this purpose, the first critique had discovered only laws of universality and necessity; how a free person can relate to an order of nature and to structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating.

Above, we saw how the Critique of Pure Reason saw the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena not simply as registering, but as producing the objective order. However, this productive work took place in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and was carried out under a law of unity which dictated that such phenomena as a house or receding boat must form a unity — which they could do only if assembled in a certain order. The objective order was a human product, but it was a universal and necessary one for the related sciences were valid both for all things and for all people.

Here in the "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," the imagination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. Nonetheless, there are essential similarities. As in the first critique the approach is not from a priori principles which are clear all by themselves and are used to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, under the rule of unity, the imagination moves to order and reorder the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle on the part of

38 Ibid., pp. 37-200.
the intellect – the appropriateness of which emerges from the reordering carried out by the productive imagination.

In the "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," the imagination in working toward an integrating unity is not confined by the necessitating strictures of categories and concepts or their structures. Instead it ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether relatedness and purposefulness can emerge. Hence, it might stand before a work of nature or of art; it might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations — or, indeed, upon any combination of these such as a natural environment or a society, which may be encountered either as concrete realities or as expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this, the ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Just as the range of materials is unlimited, so is the range of the unities which can be elaborated by the productive imagination. Unrestricted by any a priori categories, it can integrate necessary patterns or dialectics within its own free production and integrate scientific universals within its own unique concrete harmonies. This is the properly creative work of the human person in this world.

In the third critique, the productive imagination continues a true unity by bringing the elements into an authentic harmony. As this cannot be identified through reference to a category because freedom then would be restricted within the laws of necessity of the first critique, it must be recognizable by something free. To extend the realm of human freedom to the whole of reality, this harmony must be able to be appreciated not purely intellectually in terms of relation to a concept, but aesthetically by the pleasure or displeasure of the free response it generates. It is our contemplation or reflection upon this which shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved.

Hence, the aesthetic judgment is concerned not with a concept, but with the pleasure or displeasure, the elation at the beautiful and sublime or the disgust at the ugly and revolting, which flows from our contemplation or reflection. One could miss the integrating character of this pleasure or displeasure and the related judgment of taste by looking at it reductively as a merely interior and purely private matter, taking place at a level of consciousness unrelated to anything but an esoteric, indeed stratospheric, band of reality. That would ignore the structure of Kant’s work, which he laid out at length in his first "Introduction" to his third critique. He conceived his critiques of the aesthetic and teleological judgments not as merely juxtaposed to the first two critiques of pure and practical reason, but as integrating both in a richer whole.

Hence, in the aesthetic imagination one works with and includes both the necessary relations of nature and the free interrelations of persons. This may be exemplified through one’s reaction to the exploitative housing of migrant workers. To respond in disgust is to go far beyond the cool, technical judgments of "unsafe" or "unsanitary" made by the engineer or health specialist at the level of the first critique. It may be true that, as far as he went, Churchill was correct in saying that "Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of those laws and in the possibility thus afforded of making them work systematically toward definite

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39 See Kant’s development and solution to the autonomy of taste, Critique of Judgment, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where Kant treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66.

40 See below the paper of Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" for an elaboration of the essential notions of the beautiful, the sublime and taste in Kant’s aesthetic theory.

But it would be obscene to speak of the squalor of the migrant housing as having been dictated by market forces or of the events of Tiananmen Square as confirming one’s theory. Kant’s concern in his third critique is much deeper and provides a context within which "definite ends" can be framed. For this, it reaches beyond anything that could be stated in terms of Lenin’s definition of matter as "that which, acting on our organs, produces sensation," beyond Marx’s periodization of history, and beyond all that can be stated in the terms of the first critique.

Indeed, it goes beyond even the objective judgments made by economic analysts, legal advisors or social critics at the level of the second critique. Though abundantly true, it would be grossly inadequate to say only that the civil rights of the migrants or the requirements of justice were being violated.

In the third critique the work of the productive imagination variously "turns over," models and inspects all these factors from the scientific and moral levels on which the migrant labor camp has just been considered. But it goes further to situate them as multiple modes of destructive personal violence with regard to the full dignity of the concrete persons involved, including not only their physical well-being, but their human dignity; not only elements which are common to all, but those which are unique to particular persons in the family; as well as social commitments which constitute their search for meaning and fulfillment.

Finally, the productive imagination working at the aesthetic level does not merely tally all of these once and for all as might an accountant, but considers endless points of view and patterns of relationships which do or could obtain between these factors. It reflects, in other words, upon the level of harmony or disharmony, of beauty or ugliness of the whole. On the part of the object then, the aesthetic judgment is characterized by all-inclusiveness.

On the part of the subject, this judgment is profoundly personal, for it is based upon one’s deepest, richest and most passionate response as an integrated person — body and spirit. This does not make one’s judgment solitary or arbitrary, however, for it corresponds to real harmony or disharmony. Hence, developing new degrees of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to image responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future.

This is manifest in a good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt. Their power to mobilize a people lay especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons, and thereby to evoke appropriate and varied responses from each according to his or her capabilities. As personable, free and creative, such work of the aesthetic judgment is not less, but more inclusive in its content, applications and the responses it evokes from others.

Such experiences of aesthetic taste, passed on as part of a tradition, become components of a culture. Some thinkers such as William James and Jürgen Habermas, fearing that attending to

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42 F. Engels, Anti-Düring, I, 11.
these free creations of a cultural tradition might distract from the concrete needs of the people, have urged a turn to the social sciences and their employment in pragmatic responses or in social analysis and critique. Kant’s third critique points in another direction. Though it integrates, it does not focus upon universal and necessary scientific social relations or even directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we imaginatively create as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness -- actual and potential.

Note that here the focus is not directly upon the beauty or ugliness as in things themselves, but upon our contemplation of our freely created integrating images of these things. This contemplation, in turn, is appreciated in terms of the free and integrating response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion it generates most deeply within our whole person.

In this way one’s freedom at the height of its sensibility serves as a lens presenting the dense block of reality in varied and heightened ways: it is both a spectroscope and a kaleidoscope of being. Even more, freely, purposively and creatively, our imagination weaves through reality, focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and interrelations. In the process, reality manifests not only its forms and their potential interrelations, but its power to evoke our free response of love and admiration or of hate and disgust. In this manner, our freedom becomes at once the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the disposition of all that we imaginatively can propose.

What emerges finally is that all is purposive, that all has been created out of love and for our personal evaluation and response. As free, our task is to assess and choose among the many possibilities, and through our imagination creatively to project them into the flow of actual being. In this manner, we enter into that teleology called Providence by which all are drawn to Resurrection and new Life.

*The Catholic University of America*

*Washington, D.C.*

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Chapter II
Kierkegaard on the Role of Imagination in the Development of Human Beings
Antoni Szwed

The greatest problems of human life are undoubtedly the question: "Who am I?" and "In what way ought I to live?" Naturally, there is no general theoretical answer to these questions, for they have strictly personal and individual dimensions. Every person must give his or her personal answer because such questions are related to the individual being. Each person must find in himself or herself the key to his or her answer.

However, a metaphysical elaboration of these problems can be found in the works of Kierkegaard. According to the Danish Existentialist, in the process of self-understanding the human imagination plays a key role in human spiritual self-development. Kierkegaard did not create a closed ontological system, but in his works we can find many remarks which permit us to reconstruct a picture of an overall philosophy of man. These pages cannot reflect its full richness but can point out briefly the main presuppositions of that philosophy in order to clarify the role of the imagination in human self-development.

According to Kierkegaard, a human being can be considered according to three levels of inner experience: (a) the sphere of the body; (b) the sphere of the soul (soul is not meant in the usual Christian sense of an immortal part of man, but as embracing all sorts of psychic experiences, mental activity connected with the process of thinking, and concrete personal characteristics, gifts and talents, including those that are most intimate and deeply latent); and (c) the sphere of spirit, which constitutes the core of man.

This last sphere was the object of Kierkegaard’s great interest. He understood spirit in various ways; principally, however, it was seen both as subjective—the conscious subject of human existence (the spiritual life reflected larger in our psyche), and as objective—something given which is to be completed or fulfilled. Very often the existing spirit is called a self, for it aims at self-understanding in the ethico-religious sense. One of the fundamental presuppositions of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of man is the conviction that the human spirit is free in its very essence, as if potentially and not only in the very act of making free decisions. In his Training in Christianity, Kierkegaard takes this freedom in its deepest ontological sense as an inborn property of spirit. It is the ability to undertake every free act; this he calls will.

On the same ontological level Kierkegaard places a second property of spirit, namely, imagination. He writes as follows: "Every man possesses in a greater or lesser degree a talent, which is called imagination, the power of which is the first condition determining what a man will turn out to be, for the second condition is the will, which in the final resort is decisive." Imagination is considered here as an inborn property.

In addition, it is seen as a means by which one can describe himself. How is this possible? The briefest answer is the following: the imagination is an ability which produces possibilities. Due to imagination, according to Kierkegaard, a human world of feelings, emotions, understanding and will takes concrete shape. Other features of one’s concrete personality disclose themselves

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through the mediation of imagination, whose essential task consists in forming representations, scientific categories and existential projects.³ Thus, in particular cases imagination, also, is a tool for creating one’s self-image at any existential moment.

Creating One’s Self-Image

How does it do this? Let us look at the following fragment of Sickness Unto Death:

Inasmuch as the self as a synthesis of finitude and infinitude, is, *kata dunamis* (potentially), in order to become itself it reflects itself in the medium of imagination, and thereby its infinite possibility becomes manifest. The self is *kata dunamis* (potentially) just as possible as it is necessary, for it is indeed itself, but it has the task of becoming itself. Insofar as it is itself, it is the necessary, and insofar as it has the task of becoming itself, it is possibility.⁴

Here the activity of the imagination is seen against the background of becoming itself.

Simultaneously he uses such other concepts as: necessity, possibility, finitude and infinitude. In Kierkegaard’s texts we can encounter many such descriptive notions by which the author of Sickness Unto Death sets great store. To bring out many of the interesting features of the existing and thinking self, Kierkegaard often described it in terms of synthesis. Such a synthesis is an ontological product of Kierkegaard’s attempt to grasp the phenomenon of the self. In such cases the self is considered a synthesis of two different, but complementary, elements. To unfold the full sense of the above-mentioned quotations, we must consider in turn three such synthesizes, i.e., the synthesis of necessity and possibility, the synthesis of finitude and infinitude and finally the synthesis of reality and ideality.⁵ Let us attempt to explain the first of these.

Self is in the process of becoming, which occurs independently of human will, or dependently as self-conscious existence. Especially in Either/Or, Kierkegaard describes at length the meaning of self-conscious existence on the ethical level. But as that is not our topic, it is sufficient here merely to underline that distinction. Thus, existence as self-conscious becoming is in a certain sense constrained by necessity, and we must explain of what that limitation of possibility consists and what it means.⁶

Necessity is something given beforehand, prior to all types of becoming. Kierkegaard says that in relation to possibility necessity restricts the choice among multiple possibilities. As necessity fulfills a limiting function, Kierkegaard calls it the limits of self.⁷ On the contrary, we recall that at times the existing self transcends such limits. In such cases, there follow inner disunion and disinclination, which cause the appearance of spiritual despair.

Consideration of the third synthesis permits us to deepen that problem. The element of necessity introduces a creative degree of determinism into human life which cannot be neglected without harm. As with many concepts in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, the concept of necessity is not univocal, but has at least two distinct meanings. The first is that of one’s concrete personal endowment: the concrete features of man’s psyche and character — one’s predispositions, gifts,
talents and inborn faults. To some degree, a concrete personality is something given, undeniable or transcendent.

Secondly, the concept of necessity has also a metaphysical sense. Kierkegaard is convinced that the human spirit is not a product of the creative power of human consciousness and is not a suitable concept for expressing all the experiences of a subject. A good example of such subjective experience is provided by Judge William in *Either/Or*, where he shows that nobody desires to be another person in the total range of his personality; whatever changes one desires, one wants to remain oneself. Even in suicide a person rejects his actual state, but not his self.

Originally, the spirit was created by God in a manner similar to the creation of the physical world, conferring upon man a metaphysically determined form. For that religious-metaphysical premise Kierkegaard finds philosophical justification in immediate psychic and moral experience. His new approach to the traditional question of man’s metaphysical nature consists in circumventing pure speculation on this subject. Naturally, it would not be meaningless if man were to be able to speak of his metaphysical nature, but for Kierkegaard that is impossible. Philosophical speculation is an imaginative creation and, for that reason, cannot have been held over from some primordial reality of spirit. The *adequatio* in the classical definition of truth cannot be realized.

As a creative force of the human spirit, the imagination in its creative activity is entirely free; *adequatio* is a matter of will, not of imagination. Imagination provides different possible (speculative) representations of the existing self: all have equal cognitive value; all are equally objective from the point of view of the existing self. The principal difference between a so-called "objective thinker" and one that is "subjective" is that the latter, rather than the former, appropriates the full possibility. However, the criterion for choosing an adequate possibility is not established arbitrarily by the will; for there is a prior criterion in such psychic experiences as anxiety, boredom, despair, shame and the correlative ethico-religious experiences of fault and sin.

Kierkegaard paid great attention to the existential situation in which these appear. Various kinds of anxiety are treated in *The Concept of Anxiety*; boredom is exemplified in the person of the Emperor Nero (*Either/Or*, Vol. 2); sin as a moral dimension of spiritual despair is shown in *Sickness Unto Death*; and so on.

If now we return to our main problem, the role of the imagination in human development, we must grasp more exactly the relation between the whole sphere of immediate experience and the creative activity of the imagination in order to describe their mutual interaction. Consideration of the second synthesis (finitude-infinitude) permits us to take another step, for that synthesis underlines the inward dynamism of the human self, namely, its existence as a sequence of momentary situations.

**Understanding Oneself**

In *The Concept of Anxiety*, Kierkegaard introduces a new notion of understanding by distinguishing between understanding what one says and understanding oneself in what is said. This latter meaning of understanding undoubtedly has ethical connotations and is very closely connected with the process of appropriation mentioned above. It can be concluded easily that the individual determines himself when he begins to understand himself in an existential

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project. The synthesis of finitude and infinitude shows this process of understanding in greater
detail. In very abstract categories, there is a double movement in opposite directions. The first is
one of infinite coming out from one’s self; in this the self negates its limits. The second, on the
contrary, is an inverse process of intimate return to oneself, making oneself something finite.
Kierkegaard explains that "the self is the synthesis of which the finite is the limiting and the infinite
the extending constituent." 11

What is infinity, or better, what is the process of infinitizing? Help on this can be found in the
third synthesis, analyzed in his early work, entitled "Johannes Climacus or Omnibus dubitandum
est." There, inspired by the first chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Kierkegaard
conders two states of consciousness: immediacy and mediacy. "What then is immediacy?" asks
Kierkegaard.

It is reality itself. What is mediacy? It is the word. How does the one cancel the other? By
giving expression to it, for that which is given expression is always presupposed. Immediacy is
reality; language is ideality; consciousness is contradiction. The moment I make a statement about
reality, contradiction is present, for what I say is ideality. 12

Let us consider this quotation more carefully. Consciousness of spirit may appear in different
states. On the most basic level Kierkegaard says that primitive consciousness is the sphere of
reality—in Hegel’s terms it is "sensitive certainty." Reality is nothing more than a stream of pure,
unreflected experiences which cannot yet be separated as experiences, concrete feelings and
emotions. This is impossible because there is no distance between spirit as subject and spirit as
object: immediacy presupposes the lack of such distance.

Consciousness moves to a higher level when existing spirit utters (or tries to utter) its
experiences in words, sentences, concepts—generally, in language and in thinking. At that point a
distance opens between the experienced reality of spirit (connected strictly with soul and body)
and the thinking spirit, that is, the sphere of ideality. That distance cannot be overcome because of
the radical difference (contradiction) between the essence of reality and that of ideality. To the
essence of reality belongs continuous changeableness, becoming and movement while every
uttered word or sentence in its content is invariant, timeless and unchangeable. Words and concepts
petrify volatile experience. That is why every uttered experience, in the very moment of its
uttering, is not adequate to express the vivid character of experience, but only its possibility.

In this light we can return to our previous synthesis of finitude and infinitude. It is now evident
that imagination does not directly reproduce anything from the sphere of reality. Kierkegaard
speaks in this context of a reproduction. 13 In view of the above remarks, it is clear that we can
speak only of inspiration or of necessary impulses from the reality of self. Hence, the process of
creating, of self-representation in the sphere of ideality, must be a departure from the limits of
reality which is finite or fixed in its spirit, soul and body. Transcending finitude is an unavoidable
sign of the creative power of imagination, which can create but not reproduce.

Inasmuch as imagination acts freely, the self transcends its reality and creates a so-called
"abstract self" with a totally objective content. The opposite process of limitation is subject to
verification and objective content and compels the imagination to make some corrections. Next
there follows an appropriation through representation which is valid only briefly for an existing
spirit. Afterwards, the whole synthesis must be repeated from the beginning. True existence
demands such repetitions while being prepared to accept new experience. False existence consists

11 Sickness Unto Death, p. 30.
12 "Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus dubitandum est," pp. 167-169.
13 Sickness Unto Death.
mainly in accepting determined representations, once and for all, thereby closing oneself in upon the inner world of one’s experiences.

Kierkegaard’s aesthetics (see, *Either/Or*, Vol. 2) provides an opportunity to see how self-closure enables one to choose (and to verify) an adequate representation. On the aesthetic level the person does not know who he is: actor, scientist, husband. His imagination acts quite freely, without limitations (as Judge William notes). He is open to himself, self-conscious of his human reality; he can experience so-called pure moral consciousness and traces of God’s presence.\(^{14}\) The limits of positive and negative psychic, moral and religious experiences constitute the limits of the freedom of this imagination.

*Pontifical Academy of Cracow*

*Cracow, Poland*

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\(^{14}\) *Papirer.*
Chapter III
Affectivity: The Power Base of Moral Behavior

Sebastian A. Samay

Executive Knowledge Or Socratic Fallacy?

Whatever else might be said about the relationship between science and morality, one thing is fairly clear: the two are aimed at different ends. Science is undertaken with a view of gaining awareness, knowledge and information about the world; while the aim to morality is to develop dispositions for right action or right behavior in the agent. To be sure, science, too, involves action, but only as a means of attaining its end. All the methodical probing, measuring and testing merely serve as preparatory steps toward what is really intended by the scientific enterprise, namely, that end is knowledge. By contrast, morality makes use of knowledge and turns it into a means for its own end. As a preparatory step toward deliberate and righteous action, knowledge is undoubtedly a guide to morality, but not the whole of it; knowledge is neither the goal nor the final end of morality. That end is action which transmutes knowledge into concrete performance and thereby actualizes what knowledge merely represents. Through this actualization, a certain power or perfection, a surplus-being or reality, accrues to the moral agent. Traditional wisdom calls this increase: virtue.

One would expect from this that moral philosophies, especially theories of moral education, would have a great deal to say about how to foster virtue in people. At the very least, one would expect that, along with analyzing the sources, principles, objects and methods of moral knowledge, ethics would also explain to us the dynamics which turns our moral representations into performative skills. Besides enumerating the reasons for which people act or should act, ethics must call attention also to the energies through which people are enabled to act for those reasons. After all, the reality, which moral philosophy studies, can be said to exist only after people acquired the ability and disposition, not only to think according to a certain set of principles, but also to act on them. To understand morality, therefore, requires that we investigate not only the processes of moral discourse, but also the root of the dynamism of moral life.

Alas, most moral theories, traditional and current alike, are rather thin on the latter score. Preoccupied with the problems of moral reasoning and moral discourse, many of them quickly gloss over the dynamics of moral action as virtually unproblematic. But, there are problems, many of them, that cannot be resolved in terms of knowledge alone. How is it that certain moral judgments are implemented while others are not? Is it the truth or falsity of these judgments that decides their implementation or the lack of it? What initiates the action of implementation? Is the initiative causal or merely directional? What exactly are the connections between knowledge and behavior, between judgment and action, between theory and practice?

Finding few or scant answers to problems such as these slowly gives rise to the nagging impression that most moral theories, in spite of their verbal protestation to the contrary, are content with being theories about moral thinking rather than theories about moral life and moral action. Regardless of what they intend to be, to one degree or another, they can be correctly labeled as "spectator ethics."

It would be difficult to account adequately for this persistent neglect of the dynamic dimensions of morality, but one reason for it may be found in the particular kind of intellectualism
which is never very far from the center of Western philosophy.\(^1\) The question is the ethical intellectualism of Socratic origin, which has the tendency of absorbing the dynamic components of moral life into knowledge by simply assuming that agents, when they are involved in a concrete situation,\(^2\) will necessarily and automatically perform according to the principles which they uphold as uninvolved spectators of similar situations. All commentators seem to agree that Socrates credited knowledge with a kind of executive efficacy with regard to moral action: "knowing what is good is not only a necessary but also the sufficient condition of possessing goodness and hence of doing what is good."\(^3\) This means, of course, that knowledge is not only an informing, factor but also the enabling factor of moral behavior. Moreover, it also follows that, if knowledge is ability, a man with the ability of doing the good could not knowingly do what is wrong; his wrongdoing could only be inadvertent, a matter of ignorance. Based on the belief that knowledge is virtue, intellectualists of all ages could always appeal to a ready-made solution to the central problem of moral education, namely, the problem of how to teach virtue. Right action in the learners of virtue, says this silent creed, is best elicited by improving their knack of making the right moral judgments. Pointing out to them what is good and what is evil, or demonstrating with logical stringency the advantages of the "real" good over a mere, "apparent" good, is the best way of turning them away from the latter and making them pursue the former.

The hope of this essay is to point out that this belief, even when better stated and accompanied by cautious qualifications, is illusory and inconsistent with the structures of human behavior. The intellectualist conception not only does not give an adequate account of the dynamic determinants of moral action, but it also puts the cart before the horse when it attributes primacy to cognition among those determinants. Primacy belongs to a striving or conative force which shall be designated herein by the term, "affectivity." As an all-pervasive propensity of living nature, affectivity will be seen as the general power supply of all behavior, the igniting spark of all activity, the integrating force of all knowledge and valuation, and the parent rapport between life and reality. The principal thrust of this essay will be to show that moral behavior is only half-understood as a consequence of moral judgments. Without the executive propensity of the affective or striving impulse, such judgments would not be made in the first place or, if made, would remain forever in the domain of mere knowledge or pure representation.

Identifying affectivity rather than the intellect as the dynamic source of moral life is based on the firm conviction that the essential perfection and final end of human development is not to be an epistemic or knowing subject, but to become an autonomous person, a self-regulating agent, who not only has life but also freely and resolutely leads it. While the beginnings of this self-regulating existence may coincide with the primitive strivings of life’s self-movement, its peak is reached only in that affective exchange among sovereign individuals which we call "love." Love, rather than contemplation, constitutes man’s ultimate relation to reality and even provides the obedient disposition into which an invitation to supernatural destiny can be projected.

This conviction is in marked contrast with some aspects of the hallowed Greek tradition, according to which the highest, most divine, element in man is his participation in the imperishable

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\(^2\) Note that it is only by virtue of that involvement, and not apart from it, that a person is constituted an agent.

Intelligence (Nous), whose final perfection consists in a beatifying contemplation of the Supreme Idea or Form. Totally separated from matter, simple and incorruptible, the Intelligence was held to be the standard of excellence in being; and its contemplative mirroring of spiritual reality, an end in itself. The rank or worth of all other kinds of reality was measured against this ideal degree of being, and all other activities were judged by how closely they resembled the restful awareness of contemplation or how closely they contributed to it.

The irresistible pull of this intellectualistic bias is detectable even in the otherwise balanced philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Though not an intellectual determinist, according to which knowledge exercises not only a guiding influence over the freedom of the will but also a causal determination, he was, nevertheless, an intellectualist when it came to evaluating the position of the will in relation to the intellect. According to Thomas, even in those cases where will and intellect cooperate, they can be distinguished by their respective objects: the object of the intellect is the abstract meaning of the good (ratio boni), while the object of the will is the concrete good itself (bonum ipsum). Ordinary readers would imply from this that, as an appetite for the concrete good, the will excels the intellect. But then came the surprising conclusion which illustrated how deeply Aquinas was committed to intellectualism: precisely because its object is "simpler and more abstract," the intellect is, absolutely speaking, "higher and nobler" than the will.

Although Thomas admitted that accidentally the will and its chief activity of love could be considered higher than the intellect, he attributed this superior ranking to the provisional imperfection under which the intellect is forced to operate in the present, pilgrim-state of man. That imperfection, however, was expected to be lifted in man’s definitive state – heaven — where the intellectual vision of the supreme good would secure the possession of that good all by itself.

Human values, identically intellectual ones in the definitive state of our final destiny, undergo a certain reversal in man’s present state where values belong essentially to the order of the will. In heaven the perfection of the blessed is measured by the clarity of each one’s Beatific Vision; but on earth the only criterion of moral rectitude we possess is to be found in each one’s capacity for love.

I simply do not hold with such reversals of priorities but hold instead that on any level, experiential as well as metaphysical, natural as well as supernatural, man’s primary relation to the real is always of the affective order — an order of love, ordo amoris, as Max Scheler called it. I coined the term protention to characterize this relation. The elements of this coined word for man’s primary relation to the real suggest that the original thrust of affectivity includes both the energetic aspect of launching oneself toward something (a project) and the knowing aspect of directing one’s attention toward it (an intention). Of the two aspects, I consider the first more basic. In other words, I hold that the real is primarily that with which living beings are affectively involved and only secondarily that which is offered to human inspection. Knowledge, inspection and representation are merely cognitive expressions of peoples’ spontaneous attachment to, and appetite for, the

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4 Even though some careless expressions of his could be so interpreted. For instance: "quia enim intellectus movet voluntatem, velle est effectus eius (italics mine). In Rom., 7, 3.

5 Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior inventur. Et hoc appareat ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. . . . Nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem ipsum appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilis et altius (italics mine). S.T. I, q. 82, a. 3.

6 Rousselot, The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, p. 199.
real. True, sometimes this attachment must be suspended, delayed and critically examined by reflective thought so that our allegiance may be bestowed not necessarily on the nearest good but on the greatest good available at the moment. Nevertheless, the whole process of inspection is carried out for the sake of subsequent involvement. This is eminently true in the moral domain where the perennial problem is how to carry our best judgments into action. Any theory of morality or moral development that neglects this problem or deals with it but sparingly is not very helpful.

**Affectivity as Protention: Attentive Dynamism or Dynamic Awareness**

The problem of how to carry our moral thoughts into action seems to be no problem at all for thinkers of the intellectualist persuasion because, as suggested above, the very tendency of intellectualism is to invest thought with a sort of causal efficacy with regard to action. This is not to say that all intellectualist theories always attribute this efficacy directly to thought itself, although some expressions of Spinoza’s *Ethics*, for instance, could be interpreted in that sense. Instead, most theories hold that causal influence is exercised through a separate intellectual faculty, namely, the will, which is seen by them as an intermediary between pure thought and physical action. Inhabiting a sort of spiritual command post and prompted by representations of the intelligible good, the will is portrayed as dispatching summons to the other faculties to spring into action and execute the movements necessary for the attainment of that good. Sometimes thought and volition are fused, and the will is regarded merely as the energetic aspect of reason itself. Kant, for instance, defined will as the efficacy of the intellect and, as such, "nothing else than practical reason."

Whether operating directly or mediated through other faculties, thought is seen by most intellectualists as the ultimate force behind moral action, moving us to actualize the objects of our moral representations. For reasons already hinted at and reasons that will become clear later on, I wish to attribute that kind of motive force, instead, to affectivity. To do so without creating a whole series of misunderstandings, it is necessary first to excise some habitual connotations attached to the concept of affectivity and redefine it in a more comprehensive, radical way. Hopefully, as a result of severe pruning, a fresh understanding of moral development can be grafted on the stock of affectivity.

To begin with, affectivity, as intended by this essay, must be rigorously distinguished in many respects from the psychological constructs called "emotions," "affects" or "passions." A few maverick views apart, emotions are considered by the behavioral sciences as temporary disturbances in a person’s normal state of mind and body, induced by the representation of particular situations as desirable or undesirable, and accompanied by a certain tendency either to seek or to avoid those situations through appropriate action. Theories of emotion based on this

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9 *Ibid.*, p. 446. It must be noted, however, that Kant is not always consistent in fusing will with practical reason: there are times when he talks of practical reason only as a representational faculty and the will as the real source of motive force.
general understanding differ considerably depending on which component aspects are thought to constitute the defining feature of emotion. "Bodily upset" theories emphasize the agitation of the organism and consider emotions to consist in the very awareness of that agitated state, its "psychic shadow." "Motivational" theories view emotions as prompters of action based on some kind of value estimation or calculation of utility. "Feeling" theories emphasize the immediacy and spontaneity of emotions. The great diversity and contrast between these theories do not, however, exclude a certain convergence on several points.

Influenced by an organic interpretation of system balance or equilibrium (homeostasis), most psychological theories consider emotions to be impermanent, transient affairs, as opposed to attitudinal or dispositional states which are more stable and permanent. As a feature of living systems, equilibrium requires the maintenance of a steady state of balance between organism and environment. When this steady state is upset, some mechanism within the system itself springs into action in order to reestablish the equilibrium. According to most theories, emotions are typically human ways of responding to temporary disequilibria and of triggering the process of return to a steady state.

Secondly, most theories consider emotions to be particular and specific reactions to imbalance, even when overt behavior or physiological research can disclose no pattern that would be characteristic of, say, "embarrassment" as distinct from "shame." In other words, both ordinary language and psychology operate with many more terms designating emotional mental states than there are behavioral or bodily symptoms manifesting these (supposedly) distinct states.

Thirdly, all of them agree that emotions are conditioned, or at least triggered, by some form of perception, idea or intuition, in short, by some type of representation. Perception is seen as the cause of emotion — "cause" being understood here in the sense in which most positive sciences use the term, namely, as an "antecedent state" which strictly determines the subsequent event in question. In fact, it has been suggested by some experimenters that "the same state of physiological arousal could be labeled ‘joy’ or ‘fury’ or ‘jealousy’ or any of a great diversity of emotional labels depending on the cognitive aspect of the situation."11 This, of course, would mean that knowledge or cognition not only occasions an emotion, but also determines its identity and meaning.

Finally, in spite of this strongly mentalistic and cognitive interpretation, the most consistent connotation attached to emotions is "irrationality," "turbulence" or "frenzy."12 This is especially true when emotion is equated with the singularly ambiguous term, "passion." Emotion, in this sense, is a sheer liability to be avoided or, at least, kept in strict control for the sake of rational action. Very few theories consider emotions to be of service in revealing the real nature or real value of things.

12 Philip L. Harriman in the Handbook of Psychological Terms (Totawa: Littlefields, Adams & Co., 1975, p. 57), defines "emotional" as "prone to strong reactions rather than cognitive responses." The same is repeated by the Dictionary of Behavioral Sciences, p. 118. In an essay "In Praise of Cognitive Emotions," *Teachers College Record*, 79, (1977), 171-186, Israel Scheffler of Harvard finds it necessary to apologize for coupling these two terms, "for cognition and emotion, as everyone knows, are hostile worlds apart. Cognition is sober inspection; it is the scientist’s calm apprehension of fact after fact in his relentless pursuit of truth. Emotion, on the other hand, is commotion, an unruly inner turbulence fatal to such pursuit but finding its own constructive outlets in aesthetic experience and moral or religious commitment." The rest of the essay, however, challenges this entrenched opinion by arguing that there are some emotions "in service of cognition" and some that are positively "cognitive emotions."
Without contesting the right of the positive sciences to define and elaborate their theoretical constructs in a way most suitable to their particular purposes and most in harmony with the explanatory models they have chosen, I claim that "affectivity" has very little in common with the psychological acceptation of "emotion" and other cognate terms. In fact, as referred to here, affectivity can be characterized by features that are very nearly the opposite of those applied to emotion.

First of all, the term, "affectivity," designates that enduring orientation and universal propensity, adherence or tendency by virtue of which living individuals are bonded to their environment and interact with it, both by fitting themselves to it and rearranging it to their own advantage or to the advantage of their kind. In this sense, affectivity is immeasurably wider, older and more basic than particular human emotions. As a fundamental orientation (an ontological intentionality), affectivity is found in various forms in all sentient beings and perhaps even in some higher forms of plant life. It would be an unwarranted extrapolation, however, to conclude from this that people, beasts and vegetation are ontologically the same just because they share in the propensity of all life for spontaneity and self-actualization. Affective intentionality is called ontological in order not to designate sameness of nature in all its bearers but to indicate that affectivity is not deployed through a special faculty, but involves the individual in its totality and imparts directedness to its life as a whole. By contrast, noetic intentionality is an act mediated through conscious representation or appetite, an act of the mind by which it tends toward the object. Moreover, the global aim of affective propensity is not the mere maintenance of being, but the promotion of increase in being. In other words, affectivity is the basic dynamism of life that can reach beyond the factual towards the possible and, at a certain level of development, can even represent the possible as a "purpose to be actualized." As such, affectivity is the energy source of all growth, progress, striving, desiring, planning and willing. Simply stated, affectivity is rooted in the fact that, for life, being is not merely an object already given but also a cradle of further reality that makes the creative evolution of life possible.

Secondly, as a basic and permanent orientation of life, affectivity has no object, aim or intention other than the general one of life’s self-enhancement. However, this generality implies neither invariance nor fixity on the part of affectivity. On the contrary, affectivity is the conative or dynamic matrix of the whole unsurveyable range of drives, instincts and appetites that constantly appear along the process, whereby life intrudes into the domain of inertia. It is unspecific and undifferentiated only in the sense that, in itself, it represents the global impact of cumulative living on the individual’s general orientation. As such, it is not the work of any particular faculty; it is not tied to any particular function or organic pattern, even though it can operate through all of them and, in so doing, acquire the specificity proper to the occasion.

Thirdly, the relationship between affectivity and knowledge is in reality the inverse of the one usually posited by philosophers between the emotional and cognitive factors of experience: the growth, refinement and evolution of affectivity make possible and give rise to the different kinds

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13 That is why the term "will" was not chosen. Will is regarded by most traditions as a separate faculty of rational appetite. It is called rational not because it is considered as a form of discernment in itself, but because — lacking any discernment — it must follow the judgments of the intellect. Whenever the will is not considered this kind of dependent function of intellectual representation, it is usually inflated into an altogether blind force of cosmic dimensions. Schopenhauer’s "will-to-live" is a case in point (cf. The World as Will and Representation, transl. by E. F. J. Payne [Indian Hills: The Falcon’s Wing Press, 1958], pp. 275ff). Neither will as an appendage of the intellect, nor will as an irrational thing-in-itself can do justice to the concept of affectivity as a cumulative directedness or protention of life.
and degrees of cognitive representation, not the other way around. This means that the kind of knowledge available to a subject is directly related to the kind of attitudinal posture he or she is capable of assuming and that the process of objectification required for cognitive development depends on a process of affective dissociation or diffusion.

First, remarks about the inversion itself and then some aspects of this process will be indicated. The heterodoxy of this position should not be obscured. On the contrary, it should be emphasized from the start that this essay diverges in the sense that it does not endorse the long-standing Greek bias of unquestioned primacy of speculative knowledge over conation in every respect. This goes to the heart of many recent developments in the understanding of the person and of personal life. One need not be a wholesale pragmatist — in fact, one need not be a pragmatist at all — to agree with Dewey’s analysis that pure thought has a certain colonizing bent which tends to absorb the whole of experience into reflection. Like a typical colonial settler, reflection soon claims the whole territory of experience, so that after a while even the native occupants are believed to exist at its sufferance alone.

What is known, what is true for cognition, is what is real in being. The objects of knowledge form the standards of measures of the reality of all other objects of experience. Are the objects of affections, of desire, effort, choice, that is to say everything to which we attach value, real? Yes, if they can be warranted by knowledge; if we can know objects having these value properties, we are justified in thinking them real. But as objects of desire and purpose they have no sure place in being until they are approached and validated through knowledge.¹⁴

It is against just this sort of familiar, but usually unexpressed, encroachment that these few pages wish to defend the rights not of action, as Dewey tried to do, but of affectivity and of life in general. This wish is motivated by the firm conviction that the human world is originally and throughout a lived world of involvement, rather than a spectacle provided for the dispassionate gaze of speculative thought.

Finally, if affectivity cannot be justly regarded as a ward of knowledge, neither it cannot be considered its rival. Knowledge is merely a later and more developed form of that affective discernment through which all living things endeavor to sort out the value and meaning of their environment. Long before the appearance or even the possibility of explicit representation of goals by individual organisms, life already had an intrinsic directedness through genotypically shaped processes, such as the instinctual acts of animals. Thanks to their value-orientation and affective interchange with the environment, living beings can feel "at home" in the world, even though they can only enact, but not yet represent, that feeling. This ability of life forms to be selective of value, without the benefit of separate and antecedent representation of ends and means, suggests that life as a whole cannot be regarded either as an entirely mechanical process or as a properly purposive one. On some levels at least, life seems to "know" reality by its mere attitudinal involvement with the real and to be able to accomplish its "purposes" almost automatically and unconsciously.

Even on the properly human level, affectivity provides the field of force from which the initial meaning of the "lived world" (Lebenswelt) is progressively precipitated or drawn out. That original world is not so much a network of objects as a forge of actual goods and ideal values; the rapport through which these values are disclosed is not so much an intellectual grasp as an affective grasp or "protention." In other words, it is significant and decisive that the process through which the world is gradually invested with meaning takes its origin in valuation rather than in contemplation. Likewise, at the end of this process of meaning-production we discover "love," the noblest

expression of affectivity as well as a principle of knowledge par excellence. This alone permits us to understand others in their uniqueness, a dimension forever inaccessible to the attitude of detached spectatorship.

Therefore, the fear – that granting affectivity its rightful place in human experience might somehow lead to emotionalism, irrationality or blind voluntarism — is needless. Affectivity does not detract from knowledge because it is the parent source of knowledge: man’s dynamic attachment to being. Ideas that not only inform us but also move us derive their energy to do so from the fact that, by virtue of their affective residue, they are able to address themselves to the center of dynamic striving in our being, where goals, resolutions and actions are forged. Fact and value as well as knowledge and action can indeed be reconciled through the mediating role of affectivity which forms an actual bridge between the true and the good.

Life And Knowledge

The altered meaning of "affectivity" — its contrast to the customary psychological acceptations — necessitates a few adjustments in the understanding of the terms "knowledge" and, by extension, of "reason," as well. In order to introduce these modifications, one must first outline some salient points of the dominant view, concerning knowledge in general.

By and large, most current theories recognize that knowledge is an emergent process, rooted in such precognitive and even preconscious phenomena as adaptive action, habit formation or patterned response. The recognition of this link does not mean, however, that continuity between preconscious and conscious life is admitted as a matter of course by most theories. On the contrary, conscious life usually is posited in direct opposition to mere organic reaction to stimuli. Consciousness is regarded as the sole, or at least the principal, producer and purveyor of meanings, and as such, the first of a series of qualitative breaks in the order of life forms. Similar breaks are said to exist also between the various forms of consciousness and the various degrees of knowledge. These degrees are believed to constitute a structured hierarchy of distinct forms of meaning-giving, culminating in the construction or discovery of purely abstract intelligibilities represented by conceptual symbols and expressed in assertive judgments. This is the familiar Greek ideal of speculative knowledge (theoria). The tendency to regard only this final degree as "real" knowledge is so addictive that even so-called genetic epistemologists, who admit a linear continuity between the various stages of knowing, end up considering this stage as normative for all the rest. In other words, all other forms and degrees of knowing are allotted intelligibility only to the extent that they approximate or somehow imitate this ideal degree.

It seldom occurs to knowledge-theorists or to genetic epistemologists to surmise that the development of consciousness ("the meaning-giver") may not be single-valued or linear at all; that, starting with some primitive datum which is both value- and knowledge-laden (axiological and noetic), development may fan out in several directions and tend towards not one but several ideal goals. Many theorists and philosophers simply disregard the fact that there is more than one mode of judging, more than one way of expressing and communicating the various meanings constructed or discovered by consciousness, and that there are, in fact, distinct forms of consciousness, many of which are not primarily cognitive. As Sartre once said, "all consciousness is not knowledge" (toute conscience n’est pas connaissance).¹⁵

What is needed, therefore, is a new theory of knowledge — one that is not boxed into a single-model explanation and can resist the pull of reductionism. What is needed is a perspective which

can reveal not only the external complementarity of life and knowledge, but also their internal, genetic connection which founds that complementarity. What is needed is an explanation of the life of knowledge. The limits of this essay, and even more the limitations of its author, make the appearance of such a theory, at best, a faraway possibility. The most that can be done for the time being is to propose a few theses which, when properly validated, could coalesce into a theory capable of presenting knowledge as a polyvalent and cumulative process that enables an organism to learn from its continued living, not only by storing and repeating crucial aspects of past experience, but also by inventing new and unprecedented ways of experiencing.

Knowledge as Symbiotic. The first thesis about knowledge as a basic phenomenon of life in general has been suggested earlier. Here it could be recapitulated in the following manner: Originally, knowledge is a purely symbiotic function of life’s spontaneous self-differentiation and self-actualization, totally indistinguishable in scope from that spontaneous urge itself. It is crucial that this first thesis be understood in the exact sense it was intended.

First of all, the statement refers to what knowledge is thought to be in its roots or "originally" in the double sense of the German term, ursprünglich. In one sense, origin signifies a "primordial leap," an act of emergence and novelty, a process of departure from what was there before; in another sense, it signifies the ancestral resemblance, the permanent stamp left on the process by its parentage. Therefore, in its originality, knowledge both transcends the processes of life and is branded by them. In one sense, knowledge is an original departure from mere life; in another, it is continuous with it. This means that, no matter how far knowledge evolves "beyond" its origins, it never ceases to be recognizable as a vital function, serving some higher interest of life; inversely, no matter how primitive a life form may be, it can never lack that minimal degree of interiority (Innesein) through which living things are for themselves (Fürsichsein) and which also constitutes the embryonic meaning of consciousness.

Nevertheless, on this original level, knowledge is not yet undergirded by consciousness in the explicit sense of that word because, on that level, knowledge itself is only an operational aspect of an undifferentiated vital impulse towards self-differentiation. This is the lowest form of psychic life which Max Scheler used to call a Gefühlsdrang. As an original form, this "feeling-impulse" cannot be defined by reference to something more original; it can only be circumscribed.

As the term implies, "feeling" and "impulse" are not yet separated. Impulse always has a specific direction, a goal-orientation "towards something," for example nourishment or sexual satisfaction. A bare movement "toward," as toward light, or "away from," as a state of pleasure or suffering devoid of object, are the only two modes of this primitive feeling. Yet this impulse is quite different from the centers and fields of energy that we associate with the images of inorganic bodies without consciousness. They do not have an inner life in any sense.16

Primitive as it may be, this impulse is not chaotic. In the first place, it already has a prototendency "towards" or "away from." But more importantly, as it pushes against the resistance of the environment, the vital impulse communicates to the living organism that first sense of "reality" or "objectivity" which, in the later reaches of development, becomes the guiding motivation of all search for knowledge.17 The very same push also sets into motion the processes by means of which the primitive Gefühlsdrang develops into conscious representation, knowledge, appetite, will and all the other higher functions of life. As Scheler pointed out, one of those processes is, at least in

17 "... this vital feeling is also the subject of that primary experience of résistance which is the root of experiencing what is called ‘reality,’ especially the unity and the impression of ‘reality’ which precedes any specific representation." Ibid., p. 14.
its over-all design, dissociative.\textsuperscript{18} As we shall have occasion to show, it is through the dissociation of the representational and striving or conative elements of experience that intentional consciousness, the locus of cognition proper, begins to emerge. The other process, complementary to dissociation, is what more recently came to be called equilibration. This theoretical construct of Piaget is a sort of integrating principle, defined as "a general biological tendency to organize isolated elements into structured wholes."\textsuperscript{19} This tendency comes into play in the interest of associative learning and practical intelligence, both of which represent further degrees of vital development through which behavior is gradually set free from the relative fixity of instinctual response and turned into a self-regulating process that is increasingly open to modification by individual invention and control.

However, the point to note in all this is that both dissociations and reintegrations are possible only because the dissociated elements are first delivered in an original unity of experience prior to knowledge proper. Cognitive development takes place as a series of polarizations in that experience. In itself, however, before the onset of polarizations, that basic experience is more of an affective adherence than a cognitive confrontation between organism and nature; it is more a matter of \textit{eros} than of \textit{logos}. In fact, even after the emergence of consciousness, certain initial stages of cognition derive their cognitive value from the affective side of reactive behavior to which they are linked and which they serve. To a certain extent, most animal knowledge falls into this category. Animal knowledge is economical: each animal has only as much knowledge as it needs to live by. As J.J. von Úxkull so ably pointed out, most animals are allowed to be aware only of those segments and qualities of their environment to which they can respond by adaptive behavior.\textsuperscript{20} The rest is not merely dismissed or ignored; it simply does not exist for the animal. Only need-related qualities compose the "objects" of animal awareness; life-neutral qualities are absent. Whether the ideal of complete neutrality is ever reached at all even by man is a further question; it certainly is not an original datum of cognition.

\textit{Consciousness in Dialogue.} The second thesis refers directly to knowledge as it appears on the properly human level. Without defining first what makes certain types of knowledge properly human, a summary statement could be framed in the following words: Any effort at understanding human understanding must include a framework which is not that of a self-reflective, entirely

\textsuperscript{18} "This creative dissociation, not association or the synthesis of single pieces, is the basic process of psychic evolution. The same is true in physiological terms." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 20. This may give the impression that Scheler considered the nature of intelligence purely analytical. His treatment of instinctual behavior, the second stage of psychic life, may indeed reinforce this impression. According to him, instinct can operate without previous learning because instinctual behavior does not have to construct a meaningful whole out of disjointed bits of experience (the \textit{blosse Mannigfaltigkeit} of Kant); instinct and environment form a single organic configuration, a value-laden whole or \textit{Gestalt} to start with. Intelligence is needed only for the "dis-integration" of such wholes into their component parts. Nevertheless, even Scheler admits that every disjunction of experience is done in order to permit new associations and creative recombinations of the dissociated elements. The twin ability to do both is at the basis of further evolution that results in associative memory (= learning), imagination, problem solving (= practical intelligence) and abstract thought.


\textsuperscript{20} Baron Jacob J. von Úxkull, \textit{Streifzüge durch die Umwelten der Tiere und Menschen} (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1934), p. 6ff. See also p. 61: "Wir werden sagen dürfen, soviel Leistungen ein Tier ausführen kann, soviel Gegenstände vermag es in seiner Umwelt zu unterscheiden. Besitzt es bei wenigen Leistungen wenig Wirkbilder, so besteht auch seine Umwelt aus wenigen Gegenständen."
translucent consciousness, but rather that of a consciousness engaged in a multiple dialogue with
the world. Such a consciousness is only partially understood as a polar relationship between a
knowing subject and objects known (noesis-noema structure), and its dialogue with the world is
poorly grasped as a production of speculative meanings expressible in universally valid,
propositional judgments. A great deal of explanation would be needed to elucidate adequately the
precise meaning of this thesis, but the following remarks should at least help to clarify its general
import.

The first remark is merely a reminder that theories about knowledge are particularly
vulnerable to what Whitehead termed the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," and that this fallacy
can be committed in more ways than one. The usual way of committing it consists in first reifying
the theoretical constructs of an explanatory schema and then treating them as concrete things or
entities. Many of the theoretical objects of modern science, such as models of the atom and atomic
particles, are accorded reality at the expense of the objects of ordinary experience on such mistaken
grounds.\(^{21}\) Placing concreteness where it does not belong can also be done in the paradoxical way
of judging and validating the reality of existing, concrete phenomena by their approximation to an
unrealizable ideal case. Here, "an entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain
categories of thought."\(^{22}\) This gives rise to the curious view that the real is really the ideal but does
not exist, while concrete existence is only an imperfect illustration of reality. Finally, concreteness
can be misplaced when it is sought among the constructs of explicit consciousness rather than in
the operations of lived experience. Knowledge as a concrete phenomenon of human life is thus
diluted every time it is measured against the imaginary standards of absolute knowledge, born of
a pure and transcendental mind.

Warning against the danger of such dilution, Professor Calvin Schrag of Purdue University
recently attempted to establish a sort of "archeology of knowledge" that could serve as a proto-
philosophical anchor point for the human sciences. In a book-length critique of traditional theories
of consciousness, he calls for a "radical reflection" that would avoid the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness by refusing to identify knowledge with the work of pure consciousness.\(^ {23}\) Drawing
on the Marxian critiques of theoretical knowledge as well as on some general lessons of
phenomenology, Schrag attempted to get to the roots of knowledge by tracing it back in the
direction of pre-reflective comprehension of experience, where "reflection is no longer separable
from the order of things into which man is inserted and in which he moves about as perceiver,
speaker, and actor."\(^ {24}\)

The original world of experience is not a construct of pure consciousness, but a matrix of
things, facts and values offered to the use, knowledge and appreciation of people. Instead of being
an object of contemplation by an all-seeing eye, the world of experience is an arena for human
action, of \textit{praxis} as Marx used to point out. Perhaps the profound philosophical meaning of the
Marxian notion of \textit{praxis} is that it "reorients the classical concept of consciousness in such a
manner that it no longer simply serves the function of a theoretic-epistemological grounding of
human thought."\(^ {25}\) The consciousness underlying human action is only secondarily a cognitive

\(^{24}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 72.
\(^{25}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 36.
subject: in its immediacy it is an affective openness. Likewise, the world of action is only secondarily a collection of objects to be known: in its immediacy it is an object of exchange, utility and delight. Even Husserl recognized this at the beginning of his phenomenology: Therefore this world is not there for me as a mere world of facts and affairs, but, with the same immediacy, as a world of goods, a practical world. Without further effort on my part I find the things before me furnished not only with the qualities that befit their positive nature, but with value-characters such as beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, and so forth.26

The fact that his later philosophy, in particular his transcendental reduction, was able to recover only a diluted version of this lived world does not detract from Husserl’s initial recognition of it.

The injunction against equating consciousness with the ideal of epistemic consciousness does not mean, of course, that the very idea of transcendental consciousness is without merit. As the capacity for knowledge with general, impersonal validity, the notion of transcendental consciousness correctly identifies one of the ideal goals of human knowledge. Humans, and humans alone, are capable of positing and approximating such an ideal. While an animal recognizes and reacts to whatever corresponds to its subjective interests, man can know more or less disinterestedly. Man’s advantage over the animal resides in his ability to judge and evaluate the world objectively, that is, in relative independence from his immediate needs. An animal does not, properly speaking, confront its environment: its organism is an integrated circuitry, where the input of environmental stimuli are immediately turned into reactive output. Here organism and environment are continuous. In man, the circuitry can be interrupted. What man knows and perceives need not spill over into immediate action: between external stimulation and internal leaning to action, there is a possible break. The possibility of that interruption is what we ordinarily call "thinking" or "reflection," and the relative distance from immediate interests we call "the objectivity of human knowledge." The world for man ceases to be a mere, vital correlated and becomes an object, a Gegenstand in German. Rather than always fading and melting into the environment, man sometimes stands opposite to it, and it stands opposite to him. By virtue of this confrontation, man can emerge as a self against the resistant non-self of the world. All this is quite true as long as we keep in mind that impersonal validity is only one possible direction in which human awareness can develop; that objectivity in the sense of complete detachment from subjective interest is more a matter of ideal task than actual fact;27 and that the concrete human knower is and remains a body-consciousness and not a disembodied, speculative reason.

27 That "the distinction between subjective and objective is relative" has been brilliantly argued by Thomas Nagel of Princeton in one of the essays of his book, Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). In the same essay, he writes: "We flee the subjective under the pressure of an assumption that everything must be something not according to any point of view, but in itself. To grasp this by detaching more and more from our own point of view is the unreachable ideal at which the pursuit of objectivity aims" (p. 208, italics added). The reason objectivity is said to be unattainable is that the very attainment of it requires its subjective acceptance and incorporation into one’s personal world-view: "... since an agent lives his life from where he is, even if he manages to achieve an impersonal view of his situation, whatever insights result from this detachment need not be made part of a personal view before they can influence decision and action. The pursuit of what seems impersonally best may be an important aspect of individual life, but its place in that life must be determined from a personal standpoint, because life is always the life of a particular person, and cannot be lived sub specie aeternitatis. . . . The impersonal standpoint takes in a world that includes the individual and his personal views. The personal standpoint, on the other hand,
Beside its speculative orientation, human consciousness is constantly scanning the world through a whole series of distinct intentionalities in search of a range of distinctive meanings. Not only in thought and speech, but by every act of looking, listening, molding, arranging, moving, contriving, in bustle as well as in repose, man is continuously taking up positions towards the world, he is making pronouncements about himself and the environment around him. To say this is not to imply that all these ways are incipient or abortive thoughts which, had they been given a sufficient period for gestation, would have emerged as mental propositions or would have converted into verbal assertions. Rather, the point is simply that these are non-speculative ways of getting meaning out of our relations and interchange with the world: non-verbal appraisals and pronouncements about reality and its value, for which speculative meanings and verbal judgments are no substitutes.

It is evident that in the experience of every individual certain actions and certain works of art are best left untranslated into statements, not because of hidden antipathy to the promotion of knowledge, but because, on the contrary, verbal translation is inadequate, irrelevant, or anticlimactic to knowledge already felt to be gained.28

A full-blown theory of meaning would have to inventory all the possible intentionalities by means of which meaning is generated. For our limited purposes, however, it is sufficient to refer to Buchler’s theory, which distinguishes three generic classes of producing meaning out of our relations with the world: doing, making and saying. To each of these corresponds a type of judgment that is designated respectively as active judgment, expositive judgment and assertive judgment. The merit of Buchler’s theory lies precisely in its ability to argue convincingly that active and expositive judgments are cognitive, but not in the sense of being inchoative assertions; they are cognitive in different respects, not in differing degrees.29

Linking Cognition and Affectivity in the Idea of Reason. This could be framed in the following words: Human consciousness is possessed of a dynamism that demands an unqualified receptivity for the presence and meaning of being, no matter how that meaning reveals itself and regardless of the road that leads to it. That passion of consciousness for openness, that global effort to confer sense on everything it encounters and to let nothing stand unrelated and meaningless, that universal appetite of the human mind is the essence of reason itself.

This means, in the first place, that any definition of reason that does not take into account this multidimensionality and dynamic character of human consciousness is going to be defective and misleading. For example, reason defined as a timeless structure of universally valid meanings is an impoverished idea because it limits the meaning of meaning to one of its manifestations, the one accessible to the impersonal intellect of scientific understanding. Such a constriction of reason regards the deliverance of impersonal reflection as only a part of any individual’s total view of the world" (pp. 205-206).

29 "The fact that history is more particularistic than physics does not make it less truly knowledge. And if poetry is, as Aristotle says, more universal than history, . . . that does not make it more truly knowledge. Physics, history, and poetry are cognitive in different respects, not in different degrees. The cognitive values of the three modes of judgment are not easily comparable, and perhaps not comparable at all; and this may be a part of what has to be meant by the view that there are three modes of judgment." Ibid., p. 39.
is contrary to the most fundamental attitude of reason itself, which, as Karl Jaspers pointed out, is one of sympathy, unlimited attentiveness and accommodating receptivity.\(^{30}\)

Thanks to that accommodating attitude, reason can give meaning to all human endeavors. "If it is insufficiently decisive to regard man as an animal that judges, it may be sufficient to regard him as an animal that cannot help judging in more than one mode."\(^{31}\) Not only man’s science, but also his industry, art, philosophy, moral life and religion are taken up in the unity and unifying recollection of reason. In other words, the unity of reason includes more than a system of ideas: it shepherds all the efforts of human life towards a harmony of meaning and action. The grotesque option that man must be engaged either in unfeeling science or drowning in the swamp of mindless feelings is unmasked as a pseudo-option by the original living unity or symbiosis (\textit{Mitleben}) of knowledge and affectivity in reason.\(^{32}\)

Moreover, the development of reason, the universal giver and interpreter of meaning, receives its impetus from the direction of its affective component. Degrees, stages and modes of evolving understanding result from the progressive maturation and refinement of the affective side of reason. Stimulation for the growth of knowledge comes from man’s love of truth — not only because truth has "cash value" for him, but primarily because he senses that it is truth that will make him free. Knowledge for him is a means of emerging as a sovereign subject in the world, and even more as a free partner in a dialogue of love.

\textbf{Toward a Theory of Dynamic Consciousness}

To represent the original symbiosis of action, love and knowledge in the ancient layers of reason calls for a theory of dynamic consciousness: a theory that would enable us to understand how consciousness can be a kind of interiority as well as a project at the same time. Such a theory would avoid the twin dangers of either reducing consciousness to the "nothingness" of pure intentionality (e.g., Sartre), or of inflating it into a spontaneous activity of an ideal or "transcendental ego" producing ideal or pure objects (e.g., Kant, Hegel, Husserl). Finally, as an alternative also to behaviorism, which banishes consciousness altogether by insisting that behavior is merely a set of glandular and muscular reactions to stimuli, this theory would also show that behavior as an aggregate of unit reflexes is no more intelligible than behavior as a pantomime for pure thought. Behavior is the manifestation of a \textit{conscience engagée}, exhibiting the primarily affective character of consciousness. Presenting affectivity as the anchor point of consciousness in real life could provide the mediating link between the energetic and directional aspects of all behavior, including moral life. Building such a theory with all the attendant laws and models belongs to psychological research.

In the meantime, however, philosophy can be of some help to psychological research by suggesting either the possible shape of such theories or the areas of research in which they are most likely to be found. The present essay wishes merely to highlight a few broad concepts from

\(^{30}\) There is an absolutely resonant passage in Jaspers’ \textit{Von der Wahrheit} (München: Piper Verlag, 1947), p. 115, which is here quoted in the original to show the compenetration of active and passive aspects of sympathy and assistance: "Grundhaltung der Vernunft ist universelles Mitleben. Vernunft als das ständige Vordringen zum Anderen ist die Möglichkeit des universellen Mitlebens, Dabei eins, des allgegenwärtigen Hörens dessen, was spricht, und dessen, was sie selbst erst sprechen macht. Vernunft ist Vernehmen, aber das uneingeschränkte von allem, was ist und sein kann."


\(^{32}\) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962); hereafter cited as \textit{Phenomenology}. 
which an affectivity-based theory of consciousness in general and of moral behavior in particular could be constructed by empirical researchers.

Without prejudice to Freud and his pioneering work on the role of instinctual energy in the psychological development of the individual, the insights of three other authors, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Kurt Goldstein and Max Scheler, seem particularly promising for laying the foundations of a science of affective consciousness. From different starting points and for different reasons the thoughts of all three appear to converge on the central thesis of this paper, namely, that the energetic component of any form of human behavior, including moral life, is an affective impetus which drives the mind to recognize the "worth of things" and drives the somatic and other processes to pursue that worth. A brief sketch of the relevant points of each of these thinkers is in order here.

The Pivotal Role of Body-Consciousness: Maurice Merleau-Ponty

In the beginning of Chapter Five of his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty points out why analyzing our experience in terms of a preponderantly cognitive consciousness can never recapture the organic relationship between the living subject and its world. It cannot do so because such an analysis "is transformed by its own activity into an intercourse between the epistemological subject and the object." While perfectly illuminating in other respects, this cognitive approach cannot reveal the world as value-charged because the ideal goal of cognition is precisely value-free objectivity. If we want to see then how values are brought to birth in the exchange between subject and the world, "we must look at the area of our experience which clearly has significance and reality for us, and that is our affective life." Even more significantly, Merleau-Ponty recognized affective life not merely as "a mosaic of emotional states of pleasures and pains," but as a distinct form of consciousness through which the world is invested with values. Using sexuality as a particular example, he shows that it is consciousness as affection, rather than consciousness as knowledge, that projects a human world around the body-subject. Although his rich analyses cannot even be outlined here, a few points must be noted in passing.

It is in the context of affectivity that Merleau-Ponty argues for the existence of an erotic mode of perception, supporting objective perception but "distinct from objective perception and intellectual significance." This perception is not a form of knowledge (cogitatio), but the protention of a body-subject towards the world. Disturbances in that affective substratum always result in disturbed behavior, even when no impairment of knowledge can be detected to accompany the affective trauma.

Certain forms of these disturbances, like the famous Schneider case, are particularly instructive by their broad implications. The very structure of Schneider’s mode of perceiving the world has undergone a change because that secret connivance with the world that constitutes normal affectivity is impaired. Because he no longer addresses the world about certain subjective

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33 *Ibid.*, p. 154. Proving the inadequacy of analyzing experience and behavior either in causal or in cognitive terms was the burden of Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work, *The Structure of Behavior* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), cf. "Behavior is not a thing, but neither is it an idea" (p. 127).

34 *Phenomenology*, p. 154.

35 *Ibid*.


37 First analyzed in the works of Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein.
values, the objective stimuli coming from the environment no longer speak to his body and, consequently, confuse rather than inform him. For instance, he has difficulty pointing to his nose or the middle knuckle of his left hand on command. Similarly, he cannot carry out the movements of his trade (sewing of leather goods) in the abstract. His movements appear hesitant as though he were trying to "locate" his limbs in objective space. No such hesitation occurs, however, when his body is involved in a network of familiar needs, such as blowing his nose or scratching his knuckle where a mosquito is stinging him. It is as if his consciousness functioned intermittently.

But how is this possible, Merleau-Ponty asks? "If I know where my nose is when it is a question of holding it, how can I not know where it is when it is a matter of pointing to it?" His answer is very simple and very much to the point of this essay: for the disturbed patient the "nose-to-be-pointed-to" and the "nose-to-be-blown" are not the same value objects; they do not belong to the same phenomenal world. The former belongs to the world of knowledge as an object of abstract inquiry; the latter is not an object at all because it belongs to the integrated dynamism of a living, acting body-consciousness. As his nose, the latter is a functioning aspect of his subjectivity. Something can be given to this consciousness, to this subjectivity, without being given as an object of representation, and vice-versa. Schneider’s trouble consists precisely in his inability of making the transition from one to the other. Therefore his impairment could be described from either side. On the one hand, it could be said that he is "lost" and cannot "find" himself in the objective world precisely because that world is only objective, without subjectively meaningful qualities. "Faces for him are neither attractive nor repulsive. . . . Sun and rain are neither gay nor sad . . . and the world is emotionally neutral." On the other hand, it could be said that it is his abstract attitude that is disturbed and that his "knowledge" is restricted to the comprehension of those situations which represent familiar problems to be solved by the mobilization of his body. In either case, the uncoupling of the normal link between representational and dynamic consciousness is attributed to an affective disturbance, and not the other way around. It is not the weakening of representations that causes reduction in desire or importance in action because "absent-mindedness and inappropriate representations are not causes but effects." Both action and representation are diminished in the patient because of his loss of affective attachment to the world.

That is why, according to Merleau-Ponty, the role of body is so pivotal in all this. Ideas and representations do not come first in life. They come later as "expressions" of our gathering existential momentum, as mental symbols of our concrete striving for greater life and greater values. Because ours is an incarnate existence, we do not start with "inner phenomena," which we subsequently translate into bodily pantomime, but with real situations or value-orientations that have to be changed into actual values. It is the "body’s role to ensure this metamorphosis." The body is precisely that two-way gate which can either open or bar the way of the forward project of existence. Insofar as I have a body, I have the power to withdraw from existence and "shut myself up in an anonymous life which subtends my personal one. But precisely because my body can shut

39 Phenomenology, p. 103.
40 Ibid., p. 104.
41 Ibid., p. 157.
42 Ibid., p. 156.
43 Ibid., p. 164.
itself off from the world, it is also what opens me out upon the world and places me in a situation there." It is bodily existence as projective that "continually sets the prospect of living before me . . . and establishes my first consonance with the world." This consonance is the concrete "expression" of that bonding between organism and environment mentioned above as a defining element of affectivity. However, the term "expression" is not to be understood here in the ordinary sense of an arbitrary sign to which a signification is attached by conventional predication.

Anterior to conventional means of expression, . . . we must recognize a primary process of signification in which the thing expressed does not exist apart from the expression, and in which the signs themselves induce their significance. In this way body expresses total existence, not because it is an external accompaniment to that existence, but because existence comes into its own in the body. This incarnate significance is the central phenomenon of which body and mind, sign and significance, are abstract moments.

In the same way, one might say that the affective propensity which breathes life into our original world is the central phenomenon in which one can discern the germs of development both in a cognitive as well as in an axiological direction.

The Drive toward Self-Actualization: Kurt Goldstein

An interesting sidelight with regard to the nature of this development can be gained from the writings of Kurt Goldstein. In cooperation with Adhemar Gelb, a psychologist, Goldstein’s initial researches were about the aftereffects of brain injuries on German soldiers in the First World War. His work yielded many practical results for medicine and psychology, but it also led him to interesting theoretical concepts. Among others, Goldstein soon adopted a holistic approach to human nature. He believed that every human phenomenon, normal as well as pathological, was the activity of the whole organism. This was already evident to him from the facts gathered through studies of the nervous system. "The nervous system," he wrote, "is an apparatus which always functions as a whole. It is always in a state of excitation, never at rest." All behavior is an expression of this condition of perpetual protention of the nervous system in particular and, through it, of the organism in general. Although not all points of the organism are affected the same way by this energetic state, all excitation concerns the entire system.

This is so because the organism as a whole is motivated by one drive only: self-actualization. Goldstein insisted that this drive was not to be confused with what is frequently regarded as "a tendency to maintain the existent state, to preserve oneself." Self-preservation is characteristic of life at the stage of incipient decay: the only form of actualization that remains for a person in an impaired condition is to hang on to his existent state. "This is not the tendency of a normal person. . . . Under adequate conditions the tendency of normal life is toward activity and progress."
The drive to actualize one’s capacities as fully as possible obviously has to have a built-in cognitive component. To be successful in discovering one’s possibilities one has to go beyond tried ways of reacting; one must develop what Goldstein calls an *abstract attitude*. This involves the capacity of "approaching things that are only imagined, ‘possible’ things, things which are not given in the concrete situation." Thus abstraction is not so much an action, for all action is concrete, but an attitude and an evaluation of action before it takes place.

The ability to approach things abstractly forms an integrated part of the behavioral circuitry of healthy and developed individuals. It helps them to relate to their environment creatively by leading them beyond the beckonings of the immediate situation outlined by a present perception and preparing them for new and unprecedented ways of dealing with the familiar. The breakdown of this circuitry results in the most fascinating, and, from certain perspectives the most puzzling, behavioral disorders. Goldstein’s works are replete with the study and explanation of just such disorders. The case histories of these disorders make for fascinating psychological reading. Philosophically, there are, here, two general conclusions worth noting.

First, Goldstein’s descriptions show that abstraction is a relative latecomer on the scene of human development. Long before the appearance of this behavioral skill and, often, long after its disappearance in patients suffering from amnesic aphasia, meanings are organized by the more ancient and durable scheme of affective exchange between the subject and the world. Secondly, even though Goldstein insists on the decisive advantage that comes with the ability to grasp things abstractly, he nevertheless agrees with those who claim that "the formation of abstract concepts is usually not an end deliberately sought for itself. It has always been a means to an end." For Goldstein, that end is self-actualization, though not in the obviously utilitarian or hedonistic sense: abstraction is an instrument of self-actualization and, as such, affectively based.

Before leaving the writings of Goldstein, there is one final point that must be made. His persistent claim that "there is only one motive by which human activity is set going, the tendency to actualize oneself" may easily lead to the impression that his studies were merely justifications for individualism and egotism based on biology. Nothing could be further from the truth. He rarely missed an opportunity to emphasize that "self-realization, i.e., human existence, is possible only in relation to the self-realization of the ‘other.’" Moreover, the discovery of the presence of other persons takes place not in an impersonal act of object-consciousness, but in a more intimate act of bonding called "encounter." Encounter is an original mode of consciousness, signaling the affective significance of another ego. "The experience in encounter," wrote Goldstein, "brings to the fore something that is profoundly characteristic of human nature, namely, that my existence is bound to the self-realization of the ‘other one.’"

The experience of the presence of others is in fact composed of several elements:

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51 *Ibid.*, p. 54. The same ability is sometimes referred to as "categorical attitude."
52 A complete bibliography of Goldstein’s works was put together by Joseph Meiers in *The Reach of Mind: Essays in Memory of Kurt Goldstein* (New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 271-295.
54 *Human Nature*, p. 201.
1. First of all, it contains an immediate recognition that others are necessary for my self-actualization. Here others are revealed in their relative value for me: my self-actualization requires a corresponding self-restriction on their part.

2. On the other hand, the presence of others is also recognized as a limiting factor on my self-actualization. Inasmuch as their presence encroaches on my freedom, the others represent a relative disvalue for me. Their claim to self-realization relativizes mine and calls for self-restriction on my part.

3. This means that, while the recognition of the relative value or relative disvalue of others is an immediate datum of my experience, the reconciliation between them is not. In the words of Goldstein, "there is not a pre-established harmony between human beings . . . they must seek it in an active way." Harmony can be achieved only through a deliberate adjustment of attitudes. It comes about when individuals can accept self-restriction for the sake of others without resentment, and when they can lay claim to the affection of others without self-accusation.

4. Finally, the experience of encountering the presence of others leads to the derivative awareness that self-actualization demands an active balancing of compliant and encroaching behavior.

Only then can the individual realize himself, and assist others in their self-realization. Furthermore, the highest forms of human relationship, such as love and friendship, are dependent on the individual’s ability and opportunity to realize both of these aspects of human behavior. Love is not merely a mutual gratification and compliance; it is a higher form of self-actualization, a challenge to develop both oneself and another in this respect. Self-restriction is experienced as inherent in human nature; it corresponds to what we call the ethical, to the norms.

The Primacy of Value-Orientiation: Max Scheler

An even richer source of insight into the affective substructures of consciousness can be found in the philosophy of our third author, Max Scheler. Consciousness as an axiological protention towards reality comes especially to the fore in his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, which argues that value-qualities grasped by affective acts have the same objective status in nature as sensory qualities grasped by perception. Man's Place in Nature, Scheler’s last published work, goes even further to identify the deepest stratum of life with a consciousless "forward-urge" (Drang), which provides the "steam" (Dampf) for life’s perpetual self-transcendence, including the ultimate sublimation of life by the "spirit."

In the introductory remarks to Formalism, Scheler notes that he wanted later to present a work on philosophical ethics based on phenomenological experience but saw as an obstacle Kant’s moral philosophy, "that colossus of steel and bronze" still generally accepted as valid. This meant that first he had to get around the formalism of Kant without, at the same time, lapsing into the errors of all non-formal ethics of goods and purposes; the ultimate rejection of which Scheler

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58 Ibid., pp. 207-8. Italics added.
60 See note 16, hereafter cited as Man’s Place.
61 Formalism, p. 6.
62 This term is used here as an equivalent of "contentual" or "material."
considered "the sole merit of Kant’s practical philosophy."\textsuperscript{63} Ethics of goods and purposes (\textit{Güter und Zweckethik}) are all those inquiries which start with the question, What is the highest good or What is the highest purpose of all volitional conations? Scheler’s acceptance of Kant’s general critique of all such ethics, while rejecting some presuppositions of that critique\textsuperscript{64} resulted in a highly original value-ethics which tries to steer a middle course between material ethics and Kantian formalism.

From Scheler’s complex theory of values, two major points are of special interest: first, his insistence that conation plays a decisive role in the apprehension of values; and secondly, his belief that in all goal-directed action the value-component or affective aspect precedes and founds the picture-component or representational aspect. Considering these two points briefly will illustrate for us how he regarded value-feelings as "an original relation towards objects," and how he attributed categorical priority to affectivity, and ultimately to love, "as pure attraction and pure interest in the world."\textsuperscript{65}

Scheler speaks of striving or conation (\textit{Streben}) in the context of goals and purposes, yet his point is precisely to show that striving and purpose are not logically connected.\textsuperscript{66} While conation "possesses its own intrinsic phenomenal differences of directedness"\textsuperscript{67} by itself and on all levels, "it is only and exclusively at a definite level of our conation that purpose makes its appearance."\textsuperscript{68} Conation, which begins as an impersonal and unconscious inner stirring (\textit{Regung}), reaches the level of purposiveness when it becomes the act of a central ego. It is in purposive conation that the value-component and picture-component of striving really become distinguishable and the latter achieves prominence because, for Scheler, purpose signifies precisely "\textit{represented contents of goals of conation}."\textsuperscript{69} What takes place at this level is the emergence of the consciousness of conation from conative consciousness. The confluence of the two is called the \textit{will} in traditional terms; that is why purposes are often mentioned by Scheler as "purposes of the will."

How the value-component and picture-component of an act of will are related to each other is pivotal not only for understanding Scheler, but also for the general drift of this essay. It is a matter of quite ordinary experience that the value-control of our conations are often independent of our ability to represent those values. For instance, we may at times experience a great readiness to make sacrifices or to be kind to people without having any clear idea of the objects we are going to give up or of the benevolent deeds we are going to perform. Here, the resoluteness with regard to the value of sacrifice or kindness contrasts sharply with the irresoluteness of the idea or picture-content of their representation. However, the significance of such experiences for Scheler is not simply the fact that value-contents are distinct and even separable from representations, but the more radical claim that \textit{values are in fact the foundations and first messengers of representational meaning}. To quote him: "The ontic relation between them is such that the value-component founds

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{Formalism}, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{64} For a pertinent reference, consult Farrelly’s distinction between teleological and deontological ethics in this volume.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Manfred Frings, \textit{Max Scheler} (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), p. 111.
\item \textsuperscript{66} E.g., the color and fragrance of flowers serve the "purpose" of attracting pollinating insects, but this does not mean that flowers are "striving" to achieve pollination by these means.
\item \textsuperscript{67} \textit{Formalism}, p. 33.
\item \textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 32.
\item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 39.
\end{itemize}
the picture-component; that is, the picture-component is differentiated according to its possible suitability to the realization of the value-component."

The last part of the statement just quoted directs our attention to another work of Scheler, *Man’s Place in Nature*, where he outlined the stages of differentiation through which the picture-component or representational aspect of behavior emerges from life’s basic value-orientation. From plant to person, the primary orientation of life is toward value, according to Scheler — not the same value to be sure, but a whole hierarchy of values. In fact, personhood itself is a value, in deference to which life yields up its innate direction. As a result of this yielding, personal life gains a new guiding principle: spiritual knowledge.

As we shall see, this does not mean that Scheler considered the spirit an outgrowth of life’s natural evolution or that he tried to reduce human knowledge to a need-related function of vital drives. Quite the contrary, if anything, he is guilty of a sort of metaphysical dualism that pitches spirit against life, presenting it as "a principle opposed to life as such, even to life in man." In its origin and according to its essence, Scheler saw spirit as independent from, and even antagonistic to, life — a perpetual naysayer to life’s libidinal impulses. Nevertheless, he was careful in pointing out that the autonomy of the spirit is in reality a borrowed one, for in actual operation the spirit is completely dependent on the energies withdrawn from life, having none on its own. Scheler thought it was a "fallacy to assume that the world in which we live is so ordered that, with the superior meaning and values revealed in higher forms of being, there goes a corresponding increase in power and energy." In other words, spirit is superior to life and supersedes it only as a navigational device, not as a power source: "Spirit and will never mean anything else but guidance and direction."

Our point, however, is not to present Scheler’s metaphysics, the acceptance or rejection of which leaves our concern relatively untouched. Our concern is to show how, through successive polarizations of its value-orientation, life can refine and redefine the goals toward which it strains, until it gives way to that non-objectifiable (but objectifying) process of self-ordered acts which we call personal life. Scheler has a great deal to teach us about the life of persons and their interpersonal exchange, independently of his ultimate metaphysical doctrines. The following outline provides a few hints about life’s development towards the stage and value of emerging personhood.

1. Vital Urge. The first modality of life, already noted as the point of departure also for a theory of cognition, consists in a nonspecific vital push (*Gefühlsdrang*) of the organism against its environment. This primitive push is nonspecific precisely because, in it, innerliness and protention are as yet undifferentiated, knowing and tending coincide. Found in all life, including plant life, this original urge lacks all means of reporting back the events that take place inside or outside the organism. Life at this level is completely consciousless, without any sensorimotor equipment and,

70 Ibid., p. 34.
71 Scheler noted four distinct ranks in that hierarchy: 1. sensible values; 2. vital values; 3. spiritual values; 4. values of holiness. Cf. *Formalism*, pp. 104-110.
72 Scheler understands by *spirit* "a term which includes the intuition of essences and a class of voluntary and emotional acts such as kindness, love, remorse, reverence, wonder, bliss, despair and free decision." *Man’s Place*, p. 36.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., p. 64.
75 Ibid., p. 68.
consequently, without active purposiveness of any kind. It fulfills itself in a blind protention of nourishment, growth and reproduction.

Vital feeling or urge is characteristic of plant life, but it is present in animal and human life also. Mixed in with more complex functions and largely subsumed by them, the vital urge nevertheless retains a certain archaic independence from them. Even when energy is withdrawn from more specific drives and functions, as in states of sleep, hibernation, fainting or coma, the vital urge burns on. On the other hand, "there is no sensation, no perception, no representation behind which is not the dark impulse burning continuously through periods of sleeping and waking." *Even the simplest sensation is not merely the response to a stimulus, but always the function of a drive-motivated attention.*

2. Instinct. Life’s value-orientation begins to give rise to representational content in instinctual behavior because it is on this level that the drive-motivated attention, just mentioned, brings about sensation. Sensation, in turn, as a reporting back of an organ to a nerve-center, modifies the subsequent deployment of the drive. Thus begins, within the vital urge, a dialectic process between action and representation leading to repeated "disintegrations" (in the non-pejorative sense) and reintegrations of the initially undifferentiated protention of life. It is in instinct that the "undifferentiated energy of growth, reaching out ecstatically into a neutral, unspecified environment, is modified by sensation and spontaneous locomotion . . . which begin to untie the living being from its vegetative level.*

Scheler calls behavior instinctive when it exhibits the following five characteristics: it must be meaningful for the whole of the organism or for the whole of another organism; it must have a set rhythm; it must be typical for the species; it must be innate; it must be complete rather than tentative. The first feature refers to the quasi-purposive or end-directed nature of instinct. Scheler coined the word teleoctic for this kind of purposiveness which does not depend on individual representation. The second feature emphasizes the fact that instinct is not constructed by imitation or learning from others. Thirdly, instinct is typical behavior — typical of the species rather than of the individual. Fourthly, instinct is not acquired, but hereditary. This does not mean, however, that "instinctive behavior must be present at the time of birth; it means only that it is coordinated with fixed stages of growth and maturation, and possibly even (in the case of polymorphism) with different developmental stages in animals.*

Finally, instinct does not come about through the stringing together of partial movements that proved successful before. Its essential pattern is mounted ready-made, so to speak, before the processes of trial and error.

The really intriguing thing for our purposes, however, is what Scheler has to say about the function of knowledge in relation to instinctual behavior. There is in instinct, as noted above, a beginning of the separation between sensation and drive, but there is also a very close functional connection. In a biologically shaped behavior such as instinct, knowledge can serve only an instrumental function to action: "What an animal can imagine or perceive is controlled by the *a priori* relation of its instincts to the structure of the environment . . . An animal sees and hears what is significant for its instinctive behavior.*

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76 *Man’s Place*, p. 13. Italics added.
77 Frings, *Max Scheler*, p. 34.
78 *Man’s Place*, p. 17.
79 *Ibid.*, p. 18. The last sentence suggests that even developmentally the receptor system, what the Germans call *Merknetz*, is tailored to the capacities of the effector system, the *Wirknetz*. 
Moreover, the knowledge operative in instinct is not the property of individuals; it is the atavistic wit of the whole species, so to speak. That is why instinctual knowledge is as much a filter as it is a mirror with regard to the environment. It admits only as much of it as the wisdom of the species allows the individual to perceive.

Finally, Scheler indicates that instinctual knowledge is predominantly and by nature affective. "Knowledge inherent in the instinct is not a knowledge by means of representations, images or even ideas. It is rather a feeling of value-charged resistances which are differentiated as attractive or repulsive according to these value-impressions."80

3. Associative Memory. The next stage in the "disintegration" of the vital urge is the vast domain of learning, that is, the domain of behavior modification on the basis of previous experience. The possibility of learning from previous experience implies that the past has not entirely passed but left some traces of itself behind which can be recalled and combined with a new experience. The ability to retain the past and link parts of it with the present is called associative memory.

The appearance of the associative principle is significant for our essay from two points of view. First, the affectivity underlying associative learning is quite manifest here. Progress in learning, fixation of habit, strength of conditionment are directly proportionate to the number of trial movements, on the one hand, and to the affective meaning ("satisfying," "frustrating") or value-quality of those trials, on the other. In other words, the twin engines of behavior modification, i.e., reinforcement and inhibition, are obviously value-driven. Associative learning is significant, secondly, because it initiates the emergence of the individual qua individual. Insofar as an animal begins to manifest behavior learned through association, it also begins a process of emancipation from its bondage to the species. It begins to be more and more a center of its own behavior, rather than a mere arena for it, "for only with the operation of this principle can the individual adapt himself to new situations, to situations not typical of the species. Thus the individual ceases to be no more than a point of transition in the reproductive process of the species."81

4. Practical Intelligence or Cunning. The liberation and centralization of individual behavior resulting from associative learning is counterbalanced by the attendant perils of mechanization of learned behavior. No sooner freed from the rigidity of species-bound instinct, behavior is in danger of lapsing into routine and stereotypy. As a corrective for such dangers, further differentiation brings forth cleverness or practical intelligence.

This type of intelligence is called "practical" because it deals with action and the choice of action by means of which the animal seeks to attain some goal set by its drives. This does not mean, however, that animal intelligence is a mere motor skill, for in fact it contains a great deal of independent imagination and even some hints of proto-abstraction. Indeed, intelligence is the faculty of "a sudden insight into a connected context of facts and values within the environment that is not perceived now nor was ever perceived previously."82

The newness of the situation acts as an obstacle to the attainment of the need-determined goal. To overcome this obstacle, to master the unprecedented situation, the experiential field of the animal has to be actively restructured for possible clues. Hitherto neutral elements or elements

80 Ibid., p. 21.
81 Ibid., p. 27.
82 Ibid., p. 30.
corresponding to other needs must assume an instrumental relationship to the goal in question. This means, however, that those elements must be drawn into a relatively "abstract" and "objective" perspective by the animal. Commenting on Kohler’s experiments with chimpanzees, Scheler called special attention to the degree of abstraction involved here. To reach the fruit lying outside the cage, these clever beasts used not only sticks which, after all, resemble branches on which the fruit normally hangs, but also pieces of wire, the brim of a straw hat, a blanket, anything that satisfied the abstract representation of "movable and elongated."

Nevertheless, Scheler also noted that this kind of ad hoc abstraction is not yet the reflective and universal abstraction usually associated with human inventiveness. Rather, "it is the dynamic energy of the drive itself that is here objectified and projected into constituents of the environment." The objectivity discovered here is still only the instrumental aptness of some environmental feature to satisfy a particular end.

5. **Spirit.** Fully abstract knowledge, which can represent the qualities and values of things objectively, i.e., not just in particular circumstances but universally and independently of subjective need, is reached only by the properly human capacity called "spirit." While the concept of spirit for Scheler includes the capacity for such acts as volition, love, remorse, reverence, despair and so on, we shall concentrate on it exclusively as a special function of knowledge.

Whatever the ontological status of the spirit may be, the importance of its cognitive function is fairly clear. It is in spiritual knowledge that the drive toward objectification, which was merely begun and foreshadowed by instinct, memory and intelligence, finally succeeds. The consequences of this breakthrough are far-reaching and decisive for the understanding of the proper relationship between the cognitive and affective components of moral behavior.

Scheler correctly presents objectification as an act of emancipation of spiritual knowledge from narrow environmental pressures and interests, but he is mistaken when he perceives this emancipation as a form of detachment pure and simple. He is more correct when he emphasizes that detachment from the environment in human knowledge actually means the unlimited expansion of man’s interests to the point of his being open to the world (weltoffen). "To become human is to acquire this openness to the world by virtue of the spirit." Instead of being tied to a limited field of interaction, as is animal life, human interest extends to the most remote aspects of the world at large. Spirit is the ability of placing one’s living space with its select centers of attraction and resistance into an extended context that objectifies that space and transforms one’s "environment" into a "world."

This transformation is in reality a transvaluation. Objectification (and objectivity) is sought, first and foremost, as a value for man. It is sought as a condition for inventiveness, as a means of creative diversification of behavior. Instead of seeing things and relating to them only in the light of determined needs, man can see them and interact with them multifacetedly. Objective knowledge is so far from being a form of detachment from reality that it could be properly described as a universalization of attachment, for it expresses man’s unbounded appetite for being that reaches beyond the points of interest given in animal knowledge.

But above all, objectification is sought as an access to self-consciousness, that is, "consciousness that the spiritual center of action has of itself." Simultaneously with the

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84 See note 72.
85 *Man’s Place*, p. 39.
objectification of the world, but logically consequent upon it, man’s consciousness can objectify
even his own inner states and vital drives and thus emerge as a substantial "self" against the "non-
self" of the world.

All this is in marked contrast to animal knowledge which has no object, no center, no world.
The animal inhabits a limited environment, "which it carries along as a snail carries its shell." 87 Its
knowledge is a more or less dependent function of that environment in which things are given only
as centers of resistance to attraction or repulsion. Anything that falls outside those centers is not
given at all. "Animals only notice and grasp those things which fall into the secure borders of their
environmental structure." 88 This environmental structure itself, forming a functional circle with
the animal organism that is fitted into it, 89 guides both animal knowledge and animal behavior.

Man, on the other hand, has a new and largely independent method for guiding his
behavior. Inasmuch as he is able to objectify even his vital impulses, he can evaluate them,
coordinate their several goals under an overarching representation, and rechannel their energies
toward a freely chosen project. In psychological terminology, the ability to call upon natural
energy complexes to accomplish goals not necessarily native to those complexes is usually
referred to as sublimation, and the agent behind sublimation is referred to as the will. Both of these terms
are useful, but both are liable to be misinterpreted.

Sublimation is a useful concept if it throws light on the change that takes place in the transition
from sensory striving or drive-directed behavior to voluntary striving or mind-directed behavior.
The essential difference is usually and mistakenly seen by philosophers as a difference in the kind
of goal or object pursued by each: the object of sensory striving is said to be some "particular"
good, while the object of the will is supposed to be the "universal" good. The same difference is
sometimes expressed in terms of the contrast between the "concrete" and the "abstract." However,
these distinctions confuse the object of striving with the manner of representing that object. While
it is true that the object of a voluntary act is represented generally and abstractly, that does not
mean that its object is a "good in general," and much less that it is an "abstract good." There might
be abstract intelligibilities and general meanings, objects for pure thought, but as the object of
appetition, the good can only be concrete and particular. All affective propensities — love,
volition, desire, even instinctual drive — seek the concrete reality rather than the abstract
representation of their object. To be sure, some of them, like love and volition, seek their goal by
the light of abstract representation, but what they seek is not abstract. The theory of sublimation
is a refined way of saying all this. It is a way of suggesting that some of man’s goal-directed actions
are indeed objective and spiritual in the sense that, in them, the basic value-orientation of life
finally gives rise to a separate picture-component that can function as an independent guidance
system for those actions. By virtue of this guidance, the initially stereotyped operations of libidinal
energies are freed and redirected towards the accomplishment of cultural projects. Needless to say,
the production of culture itself is only a means for producing the very maker of culture: man
himself.

Epilogue: The Formation of Trends and Attitudes

This essay began by hinting at the inadequacy of studying morality and moral education under
the heading of cognition. Treating morality as one more instance of applied knowledge, it was

87 Ibid., p. 39.
88 Ibid., p. 38.
noted, tends to overlook the problems connected precisely with the application of such knowledge in action. The tendency is to assume that the very cogency of the reasons offered by the various moral theories for acting in a certain way is sufficient to trigger the process of appropriate application. At the very least, all cognitive moral theories are haunted by the ghosts of ideomotorism, that is, the belief that the picturing of appropriate ends and means can somehow overflow into purposive action all by itself.

The thrust of this essay has been to exorcise that ghost once and for all and to argue that ideation cannot be both the informing and the enabling factor of moral action, and that knowledge, while indispensable to morality as a directional device, cannot at the same time be its energetic component. That component, it was argued, derives from life’s fundamental value-orientation, called affectivity. This power to act morally is furnished by a goal-directed disposition which all living beings possess, but which in man is elevated to the rank of a conscious striving toward self-realization.

Introducing affectivity as a second major component of moral behavior is liable to give rise to some unintended and potentially misleading implications. For instance, to the extent that philosophers and psychologists make use of the concept of affectivity at all, they usually take it to mean the same thing as emotion — some kind of strong visceral agitation which signals the upset of the normal balance between organism and environment, but which also initiates the process of return to that normal state. Other, more untoward acceptations equate affectivity with unruly passions and chaotic arousals, with the moods and urges of a turbulent id. In either case, affectivity is usually seen as an interloper in human affairs. Under the first perspective, it appears as a momentary departure from a preset norm which, however, soon rights itself; under the second, it is seen as a violent counterforce to reason that has to be kept in constant check by commensurate rational resistance. But even without such sinister connotations, to say that moral behavior has an affective as well as a cognitive component is liable to make morality appear a dual phenomenon, that is, the work of two separate faculties existing side by side and working either in tandem or against one another. It could be interpreted to mean that in moral questions the "heart" too has its say, after reason has spoken. In order to preclude such a dualistic interpretation, on the one hand, and to make sure that it is not taken for a cybernetic theory of behavior, on the other, this essay tried to describe affectivity as life’s fundamental value-orientation from which both knowledge and the particular acts of emotion, desire, will and striving take their origin. In other words, the essay does not merely complement other, cognitive considerations; it ascribes primacy to the affective processes because it considers these to be the actual movers of moral life.

This last point may strike one either as momentous or as trifling, depending on what one considers the goal of moral education to be. If the goal is simply to teach students how to discover higher and broader moral purposes, their affectivity need not be stimulated beyond the point of awakening in them a curiosity to learn about such topics. But if the task is to form in them a steady skill and disposition to strive toward these purposes, then something more primordial than their intellectual curiosity must be touched. Their dynamic value-orientation must be stirred up, and their love of probity must be set in motion; for that alone transforms them into moral agents.

In order to intimate that purposiveness and value-orientation are indeed non-derivative dimensions of human consciousness, this essay next presented a sampling of the pertinent ideas of two philosophers and one psychologist which point to the possibility of reconstructing the theory of consciousness on an affective basis. The actual reconstruction, should it ever be attempted, will require a great deal of programmatic research and model building on the part of educational psychologists. That is obviously no longer a philosophic task.
Before leaving the scene, however, philosophy can perform one last service for the researcher by warning him about one more fruitless attempt of representing affectivity through concepts which are unsuitable to the task. The recurrent emphasis of these pages on the importance of affectivity in moral behavior might have led to the ideas that the matter must, therefore, be restated in terms of "motivation"; that the dynamic component so often mentioned is to be read as the "motivational" component of behavior; and, especially, that the question of moral education may now appear as a question of how to "motivate" people to act righteously. The point of the warning is that theories of motivation, while enormously relevant in explaining other things, tell us very little about how to think and what to do about the properly affective structure of purposive behavior.

A relative latecomer on the intellectual scene, the concept of "motive" or "motivation" betrays its philosophical ancestry by the manner in which it was made to function in the behavioral sciences. The psychological and sociological usage of "motive" designates what in earlier contexts used to be called either the "final cause" or the "efficient cause" of conduct. One set of theories identifies motives with the "reasons" for which an action is performed. Here, reasons mean the anticipatory representation of an end-state to be brought about by means of a certain course of action. In ordinary language usage, we call that the "purpose" or "point" of an action. The representation of the end itself is thought to be the full explanation of why the action is undertaken. Here motive functions as a final cause.

However, since it is at least arguable that the "real" reason for an action was not what the agent himself "thought" it was, another set of theories dispenses with the representation of purposes altogether and rebuts the belief that reasons are necessary at all for the understanding of regulated acts. A motive, according to this view, is not the intent for the sake of which or in view of which something is done, but a certain tropism, an unconscious drive or a tissue condition which is already programmed to bring on self-regulatory behavior. Theories which regard the underlying mechanism of motivation to reside in brain stimulation or endocrine processes, theories of drive reduction, libidinal theories, social learning theories — all belong to this second group. Their explanations are modelled on efficient causality.

Thus alternating between ideas and drives and alternating between final and efficient causality, motivational theories lack the integrated view necessary to understand the value-orientation of moral behavior. On one hand, they can give no adequate description of the dynamics of moral pursuit; on the other, they can explain what happens to man, but not what he does. While each of them can bring to light some valid aspect of purposive behavior, theories of motivation fall short of providing a theory of affectivity or a conceptual model for moral education. That theory and that model must be looked for along different lines of approach.

To find them, empirical research must turn from focusing on the reasons or compulsions of human behavior to exploring the deep-dynamic structures of consciousness. For it is the activation of these structures, rather than thought or duress, that underline the formation of such positive trends of character disposition as courage, persistence, trust, confidence, interest, respect, rectitude, kindness and love. It should be fairly clear that these dispositions are not motives in the

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sense of reasons for which one acts, causes that make one act, agitations and emotions. They are, instead, relatively stable modifications in the general value-orientation of affectivity. As such, their influence on action and the quality of action is undeniable. Even though their influence is not causal, their presence imparts a particular cast to the acts whereby values are actualized.

One might say that the remaining task consists essentially in answering two fundamental questions: "How is human affectivity organized?" and "What pedagogic measures are likely to promote the positive development of affectivity?" Accent here is on the word "positive," for it seems that there can also be a negative development of value-orientation. This happens whenever the natural impulse of affectivity towards self-actualization is either arrested, repressed or misdirected. It is then that the foundations of immoral or criminal behavior are laid in such negative character dispositions as fear, mistrust, isolation, diffidence, apathy, cynicism, deviousness, meanness and hatred. In other words, the goodness or badness of affectivity appears to depend on the direction of its development. Four of Scheler’s value-axioms are especially pertinent here:

1. Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a positive value in the sphere of willing.
2. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a negative value in the sphere of willing.
3. Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a higher (or the highest) value in the sphere of willing.
4. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a lower (or the lowest) value in the sphere of willing.

Thus, education in goodness must mean education in value-realization and, not merely, value-recognition. At the very least, moral education must involve the removal of all inertial obstacles which tend to block or deflect the positive direction of the affective impulse. More than that, it requires also the strengthening of the will and the imparting of such positive attitudes to affectivity as were mentioned above. Only a person with positive moral inclinations is really a mature moral subject. How can such positive attitudes be imparted? Must they be "caught" from the teacher by way of role-modelling, or merely elicited from the native powers of the student himself? What are the concrete lines of communication between the directional and energetic components of behavior? How is a commitment to recognized values made and maintained? All these problems are so many aspects of one and the same essential problem, "What is moral education"? This is the issue! *Hic labor, hic opus est!*

*St. Vincent College*
*Latrobe, Pa.*

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Chapter IV
The Imagination in the Post-Kantian Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur

David N. Power

Much current writing on the role of the imagination in moral action has its roots in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. On the one hand he posited a connection between imagination and pure reason, in terms of the pure intuition of space and time. On the other hand, in his Critique of Judgment he posited a relation between aesthetics, the beautiful, moral judgment and teleology. Ever since, for philosophers and ethicists interested in the role of the imagination in the development of the moral life of the person or of society, how these fields of human action can be brought together has been a key problem. A starting-point is in fact found in Kant’s notion of the symbol that relates the beautiful to the morally good. Symbolic representation does not present a concept directly, as does transcendental schematism, but only indirectly, as there is no proper schema for the concept. The representation of the symbol in its relation to the morally good and its teleology is not reproductive but rather the occasion for reflection. Though Kant is more interested in the world of natural beauty in its inspiration of good than in artistic expression, from this starting-point of the symbol in fact the whole world of artistic creation could be opened up as a world in which the power of the imagination and of feeling is explored.

In this essay, I will focus on the work of Paul Ricoeur rather than trying to encompass the whole range of writings and ideas pertinent to this question since Kant. An advantage of taking Ricoeur as a central focus is that he has developed his own thought over the years in the form of dialogue with philosophers both ancient and modern and has addressed just about every issue that has emerged in contemporary philosophy and praxis. At times that makes his thought rather tattered, but it also means that readers have to tackle the questions for themselves rather than depending on his answers. This being the case, evidently my presentation is quite incomplete, as it is also an interpretative reading that tends primarily to the questions raised by him, and by us in terms of the imagination.

The Ascent of Feeling and the Quest for Historical Unity

Friedrich Schleiermacher transposed the Kantian approach to the moral good to the world of the religious. To all religious expression there is an a priori of religious feeling. There is a paradox of identity/non-identity between religious expression and religious feeling which leaves the way open to misinterpretation and misunderstanding between people. These can be overcome, however, in the effort to remain in touch with the authentic religious feeling that is the transcendental of human experience common to all.

Naturally, this raises the issue of how different historical epochs and different cultures can communicate and contribute from one to another, and especially how a historical religion like Christianity can be ever effective. Distinguishing between the natural sciences with their empirical field, and the human sciences with their interest in inner spirit and its ideals, Wilhelm Dilthey completed the critiques of Kant with the critique of historical reason. He wished to embrace not

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only psychological conditions, but also historical contexts, and to find a way which would enable human beings to understand each other across the barriers of history. He believed this to be possible because of a common human nature, with its core sensibility common to all, and because of the power of language and other symbolic forms to capture this life in specific cultural realizations. Because of the convergence of the common and the particular, it is possible to understand the past and to see a communality in diversity running through history. History in effect is the manifestation or expression of the movement of the Spirit, and its individual life-expressions form the interlinking of history.

Ricoeur considered the great contribution of Dilthey to be his insistence that life can be grasped only through its mediations. Dilthey, however, appeared to renege on this perception in the effort to find what is behind the text, as though in the end by some psychic sympathy the life itself of the other could be grasped. It has always been Ricoeur’s contention that the distanciation between life and text means that we are always one stage removed from the immediacy of life. One must learn, therefore, to deal with texts as texts (and similarly for other forms of expression), rather than seeing them as a way to a mediated immediacy to life-forces or to being.

The optimism born of Dilthey’s thought, which worked its way into religious studies, biblical hermeneutics and even literary criticism, had to contend with three other developments. The first was the dominance of the empirical in the form of great advances in the sciences and technology, which tended to give priority in the ordering of human life to these sciences, with an assertive independence from more basic values. The second was the intense suspicion regarding the potentially destructive power of the imaginative that resulted from Sigmund Freud’s unearthing of the subconscious. This suspicion was enhanced by Nietzsche’s dissection of subject-centred reason and the will to power, and by Marx’s critique of the corroboration of oppressive and alienating power systems by ideologies that project an idealized order. The third was disillusionment with the mythical and its incapacitating effect upon historical narrative because of its tendency to confuse form with reality.

These three developments lead to a suspicion of the imagination, where one can opt only for a liberation from its trammels by the use of reason, by psychological release or by a religious faith that falls back on the centrality of feeling and is agnostic about the historical. If one concludes that the only thing held in common across history and culture is existential anger, then the possibilities of a right objective order recede before the purely subjective. All efforts at a social ordering must be seen as illusory and manipulative, whether they be economic, political or religious. The power of creative imagination in ordering social life is virtually denied, a conclusion which paradoxically leaves the way ever more open for its manipulative control by idealist and ideological systems.

Behind the mechanistic ordering of modern life, Martin Heidegger saw the forgetfulness of Being and the dominance of the rational, which he blamed upon the confusion between beings and Being in Western metaphysics. To avoid individual despair Heidegger advocated authentic living in a being-towards-death, but to avoid cultural despair he attributed a power to wrestle with the forgetfulness of Being to poetic language. In doing this latter, however, did he lapse into a cultural

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idealism that could tolerate the thought of the superman and the superior culture advocated by Nazi-"ism.\(^5\)

In looking for a way that makes objective interpretation possible without losing sight of the subjective, Hans-Georg Gadamer sought to retrieve the cultural models of the work of art and the classic. He saw this as a unifying principle of human understanding that could overcome the separation of the empirical and the human sciences. There are indeed distinguishable regions of our relations with the world which give rise to the distinction between the sciences. There are, however, comparable procedures of understanding to all the sciences; these have to do with the detection of patterns and paradigms and the projection of explanatory hypotheses which need verification. Art, history and language are indeed fields of expression that put human beings more fully in touch with their fundamental belongingness to the world and to the truth of being than the empirical sciences. These latter genuinely serve the pursuit of the common good only in an order that maintains the relation and interaction between culture, human sciences and empirical sciences.

As for the conditions of interpretation, given the wide diversity of the cultural and the historical interpretation across time is possible with due attention to the three factors of prejudice, praxis and horizon. This makes conversation and the continuing expansion of human consciousness possible. The first of these, the rehabilitation of prejudice, means that both individual persons and groups must recognize the preconceptions, bias and judgments which they bring to any act of interpretation, as well as to the reading of this past. Such prejudice is not understood pejoratively; it is simply a recognized condition of human understanding. Praxis means that we recognize the interest and the orientation to action which is present in understanding and in interpretation, so that these are in effect inseparable.

Horizon seems a quite elusive concept in Gadamer. He defines it as "the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point," and adds that "a person who has an horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon."\(^6\) One actually is able to expand it by seeing beyond it and accepting new questions. A fusion of horizons occurs when people come together from different starting-points in a genuine conversation and find that they enter a common horizon in sharing common questions and in mutually acknowledging prejudices which they leave open to question, as well as interests in common issues regarding action.

While Gadamer vigorously asserts that he has only laid out what actually happens in the process of understanding and has not attempted a social critique, there are those who wonder whether there is not an excessive optimism to his ideal of conversation. Has he truly probed the need for imaginative expression in the first place; if not he is prone to be victim to its delusive power. In the second place, has he brought enough suspicion to the power of ideology to distort not only the social but the very inner expressions of language and art? These accusations are made forcefully by Jürgen Habermas and the Deconstructionists. At this point we can turn to Ricoeur who tries to take account of all positions.

**Ricoeur: The Thraldom of Finitude and Fallibility**\(^7\)

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\(^6\) *Truth and Method*, p. 269.

With Gadamer, one is aware that philosophy has made the turn to the consideration of operations rather than of human faculties, as was the case with classical philosophy. One does not so much have to attribute actions to each of the faculties, including sense, will, understanding and imagination, as to see how humans perform. Imagining can be considered as an act, inclusive of affective, cognitive and operative force, so that there is less need to distinguish it from intellect and will.8

Pursued by his fascination with the powerlessness of the will to have, to exercise power and to be in freedom, Paul Ricoeur adopted the form of Husserl’s eidetics to initiate a multi-volume study of the human will (will as will-ing, not as faculty), which may or may not yet be finished with the three volumes of *Time and Narrative.*9 It was indeed in the realization of the dominating appetite to have, to hold power and to be free, countered by the viciousness inherent in the thwarted historical and cultural efforts to realize these appetites, that Ricoeur perceived a radical incapacity on the part of human nature either to understand itself or to realize its goal to be. That very goal can be misconceived and misconstrued radically as the will for having and for power, whereas the ultimate will is, of course, to constitute one’s own being and one’s own freedom.

This apparently clear analysis of the human condition is misleading in its very clarity. Not only is there a weakness of will, there is also a blindness of perception behind our flawed existence and our destructive use of things and of power. If the language of reason and of analysis cannot clarify and occasion a redirection of forces, what can? Ricoeur’s first postulate for the role of the imaginative comes thus from the need to assume an indirect form of language in expressing human finitude, and especially in addressing human fault and formulating human desire. He sees this effort to find what has to be a liberating expression (both purgative and energy-freeing) to be as old as human history and as multiform as human culture. He endeavours to systematize it in a classification of primary symbols and myths.10 The most archaic symbols are those which express fault and tend to make their appearance in confessions of sin; he classifies these under the headings of stain, sin (or straying) and guilt. The myths which he explores in order to locate these symbols in a context of meaning are those of creation, tragedy, exile and the Adamic.

The ability of this imaginative expression, first to unveil, next to bring into individual and collective consciousness, the conflicting drives of desire, and then to bring them to thought, provides understanding that allows for some rational ordering of the human project. However, the symbolic and mythical is not to be seen simply as a temporal or historical stage in consciousness on the way towards greater clarity and freedom. It is a foundation that has to be ever renewed and kept alive, both because it can continually show us our delusions and escapisms and because it can release energy. Whenever a culture or a group in a society, whether political or religious, believe and act as if they have achieved full consciousness, complete understanding and absolute norms of behavior, they have in effect given way to the demonic of a collusion between thwarted desire and imagination. They can be saved only by a retrieval of the ambiguous polysemy and polyenergy of the imaginative, with its inherent humility of non-totality. Though contemporary cultures cannot


10 *Symbolism of Evil.*
be expected to live in the naïveté of the mythical, they have to capture a second naïveté that keeps them in tune with the power of the imaginative to express: (i) humanity’s oneness with the known and the expanding world, (ii) humanity’s limited perception and bound freedom, (iii) humanity’s finitude, and (iv) humanity’s profound desire for the gift of infinitude.

At this stage of his project, Ricoeur had posited the roots of imagination in desire. He had also given it a role in the project of the self. He tended, however, to give it a rather representational character, a function that showed up the flaws in human existence and the disillusionments or false ambitions to be overcome in coming to be in freedom. Only in the section of the Symbolism of Evil on the Adamic or eschatological myth, where he draws on Christian sources, does he seem to touch on a creative imagination that brings forward the work of redemption. Still, the operative axiom of this work, much repeated by those who have read him, is "The Symbol gives rise to thought."

Ricoeur found a fuller exploration of the imaginative possible through a dialogue with Freud. Some find this dialogue perverted by misunderstanding, but at any rate Ricoeur develops it within his own quest for the clue in the imagination to the desire to be.11 Thus he elaborates upon the archeology and the teleology of the imagination and in this way develops the relation of the imagination to desire. It still has an archeological task, digging up as it were the contours of desire as well as its frustrations. More importantly, it has a teleological task, one that drawing upon its own power to recreate opens the way to the fulfillment of desire in the resolution of frustration and disorientation. By stressing the importance which Freud gave to the narration and interpretation of dreams, rather than simply to the dreams themselves, Ricoeur showed that one must not confuse image with imagining. To imagine is to reorder, to resolve conflicts, to open up possibilities of relationship and of being.

Ricoeur accepts Freud’s depiction of the influence of desire on aesthetic and religious cultural expressions, but rejects any suggestion of reduction to the sexual and to familial relations. In fact, he reads some of Hegel’s attempt to embrace the whole of culture and his preference for the master/slave relation in an explication of systems, along with the notion of archeology/teleology that he attributes to Freud. Freud would lead him to suspect what is behind idealized individual conduct. Hegel showed him the need to see the work of the imagination in the context of the entire human enterprise and to relate the desire to be to its total context. Marx and Nietzsche allow him to suspect what is behind idealized social conduct and system, for what they camouflage of inordinate desire and what they project by way of quest for a human absolute.

For the teleological power of the imagination in realizing the human project, and for doing so in a way that respects moral value, he continued to evoke the work of Kant. Indeed, in Kant’s notion of the symbol and in his distinction between pure reason and the categories of practical reason (God, Law, Freedom) that order the moral life, he found an invitation to think beyond what the mind represents. There is a suggestion in this of a cognitive function inherent to the Kantian imagination; in any case, Ricoeur chooses to give it that by way of introduction into the world beyond the senses.12

He completes the quest for an understanding of the social function of imagination by adopting Karl Mannheim’s typology of ideology as both model of and model for, as both negative and

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positive in relation to the common good. Some criticisms are levelled against this stage of Ricoeur’s analysis of the imaginative. One (which Ricoeur himself later makes) is that it confuses the symbolic and the imaginative, to the detriment of the power of imagination. The second is that it focuses so heavily on the archeology of evil that the teleological does not come sufficiently to the fore. The third is that the social is explained by way of an analogy with the individual ego, without adequate attention to the social in itself, as though it were but the sum total of individuals and their energies. Also, little attention is given to social praxis as liberating.

Imaginative Liberation

In the next phase of his analysis of the imaginative, in relation to the power to be and to be in freedom, one can differentiate between four different moves, going on more or less simultaneously in a variety of essays. These are: (1) the central role given to metaphor rather than to symbol both in interpretation and in discovering the liberating and recreative power of the imagination; (2) an attempt to understand human action on a par with the understanding of text; (3) an interest in ideology as utopia, and therewith in judeo-christian eschatology; (4) a broadening of the scope of the imagination to include the variety of forms of literary expression, which is linked with his interest in judeo-christian revelation.

Metaphor

As remarked above, Ricoeur’s initial interest in symbol focused upon images which could unveil the unspeakable and on their assimilation into myth. Later he thought that he had paralleled this verbal imagery too closely with the visual and had not attended to the recreation of language from within, nor to the change of reference which this brings about. In studying metaphor he wanted to discover that which was truly innovative in speech and text, that which was most apt to relate desire to its foundations in the desire to be, and that which could best serve to liberate human consciousness from its own finitude and fallibility, without negating these.

While in the process he dialogued with many philosophies and proponents of literary criticism, the roots of his intuition lie in his analysis of Aristotle’s Poetics. In Aristotle, Ricoeur finds a distinction between mimesis as mythos and mimesis phuseos which is tragedy. He employs this distinction to find a difference between that expression which simply tells us the nature of humanity’s relation with the universe, and that which tells us what it could be, without having to deny the reality of the given. Tragedy explores the virtuality of human conduct in the midst of its own fallibility and fault, the power to overcome this and to find new insight and new direction.

As he had already begun to say in his examination of Freud, for example, in the Oedipus story he finds as much significance in the blinding of Oedipus as in the murder of his father. The blinding is in fact a coming to see, the birth of an ability to be free within the bounds set by fault. In the tragic narrative, one gets behind the fault and the vainglory to discover the roots of all desire and all action in the desire to be. If one attends to this desire, one discovers the power of participation in the universe and in being itself. If there is to be an ontology, it has to be grounded in the consciousness of this desire as it is mediated to us through language and story.

At the core of such liberative expression is the power of metaphor, which challenges and reverses common perceptions. As Ricoeur puts it, in redescribing reality it recreates it. It is metaphor, not simply symbol in a generic way, which gives rise to thought. The symbols rooted in nature and cosmic myths tell us much about our dwelling in the world which cannot afford to be ignored, without paying the price of an environmental crisis arising from exploitation. But they do not adequately put us in touch with the desire for infinitude within finitude, nor with the power to be in creative tension with the world. Metaphors change our whole perception of reality; they open a reference beyond the text and beyond the world of immediacy to a world which can be and to whatever transcendent power we touch in the pursuit of this vision.

The real power of metaphor cannot be explored within the single sentence, but within the story or within interlocking stories. The category itself has to be extended to read ‘extended metaphor.’ Consequently, Ricoeur explores such things as folk-tales, and most especially parables, for an alternative vision of reality and of humanity’s participation in the universe. Such a simple gospel parable as that which compares the radicality of discipleship with the astuteness of a builder in providing materials, or a king at war in providing arms and armies, tells us that human good depends on a way of being in the world which is totally different from that of using things to our own purposes. At the same time it conjures up a utopian vision of an entirely different social order.

Action as Text

Such considerations could not in fact be carried very far without attention to human action as praxis, that is, to its insertion into the social and historical world of human enterprise, in the pursuit of desired goals. The first thing to be noted about Ricoeur’s approach to action is that he takes it as another form of distanciation. The subject, individual or collective, is not directly in contact with its motivations and feelings, but can see them reflected in action. Through the appropriation of action, there is therefore some possibility of the indirect appropriation of the self. From this, another question necessarily follows: how is it possible to bring action to reflection?

The road to this understanding is through imagination and its ability to read action as text and indeed to bring it to textual expression, whether in history or in fiction. In his more recent work Ricoeur takes issue with the Annales school of history. An example taken from this may indeed cast light on his earlier efforts to come to a creative understanding of action.¹⁹ In Fernand Braudel’s work The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Ricoeur finds something going on comparable to the use of pure symbol simply to make us conscious of what is around us. Braudel counts the armies and weapons, describes the terrain and types of ships used in trade and in war, knows what was in Philip’s treasury and the standard of living of the peasant alike. If we know enough about socio-economic forces, then it is deemed possible to understand the outcome of historical action. Ricoeur finds that, despite himself, Braudel has recourse to the mode of narrative in presenting this history. It is as though the Mediterranean world itself becomes

the actor in a narrative. It is curious however that there are no human actors. Philip hardly occurs except in the title of the work, where he is merely used as an indicator of the time being considered. The fate and suffering of persons are treated quite casually. Events and persons are minimized.

It is Ricoeur’s contention that however useful it is to have this vast information, it is impossible to understand history without grasping human action and its motivations and directions which actually cast it free from such compelling structural forces. One must understand as well the sufferings of persons caught up in the chain of events and revolutions, and who demand as it were to be remembered. There is nothing predictable about what a person will do in a given set of circumstances, but there are a variety of possibilities rooted in the human power to act. This might be the faulted and fallible drive of the will to have or of the will to power, but it could also be the liberated alternative, much harder to grasp and always to be explored through what imagination opens up to reflection. In some accounts of history, we can grasp meaning only by discerning the perverted imagination in its desire for the Absolute and for the creation of the Self. In others, meaning is linked with what might be called metaphoric action, that is action which comes from a vision of the possible alternative and is by its very reality critical of the bound and the oppressive. In all, suffering has to be taken seriously.

Precisely because the personal and social enterprise depends upon the exploration and freeing of the virtualities of being and action, Ricoeur cannot be content with history. Fiction has to complement it by its suggesting new ways of dealing with small and great realities. The individual can be aided for example by a fictional account which offers a way of facing death. The social enterprise needs a larger imagination, one that is more radical and more encompassing, and which indeed dares to paint utopia.

Utopia

No doubt Ricoeur’s personal Christian faith had a hand here, but it was his interest in finding how utopia inserts itself metaphorically into human action that compelled him to dwell at length over a period of time upon judeo-christian sources, without to his own mind disrupting his fundamentally philosophical rather than theological enterprise. History and fiction can somehow be paralleled with Mannheim’s double notion of ideology as model of and model for, and the consequent sense of the positive force of a utopian ideology. If history is allied with imagination, it gives us insight into what was and what is, both into social, economic and political structures and into action in this bound world. There are underlying motivations and interests and ideals at work that serve as justification of whatever order is espoused. Insight into these gives us the model of that which is.

At this point, of course, one has to deal with the negative notion of ideology and to address the perverseness that upholds certain social structures. Indeed, we need even to be suspicious of all structures and to probe the particular interests that they serve even when they use virtuous language. At the same time, not all ‘models of’ are necessarily sinful, though they are always finite and fallible. Thus, the inspiration of action needs a ‘model for’, a way of perceiving that leads to an alternative vision which idealistically presents a vision of the common good or, in other words, a utopia. This becomes dangerous if it is confused with strategic planning, but it is a force for freedom when it provides a vision towards which a society is reaching. Ricoeur gave so much attention to judeo-christian eschatology because in it he found the historical example that both inspired insight and was consonant with his fundamental philosophical interest in the freedom of the will.
However, he has never been hesitant to critique concrete forms of Christianity, especially when he detects a tendency to make absolute claims for the model of, or the actual structure and motivation at work in, any given moment of historical reality. He can be as scathing about religious institutions as about social and political ones, since he finds a claim to the absolute either in the political, the religious or the cultural to be equally dangerous to the human good.

His attention to the goal of participation in being emerges in all this, as well as the need to encounter the finite and the fallible in its pursuit. His ontological stance has to perceive being as gift: there is nothing in human nature that is ultimately self-constituting. Paradoxically, freedom in the long run comes only to those who acknowledge it as a gift, and this has to be true also for the realization of the utopian vision.

Every attempt to be absolute either in thought or in action, every philosophy or system that has laid claim to encompass the whole of reality and its vital sources, has proved inimical to the common good. Even the apparently innocent claim to be acting in response to a divine revelation can be this, for it may be nothing other than the vanity of enclosing the Infinite in finite mediations. Though Ricoeur does not put it this way, the religious can be said to stray as much as the political when it replaces the power of metaphor, with its referent beyond itself, with the symbol that takes the immediately given to be the full reality or indeed even the only possible form of its mediation.

**Forms of Expression**

It would take us too far to explore this at any length, but as in Aristotle Ricoeur found insight into the imagination in his analysis of mythic and poetic forms, so also one gets more insight into Ricoeur’s apprehension of the very processes of imagination as imagining and of metaphor as metaphorizing from his various studies of literary forms, whether profane or religious. In the coming to expression of texts, we see at work the process of desire and the action that comes from desire. History, fiction and folk-tale do not reveal identically but they complement one another. In Judeo-Christian literature, the same is true of narrative, parable, prophecy, song, wisdom and prescription. The initial perception of the need for and the revealing power of indirect language has developed into a constellation of forms, issuing out of the dynamism of the perception into metaphor.

Narrative is always the most basic form, since it is the way in which being in time is brought to expression. Though Christian revelation is located in history and must be told through historical narrative, in exploring the language of the gospels Ricoeur devoted much attention to parable. In the parable he found a god example of the use of metaphor, for what is it but extended metaphor. He also found the hyperbolic language which he thought typical of the kingdom of God as God’s action in human history. Because of its metaphorical and hyperbolic quality, Ricoeur dubbed parable the distinctively religious form of language.

Several writers have taken note of this attention to the specifically religious form in Ricoeur, and have related it to the concept of limit-experience and limit-situation. They seem to suggest that for Ricoeur it is in the experience of limit that humans are most conscious of the kingdom of God as horizon and advent. However, it may be necessary to be more attentive to his reasons for the privileged place given to the hyperbolic, since I suspect a polite demurral from Roman Catholic positions on theology and on religious mediation in Ricoeur’s reflections. This demurral is necessary within his thought in order to keep open the gap between the finite and the infinite. In an essay on Thomas Aquinas, Ricoeur expresses considerable admiration for his discourse on the

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analogy of being. He seems to think, however, that Aquinas has exceeded the boundaries of human thought and insists that in expressing being and the infinite, one has to have recourse both in the beginning and in the end to metaphor. In writing on parable, he finds that hyperbole keeps the sense of the eschatological alive and interprets this as the unexpected advent of God into the human, opening up unexpected utopian horizons. It is not possible to find a systemic mediation, of doctrine or of grace, which does not falter in face of the unexpected of God, or which can adequately translate the eschatological into human concepts. Human thought and human system are as open to the temptation to be totalitarian in dealing with the divine as they are in dealing with the human.

*Time and Narrative*

What has just been described represents a highly religious concentration in Ricoeur’s work, though it cannot be said to be exclusively so. In any case, once he seems assured that the reality of the captive will is clear and that the delusions of an imagination that wishes to do away with the double finitude of being and perverted historical endeavor have been laid bare, Ricoeur looks more to the liberating power of imaginative expression. This requires a utopian expression that goes beyond any particular plan of social construction, shows the very limits of the latter, and is open to the ultimate giftedness of being as opposed to self-achievement. It requires also great attention to the complementarity of forms of narrative, prophecy, wisdom, song and law which allow human groups to order life within the expectation of utopia.

In his more recent trilogy, *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur adopts a more philosophical and secular mode of speech, and has turned his attention to the contours of profane history, of literature and of autobiography. The dilemma of human existence, personal and collective, as he spells it out in this work is ultimately that of being in time, but with a much greater historical consciousness than was allowed by Heidegger and with a much more cosmopolitan (social, ethnic and literary) appreciation of the forms of literature, though still with relatively little attention to the non-verbal.

How can any given generation live within its own time and cultural epoch, while being conscious of time beyond time, that is, of the time in which past and future generations or cultures live, or indeed even of the time of the galaxies of which humans have such little perception? How can it live not only in its time, but in a harmony with their time, or in the totality of all time which is not simply the addition of all times together? How can this be done without losing sight of a fundamental rootedness of being in one’s own time while at the same time being in the time that is not measured (and perhaps is unmeasurable?)?

Ricoeur in these volumes only alludes to the question of the eternal in a theistic sense, for he seems to wish to stay in the field of what he has mapped out for the philosopher and to make possible a dialogue and an understanding across cultures and even across adherence to faiths or to religions. One senses something of a dilemma. He is profoundly committed to social change and believes in the transforming power of christian faith, ethics and hope, but does not want to intrude this on those whose conversation might be, as it were, in another sphere. Thus he plumbs, through an examination of a variety of narratives and narrative styles, both fiction and history, for a way of being in time that opens up the possibility of historical consciousness and a way of being together, not only across cultures, but across generations, not only with humans but with the earth with which humans are one, and with the universe itself in whose music humanity is invited to dwell.
In doing all of this, he carries forward earlier inquiries into the nature of memory and representation. Starting with the *Confessions* of Augustine, he finds in memory the effort to hold past and future together in the present, and thus indeed to open the present to participation in something larger and more comprehensive than itself or indeed than any measure of time. The *distentio animae* of which Augustine speaks is not simply a matter of seeing past, present and future together as one, but it is a matter of seeing them in a greater time of which they are but the representation. The capacity of memory to hold times together in this way is the power to represent a coming to be in a measured time of a time that is not identical with its measurements or with its representations.

Augustine had, of course, his own religious response to this dilemma, but Ricoeur brackets the response and holds in place the dilemma as a philosophical one. It is not a dilemma of abstract philosophy, but resides at the heart of human endeavor and of the utopian quest hidden at the heart of history. It is one with the desire to come to be in freedom in a participation in being and with the incapacity, in effect, to forge a history that does this. Therefore, he also returns to Aristotle for the notion of emplotment in which it is possible to include the experience of fear, pity and suffering, as well as creative action. In this way he now concentrates on the notion of *mimesis praxeos* instead of on that of *mimesis phuseos*, as he had in his earlier work on metaphor. He still harps on the idea that representation is more than imitation or reproduction of a past deed in the present. It is a telling which breaks open the space for fiction, that is, for reconceiving what actually happened, for telling it as a story that is open to a future that can take fear and pity and suffering into the action and so transform actuality and hope.

Playing with the efforts of memory to bridge desire and reality, and thus to inspire imagination, Ricoeur distinguishes between *Mimesis 1*, *Mimesis 2* and *Mimesis 3*, which together constitute the work or operation of representation. The first is that work of imagination which enables us to image the configurations of actions, to take in all the parts, to place them in their settings and relationships, or to see the before and the after of action. I see this as something akin to what Ricoeur attributed to symbol when he distinguished it from metaphor.

The second *mimesis* is indeed like the work of metaphoring. It probes into virtualities of action or of time, not just as they were, but as they might have been. Indeed, it uncovers in them as they were a power that mere sight does not perceive, not necessarily in mighty deeds but perhaps more importantly in suffering and tragedy. It is more fully in touch with the power of desire and its teleology. Placed in history, it is in touch with the aspiration to be in that time of which moments of time are only a representation and to which even taken together they never add up. It redescribes reality within this vision and in doing so recreates it. To be fully representative, or to do all that is within the power of representing it needs fiction as well as history.

The third *mimesis*, or should one say the third moment in *mimesis*, is the appropriation in desire and in action of what is thus represented. Naturally, this would be but a fresh beginning, not of a cycle, but of a progression. This is not to suggest an ever progressing human development, since lapse is the ever present surd of being in time. Towards the end of his book, Ricoeur calls for a renunciation of the Hegelian temptation, of the impossible total mediation. The exodus from Hegelianism is an event in thinking with vast hermeneutical and political ramifications. Ricoeur

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21 *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1, 5-30.
believes that only if humanity makes this exodus can the political implications of his own approach to representation and mediation come to fruit.

I see in this conclusion both an appropriation of his original insights into a larger and more diversified field, and an apprehension of the realities of the current world order with its factual tension between opposing ideologies. The original insight is into the bound reality of the infinite desire to be and into the rooting of all human action in the tension of this conflict. It implies the need of a mediation, centering on the role of the imagination, that would give birth to the joy of saying yes within the sadness of finitude. The apprehension of (and about) the present world order has to do with the fear of the absolutizing will of opposing ideologies, whether these be various forms of capitalist democracy or of socialism.

Critiques

It is impossible in this paper to elaborate on other current philosophies of the human situation or other pursuits of a just order. This last section of the paper will simply mention some criticisms of Ricoeur’s project, often coming from a different vision. This can be enough for our purposes to bring Ricoeur into dialectic with other perceptions of the power or the role of the imagination in social ordering and in the pursuit of the good.

In criticism of Ricoeur’s project, it could be said that as far as the role of the imaginative is concerned, it is either too ambitious or too restrictive. It might be found romantic in passing too lightly over both praxis and reason in mapping the human project. His position on language might be contrasted, for example, with that of Habermas. While Habermas used Freud for the sake of an analysis of the distortions of human communication and of order, which he compared to the distorted ego of the individual, he has had recourse to the language theories of Chomsky and Austin to understand the role of language as communication. Communication is necessary to human interaction and to rational discourse, but to take part in it one must know the rules of language expression and its power to shape a world. Rather than indulge in flights of the imagination, in outmoded appeals to the religious, or in an equation of literary studies with philosophy, the power of reason discovered by the Enlightenment must be restored.25 It is this which allows us to argue value, and in the consensus of argument to arrive at values that can moderate the life of society. The ability to take part in such argument requires the ability to communicate. Sensing the power of the imagination allows us to see what distorts communication, but it is command of the language system that gives the power to take part in reasoned communicative-praxis.

Habermas has his own problems in holding the world together as one, or in countering what he too sees as the oppressive ideologies of both East and West. In ordering a life-world in which persons freely participate in the shaping of their own existence, Habermas seems to have cut off the life-world from systems and so to have narrowed the world in which most people find life. He also has disavowed religion, but leaves himself the question as to what in the modern world may be the bearer of the values that were supported by the religious. Though he found romantic Benjamin’s appeal to memory and solidarity with the past, in face of the death of his friend Gerhard

Scholem he could find only the response of committing him to being cherished in the memory of his survivors.  

While Habermas may be said, in comparison with Ricoeur, to limit the role of the imaginative in favor of the rational, Deconstructionism would say that Ricoeur actually limits it too much, because he limits its free play and its capacity to construe different worlds.  

There is an irreparable loss of Being in human history and one cannot now introduce some kind of transcendent, be it through the imagination or through reason, in order to bridge a gap between expressed worlds or even between texts; that gap in fact cannot be overcome. One can play with the possibilities opened up by worlds or by texts, but one must play freely and not be tied to the pursuit of some transcendent outcome or to the illusion of some transcendent power for being working within the human. One has to learn to live and even to communicate within the absence of Being, while working out limited though real strategies for good living from the imaginative sources open to one’s play. For those who still yearn for a fullness, and resort to a christian tradition fragmented by incommunicability, the door appears to be opened within deconstructionism for a theology that invites humans to live under the sign of the non-being of God, which is the Cross. Or a radical hermeneutics might enable one to learn from Kierkegaard’s repetition an approach that is almost mystical in its intent, but claims to speak no word about the Absolute. However, such restoration of the difficulty of life and of courage in front of the Abyss is another story and another project. It is matter perhaps for another day’s discussion, and certainly not for the faint-hearted.

*The Catholic University of America*

*Washington, D.C.*

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27 Saying that this applies *a fortiori* to Ricoeur, Caputo says of Gadamer: "Gadamer’s ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ is a reactionary gesture, an attempt to block off the radicalization of hermeneutics and to turn it back into the fold of metaphysics." (*Op. cit.*, p. 5.)
"To put a complete ban on the concept of beauty would be as damaging for aesthetics as would the removal of the concept of psyche from psychology or that of society from sociology."  Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory

The Beautiful in Moral Imagination

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that the beautiful may refer to a natural thing or to a work of art in such a manner that it is judged to be "what, without a concept, is liked universally" (CJ, 64). A work of art need not be beautiful, but, if it is, it is thought to be a source of social pleasure for everyone. The beautiful, therefore, emerges as the aesthetic power of difference. It exceeds the aesthetic taste of sense revealed through charm. From the start, it is linked to the taste of reflection: the idea of universal communicability. Without this universality, a work of art would be merely a work of Kitsch, an agreeable, entertaining mode of the creative. Kitsch, which pleases the senses without quickening the mind, reveals an intermingling of charms and emotions, forming the bases of a private expression of taste. There can be no agreement with regard to the private feelings one may have of Kitsch. What aesthetics needs is not a wine-taster’s view of art, but something which pleases without the interference of private conditions. Such an aesthetic form of pleasure can only be disinterested, universal and socially necessary. Its purity lies precisely in the freedom of relations that are discerned in the crucial connection between imagination and understanding. But why does Kant choose purity of pleasure as the "new ground" of aesthetics? Why does he attribute the beautiful to the form of presentation of an object in the subject, rather than to the existence of the object?

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant introduces a way of presenting "things" that exceeds the method of representation established in the Critique of Pure Reason. It concerns the free relations of judgment and imagination. The epistemic turn from a limited analytic use of imagination to an aesthetic opening of imagination for reflective judgment makes it untenable for thought (Denken) to return to representational modes of understanding questions which give rise to teleologic and aesthetic interests. Taste, rather than mere understanding, commands imagination’s respect in its ability to judge an object. Taste emerges as the pure art of reflection by the imagination. As pure work of art within the mind’s imaginal being, taste "is an ability to judge an object in reference to the free lawfulness of imagination" (CJ, 91). As a work of judgment about the beautiful, taste is universally communicable. This means that Kant does not ascribe universal communicability to an aesthetic judgment, such as taste of sense. What is liked universally and considered beautiful is not the existence, but the imaginal form of the "object." In turn, what is beautiful is pleasurable precisely in relation to an aesthetic showing of the spontaneous power of imagination. When imagination is no longer compelled to proceed according to a determinate concept or purpose, the pleasure derived from the aesthetic ability to judge is disinterested.

The liking for the beautiful is a liking for taste: a pure work of reflection given by nature to the subject as an innate productive ability, a fine art. The pure work of art as "nature in the subject" is imagination’s free play, giving the rule to art in general. "Fine art cannot itself devise the rule by which it is to bring about its product" (CI, 175). The pure work of art as a matter of taste, therefore, precedes art and works of art in relation to their existence. This peculiar aesthetic antecedence has been overlooked by metaphysics through its logocentric highlighting of the principle of sufficient reason.

It is absurd to designate Kant’s aesthetics as subjective without pointing out that it is not the subject in the work of art that concerns Kant but "nature in the subject" (CI, 175). The cognitive and practical mode of presenting objects is now preceded by a mode of judging which is linked to "nature in the subject." "Nature" is here conceived as taste, a free and pure work of imagination. Consequently, it is as a pure work of art that taste gives the rule to aesthetic dimensions. Only as such can its object which is judged to be beautiful be conceived as universally valid without a definite concept. Indeed, the pure work of art, nature’s free play in the subject, involves the kind of communicability we like to see in individual products of fine art. Contrary to what Guyer asserts, Kant’s communicability theory of pleasure is never given up. If one understands it in alignment with the question of imagination’s "free lawfulness," i.e., nature’s play in the subject, there is no reason to suggest that disinterested pleasure cannot be imputed to everyone as necessary. The focal point is not the empirical or psychological inclination of the subject for the object, but the aesthetic capacity to communicate imagination’s free relation to the cognitive faculties.

Given Kant’s view, taste is consonant with an understanding of pleasure qualitatively different from the feelings of pleasure perceived by the senses or reason. Agreeable feelings of pleasure are not founded on imagination’s independence of sensibility. Moral feelings of pleasure confine imagination to the practical itineraries of reason. Only a pure aesthetic judgment of taste which demands a "free lawfulness" of imagination pertains to a quality of pleasure, quite different from feelings of pleasure which affect a cognitive or a moral enterprise. In turn, a pure judgment of taste involves not only a claim to subjective universality but also a claim to disinterestedness, purposiveness and necessity. Beyond some of these aesthetic dimensions of taste, I will now turn to the four moments of Kant’s description of a judgment of taste in relation to the question of seeing something as a pure work of art even, and especially, when we are looking at an artwork such as a painting.

Disinterestedness

Let us begin, then, with the aesthetic moment of pleasure "devoid of all interest." If we decide that Cézanne’s The House of the Hanged Man (1872-73) is beautiful, then, on Kant’s view, imagination arouses our mental faculties to a feeling of pleasure. What is beautiful in the painting has little if anything to do with the painting itself except insofar as our presentation of the painting is referred to imaginale free play. Hence, two entirely different relations, namely, imagination’s relation to understanding and, within that play, imagination’s relation to the presentation of the painting, are interwoven in a disinterested order of pleasure. What is beautiful in the painting points to the disinterested "nature in the subject," a desire to be free. The initial moment inferred from a judgment of taste is a distinctive theory of pleasure which is necessarily aligned to what is judged to be beautiful. Cézanne’s The House of the Hanged Man may present imagination with ambivalent feelings. The very title distracts from our discourse on the beautiful. But since the distraction appears to be related to the obvious ill fate of a subject revealed in the title, we need
not refrain from judging the painting to be beautiful, so long as the way we are presenting it to imagination is without psychological or moral interests. Accordingly, are we then to turn our attention to a play of sensations constituted by the texture and coloration of Cézanne’s work?

First, it seems that we must be wholly indifferent to the existence of the painting. It is not the object in its materiality together with the properties that concerns us, but whether or not the presentation of the object in its referral to the subject arouses a feeling of disinterested pleasure. It appears that an imaginal presentation, which is quite different from the representation of the painting, determines the way in which the painting will be presented to judgment. While the seductive configurations of color, design, and texture are not removed from aesthetic judgment, they do not by themselves determine whether a painting is beautiful. Kant merely wants to know whether the presentation of the object is accompanied by a liking devoid of all interest. He writes: "We can easily see that, in order for me to say that an object is beautiful, and to prove that I have taste, what matters is what I do with this presentation within myself, and not the [respect] in which I depend on the object’s existence" (*CI*, 46). In other words, I am asked to continue to paint, to produce beyond the presentation of a particular aesthetic production. The work of art I see is not complete. It will remain unfinished even after I continue to play freely with the imaginal presentation withdrawn from empirical and practical representations.

On Kant’s view, the work needs to be elevated into a pure terrain of pleasure, a disinterested domain of reflection. The painting must gain the approval of imagination for which the production of art is invariably a production of freedom. Within the play of imaginal lawfulness, the work must be painted anew. For Kant, art is free of the contingencies of existence in order that reality may be elevated to a purposiveness whose form imagination freely provides. Hence, when we look at *The House of the Hanged Man*, we are looking at a painting in which the composition, the coloration, and the design form a presentation of an *other* painting which the mind calls to attention. It is the *other* painting in the painting that is called beautiful. This other is the pure work of imagination, displacing the initial representation of a particular artwork. A transposition occurs from Cézanne’s *The House of the Hanged Man* to imagination’s way of presenting that painting. We begin to see several layers of presentation founded on an unfettered impulse to move the painting into the pleasurable terrain of imaginal reflection. What is beautiful in the painting is not Cézanne’s painting, but the imagination’s new painting of Cézanne’s work each time we judge a work such as that to be beautiful.

Taste, therefore, emerges as imagination’s disinterested work of art colliding freely with the aesthetic presentation of individual matters of art without committing these to interests of sense or reason. It seems that it is not even possible to judge something as beautiful unless we are first able to see what enables us to make such a judgment. That is nothing other than the power of imagination with its ability to play freely with presentations, particularly, judgment’s unique presentation of the cognitive faculties. On what I have proposed so far, one can argue that the pure work of art is in fact the very movement of imagination in relation to understanding and reason. The pure work of art is not something that is given, but something that is continually formed in the very process of judging something to be beautiful. Consequently, it may also be conceived as a schema of imagination which makes it possible to judge individual works of art within the framework of disinterestedness.

*Beurteilung*, then, is imagination’s "free play," regarded as the pure work of art that precedes and cultivates presentations of individual artworks. This pure work of art lets every work of art be what it is not within its existence as an object of mere reflection. It is important not to confound
Kant’s association of judgment and art by saying that art is reduced to a dialectic. *Beurteilung* shows that there is always more to a work of art than its representation. A work of art extends its being beyond representation in imagination’s renewed aesthetic presentation of its form. It begins with the aesthetic moment of purity and ends with the reflective moment of pleasure. Beginning and end combine to form what judgment calls the beautiful.

**Universality**

A pure work of art makes it possible to refer the object’s presentation to imagination, a presentation exceeding that of a particular artwork. This aesthetic referral to a presentation, entirely different than the presentation of an object, is a matter of a *universal* liking. It is not the work of art as object that is presented as beautiful, but the relation of the form of the imagination’s presentation to the presentation of a particular work. Hence, no private condition underlies the process of aesthetic referral, but a grounding that is free of the principle of ground.

The pure work of art does not *ground* a particular artwork. Always the *other* in every work of art, the pure work of art demands a *universal* liking for its work, more accurately, its distinct aesthetic movement. We can lay claim to everyone’s assent when it comes to grounding a work of art by means of a pure work of art. While the pure work of art is the “universal voice” in each work of art, it is conceived as a matter of universal, disinterested pleasure. The claim to intersubjective validity, then, requires a grounding rather than a ground. Such a subjective grounding entails the presentational role of a pure work of art that invariably prompts individual artworks to be presented to imagination. What we ought to agree on is merely the idea that a work of art (such as Cezanne’s *The House of the Hanged Man*) is declared to be beautiful not because it is beautiful (nothing is beautiful by itself), but because the pure work of art in the imaginal presentation of this particular work is liked universally.

Accordingly, the pure work of art, which is always the anti-art in art, is the "universal voice" of taste, which, without a concept, is a matter of delight to everyone. It cannot help but be a universal delight. As such it is also the key to the critique of taste with its basis in the universal communicability of the beautiful. In a judgment of taste, the feeling of pleasure arises from the attribution of the pure work of art to a particular work of art. Hence, merely looking at Cezanne’s work does not require that everyone consider it beautiful. But reflecting aesthetically on his work does command a universal consensus as to the ascription of the beautiful to the imaginal presentation of that work. "When this happens," Kant writes, "the cognitive powers brought into play by this presentation are in free play, because no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition" (*CJ*, 62). What is universally communicable is an aesthetic rule that is free of any singular cognitive or moral role, a pure work of art which imagination presents to our attention.

**Purposiveness**

Imagination alludes to a product of fine art, something that is beautiful. Otherwise, there is no possibility of universal communicability with regard to aesthetic pleasure. It seems quite clear that *Kitsch* does not serve to relate a presentation of this object to the form of presentation in imagination. Taste limits such a consideration. The pure work of art prompts judgment to disengage its relation to a presentation of an object that limits imagination to the world of sense or reason without a significant interaction. This brings us to the third moment in a judgment of taste.
which shows purposiveness to be the form of presentation in relation to the imaginal presentation of a work of art. Kitsch fails to live up to that purposiveness simply because it confines the power of aesthetic judgment to the sphere of interests. Moreover, it narrows the movement of imagination to a feeling of pleasure universally displeasing because it leans on private conditions. A pure judgment of taste is based solely on the aesthetic grounding of a pure work of art or the "form of purposiveness" of an object. Purposiveness in general in an artwork is the moment of affinity it shares with imagination’s presentation of a pure work of art. Form of purposiveness is imagination’s free work of art operative in the aesthetic grounding of disinterested pleasure. Initially, perhaps, the purposiveness of the painting is its pictorial unity, the lasting impression of the work, the aesthetic motif of nature. Notably, here purposiveness may be assigned to a diffusion of impressions in the beautiful image of nature conveyed by vivid, eccentric movements of green colors flowing down the roofs of a house onto the grass. The vision of this house is impeded by desolate trees and branches disrupting the horizontal design of the painting at large as the wind sways from the path which turns away from the ground. There is no subject present in the painting. But in passing, one can see "nature in the subject," emerging as the pure work of art of the painting with other presentations and a silent purposive discourse of which Baudelaire might write:

I have not forgotten the house we lived in then, it was just outside of town, a little white house in a skimpy grove that hid the naked limbs of plaster goddesses — the Venus was chipped! Nor those seemingly endless evenings when the sun (whose rays ignited every windowpane) seemed, like a wide eye in the wondering sky, to contemplate our long silent meals, kindling more richly than any candlelight the cheap curtains and the much-laundered cloth.²

Cézanne’s painting is merely the semblance of what Baudelaire recalls. "The house we lived in then, it was just outside of town, a little white house. . . ." The ground whose principle is mostly white is now shattered. The hanged man vanishes in the night. Unrelenting, the shadows poor out of darkness while the work in the night is only a semblance of what is beautiful in the "nature of the subject." A painting in a poem may also become a presentation in a symphony in which the fourth movement paints the subject out of existence. Yet, the fifth movement of Berlioz’ Symphonie fantastique indicates that the aesthetic march to the scaffold, possibly the end of the subject, is merely a purposive image in the free play of imagination. Effacing the subject’s semblances, this movement presents to imagination a desire to act according to a feeling, free not to forget the house we lived in then, the ethos just outside of Athens. Now we are much closer to the flowers of evil. "I come and go — the Demon tags along, hanging around me like the air I breathe."³

The paintings, the poems, and the musical compositions as works of art are presented as semblances of purposive connection (nexus finalis) in imagination’s search for freedom. "Now this relation, when judgment determines an object as beautiful, is connected with the feeling of pleasure, a pleasure that the judgment of taste at the same time declares to be valid for everyone" (CJ, 66). While the presentation of an artwork forms the spatial and temporal configurations into purposiveness, a way of presenting the work that is amenable to being liked universally, the form of purposiveness does not come into play until we take note of the presentation in relation to the presentations combined by imagination.

Therefore the liking that, without a concept, we judge to be universally communicable and hence to be the basis that determines a judgment of taste, can be nothing but the subjective purposiveness in the presentation of an object, without any purpose (whether objective or

³ Ibid., 121.
subjective), and hence the mere form of purposiveness, insofar as we are conscious of it, in the presentation by which an object is given us (CJ, 66).

Taste, then, is founded on (Bestimmungsgrund) the pure work of art, an imaginal mirroring, which provides an individual artwork with presentations independent of an objective or a subjective purpose. A presentation is always free for a formal purposive way of presenting the work by means of an aesthetic, disinterested "mirror" of imagination. Indeed, the pure work of art is expressive of a "mirror" in which an alliance of presentations constitutes a free liking for a work of art.

**Necessary**

My starting point with regard to showing the radical epistemic turn in the Critique of Judgment is to take the argument from the pure work of art as the argument for the universal communicability of taste as understood by Kant. In turn, I have examined the pure work of art in relation to such aesthetic moments of taste as disinterestedness, universality and form of purposiveness, moments which can to said to ground the free movement of imagination. The beautiful has been shown to be precisely what is perceived in the aesthetic relation of imagination to be the pure work of art prior to, within and without a work of art. But what of the question of the modality of aesthetic pleasure, in a manner of speaking, the necessary relation of the pure work of art to any presentation of which there is a possibility that it be connected with the beautiful? In short, why is the pure work of art necessarily linked to the beautiful?

Kant argues that pleasure in the presentation of a work submitted by imagination to the mental powers is not only free but also necessary.

This necessity is of a special kind. It is not a theoretical objective necessity, allowing us to cognize a priori that everyone will feel this liking for the object I call beautiful. Nor is it a practical objective necessity . . . through concepts of a pure rational will that serves freely acting beings as a rule (CJ, 85).

Instead, the pleasure in a judgment of taste about the beautiful is necessary in a subjective and conditioned sense. It is subjective insofar as it is determined by a grounding of the pure work of art as "nature in the subject." It is conditioned because something that is declared to be beautifulought to be liked by everyone, if we can be sure that the instance of a work of art is taken up by the pure work of art which is the rule for a free imagination. Hence, a judgment of taste about the beautiful does not maintain that everyone will agree but that everyone ought to agree that something is beautiful if, and only if, it can be shown to be connected with a feeling of pleasure necessarily free and purposive without leaning on a specific purpose. The aesthetic relation of beauty and freedom rests upon the necessity of a distinct condition in imagination, the ability of judgment to be free for the cognitive play of relations. The pure work of art that emerges in this distinct aesthetic relation is necessarily pleasurable because the purposive play by imagination is always new to us. The pure work of art is necessarily related to our liking for particular works of art insofar as imagination plays freely with presentations of an object without limiting these presentations to the object. Lifting the presentations from the objective realm of cognition to the purposive form of imagination lets works of art be free, untouched by interests which run counter to taste.

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4 Vide CJ, 93.
Free

The *Critique of Judgment* introduces a conditional relation between the universal and the necessary, a relation pertaining to the free power of imagination. The difference between the moments of quantity and modality in a judgment of taste lies in the "free lawfulness" of imagination. In the case of the beautiful, or the form of imagination’s purposive play, there is a necessary connection to a free and universal pleasure. This necessity lies simply in the aesthetic manner of presenting objects to the subject. The manner is *exemplary* in that the presentation of the object is referred to an "archetypical" dimension of the subject, the pure play of power in imagination. A common grounding, not to be confused with "another ground" within a principle of the will, arouses a necessary pleasure only if what is declared to be beautiful concerns a universal and disinterested relation between imagination and the presentational powers of the mind. The demand for such an aesthetic relation is necessary in order to show that a work of art or any other object of aesthetic, reflective judgment is ready to be presented in a manner that befits a free being.

What releases the object into its free being, is the work of imagination: subject and object become free in a new sense. A new quality of pleasure follows from this radical change in attitude toward being, generated by the form in which the object now reveals itself.\(^5\)

**The Pure Work of Art: A New Moral Attitude Toward Being**

Malevich’s return to figuration at the end of the 1920s can be understood as a way of showing that the idea of an "objectless world" can be presented in the Suprematist style as well as in figurative painting. The centrifugal force in art does not lie primarily in a particular compositional form but rather in the aesthetic fusion of characteristic visual configurations which serves to present the primacy of pure sensation.

A manner of presenting that reveals a "free" being becomes evident in many of Kasimir Malevich’s paintings, particularly, those of the Suprematist period. By Suprematism, Malevich means the primacy of pure feeling in the visual arts. Malevich may be the first artist for whom form, color, surface, and composition exist in the purposiveness of their pure relations. They are presentations freed from objectivity for a world not determined by time and space. Each work is characterized by a supplementarity which makes it possible to collide abstraction and figuration, elements of one work with another, even to the point of backdating works painted decades earlier. This aesthetic supplementarity points to a realm of aesthetic purity which frees the work from a dialectic in which the relations of subject and object are reconciled. It is as if subject and object dissolve in the suprematist form of an "objectless world" which nevertheless reveals bold variations in composition and color.

In *Woman with a Rake*, the presentation of the painting is not referred to a subject as object of reflection, but to a being free for the pure play of imagination. Indeed, the "nature in the subject" is the imaginal form, a mirror of world in objectlessness. Such a mirror indicates infinite dialectic collisions between new plastic forms and imaginal judgments related to these forms. Thus, the supplementary mirroring pertains to newly applied abstractions in conjunction with the imagination’s desire to be free without ever withdrawing from the intuitional ground in a work of art. An aesthetic judgment makes no sense with a singular intuitional content.

Still, a work of art need not be confined to an objective analysis of the aesthetic content since that content is invariably thought with regard to the relations of imagination at work in art. The striking Portrait of Ivan Kliun by Malevich, therefore, invites imagination to judge a subject in disarray in light of peculiar cubistic (and suprematist) configurations of straight lines and colors which seem to indicate a work of art without beginning or end. It evokes the thought of a work of art speaking for a subject in a play beyond any subject.

Not only the colors and the lines seem to move and shift horizontally, vertically, and diagonally, but, as several of Malevich’s more suprematist paintings show, there is an attempt to seduce the work of art out of its material state of existence into a purposive play of artistic imagination. No attempt is made to embed the subject into history or nature. Instead, the historical and natural can now be seen from the perspectives of an "objectless world." This does not reduce mundus sensibilis and mundus intelligibilis to an abstract transcendent realm. To some extent, this may ultimately have been Malevich’s mystical intention, but it is not part of Kant’s aesthetics. Nevertheless, Malevich serves to show that an aesthetic presentation is never completely formed, but always in a state of formation in accordance with other presentations which emerge invariably as collisions of radical difference. In turn, each work of art is embedded in the purposive form of imagination, the pure work of art that is formed anew in the compelling contributions of diverse aesthetic presentations.

An early oil painting by Malevich called Bathing Women (1908) points to the distinguishing features of an unbroken aesthetic interplay between the pure work of art set up by imaginal judgment and particular presentations of artworks themselves. The primacy of the pure play of form is meant to suggest that no work of art is present solely in what is perceived to be the compositional structure of an art object. On the contrary, there is no work of art completely given to itself. What we have is a suprematist mirroring of the visual forms and the imaginal presentations. Through this mirroring, the artwork is released from a determinate reflection of its material structure so that it may be judged according to the imaginal play of purposiveness. Malevich’s painting conveys the primacy of this play by highlighting the ephemeral white figures who appear ready to step outside of the painting. One is presented, it seems, with an apparition within the aesthetic presentation of the visual configurations of colors. The ekstasis of the bathing women is suprematist even though the work is figurative. On closer view, one of the figures, in fact, walks towards a blue-colored stream into the opaque scene of the painting. Still, all three of the white figures signify the transitory presence of the pure work of art in the compositional play of sensations.

While Malevich’s Bathing Women exhibits the difference between a suprematist and representational presentation, it also marks the new aesthetic “identity” of play and surface. In turn, what withdraws from the work is also drawn into the artwork. The figures present their withdrawal as purposive play to imagination. Imagination, however, returns the abstraction to figuration so that the pure work of art is always already engaged in play with a particular artwork. Whether we are dealing with the early or the late works of Malevich, the artist or the theorist of art, we cannot separate the suprematist from the figurative paintings unless we are willing to part with his supplementary theory of art. It seems to me that expressly this theory amplifies Kant’s aesthetics of purity. It shows that the aesthetic dimension consists in manners of presentation which generously enlarge the presentational powers of the cognitive forces on the basis of imagination’s relation to individual works of art. Most of Malevich’s paintings reveal his commitment to the primacy of pure sensation. His work extends Kant’s discussion of aesthetic judgment into the domain of painting. More importantly, however, Malevich’s theory of suprematist art exposes a
distinctive aesthetic schema which relates judgment to art without subsuming art under judgment. Such a relation reveals abstract and figurative images of an "objectless world" beyond time in a free place called the work of art.\(^6\)

Malevich draws attention to the necessary engagement of representation and abstraction. Like Kant, he suggests that this interplay is indicative of the reflective aesthetic relation between art and judgment. Free to abstract from representation, judgment does not linger in the domain of abstraction. Indeed, in its aesthetic relation to imagination, it is open to representation and, thereby, chooses to collide with presentations of individual works of art. That very capacity in judgment elicits a mirroring of abstraction and figuration in a play that is purposively free. What happens, then, is that judgment is challenged by an art that is rid of the ballast of the object. What can be extracted from presentations of individual works is the chance of countless different exposures to artworks in general. Such a wealth of aesthetic exposure is possible only if the relation between judgment and art remains disinterested, universal, purposive, and necessary. In short, the \textit{aesthetic} relation must be free.

\textit{Urbild} of Taste

For Kant, this relation is a matter of taste, explicitly \textit{Urbild} of taste. "That \textit{Urbild} of taste, which does indeed rest on reason’s indeterminate idea of a maximum, but which still can be presented not through concepts but only in an individual presentation, may more appropriately be called the ideal of the beautiful" (\textit{CJ}, 80). This ideal signifies the primacy of aesthetic purity. While we cannot possess it, we can bring it about by means of imagination. "But it will be merely an ideal of imagination, precisely because it does not rest on concepts but rests on a presentation, and the power of presentation is imagination" (\textit{CJ}, 80). Thus, the pure work of art that is merely an ideal of imagination denotes not only an aesthetic play of forces, but also the dynamic effect that arises from multiple presentations in this play. It seems that Kant understands the idea of imagination’s pure work of art in accordance with two mimetic tasks: One concerns the \textit{mimesis} of an individual intuition (of imagination), the other that of a \textit{rational idea} for which the purposes of humanity become the principle for judging. In other words, Kant proposes a \textit{horizontal mimesis} which serves to reveal the aesthetic grounding of taste and a \textit{vertical mimesis} which attests to the moral sense of taste.

With regard to the former, he points to an individual work of art by an Athenian sculptor of the fifth century B.C. named Myron, who worked mainly in bronze (\textit{chalkos}). Indeed, Kant’s theory of the ideal of beauty may have been inspired by the human figure in early Greek sculpture, notably the \textit{kouros}. A form of nude male figures in marble, usually depicted as athletes, the \textit{kouroi} are known for their look of grandeur, simplicity and permanence. A \textit{kouros} illustrates the standard idea of the beautiful in the sculptural form of a male figure standing erect with left leg forward and hands at his side with clenched fists. Large almond-shaped eyes decorate the clearly defined surface patterns of the marble body. The \textit{kouroi} exemplify the power of procreation not solely in the usual sense, but also in pure form described, for instance, by Diotima in the \textit{Symposium}. It is important to note that the \textit{kouros} is not meant to represent a variety of specific

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\(^6\) When we emphasize the imaginal relation of judgment to art, we are not diminishing the importance of the difference between Malevich’s earlier more direct suprematist period and his later figurative insistence on horizontal and vertical lines. The post-cubist form is later supplemented by a cruciform outline founding the symmetrical compositions of the paintings. See Charlotte Douglas’ fine article on Malevich entitled, "Behind the Suprematist Mirror," in \textit{Art in America} (September, 1989), pp. 164-177.
details, but a simple artistic canon of what is thought to be beautiful in human figure sculpture. Accordingly, these white stone sculptures of young men formed lasting and indispensable presentations of early Greek art. Their beauty became the rule for judging other figures of art. Some of these *kouroi* and *korai* were dedicated to the gods, notably to Apollo as he was the god of youthful images. Some statues were carved in over-life-size marble to highlight the power of pure form which exceeds that of contemporary humans. The first component of Kant’s suprematist *mimesis* is, therefore, "an aesthetic idea fully *in concreto* in a model image" (*CJ*, 81), regardless of the fact that he chooses Myron’s *Cow* rather than the bronze statue of the famous discus-thrower. That Kant refers primarily to the fifth century of Greek sculpture, when bronze seems to have been more prevalent than marble, does not diminish the significance of the idea of the *kouroi* for his understanding of the standard idea of the beautiful. Polyclitus’ bronze statue of a spear-bearer, *Doryphorus*, to which Kant also alludes, varies from but does not abandon the *kouros* figure. In fact, Polyclitus perfects the earlier form of sculptural beauty detached entirely from human emotions. It is no coincidence that Kant speaks of "the famous *Doryphorus*" of the Argive sculptor. The very idea of taste in its pure aesthetic judgment is indicative of the idea of Greek beauty revealed in the free sculptural form of the body.

Nevertheless, the aesthetic presentation of such a pure work of art is not what Kant calls "the entire Urbild of beauty" (*CJ*, 83). It must still be distinguished from "the ideal of the beautiful," which consists solely in a vertical *mimesis* of taste, one which aligns the aesthetic power of presentation with a teleological play that is universally liked.

With regard to Kant’s understanding of the ideal of beauty it is important to bear in mind that the standard idea of the beautiful is not excluded from the ideal presentation of taste. While the standard idea is the aesthetic model of taste *in concreto* and can therefore be referred to the stunning sculpture of Polyclitus, the beautiful ideal elicits a dynamic extension of the aesthetic dimension in the very presentation of the "human figure." Respectively, Urbild of taste begins with the individual aesthetic presentation of the "famous *Doryphorus*," which serves as a rule for following the principles of symmetry in other works of art. And yet, taste exceeds this standard in contemplating a form of purposiveness in the aesthetic image of the human figure from which to judge the artwork. This form cannot be presented in the sensuous object of the work of art, but only in imagination at play with a rational idea. In effect, the pure work of art accommodates both the aesthetic intuition of a concrete artwork and the teleologic extension which the work exhibits in imagination.

The ideal in the human figure, notably in early Greek art, consists in the expression of the dynamic power of youth. Kant alludes to the Greek ideal of athletic beauty, in particular to *Doryphoros* who in his disarming nudity, carrying a lance, gives the impression that he is both at rest and in motion. Polyclitus reconciles strife and peace in the restrained yet dynamic play of sculptural beauty. A delight to the eyes of imagination, *Doryphoros* became the most copied of Greek statues in Roman times. On Kant’s view, the ideal in this figure expresses an ethical domain in which the purposes of humanity show themselves without being subsumed under sensibility.

Now it seems that the aesthetic and the ethical presentations are connected in the form of the human figure without reducing either presentation to one or the other. Kant writes: "In order for this connection to be made visible, as it were, in bodily expression (as an effect of what is inward), pure ideas of reason must be united with the strong power of imagination in someone who seeks so much as to judge, let alone exhibit, it" (*CJ*, 84). Thus, Kant pursues an aesthetic theory that is determined not solely by taste but also by an ethical sense of taste, a pure work of art that is never so pure as not to mingle with individual artworks which exhibit ethical ideas.
Kant’s idea of an interplay of aesthetic and teleologic presentations does not weaken his claims of taste so long as this interplay is conceived in accordance with imagination’s free relation to reason. If imagination were not free in its play of purposiveness, the teleologic presentation would dominate the aesthetic image of the human figure and the judgment of taste could never be pure. Kant does not clarify the distinction between a purely aesthetic mode of judgment and imagination’s free mode of playing. One can still speak of a pure work of art without subsuming the free play of imagination under a pure judgment of taste or a purely aesthetic presentation. In other words, the idea of the pure work of art is not limited to a standard that is solely aesthetic, without an object’s form of purposiveness.

The very relation of imagination to the mental powers demands a purposiveness without the presentation of a purpose. This aesthetic relation is already embedded in a teleological moment which is invariably connected to the ideal of beauty. The purity in a judgment of taste is not tainted by the interplay of aesthetic and teleologic presentation if one accounts for this purity on the basis of a disinterested pleasure. This is distinctly the case in the presentational movement of imagination in which Urbild of taste reveals an interweaving of art and judgment without confining art to judgment or judgment to art. While the Critique of Judgment does not expressly highlight a teleo-aesthetic equilibrium, it provides the conditions for its possibility in the dynamic movements of imaginal presentations. In short, the pure work of art, which embraces Kant’s aesthetic standard of taste and its supplementary purposiveness in the ideal of the beautiful, signifies the "highest model" of taste as a horizontal and vertical mimesis for judging matters of art.

In this way, the pure work of art rests on the mimetic power of presentation as an ideal of imagination, as such not free of mimesis. Still, the idea of mimesis is not bound by a determinate concept. On the contrary, one might suggest that the pure work of art appertains to mimetic presentations of artworks in a manner that is historically vertical but thematically horizontal. This means that both components of the pure work of art, namely, the aesthetic figuration as well as the teleologic configuration, tend to merge in a horizontal grounding that is mimetically problematic. For the ideal of beauty is a mimetic constellation of a horizontal and vertical way of judging something.

Kant’s attempt to interpenetrate the horizonal, the pure aesthetic judgment of taste and the vertical, i.e., the "idea of highest purposiveness," expounds an "argument the spirit of which is obscure." Paul Guyer even refers to Kant’s inquiry in section 17 as something that "must be regarded as an aberration." On closer inspection, however, there really is no aberration but simply an abstraction, the abstraction being that Urbild of taste involves a mimesis that is both free of sensory and rational preferences and free for apparent rational interests. But we must not forget that the vertical dimension of mimesis has now become part of the movement of imagination rather than practical reason. A congruence of the aesthetic and teleologic moments in a judgment of taste indicates that the pure work of art turns from a purely vertical orientation of reason; so that, as Sallis clearly shows, reason descends to imagination, in order to let an object’s form of purposiveness be without the presentation of a purpose.

Beauty is precisely such a form according to the ideal that is exhibited by the pure work of art in an imaginal presentation of an individual human figure, such as Doryphorus. Turning toward the highest point, therefore, Urbild of taste exceeds the moral in the very presentation of the ethical, so that "an underlying idea of reason" is accorded a free space for the aesthetic presentation of the pure work of art as it is revealed in the concrete artwork of the human figure. What matters,

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8 Ibid., p. 255.
for Kant, is the ideal, the work, the judgment which consists in the art of the beautiful as an effect of what is inward, what is free in the ethical space of imagination.

The complexity of the pure work of art or what Guyer calls "the scope of the power of abstraction," points to an uncertainty in the Kantian aesthetic which may have something to do with how Kant understands the beautiful. Kant writes, "free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) and merely dependent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens)" (CJ, 76). But if beauty is perceived in relation to disinterestedness, universality, and necessity how can it be anything but free? It is not surprising that Kant discusses this matter under the sections that deal with the third moment of judgments of taste, namely the question of purposiveness. Indeed, if there is a possible difficulty with regard to the issue of aesthetic purity, it is linked to the problem of purpose. Can Kant underline the disinterested, universal moments of taste in relation to purposiveness and still retain an autonomous and pure conception of beauty?

Let us briefly consider the argument of section sixteen of the Critique of Judgment. First it seems that Kant does not really divide the idea of the beautiful, but only judgments about the beautiful. A judgment related to imagination at play pertains to free beauty. "Here we presuppose no concept of any purpose for which the manifold is to serve the given object" (CJ, 77). In contemplating the presentation of an object, imagination is not restricted by any concept. In a pure judgment of taste, then, there is no room for the idea of perfection or any other concept which would determine what something is meant to be. Instances of such a judgment mentioned by Kant are presentations of natural objects such as flowers, parrots, hummingbirds, crustaceans in the sea and in matters of art, designs à la grecque, foliage on borders, wallpaper and "all music not set to words" (CJ, 77). In turn, natural things and certain individual works of art may be included in the concept of free beauty. With regard to these dimensions, judgment is not founded on any concept but rests solely on the feeling of unrestrained pleasure.

On the other hand, judgments that relate to what is beautiful in the human being are attributed to dependent or conditioned beauty, one which reveals that imagination is not entirely free in its play of presentations. It may be that imagination gains by a connection with reason so that what is beautiful is freely so only in a particular imaginal play of presentations. But there are a diversity of presentations in the play of imagination. One of these includes the conditioned presentations of the beautiful. The beautiful that is accessory to a concept is not less beautiful but — paradoxically — more beautiful, insofar as it enlarges the power of presentation in imagination. While the judgment of taste may no longer be theoretically pure in its aesthetic form, it is still practically free in its relation to the pure work of art which sustains the harmony of our mental powers.

Hence, we are advancing an argument that might clarify the distinction of free and dependent beauty, a distinction that is linked to the peculiarity of a theoretical and practical difference in aesthetic purity. While free beauty delights without a concept within the theoretical space of imagination, dependent beauty presupposes a concept within the practical movement, i.e., applied judgment of imagination. It is, therefore, not at all unreasonable to suppose that the difficulty in Kant’s argument of section sixteen concerns the problematic of the freedom of the imagination. In other words, imagination is free to play the game of aesthetic Beurteilung according to a theoretical (i.e., free) and a practical (i.e., conditioned) rule of presentations. What is judged to be beautiful in connection with imagination’s abstraction from all sensory and rational matters is freely beautiful. And what is judged to be beautiful in connection with imagination’s desire to mingle with reason is practically free in its conditioned beauty. One falls under the form of a pure

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9 Ibid., 250: "The problem of free and dependent beauty and of Kant’s attitude toward art, it turns out, is connected to some obscurity in the most fundamental concepts of his aesthetic theory."
presentation of objects, the other falls under the form of a purposive presentation of objects. The form of both kinds of presentations is still free and pure. Individual judgments made in accordance with each of the forms of presentation are respectively theoretical or practical in an aesthetic sense.

**Conclusion**

From the above, it seems clear that the pure work of art in Kant’s aesthetic theory turns out to be what one may call "the moral imagination." Indeed, with regard to judgments about the beautiful, Kant speaks of "moral taste." Thus, the relation of imagination and morality, i.e., art and culture, is central to the argument concerning universal social communicability. What then, in short, are we to make of this peculiar aesthetic theory of the practical or moral? For one, what is moral is not confined to a repressive structure, but is open instead to the playful presentations of a *creative imagination*. This does not diminish the significance of the moral; on the contrary, it makes it possible to disclose a "new ground" (*neuer Boden*) of moral judgment. Such a disclosure is necessary in an epoch in which the principle of ground is radically undermined.

Secondly, the constellation of the aesthetic and the teleologic in the emergence of the pure work of art as moral imagination serves to reveal society from a perspective of freedom that is not marked primarily by historical constraints, but rather by a plurality of possibilities. "By right," Kant writes, "we should not call anything art except a production through freedom" (*CJ*, 170). In its capacity as pure work of art, moral imagination, then, is the camera of *judicium* (judgment) in which and through which society and culture are "filmed." Invariably, a moving camera, judgment lies between the aesthetic and the moral in the depth of imagination’s sublime journey towards freedom.

Through allusions to works of art, this journey teaches a necessary pause prior to judging. This aesthetic pause or interruption is expressly what is moral in imagination which discontinues moralizing with frozen concepts. By the same token, imagination frees thought for a new morality play, somewhat in the allegorical sense, but instead of having characters personify moral qualities, as had been the case in the morality plays of the 15th and 16th centuries, works of art are now called upon to present possibilities for discernment by evoking a desire to postpone or defer judgment. The desire to defer is necessary in order to set up a *Beurteilung*, a moral discerning which is determined not by tradition or authority, but by an imaginal narrative of what is yet to be. From this viewpoint, the old morality dissolves. And all that remains is what imagination is yet to accomplish: not the eternal return of the same moral abstractions known since childhood, but a passionate, dynamic moral story. This is imagination’s new but pure work of art, a glimpse of what can be seen in each concrete work of art.

*Department of Philosophy, Duquesne University*  
*Pittsburgh, PA*
Chapter VI

The Imagination, Epistemology and Values: A Perspective from Religious Thinkers

George Worgul

Introduction

Without a doubt, the present generation of religious thinkers includes a growing increasingly interested in the human imagination as an avenue to meaning and value. Paul Ricoeur\(^1\) and David Tracy\(^2\) have highlighted imagination’s operation in hermeneutics. William Lynch\(^3\) has unfolded a Christology and theological anthropology explicitly grounded in imagination theory. Harvey Cox\(^4\) has explored imagination in the interrelationships of religion and culture. Phil Keane\(^5\) has rooted an ethics in imagination theory. Ray Hart\(^6\) has analyzed the relationship of imagination and revelation, and I have sketched the place of imagination in ritual, sacraments and eucharistic theology.\(^7\) While any claim to the existence of a "School of Imagination" must be resisted as premature, its birth might be witnessed in the near future.

While it might be tempting to assign a mark of novelty or discovery to the present efforts which examine religion within an imaginative context, this claim would be unjustified. A host of religious thinkers, artists, philosophers and poets in the 19th century had already mapped the location and begun the preliminary excavation of this rich mine of human meaning, value and life itself. Unfortunately, the intellectual tradition of the \textit{Aufklarung} barred the crucial nature of their discoveries from attaining its full and far-reaching impact. The Enlightenment’s central "virtue" of autonomous human existence dominated by the principles of self-sufficiency and self-finality banished the human imagination into a world of "forgotten truths," awaiting rediscovery, resuscitation, revitalization and development.

The real "newness" in the contemporary interests in imagination lies both in the contemporary context or \textit{Weltenschauung} in which it is being explored and in the varied interdisciplinary roads being traveled in its pursuit. Above all else, the altered worldview marking our contemporary age is the newness in which the imagination can be rediscovered and flourish. The turn from autonomous existence and the reign of objective detached reason to the embrace of interpersonal human existence and the reason of dynamic integrative human experience has once again set the human imagination free to find itself and release its creative and corrective energy. Additionally, the maturation of the human, social and technological sciences has empowered them to explore

worlds of meaning previously hidden and to chart these new terrains by imaginative study and reflection. Moreover, these various sciences have increasingly recognized that these new worlds are simultaneously too diverse and too diversified to be exhausted or even accurately comprehended by any solitary science. Interdisciplinary collaboration and cooperation promise a great yield of integrative vision. By their nature, interdisciplinarity and integrity are sustained by imagination.

In an effort to unfold the centrality of imagination to human personal and social life, this paper will first outline representative understandings of imagination in the 19th century. Second, the paper will sketch the understanding of the imagination in more contemporary religious thought. Finally, in view of the preceding sections, the paper will propose the importance of imagination to epistemology and values.

19th Century Trends

As noted above, the intersection and interaction of religion and imagination is not totally novel. Religions frequently have appealed to imagination as a creative human capacity or power through which religious significance or meaning might be glimpsed, understood or lived. Perhaps the greatest testimony to the "success" with which the human imagination can penetrate the deep and dense mysteries of religion is the creation of religious art. Who can resist the demand for awe and adoration before the all powerful transcendent God imaged through the verticality of the Gothic Cathedrals? Whose emotions can be held in check when standing before the broken-hearted mother of Michelangelo’s Pieta? Who can avoid the chilling fear of judgment produced by the percussion that dominates the "Dies Irae" of Verdi’s Requiem?

Throughout the centuries, the great religious artists have crafted imaginative classics to express religious meaning. Our contact with these imaginative creations stimulates our own imaginations so that we too, in our own way, may penetrate more deeply into religious mystery. One must never forget that the vast majority of religious people’s existence and survival has been sustained by imaginative participation rather than logical or cognitive insight. They have not been primarily people of a written text, but a people of symbols and symbolic behavior.

While attentiveness to the historical living experience of people will lead us to a focus on imagination, attentiveness to the history of intellectual thought and reflection will do the same. Many great human thinkers, whether ancient (Plato and Aristotle), medieval (Aquinas), modern (Descartes and Kant) or contemporary (Newman, Coleridge, Heidegger, Polanyi, Kuhn, Ricoeur) have explored and rendered their evaluation on the human imagination. As might be expected, these evaluations are varied.

Plato was somewhat suspicious of imaginative knowing as knowing of a lesser form, an imitation of imitation, although Plato himself works in and through metaphors, myths and symbols. Aristotle and, by extension, the medievalists judged imagination to be a faculty wavering between perception and intellect. Kant, while being one of the first modern philosophers to be open to the role and function of the imagination in his "turn to the subject," accomplished through a focus on the "a priori conditions" of the human mind which enter into reason and critical thought, retracted his position in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. As Heidegger correctly noted in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics:

By his radical interrogation, Kant brought the ‘possibility’ of metaphysics before the abyss. He saw the unknown; he had to draw back. Not only did the imagination fill him with alarm, but in
the meantime (between the first and second editions) he had come more and more under the influence of pure reason as such.\textsuperscript{8}

The thinkers of the Enlightenment found little room for the imagination. Their logical and cognitive depiction of reason and rationality was inimicable to feeling, emotions, intuition and imaginative thought. This radical vision, however, was to call forth a reaction in the 19th century which would open a pathway for investigations into the imagination. This reaction offers a clue to what is new in current understandings of imagination and religion.

A fascinating quote from P.B. Shelley’s "Defense of Poetry" locates and orients the understanding and centrality of imagination as it appears in the 19th century. He describes a poem as:

The very image of life, expressed in its eternal truth... The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause. Poetry strengthens the faculty which is the organ of the moral nature of man in the same manner as exercise strengthens a limb.\textsuperscript{9}

He also identified the context which pleads for survival through imagination and poetry:

The cultivation of poetry is never more desired than at periods when, from an excess of the selfish and calculating principle, the accumulation of materials of external life exceeds the quantity of the power of assimilating them to the internal law of human nature.\textsuperscript{10}

Shelley’s perspective is more accurately developed in Goethe’s theory of fundamental vision or orientation (\textit{Vorstellungsarten}). Goethe contrasts two different styles of thinking or knowing. One style begins with an a priori form of wholeness impressed on us by experience of phenomenon. Subsequently, careful analysis demonstrates how the different factors and facets organize themselves into a whole marked by organic growth. The second style begins with particular experiences and attempts to explain them by contrasting theories which can account for logically coherent patterns that explain the relevant facts. The form of wholeness is a posteriori and the model of the whole is mechanistic.

The former way of thought is represented both in the post-Kantian German tradition beginning with Schelling and von Badder and ripened in Schliermacher as well as in English Romanticism represented by Wordsworth, Shelley, and Coleridge. Since von Badder and Coleridge comment at length on the imagination and identify it as the underlying foundation for knowing, a brief sketch of their views is in order.

Von Badder proclaims imagination as the central power or key human knowing. Following Schelling, he affirmed a unified antecedent absolute which manifested itself in \textit{objective nature} and \textit{subjective spirit}. Individual subjects or persons are empowered by the presence of the antecedent absolute in their individual subjectivity to consciously grasp the antecedent unity within


\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Ibid.}
the experiential-concrete-real subject-object polarity. The condition of possibility, however, for this event is the subject’s abandonment of purely ego-centered interests. Von Badder writes:

The opposition between the concepts (nature and spirit) is grounded, as in an antecedent condition of possibility, in a concept of unity from which they have been detached, not however in such a way that they are since unrelated one to the other, but in such a manner that the antecedent unity is still preserved in the opposition of the concepts. In the relation of tension, the original unity keeps working. The opposition once again points back to the original unity.\(^{11}\)

For von Badder, imagination creates an Idea Formatrix. This foundational image penetrates the human will so that it is desired. Concurrently, all particular imaginative acts create particular desires and are truly dependent on and proceed from the deeper antecedent imaginative image or idea. In this way, the particular products and desires of the imagination are symbols for the ultimate desire and knowledge of the antecedent unity which has given them birth. Moreover, it becomes more or less recognized that the antecedent unity generates the whole imaginative process.

In Coleridge, one encounters perhaps the finest mind of Romanticism and the hero of human imagination. Like Schelling and von Badder, Coleridge affirmed the general character of human knowing as a movement from a real but unconscious whole to a conscious comprehensiveness or wholeness. In Coleridge’s view imagination is rooted in unconscious wholeness and is the power which enables a person to move and live as a whole. Imagination enables a person to organize all the particular human faculties to create or produce a work of art which symbolizes and mediates through its objective wholeness or harmony the prior unthematized wholeness from which it proceeds and to which it returns.

Coleridge unfolded the above dynamics in his unsurpassed description of poetic genius empowered by imagination.

The poet described in ideal perfection brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other according to their relative worth and dignity . . . by that synthetic and magic power to which I would exclusively appropriate the name Imagination. . . . Good sense is the body of poetic genius, Fancy its drapery, motion its life, and Imagination the soul that is everywhere and in each; and forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole.\(^{12}\)

Coleridge argued that imagination operates in both a primary and secondary mode. As primary, the imagination is prior to conscious thought and will and that which allows the finite person to participate in the infinite wholeness of creative Being. Viewed in the secondary mode, imagination accompanies will and thought as a guide, directive presence or focusing energy. Coleridge distinguished imagination from fancy. Fancy was merely the juxtaposition or manipulation of images in a contrived or deliberate fashion. Imagination, on the contrary, empowers real creation or creativity. Fancy is a mere assembly or arranged data. Imagination creates a new whole or spiritual union. With Schelling and von Badder, Coleridge proposes imagination as the power which reunifies the division of subject and object, mind and matter into the original antecedent infinite wholeness from which they emerge.

Coleridge also distinguishes between reason and understanding, Verstand and Vernunft. Reason is true knowledge of the whole which recognizes and actively pursues truth beyond the level of sensation. Understanding is the science of phenomena which knows and judges according to sensation. For Coleridge reason is to understanding as imagination is to fancy. In the two related

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but distinguishable enterprises of artistic creation and creative truth-seeking thought, the intuitive awareness and knowledge of imagination’s and reason’s presence becomes clear and undeniable.

Coleridge argues that imagination and reason lead to moral truth and conscience. Imagination and reason lead the will, the locale of human freedom, to embrace moral truth and live a moral life. Moral perfection results from the personal synthesis of Reason and Will, a synthesis which is possible only through the operation of imagination.

In the writings of Newman, especially the *Grammar of Assent*, we discover an English Catholic response to rationalism reminiscent of that witnessed in German and English romanticism. While Newman clearly embraced the British propensity for experience and facts, he refused to limit facts and experience to objectively verifiable sensation or conceptual constructs which could be logically derived from them. Newman included emotions, intuitions and feelings within experiences. These phenomena might be characterized as the whole dynamic complex of one’s inner life, one’s inner experiences which are as real — if not more real — than external sensations and their conceptual derivatives.

Matching Newman’s fascination for reality was his interest in how the human being grasps or knows the real. On this question, Newman is crucial to our discussion of the imagination. Newman was committed to a vision of reality, human knowing and human decision-making as an organic personal unity. Experience and knowledge of the real includes more than passive sensations. It also encompasses our activities and unconscious (but no less real) influences, predisposition and presuppositions. The individual facets of experience and knowledge cannot be separated from the personal whole or, even more, from the social whole.

Newman proposed two pathways to knowing reality. One way is by cognitive personal reasoning which is the normal maturation of the developing personality in its process of formation. Another way is the path of formal reasoning or deliberate conscious thought. The former yields real living knowledge and leads to real assent. The latter results in notional knowledge and leads to notional assent. While Newman judged that both paths are interrelated and mutually valuable, he clearly prioritizes real knowledge as the superior form of knowing.

What is of immediate special interest to us is Newman’s identification of imagination with real apprehension or real knowledge. What did Newman mean in identifying imagination with real knowing? The *Grammar* offers insight. In his text, Newman pinpoints perception as the act by which we know concrete reality. Imagination is called the totality of the act by which we take hold of a real object. Clearly, imagination and the real are on a par.

One must resist any attempt to understand imagination as one feature or component in the complex dynamic of knowing. Newman rejects any identification of imagination with a mode or element of purely sensible knowing. On the contrary, imagination is our entire faculty for knowing the concrete real. Without imagination, the real would be unknown.

While Newman did not draw an explicit connection between imagination and the illative sense, hindsight makes the link evident. Newman’s illative sense is the power of judging and concluding which results from natural and spontaneous reasoning about the real. The illative sense is, in reality, nothing less than the effect which the imagination has on our choices and evaluations once reality has been really and personally grasped. If imagination allows us to know reality, it also demands that we pursue and choose reality and truth.

Unfortunately, Newman never developed a complete theory of the imagination. However, one does find in the English sage an impulse or outburst of genius. He indicates to us that imagination is not one human faculty on par with others. On the contrary, imagination is a special faculty which

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undergirds the others. It is a ground or base which guides us through the organic whole of life and enables us to grasp and know what is real.

The 20th Century

Twentieth century religious and theological investigations into the human imagination have pursued a twofold strategy. The first direction of this enormous effort has been preliminary, insofar as it aimed to further specify the nature and facets of imaginative activity. This effort was and is irksome given the quagmire of conflicting terminology, vision and theories surrounding the topic of imagination in the scientific disciplines. Critical scholars have been forced to avoid persistently the Cyribdus of fantasy and the Cibilla of bloating imagination into a cypher, or repository, for everything which smacks of creativity, stimulation or difference.

The second direction of this effort has been more systematic. After establishing the validity of imagination as a process of knowing, religious thinkers have explored the role of human imagination in the interaction of the person with the world. This front of the twofold strategy reflects a most important principle operative in contemporary thought. Human intelligence, in its most comprehensive forms, does not exist merely to understand reality. Even more radically and fundamentally, human intelligence exists so that we may survive within the world and critically change the world. In many ways, the success of human understanding has intensified the challenge of survival and need for creative change. While logical, conceptual, emotive and intuitive thought have each, in their own way and style, more or less adequately entered into understanding, survival and creative change, perhaps the human imagination enters into all three arenas in a more comprehensive and integrative fashion.

The one contemporary thinker who most exemplifies the twofold strategy which marks the current study of the imagination is William Lynch. From the 1950s into the 1980s Lynch has studied the imagination’s various viewpoints, including literary theory, philosophy, psychology and theology. Although Lynch has travelled many roads in his pursuit of the imagination, his sojourn has maintained a single focus, i.e., the grasping of a culture’s totality. Lynch has proposed that the human imagination’s importance becomes clear against the background of this enterprise.\footnote{14}

Lynch begins cultural analysis with an assessment of the actual forms of reality embedded in a culture. Examining ideas is not enough. One must also examine the physicalness of actual

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experience. A recognition of rich multiplicity and plurality emerges from this delineation. This recognition immediately gives rise to a concern for unity. One moves from an observation of fundamental realities to patterns of synthesis. The search for synthesis is energized by an inner psychological calling to broaden oneself and to develop an integrated personality which will be capable of undertaking the task of living with unity-in-difference. Personality development is not magically automatic but demands the cultivation of "forms" or "experiences" of openness.

Attentiveness to cultural reality, recognition of diversity-in-unity, and progressive personality integration lures an individual into the profound recognition that human existence is stamped with a positive dialectic, a dialectic of self, world and the human community. A culture’s central or paradigmatic vision stands out within this dialectic. Given the judgment that reality is multiple and organic, every culture articulates its own unique image or metaphoric model which will sustain social and personal life within a dialectic of unity-multiplicity. Lynch argues that only with epistemological flexibility can the reality of the dialectic be adequately preserved. It is the imagination at work in one’s style of thinking which fosters and enhances this flexibility.

Analogy has a crucial role in Lynch’s cultural analysis and is the theoretical access point to the world of images and symbols. Analogy, for Lynch, embraces three perspectives. First, analogy is an attitude which senses the interrelatedness of different realities. (Ultimately, this sense of distinctiveness-interrelatedness arises from the experience of one’s own body-organism.) Secondly, analogy is a logical procedure which compares different realities and interrelates them through creative confrontation. This analogy is a metaphysical doctrine. It judges that reality possesses many dimensions, each unique and valuable, yet each participating in the being of the others. Lynch depicts the imagination as empowering each analytical act.

Analogical activity leads us to the world of images and symbols. Lynch’s phenomenology of symbols reveals three fundamental and distinct qualities and referents. First, every symbol seeks to bring into conscious activity emotional energies and drives from within the inner life of the person and community. Second, every symbol possesses degrees of cognitivity, signifies real entities and arouses attention toward implicit concepts and judgments. This symbolic cognitivity reflects the objective capacity of images and symbols. Likewise, symbolic cognitivity combats a privatization of symbols and directs an individual toward a commonly shared world. Third and crucial to Lynch’s study of the imagination, images and symbols are rhythmic. Images and symbols possess a rhythm by reason of their dramatic structure. They are molded or constructed in moments of action/reaction. The particular constellation of these moments has a weight or tendency which impels those who experience and perceive the symbol to act or react in a similar fashion.

Lynch is convinced that images and symbols are bridges between humankind’s interior and exterior worlds, worlds which are always in a delicate balance. Investigating images and symbols will reveal both an individuals and a culture’s balance and imbalance, thereby revealing the particular inner dynamics of any culture. Therefore, a necessary prerequisite to actual cultural analysis through the prism of images and symbols is a more explicit understanding of how the human imagination interacts with these entities. Four basic imaginative acts can be discerned among Lynch’s many descriptions of imagination and its actions.

The primary and fundamentally imaginative act can be described as "Forming the Boundaries and Consciousness." Herein, the imagination establishes or constructs a border of psychic boundaries around the entire range of human consciousness. It builds a wall or carves a horizon within which various experienced entities can be associated. This imaginative act is a primordial action insofar as it "composes a world" according to its own terms.
This first imaginative action is only partially conscious and minimally voluntaristic. Therefore, it can be dangerous for it can become a trap which constricts imaginative development and growth, by the particular horizon of consciousness which it creates.

The key aspect of the first imaginative act is its incorporation of distinct physiological rhythms within the psychological boundaries it establishes. Lynch defines a physiological rhythm as a set pattern of physical action which tends to induce an imitative action in one who perceives it. This pattern of physical action is an incorporation of some movement, e.g., attraction-repulsion-interrelation, within an individual’s awareness. The pattern is experienced in ordinary daily routines and in critical decisions. It can be observed in stage drama (theater) and literature, which grasp and challenge the rhythms deep within us.

The second imaginative act is the production of "specific mental images." What is crucial, here, is not the process of forming specific images, but how our mental images contain or repeat the fundamental physiological images implanted within the first imaginative act. The habits of arranging perception (act one) are carried into the images our mind forms (act two). A particular person may be dominated by one or another rhythmic action which allows for classification, e.g., the Manichean — which disassociates and seethes with hidden hostility; the gnostic — which alienates the outer world from the inner; the absolutist — which bloats one reality over all others and leads to extremism; the analogical — which inherently values all realities and pushes towards an integrative unity. While the production of a specific image is a phenomenon clearly experienced by everyone, closer attention must be paid to the highly determinative force of the types or style of imagining which informs the production of specific images.

The third imaginative act involves the interaction and confrontation of specific images. In the collision of images, the rigidity of hidden psychological rhythms and their accompanying emotional force can be shaken free. An individual may recognize the predisposed prejudices which were imbedded in imaginative activity. This confrontation can bring with it the recognition that all one’s images are finite. While this disclosure may be painful, it marks a critical turning point. Having recognized the "fantasies" in our images and "seen" their form and edges in the finite limitation, a person must turn and respond to the challenge resurrected in this concrete situation. Some might despair; a few escape into mysticism. Lynch identifies one response which will allow further growth within the human imagination and calls this response generative.

The generative response consists in a basic acceptance of "the finite concrete" as the only healthy and effective path to whatever has been regarded traditionally as the goal of the human imagination, for that matter of the total human personality. The generative response is not merely an acceptance of negativity or definite — facing its good and bad aspects, striving to create insight and potentially hope in things not yet seen. At this point imaginative activity has become a highly conscious undertaking with the intentional and free interaction among various images.

The generative response to the collision and relativizing of images allows for what Lynch calls interpenetration. The imagination will seek a dynamic interplay of images either in random or through more deliberate experimentation. What emerges is a style of imagining (in all dimensions of thought) which is relational and contextual. Consciousness will continue to view facts and events concretely but then see them in larger contexts and related to other facts and events. Interpenetration may create new hypotheses, change lives and cultures. The interpenetrative and generative imagination is no longer a slave to past hidden emotions and experienced rhythms. By facing the limits of the concrete, it can enlarge life through creative vision.
Lynch labels the final imaginative act "Achieving Insight or Vision." This final act is really a return to the first imaginative act with a better awareness of self, world and a growing imagination. It is marked by a continual review of the established boundaries of consciousness with the freedom gained by the acceptance of finite experience in its relational contextualization.

Lynch sees insight and vision emerging from a reciprocal balance of concrete experience and finite realities; and the outer limits of thinking, a reciprocal balance of dreaming/hoping and the constant reevaluation and rearrangement through confrontation with the concrete. Reciprocity is the key to personal unity and contentment. The unity and mutual insight between fact and hope permits a continuous restructuring of personal life patterns, foster a realistic creativity for shaping the world around us, and produces vision. Lynch notes: "At this stage, therefore, the achieved fantasy is no fantasy at all, but a sense of vision, a reach of the imagination, a sense of contact with the fullness of being, that is effected by a perfect contact with some part of human reality."15

While the study of the human imagination is important in its own right and I have suggested that it may be the central clue to developing a new anthropological paradigm, it may become a key to developing a new theological vision and synthesis. Lynch himself has taken this tactic in his theological reflections on faith, hope and, most importantly, Christology. Let us turn briefly to his imaginative Christology as an example of the theological fruits which are born within an imaginative framework. Lynch correctly locates the center of Christian theology in Christology. Christ is the crossroads where God and the human meet. Theology has traditionally underscored the objective character of this meeting in the doctrine of the incarnation. Lynch argues that human beings are only subjectively transformed by this encounter when the specific image of Christ invades human imaginative activity and forms a Christological imagination. Interestingly, the role of theology from this perspective becomes a stewardship of the images of Christ which are the coinage/currency for Christian spirituality. The shaping of a Christological imagination explores how a concrete image of Christ possesses the power to transform the ordinary movement of human imaginative activity. This involves the intrusion of an image of Christ at crucial junctures in the growth of the imagination. Three particular junctures stand out: first, the moment of taking an attitude or habit of perception toward the definite and concrete; secondly, the quality of interpenetration and balance established between natural and historical images; and thirdly, the attaining or non-attaining of a perspective which is reciprocal and participatory in its unitive vision. Within these junctures, the image of Christ can seize an individual’s imagination and lead it to a unitive vision — but a unitive vision which exceeds its wildest expectation, extending into the very mystery of God.

Within the first juncture, the imagination’s confrontation with a definite, concrete image a proper image of Christ may challenge the imagination’s own prejudice. This image of Christ must be concrete: it must accept the absolute specificity of Jesus of Nazareth in historical particularity and real bodiliness. Once accepted, this image of the historical Jesus can generate analogies, create new images and encourage us to face the implicit limitedness of all images. As the image of Jesus generates analogies, it becomes the validation of natural symbols and the power of their transformation. Jesus assumes natural symbols in his own level of actuality, devotion and commitment. The image of Jesus places in motion a reciprocity between the historical and the natural, i.e., the historical symbol re-vitalizes natural symbols in the depth of their meaning; the natural provides broader areas within which the historical may achieve its unique effect.

Gradually, the life of Christ becomes a model for the life of any human person, insofar as the manifold mysteries of Christ’s life point to the mysteries of human life itself. Most interestingly,

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15 Images of Hope, p. 201.
the definite, generative image of Christ gives birth to a faith in the capacity and potential of human life. The mystery of God revealed in Christ is realized only by a "yes" to the hard realities of human life.

The interaction between Christ and the person can become the standard for viewing all human relationships. Christ occupies the center of one’s imagination and calls for all reality to be interpreted according to the rhythms of his life. This implies embracing the rhythms of life in freedom, an action which can recreate and transform all reality in the historical-faith image of Jesus.

**Imagination, Epistemology and Values**

When one shifts from an historical to a synthetic vision of imagination, certain key dimensions, characteristics and applications assume crucial importance. Attention will be limited to three areas. First, what is the basic understanding of the reality named imagination? Secondly, how does imagination influence cognitive theory or epistemology? Thirdly, how is imagination necessarily linked to and how does it influence the phenomena called values?

The representative thinkers selected from the 19th and 20th centuries indicate that the imagination should not be approached as one among many human faculties. On the contrary, imagination stands below, above and alongside every human capacity. In short, imagination defines the human qua human. It empowers all human powers as their a priori condition of possibility.

Imagination is below all human faculties insofar as it generates life within them. Imagination is alongside human faculties insofar as it is present to and within them as guide. Further, imagination is above all human faculties insofar as it challenges and motivates the human faculties not only to attain their specific goals or ends but also to recognize, strive for and achieve the goal or end of unified wholeness, which transcends the finite ends of splintered or fractured wholeness in its multiple expressions.

Imagination is irreducible to cognitive or intuitive thought. It is not identical to concept-imaging but is its a priori condition. Imagination motivates emotion and will.

Imagination is both a priori and a posteriori to the actual engagement of the above-mentioned faculties: it overlaps human transcendence. It is the pervasive movement of an individual or community in existence, confronted by existence and attempting to discover and make meaning in existence. The imaging, understanding, feeling and acting emerging from this process is a testimony that the imagination is truly at work.

Imagination is the driving power of the human which seeks and claims to attain truth and reality. This drive cannot be limited to one or another human capacity but pervades the whole of the human person. The human transcends any particular reality through its proper faculty by surrendering to the more fundamental preconscious and unthematized power of imagination.

The preceding description of the human imagination clearly affects one’s cognitive theory or epistemology. Coleridge leads us into the issue:

The notional understanding itself is but the shadowy abstraction of living and actual truth. On the immediate, which dwells in every man, and on the original intuition or absolute affirmation of it (which is likewise in every man, but does not in every man rise into consciousness) all
the *certainty* of our knowledge depends; and this becomes intelligible to no i by the ministry of mere words from without.\(^\text{16}\)

What is at stake here is the relationship between conceptual, theoretical or notional knowledge and real or personal knowledge. Newman, Blondel, Polyani and Kuhn have all seriously labored over this issue which assumes increased importance in the context of imagination.

In the *Grammar of Assent*, Newman clearly distinguished notional and real knowledge:

To apprehend notionally is to have breath of mind, but to be shallow; to apprehend really is to be deep, but to be narrow minded. The latter is the conservative principle of knowledge, and the former is its principle of advancement. Without the apprehension of notions, we should forever pace around one small circle of knowledge; without a firm hold upon things, we should waste ourselves in vague speculations. However, real apprehension has the precedence as being the scope, and end, and the test of the notional, and the fuller is the mind’s hold on things on what he considers such, the more fertile is it in its aspects of them and the more practical in its definitions.\(^\text{17}\)

Blondel paralleled real and notional knowledge to an explorer’s actual experience and his notebooks offer descriptions which always fall short of the richness of the actual experience. Imagination empowers both real and notional knowledge. In real knowledge, the reality is grasped by the whole person in dynamic unity in difference, a unity sustained by imagination. In notional knowledge, ideas or notions are grasped by the intellect or mind, empowered by imagination always to recognize the difference in unity and seek after the real beyond the idea or notion. In this sense, real and notional knowledge reflect the power of imagination as primary and secondary. In essence, then, the imagination is the part of human contact with the real. Imagination continually calls the human to seek union with the experience of difference. Cognitive theory or epistemology must clearly differentiate notional and real knowledge and include imagination as the crucial power which makes knowledge possible.

Notional and real knowledge issue forth in notional and real assent. Notional assent is an intellectual commitment to an idea or notion as true or false. Real assent, however, is the commitment of the whole person in multiple dimensions to the truthfulness of the real as such. In this context, one discovers the interrelation of imagination, knowledge, values, conscience and morality. Values and the ethical (morality) are an imperative. The force of conscience emanates from the integrity or wholeness of reality mediated to us by imagination, recognized by us through imagination and lived by us in imaginative life.

Values and the moral life are a response to the integral wholeness of reality and to the distinctive dignity of the human qua human who recognizes its meaning. The human is the locus of being and meaning. Therefore, values and the moral life reflect not ideas about reality (notional knowledge), but the commitment of the whole-person meaning of reality (real knowledge/real assent).

Imagination occupies the central place in the linkage of the human person and community to the real and in the imaginative expression of appropriate behaviors which symbolize and reflect the organic unity of reality. Imagination discloses the horizon of the real in which values stand out and are desired. Imagination empowers knowledge of the real in which values are known. Imagination moves the human will so that values are chosen and a moral life is embraced.

\(^{16}\) Coleridge, p. 132.

\(^{17}\) *Grammar*, p. 34.
Theology Department, Duquesne University
Pittsburgh, PA
Dialogue I: The Need for Moral Imagination

The Project

Since the time of Aristotle, the most notable reality in the world has been considered to be change. Often, its goals are most laudable, e.g., liberation of the person and the humanization of society. As a process, however, it presents the new and unknown often the perplexing, and at times even the tragic. Thus, the changes in Eastern Europe give new and breathtaking hopes but are shadowed by lurking fears of collapse and conflict. One thinks, of course, of the city of Beijing, but what of the City of Washington where drugs have produced the highest murder rate and double the average rate of infant mortality in the country. The signs of progress in many third world countries give founded hope, but this tempered by recurrent threats to stability in other countries and a fortiori to the lives of their citizens.

Continued progress on all levels – socio-cultural, politico-economic and moral – depends upon values by which we direct our daily lives and build our future. As such values emerge out of our experience and history and come to us as tradition the challenge of change forces us to look back for the resources of human vision and forward to new ways of human life.

Such issues have been examined and written in a series of volumes, regarding the nature and experience of values, especially in the face of such present issues as intercultural conflict, the crisis of values in urban life and the emerging sense of the person in society. The project has included studies on the various cultural regions as well as the implications of all these for the philosophical, psychological and pedagogical horizons or moral education and character development.

The present study grows out of this overall context. It is focused upon imagination, with special attention to three factors. The first is the work of the imagination in integrating the various human capabilities or faculties by bringing together the contributions of the various senses and of the intellect. Should the imagination be considered as mediating from the senses to the intellect, or vice versa? Does it provide the images in reference to which the intellect does its own work? Or could it reach even beyond the intellect to provide a point of higher integration of intellect and will, spirit and body in the manner suggested by the third Kantian critique?

Secondly, some functions of the imagination bring new hope. Many of the problems of contemporary thought reflect the way in which technical and abstract reasoning has desiccated the context of human life today by forcing all into univocal and universal categories insensitive to the uniqueness of the person. The work of the imagination, by mediating a concrete incarnation of the spirit, could provide the abstractive intellect with access to the concrete and, hence, with the means of reference to the unique reality of the human freedom of self and others, both individually and socially.

Thirdly, as a point of integration of the human personality, the imagination can point to that center which is most profoundly personal, not merely as the foundation of the multiple human powers or faculties, but also as the dynamic wellspring or source of life. It should be here that the
person is enabled to envisage what can and needs to be and to take creative action to realize what is truly new.

The study of imagination in these terms should contribute on three levels.

First, it will be part of the general corrective move from a one-sided attention to objectivity toward integrating the self-conscious and self-determining dimensions proper to the subject.

Second, it should contribute to the effort to overcome mass and excessive systematization and to make room for the person, for creativity and for personal initiative and, hence, for the cultures which humans create. This, in turn, will enable us to work upon the issues of intercultural relations and build toward respect for others and that harmonious cooperation which truly promotes human life.

Third, in education, the study of the imagination should make an important contribution to the development of moral persons by not merely conveying information about moral rules or about techniques for solving moral dilemmas, but by shedding light upon the growth of persons who can be sensitive to others and creative in building a home, a neighborhood and a world.

The Problematic

The discussion of the above issues was directed toward identifying the dimensions of the problematic of the overall project. If imagination were to be taken as a process of fantasizing, of dreaming and of developing utopia which are arbitrary and unrelated to the real needs of people, it could distract from the urgent needs of the times. Thus, participants from China, Africa and south America were careful to cast a realistic, in contrast to an idealistic, orientation for the discussion. The study must begin from the realities of the present.

This, however, made the question of what is real, particularly in the human order, of central importance. Were one to consider it to be simply that which appears to the senses, as Engels had held, then technological reason would suffice. One would be blinded to the properly human mode of life and its realm of freedom, to the way in which human associations are freely created and to the search for personal and social fulfillment. Attention was turned precisely toward these latter dimensions and to the role of the imagination therein.

It was suggested that the center for the ordering of social reality is, in fact, the imagination. On the macro level it was the exercise of the imagination at the time of the Enlightenment, for example, which began to envisage an order which has gradually come to be articulated through the various social and political struggles and to develop more adequate national structures throughout the world. This was illustrated by the development of an American identity which, though based upon European cultures, is not reducible thereto. This suggests that with the emerging sense of pluralism what is important is not merely a correct translation of tradition, but an understanding of the ways in which the imaginative can reorder materials in order to form the foundational symbols that order our life.

In this sense, too, attention must be given to the role of ideology. This can be taken in a positive sense as it defines what a people, and especially a set of peoples and cultures within a single nation, have in common in their effort to replace outmoded structures by new ones more adapted to their times. In this sense, the level of development of a people may depend more upon what they have in their minds and hearts than in their hands – as illustrated by Japan. Conversely, the role of the imagination in developing an ideology can be perverted into crating instruments of illusion and even suppression.
In this process, a study of the dialectic of ideological development can be of use. If in this area ontogeny follows phylogeny, and if each stage both repeats and negates its predecessor, which in turn stands in a similar relation to its predecessors, then a sophisticated logic might help us with a scientific analysis of the formal constants in cultural growth.

However, the issue may be deeper than one of political ideologies and formal social structures, even if these be well-directed. For if the person is not only a citizen and, hence, is not able to be understood exclusively in terms of the political order, then the imagination has deeper roots and a richer task. Thus, for example, the founding documents of the American republic speak of God-given rights and values to be respected by the newly emerging political structures; indeed, the promotion of those values is the raison d’être of the political structures. Similarly, the long, as well as the recent, experience of the Polish people shows how a sense of communion can provide the foundational context of a people’s life despite the circumstances of military, political and economic repression. The power of an ideology with all modern means at its disposal and absolute control to submerge all into an undifferentiated society becomes more questionable the longer it is attempted.

This suggests that there are levels of human life deeper than the political imagination. Some noted that the real roots of social problems are in breaking away from a foundational unity toward selfishness. This calls for a radical change of heart. In the Indian vision, this is called liberation (moksha) in the summary sense of overcoming selfishness.

A second indication of deeper levels of concern is that cultures do change. One profound instance is the transition from the Old to the New Testament sense of life. This is richly documented in biblical sources and in the rich literature of the early Christian Fathers. It was suggested that one might study, for instance, the way in which the notion of resurrection did not supplant but imaginatively transformed all previous symbols such as kingdom, divine presence and the way to combat evil in order to make possible the foundational development of a new culture. Insight from such a study could be of great importance for various parts of the world as they move, e.g., from agriculture to industry, and/or from industry to an information culture with its implied intensive interplay between cultures.

The importance of attending to the imagination is reflected also in the field of liturgy. Whereas previous this had been treated only in terms of devotion and ritual, more recent phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches have brought out its deeper role as the central expression and, hence, realization of salvation through symbols. As has always been believed, it is now seen more clearly to be a reenactment through time of the Mysteries themselves.

In this light, imagination begins to emerge not only as personal or a fortiori as personal fantasy, but as a social force more powerful even than rational cognition. This may augur a truly new age succeeding that of reason. At the same time, we now can see how deeply enslaving has been colonial and “melting pot” efforts to erase the language and memory of a people and to substitute their culture with another’s store of images by which it understands itself and its world. Hence, critical consciousness is needed to assure that the new information age is not less, but more, free and rich than its predecessors. Imagination can and must become a creative and liberating force for projecting the future, nourishing hope and tracing utopia as the positive side of ideologies. This requires an in-depth analysis of the modes of imagination in narrative, ritual and song.

This points, in turn, to the importance of literature and stories in the education of a child and of a people, and hence, to the importance of exercising and developing the imagination. This can be done in drawing and writing in which the person projects him or herself beyond experience in order to bring out both the good and the bad, as well as the tension between the two. This makes
is possible not only to build castles in the sky, but to analyze, illustrate and envisage solutions to the ills of society. Such a conjunction of the creative and critical aspects of the imagination can be the key to a realism that is truly progressive.

**Dialogue II: The Imagination in Aristotle, Kant and Ricoeur**

In the range of reality from the material, as extended but not self-aware, to the spirit, as not extended but self-aware and self-determining, Aristotle conceives of the imagination as holding a mediating position. This has special relevance for our time precisely to the degree to which the Cartesian project of clear and distinct ideas first divided the human person between spirit and matter and later suppressed one in favor of the other. The resultant loss of freedom and creativity in history has made it necessary now to put new emphasis upon synthesis and integration and to look at the human person wholistically. In this context a renewed interest has developed in the mediating and integrating role of the imagination.

How should this be conceived? Is the imagination (a) a free agent weaving back and forth between spirit and matter in order to mediate between the two, after the manner of *The Critique of Pure Reason*? Or is it (b), as in *The Critique of Judgement*, neither the lowest or animal in the human person nor the highest or angelic therein, but the point of human integration whereby one is able to be most distinctively human and to act in a characteristic manner? The history of this notion in Aristotle and his school would appear to move subtly from (a) to (b).

The Greek etymology of the Latin term for “imagination” points beyond images and even imaging to the capacity to image. To understand this in Aristotle, one must begin from the notion of substance, for his understanding is rooted in being. Hence, he does not look first to imaging or to a general flow of consciousness in which the person would be absorbed, but to the strong sense of the constitution as a distinctive being in one’s own right and with one’s own characteristic level of being and life project. Of itself, this does not bespeak freedom, for it is characteristic of substance on all levels of reality from the most material to the most spiritual. But it is a prerequisite for freedom at the level of self-conscious beings, for without this autonomy one would be but a function of some larger material universe, social class or all-powerful state.

*Imagination as Independent and Creative*

In the gradation of being, particularly as it is found in the one human composite of synolon, Aristotle proceeds in his *De Anima* to pry open some space, as it were, for the imagination by distinguishing it from spirit and matter. In so doing, he establishes its two special characteristics, namely, independence and creativity.

Aristotle establishes the independence and freedom of imagination vis a vis, on the one hand, opinion as the lowest level of intellect and, on the other hand, the senses. The independence he discerns is both objective and subjective. The imagination has objective independence because it depends upon the will and, hence, is not instinctively or necessarily moved by external stimuli. Therefore, it is also to work out alternatives, rather than be held to reporting upon given status of affairs. Further, the imagination also has subjective independence. Since it is not reporting on a real external state of affairs, it does not feel threatened by an imagined danger as it would by one which it knew or opined. Indeed it can continue to function even in the absence of external objects. Thus, the imagination enjoys a unique degree of independence in Aristotle’s realistically oriented
philosophy. This will give it unique importance wherever creativity is required on the part of the person or society.

Aristotle traces the liberation of the imagination from a state of domination by the senses to one of creative life for the spirit through a combination of three characteristics. First, the imagination serves as the subject of the flux of consciousness—a sensation of sensation; it variously relates contrary notions derived from the senses. Secondly, it is productive (poiesis) for it does not merely receive sense data but actively elaborates images regarding the common sensibles. Thirdly, it is peculiarly free, at least in the sense of indetermination, for it is not bound or oriented to a single goal but stands more properly in the productive order of efficient cause. Thus, it is rightly called creative for it is the source of action which is productive and free.

The Role of Imagination in Relation to Knowledge, Moral Action and Beauty

On the basis of these two characteristics of independence and creativity, Aristotle in his various works and his school in later ages, was able to delineate further the range of the imagination by studying it in relation to truth or thought, to the good via action and to beauty and the aesthetic order.

1/ The role of imagination in relation to truth and thought was progressively enriched. Aristotle’s emphasis upon realism necessitates that all come through the senses to the intellect in order to assure the real content of intellectual knowledge. Thomas Aquinas’ further emphasis upon the unity of the person implies that the human intellect must work with the body and, indeed, intuit the nature of things in the sense images. The imagination then is not only a conduit to the intellect, but an integral factor in any integrally human act of knowledge.

This implies three essential human abilities: (a) the ability to return via the phantasm to the concrete individuality of others—and, hence, to be able to recognize and respect their freedom; (b) the ability to unfold the meaning of a phantasm by varying and completing its structure, etc.; and (c) the ability thereby creatively to open new possibilities via these new combinations or patterns in the imagination.

2/ For the role of the imagination in relation to the good and action, Aristotle relates action to desire, which in turn depends upon the imagination in working out what can be desired. Through generating pleasure, by which we are moved to action, the imagination can reinforce our tendencies to good or evil. As itself, the imagination is morally insensitive; however, this generates the problem of controls by the person and the intellect over the imagination. This, in turn, implies the entire moral task of developing a proper interrelation between the virtues and values by which we activate our moral life.

The role of the imagination in relation to beauty and the aesthetic becomes particularly crucial as the need for synthesis intensifies. Because beauty unites the true and the good according to the classical formula that beauty is “that which pleases when seen,” the imagination can serve to unite knowledge and action. Thereby it can contribute to creative action which goes beyond that which can be emulated by a computer, calculated by the intellect, or legally enforced in the public arena. Beyond all this the imagination calls us to even higher standards of harmony and beauty in human affairs. It reaches, also within to the center point of our personhood and identity from which we respond integrally and, hence, most humanely to others.
In this manner in the Aristotelian tradition, the imagination appears as central to the deepest levels of our personhood, enabling our life to be both affective and effective, responsive and loving, creative and free.

Kant

Freedom must be related not simply to self, but to productive action. To do this Kant needed the imagination in order to find a way between Leibniz’s reason without person and Hume’s individual without community. This can be seen by returning to the basic pre-Socratic material elements, atoms and space, and observing how Democritus escaped the classical dilemmas of Zeno by introducing elements of the imagination to synthesize the intervals of space and time. For Kant this unitive element was the pure form of intuition. In dialectical terms this would deny both thesis and antithesis, but rather than uniting them in a synthesis, it would transcend them both. The work of the imagination is this very process of transcending which the imagination carries out in terms of space and time.

In this, Kant echoes the above description of the imagination in Aristotle as the flow of consciousness integrating contraries derived from the senses. For Kant, the requirement of a subject for this work of synthesizing opposites points to a transcendent order. He treats this not in a Hegelian manner through a four valued logic, but as a transcendental deduction of categories.

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is concerned with the prerequisites for scientific knowledge and identifies only the elements necessary for that project. Thus, the imagination does not figure there as a factor in the exercise of freedom, which is treated rather in his second work, of practical reason. Imagination, as a free creative factor, assumes its leading position above even reason in his third Critique of Judgement.

Even the first critique, however, raises a series of questions, regarding the degree to which the mind enters the very creation of any representation and therefore is integral to all knowledge. It suggests a characteristically modern turn to subjectivity and raises the question of how this can be, not the destruction of objectivity, but its conscious implementation. In this, it suggests and goes beyond the Aristotelian tradition in which even the mind is active in contrast to being simply a passive process of imaging, or mimesis, as in Plato.

Ricoeur’s treatment of metaphor and tragedy can be suggestive here. It points out how metaphor begins with existing meaning, but by developing contraries generates new meaning. Later he turns to tragedy as drawing out the virtualities of existing reality.

These possibilities can be seen in many ways and indeed constitutes whole image-making industry ranging from heroes to horrors, from Disney to Goebbels. This can express the collective unconscious as well as the clear intent of individuals. Freud and Habermas make possible psychological and social critiques, while more metaphysical approaches are needed in order to critique and direct deeper levels of personal freedom.

Paul Ricoeur

Of the three Kantian critiques regarding, respectively, speculative knowledge, moral knowledge and aesthetics sensibility, Ricoeur looks to the last in search of the principles for the unity of a human life and project. Dilthey had completed Kant’s critiques by adding historical reason as this receives from the past the life experience and sensibility expressed in different
cultures. Gadamer focuses this work upon tradition, which he treats as a text in order to understand communication between various cultures or parts of tradition.

In order to avoid the fragmentation which appears when human psychic life is divided between faculties, Ricoeur focuses rather upon the operations of the human person. Hence, he treats especially the cognitive, affective and teleological roles of the imagination in both individual and social life. He begins this by studying what it is to will and to imagine. He finds that this constitutes a language in order to express our being as directed toward the future and as capable of fault. Both are rooted in a deeper desire to be fully, that is, to be without boundaries, and infinitely expanding.

His dialogue, as it were, with Freud brings out the teleological and interpretative roles, not of images, but of imaging itself. In this he searches for the way in which this is inserted into action, helping us to express its meaning and to project before us new types of action.

Here, metaphor play a central role; indeed Ricoeur replaced symbol by metaphor as giving rise to thought because metaphor does not merely repeat or restate, but reshape, language. By redescribing reality, we recreate it. This is reflected to an even greater degree in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Poetic* where tragedy describes, not how things are, but how things could be through a reordering of what already is. Applied to the whole of life, this provides a way, not merely of repeating through redescribing and recreating what is, but of taking hold of the past in ways which never were. Thus, metaphor allows us to look ahead or in front as it were in order to envisage life that is truly new.

In social language the use of symbol corresponds to ideologies as ever repeating themselves, whereas metaphors would correspond to utopias. For Ricoeur ideology retains a positive sense of presenting reality in a comprehensive manner, but needs something in the order of utopias in order to find goals, to take society beyond itself and to provide a sense of history.

At least three issues appear to emerge here: (1) how imagination can serve to unite human projects and enable us to encompass all fields, bridging times and cultures; (2) the need for imagination in order to give birth to action; (3) and the need to go beyond representation as reproduction to memory and the creation of new possibility.

**Discussion**

The creative role of the imagination can be illustrated by various stories and parables which make manifest the process by which a people shapes its history in a positive fashion, for our self-understanding lies within a larger whole, or *plethos*, which itself is a human cultural creation. At points of sharp cultural change, such as the 1960s with the breakdown of many institutions, we must search for new symbols in order to maintain and develop our lives. These are found in the stories of a people and include both actual happenings which take on symbolic moment and creations of the imagination which express deeply felt truths about a people’s life and experience.

Such texts play a number of roles which exceed the capabilities of actual experience.

First, they recreate experience which, as happening in time, occurs once and then passes away or becomes increasingly distant. Or should it be said that such a fleeting notion of time itself lacks the perdurance which reality possesses before and through human consciousness or that things last not merely as memories but in and through their relation to the images of the mind.

Second, with such texts the imagination can provide for a certain distantiation. Beyond the immediacy of the now in which an event occurs, human consciousness is able, as it were, to take hold of an experience, hold it up before its gaze, look at it from many facets and respond to it more
reflectively and integrally. Music may suggest something of this if we ask in what senses sad music can be not only less, but more, than a sad experience.

Third, in developing these stories the imagination is not held simply to what it finds in actual experience itself. It is able to project implications which have not yet occurred, to consider alternate implications among which one can choose those which actually will occur, and, therefore, to avoid evil consequences and to cooperate in the realization of the good.

There are broader and deeper implications of this in the thought of Ricoeur. For his concern is not simply with the management of day to day events, but with the realization of persons and peoples as they strive toward fulfillment. Here the level is not that of resolving psychological stress or achieving social justice, but more profoundly how these – and all else – can be a manifestation of the goodness of being in time.

The opposite of this is the negation of being, which in contrast to goodness is sin. Thus, his concern is the foundational one of whether we, as persons and peoples, are open to the infinite source of being and goodness, or are so turned into ourselves as to be closed to all, but our own limited, resources. For the human spirit, such a closure upon oneself would spell an ultimate self-negation of being and the good at its source: it would be the original sin, setting the fate of all of our life. Hence, his radical question is how this totalizing question is posed, recognized and responded to in our lives as persons and peoples.

How are we able to become conscious of the issue of the basic orientation of our life? How are we ever free to be able to take hold of our personal lives? It is here that the issue of sin as a whole and at its roots emerges, and from it, correspondingly comes our own resurrection and liberation. We might attempt to treat this with abstract categories, but that would assure that we abstract precisely from our own most personal decision. We need instead to attend above all to that option by which we set the basic orientation of all our particular decisions and determine what our whole life, with all its struggles and achievements, will add up to. This requires a concrete mode of thought for which and in which imagination is an essential component. First, it can bring my free and hence, my uniquely personal actions for evil or good into evaluation and judgement; secondly, it can imaginatively reorder and redirect the real components of my life (conversion); and thirdly, it can decide upon the future orientation of my life (resurrection and commitment).

It should not be thought, however, that this is only a personal matter, for as humans we are essentially and not only accidentally members of a community. Thus, the issues which have just been stated in personal terms must be take not only in an individual sense, but in social sense as well. Nations, too, have their original sin and their basic choices to make and to implement. For example, in the US this sin could well be the fact of slavery as the contradiction of that nation’s founding enlightenment principles of freedom, equality and brotherhood. Its civil war was fought on this issue, and its basic decision on the matter made. However, each of its ramifications for education, health, care and housing presents a quandary, a difficult struggle and a perilous outcome. It is possible for a people to read the history of slavery as tragedy, to set Lincoln as its symbol of liberation, and to redirect its future not only in principle, but wholly and with concrete implications for each person and each decision? If not, then the notion of a free people has little meaning in making decisions that are truly pervasive and working out their ever unfolding meanings.

In doing this, it is not sufficient to look only to the future, for that is a blank tablet; it is not yet written and provides nothing to draw upon for our understanding and orientation. We need rather to look to the past for what has been seen, valued and chosen. We look to what has been so valued as to be passed on as a key to a decent life for the next generation, and then reaffirmed in
being passed on (*tradita*) time and again from generation to generation. This is truly the fruit of the human spirit freely responding to the good, which it cumulatively proclaims.

Some consider it important that we reaffirm this *tradita* in our day, that we rejoice in it, celebrate it and proclaim it in fiesta ad festivals in order to pass it on to the next generation. Others see such rituals, festivals and fiestas as in danger of being a simple repetition of structures which either have been oppressive in the past or are inadequate and, hence, retrogressive in relation to the modalities of life in the present. This latter view calls for a critical hermeneutics to focus upon changing the structures in such ways as to permit and promote the growth of freedom in our day.

It may be that both approaches – celebration and critique – have an essential contribution to make. Structures are important – increasingly so as life become more complex and technically structures. Those which were, or now are becoming, restrictive and repressive must be recognized as such and changed. But changed in terms of what? If it is true that humankind has not only experienced certain structures of social organization but has discovered thereby something of what it is to be human, just and loving, then it is crucial that these lessons be not lost but proclaimed. If humankind is not to be run by a history or a system but to direct these toward promoting human life, then such values must be proclaimed and enjoyed. If these values are to be not formal restrictions, but dynamic and creative principles in our life, then they need to be proclaimed and enjoyed in an open, even playful manner, that is, they need to be celebrated. Only thus can they spark the creative imagination and give hope to the heart that problems of the present can be faced by peoples in a manner that will lead to a future worthy of their members.

**Dialogue III. The New Interest in the Imagination**

*Imagination, Rationalism and Natural Experience*

A major source of contemporary difficulties lies in the very triumph of scientific and technical reason from which our times derive its capabilities. The ability to abstract from the wholeness and integrity of concrete reality enables one to focus upon certain aspects. The result of this capability when applied with the modern fascination for clarity and control has been to reduce human horizon to but one or another dimension of reality. Despite the full range of experience, this unilaterally absorbs all of human concerns and sensibilities, leaving no room for the imagination to envisage new possibilities. To live in such a society is to be correspondingly restricted because all other dimensions of a person or a people are rejected and oppressed. This can be experienced when exclusive stress upon reason and dogma by a church results in the countersign of the inquisition. In our days, it has been experienced in the intensively scientific materialism of Marx with its resulting totalitarianism.

The way out of this will require imagination, which is not manipulated by another one-sided ideology such as fascism. Where can we recuperate the plenitude of sensibility wherein such imagination can truly unfold and explore? It was suggested that this can be done not in intellectual terms alone which are essentially subject to the above limitations, but in incarnational terms in which the intellect is incorporated within the integral person and the person within his or her social context. This is as close to us as our infancy in which we were bonded to our mothers from whom our life had emerged. This is not merely a physical, psychological or social relation, but all of these entwined in the integrity of our persons. It can be detected in the Genesis accounts in which Adam not merely dominates nature by categorizing and naming it, but being truly to live in this world by seeing it reflected in the eyes of Eve. What appears in the original story of these personal relations
is not that man is evil, but good. This provides a strong insight into the African and Chinese cultures and implies a profound shift in one’s attitude toward death, and hence, to life as well.

Others would note that the sense of the fallenness of man can be poorly or excessively conceived in terms of a corruption of human nature itself, it thereby generates a dour sense of life and a presumption of interpersonal attitudes of conflict. Nevertheless, the opposite presumption of innocence is dangerously romantic. African myths do not omit the sense of surrounding evils, protection against which is a pervasive – some would say, strongly restrictive – preoccupation. The notion of original sin is directed toward taking account of the deep reality alienation in the world. To deny this in favor of a lost innocence or an original joy would be to fail to face the real challenges and psychological restrictions of human life. Integral and realistic human engagement in life comes, then, not through a claim to innocence, imaged as an idyllic incarnation of spirit in matter, but through evil, consciously encountered and overcome, that is, through redemption and resurrection.

Further there is danger in working cross culturally. One’s own culture cannot only be taken as normative for all others – such cultural imperialism has characterized modern mentalities whose evolutionary presumption implies that their present view rightly surpasses all others; but the opposite can be true as well. In finding much that is good in earlier cultures, there is danger of becoming overly pessimistic about the mentality of our own day or culture. The result would be a reverse imperialism, but an imperialism, nonetheless. This can be dangerous if the world is becoming not necessarily better, but certainly more complex and technically sophisticated. For in that case, the issue of evil and alienation itself becomes more complex and more dangerous and requires a proportionately rigorous and penetrating response.

Where then is one to find the radically humanizing insights which become ever more necessary, but less vivid conscious in our increasingly technical culture? Where no single source can suffice, a combination of resources might yet succeed. The increasing evidence of the inadequacies, on the personal and international levels, of the imperialism of abstractive rationality (despite its obvious contributions), has been forcing people to look for additional dimensions of human awareness and meaning. Though these are available in one’s own family experience, what is close to home is often least noticed. For this reason, it can be important to pay attention to alternate modes of human sociality as realized in other, and often earlier types of communities which have been less affected by the rationalization of modern urban life. Patterns of small communities of tribal and village life can provide new or renewed insight for those who are experiencing depersonalization and alienation. In Latin America such communities have been found to facilitate a renewed humanization of life within an impersonal context for new urban immigrants, and these basic Christian communities, in turn, suggest new possibilities for other cultures.

Of course, to attempt simply to import or mimic such alien, living patterns would itself be alienating, but they can point one to dimensions of life which were present in one’s own personal experience of human life and meaning as lived in one’s family. Beyond this they can direct attention to elements common to culture providing, thereby, a shared foundation and consensus upon which a people can begin to work together in elaborating their future.

This shared point of reference and set of values is the stuff of lived freedom. It has been tried, tested and found to be good. This wisdom, reaffirmed freely and passed on as tradition, provides resources upon which we as a people can work with our imagination to shape new ways of living in response to our new times.
These resources of a tradition contain not only spontaneous and unreflected experience, but the results of millennia of reflection. This is the achievement of peoples in working out more adequate and equilibrated responses to the dilemmas of person and community, of human and nature, of nation and nation in the social, political, economic and cultural dimensions of human life. This has been elaborated in the philosophies and theologies of the various cultures; it is an essential part of the progression of their peoples.

As time progresses, peoples meet new circumstances. In the past, these may have been environmental changes; today they are more likely to be the technological, economic or cultural impact of other peoples. In one’s own search, there is nothing unnatural, unworthy or unfitting than in a people’s turning to the philosophical and theological resources of those peoples in order to resolve dilemmas related to the impact of those cultures. What is important is that those cultural resources be used for the development of a people’s own identity and roots, rather than for their suppression and/or substitution by alien cultures.

Hence, in its situation of desiccating abstraction and hyperrationalization, Western cultures might well look to the cultures, for example, of Latin America and Africa for their living experience of community with its spontaneity and original joy and to India for its exalted sense of being. Conversely, some in those places might wish to look to the West not only for technical implementation, but for its related Enlightenment ideals of democracy and for its longer philosophical and theological tradition of grappling with issues of alienation, which industrial and urban displacement is now exacerbating in those regions.

Some see this illustrated in Chinese culture. There the Confucian tradition puts great stress on the dual sense of duty and obligation, rooted in a sense of the goodness of human and the hope of having the perfect leader whom all should follow. This is balanced by Taoism which provides an attitude of joy regarding both life and death, to the extent of seeing no real difference between the two. Its playful attitude can be seen as freeing one’s creativity.

Today these attitudes face new problems. Confucian duty can be manipulated into subservience to a bureaucratic absolutism, and for the young and inexperienced the rich, Taoist sense of play can often degenerate into responding to life simply in terms of what is considered fun. Even if one were to find richer and more positive roots in the integrating experience of infancy or in the interpersonal relations of family and small groups, would these roots to provide sufficiently strong foundations for the claims of human dignity today in the face of political, economic and informational forces of alienation?

It is here that the religious grounding of the many cultures provides the needed basis for the human person and for his or her dignity and rights. These need to be grounded not merely in the fallible and self-centered will of the collective, but in infinite and all-perfect being, freedom and love. Beyond original joy, God is love – and for the Hindus, it is Bliss (Anadnda).

Further, Christianity’s recognition of evil, and hence, its conception of resurrection as anticipation of new and higher life, provides not simply stable values, but the diachronic vision for continued struggle. It does this not merely in terms of the dynamics of material forces, but with the founded hope of success that enlivens truly human creativity, sacrifice and success in the face of great difficulties.

This could explain the very rapid development of Christianity today in, for example, Africa and Korea. Coming to a point in the life of their people where new and more complex problems are being faced, there is need for a correspondingly complex, sophisticated and richly nuanced, religious vision. Such a vision cannot substitute for the personal experience of original joy, but it can be important in working out the way in which this can be lived in more complex times: when
evil has new powers, the watch must be more alert and the weapons more elaborate. In this sense, Christianity has come in our days to describe itself more correctly not in the latter trappings of imperial power, but in its original form as a leaven, enabling all cultures to live their original joy by continually confronting the reality of evil and rising to new life.

**Dialogue IV. The Role of Imagination in Religion**

*Imagination and the Religious Quest*

Theological studies have taken different orientations in the last century. The first was critical history which looked for the sources of the text. These lay behind the scriptural text, and one attempted to reconstruct that history. In a similar manner, critical history sought to reconstruct the past history of Christianity. The second and more recent orientation focuses upon the text but is oriented toward what might be seen as in front of the text. It interprets this in the light of the text in order to constitute a narrative which shapes the reality to come. Thus, if the text speaks of the Kingdom of God, then it would be the task of the imagination to understand and interpret my life, history and the world as a whole in a manner which evolves my story in a new way as part of that kingdom.

Another major scriptural theme is that of holiness. The new task is not merely to understand what came before that text and thence to define its meaning, nor is it to proceed theologically in an a priori manner to deduce its meaning from other theological notions. Rather, the task is to work out what holiness is to mean for me in my life and times.

This could be exemplified through the development of these texts at the time of the writing of the New Testament. At that point the world of the Old Testament was breaking up under the impact of the Roman Empire; the new world of the diaspora was opening before them. “Being religious” had to mean something new in these new circumstances; it was the task of the imagination to work out what that new meaning would be. To plot, survey, engineer and construct the path ahead was a radically new task which would test the imaginative and creative genius of humankind.

When one speaks of the radically new, one need not necessarily or even primarily mean simple substitution or dislocation. To destroy all the build anew is too simple and simplistic a solution. As with urban renewal, an approach which totally clears a space and rebuilds results in something homogeneous and bland when compared to renewal that preserves the different characteristics of the terrain, both natural and human made, and evolves all in a new and rich harmony. This would appear to be the reality of the Judeo-Christian experience. By integrating earlier scriptures and the long history of God’s providence with his chosen people, the New Testament achieved its great depth of meaning and rich resonance.

Something decisively new is taking place as these earlier elements are reordered and newly interpreted in terms of new dispensation of God’s providence in sending His own Son into time for our redemption. There is a new sense of the person, of freedom and of responsibility. Though it took centuries and even millennia for its implications to unfold, the incarnation and redemption have constituted the basic vision for the development of human self-understanding in Christian cultures. This has affected not only their religious self-understanding, but their sense of person and government, and their sense of nature and industry.

In this light, one can understand the fact that today large numbers of persons are taking up Christianity in Africa and South Korea. As they transform their total life in the process of modernization, these new interpersonal relations calmly evoke the deeper sense of person and
community which originally undergird their developments and constituted their natural basis. Older tribal or communitarian foundations are no longer sufficient; people are led quite naturally to enrich their earlier traditions with new elements from Christianity. This is not a matter of foreign imposition, but an integrating factor in their free transformation of our lives.

In this it will be important to face two issues. The first is the tendency to think of culture in national terms and of religion in individual terms. This would appear to reflect the individualism and fideism especially characteristic of Anglo-Saxon cultures according to which it is the individual that is real and relations to others and religion are simply matters of the heart. One needs to enlarge this vision in order to understand the person in his or her fully communitarian dimensions, not to mention as a denizen of the cosmos. Further, one needs to understand faith not simply as a matter of the heart, but as our integrating commitment before God and, hence, before all his creatures as the basic formative factor for our life with others in this world.

For this reason it is the basis of our culture and is shaped by the creativity of our imagination as a people. This points to a number of subissues. If our capacity to communicate has been intensified, how is it that people find themselves so isolated? Could it be that the modes of mass communication do not correspond to the level of our personal enjoyment and free commitment? If so, the illusion of free interchange of meaning—when in fact this is but information or entertainment—leaves us only partially alive and radically without meaningful interchange with others.

In this light, one might also reconsider the Kantian axiom that the higher the ethic, the more universal its laws. This leads some to reject norms or their formulations which are particular to a people in favor of formulations which apply indifferently to all. Unfortunately, this can tend to direct people’s attention away from the wealth of experience and creativity developed over the centuries as being somehow unworthy of the person in these more highly rationalized times.

As a result the emphasis shifts from passionate commitment to cerebral understanding, from real to notional assent, from the rich and subtle forms of interchange of a people to less responsive and more formal or legal structures of human action. In these days of ever greater interaction, we need to be able to take account of the deep significance of the modalities of each culture in order that the pattern of world communication be a full and free engagement of all, rather than a standardizing abstract rationalization.

This is important for comprehending the ever increasing interest in Christianity in Africa and Asia. It is important that the sense of incarnation, redemption and resurrection integral to the Christian message and the resulting evolution of the sense of personal freedom in private and public life do not substitute or constitute additions overlaid upon the African and Asian cultures. Rather, in the terms of the Gospels, they come as leaven which evokes the corresponding factors in those unique cultures to their own proper development for these new times.

Religious Growth and the Imagination

Growth in our awareness of the psychological dynamics at work in the development of a person makes it possible to chart some understanding of the sense of the divine in one’s life. This can be related to one’s earliest experiences in infancy as the primary caregiver inspires a sense of openness and trust, rather than of defensiveness which, in turn, would engender a tendency to manipulation.

Psychologically, the limitation of the caregiver in conjunction with this sense of trust directs one to a point of unlimited perfection. The form of this needs to be filled in from the qualities of
the persons one encounters or the cultural vision supplied in stories, fables, pictures, etc. From all of this, the child is called upon imaginatively to construct his or her own image of God.

This process probably is not unilinear and continuous. Radical shifts are possible at transforming moments which consist primarily in leaps of the imagination when our prior worldview breaks down and we engender whole new ways of looking at life. Fowler’s stages of religious development suggest a certain progression in which this might take place as a process of imaging the ultimate context or environment in which we live and engage socially with others.

This would place our faith development as foundational. The degree to which we trust determines the way in which we live with others; our internal world shapes our morality. The moral imagination in developing symbols and models for life plays a key role in mediating these two. It articulates our more basic attitudes of sympathy and concern; this reflects the Biblical stories but in ways that are properly our own. This indeed is to create our personal story.

The fact that each one’s image of God is not simply received but imaginatively constructed suggests the importance of a number of factors. The first is that it is crucial to generate a sense of trust in the infant: for this, care in the first stage of life is centrally important. Continuous with this is the importance in the family of example of fully open, unstinting and unconditional love. In immediate, comprehensible and deeply sensed ways, this mirrors or points to the transcendent absolute love that is God.

Second, having introduced the personal psychological dynamics of the child, it becomes possible to see how this could become confused or disoriented during the many unsettling transitions through which the child must pass during his or her development. This sheds light on the roles of education and counseling. Education will not consist so much in providing the child with an image of God as in suggesting through images and stories materials with which the child can construct his or her own image of God and of his or her relations thereto. In the fact of psychological tensions which can disrupt or disorient this process, it can be expected that the child may need personal attention and counseling by someone who is professionally alert to the problems that can arise or to the possibilities which can be opened.

Thirdly, it is essential not to confuse the psychological dynamics with the content of the religious vision; that is, there is need to avoid a psychological reductionism. Just as the process of measuring and charting a reef is not the same as constructing one, to an even greater degree our process of imaging God does not constitute but reveals him. It is crucial in these matters to remember that God is precisely the transcendent to whom we can relate, but which we cannot manipulate or shape: it is not we who first loved Him, but He who first loved us. If this is not clear then we are speaking not about God and religion, but about ourselves only. Thus, the growth of our relation to God is not identical to, but only isomorphic with, the psychological dynamics which we can trace in our personal growth.

Religious Growth: Transcending the Imagination

This is brought out with great clarity in the Hindu religious vision. The ground of all reality is the one Absolute whose life is Bliss (Ananda). This is not constituted by us; rather, the realization of our life must be in terms of this Bliss. In this light, the psychological process of growth is not one of constituting a distinctive reality after the manner of an Aristotelian substance as autos or of Freudian ego. Quite the contrary, it is through sacrifice and renunciation, that is, precisely as cessation of insistence upon our separateness that we are able to live ever more fully in the One and, hence, realize that Bliss which is existence and truth. The road to this might be one
of developing consciousness or unfolding love, but it leads not to developing but to dissolving the
ego in order that the Absolute Self might be all in all.

This suggests a new and deeper sense of many points of current concern. Social concern with
alienation and exploitation need to be more deeply and correctly understood than at present. Now
they appear as contrasting sides of the same false coin made of a focus upon oneself in contrast to
all others and an understanding of that self in terms of the things one produces and possesses.
When these are withheld, one is alienated from one’s very self and exploited by others. A solution
to this can come not from simply shifting possessions from one greedy and possessive class to
another, but only from a deep change of vision and of heart. This is a change from possessiveness
to renunciation, from myself against all others to an open sense of self in which all are one, and
from single-minded pursuit of profit to concern that physical goods be made to serve all peoples.
This implies a shift from class revolutions to renunciation; it looks to religious imagination for the
basis upon which social justice and harmony can be built.

The Role of the Imagination in Religious Ritual

One might distinguish theological and anthropological approaches to this issue. The former is
centered with the world behind the text: what the ceremony is supposed to do or accomplish.
This is very important in Christian ritual which is built upon the incarnation and, hence, upon the
introduction of a fully transcendent divine Person into time. As this can be done only by God
Himself, the rituals must be traced in some way to Christ rather than to the Christian community
alone, and proportionately to the Christian community as the Body of Christ in time rather than to
the individual alone or to one’s subjective feelings. In this context, special attention is given to the
realization of the ritual after the manner of the prescriptions as derived from some transcending
source.

It would, of course, be an exaggeration to attend to the commonly prescribed ritual factors
alone, with no attention to the elements of personal involvement. Indeed, in other Christian
sacramental circumstances, such as marriage and the sacrament of reconciliation, the lack of such
personal engagement would simply nullify the sacrament. Hence, in the Christian Eucharist the
element of subjectivity would appear not so much to be absent or indifferent as overshadowed by
the transubstantiation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ Himself.

In this regard an anthropological comparison to the Iroquois ceremony of thanksgiving is
helpful in bringing out very important dimensions of religion as human action. First of all, the
overall context and intent of the ceremony is to give thanks not merely as a single event intersecting
time, but as expressing the whole of life as a process of thanksgiving. The Iroquois come together
in order, not merely to give thanks in a separate act, but to remind each other that they need to be
thankful, to live thankfully. In this regard, the wording is important. Its mode is that of a
performative: it carries out what it is describing. Its grammatical form expresses continuing action:
not merely “we thank you for it,” but “we are thanking you for it.”

It is as if time itself was stopped in order that the meaning of life which is lived through time
might emerge. Hence, during the days of the ceremony no other activities of any real importance
take place. Everything stops for this act, which is not a matter of doing or saying things but of
symbolizing, expressing or freeing the possibilities of life, which itself is the mystery.

Beneath its words and actions, the ceremony is set in the lives of the people as regulating and
expressing feelings which must be there beforehand. Hence, the words need not be carefully or
even quite completely said. What is important is that the ritual leader come from the people, that
in the ritual event he or she express their real feelings, and that thereby the time between the events be defined. The ceremony is then an expression of the deep sentiments and beliefs of the group as a whole.

What should this be called? Some would speak of a collective unconscious, but it may not be quite appropriate to call it unconscious if in fact it is the root inspiration and orientation of the whole conscious life. Indeed, belief might be a better term if this implies not arbitrariness but commitment. In that light the term collective also needs interpretation, for if it were to mean the impersonal character of contemporary ideologies, then it would not express the intensive sense of community experienced in the tribe. Perhaps the use of the term collective unconscious in this context reflects more on an individualistic empiricism on the part of the one who employs the term, rather than on the character of the foundational commitment of participants in tribal life.

The same may be true of descriptions of the events in terms of the power of mass suggestion. Totalitarian efforts at mind control do not enliven one’s freedom but deaden it. This is quite different from the days of peacefully and joyously entering into themselves for the thanksgiving ceremony in which people reaffirm their basic sensibilities and commitments.

The people of India have a rich tradition in this regard to which they have given the most sedulous attention. They are very conscious of the ability to open different levels of the psyche within and even above us, the great power that this generates and its ability to overcome great obstacles. At the same time, they distinguish such engagements which perfect human from destructive and even pathological engagements. The same can be said of much simpler cults developed in various parts of the world. Most are created by simple people; though some more sophisticated groups are engaged in others. They differ from folk religion in that they are not simply imaginative modes of expressing religious feelings, namely, those which relate human to the transcendent as such. Rather, they are attempts to manipulate higher powers in the service of humankind, often for good – but at times even for evil – purposes.

Certainly all that human puts one’s head can be done well or poorly, and self-seeking can pervert even religious activities. But one cannot for that reason cease any and all human activities. What is important in religious ceremonies is that they open us as human persons beyond ourselves toward that which transcends us, that they set our life in a context not of myopic selfishness and viciousness toward others, but of unity and brotherhood, truth and justice, love and reconciliation. In searching for God, religion is a search for the high meaning of human life.

In our rationalized and graphic urban society, there is a danger that we may lose the creativity of the religious imagination which was shown by those who lived more consciously in a symbol system. In one sense, this corresponds to a certain sense of pluralism, i.e., a willingness to allow all to have their own traditions and to learn from them. On the other hand, there may be some danger that this will reflect less on a positive evaluation of others than on a lessening of seriousness about deeper dimensions of meaning. If our religious experiences are our peak experiences and if these are specific to our religion, then what evolves in these must be radically important and make a difference. On this basis, hermeneutics would suggest that, rather than a lessening of sensitivity to one’s own tradition, thereby giving access to others, it is just the opposite: it is when we are more fully aware of what we are and on what basis we exist that we can hope to appreciate the importance and the nature of the horizons of others.

*Literature and the Search for the Absolute*
From the time of Adam, through Milton’s Paradise Lost, to Sartre’s analysis of basic human dynamics, it has been observed wisely that human wants to be God. The thrust of transcendency by which humankind pushes beyond the level of brute animals, reaches out toward others and attempts to direct the universe bespeaks a deep-seated drive of spirit which can be truly fulfilled only in divine life itself. This is the power and the glory of humankind.

Paradoxically, it can also become a human weakness and even its squalor. French intellectuals have always been particularly sensitive to this fact. For them, power implies a reach for control and thereby a threat of oppression. This has been not only a fictive juxtaposition of the mind, but the bitter experience of the repeated subversion by kings, emperors and fuhrers of attempts to live the ideals of freedom. The French have experienced this twice in this century in the form of Germany occupation; for them it is symbolized by the holocaust.

This has largely controlled discussion in French intellectual circles, which it has directed somewhat compulsively toward the confrontation of a distinctive issue of modern life. Elsewhere the growth of material affluence and consumerism may have so dissipated the drive toward transcendence that the issue is how this thrust can be recaptured and reaffirmed. In France, on the contrary, there has been a special fear that this urge will so fascinate humankind as to generate oppression and the ultimate suppression of all that is truly human. The situation is extremely delicate and volatile, even explosive; the very realization of the life of people precisely as human depends upon its adequate resolution.

Three routes have been attempted. The first is that of Heidegger: much contemporary debate on this issue is carried out in terms of interpreting and/or reinterpreting his attempt to direct attention to being itself, rather than to beings. If metaphysics is regarded, as in Hegel, as a comprehensive system of beings, then this shift of its goal by Heidegger would constitute a rejection of metaphysics. If however, if it is taken as a search to uncover being itself, then Heidegger’s work is a new and important continuation of the metaphysical quest. For our question, it is more important to ask not about the nature of the shift but about its purpose: what was he attempting to do? Was his shift from beings to being an attempt to break the fascination of the human mind with beings and their structures? Concretely was it an effort to free the mind from the fascist and Marxist structures of power experienced so bitterly in this century? Though some would see it in this light, they are concerned that Heidegger tarried too long with the fascination, that the structures of National Socialism could constitute a new and decent order. Indeed they fear that for those who inadequately differentiate being and beings, the recognition of an absolute character for the former provides a basis for the absolutization of the latter. They worry lest the enthusiastic attention given to Heidegger by those redeveloping the notion of the person in the period since World War II become the basis of a renewed fascism, a new Nietzschean nightmare.

As a result a second deconstructionist route has been undertaken which in part attempts to remove any hold on being, even for the person in society. One should, it suggests, abandon the search for meaning and ideals begun with Socrates and Plato and turn rather to a Democratian chance interplay of atoms. In this human is no longer the constructor of one’s physical or social cosmos, but a single thrust of self-affirmation and/or self-preservation in a chaotic universe. This is the prototypical reductionism in which all is derivative from a single set of minimal particles. The person who recognizes no absolutes, it is thought, can do no harm.

But could the opposites not be even more true? The one who refuses to recognize any transcendent and attempts to suppress the thrust thereto would appear to be denying that which always has been considered essential to the person: such a depersonalization of life could not but be the greatest violence to the person. Further, if there is but an atomistic interplay of forces then
life is essentially marked by violence, and only force makes right. In this manner the classical French fear that power oppresses would be realized in fact.

In the face of fascism some French writers such as Gaston Bataille earlier followed a third route. Fearing the demonic attraction of the ego to draw all to itself and constitute what has been referred to as an *ipsis*, a primary self, lording it over others, their response was to put things in words in order to renounce the tendency to exclusiveness and domination. This has similarities to such mystics as John of the Cross who passed through personal self-negation (the dark night of the soul) to a new liberation and freedom. For them unity was radical questioning of all that constituted any finite reality as absolute and thereby stunted the free expansion of being.

This echoes some essential elements of Hindu—especially Advaitin—thought of which according to the Gita stresses the need for renunciation in action. This is not a cessation of action, but a recognition that one must look beyond the particular beings or structures to the Fullness of Being, which should be reflected through the unity and harmony of all. In this one hears also echoes of Confucius.

Further, if it is important to bring all into a harmony that reflects the absolute, then a purely negative stance toward the transcendence may not be enough. (In the classical sense, the *via negative* without the *via affirmative* has neither foundation nor meaning.) Recognition of a Transcendent that can free human from enslavement to anything limited and limiting requires not only the negation of limitation, but the affirmation of positive perfection. The challenge is to be able to make this affirmation without the supreme presumption of pretending to be or to control the Absolute. This combination of affirmation and negation—or affirmation in humility—is called adoration.

**Dialogue V. The Imagination in Social Life**

*Values and the Political Image*

In *The American Presidency* Phillip Rossiter identifies six roles of the American Presidency: chief of state, chief of government, commander-in-chief, chief diplomat, chief legislator and chief of party. However, in assessing the performance of individual presidents and in evaluating each role separately, the degree of success of a popularity. President Reagan’s relatively poor performance in four of these roles, for example, is overshadowed by his very high overall popularity, and something similar could be said of President Kennedy. This directs attention to another, deeper level in order to comprehend the place of the American president in the life of the people.

The millennia of emperors and kings provided no examples of presidency. That was a typical part of the enlightenment vision of political power, emerging from the people and being invested in a person chosen to lead according to a founding constitution. It was the serendipitous fulfilment of the sense of providential mission which inspired the minds and hearts of the original settlers who left Europe in search of new social, economic and religious freedoms. George Washington exemplified the idea quite well and expressed these aspiration of the people in the words of his public, inaugural and farewell addresses as the First President and Commander-in-Chief. Ever after, the president would be not merely the chief of government, but the chief priest of American civil religion.

Thus, though Americans may be aware of serious failures in the execution of some or even most particular roles, that is, in what a president does, nonetheless, they may approve highly of a
president with a strong sense of who he is, of the identity of the country he embodies and expresses, and hence, who is successful in evoking the cohesion, commitment and energy of the people. The president must give meaning and hope to life, for it is he who moves and binds together the nation.

This directs our attention to a number of important roles played by imagination in democratic leadership. These might be surveyed in terms of the dictum that “myths are dreams fulfilled in our aspirations.” First, political power in a democracy might be seen above all as “myth.” Democracy is not formulated simply of irrational material or economic forces or is the imposition of an imperial will upon the people. It is, rather, what the people create by their ability to communicate and cooperate in delineating the exercise of the power they possess as a community and which they invest in the presidency. The president then is more than a scientific formula, for it is not a matter of merely automatic, predefined actions or responses. Rather it is the embodiment of the freedom of a people which can be exercised only in ever new and imaginative ways. But the president remains the creation of the people and, hence, at times experiences with amazement not only the power, but also the limitations of the office as this is shaped politically by the people.

Secondly, to say that myths are “dreams” bespeaks also of the transcendence of the presidency over present concrete reality and even over the cumulation of historical events. For this transcendence, the president must look back both to the Biblical imagery which shaped the self-identity and sense of mission of the original settlers and to the religious bases of the rights and aspirations of the people (the God-given character of the rights of “life, liberty and pursuit of happiness”) as articulated in the founding documents of the country. But the president must look forward as well; he/she must envisage new ways of responding in times of danger and of progressing in times of peace. Thus, the office of president has increasingly assumed the role of “chief architect” of the nation. At times of celebration and crises, the president is expected to unfold the meaning of the American dream in ever new and imaginative ways.

Thirdly, if myths are fulfilled in the “aspirations” of the people, then mere expressions of reason and understanding will not suffice; will and passion, also are required. Thus, the president must be able to express, inspire and enliven the people with the power of the dream. He must be able to move them beyond the selfish concerns which shatter a people into warring factions and open up inclusive concerns for neighbors in ever broader terms which reach beyond “me” and “my group” to others I the broader society and, indeed to other peoples of the world. The religious rootedness of the culture in God as Father of all can provide an essential basis for this. But the challenge for a people is to live up to the implications of such foundations, embracing them in heart as well as in mind, that is, as values in terms of which the nation’s life will be lived. Here. The president serves both as “priest” and as “prophet,” giving voice to the best that is in the heart of the culture and evoking the response of goodwill.

If this is the character of political leadership, then it must be asked whether politics, as a science carried out in terms of a liberal or socialist ideology, has the necessary dimensions to appreciate the role of the presidency: to paraphrase, could the presidency be too important to be left to political science?

On the other hand, it might be feared that this factor of myth might distract one from reality, thereby, resulting in losing touch with real needs and not assiduously working on the concrete tasks that must be accomplished. This, indeed, was a main reason proposed by William James in his opening lecture on Pragmatism in Faneuil Hall at the turn of the century. Worse still, can myth develop aspirations greater than can ever be fulfilled and, hence, in time inevitably undermine political leadership? Must then one lose one’s identity in order to progress, or can the converse be true?
In approaching the issue it should be noted that even people who were damaged economically by President Reagan’s policies responded enthusiastically to him for giving voice to their identity and values. This suggests that the life of a people, precisely as free, consists above all in its sense of identity and its aspirations. They are not — and they deeply fear becoming or being treated as — the product of unconscious market or power mechanisms; as a free people their primary engagement is the direction of their freedom. Their myths could be good and helpful, even if not fully lived up to; they could be good, but subject to manipulation; or they could be good, but not good enough. The history of a people might be said to consist primarily in the process of imaginatively shaping myths by which they are moved to shape their physical, social and economic environments and according to which they measure their success.

Hence, a people’s myth should not be considered only synchronously as something which always has been or which develops merely cumulatively. The work of political leadership in acting out the myth of the roots of a people is crucial to the stability of its identity and for the development of the institutions and values by which they live. In addition, their myths must inspire the diachronic factors of adaptation, change and progress. The presidency must apply the myth in new ways and create new myths or sanction them in the name of the people so that the people can adjust in times of rapid change. Here, imagination plays the central role.

Perhaps the key to the presidency lies in the relation between a nation’s myth(s) and its executive power. Is it healthy to identify in the same person both the myth and political power? Constitutional monarchies separate the two, leaving the symbolic functions to a queen or king and vesting the executive powers in a prime minister. As a result, the mythical level of basic national allegiances is not involved in the daily running of the country. The question is complex with many factors militating in both directions. It would appear to be up to the genius of a free people to work this out in their own way. Their solution, in turn, becomes part of the culture of that people. It is their gift to subsequent generations and can be drawn upon by other peoples to the degree that they find this helpful in their own process of nation building.

In any case, a people must avoid twin extremes. One is the degeneration of the national myth into a shallow caricature. For example, the rugged individualism which made it possible to conquer the American West must not be allowed to be manipulated either by oneself or by others into a selfish individualism that justifies a lack of care for, or even vicious attacks upon, others. Such struggles between good and evil must be fought continually and won within every person and people.

In this information age, the powerful tools of mass communication and manipulation make the task of interpreting national myth an increasingly constant preoccupation of a people, as can be seen in the efforts to form a national approach to abortion. This process of relating this to such basic national values as freedom (of “choice”) and human “rights” is not left only to the Supreme Court; the perceptions of the Court are prepared by the intensive efforts to shape the perceptions of the people. It is here that the mind and heart of a people is forged.

At the other extreme is the development of political power divorced from the myth and of the values of the people convened thereby. This subjects a people simply to the arbitrary will of the person or group that wields power or to the still less personal forces of market of military balance. This, too, has been the terrible experience of our times. The effort of peoples in all regions to free themselves from this oppression is the central human struggle of our times.

Does this mean that we are now more oppressed or more aware of freedom? Could it be that in the new information age both of these can be true and that the combination makes the work of the imagination simultaneously more possible, more difficult, more crucially needed and more
potentially rewarding? If so, it is the “high stakes” game of our times. In this light, avoiding the extremes, power is wedded to values and human goals; and values can be formed by power in order for those goals to be truly realized; this is the work of a free people in our day.

Imagination, Myth Making and the Evolution of Revolutions

The process of socio-political evolution manifests three major stages according principally to the mode of production, that is, to the systemic unity of productive forces and relations of production. These three stages are: the agricultural which has long been established and in many places already is past; the industrial which is still being developed in some places while in others it already is passing away; and the information stage which is now beginning. Because the forces of production cannot account for all the dynamics of the social realm, Marx distinguished between the basis and the superstructure, which include culture, opinion, information and education. These latter emerge as the seat of power or domination in the information age.

In any one of these three stages, the mode of production can be either democratic or despotic. Things become unbalanced when one sector in the relations of production gains so much power, size or preeminence that it interferes with the forces of production (e.g., if the military sector becomes too large it can unduly reduce the work force and restrict production). The emergence and finally the domination of one group over the others appears to be a natural process which intensifies gradually until it spawns a revolution. Unfortunately, however, as the new equalization or equilibrium also is subject to the same dynamics a new dominant group develops and a new revolution becomes necessary, and so on and on.

By applying the principle that ontogeny follows phylogeny it is possible to understand and respond to the mechanism of this process in greater detail. The principles mean that any subsequent stage includes as well the negation which characterized the earlier stage, which in turn includes the negation of its predecessor, et., A revolutionary history becomes also an analytic chart for understanding the present dynamics, the steps which must occur and how one can best react thereto. Thus, in analyzing present socialist regimes one is able to find the remnants of the absolutization of the leader which had characterized the level of slavery, as well as the absolute dominion over the means of production by the administrative class which had characterized the feudal state.

Can one hope for a change from such a bureaucratic absolutism in the new information age? Reason can be cited both for and against. On the one hand, hope can be found in the very nature of information and technology. Because information is located on the level of superstructure (which some would consider to be not matter, but spirit), it is not subject to being absolutely and exclusively possessed and, hence, to being exercised in an arbitrary manner. Indeed in an information and technological age, the effects of wrong decisions are more penetrating, immediate and widespread (not to discount the tens of millions who have been killed by the implications of such military and political power). In a work of large populations, sophisticated technology and complex structures, misguided economic, productive, environmental and even educational decisions soon become manifest and call urgently for redress. In this way the arbitrariness of leaders is circumscribed, for they must share their power with others inasmuch as the technical capabilities of teams of specialists are required for proper decision making.

In contrast to the industrial age which concentrated capital and, therefore, power in the hands of a very few, in the information age power is intellectual and, hence, inherently social. As a closed society cannot but fall behind in a technological era, the need to introduce communications
technology is itself liberating. Thus, survival and the socialization of information have become so
linked as to impose the latter even upon the unwilling.

On the other hand, though the industrial revolution had the equalizing effect of breaking down
class barriers, it did not really empower the workers, but reduced them to an undifferentiated mass
under an absolute leader and a faceless, bureaucratic apparatus. The myth of the absolute leader
was created, regarding whom no criticism was allowed. By eliminating all negative feedback, this
created a cybernetic blindness in which the system could not but lose its way. Worse still, the
minds of the people were positively manipulated by this blind leadership, thereby assuring that the
disorientation of the nation would be total. In this situation groups lost their identity and all shared
in false consciousness. The result was to bring out the worst in people, to generate such
disillusionment that they came to resist any positive input regarding socially oriented steps, and to
consider their vote as a mechanical process with no relation to a personal and, hence, a free
decision. The budding democratic hopes were soon extinguished.

In addition, the technology of this information age proved to be a powerful tool for
manipulating the minds of peoples. The image makers fashion the new leaders, from the words
they utter to the way in which their hair is combed. These creators of images are few and can be
paid and empowered by even fewer. Finally, the difference in native intellectual capacity and its
selective development through education and ideology assures that power in an information age
will remain structure, selective and highly oriented. Despite the extensiveness of education, the
truly directive class will remain a small elite. Indeed, we are in danger of being subjected not only
to another bureaucratic elite, but to one with even more inescapable and intrusive power – the
haunting image is that of George Orwell’s “1948.” If mythomania already exists, one trembles to
imagine what it can become with the burgeoning capabilities of the information age.

This pathology could have multiple levels. For Eastern Europe, some would relate it
historically to the aristocratic traditions distinctive of the Russian people. If this be so, then the
emergence of the other ethnic groups in the USSR could be seen as a source of socializing cultural
elements and, hence, a promising corrective force. Others would suggest that the pathology is
characteristic of socialism understood as a system which places society before person. In this light,
socialism would be inherently antidemocratic (and commonly restricting free speech, free
association and free market) and at times despotic. This view would reject any prospect of a
convergence of socialism with liberal democracy.

Still others would consider the pathology of absolute power to be more subtle and widespread,
citing its presence as well in the oligarchies of Latin America and in the combined financial and
political power of multinational businesses. When this is traced more deeply into the ideologies of
power, claims begin to appear hidden under validity claims, and ideology is seen to constitute an
inescapable cognitive loop within which all human effort to change reality is blunted, assimilated
and dissipated. An ideology may eliminate its critics or make minor adjustments, but always in
terms of preserving its identity and that of its power structure.

Finally, some would ask whether treating the question on the structural level may not be
insufficient or even harmful. Historically, it would seem that the desire to change structures has
always resulted in a new form of despotism. This may suggest that human freedom is on a different
level from formal structures. If so, it could be understood that attempts to heal the cooperative or
social exercise of human freedom solely through structural reorganization may be doomed to
frustration, if not disaster. If structures taken in isolation are alienating, then the dilemma becomes
how to institutionalize deinstitutionalization and how to do this over and over again until it is
recognized that such works of technical reason are simply inappropriate because they are manipulative and antifree.

Indeed, the information age is just the situation in which Habermas’ work begins, namely, a society awash in information, subject to technical reason and, hence, to manipulation. He works toward a participational process for working out a free social order. Gadamer would carry this process even further by looking into tradition for the values according to which such work could be directed and judged and for the shared social commitments which would give the inspiration, hopes and goals in terms of which it might be undertaken.

In this light, we come to see the need to imagine new nonmanipulative forms of social life in which the members are true participants whom the leadership accompanies rather than direct. The Biblical imagery of shepherd and of leaven remerge, with both ancient and modern meaning. Myth and imagination becomes particularly important in enabling us to integrate past elements and envisage an alternate future.

Thus, while some myths may set boundaries which restrict and manipulate, others can serve precisely to take us beyond past limitations. Durkheim did a typology of myth according to social forms, and in In Religion as Cultural System Clifford Geertz has described ways in which religion can serve as a model not only of, but for, society.

If the process of myth and symbol making is a work of human creativity, this does not mean, however, that it is not grounded in reality or that it is any less necessary for free social life. Some would point out that the inviolable dignity of the person and the appropriateness of correspondingly unrestricted care and concern by others is as primary as a mother’s care of her infant and as primordial as tribal life. These basic truths are never distant or unknown. Each person elaborates them according to their own experience and creativity in national symbols and religious myths. Their strength has borne up peoples such as the Jews and Poles, by which they have been able to survive for centuries despite the full weight of aggressive, human oppression. If freedom could be eliminated by an administrative absolutism, this would have taken place long ago. If it cannot be, then it may hold the power to humanize the structures -- but only if we have the imagination to wield it creatively.

The Evolution of Revolutions: The African Experience

Three factors appear important here: the nature and role of ideology, the nature of revolutions and the role of socialism as a means of change. Ideology is a discourse which directs political life toward particular objectives. In order to calculate clearly in this field, one needs to focus not only on ideals but also on criteria. One’s sense of ideology would consider it to be a reductionist univocal and, hence, destructive of freedom and creativity. Other senses would be more open. To speak of democratic socialism as an ideology would be precisely to emphasize the openness of the political horizon to multiple views and free innovation so that all views can be presented and can compete for public adherence and support.

The term revolution has many meanings. As with all human affairs, it can be banalized, romantic posturing and/or employed in manipulating populations. Basically, however, it expresses liberation from various forms of domination both from without and within, whether slave owners, monarchical, colonial, capitalist or totalitarian of the left or the right. Two major problems arise with regard to any such great change. One problem is that in the novelty of the resulting situation, with its implied lack of traditions for shaping people’s tolerances and for inspiring social generosity, some might manipulate the public order to the advantage of a special group, thereby
creating a new tyranny. The other problem is that the revolution might simply respond to the pressures of the previous regime, leading to its destruction, but without the conditions, the vision or the means for developing a viable successor. This could introduce a level of instability or even of anarchy which would render impossible any progress or even the maintenance of the population.

From this it follows that prior to change – a fortiori prior to a change so basic as to be called a revolution – it is necessary to have a plan or vision in the second and open sense of the term ideology above. As components, this should improve upon the discoveries and developments of modern times. Hence, it would be unrealistic to think of a modern state without the operation of a capital market, permitted to operate freely in order to integrate the personal initiative and creativity of all sectors of its population.

In addition, it should integrate also the modern contribution of socialism. In Africa this has many models, ranging from systems in which power and ideas grow out of the village level up to other systems compared to others directed from the top down, i.e., from the technologists of the central governing elite to the people. The range of socialism, however, seems to share two factors: first, socialism is common seen as a program for rapid economic and social development; secondly, it is seen as more morally and humanistically sensitive than the materially oriented concerns of capitalism.

Taken in this broad sense, socialism transcends materialism and even the nature of a socio-political or economic system. This may make it possible to overcome the seeming contradiction of capitalism and socialism when the latter depends upon public ownership. Socialism becomes, instead, a matter of human consciousness. In view of this, the imagination may be able to develop symbols and myths which enable it imaginatively to reorder such components of our situation as capitalism and socialism and to project new goals, values and structures. This is the basis and prerequisite of any revolution that gives hope of success.

Who will do the planning? Some would turn toward the government as the sole instrumentality which represents all the people. But that points to a crucial contemporary problem, namely, that the exercise of power by governments often is carried out in selfish terms which are insensitive to the concerns of the disadvantaged. In an information age, governmental controls can be conducive not to a broader dispersion of power, but to its concentration and even greater intrusion into the redouts of the family and personal psyche.

This would appear to suggest a number of considerations:

1/ The form of government is not indifferent but must have the structures which disperse power and engage ever broader groupings of the people.

2/ This can be revolutionary if it truly transforms the laws of development so that there results not a mere change of management and a new elite, but broader participation by the populace.

3/ For this a people must find in its heritage the sense of solidarity which provides the basis for considering such participation as a desirable goal to be strived for in an effort in which every accomplishment should be celebrated, shared and protected.

How is this sense of solidarity symbolized and acknowledge by a people? Answers to this question will require research into their traditions and cultural heritage. Discovery of the grounding for this and of how it is to be understood in an ever more open, pluralistic and, in that sense, democratic manner is the task of the philosopher and the theologian. How this is to be implemented in socio-economic and political structures which provide the synergies to implement and promote it is the task of our social scientists.
All three are tasks of the creative imagination by which various peoples utilize their freedom in building their cultures. There is much work to do.

*Urban Development in Latin America*

In Peru during the last eight years, a massive shift has taken place from the countryside to the city. This has been due in part to the intensification of guerrilla activity in the rural areas. More pervasively, however, it has been due to the search on the part of families for a richer life in the sense of greater opportunities for employment, education, medicine, etc.

As the urban areas are, by definition, already occupied, the newly arrived population is forced to occupy land in the desert outskirts where they build settlements which require such basic public facilities as water, electricity and drainage. For the most part, however, the settlements are developed by the inhabitants, constructing their own houses and developing common kitchens, workshops, street commerce and urban planning. In this, the resource of community, rooted often in family and/or old village ties, is very important for providing the human context and the solidarity needed to face new difficulties.

The urbanization in Villa El Salvador served as the focus for a study of the role of imagination in this process. Its range is very vast, from providing food and work to urban planning and socio-political organization, indeed, to every facet of life. The present study focused upon the development of housing through neighborhood initiative, adopting traditional materials and techniques and engaging the cooperation of architects and engineers.

The theory behind this project is to begin with the real needs and conditions of the neighborhood and to employ imagination in looking for new solutions. Habermas distinguishes two levels of action. The first is that of technical reason which is concerned not with ends, but with means. Here the technician, as it were, owns the means and dictates the manner of their application. There is a tendency for this reason to absorb or dominate all else, which it proceeds to instrumentalize toward the well-being of its own technical system. In contrast to this is the realm of values and of personal interrelation or communication, the promotion of which is the special concern of the project. Hence, the technical specialist plays a different role, making available to the residents new technical possibilities. It is to empower the people to create their own new ways of solving their housing problem. This is done by developing models which employ and improve traditional materials and techniques for developing living space built around spaces reserved for open plazas and various community buildings which facilitates and implement community interaction.

In some cases, models are designed especially for the residents, living in the area, to make changes. In other cases, the model is constructed of children’s blocks in order to invite and emphasize the resident’s imaginative participation in working out the design. In still other cases, the plans are proposed at group meetings of residents in which the technicians participate as resource persons, assessing and advising on feasibility as the discussion proceeds. The residents participate in the building process itself, particularly in Sunday community or group work. Thus, they feel the community buildings really belong to them, and they learn the techniques through actually doing the work themselves. Moreover, the goal is not merely aimed at efficiency, but promotes the creativity of the group.

Here, the theoretical underpinnings follow Habermas in looking beyond technical and practical rationalities to the realm of human interaction in which the persons, as such, become most
fully alive. In facing the real and very serious problems of building an exterior, living environment, the interchange itself among the inhabitants is the basis of their properly human life. Their cooperation in working out their solution is not merely the resolution of a problem, but the heart of their personal process of liberation as persons in community.

Similar cases were cited in Venezuela and Brazil. The goal is not to substitute older methods and structures by new, “efficient,” but culturally anonymous and dehumanizing concrete “blocks.” Instead, over a period of decades families gradually rebuild the first shake built by the family on its new plot. Wall by wall, room by room, floor by floor the family living space is solidified, expanded and possibly moved to a second floor, making room for commercial or tenant space below.

In this process the bonds of family and community play an essential role. Building often is a group activity crowned by celebration and fiesta. Indeed, some people prefer to remain in the barrios where they had grow up, feeling more secure and at peace with people they know, rather than to move to newer areas where they feel threatened and ill at ease among strangers.

Internal family structure differs according to cultures. Peoples bring from the countryside firm marriage bonds which tend to be attenuated in later urban generations. Conversely, some other groups move toward greater family stability as their subsequent generations move to urban, middle class status.

Some noted that dynamism manifested in this process as an example of how an increase in numbers as people flocked to the city constituted a crisis situation which makes new quality or new forms of social organization necessary. This survival becomes a motive force; more classically, necessity becomes the mother of invention. Others would consider still other factors to be crucial and even more fundamental. For example, debt can lead indirectly to personal advancement if it enables one to utilize undeveloped capabilities or apply unused skills, but it is important to note that it is the skills, not the debt, which is productive. There is the contrast between the situation of urban migration, such as that in Lima, and the disastrous situation of the refugee camps in, for example, Central America. The difference is not in the quantity of people brought together, but in the utilization of the personal resources of the people. This attention to personal and cultural resources allows one to focus upon and learn a number of important issues, as follows:

1/ How is the work of the imagination carried out which in a matter of weeks enables 40,000 people to gather together in a manner in which they can begin to lay out an urban community with family plots, streets, etc.?

2/ If providing for them in state owned buildings proves alienating and the concept of social property as too abstract to be truly humanizing, then what are the conditions for the development of authentic community facilities? Indeed, what properly is community?

3. The sole positive resources of the urban immigrants are the deep cultural values of sociality that reach beyond mere selfishness in the effort for survival. These bonds often extend over generations back in the villages of origin and broaden to include others in their new neighborhoods. These are the crucial humanizing factors providing positive reassurance, mutual support, identity and communicative opportunities. In turn, they make possible resilient cooperation in providing cooking, health and educational facilities and even basic public utilities.

What then are these bonds? How can these values be promoted? If they favor a life within smaller villages or ethnically based groups, allowing at most coexistence with other groups, this will not suffice for the new pluralistic situation of the modern city. Further, if such ethnically centered values are factors of their self-identity, will not any effort to broaden these sensibilities
be personally destructive and undermine the very sense of community which one wishes to foster? The terms of the problem would seem to suggest that the search for a broader commonality must be sought in and through, rather than in abstracting from, their sense of identity. Some phenomenologists suggest that this can be done by looking at their identity as gifted and, hence, as relating to a common source and goal, that is, regarding their religious roots as simultaneously reinforcing their cultural identity and on its bases evolving distinctive senses of respect, love and concern for others. The resulting reinforcement of the right and dignity of all persons and groups also will raise important questions of national social policy which so imbalance the national social order that they reinforce the flight to the city in search for the benefits of modern life.